Merge branch 'main' into zstd-linus

Merge branch 'main' into zstd-next

Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

Prepare input updates for 5.20 (or 6.0) merge window.

Merge tag 'v5.18'

Linux 5.18

Merge tag 'v5.18' into next

Sync up with mainline to get updates to OMAP4 keypad driver and other
upstream goodies.

Merge branch 'topic/cs35l41' into for-next

Pull CS35L41 codec updates

Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-gt-next

Pull in TTM changes needed for DG2 CCS enabling from Ram.

Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next

Sync up with v5.18-rc1, in particular to get 5e3094cfd9fb
("drm/i915/xehpsdv: Add has_flat_ccs to device info").

Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next

Sync up with v5.18-rc1, in particular to get 5e3094cfd9fb
("drm/i915/xehpsdv: Add has_flat_ccs to device info").

Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>

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Merge drm/drm-next into drm-misc-next

Let's start the 5.19 development cycle.

Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>

Merge tag 'asoc-fix-v5.18-rc3' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus

ASoC: Fixes for v5.18

A collection of fixes that came in since the merge window, plus

Merge tag 'asoc-fix-v5.18-rc3' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus

ASoC: Fixes for v5.18

A collection of fixes that came in since the merge window, plus one new
device ID for an x86 laptop. Nothing that really stands out with
particularly big impact outside of the affected device.

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Merge drm/drm-fixes into drm-misc-fixes

Let's start the 5.18 fixes cycle.

Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>

Merge tag 'random-5.18-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random

Pull random number generator fixes from Jason Donenfeld:

- If a hardware random number generator

Merge tag 'random-5.18-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random

Pull random number generator fixes from Jason Donenfeld:

- If a hardware random number generator passes a sufficiently large
chunk of entropy to random.c during early boot, we now skip the
"fast_init" business and let it initialize the RNG.

This makes CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER=y actually useful.

- We already have the command line `random.trust_cpu=0/1` option for
RDRAND, which let distros enable CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y while
placating concerns of more paranoid users.

Now we add `random.trust_bootloader=0/1` so that distros can
similarly enable CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER=y.

- Re-add a comment that got removed by accident in the recent revert.

- Add the spec-compliant ACPI CID for vmgenid, which Microsoft added to
the vmgenid spec at Ard's request during earlier review.

- Restore build-time randomness via the latent entropy plugin, which
was lost when we transitioned to using a hash function.

* tag 'random-5.18-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random:
random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init
virt: vmgenid: recognize new CID added by Hyper-V
random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding
random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle
random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy

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virt: vmgenid: recognize new CID added by Hyper-V

In the Windows spec for VM Generation ID, the originally specified CID
is longer than allowed by the ACPI spec. Hyper-V has added "VMGENCTR" as
a se

virt: vmgenid: recognize new CID added by Hyper-V

In the Windows spec for VM Generation ID, the originally specified CID
is longer than allowed by the ACPI spec. Hyper-V has added "VMGENCTR" as
a second valid CID that is conformant, while retaining the original CID
for compatibility with Windows guests.

Add this new CID to the list recognized by the driver.

Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

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Merge remote-tracking branch 'torvalds/master' into perf/core

To pick up fixes that went thru perf/urgent and now are fixed by an
upcoming patch.

Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redha

Merge remote-tracking branch 'torvalds/master' into perf/core

To pick up fixes that went thru perf/urgent and now are fixed by an
upcoming patch.

Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

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Merge tag 'random-5.18-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random

Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld:
"There have been a few important change

Merge tag 'random-5.18-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random

Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld:
"There have been a few important changes to the RNG's crypto, but the
intent for 5.18 has been to shore up the existing design as much as
possible with modern cryptographic functions and proven constructions,
rather than actually changing up anything fundamental to the RNG's
design.

So it's still the same old RNG at its core as before: it still counts
entropy bits, and collects from the various sources with the same
heuristics as before, and so forth. However, the cryptographic
algorithms that transform that entropic data into safe random numbers
have been modernized.

Just as important, if not more, is that the code has been cleaned up
and re-documented. As one of the first drivers in Linux, going back to
1.3.30, its general style and organization was showing its age and
becoming both a maintenance burden and an auditability impediment.

Hopefully this provides a more solid foundation to build on for the
future. I encourage you to open up the file in full, and maybe you'll
remark, "oh, that's what it's doing," and enjoy reading it. That, at
least, is the eventual goal, which this pull begins working toward.

Here's a summary of the various patches in this pull:

- /dev/urandom and /dev/random now do the same thing, per the patch
we discussed on the list. I think this is worth trying out. If it
does appear problematic, I've made sure to keep it standalone and
revertible without any conflicts.

- Fixes and cleanups for numerous integer type problems, locking
issues, and general code quality concerns.

- The input pool's LFSR has been replaced with a cryptographically
secure hash function, which has security and performance benefits
alike, and consequently allows us to count entropy bits linearly.

- The pre-init injection now uses a real hash function too, instead
of an LFSR or vanilla xor.

- The interrupt handler's fast_mix() function now uses one round of
SipHash, rather than the fake crypto that was there before.

- All additions of RDRAND and RDSEED now go through the input pool's
hash function, in part to mitigate ridiculous hypothetical CPU
backdoors, but more so to have a consistent interface for ingesting
entropy that's easy to analyze, making everything happen one way,
instead of a potpourri of different ways.

- The crng now works on per-cpu data, while also being in accordance
with the actual "fast key erasure RNG" design. This allows us to
fix several boot-time race complications associated with the prior
dynamically allocated model, eliminates much locking, and makes our
backtrack protection more robust.

- Batched entropy now erases doled out values so that it's backtrack
resistant.

- Working closely with Sebastian, the interrupt handler no longer
needs to take any locks at all, as we punt the
synchronized/expensive operations to a workqueue. This is
especially nice for PREEMPT_RT, where taking spinlocks in irq
context is problematic. It also makes the handler faster for the
rest of us.

- Also working with Sebastian, we now do the right thing on CPU
hotplug, so that we don't use stale entropy or fail to accumulate
new entropy when CPUs come back online.

- We handle virtual machines that fork / clone / snapshot, using the
"vmgenid" ACPI specification for retrieving a unique new RNG seed,
which we can use to also make WireGuard (and in the future, other
things) safe across VM forks.

- Around boot time, we now try to reseed more often if enough entropy
is available, before settling on the usual 5 minute schedule.

- Last, but certainly not least, the documentation in the file has
been updated considerably"

* tag 'random-5.18-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random: (60 commits)
random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy
random: reseed more often immediately after booting
random: make consistent usage of crng_ready()
random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator
wireguard: device: clear keys on VM fork
random: provide notifier for VM fork
random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one
random: do not export add_vmfork_randomness() unless needed
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID
ACPI: allow longer device IDs
random: add mechanism for VM forks to reinitialize crng
random: don't let 644 read-only sysctls be written to
random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value
random: block in /dev/urandom
random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq
random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types
random: cleanup UUID handling
random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed
random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32
random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up
...

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virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID

VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at
<https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by
Hyper-V an

virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID

VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at
<https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by
Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper,
<https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as:

If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most
hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind
the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running
a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious
security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows
10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve
a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root
RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the
vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG
system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous
instantiation of the same VM state.

Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by
multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution.
So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly
added add_vmfork_randomness() function.

It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter.
After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state,
then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this
driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is
described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>.
And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in
<https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>.

Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be
an accidental QEMU nuance, per
<https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>,
so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary
blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway,
considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end.

Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io>
Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

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