Merge tag 'v6.6.64' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6

This is the 6.6.64 stable release

x86/tdx: Dynamically disable SEPT violations from causing #VEs

[ Upstream commit f65aa0ad79fca4ace921da0701644f020129043d ]

Memory access #VEs are hard for Linux to handle in contexts like the
entr

x86/tdx: Dynamically disable SEPT violations from causing #VEs

[ Upstream commit f65aa0ad79fca4ace921da0701644f020129043d ]

Memory access #VEs are hard for Linux to handle in contexts like the
entry code or NMIs. But other OSes need them for functionality.
There's a static (pre-guest-boot) way for a VMM to choose one or the
other. But VMMs don't always know which OS they are booting, so they
choose to deliver those #VEs so the "other" OSes will work. That,
unfortunately has left us in the lurch and exposed to these
hard-to-handle #VEs.

The TDX module has introduced a new feature. Even if the static
configuration is set to "send nasty #VEs", the kernel can dynamically
request that they be disabled. Once they are disabled, access to private
memory that is not in the Mapped state in the Secure-EPT (SEPT) will
result in an exit to the VMM rather than injecting a #VE.

Check if the feature is available and disable SEPT #VE if possible.

If the TD is allowed to disable/enable SEPT #VEs, the ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE
attribute is no longer reliable. It reflects the initial state of the
control for the TD, but it will not be updated if someone (e.g. bootloader)
changes it before the kernel starts. Kernel must check TDCS_TD_CTLS bit to
determine if SEPT #VEs are enabled or disabled.

[ dhansen: remove 'return' at end of function ]

Fixes: 373e715e31bf ("x86/tdx: Panic on bad configs that #VE on "private" memory access")
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241104103803.195705-4-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

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x86/tdx: Rename tdx_parse_tdinfo() to tdx_setup()

[ Upstream commit b064043d9565786b385f85e6436ca5716bbd5552 ]

Rename tdx_parse_tdinfo() to tdx_setup() and move setting NOTIFY_ENABLES
there.

The f

x86/tdx: Rename tdx_parse_tdinfo() to tdx_setup()

[ Upstream commit b064043d9565786b385f85e6436ca5716bbd5552 ]

Rename tdx_parse_tdinfo() to tdx_setup() and move setting NOTIFY_ENABLES
there.

The function will be extended to adjust TD configuration.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241104103803.195705-3-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com
Stable-dep-of: f65aa0ad79fc ("x86/tdx: Dynamically disable SEPT violations from causing #VEs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

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x86/tdx: Introduce wrappers to read and write TD metadata

[ Upstream commit 5081e8fadb809253c911b349b01d87c5b4e3fec5 ]

The TDG_VM_WR TDCALL is used to ask the TDX module to change some
TD-specific

x86/tdx: Introduce wrappers to read and write TD metadata

[ Upstream commit 5081e8fadb809253c911b349b01d87c5b4e3fec5 ]

The TDG_VM_WR TDCALL is used to ask the TDX module to change some
TD-specific VM configuration. There is currently only one user in the
kernel of this TDCALL leaf. More will be added shortly.

Refactor to make way for more users of TDG_VM_WR who will need to modify
other TD configuration values.

Add a wrapper for the TDG_VM_RD TDCALL that requests TD-specific
metadata from the TDX module. There are currently no users for
TDG_VM_RD. Mark it as __maybe_unused until the first user appears.

This is preparation for enumeration and enabling optional TD features.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241104103803.195705-2-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com
Stable-dep-of: f65aa0ad79fc ("x86/tdx: Dynamically disable SEPT violations from causing #VEs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

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x86/tdx: Pass TDCALL/SEAMCALL input/output registers via a structure

[ Upstream commit 57a420bb8186d1d0178b857e5dd5026093641654 ]

Currently, the TDX_MODULE_CALL asm macro, which handles both TDCALL

x86/tdx: Pass TDCALL/SEAMCALL input/output registers via a structure

[ Upstream commit 57a420bb8186d1d0178b857e5dd5026093641654 ]

Currently, the TDX_MODULE_CALL asm macro, which handles both TDCALL and
SEAMCALL, takes one parameter for each input register and an optional
'struct tdx_module_output' (a collection of output registers) as output.
This is different from the TDX_HYPERCALL macro which uses a single
'struct tdx_hypercall_args' to carry all input/output registers.

The newer TDX versions introduce more TDCALLs/SEAMCALLs which use more
input/output registers. Also, the TDH.VP.ENTER (which isn't covered
by the current TDX_MODULE_CALL macro) basically can use all registers
that the TDX_HYPERCALL does. The current TDX_MODULE_CALL macro isn't
extendible to cover those cases.

Similar to the TDX_HYPERCALL macro, simplify the TDX_MODULE_CALL macro
to use a single structure 'struct tdx_module_args' to carry all the
input/output registers. Currently, R10/R11 are only used as output
register but not as input by any TDCALL/SEAMCALL. Change to also use
R10/R11 as input register to make input/output registers symmetric.

Currently, the TDX_MODULE_CALL macro depends on the caller to pass a
non-NULL 'struct tdx_module_output' to get additional output registers.
Similar to the TDX_HYPERCALL macro, change the TDX_MODULE_CALL macro to
take a new 'ret' macro argument to indicate whether to save the output
registers to the 'struct tdx_module_args'. Also introduce a new
__tdcall_ret() for that purpose, similar to the __tdx_hypercall_ret().

Note the tdcall(), which is a wrapper of __tdcall(), is called by three
callers: tdx_parse_tdinfo(), tdx_get_ve_info() and tdx_early_init().
The former two need the additional output but the last one doesn't. For
simplicity, make tdcall() always call __tdcall_ret() to avoid another
"_ret()" wrapper. The last caller tdx_early_init() isn't performance
critical anyway.

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/483616c1762d85eb3a3c3035a7de061cfacf2f14.1692096753.git.kai.huang%40intel.com
Stable-dep-of: f65aa0ad79fc ("x86/tdx: Dynamically disable SEPT violations from causing #VEs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

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x86/tdx: Rename __tdx_module_call() to __tdcall()

[ Upstream commit 5efb96289e581c187af1bc288ce5d26ed6181749 ]

__tdx_module_call() is only used by the TDX guest to issue TDCALL to the
TDX module.

x86/tdx: Rename __tdx_module_call() to __tdcall()

[ Upstream commit 5efb96289e581c187af1bc288ce5d26ed6181749 ]

__tdx_module_call() is only used by the TDX guest to issue TDCALL to the
TDX module. Rename it to __tdcall() to match its behaviour, e.g., it
cannot be used to make host-side SEAMCALL.

Also rename tdx_module_call() which is a wrapper of __tdx_module_call()
to tdcall().

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/785d20d99fbcd0db8262c94da6423375422d8c75.1692096753.git.kai.huang%40intel.com
Stable-dep-of: f65aa0ad79fc ("x86/tdx: Dynamically disable SEPT violations from causing #VEs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

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x86/tdx: Make macros of TDCALLs consistent with the spec

[ Upstream commit f0024dbfc48d8814d915eb5bd5253496b9b8a6df ]

The TDX spec names all TDCALLs with prefix "TDG". Currently, the kernel
doesn'

x86/tdx: Make macros of TDCALLs consistent with the spec

[ Upstream commit f0024dbfc48d8814d915eb5bd5253496b9b8a6df ]

The TDX spec names all TDCALLs with prefix "TDG". Currently, the kernel
doesn't follow such convention for the macros of those TDCALLs but uses
prefix "TDX_" for all of them. Although it's arguable whether the TDX
spec names those TDCALLs properly, it's better for the kernel to follow
the spec when naming those macros.

Change all macros of TDCALLs to make them consistent with the spec. As
a bonus, they get distinguished easily from the host-side SEAMCALLs,
which all have prefix "TDH".

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/516dccd0bd8fb9a0b6af30d25bb2d971aa03d598.1692096753.git.kai.huang%40intel.com
Stable-dep-of: f65aa0ad79fc ("x86/tdx: Dynamically disable SEPT violations from causing #VEs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

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Merge tag 'v6.6.54' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6

This is the 6.6.54 stable release

x86/tdx: Fix "in-kernel MMIO" check

commit d4fc4d01471528da8a9797a065982e05090e1d81 upstream.

TDX only supports kernel-initiated MMIO operations. The handle_mmio()
function checks if the #VE except

x86/tdx: Fix "in-kernel MMIO" check

commit d4fc4d01471528da8a9797a065982e05090e1d81 upstream.

TDX only supports kernel-initiated MMIO operations. The handle_mmio()
function checks if the #VE exception occurred in the kernel and rejects
the operation if it did not.

However, userspace can deceive the kernel into performing MMIO on its
behalf. For example, if userspace can point a syscall to an MMIO address,
syscall does get_user() or put_user() on it, triggering MMIO #VE. The
kernel will treat the #VE as in-kernel MMIO.

Ensure that the target MMIO address is within the kernel before decoding
instruction.

Fixes: 31d58c4e557d ("x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov (Intel) <legion@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/565a804b80387970460a4ebc67c88d1380f61ad1.1726237595.git.legion%40kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov (Intel) <legion@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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Merge tag 'v6.6.51' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6

This is the 6.6.51 stable release

x86/tdx: Fix data leak in mmio_read()

commit b6fb565a2d15277896583d471b21bc14a0c99661 upstream.

The mmio_read() function makes a TDVMCALL to retrieve MMIO data for an
address from the VMM.

Sean no

x86/tdx: Fix data leak in mmio_read()

commit b6fb565a2d15277896583d471b21bc14a0c99661 upstream.

The mmio_read() function makes a TDVMCALL to retrieve MMIO data for an
address from the VMM.

Sean noticed that mmio_read() unintentionally exposes the value of an
initialized variable (val) on the stack to the VMM.

This variable is only needed as an output value. It did not need to be
passed to the VMM in the first place.

Do not send the original value of *val to the VMM.

[ dhansen: clarify what 'val' is used for. ]

Fixes: 31d58c4e557d ("x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO")
Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240826125304.1566719-1-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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Merge tag 'v6.6.7' into dev-6.6

This is the 6.6.7 stable release

x86/tdx: Allow 32-bit emulation by default

[ upstream commit f4116bfc44621882556bbf70f5284fbf429a5cf6 ]

32-bit emulation was disabled on TDX to prevent a possible attack by
a VMM injecting an inter

x86/tdx: Allow 32-bit emulation by default

[ upstream commit f4116bfc44621882556bbf70f5284fbf429a5cf6 ]

32-bit emulation was disabled on TDX to prevent a possible attack by
a VMM injecting an interrupt on vector 0x80.

Now that int80_emulation() has a check for external interrupts the
limitation can be lifted.

To distinguish software interrupts from external ones, int80_emulation()
checks the APIC ISR bit relevant to the 0x80 vector. For
software interrupts, this bit will be 0.

On TDX, the VAPIC state (including ISR) is protected and cannot be
manipulated by the VMM. The ISR bit is set by the microcode flow during
the handling of posted interrupts.

[ dhansen: more changelog tweaks ]

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.0+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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x86/coco: Disable 32-bit emulation by default on TDX and SEV

[ upstream commit b82a8dbd3d2f4563156f7150c6f2ecab6e960b30 ]

The INT 0x80 instruction is used for 32-bit x86 Linux syscalls. The
kernel

x86/coco: Disable 32-bit emulation by default on TDX and SEV

[ upstream commit b82a8dbd3d2f4563156f7150c6f2ecab6e960b30 ]

The INT 0x80 instruction is used for 32-bit x86 Linux syscalls. The
kernel expects to receive a software interrupt as a result of the INT
0x80 instruction. However, an external interrupt on the same vector
triggers the same handler.

The kernel interprets an external interrupt on vector 0x80 as a 32-bit
system call that came from userspace.

A VMM can inject external interrupts on any arbitrary vector at any
time. This remains true even for TDX and SEV guests where the VMM is
untrusted.

Put together, this allows an untrusted VMM to trigger int80 syscall
handling at any given point. The content of the guest register file at
that moment defines what syscall is triggered and its arguments. It
opens the guest OS to manipulation from the VMM side.

Disable 32-bit emulation by default for TDX and SEV. User can override
it with the ia32_emulation=y command line option.

[ dhansen: reword the changelog ]

Reported-by: Supraja Sridhara <supraja.sridhara@inf.ethz.ch>
Reported-by: Benedict Schlüter <benedict.schlueter@inf.ethz.ch>
Reported-by: Mark Kuhne <mark.kuhne@inf.ethz.ch>
Reported-by: Andrin Bertschi <andrin.bertschi@inf.ethz.ch>
Reported-by: Shweta Shinde <shweta.shinde@inf.ethz.ch>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.0+: 1da5c9b x86: Introduce ia32_enabled()
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.0+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

Prepare input updates for 6.6 merge window.

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next

Catching-up with drm-next and drm-intel-gt-next.
It will unblock a code refactor around the platform
definitions (names vs acronyms).

Signed-off-by: Rodrigo V

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next

Catching-up with drm-next and drm-intel-gt-next.
It will unblock a code refactor around the platform
definitions (names vs acronyms).

Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>

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Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-gt-next

Need to pull in b3e4aae612ec ("drm/i915/hdcp: Modify hdcp_gsc_message msg sending mechanism") as
a dependency for https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/1

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-gt-next

Need to pull in b3e4aae612ec ("drm/i915/hdcp: Modify hdcp_gsc_message msg sending mechanism") as
a dependency for https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/121735/

Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>

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Merge drm/drm-next into drm-misc-next

Backmerging to get v6.5-rc2.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>

Merge tag 'v6.4' into next

Sync up with mainline to bring in updates to shared infrastructure.

ASoC: Merge v6.5-rc2

Get a similar baseline to my other branches, and fixes for people using
the branch.

Merge v6.5-rc1 into drm-misc-fixes

Boris needs 6.5-rc1 in drm-misc-fixes to prevent a conflict.

Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>

Merge branch 'master' into mm-hotfixes-stable

Merge branch 'for-6.5/apple' into for-linus

- improved support for Keychron K8 keyboard (Lasse Brun)

Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:

- Some SEV and CC platform helpers cleanup and simplifications now

Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:

- Some SEV and CC platform helpers cleanup and simplifications now that
the usage patterns are becoming apparent

[ I'm sure I'm the only one that has gets confused by all the TLAs, but
in case there are others: here SEV is AMD's "Secure Encrypted
Virtualization" and CC is generic "Confidential Computing".

There's also Intel SGX (Software Guard Extensions) and TDX (Trust
Domain Extensions), along with all the vendor memory encryption
extensions (SME, TSME, TME, and WTF).

And then we have arm64 with RMA and CCA, and I probably forgot another
dozen or so related acronyms - Linus ]

* tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/coco: Get rid of accessor functions
x86/sev: Get rid of special sev_es_enable_key
x86/coco: Mark cc_platform_has() and descendants noinstr

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Merge tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 tdx updates from Dave Hansen:

- Fix a race window where load_unaligned_zeropad() could cause a fatal

Merge tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 tdx updates from Dave Hansen:

- Fix a race window where load_unaligned_zeropad() could cause a fatal
shutdown during TDX private<=>shared conversion

The race has never been observed in practice but might allow
load_unaligned_zeropad() to catch a TDX page in the middle of its
conversion process which would lead to a fatal and unrecoverable
guest shutdown.

- Annotate sites where VM "exit reasons" are reused as hypercall
numbers.

* tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/mm: Fix enc_status_change_finish_noop()
x86/tdx: Fix race between set_memory_encrypted() and load_unaligned_zeropad()
x86/mm: Allow guest.enc_status_change_prepare() to fail
x86/tdx: Wrap exit reason with hcall_func()

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