Revision tags: v00.04.15, v00.04.14, v00.04.13, v00.04.12, v00.04.11, v00.04.10, v00.04.09, v00.04.08, v00.04.07, v00.04.06, v00.04.05, v00.04.04, v00.04.03, v00.04.02, v00.04.01, v00.04.00, v2021.04, v00.03.03, v2021.01, v2020.10, v2020.07, v00.02.13, v2020.04, v2020.01, v2019.10, v00.02.05, v00.02.04, v00.02.03, v00.02.02, v00.02.01, v2019.07, v00.02.00, v2019.04 |
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#
748ad078 |
| 30-Jan-2019 |
Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com> |
Merge tag 'u-boot-imx-20190129' of git://git.denx.de/u-boot-imx
For 2019.04
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#
b2ca8907 |
| 07-Dec-2018 |
Breno Matheus Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> |
imx: hab: Convert non-NULL IVT DCD pointer warning to an error
The following NXP application notes and manual recommend to ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior to calling HAB API authenticate_im
imx: hab: Convert non-NULL IVT DCD pointer warning to an error
The following NXP application notes and manual recommend to ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior to calling HAB API authenticate_image() function:
- AN12263: HABv4 RVT Guidelines and Recommendations - AN4581: Secure Boot on i.MX50, i.MX53, i.MX 6 and i.MX7 Series using HABv4 - CST docs: High Assurance Boot Version 4 Application Programming Interface Reference Manual
Commit ca89df7dd46f ("imx: hab: Convert DCD non-NULL error to warning") converted DCD non-NULL error to warning due to the lack of documentation at the time of first patch submission. We have warned U-Boot users since v2018.03, and it makes sense now to follow the NXP recommendation to ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null.
DCD commands should only be present in the initial boot image loaded by the SoC ROM. Starting in HAB v4.3.7 the HAB code will generate an error if a DCD pointer is present in an image being authenticated by calling the HAB RVT API. Older versions of HAB will process and run DCD if it is present, and this could lead to an incorrect authentication boot flow.
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
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522e0354 |
| 01-Jan-2019 |
Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com> |
Merge tag 'u-boot-imx-20190101' of git://www.denx.de/git/u-boot-imx
imx for 2019.01
- introduce support for i.MX8M - fix size limit for Vhybrid / pico boards - several board fixes - w1 driver for M
Merge tag 'u-boot-imx-20190101' of git://www.denx.de/git/u-boot-imx
imx for 2019.01
- introduce support for i.MX8M - fix size limit for Vhybrid / pico boards - several board fixes - w1 driver for MX2x / MX5x
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#
ea91031b |
| 21-Nov-2018 |
Parthiban Nallathambi <pn@denx.de> |
imx: hab: extend hab_auth_img to calculate ivt_offset
Current implementation of hab_auth_img command needs ivt_offset to authenticate the image. But ivt header is placed at the end of image date aft
imx: hab: extend hab_auth_img to calculate ivt_offset
Current implementation of hab_auth_img command needs ivt_offset to authenticate the image. But ivt header is placed at the end of image date after padding.
This leaves the usage of hab_auth_img command to fixed size or static offset for ivt header. New function "get_image_ivt_offset" is introduced to find the ivt offset during runtime. The case conditional check in this function is same as boot_get_kernel in common/bootm.c
With this variable length image e.g. FIT image with any random size can have IVT at the end and ivt_offset option can be left optional
Can be used as "hab_auth_img $loadaddr $filesize" from u-boot script
Signed-off-by: Parthiban Nallathambi <pn@denx.de> Reviewed-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
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Revision tags: v2018.07 |
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83d290c5 |
| 06-May-2018 |
Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com> |
SPDX: Convert all of our single license tags to Linux Kernel style
When U-Boot started using SPDX tags we were among the early adopters and there weren't a lot of other examples to borrow from. So
SPDX: Convert all of our single license tags to Linux Kernel style
When U-Boot started using SPDX tags we were among the early adopters and there weren't a lot of other examples to borrow from. So we picked the area of the file that usually had a full license text and replaced it with an appropriate SPDX-License-Identifier: entry. Since then, the Linux Kernel has adopted SPDX tags and they place it as the very first line in a file (except where shebangs are used, then it's second line) and with slightly different comment styles than us.
In part due to community overlap, in part due to better tag visibility and in part for other minor reasons, switch over to that style.
This commit changes all instances where we have a single declared license in the tag as both the before and after are identical in tag contents. There's also a few places where I found we did not have a tag and have introduced one.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
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ebca902a |
| 15-Apr-2018 |
Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com> |
Merge git://git.denx.de/u-boot-imx
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
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49e62426 |
| 26-Mar-2018 |
Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> |
imx: hab: Provide hab_auth_img_or_fail command
This patch adds hab_auth_img_or_fail() a command line function that encapsulates a common usage of authenticate and failover, namely if authenticate im
imx: hab: Provide hab_auth_img_or_fail command
This patch adds hab_auth_img_or_fail() a command line function that encapsulates a common usage of authenticate and failover, namely if authenticate image fails, then drop to BootROM USB recovery mode.
For secure-boot systems, this type of locked down behavior is important to ensure no unsigned images can be run.
It's possible to script this logic but, when done over and over again the environment starts get very complex and repetitive, reducing that script repetition down to a command line function makes sense.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com> Cc: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
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Revision tags: v2018.03 |
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ca89df7d |
| 09-Mar-2018 |
Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> |
imx: hab: Convert DCD non-NULL error to warning
commit 8c4037a09a5c ("imx: hab: Ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior to calling HAB authenticate function.") makes the DCD field being NULL a depe
imx: hab: Convert DCD non-NULL error to warning
commit 8c4037a09a5c ("imx: hab: Ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior to calling HAB authenticate function.") makes the DCD field being NULL a dependency.
This change though will break loading and executing of existing pre-signed binaries on a u-boot update i.e. if this change is deployed on a board you will be forced to redo all images on that board to NULL out the DCD.
There is no prior guidance from NXP that the DCD must be NULL similarly public guidance on usage of the HAB doesn't call out this NULL dependency (see boundary devices link).
Since later SoCs will reject a non-NULL DCD there's no reason to make a NULL DCD a requirement, however if there is an actual dependency for later SoCs the appropriate fix would be to do SoC version checking.
Earlier SoCs are capable (and happy) to authenticate images with non-NULL DCDs, we should not be forcing this change on downstream users - particularly if it means those users now must rewrite their build systems and/or redeploy signed images in the field.
Fixes: 8c4037a09a5c ("imx: hab: Ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior to calling HAB authenticate function.")
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com> Cc: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Link: https://boundarydevices.com/high-assurance-boot-hab-dummies Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
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#
e12546de |
| 25-Feb-2018 |
Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com> |
Merge git://git.denx.de/u-boot-imx
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7b889baf |
| 19-Feb-2018 |
Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> |
arm: imx: hab: Define HAB_RVT_BASE according to the processor version
Currently the following devices are using a different definition for ROM Vector Table addresses:
- i.MX6DQP = All rev - i.MX6D
arm: imx: hab: Define HAB_RVT_BASE according to the processor version
Currently the following devices are using a different definition for ROM Vector Table addresses:
- i.MX6DQP = All rev - i.MX6DQ >= rev 1.5 - i.MX6SDL >= rev 1.2
There is no need to create a new RVT macros since the only update were the RVT base address. Remove HAB_RVT_*_NEW macros and define a new RVT base address.
More details about RVT base address can be found on processors Reference Manual and in the following documents:
EB803: i.MX 6Dual/6Quad Applications Processor Silicon Revision 1.2 to 1.3 Comparison
EB804: i.MX 6Solo/6DualLite Application Processor Silicon Revision 1.1 to 1.2/1.3 Comparison
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
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#
20fa1dd3 |
| 19-Feb-2018 |
Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com> |
imx: hab: Check if CSF contains deprecated commands
Write, Check and Set MID commands have been deprecated from the Code Signing Tool (CST) v2.3.3 and will not be implemented in newer versions of HA
imx: hab: Check if CSF contains deprecated commands
Write, Check and Set MID commands have been deprecated from the Code Signing Tool (CST) v2.3.3 and will not be implemented in newer versions of HAB, hence the following features are no longer available:
- Write Data - Clear Mask - Set Mask - Check All Clear - Check All Set - Check Any Clear - Check Any Set - Set MID
The inappropriate use of Write Data command may lead to an incorrect authentication boot flow. Since no specific application has been identified that requires the use of any of these features, it is highly recommended to add this check.
Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
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#
ed286bc8 |
| 19-Feb-2018 |
Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com> |
imx: hab: Check if CSF is valid before authenticating image
For proper authentication the HAB code must check if the CSF is valid. Users must call the csf_is_valid() function to parse the CSF prior
imx: hab: Check if CSF is valid before authenticating image
For proper authentication the HAB code must check if the CSF is valid. Users must call the csf_is_valid() function to parse the CSF prior to authenticating any additional images. The function will return a failure if any of the following invalid conditions are met:
- CSF pointer is NULL - CSF Header does not exist - CSF does not lie within the image bounds - CSF command length zero
Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
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8c4037a0 |
| 19-Feb-2018 |
Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com> |
imx: hab: Ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior to calling HAB authenticate function.
DCD commands should only be present in the initial boot image loaded by the SoC ROM. DCD should not be presen
imx: hab: Ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior to calling HAB authenticate function.
DCD commands should only be present in the initial boot image loaded by the SoC ROM. DCD should not be present in images that will be verified by software using HAB RVT authentication APIs. Newer versions of HAB will generate an error if a DCD pointer is present in an image being authenticated by calling the HAB RVT API. Older versions of HAB will process and run DCD if it is present, and this could lead to an incorrect authentication boot flow.
It is highly recommended this check is in place to ensure additional HAB verified images do not include a DCD table.
Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
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669f2d18 |
| 19-Feb-2018 |
Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> |
imx: hab: Keep CAAM clock enabled after authenticating additional images
Currently it is not possible to run CMD_DEK on i.MX SPL targets:
=> dek_blob 0x12000000 0x12001000 128
The system hangs aft
imx: hab: Keep CAAM clock enabled after authenticating additional images
Currently it is not possible to run CMD_DEK on i.MX SPL targets:
=> dek_blob 0x12000000 0x12001000 128
The system hangs after running dek_blob because the CAAM clock is being disabled by the HAB code. There is no need to disable CAAM clock after authenticating additional boot images, thus keep CAAM clock enabled to address this issue.
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
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#
8e9801c2 |
| 15-Jan-2018 |
Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com> |
Merge git://git.denx.de/u-boot-imx
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9587b0d6 |
| 12-Jan-2018 |
Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> |
arm: imx: hab: Add hab_failsafe console command
hab_failsafe when called puts the part into BootROM recovery mode. This will allow u-boot scripts to script the dropping down into recovery mode.
=>
arm: imx: hab: Add hab_failsafe console command
hab_failsafe when called puts the part into BootROM recovery mode. This will allow u-boot scripts to script the dropping down into recovery mode.
=> hab_failsafe
Shows the i.MX7 appear as "hiddev0,hidraw5: USB HID v1.10 Device [Freescale SemiConductor Inc SP Blank ULT1] " in a Linux dmesg thus allowing download of a new image via the BootROM USB download protocol routine.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
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#
317956e8 |
| 12-Jan-2018 |
Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> |
arm: imx: hab: Implement hab_rvt_failsafe
This patch implements the basic callback hooks for hab_rvt_check_failsafe for BootROM code using the older BootROM address layout - in my test case the i.MX
arm: imx: hab: Implement hab_rvt_failsafe
This patch implements the basic callback hooks for hab_rvt_check_failsafe for BootROM code using the older BootROM address layout - in my test case the i.MX7. Code based on new BootROM callbacks will just do nothing and there's definitely a TODO to implement that extra functionality on the alternative BootROM API.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
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#
07eefaf1 |
| 12-Jan-2018 |
Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> |
arm: imx: hab: Make imx_hab_is_enabled global
It will be helpful to boot commands to know if the HAB is enabled. Export imx_hab_is_enabled() now to facilitate further work with this data-point in a
arm: imx: hab: Make imx_hab_is_enabled global
It will be helpful to boot commands to know if the HAB is enabled. Export imx_hab_is_enabled() now to facilitate further work with this data-point in a secure-boot context.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
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#
4467ae6c |
| 12-Jan-2018 |
Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> |
arm: imx: hab: Make authenticate_image() return zero on open boards
The BootROM will not successfully process a HAB image passed by u-boot unless the board has been set into locked mode. Some of the
arm: imx: hab: Make authenticate_image() return zero on open boards
The BootROM will not successfully process a HAB image passed by u-boot unless the board has been set into locked mode. Some of the existing usages of authenticate_image() expect and rely on unlocked boards doing the following
1. Not calling into the BootROM authenticate_image() callback 2. Returning a pass status for authenticate_image() calls anyway
A previous patch removed the necessity to call into imx_hab_is_enabled() twice. This patch ensures the reliance on authenticate_image() returning zero is maintained.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Suggested-by: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
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#
e5b30e4a |
| 12-Jan-2018 |
Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> |
arm: imx: hab: Rename is_hab_enabled imx_hab_is_enabled
Understanding if the HAB is enabled is something that we want to interrogate and report on outside of the HAB layer. First step to that is ren
arm: imx: hab: Rename is_hab_enabled imx_hab_is_enabled
Understanding if the HAB is enabled is something that we want to interrogate and report on outside of the HAB layer. First step to that is renaming the relevant function to match the previously introduced external naming convention imx_hab_function()
The name imx_hab_is_hab_enabled() is a tautology. A more logical name is imx_hab_is_enabled().
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
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#
57f65486 |
| 12-Jan-2018 |
Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> |
arm: imx: hab: Prefix authenticate_image with imx_hab
Tidy up the HAB namespace a bit by prefixing external functions with imx_hab. All external facing functions past this point will be prefixed in
arm: imx: hab: Prefix authenticate_image with imx_hab
Tidy up the HAB namespace a bit by prefixing external functions with imx_hab. All external facing functions past this point will be prefixed in the same way to make the fact we are doing IMX HAB activities clear from reading the code. authenticate_image() could mean anything imx_hab_authenticate_image() is on the other hand very explicit.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
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#
58bebfb7 |
| 12-Jan-2018 |
Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> |
arm: imx: hab: Make internal functions and data static
There is no need to export these functions and data structures externally. Make them all static now.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.od
arm: imx: hab: Make internal functions and data static
There is no need to export these functions and data structures externally. Make them all static now.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
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#
2c6c68d2 |
| 12-Jan-2018 |
Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> |
arm: imx: hab: Print HAB event log only after calling ROM
The current flow of authenticate_image() will print the HAB event log even if we reject an element of the IVT header before ever calling int
arm: imx: hab: Print HAB event log only after calling ROM
The current flow of authenticate_image() will print the HAB event log even if we reject an element of the IVT header before ever calling into the ROM. This can be confusing.
This patch changes the flow of the code so that the HAB event log is only printed out if we have called into the ROM and received some sort of status code.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Suggested-by: Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
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#
b7c3cae7 |
| 12-Jan-2018 |
Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> |
arm: imx: hab: Add a hab_rvt_check_target to image auth
Add a hab_rvt_check_target() step to authenticate_image() as a sanity check for the target memory region authenticate_image() will run over, p
arm: imx: hab: Add a hab_rvt_check_target to image auth
Add a hab_rvt_check_target() step to authenticate_image() as a sanity check for the target memory region authenticate_image() will run over, prior to making the BootROM authentication callback itself.
This check is recommended by the HAB documentation so it makes sense to adhere to the guidance and perform that check as directed.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
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#
c0a55b73 |
| 12-Jan-2018 |
Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> |
arm: imx: hab: Implement hab_rvt_check_target
This patch implements the basic callback hooks for hab_rvt_check_target() for BootROM code using the older BootROM address layout - in my test case the
arm: imx: hab: Implement hab_rvt_check_target
This patch implements the basic callback hooks for hab_rvt_check_target() for BootROM code using the older BootROM address layout - in my test case the i.MX7. Code based on new BootROM callbacks will just have HAB_SUCCESS as a result code. Adding support for the new BootROM callbacks is a TODO.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
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