History log of /openbmc/u-boot/arch/arm/mach-imx/hab.c (Results 1 – 25 of 39)
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Revision tags: v00.04.15, v00.04.14, v00.04.13, v00.04.12, v00.04.11, v00.04.10, v00.04.09, v00.04.08, v00.04.07, v00.04.06, v00.04.05, v00.04.04, v00.04.03, v00.04.02, v00.04.01, v00.04.00, v2021.04, v00.03.03, v2021.01, v2020.10, v2020.07, v00.02.13, v2020.04, v2020.01, v2019.10, v00.02.05, v00.02.04, v00.02.03, v00.02.02, v00.02.01, v2019.07, v00.02.00, v2019.04
# 748ad078 30-Jan-2019 Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

Merge tag 'u-boot-imx-20190129' of git://git.denx.de/u-boot-imx

For 2019.04


# b2ca8907 07-Dec-2018 Breno Matheus Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>

imx: hab: Convert non-NULL IVT DCD pointer warning to an error

The following NXP application notes and manual recommend to ensure the
IVT DCD pointer is Null prior to calling HAB API authenticate_im

imx: hab: Convert non-NULL IVT DCD pointer warning to an error

The following NXP application notes and manual recommend to ensure the
IVT DCD pointer is Null prior to calling HAB API authenticate_image()
function:

- AN12263: HABv4 RVT Guidelines and Recommendations
- AN4581: Secure Boot on i.MX50, i.MX53, i.MX 6 and i.MX7 Series using
HABv4
- CST docs: High Assurance Boot Version 4 Application Programming
Interface Reference Manual

Commit ca89df7dd46f ("imx: hab: Convert DCD non-NULL error to warning")
converted DCD non-NULL error to warning due to the lack of documentation
at the time of first patch submission. We have warned U-Boot users since
v2018.03, and it makes sense now to follow the NXP recommendation to
ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null.

DCD commands should only be present in the initial boot image loaded by
the SoC ROM. Starting in HAB v4.3.7 the HAB code will generate an error
if a DCD pointer is present in an image being authenticated by calling the
HAB RVT API. Older versions of HAB will process and run DCD if it is
present, and this could lead to an incorrect authentication boot flow.

Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>

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# 522e0354 01-Jan-2019 Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

Merge tag 'u-boot-imx-20190101' of git://www.denx.de/git/u-boot-imx

imx for 2019.01

- introduce support for i.MX8M
- fix size limit for Vhybrid / pico boards
- several board fixes
- w1 driver for M

Merge tag 'u-boot-imx-20190101' of git://www.denx.de/git/u-boot-imx

imx for 2019.01

- introduce support for i.MX8M
- fix size limit for Vhybrid / pico boards
- several board fixes
- w1 driver for MX2x / MX5x

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# ea91031b 21-Nov-2018 Parthiban Nallathambi <pn@denx.de>

imx: hab: extend hab_auth_img to calculate ivt_offset

Current implementation of hab_auth_img command needs ivt_offset to
authenticate the image. But ivt header is placed at the end of image
date aft

imx: hab: extend hab_auth_img to calculate ivt_offset

Current implementation of hab_auth_img command needs ivt_offset to
authenticate the image. But ivt header is placed at the end of image
date after padding.

This leaves the usage of hab_auth_img command to fixed size or static
offset for ivt header. New function "get_image_ivt_offset" is introduced
to find the ivt offset during runtime. The case conditional check in this
function is same as boot_get_kernel in common/bootm.c

With this variable length image e.g. FIT image with any random size can
have IVT at the end and ivt_offset option can be left optional

Can be used as "hab_auth_img $loadaddr $filesize" from u-boot script

Signed-off-by: Parthiban Nallathambi <pn@denx.de>
Reviewed-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>

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Revision tags: v2018.07
# 83d290c5 06-May-2018 Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

SPDX: Convert all of our single license tags to Linux Kernel style

When U-Boot started using SPDX tags we were among the early adopters and
there weren't a lot of other examples to borrow from. So

SPDX: Convert all of our single license tags to Linux Kernel style

When U-Boot started using SPDX tags we were among the early adopters and
there weren't a lot of other examples to borrow from. So we picked the
area of the file that usually had a full license text and replaced it
with an appropriate SPDX-License-Identifier: entry. Since then, the
Linux Kernel has adopted SPDX tags and they place it as the very first
line in a file (except where shebangs are used, then it's second line)
and with slightly different comment styles than us.

In part due to community overlap, in part due to better tag visibility
and in part for other minor reasons, switch over to that style.

This commit changes all instances where we have a single declared
license in the tag as both the before and after are identical in tag
contents. There's also a few places where I found we did not have a tag
and have introduced one.

Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

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# ebca902a 15-Apr-2018 Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

Merge git://git.denx.de/u-boot-imx

Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>


# 49e62426 26-Mar-2018 Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>

imx: hab: Provide hab_auth_img_or_fail command

This patch adds hab_auth_img_or_fail() a command line function that
encapsulates a common usage of authenticate and failover, namely if
authenticate im

imx: hab: Provide hab_auth_img_or_fail command

This patch adds hab_auth_img_or_fail() a command line function that
encapsulates a common usage of authenticate and failover, namely if
authenticate image fails, then drop to BootROM USB recovery mode.

For secure-boot systems, this type of locked down behavior is important to
ensure no unsigned images can be run.

It's possible to script this logic but, when done over and over again the
environment starts get very complex and repetitive, reducing that script
repetition down to a command line function makes sense.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Cc: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>

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Revision tags: v2018.03
# ca89df7d 09-Mar-2018 Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>

imx: hab: Convert DCD non-NULL error to warning

commit 8c4037a09a5c ("imx: hab: Ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior
to calling HAB authenticate function.") makes the DCD field being NULL a
depe

imx: hab: Convert DCD non-NULL error to warning

commit 8c4037a09a5c ("imx: hab: Ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior
to calling HAB authenticate function.") makes the DCD field being NULL a
dependency.

This change though will break loading and executing of existing pre-signed
binaries on a u-boot update i.e. if this change is deployed on a board you
will be forced to redo all images on that board to NULL out the DCD.

There is no prior guidance from NXP that the DCD must be NULL similarly
public guidance on usage of the HAB doesn't call out this NULL dependency
(see boundary devices link).

Since later SoCs will reject a non-NULL DCD there's no reason to make a
NULL DCD a requirement, however if there is an actual dependency for later
SoCs the appropriate fix would be to do SoC version checking.

Earlier SoCs are capable (and happy) to authenticate images with non-NULL
DCDs, we should not be forcing this change on downstream users -
particularly if it means those users now must rewrite their build systems
and/or redeploy signed images in the field.

Fixes: 8c4037a09a5c ("imx: hab: Ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior
to calling HAB authenticate function.")

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Cc: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Link: https://boundarydevices.com/high-assurance-boot-hab-dummies
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>

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# e12546de 25-Feb-2018 Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

Merge git://git.denx.de/u-boot-imx


# 7b889baf 19-Feb-2018 Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>

arm: imx: hab: Define HAB_RVT_BASE according to the processor version

Currently the following devices are using a different definition for ROM
Vector Table addresses:

- i.MX6DQP = All rev
- i.MX6D

arm: imx: hab: Define HAB_RVT_BASE according to the processor version

Currently the following devices are using a different definition for ROM
Vector Table addresses:

- i.MX6DQP = All rev
- i.MX6DQ >= rev 1.5
- i.MX6SDL >= rev 1.2

There is no need to create a new RVT macros since the only update were the
RVT base address. Remove HAB_RVT_*_NEW macros and define a new RVT base
address.

More details about RVT base address can be found on processors Reference
Manual and in the following documents:

EB803: i.MX 6Dual/6Quad Applications Processor Silicon Revision 1.2 to 1.3
Comparison

EB804: i.MX 6Solo/6DualLite Application Processor Silicon Revision 1.1
to 1.2/1.3 Comparison

Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>

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# 20fa1dd3 19-Feb-2018 Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>

imx: hab: Check if CSF contains deprecated commands

Write, Check and Set MID commands have been deprecated from the Code
Signing Tool (CST) v2.3.3 and will not be implemented in newer versions
of HA

imx: hab: Check if CSF contains deprecated commands

Write, Check and Set MID commands have been deprecated from the Code
Signing Tool (CST) v2.3.3 and will not be implemented in newer versions
of HAB, hence the following features are no longer available:

- Write Data
- Clear Mask
- Set Mask
- Check All Clear
- Check All Set
- Check Any Clear
- Check Any Set
- Set MID

The inappropriate use of Write Data command may lead to an incorrect
authentication boot flow. Since no specific application has been identified
that requires the use of any of these features, it is highly recommended to
add this check.

Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>

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# ed286bc8 19-Feb-2018 Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>

imx: hab: Check if CSF is valid before authenticating image

For proper authentication the HAB code must check if the CSF is valid.
Users must call the csf_is_valid() function to parse the CSF prior

imx: hab: Check if CSF is valid before authenticating image

For proper authentication the HAB code must check if the CSF is valid.
Users must call the csf_is_valid() function to parse the CSF prior to
authenticating any additional images. The function will return a failure
if any of the following invalid conditions are met:

- CSF pointer is NULL
- CSF Header does not exist
- CSF does not lie within the image bounds
- CSF command length zero

Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>

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# 8c4037a0 19-Feb-2018 Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>

imx: hab: Ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior to calling HAB authenticate function.

DCD commands should only be present in the initial boot image loaded by
the SoC ROM. DCD should not be presen

imx: hab: Ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior to calling HAB authenticate function.

DCD commands should only be present in the initial boot image loaded by
the SoC ROM. DCD should not be present in images that will be verified
by software using HAB RVT authentication APIs. Newer versions of HAB
will generate an error if a DCD pointer is present in an image being
authenticated by calling the HAB RVT API. Older versions of HAB will
process and run DCD if it is present, and this could lead to an incorrect
authentication boot flow.

It is highly recommended this check is in place to ensure additional HAB
verified images do not include a DCD table.

Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>

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# 669f2d18 19-Feb-2018 Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>

imx: hab: Keep CAAM clock enabled after authenticating additional images

Currently it is not possible to run CMD_DEK on i.MX SPL targets:

=> dek_blob 0x12000000 0x12001000 128

The system hangs aft

imx: hab: Keep CAAM clock enabled after authenticating additional images

Currently it is not possible to run CMD_DEK on i.MX SPL targets:

=> dek_blob 0x12000000 0x12001000 128

The system hangs after running dek_blob because the CAAM clock is being
disabled by the HAB code. There is no need to disable CAAM clock after
authenticating additional boot images, thus keep CAAM clock enabled to
address this issue.

Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>

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# 8e9801c2 15-Jan-2018 Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

Merge git://git.denx.de/u-boot-imx


# 9587b0d6 12-Jan-2018 Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>

arm: imx: hab: Add hab_failsafe console command

hab_failsafe when called puts the part into BootROM recovery mode.
This will allow u-boot scripts to script the dropping down into recovery
mode.

=>

arm: imx: hab: Add hab_failsafe console command

hab_failsafe when called puts the part into BootROM recovery mode.
This will allow u-boot scripts to script the dropping down into recovery
mode.

=> hab_failsafe

Shows the i.MX7 appear as "hiddev0,hidraw5: USB HID v1.10 Device [Freescale
SemiConductor Inc SP Blank ULT1] " in a Linux dmesg thus allowing download
of a new image via the BootROM USB download protocol routine.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>

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# 317956e8 12-Jan-2018 Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>

arm: imx: hab: Implement hab_rvt_failsafe

This patch implements the basic callback hooks for
hab_rvt_check_failsafe for BootROM code using the older BootROM address
layout - in my test case the i.MX

arm: imx: hab: Implement hab_rvt_failsafe

This patch implements the basic callback hooks for
hab_rvt_check_failsafe for BootROM code using the older BootROM address
layout - in my test case the i.MX7. Code based on new BootROM callbacks
will just do nothing and there's definitely a TODO to implement that extra
functionality on the alternative BootROM API.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>

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# 07eefaf1 12-Jan-2018 Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>

arm: imx: hab: Make imx_hab_is_enabled global

It will be helpful to boot commands to know if the HAB is enabled. Export
imx_hab_is_enabled() now to facilitate further work with this data-point in
a

arm: imx: hab: Make imx_hab_is_enabled global

It will be helpful to boot commands to know if the HAB is enabled. Export
imx_hab_is_enabled() now to facilitate further work with this data-point in
a secure-boot context.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>

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# 4467ae6c 12-Jan-2018 Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>

arm: imx: hab: Make authenticate_image() return zero on open boards

The BootROM will not successfully process a HAB image passed by u-boot
unless the board has been set into locked mode. Some of the

arm: imx: hab: Make authenticate_image() return zero on open boards

The BootROM will not successfully process a HAB image passed by u-boot
unless the board has been set into locked mode. Some of the existing usages
of authenticate_image() expect and rely on unlocked boards doing the
following

1. Not calling into the BootROM authenticate_image() callback
2. Returning a pass status for authenticate_image() calls anyway

A previous patch removed the necessity to call into imx_hab_is_enabled()
twice. This patch ensures the reliance on authenticate_image() returning
zero is maintained.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>

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# e5b30e4a 12-Jan-2018 Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>

arm: imx: hab: Rename is_hab_enabled imx_hab_is_enabled

Understanding if the HAB is enabled is something that we want to
interrogate and report on outside of the HAB layer. First step to that is
ren

arm: imx: hab: Rename is_hab_enabled imx_hab_is_enabled

Understanding if the HAB is enabled is something that we want to
interrogate and report on outside of the HAB layer. First step to that is
renaming the relevant function to match the previously introduced external
naming convention imx_hab_function()

The name imx_hab_is_hab_enabled() is a tautology. A more logical name is
imx_hab_is_enabled().

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>

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# 57f65486 12-Jan-2018 Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>

arm: imx: hab: Prefix authenticate_image with imx_hab

Tidy up the HAB namespace a bit by prefixing external functions with
imx_hab. All external facing functions past this point will be prefixed in

arm: imx: hab: Prefix authenticate_image with imx_hab

Tidy up the HAB namespace a bit by prefixing external functions with
imx_hab. All external facing functions past this point will be prefixed in
the same way to make the fact we are doing IMX HAB activities clear from
reading the code. authenticate_image() could mean anything
imx_hab_authenticate_image() is on the other hand very explicit.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>

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# 58bebfb7 12-Jan-2018 Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>

arm: imx: hab: Make internal functions and data static

There is no need to export these functions and data structures externally.
Make them all static now.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.od

arm: imx: hab: Make internal functions and data static

There is no need to export these functions and data structures externally.
Make them all static now.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>

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# 2c6c68d2 12-Jan-2018 Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>

arm: imx: hab: Print HAB event log only after calling ROM

The current flow of authenticate_image() will print the HAB event log even
if we reject an element of the IVT header before ever calling int

arm: imx: hab: Print HAB event log only after calling ROM

The current flow of authenticate_image() will print the HAB event log even
if we reject an element of the IVT header before ever calling into the ROM.
This can be confusing.

This patch changes the flow of the code so that the HAB event log is only
printed out if we have called into the ROM and received some sort of status
code.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>

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# b7c3cae7 12-Jan-2018 Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>

arm: imx: hab: Add a hab_rvt_check_target to image auth

Add a hab_rvt_check_target() step to authenticate_image() as a sanity
check for the target memory region authenticate_image() will run over,
p

arm: imx: hab: Add a hab_rvt_check_target to image auth

Add a hab_rvt_check_target() step to authenticate_image() as a sanity
check for the target memory region authenticate_image() will run over,
prior to making the BootROM authentication callback itself.

This check is recommended by the HAB documentation so it makes sense to
adhere to the guidance and perform that check as directed.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>

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# c0a55b73 12-Jan-2018 Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>

arm: imx: hab: Implement hab_rvt_check_target

This patch implements the basic callback hooks for hab_rvt_check_target()
for BootROM code using the older BootROM address layout - in my test case
the

arm: imx: hab: Implement hab_rvt_check_target

This patch implements the basic callback hooks for hab_rvt_check_target()
for BootROM code using the older BootROM address layout - in my test case
the i.MX7. Code based on new BootROM callbacks will just have HAB_SUCCESS
as a result code. Adding support for the new BootROM callbacks is a TODO.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>

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