#
360823a0 |
| 17-Feb-2025 |
Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.78' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.78 stable release
# -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- # # iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmey9hUACgkQONu9yGCS # aT7Ecw//Ts3+DVy
Merge tag 'v6.6.78' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.78 stable release
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Revision tags: v6.6.78, v6.6.77, v6.6.76 |
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#
893b2837 |
| 06-Feb-2025 |
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> |
btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file
commit 2c8507c63f5498d4ee4af404a8e44ceae4345056 upstream.
This commit re-attempts the backport of the change to the linux-6.6.y branch.
btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file
commit 2c8507c63f5498d4ee4af404a8e44ceae4345056 upstream.
This commit re-attempts the backport of the change to the linux-6.6.y branch. Commit 6e1a82259307 ("btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file") on this branch was reverted.
During swap activation we iterate over the extents of a file and we can have many thousands of them, so we can end up in a busy loop monopolizing a core. Avoid this by doing a voluntary reschedule after processing each extent.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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#
b4e355e7 |
| 06-Feb-2025 |
Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com> |
Revert "btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file"
This reverts commit 6e1a8225930719a9f352d56320214e33e2dde0a6.
The backport for linux-6.6.y, commit 6e1a82259307 ("btrfs: avoid
Revert "btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file"
This reverts commit 6e1a8225930719a9f352d56320214e33e2dde0a6.
The backport for linux-6.6.y, commit 6e1a82259307 ("btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file"), inserted cond_resched() in the wrong location.
Revert it now; a subsequent commit will re-backport the original patch.
Fixes: 6e1a82259307 ("btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file") # linux-6.6.y Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Revision tags: v6.6.75, v6.6.74, v6.6.73, v6.6.72, v6.6.71 |
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#
9144f784 |
| 09-Jan-2025 |
Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.70' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.70 stable release
Conflicts: include/linux/usb/chipidea.h
Conflict was a trivial addition.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jeffery <andrew@c
Merge tag 'v6.6.70' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.70 stable release
Conflicts: include/linux/usb/chipidea.h
Conflict was a trivial addition.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au>
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Revision tags: v6.12.9, v6.6.70, v6.12.8, v6.6.69, v6.12.7, v6.6.68, v6.12.6, v6.6.67, v6.12.5, v6.6.66, v6.6.65, v6.12.4, v6.6.64, v6.12.3, v6.12.2, v6.6.63, v6.12.1, v6.12, v6.6.62, v6.6.61 |
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#
6228f13f |
| 13-Nov-2024 |
Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> |
btrfs: fix use-after-free in btrfs_encoded_read_endio()
commit 05b36b04d74a517d6675bf2f90829ff1ac7e28dc upstream.
Shinichiro reported the following use-after free that sometimes is happening in our
btrfs: fix use-after-free in btrfs_encoded_read_endio()
commit 05b36b04d74a517d6675bf2f90829ff1ac7e28dc upstream.
Shinichiro reported the following use-after free that sometimes is happening in our CI system when running fstests' btrfs/284 on a TCMU runner device:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_release+0x708/0x780 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888106a83f18 by task kworker/u80:6/219
CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 219 Comm: kworker/u80:6 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-kts+ #15 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPi-TF, BIOS 3.3 02/21/2020 Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_end_bio_work [btrfs] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 print_report+0x174/0x505 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x410 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 kasan_report+0xda/0x1b0 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __wake_up+0x44/0x60 lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x60 __wake_up+0x44/0x60 btrfs_encoded_read_endio+0x14b/0x190 [btrfs] btrfs_check_read_bio+0x8d9/0x1360 [btrfs] ? lock_release+0x1b0/0x780 ? trace_lock_acquire+0x12f/0x1a0 ? __pfx_btrfs_check_read_bio+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460 ? lock_acquire+0x31/0xc0 ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460 process_one_work+0x85c/0x1460 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? assign_work+0x16c/0x240 worker_thread+0x5e6/0xfc0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x2c3/0x3a0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK>
Allocated by task 3661: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x16c/0x6d0 [btrfs] send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs] process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs] changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs] _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 3661: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 __kasan_slab_free+0x4f/0x70 kfree+0x143/0x490 btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x531/0x6d0 [btrfs] send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs] process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs] changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs] _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106a83f00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-rnd-07-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of freed 96-byte region [ffff888106a83f00, ffff888106a83f60)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888106a83800 pfn:0x106a83 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0017ffffc0000000 ffff888100053680 ffffea0004917200 0000000000000004 raw: ffff888106a83800 0000000080200019 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888106a83e00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888106a83e80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc >ffff888106a83f00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888106a83f80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888106a84000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ==================================================================
Further analyzing the trace and the crash dump's vmcore file shows that the wake_up() call in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is calling wake_up() on the wait_queue that is in the private data passed to the end_io handler.
Commit 4ff47df40447 ("btrfs: move priv off stack in btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages()") moved 'struct btrfs_encoded_read_private' off the stack.
Before that commit one can see a corruption of the private data when analyzing the vmcore after a crash:
*(struct btrfs_encoded_read_private *)0xffff88815626eec8 = { .wait = (wait_queue_head_t){ .lock = (spinlock_t){ .rlock = (struct raw_spinlock){ .raw_lock = (arch_spinlock_t){ .val = (atomic_t){ .counter = (int)-2005885696, }, .locked = (u8)0, .pending = (u8)157, .locked_pending = (u16)40192, .tail = (u16)34928, }, .magic = (unsigned int)536325682, .owner_cpu = (unsigned int)29, .owner = (void *)__SCT__tp_func_btrfs_transaction_commit+0x0 = 0x0, .dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){ .key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c, .class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 }, .name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "", .wait_type_outer = (u8)37, .wait_type_inner = (u8)178, .lock_type = (u8)154, }, }, .__padding = (u8 [24]){ 0, 157, 112, 136, 50, 174, 247, 31, 29 }, .dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){ .key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c, .class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 }, .name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "", .wait_type_outer = (u8)37, .wait_type_inner = (u8)178, .lock_type = (u8)154, }, }, .head = (struct list_head){ .next = (struct list_head *)0x112cca, .prev = (struct list_head *)0x47, }, }, .pending = (atomic_t){ .counter = (int)-1491499288, }, .status = (blk_status_t)130, }
Here we can see several indicators of in-memory data corruption, e.g. the large negative atomic values of ->pending or ->wait->lock->rlock->raw_lock->val, as well as the bogus spinlock magic 0x1ff7ae32 (decimal 536325682 above) instead of 0xdead4ead or the bogus pointer values for ->wait->head.
To fix this, change atomic_dec_return() to atomic_dec_and_test() to fix the corruption, as atomic_dec_return() is defined as two instructions on x86_64, whereas atomic_dec_and_test() is defined as a single atomic operation. This can lead to a situation where counter value is already decremented but the if statement in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is not completely processed, i.e. the 0 test has not completed. If another thread continues executing btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages() the atomic_dec_return() there can see an already updated ->pending counter and continues by freeing the private data. Continuing in the endio handler the test for 0 succeeds and the wait_queue is woken up, resulting in a use-after-free.
Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Suggested-by: Damien Le Moal <Damien.LeMoal@wdc.com> Fixes: 1881fba89bd5 ("btrfs: add BTRFS_IOC_ENCODED_READ ioctl") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Alva Lan <alvalan9@foxmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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#
ed454332 |
| 05-Jan-2025 |
Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.69' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.69 stable release
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#
6e1a8225 |
| 09-Dec-2024 |
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> |
btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file
commit 2c8507c63f5498d4ee4af404a8e44ceae4345056 upstream.
During swap activation we iterate over the extents of a file and we can have m
btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file
commit 2c8507c63f5498d4ee4af404a8e44ceae4345056 upstream.
During swap activation we iterate over the extents of a file and we can have many thousands of them, so we can end up in a busy loop monopolizing a core. Avoid this by doing a voluntary reschedule after processing each extent.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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#
278002ed |
| 15-Dec-2024 |
Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.66' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.66 stable release
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#
2a72d5cc |
| 29-Nov-2024 |
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> |
btrfs: fix missing snapshot drew unlock when root is dead during swap activation
[ Upstream commit 9c803c474c6c002d8ade68ebe99026cc39c37f85 ]
When activating a swap file we acquire the root's snaps
btrfs: fix missing snapshot drew unlock when root is dead during swap activation
[ Upstream commit 9c803c474c6c002d8ade68ebe99026cc39c37f85 ]
When activating a swap file we acquire the root's snapshot drew lock and then check if the root is dead, failing and returning with -EPERM if it's dead but without unlocking the root's snapshot lock. Fix this by adding the missing unlock.
Fixes: 60021bd754c6 ("btrfs: prevent subvol with swapfile from being deleted") Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Revision tags: v6.6.60 |
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#
e50e86db |
| 03-Nov-2024 |
Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.59' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.59 stable release
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Revision tags: v6.6.59, v6.6.58 |
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#
35217546 |
| 22-Oct-2024 |
Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> |
btrfs: fix passing 0 to ERR_PTR in btrfs_search_dir_index_item()
commit 75f49c3dc7b7423d3734f2e4dabe3dac8d064338 upstream.
The ret may be zero in btrfs_search_dir_index_item() and should not passed
btrfs: fix passing 0 to ERR_PTR in btrfs_search_dir_index_item()
commit 75f49c3dc7b7423d3734f2e4dabe3dac8d064338 upstream.
The ret may be zero in btrfs_search_dir_index_item() and should not passed to ERR_PTR(). Now btrfs_unlink_subvol() is the only caller to this, reconstructed it to check ERR_PTR(-ENOENT) while ret >= 0.
This fixes smatch warnings:
fs/btrfs/dir-item.c:353 btrfs_search_dir_index_item() warn: passing zero to 'ERR_PTR'
Fixes: 9dcbe16fccbb ("btrfs: use btrfs_for_each_slot in btrfs_search_dir_index_item") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Revision tags: v6.6.57, v6.6.56, v6.6.55, v6.6.54, v6.6.53 |
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#
76921820 |
| 18-Sep-2024 |
Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.52' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.52 stable release
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Revision tags: v6.6.52, v6.6.51, v6.6.50, v6.6.49, v6.6.48, v6.6.47, v6.6.46 |
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#
5ee7efa6 |
| 12-Aug-2024 |
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> |
btrfs: update target inode's ctime on unlink
[ Upstream commit 3bc2ac2f8f0b78a13140fc72022771efe0c9b778 ]
Unlink changes the link count on the target inode. POSIX mandates that the ctime must also
btrfs: update target inode's ctime on unlink
[ Upstream commit 3bc2ac2f8f0b78a13140fc72022771efe0c9b778 ]
Unlink changes the link count on the target inode. POSIX mandates that the ctime must also change when this occurs.
According to https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/unlink.html:
"Upon successful completion, unlink() shall mark for update the last data modification and last file status change timestamps of the parent directory. Also, if the file's link count is not 0, the last file status change timestamp of the file shall be marked for update."
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ add link to the opengroup docs ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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#
ca2478a7 |
| 12-Sep-2024 |
Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.51' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.51 stable release
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Revision tags: v6.6.45, v6.6.44 |
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#
f1eb69aa |
| 29-Jul-2024 |
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
btrfs: initialize location to fix -Wmaybe-uninitialized in btrfs_lookup_dentry()
[ Upstream commit b8e947e9f64cac9df85a07672b658df5b2bcff07 ]
Some arch + compiler combinations report a potentially
btrfs: initialize location to fix -Wmaybe-uninitialized in btrfs_lookup_dentry()
[ Upstream commit b8e947e9f64cac9df85a07672b658df5b2bcff07 ]
Some arch + compiler combinations report a potentially unused variable location in btrfs_lookup_dentry(). This is a false alert as the variable is passed by value and always valid or there's an error. The compilers cannot probably reason about that although btrfs_inode_by_name() is in the same file.
> + /kisskb/src/fs/btrfs/inode.c: error: 'location.objectid' may be used +uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]: => 5603:9 > + /kisskb/src/fs/btrfs/inode.c: error: 'location.type' may be used +uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]: => 5674:5
m68k-gcc8/m68k-allmodconfig mips-gcc8/mips-allmodconfig powerpc-gcc5/powerpc-all{mod,yes}config powerpc-gcc5/ppc64_defconfig
Initialize it to zero, this should fix the warnings and won't change the behaviour as btrfs_inode_by_name() accepts only a root or inode item types, otherwise returns an error.
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/bd4e9928-17b3-9257-8ba7-6b7f9bbb639a@linux-m68k.org/ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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#
26d0dfbb |
| 29-Aug-2024 |
Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.48' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.48 stable release
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Revision tags: v6.6.43, v6.6.42, v6.6.41, v6.6.40, v6.6.39, v6.6.38, v6.6.37, v6.6.36, v6.6.35, v6.6.34, v6.6.33, v6.6.32, v6.6.31, v6.6.30, v6.6.29, v6.6.28, v6.6.27, v6.6.26, v6.6.25, v6.6.24, v6.6.23, v6.6.16, v6.6.15, v6.6.14, v6.6.13 |
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#
1bca9776 |
| 16-Jan-2024 |
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
btrfs: replace sb::s_blocksize by fs_info::sectorsize
[ Upstream commit 4e00422ee62663e31e611d7de4d2c4aa3f8555f2 ]
The block size stored in the super block is used by subsystems outside of btrfs an
btrfs: replace sb::s_blocksize by fs_info::sectorsize
[ Upstream commit 4e00422ee62663e31e611d7de4d2c4aa3f8555f2 ]
The block size stored in the super block is used by subsystems outside of btrfs and it's a copy of fs_info::sectorsize. Unify that to always use our sectorsize, with the exception of mount where we first need to use fixed values (4K) until we read the super block and can set the sectorsize.
Replace all uses, in most cases it's fewer pointer indirections.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Stable-dep-of: 46a6e10a1ab1 ("btrfs: send: allow cloning non-aligned extent if it ends at i_size") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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46ca3ec9 |
| 24-Jan-2024 |
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
btrfs: handle invalid root reference found in may_destroy_subvol()
[ Upstream commit 6fbc6f4ac1f4907da4fc674251527e7dc79ffbf6 ]
The may_destroy_subvol() looks up a root by a key, allowing to do an
btrfs: handle invalid root reference found in may_destroy_subvol()
[ Upstream commit 6fbc6f4ac1f4907da4fc674251527e7dc79ffbf6 ]
The may_destroy_subvol() looks up a root by a key, allowing to do an inexact search when key->offset is -1. It's never expected to find such item, as it would break the allowed range of a root id.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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6be93055 |
| 24-Jan-2024 |
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
btrfs: push errors up from add_async_extent()
[ Upstream commit dbe6cda68f0e1be269e6509c8bf3d8d89089c1c4 ]
The memory allocation error in add_async_extent() is not handled properly, return an error
btrfs: push errors up from add_async_extent()
[ Upstream commit dbe6cda68f0e1be269e6509c8bf3d8d89089c1c4 ]
The memory allocation error in add_async_extent() is not handled properly, return an error and push the BUG_ON to the caller. Handling it there is not trivial so at least make it visible.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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e0d77d0f |
| 19-May-2024 |
Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.31' into dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.31 stable release
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570bff14 |
| 26-Mar-2024 |
Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> |
btrfs: make btrfs_clear_delalloc_extent() free delalloc reserve
[ Upstream commit 3c6f0c5ecc8910d4ffb0dfe85609ebc0c91c8f34 ]
Currently, this call site in btrfs_clear_delalloc_extent() only converts
btrfs: make btrfs_clear_delalloc_extent() free delalloc reserve
[ Upstream commit 3c6f0c5ecc8910d4ffb0dfe85609ebc0c91c8f34 ]
Currently, this call site in btrfs_clear_delalloc_extent() only converts the reservation. We are marking it not delalloc, so I don't think it makes sense to keep the rsv around. This is a path where we are not sure to join a transaction, so it leads to incorrect free-ing during umount.
Helps with the pass rate of generic/269 and generic/475.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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c1e01cdb |
| 02-May-2024 |
Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.30' into dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.30 stable release
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5e2239fe |
| 06-Apr-2024 |
Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me> |
btrfs: fallback if compressed IO fails for ENOSPC
commit 131a821a243f89be312ced9e62ccc37b2cf3846c upstream.
In commit b4ccace878f4 ("btrfs: refactor submit_compressed_extents()"), if an async exten
btrfs: fallback if compressed IO fails for ENOSPC
commit 131a821a243f89be312ced9e62ccc37b2cf3846c upstream.
In commit b4ccace878f4 ("btrfs: refactor submit_compressed_extents()"), if an async extent compressed but failed to find enough space, we changed from falling back to an uncompressed write to just failing the write altogether. The principle was that if there's not enough space to write the compressed version of the data, there can't possibly be enough space to write the larger, uncompressed version of the data.
However, this isn't necessarily true: due to fragmentation, there could be enough discontiguous free blocks to write the uncompressed version, but not enough contiguous free blocks to write the smaller but unsplittable compressed version.
This has occurred to an internal workload which relied on write()'s return value indicating there was space. While rare, it has happened a few times.
Thus, in order to prevent early ENOSPC, re-add a fallback to uncompressed writing.
Fixes: b4ccace878f4 ("btrfs: refactor submit_compressed_extents()") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Co-developed-by: Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev> Signed-off-by: Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev> Signed-off-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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aeddf9a2 |
| 17-Apr-2024 |
Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.28' into dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.28 stable release
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14431815 |
| 21-Mar-2024 |
Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> |
btrfs: qgroup: fix qgroup prealloc rsv leak in subvolume operations
commit 74e97958121aa1f5854da6effba70143f051b0cd upstream.
Create subvolume, create snapshot and delete subvolume all use btrfs_su
btrfs: qgroup: fix qgroup prealloc rsv leak in subvolume operations
commit 74e97958121aa1f5854da6effba70143f051b0cd upstream.
Create subvolume, create snapshot and delete subvolume all use btrfs_subvolume_reserve_metadata() to reserve metadata for the changes done to the parent subvolume's fs tree, which cannot be mediated in the normal way via start_transaction. When quota groups (squota or qgroups) are enabled, this reserves qgroup metadata of type PREALLOC. Once the operation is associated to a transaction, we convert PREALLOC to PERTRANS, which gets cleared in bulk at the end of the transaction.
However, the error paths of these three operations were not implementing this lifecycle correctly. They unconditionally converted the PREALLOC to PERTRANS in a generic cleanup step regardless of errors or whether the operation was fully associated to a transaction or not. This resulted in error paths occasionally converting this rsv to PERTRANS without calling record_root_in_trans successfully, which meant that unless that root got recorded in the transaction by some other thread, the end of the transaction would not free that root's PERTRANS, leaking it. Ultimately, this resulted in hitting a WARN in CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG builds at unmount for the leaked reservation.
The fix is to ensure that every qgroup PREALLOC reservation observes the following properties:
1. any failure before record_root_in_trans is called successfully results in freeing the PREALLOC reservation. 2. after record_root_in_trans, we convert to PERTRANS, and now the transaction owns freeing the reservation.
This patch enforces those properties on the three operations. Without it, generic/269 with squotas enabled at mkfs time would fail in ~5-10 runs on my system. With this patch, it ran successfully 1000 times in a row.
Fixes: e85fde5162bf ("btrfs: qgroup: fix qgroup meta rsv leak for subvolume operations") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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