Revision tags: v6.6.71 |
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9144f784 |
| 09-Jan-2025 |
Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.70' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.70 stable release
Conflicts: include/linux/usb/chipidea.h
Conflict was a trivial addition.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jeffery <andrew@c
Merge tag 'v6.6.70' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.70 stable release
Conflicts: include/linux/usb/chipidea.h
Conflict was a trivial addition.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au>
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Revision tags: v6.6.70, v6.6.69, v6.6.68, v6.6.67, v6.6.66, v6.6.65, v6.6.64, v6.6.63, v6.6.62, v6.6.61, v6.6.60, v6.6.59, v6.6.58, v6.6.57, v6.6.56, v6.6.55, v6.6.54, v6.6.53, v6.6.52, v6.6.51, v6.6.50, v6.6.49, v6.6.48, v6.6.47, v6.6.46, v6.6.45, v6.6.44, v6.6.43, v6.6.42, v6.6.41, v6.6.40, v6.6.39, v6.6.38, v6.6.37, v6.6.36, v6.6.35, v6.6.34, v6.6.33, v6.6.32, v6.6.31, v6.6.30, v6.6.29, v6.6.28, v6.6.27, v6.6.26, v6.6.25, v6.6.24, v6.6.23, v6.6.16, v6.6.15, v6.6.14, v6.6.13, v6.6.12, v6.6.11, v6.6.10, v6.6.9, v6.6.8, v6.6.7, v6.6.6, v6.6.5, v6.6.4, v6.6.3, v6.6.2, v6.5.11, v6.6.1, v6.5.10, v6.6, v6.5.9, v6.5.8, v6.5.7, v6.5.6 |
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0d2cc60b |
| 27-Sep-2023 |
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> |
btrfs: rename and export __btrfs_cow_block()
[ Upstream commit 95f93bc4cbcac6121a5ee85cd5019ee8e7447e0b ]
Rename and export __btrfs_cow_block() as btrfs_force_cow_block(). This is to allow to move
btrfs: rename and export __btrfs_cow_block()
[ Upstream commit 95f93bc4cbcac6121a5ee85cd5019ee8e7447e0b ]
Rename and export __btrfs_cow_block() as btrfs_force_cow_block(). This is to allow to move defrag specific code out of ctree.c and into defrag.c in one of the next patches.
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Stable-dep-of: 44f52bbe96df ("btrfs: fix use-after-free when COWing tree bock and tracing is enabled") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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34d6f206 |
| 07-Oct-2024 |
Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.54' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.54 stable release
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f56a6d9c |
| 03-Sep-2024 |
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> |
btrfs: fix race setting file private on concurrent lseek using same fd
[ Upstream commit 7ee85f5515e86a4e2a2f51969795920733912bad ]
When doing concurrent lseek(2) system calls against the same file
btrfs: fix race setting file private on concurrent lseek using same fd
[ Upstream commit 7ee85f5515e86a4e2a2f51969795920733912bad ]
When doing concurrent lseek(2) system calls against the same file descriptor, using multiple threads belonging to the same process, we have a short time window where a race happens and can result in a memory leak.
The race happens like this:
1) A program opens a file descriptor for a file and then spawns two threads (with the pthreads library for example), lets call them task A and task B;
2) Task A calls lseek with SEEK_DATA or SEEK_HOLE and ends up at file.c:find_desired_extent() while holding a read lock on the inode;
3) At the start of find_desired_extent(), it extracts the file's private_data pointer into a local variable named 'private', which has a value of NULL;
4) Task B also calls lseek with SEEK_DATA or SEEK_HOLE, locks the inode in shared mode and enters file.c:find_desired_extent(), where it also extracts file->private_data into its local variable 'private', which has a NULL value;
5) Because it saw a NULL file private, task A allocates a private structure and assigns to the file structure;
6) Task B also saw a NULL file private so it also allocates its own file private and then assigns it to the same file structure, since both tasks are using the same file descriptor.
At this point we leak the private structure allocated by task A.
Besides the memory leak, there's also the detail that both tasks end up using the same cached state record in the private structure (struct btrfs_file_private::llseek_cached_state), which can result in a use-after-free problem since one task can free it while the other is still using it (only one task took a reference count on it). Also, sharing the cached state is not a good idea since it could result in incorrect results in the future - right now it should not be a problem because it end ups being used only in extent-io-tree.c:count_range_bits() where we do range validation before using the cached state.
Fix this by protecting the private assignment and check of a file while holding the inode's spinlock and keep track of the task that allocated the private, so that it's used only by that task in order to prevent user-after-free issues with the cached state record as well as potentially using it incorrectly in the future.
Fixes: 3c32c7212f16 ("btrfs: use cached state when looking for delalloc ranges with lseek") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.6+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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ca2478a7 |
| 12-Sep-2024 |
Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.51' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.51 stable release
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7b5595f3 |
| 29-Aug-2024 |
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> |
btrfs: fix race between direct IO write and fsync when using same fd
commit cd9253c23aedd61eb5ff11f37a36247cd46faf86 upstream.
If we have 2 threads that are using the same file descriptor and one o
btrfs: fix race between direct IO write and fsync when using same fd
commit cd9253c23aedd61eb5ff11f37a36247cd46faf86 upstream.
If we have 2 threads that are using the same file descriptor and one of them is doing direct IO writes while the other is doing fsync, we have a race where we can end up either:
1) Attempt a fsync without holding the inode's lock, triggering an assertion failures when assertions are enabled;
2) Do an invalid memory access from the fsync task because the file private points to memory allocated on stack by the direct IO task and it may be used by the fsync task after the stack was destroyed.
The race happens like this:
1) A user space program opens a file descriptor with O_DIRECT;
2) The program spawns 2 threads using libpthread for example;
3) One of the threads uses the file descriptor to do direct IO writes, while the other calls fsync using the same file descriptor.
4) Call task A the thread doing direct IO writes and task B the thread doing fsyncs;
5) Task A does a direct IO write, and at btrfs_direct_write() sets the file's private to an on stack allocated private with the member 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true;
6) Task B enters btrfs_sync_file() and sees that there's a private structure associated to the file which has 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true, so it skips locking the inode's VFS lock;
7) Task A completes the direct IO write, and resets the file's private to NULL since it had no prior private and our private was stack allocated. Then it unlocks the inode's VFS lock;
8) Task B enters btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging(), then the assertion that checks the inode's VFS lock is held fails, since task B never locked it and task A has already unlocked it.
The stack trace produced is the following:
assertion failed: inode_is_locked(&inode->vfs_inode), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 9 PID: 5072 Comm: worker Tainted: G U OE 6.10.5-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 69f48d427608e1c09e60ea24c6c55e2ca1b049e8 Hardware name: Acer Predator PH315-52/Covini_CFS, BIOS V1.12 07/28/2020 RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs] Code: 50 d6 86 c0 e8 (...) RSP: 0018:ffff9e4a03dcfc78 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff9078a9868e98 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff907dce4a7800 RDI: ffff907dce4a7800 RBP: ffff907805518800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e4a03dcfb38 R10: ffff9e4a03dcfb30 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff907684ae7800 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff90774646b600 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f04b96006c0(0000) GS:ffff907dce480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f32acbfc000 CR3: 00000001fd4fa005 CR4: 00000000003726f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x14/0x24 ? die+0x2e/0x50 ? do_trap+0xca/0x110 ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] btrfs_sync_file+0x21a/0x4d0 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? __seccomp_filter+0x31d/0x4f0 __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 ? do_futex+0xcb/0x190 ? __x64_sys_futex+0x10e/0x1d0 ? switch_fpu_return+0x4f/0xd0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Another problem here is if task B grabs the private pointer and then uses it after task A has finished, since the private was allocated in the stack of task A, it results in some invalid memory access with a hard to predict result.
This issue, triggering the assertion, was observed with QEMU workloads by two users in the Link tags below.
Fix this by not relying on a file's private to pass information to fsync that it should skip locking the inode and instead pass this information through a special value stored in current->journal_info. This is safe because in the relevant section of the direct IO write path we are not holding a transaction handle, so current->journal_info is NULL.
The following C program triggers the issue:
$ cat repro.c /* Get the O_DIRECT definition. */ #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif
#include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <errno.h> #include <string.h> #include <pthread.h>
static int fd;
static ssize_t do_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, off_t offset) { while (count > 0) { ssize_t ret;
ret = pwrite(fd, buf, count, offset); if (ret < 0) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; return ret; } count -= ret; buf += ret; } return 0; }
static void *fsync_loop(void *arg) { while (1) { int ret;
ret = fsync(fd); if (ret != 0) { perror("Fsync failed"); exit(6); } } }
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { long pagesize; void *write_buf; pthread_t fsyncer; int ret;
if (argc != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "Use: %s <file path>\n", argv[0]); return 1; }
fd = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_DIRECT, 0666); if (fd == -1) { perror("Failed to open/create file"); return 1; }
pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); if (pagesize == -1) { perror("Failed to get page size"); return 2; }
ret = posix_memalign(&write_buf, pagesize, pagesize); if (ret) { perror("Failed to allocate buffer"); return 3; }
ret = pthread_create(&fsyncer, NULL, fsync_loop, NULL); if (ret != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create writer thread: %d\n", ret); return 4; }
while (1) { ret = do_write(fd, write_buf, pagesize, 0); if (ret != 0) { perror("Write failed"); exit(5); } }
return 0; }
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdi $ mount /dev/sdi /mnt/sdi $ timeout 10 ./repro /mnt/sdi/foo
Usually the race is triggered within less than 1 second. A test case for fstests will follow soon.
Reported-by: Paulo Dias <paulo.miguel.dias@gmail.com> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219187 Reported-by: Andreas Jahn <jahn-andi@web.de> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219199 Reported-by: syzbot+4704b3cc972bd76024f1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000044ff540620d7dee2@google.com/ Fixes: 939b656bc8ab ("btrfs: fix corruption after buffer fault in during direct IO append write") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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c005e2f6 |
| 14-Aug-2024 |
Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.46' into for/openbmc/dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.46 stable release
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0a108bde |
| 26-Jul-2024 |
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> |
btrfs: fix corruption after buffer fault in during direct IO append write
commit 939b656bc8ab203fdbde26ccac22bcb7f0985be5 upstream.
During an append (O_APPEND write flag) direct IO write if the inp
btrfs: fix corruption after buffer fault in during direct IO append write
commit 939b656bc8ab203fdbde26ccac22bcb7f0985be5 upstream.
During an append (O_APPEND write flag) direct IO write if the input buffer was not previously faulted in, we can corrupt the file in a way that the final size is unexpected and it includes an unexpected hole.
The problem happens like this:
1) We have an empty file, with size 0, for example;
2) We do an O_APPEND direct IO with a length of 4096 bytes and the input buffer is not currently faulted in;
3) We enter btrfs_direct_write(), lock the inode and call generic_write_checks(), which calls generic_write_checks_count(), and that function sets the iocb position to 0 with the following code:
if (iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_APPEND) iocb->ki_pos = i_size_read(inode);
4) We call btrfs_dio_write() and enter into iomap, which will end up calling btrfs_dio_iomap_begin() and that calls btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write(), where we update the i_size of the inode to 4096 bytes;
5) After btrfs_dio_iomap_begin() returns, iomap will attempt to access the page of the write input buffer (at iomap_dio_bio_iter(), with a call to bio_iov_iter_get_pages()) and fail with -EFAULT, which gets returned to btrfs at btrfs_direct_write() via btrfs_dio_write();
6) At btrfs_direct_write() we get the -EFAULT error, unlock the inode, fault in the write buffer and then goto to the label 'relock';
7) We lock again the inode, do all the necessary checks again and call again generic_write_checks(), which calls generic_write_checks_count() again, and there we set the iocb's position to 4K, which is the current i_size of the inode, with the following code pointed above:
if (iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_APPEND) iocb->ki_pos = i_size_read(inode);
8) Then we go again to btrfs_dio_write() and enter iomap and the write succeeds, but it wrote to the file range [4K, 8K), leaving a hole in the [0, 4K) range and an i_size of 8K, which goes against the expectations of having the data written to the range [0, 4K) and get an i_size of 4K.
Fix this by not unlocking the inode before faulting in the input buffer, in case we get -EFAULT or an incomplete write, and not jumping to the 'relock' label after faulting in the buffer - instead jump to a location immediately before calling iomap, skipping all the write checks and relocking. This solves this problem and it's fine even in case the input buffer is memory mapped to the same file range, since only holding the range locked in the inode's io tree can cause a deadlock, it's safe to keep the inode lock (VFS lock), as was fixed and described in commit 51bd9563b678 ("btrfs: fix deadlock due to page faults during direct IO reads and writes").
A sample reproducer provided by a reporter is the following:
$ cat test.c #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif
#include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <unistd.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc < 2) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <test file>\n", argv[0]); return 1; }
int fd = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_DIRECT | O_APPEND, 0644); if (fd < 0) { perror("creating test file"); return 1; }
char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); ssize_t ret = write(fd, buf, 4096); if (ret < 0) { perror("pwritev2"); return 1; }
struct stat stbuf; ret = fstat(fd, &stbuf); if (ret < 0) { perror("stat"); return 1; }
printf("size: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)stbuf.st_size); return stbuf.st_size == 4096 ? 0 : 1; }
A test case for fstests will be sent soon.
Reported-by: Hanna Czenczek <hreitz@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/0b841d46-12fe-4e64-9abb-871d8d0de271@redhat.com/ Fixes: 8184620ae212 ("btrfs: fix lost file sync on direct IO write with nowait and dsync iocb") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Tested-by: Hanna Czenczek <hreitz@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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b97d6790 |
| 13-Dec-2023 |
Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> |
Merge tag 'v6.6.6' into dev-6.6
This is the 6.6.6 stable release
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
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Revision tags: v6.5.5, v6.5.4, v6.5.3 |
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d5e09e38 |
| 12-Sep-2023 |
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> |
btrfs: abort transaction on generation mismatch when marking eb as dirty
[ Upstream commit 50564b651d01c19ce732819c5b3c3fd60707188e ]
When marking an extent buffer as dirty, at btrfs_mark_buffer_di
btrfs: abort transaction on generation mismatch when marking eb as dirty
[ Upstream commit 50564b651d01c19ce732819c5b3c3fd60707188e ]
When marking an extent buffer as dirty, at btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(), we check if its generation matches the running transaction and if not we just print a warning. Such mismatch is an indicator that something really went wrong and only printing a warning message (and stack trace) is not enough to prevent a corruption. Allowing a transaction to commit with such an extent buffer will trigger an error if we ever try to read it from disk due to a generation mismatch with its parent generation.
So abort the current transaction with -EUCLEAN if we notice a generation mismatch. For this we need to pass a transaction handle to btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty() which is always available except in test code, in which case we can pass NULL since it operates on dummy extent buffers and all test roots have a single node/leaf (root node at level 0).
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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e017769f |
| 23-Oct-2023 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
Merge tag 'for-6.6-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fix from David Sterba: "One more fix for a problem with snapshot of a newly created subvolume t
Merge tag 'for-6.6-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fix from David Sterba: "One more fix for a problem with snapshot of a newly created subvolume that can lead to inconsistent data under some circumstances. Kernel 6.5 added a performance optimization to skip transaction commit for subvolume creation but this could end up with newer data on disk but not linked to other structures.
The fix itself is an added condition, the rest of the patch is a parameter added to several functions"
* tag 'for-6.6-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: btrfs: fix unwritten extent buffer after snapshotting a new subvolume
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eb96e221 |
| 19-Oct-2023 |
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> |
btrfs: fix unwritten extent buffer after snapshotting a new subvolume
When creating a snapshot of a subvolume that was created in the current transaction, we can end up not persisting a dirty extent
btrfs: fix unwritten extent buffer after snapshotting a new subvolume
When creating a snapshot of a subvolume that was created in the current transaction, we can end up not persisting a dirty extent buffer that is referenced by the snapshot, resulting in IO errors due to checksum failures when trying to read the extent buffer later from disk. A sequence of steps that leads to this is the following:
1) At ioctl.c:create_subvol() we allocate an extent buffer, with logical address 36007936, for the leaf/root of a new subvolume that has an ID of 291. We mark the extent buffer as dirty, and at this point the subvolume tree has a single node/leaf which is also its root (level 0);
2) We no longer commit the transaction used to create the subvolume at create_subvol(). We used to, but that was recently removed in commit 1b53e51a4a8f ("btrfs: don't commit transaction for every subvol create");
3) The transaction used to create the subvolume has an ID of 33, so the extent buffer 36007936 has a generation of 33;
4) Several updates happen to subvolume 291 during transaction 33, several files created and its tree height changes from 0 to 1, so we end up with a new root at level 1 and the extent buffer 36007936 is now a leaf of that new root node, which is extent buffer 36048896.
The commit root remains as 36007936, since we are still at transaction 33;
5) Creation of a snapshot of subvolume 291, with an ID of 292, starts at ioctl.c:create_snapshot(). This triggers a commit of transaction 33 and we end up at transaction.c:create_pending_snapshot(), in the critical section of a transaction commit.
There we COW the root of subvolume 291, which is extent buffer 36048896. The COW operation returns extent buffer 36048896, since there's no need to COW because the extent buffer was created in this transaction and it was not written yet.
The we call btrfs_copy_root() against the root node 36048896. During this operation we allocate a new extent buffer to turn into the root node of the snapshot, copy the contents of the root node 36048896 into this snapshot root extent buffer, set the owner to 292 (the ID of the snapshot), etc, and then we call btrfs_inc_ref(). This will create a delayed reference for each leaf pointed by the root node with a reference root of 292 - this includes a reference for the leaf 36007936.
After that we set the bit BTRFS_ROOT_FORCE_COW in the root's state.
Then we call btrfs_insert_dir_item(), to create the directory entry in in the tree of subvolume 291 that points to the snapshot. This ends up needing to modify leaf 36007936 to insert the respective directory items. Because the bit BTRFS_ROOT_FORCE_COW is set for the root's state, we need to COW the leaf. We end up at btrfs_force_cow_block() and then at update_ref_for_cow().
At update_ref_for_cow() we call btrfs_block_can_be_shared() which returns false, despite the fact the leaf 36007936 is shared - the subvolume's root and the snapshot's root point to that leaf. The reason that it incorrectly returns false is because the commit root of the subvolume is extent buffer 36007936 - it was the initial root of the subvolume when we created it. So btrfs_block_can_be_shared() which has the following logic:
int btrfs_block_can_be_shared(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *buf) { if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_SHAREABLE, &root->state) && buf != root->node && buf != root->commit_root && (btrfs_header_generation(buf) <= btrfs_root_last_snapshot(&root->root_item) || btrfs_header_flag(buf, BTRFS_HEADER_FLAG_RELOC))) return 1;
return 0; }
Returns false (0) since 'buf' (extent buffer 36007936) matches the root's commit root.
As a result, at update_ref_for_cow(), we don't check for the number of references for extent buffer 36007936, we just assume it's not shared and therefore that it has only 1 reference, so we set the local variable 'refs' to 1.
Later on, in the final if-else statement at update_ref_for_cow():
static noinline int update_ref_for_cow(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *buf, struct extent_buffer *cow, int *last_ref) { (...) if (refs > 1) { (...) } else { (...) btrfs_clear_buffer_dirty(trans, buf); *last_ref = 1; } }
So we mark the extent buffer 36007936 as not dirty, and as a result we don't write it to disk later in the transaction commit, despite the fact that the snapshot's root points to it.
Attempting to access the leaf or dumping the tree for example shows that the extent buffer was not written:
$ btrfs inspect-internal dump-tree -t 292 /dev/sdb btrfs-progs v6.2.2 file tree key (292 ROOT_ITEM 33) node 36110336 level 1 items 2 free space 119 generation 33 owner 292 node 36110336 flags 0x1(WRITTEN) backref revision 1 checksum stored a8103e3e checksum calced a8103e3e fs uuid 90c9a46f-ae9f-4626-9aff-0cbf3e2e3a79 chunk uuid e8c9c885-78f4-4d31-85fe-89e5f5fd4a07 key (256 INODE_ITEM 0) block 36007936 gen 33 key (257 EXTENT_DATA 0) block 36052992 gen 33 checksum verify failed on 36007936 wanted 0x00000000 found 0x86005f29 checksum verify failed on 36007936 wanted 0x00000000 found 0x86005f29 total bytes 107374182400 bytes used 38572032 uuid 90c9a46f-ae9f-4626-9aff-0cbf3e2e3a79
The respective on disk region is full of zeroes as the device was trimmed at mkfs time.
Obviously 'btrfs check' also detects and complains about this:
$ btrfs check /dev/sdb Opening filesystem to check... Checking filesystem on /dev/sdb UUID: 90c9a46f-ae9f-4626-9aff-0cbf3e2e3a79 generation: 33 (33) [1/7] checking root items [2/7] checking extents checksum verify failed on 36007936 wanted 0x00000000 found 0x86005f29 checksum verify failed on 36007936 wanted 0x00000000 found 0x86005f29 checksum verify failed on 36007936 wanted 0x00000000 found 0x86005f29 bad tree block 36007936, bytenr mismatch, want=36007936, have=0 owner ref check failed [36007936 4096] ERROR: errors found in extent allocation tree or chunk allocation [3/7] checking free space tree [4/7] checking fs roots checksum verify failed on 36007936 wanted 0x00000000 found 0x86005f29 checksum verify failed on 36007936 wanted 0x00000000 found 0x86005f29 checksum verify failed on 36007936 wanted 0x00000000 found 0x86005f29 bad tree block 36007936, bytenr mismatch, want=36007936, have=0 The following tree block(s) is corrupted in tree 292: tree block bytenr: 36110336, level: 1, node key: (256, 1, 0) root 292 root dir 256 not found ERROR: errors found in fs roots found 38572032 bytes used, error(s) found total csum bytes: 16048 total tree bytes: 1265664 total fs tree bytes: 1118208 total extent tree bytes: 65536 btree space waste bytes: 562598 file data blocks allocated: 65978368 referenced 36569088
Fix this by updating btrfs_block_can_be_shared() to consider that an extent buffer may be shared if it matches the commit root and if its generation matches the current transaction's generation.
This can be reproduced with the following script:
$ cat test.sh #!/bin/bash
MNT=/mnt/sdi DEV=/dev/sdi
# Use a filesystem with a 64K node size so that we have the same node # size on every machine regardless of its page size (on x86_64 default # node size is 16K due to the 4K page size, while on PPC it's 64K by # default). This way we can make sure we are able to create a btree for # the subvolume with a height of 2. mkfs.btrfs -f -n 64K $DEV mount $DEV $MNT
btrfs subvolume create $MNT/subvol
# Create a few empty files on the subvolume, this bumps its btree # height to 2 (root node at level 1 and 2 leaves). for ((i = 1; i <= 300; i++)); do echo -n > $MNT/subvol/file_$i done
btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT/subvol $MNT/subvol/snap
umount $DEV
btrfs check $DEV
Running it on a 6.5 kernel (or any 6.6-rc kernel at the moment):
$ ./test.sh Create subvolume '/mnt/sdi/subvol' Create a readonly snapshot of '/mnt/sdi/subvol' in '/mnt/sdi/subvol/snap' Opening filesystem to check... Checking filesystem on /dev/sdi UUID: bbdde2ff-7d02-45ca-8a73-3c36f23755a1 [1/7] checking root items [2/7] checking extents parent transid verify failed on 30539776 wanted 7 found 5 parent transid verify failed on 30539776 wanted 7 found 5 parent transid verify failed on 30539776 wanted 7 found 5 Ignoring transid failure owner ref check failed [30539776 65536] ERROR: errors found in extent allocation tree or chunk allocation [3/7] checking free space tree [4/7] checking fs roots parent transid verify failed on 30539776 wanted 7 found 5 Ignoring transid failure Wrong key of child node/leaf, wanted: (256, 1, 0), have: (2, 132, 0) Wrong generation of child node/leaf, wanted: 5, have: 7 root 257 root dir 256 not found ERROR: errors found in fs roots found 917504 bytes used, error(s) found total csum bytes: 0 total tree bytes: 851968 total fs tree bytes: 393216 total extent tree bytes: 65536 btree space waste bytes: 736550 file data blocks allocated: 0 referenced 0
A test case for fstests will follow soon.
Fixes: 1b53e51a4a8f ("btrfs: don't commit transaction for every subvol create") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.5+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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c900529f |
| 12-Sep-2023 |
Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de> |
Merge drm/drm-fixes into drm-misc-fixes
Forwarding to v6.6-rc1.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
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Revision tags: v6.5.2, v6.1.51, v6.5.1 |
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1ac731c5 |
| 30-Aug-2023 |
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> |
Merge branch 'next' into for-linus
Prepare input updates for 6.6 merge window.
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Revision tags: v6.1.50, v6.5, v6.1.49, v6.1.48 |
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#
57ce6427 |
| 24-Aug-2023 |
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
Conflicts:
include/net/inet_sock.h f866fbc842de ("ipv4: fix data-races around ine
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
Conflicts:
include/net/inet_sock.h f866fbc842de ("ipv4: fix data-races around inet->inet_id") c274af224269 ("inet: introduce inet->inet_flags") https://lore.kernel.org/all/679ddff6-db6e-4ff6-b177-574e90d0103d@tessares.net/
Adjacent changes:
drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c e74216b8def3 ("bonding: fix macvlan over alb bond support") f11e5bd159b0 ("bonding: support balance-alb with openvswitch")
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac.c d6499f0b7c7c ("net: bgmac: Return PTR_ERR() for fixed_phy_register()") 23a14488ea58 ("net: bgmac: Fix return value check for fixed_phy_register()")
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmmii.c 32bbe64a1386 ("net: bcmgenet: Fix return value check for fixed_phy_register()") acf50d1adbf4 ("net: bcmgenet: Return PTR_ERR() for fixed_phy_register()")
net/sctp/socket.c f866fbc842de ("ipv4: fix data-races around inet->inet_id") b09bde5c3554 ("inet: move inet->mc_loop to inet->inet_frags")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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fdebffeb |
| 23-Aug-2023 |
Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> |
BackMerge tag 'v6.5-rc7' into drm-next
Linux 6.5-rc7
This is needed for the CI stuff and the msm pull has fixes in it.
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
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#
642073c3 |
| 20-Aug-2023 |
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
Merge commit b320441c04c9 ("Merge tag 'tty-6.5-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty") into tty-next
We need the serial-core fixes in here as well.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kr
Merge commit b320441c04c9 ("Merge tag 'tty-6.5-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty") into tty-next
We need the serial-core fixes in here as well.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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12e6cced |
| 19-Aug-2023 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
Merge tag 'for-6.5-rc6-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
- fix infinite loop in readdir(), could happen in a big directory when
Merge tag 'for-6.5-rc6-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
- fix infinite loop in readdir(), could happen in a big directory when files get renamed during enumeration
- fix extent map handling of skipped pinned ranges
- fix a corner case when handling ordered extent length
- fix a potential crash when balance cancel races with pause
- verify correct uuid when starting scrub or device replace
* tag 'for-6.5-rc6-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: btrfs: fix incorrect splitting in btrfs_drop_extent_map_range btrfs: fix BUG_ON condition in btrfs_cancel_balance btrfs: only subtract from len_to_oe_boundary when it is tracking an extent btrfs: fix replace/scrub failure with metadata_uuid btrfs: fix infinite directory reads
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Revision tags: v6.1.46 |
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#
9b378f6a |
| 13-Aug-2023 |
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> |
btrfs: fix infinite directory reads
The readdir implementation currently processes always up to the last index it finds. This however can result in an infinite loop if the directory has a large numb
btrfs: fix infinite directory reads
The readdir implementation currently processes always up to the last index it finds. This however can result in an infinite loop if the directory has a large number of entries such that they won't all fit in the given buffer passed to the readdir callback, that is, dir_emit() returns a non-zero value. Because in that case readdir() will be called again and if in the meanwhile new directory entries were added and we still can't put all the remaining entries in the buffer, we keep repeating this over and over.
The following C program and test script reproduce the problem:
$ cat /mnt/readdir_prog.c #include <sys/types.h> #include <dirent.h> #include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { DIR *dir = opendir("."); struct dirent *dd;
while ((dd = readdir(dir))) { printf("%s\n", dd->d_name); rename(dd->d_name, "TEMPFILE"); rename("TEMPFILE", dd->d_name); } closedir(dir); }
$ gcc -o /mnt/readdir_prog /mnt/readdir_prog.c
$ cat test.sh #!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdi MNT=/mnt/sdi
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV &> /dev/null #mkfs.xfs -f $DEV &> /dev/null #mkfs.ext4 -F $DEV &> /dev/null
mount $DEV $MNT
mkdir $MNT/testdir for ((i = 1; i <= 2000; i++)); do echo -n > $MNT/testdir/file_$i done
cd $MNT/testdir /mnt/readdir_prog
cd /mnt
umount $MNT
This behaviour is surprising to applications and it's unlike ext4, xfs, tmpfs, vfat and other filesystems, which always finish. In this case where new entries were added due to renames, some file names may be reported more than once, but this varies according to each filesystem - for example ext4 never reported the same file more than once while xfs reports the first 13 file names twice.
So change our readdir implementation to track the last index number when opendir() is called and then make readdir() never process beyond that index number. This gives the same behaviour as ext4.
Reported-by: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/2c8c55ec-04c6-e0dc-9c5c-8c7924778c35@landley.net/ Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217681 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.4+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Revision tags: v6.1.45, v6.1.44 |
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#
2612e3bb |
| 07-Aug-2023 |
Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> |
Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next
Catching-up with drm-next and drm-intel-gt-next. It will unblock a code refactor around the platform definitions (names vs acronyms).
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo V
Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next
Catching-up with drm-next and drm-intel-gt-next. It will unblock a code refactor around the platform definitions (names vs acronyms).
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
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#
9f771739 |
| 07-Aug-2023 |
Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> |
Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-gt-next
Need to pull in b3e4aae612ec ("drm/i915/hdcp: Modify hdcp_gsc_message msg sending mechanism") as a dependency for https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/1
Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-gt-next
Need to pull in b3e4aae612ec ("drm/i915/hdcp: Modify hdcp_gsc_message msg sending mechanism") as a dependency for https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/121735/
Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
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Revision tags: v6.1.43, v6.1.42, v6.1.41 |
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#
61b73694 |
| 24-Jul-2023 |
Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de> |
Merge drm/drm-next into drm-misc-next
Backmerging to get v6.5-rc2.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
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Revision tags: v6.1.40, v6.1.39 |
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#
50501936 |
| 17-Jul-2023 |
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> |
Merge tag 'v6.4' into next
Sync up with mainline to bring in updates to shared infrastructure.
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#
0791faeb |
| 17-Jul-2023 |
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> |
ASoC: Merge v6.5-rc2
Get a similar baseline to my other branches, and fixes for people using the branch.
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#
2f98e686 |
| 11-Jul-2023 |
Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org> |
Merge v6.5-rc1 into drm-misc-fixes
Boris needs 6.5-rc1 in drm-misc-fixes to prevent a conflict.
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
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