History log of /openbmc/u-boot/doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt (Results 1 – 20 of 20)
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Revision tags: v00.04.15, v00.04.14, v00.04.13, v00.04.12, v00.04.11, v00.04.10, v00.04.09, v00.04.08, v00.04.07, v00.04.06, v00.04.05, v00.04.04, v00.04.03, v00.04.02, v00.04.01, v00.04.00, v2021.04, v00.03.03, v2021.01, v2020.10, v2020.07, v00.02.13, v2020.04, v2020.01, v2019.10, v00.02.05, v00.02.04, v00.02.03, v00.02.02, v00.02.01, v2019.07, v00.02.00, v2019.04
# cf7c6f53 03-Dec-2018 Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

Merge branch '2018-12-03-master-imports'

- Baltos platform updates
- rtc m41t62 converted to DM.
- PowerPC MPC8xx DM conversion
- Verified boot updates


# e83cf2fb 14-Nov-2018 Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>

doc: uImage.FIT: signature.txt: add option padding

Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>


Revision tags: v2018.07, v2018.03
# da54e7e5 16-Jan-2018 Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

Merge git://git.denx.de/u-boot-dm


Revision tags: v2018.01
# 83840405 03-Dec-2017 Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>

doc: FIT image: fix incorrect description of DT node unit address

The DT spec demands a unit-address in a node name to match the "reg"
property in that node. Newer dtc versions will throw warnings i

doc: FIT image: fix incorrect description of DT node unit address

The DT spec demands a unit-address in a node name to match the "reg"
property in that node. Newer dtc versions will throw warnings if this is
not the case.
Fix all occurences in the FIT image documentation files where this was not
observed, to not give bad examples to the reader.

Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>

show more ...


Revision tags: v2017.11
# 6af5520f 19-Oct-2017 Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>

doc: verified-boot: fix crypto algorithm examples

As you see in crypto_algos in common/image-sig.c, the algorithm
should be either "rsa2048" or "rsa4096". "rs2048" is a typo.

Signed-off-by: Masahi

doc: verified-boot: fix crypto algorithm examples

As you see in crypto_algos in common/image-sig.c, the algorithm
should be either "rsa2048" or "rsa4096". "rs2048" is a typo.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

show more ...


# e43f74ac 22-Aug-2017 Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>

doc: verified-boot: fix typos

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>


# f1ca1fde 06-Jan-2017 George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>

mkimage: Add support for signing with pkcs11

Add support for signing with the pkcs11 engine. This allows FIT images
to be signed with keys securely stored on a smartcard, hardware security
module, e

mkimage: Add support for signing with pkcs11

Add support for signing with the pkcs11 engine. This allows FIT images
to be signed with keys securely stored on a smartcard, hardware security
module, etc without exposing the keys.

Support for other engines can be added in the future by modifying
rsa_engine_get_pub_key() and rsa_engine_get_priv_key() to construct
correct key_id strings.

Signed-off-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>

show more ...


Revision tags: v2016.07, openbmc-20160624-1
# 4c1d5c29 23-Mar-2016 Andreas Dannenberg <dannenberg@ti.com>

doc: clarify openssl-based key and certificate generation process

Add some basic clarification that the dev.key file generated by OpenSSL
contains both the public and private key, and further highli

doc: clarify openssl-based key and certificate generation process

Add some basic clarification that the dev.key file generated by OpenSSL
contains both the public and private key, and further highlight that
the certificate generated here contains the public key only.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Dannenberg <dannenberg@ti.com>

show more ...


Revision tags: v2016.01-rc1, v2015.10, v2015.10-rc5, v2015.10-rc4, v2015.10-rc3, v2015.10-rc2, v2015.10-rc1, v2015.07, v2015.07-rc3, v2015.07-rc2, v2015.07-rc1, v2015.04, v2015.04-rc5, v2015.04-rc4, v2015.04-rc3, v2015.04-rc2, v2015.04-rc1, v2015.01, v2015.01-rc4, v2015.01-rc3, v2015.01-rc2, v2015.01-rc1, v2014.10, v2014.10-rc3, v2014.10-rc2, v2014.10-rc1, v2014.07, v2014.07-rc4
# e0f2f155 02-Jul-2014 Michael van der Westhuizen <michael@smart-africa.com>

Implement generalised RSA public exponents for verified boot

Remove the verified boot limitation that only allows a single
RSA public exponent of 65537 (F4). This change allows use with
existing PK

Implement generalised RSA public exponents for verified boot

Remove the verified boot limitation that only allows a single
RSA public exponent of 65537 (F4). This change allows use with
existing PKI infrastructure and has been tested with HSM-based
PKI.

Change the configuration OF tree format to store the RSA public
exponent as a 64 bit integer and implement backward compatibility
for verified boot configuration trees without this extra field.

Parameterise vboot_test.sh to test different public exponents.

Mathematics and other hard work by Andrew Bott.

Tested with the following public exponents: 3, 5, 17, 257, 39981,
50457, 65537 and 4294967297.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Bott <Andrew.Bott@ipaccess.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Wishart <Andrew.Wishart@ipaccess.com>
Signed-off-by: Neil Piercy <Neil.Piercy@ipaccess.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael van der Westhuizen <michael@smart-africa.com>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

show more ...


# dab5e346 16-Jul-2014 Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>

Merge branch 'master' of git://git.denx.de/u-boot

Signed-off-by: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>

Conflicts:
boards.cfg


# ed1d98d8 25-Jun-2014 Albert ARIBAUD <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>

Merge branch 'u-boot/master' into 'u-boot-arm/master'


# ce1400f6 12-Jun-2014 Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

Enhance fit_check_sign to check all images

At present this tool only checks the configuration signing. Have it also
look at each of the images in the configuration and confirm that they
verify.

Sig

Enhance fit_check_sign to check all images

At present this tool only checks the configuration signing. Have it also
look at each of the images in the configuration and confirm that they
verify.

Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de> (v1)

show more ...


Revision tags: v2014.07-rc3
# 21d29f7f 28-May-2014 Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>

bootm: make use of legacy image format configurable

make the use of legacy image format configurable through
the config define CONFIG_IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY.

When relying on signed FIT images with req

bootm: make use of legacy image format configurable

make the use of legacy image format configurable through
the config define CONFIG_IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY.

When relying on signed FIT images with required signature check
the legacy image format should be disabled. Therefore introduce
this new define and enable legacy image format if CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE
is not set. If CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE is set disable per default
the legacy image format.

Signed-off-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Cc: Lars Steubesand <lars.steubesand@philips.com>
Cc: Mike Pearce <mike@kaew.be>
Cc: Wolfgang Denk <wd@denx.de>
Cc: Tom Rini <trini@ti.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Acked-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

show more ...


Revision tags: v2014.07-rc2
# e7f93505 15-May-2014 Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>

Merge branch 'master' of git://git.denx.de/u-boot-arm


Revision tags: v2014.07-rc1
# d2a3e911 09-May-2014 Albert ARIBAUD <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>

Merge branch 'u-boot/master'

Conflicts:
drivers/net/Makefile

(trivial merge)


# 0f507779 17-Apr-2014 Tom Rini <trini@ti.com>

Merge branch 'next'


Revision tags: v2014.04, v2014.04-rc3, v2014.04-rc2
# 29a23f9d 03-Mar-2014 Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>

tools, fit_check_sign: verify a signed fit image

add host tool "fit_check_sign" which verifies, if a fit image is
signed correct.

Signed-off-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chr

tools, fit_check_sign: verify a signed fit image

add host tool "fit_check_sign" which verifies, if a fit image is
signed correct.

Signed-off-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

show more ...


# 646257d1 03-Mar-2014 Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>

rsa: add sha256-rsa2048 algorithm

based on patch from andreas@oetken.name:

http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/294318/
commit message:
I currently need support for rsa-sha256 signatures in u-boot and

rsa: add sha256-rsa2048 algorithm

based on patch from andreas@oetken.name:

http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/294318/
commit message:
I currently need support for rsa-sha256 signatures in u-boot and found out that
the code for signatures is not very generic. Thus adding of different
hash-algorithms for rsa-signatures is not easy to do without copy-pasting the
rsa-code. I attached a patch for how I think it could be better and included
support for rsa-sha256. This is a fast first shot.

aditionally work:
- removed checkpatch warnings
- removed compiler warnings
- rebased against current head

Signed-off-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
Cc: andreas@oetken.name
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

show more ...


Revision tags: v2014.04-rc1, v2014.01, v2014.01-rc3, v2014.01-rc2, v2014.01-rc1, v2013.10, v2013.10-rc4, v2013.10-rc3, v2013.10-rc2, v2013.10-rc1, v2013.07, v2013.07-rc3, v2013.07-rc2, v2013.07-rc1
# 4d098529 13-Jun-2013 Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

image: Add support for signing of FIT configurations

While signing images is useful, it does not provide complete protection
against several types of attack. For example, it it possible to create a

image: Add support for signing of FIT configurations

While signing images is useful, it does not provide complete protection
against several types of attack. For example, it it possible to create a
FIT with the same signed images, but with the configuration changed such
that a different one is selected (mix and match attack). It is also possible
to substitute a signed image from an older FIT version into a newer FIT
(roll-back attack).

Add support for signing of FIT configurations using the libfdt's region
support.

Please see doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt for more information.

Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

show more ...


# 3e569a6b 13-Jun-2013 Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

image: Add signing infrastructure

Add a structure to describe an algorithm which can sign and (later) verify
images.

Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>