| d1f04410 | 22-Jan-2021 |
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> |
certs: Add ability to preload revocation certs
Add a new Kconfig option called SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS. If set,
this option should be the filename of a PEM-formated file containing
X.509 certificates
certs: Add ability to preload revocation certs
Add a new Kconfig option called SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS. If set,
this option should be the filename of a PEM-formated file containing
X.509 certificates to be included in the default blacklist keyring.
DH Changes:
- Make the new Kconfig option depend on SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST.
- Fix SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS=n, but CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST=y[1][2].
- Use CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST for extract-cert[3].
- Use CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST for revocation_certificates.o[3].
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e1c15c74-82ce-3a69-44de-a33af9b320ea@infradead.org/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210303034418.106762-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304175030.184131-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200930201508.35113-3-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-4-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428673564.677100.4112098280028451629.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433312452.902181.4146169951896577982.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529606657.163428.3340689182456495390.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
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|
| 2565ca7f | 22-Jan-2021 |
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> |
certs: Move load_system_certificate_list to a common function
Move functionality within load_system_certificate_list to a common
function, so it can be reused in the future.
DH Changes:
- Added in
certs: Move load_system_certificate_list to a common function
Move functionality within load_system_certificate_list to a common
function, so it can be reused in the future.
DH Changes:
- Added inclusion of common.h to common.c (Eric [1]).
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/EDA280F9-F72D-4181-93C7-CDBE95976FF7@oracle.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200930201508.35113-2-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-3-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428672825.677100.7545516389752262918.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433311696.902181.3599366124784670368.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529605850.163428.7786675680201528556.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
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|
| 56c58126 | 22-Jan-2021 |
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> |
certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries
This fixes CVE-2020-26541.
The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now
revoked signatures and keys previously app
certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries
This fixes CVE-2020-26541.
The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now
revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure
Boot enabled. The dbx is capable of containing any number of
EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
entries.
Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are
skipped.
Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring.
Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring
are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected.
[DH: Made the following changes:
- Added to have a config option to enable the facility. This allows a
Kconfig solution to make sure that pkcs7_validate_trust() is
enabled.[1][2]
- Moved the functions out from the middle of the blacklist functions.
- Added kerneldoc comments.]
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200901165143.10295-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # rfc
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200909172736.73003-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200911182230.62266-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v4
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-2-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428672051.677100.11064981943343605138.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433310942.902181.4901864302675874242.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529605075.163428.14625520893961300757.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bc2c24e3-ed68-2521-0bf4-a1f6be4a895d@infradead.org/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225125638.1841436-1-arnd@kernel.org/ [2]
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| a6cb0ab7 | 20-Nov-2020 |
Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> |
certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
Align with the new macros and add appropriate include files.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ho
certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
Align with the new macros and add appropriate include files.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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| 4993e1f9 | 20-Nov-2020 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(),
as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as
KEY_ALL
certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(),
as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as
KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update()
uses it. LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag.
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot
write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash
from it.
Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set
KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key. blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass
this to keyring_alloc().
We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag
manually.
Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current
implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the
blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed.
Fixes: 734114f8782f ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring")
Reported-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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| 84ffbefd | 20-Nov-2020 |
Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> |
certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
When looking for a blacklisted hash, bin2hex() is used to transform a
binary hash to an ascii (lowercase) hexadecimal string. This string is
the
certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
When looking for a blacklisted hash, bin2hex() is used to transform a
binary hash to an ascii (lowercase) hexadecimal string. This string is
then search for in the description of the keys from the blacklist
keyring. When adding a key to the blacklist keyring,
blacklist_vet_description() checks the hash prefix and the hexadecimal
string, but not that this string is lowercase. It is then valid to set
hashes with uppercase hexadecimal, which will be silently ignored by the
kernel.
Add an additional check to blacklist_vet_description() to check that
hexadecimal strings are in lowercase.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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| 2e12256b | 27-Jun-2019 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will als
keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.
============
WHY DO THIS?
============
The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.
For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:
(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.
Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.
As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.
Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.
===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============
The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.
(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
added, removed and replaced in a keyring.
(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is
split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.
(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:
(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
(*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
(*) Group - permitted to the key group
(*) Everyone - permitted to everyone
Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.
Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata
READ Can read the key content
WRITE Can update/modify the key content
SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting
LINK Can make a link to the key
SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry
INVAL Can invalidate
REVOKE Can revoke
JOIN Can join this keyring
CLEAR Can clear this keyring
The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.
The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.
The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.
======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================
To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.
It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.
SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.
The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.
It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.
=======
TESTING
=======
This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the
key.
(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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| 278311e4 | 21-Jan-2019 |
Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com> |
kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
This patch allows the kexec_file_load syscall to verify the PE signed
kernel image signature based on the preboot keys stored in the .p
kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
This patch allows the kexec_file_load syscall to verify the PE signed
kernel image signature based on the preboot keys stored in the .platform
keyring, as fall back, if the signature verification failed due to not
finding the public key in the secondary or builtin keyrings.
This commit adds a VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING similar to previous
VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING indicating that verify_pkcs7_signature
should verify the signature using platform keyring. Also, decrease
the error message log level when verification failed with -ENOKEY,
so that if called tried multiple time with different keyring it
won't generate extra noises.
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> (for kexec_file_load part)
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: tweaked the first paragraph of the patch description,
and fixed checkpatch warning.]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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