Searched hist:"5 c3131c3" (Results 1 – 4 of 4) sorted by relevance
/openbmc/qemu/include/sysemu/ |
H A D | kvm_int.h | 5c3131c3 Mon Mar 18 13:41:10 CDT 2024 Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> KVM: track whether guest state is encrypted
So far, KVM has allowed KVM_GET/SET_* ioctls to execute even if the guest state is encrypted, in which case they do nothing. For the new API using VM types, instead, the ioctls will fail which is a safer and more robust approach.
The new API will be the only one available for SEV-SNP and TDX, but it is also usable for SEV and SEV-ES. In preparation for that, require architecture-specific KVM code to communicate the point at which guest state is protected (which must be after kvm_cpu_synchronize_post_init(), though that might change in the future in order to suppor migration). From that point, skip reading registers so that cpu->vcpu_dirty is never true: if it ever becomes true, kvm_arch_put_registers() will fail miserably.
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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H A D | kvm.h | 5c3131c3 Mon Mar 18 13:41:10 CDT 2024 Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> KVM: track whether guest state is encrypted
So far, KVM has allowed KVM_GET/SET_* ioctls to execute even if the guest state is encrypted, in which case they do nothing. For the new API using VM types, instead, the ioctls will fail which is a safer and more robust approach.
The new API will be the only one available for SEV-SNP and TDX, but it is also usable for SEV and SEV-ES. In preparation for that, require architecture-specific KVM code to communicate the point at which guest state is protected (which must be after kvm_cpu_synchronize_post_init(), though that might change in the future in order to suppor migration). From that point, skip reading registers so that cpu->vcpu_dirty is never true: if it ever becomes true, kvm_arch_put_registers() will fail miserably.
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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/openbmc/qemu/target/i386/ |
H A D | sev.c | 5c3131c3 Mon Mar 18 13:41:10 CDT 2024 Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> KVM: track whether guest state is encrypted
So far, KVM has allowed KVM_GET/SET_* ioctls to execute even if the guest state is encrypted, in which case they do nothing. For the new API using VM types, instead, the ioctls will fail which is a safer and more robust approach.
The new API will be the only one available for SEV-SNP and TDX, but it is also usable for SEV and SEV-ES. In preparation for that, require architecture-specific KVM code to communicate the point at which guest state is protected (which must be after kvm_cpu_synchronize_post_init(), though that might change in the future in order to suppor migration). From that point, skip reading registers so that cpu->vcpu_dirty is never true: if it ever becomes true, kvm_arch_put_registers() will fail miserably.
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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/openbmc/qemu/accel/kvm/ |
H A D | kvm-all.c | 5c3131c3 Mon Mar 18 13:41:10 CDT 2024 Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> KVM: track whether guest state is encrypted
So far, KVM has allowed KVM_GET/SET_* ioctls to execute even if the guest state is encrypted, in which case they do nothing. For the new API using VM types, instead, the ioctls will fail which is a safer and more robust approach.
The new API will be the only one available for SEV-SNP and TDX, but it is also usable for SEV and SEV-ES. In preparation for that, require architecture-specific KVM code to communicate the point at which guest state is protected (which must be after kvm_cpu_synchronize_post_init(), though that might change in the future in order to suppor migration). From that point, skip reading registers so that cpu->vcpu_dirty is never true: if it ever becomes true, kvm_arch_put_registers() will fail miserably.
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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