Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/vivier/tags/m68k-for-6.0-pull-request' into staging

Pull request m68k-20210212

Move bootinfo headers to include/standard-headers/asm-m68k
A

Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/vivier/tags/m68k-for-6.0-pull-request' into staging

Pull request m68k-20210212

Move bootinfo headers to include/standard-headers/asm-m68k
Add M68K_FEATURE_MSP, M68K_FEATURE_MOVEC, M68K_FEATURE_M68010
Add 68060 CR BUSCR and PCR (unimplemented)
CPU types and features cleanup

# gpg: Signature made Fri 12 Feb 2021 21:14:28 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key CD2F75DDC8E3A4DC2E4F5173F30C38BD3F2FBE3C
# gpg: issuer "laurent@vivier.eu"
# gpg: Good signature from "Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>" [full]
# gpg: aka "Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>" [full]
# gpg: aka "Laurent Vivier (Red Hat) <lvivier@redhat.com>" [full]
# Primary key fingerprint: CD2F 75DD C8E3 A4DC 2E4F 5173 F30C 38BD 3F2F BE3C

* remotes/vivier/tags/m68k-for-6.0-pull-request:
m68k: import bootinfo headers from linux
m68k: add MSP detection support for stack pointer swap helpers
m68k: MOVEC insn. should generate exception if wrong CR is accessed
m68k: add missing BUSCR/PCR CR defines, and BUSCR/PCR/CAAR CR to m68k_move_to/from
m68k: improve comments on m68k_move_to/from helpers
m68k: cascade m68k_features by m680xx_cpu_initfn() to improve readability
m68k: improve cpu instantiation comments

Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

show more ...

Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/philmd-gitlab/tags/integration-testing-20210208' into staging

Integration testing patches

Tests added:
- Armbian 20.08 on Orange Pi PC (Phi

Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/philmd-gitlab/tags/integration-testing-20210208' into staging

Integration testing patches

Tests added:
- Armbian 20.08 on Orange Pi PC (Philippe)
- MPC8544ds machine (Thomas)
- Virtex-ml507 ppc machine (Thomas)
- Re-enable the microblaze test (Thomas)

Various fixes and documentation improvements from Cleber.

# gpg: Signature made Mon 08 Feb 2021 20:19:12 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key FAABE75E12917221DCFD6BB2E3E32C2CDEADC0DE
# gpg: Good signature from "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé (F4BUG) <f4bug@amsat.org>" [full]
# Primary key fingerprint: FAAB E75E 1291 7221 DCFD 6BB2 E3E3 2C2C DEAD C0DE

* remotes/philmd-gitlab/tags/integration-testing-20210208:
Acceptance Tests: remove unnecessary tag from documentation example
Acceptance tests: clarify ssh connection failure reason
tests/acceptance/virtiofs_submounts: required space between IP and port
tests/acceptance/virtiofs_submounts: standardize port as integer
tests/acceptance/virtiofs_submounts: use a virtio-net device instead
tests/acceptance/virtiofs_submounts: do not ask for ssh key password
tests/acceptance/virtiofs_submounts: use workdir property
tests/acceptance/boot_linux: rename misleading cloudinit method
tests/acceptance/boot_linux: fix typo on cloudinit error message
tests/acceptance: Re-enable the microblaze test
tests/acceptance: Add a test for the virtex-ml507 ppc machine
tests/acceptance: Test the mpc8544ds machine
tests/acceptance: Move the pseries test to a separate file
tests/acceptance: Test U-Boot/Linux from Armbian 20.08 on Orange Pi PC
tests/acceptance: Extract do_test_arm_orangepi_armbian_uboot() method
tests/acceptance: Introduce tesseract_ocr() helper
tests/acceptance: Extract tesseract_available() helper in new namespace

Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

show more ...

Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/dgilbert/tags/pull-migration-20210208a' into staging

Migration pull 2021-02-08

v2
Dropped vmstate: Fix memory leak in vmstate_handle_allo

Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/dgilbert/tags/pull-migration-20210208a' into staging

Migration pull 2021-02-08

v2
Dropped vmstate: Fix memory leak in vmstate_handle_alloc
Broke on Power
Added migration: only check page size match if RAM postcopy is enabled

# gpg: Signature made Mon 08 Feb 2021 11:28:14 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key 45F5C71B4A0CB7FB977A9FA90516331EBC5BFDE7
# gpg: Good signature from "Dr. David Alan Gilbert (RH2) <dgilbert@redhat.com>" [full]
# Primary key fingerprint: 45F5 C71B 4A0C B7FB 977A 9FA9 0516 331E BC5B FDE7

* remotes/dgilbert/tags/pull-migration-20210208a: (27 commits)
migration: only check page size match if RAM postcopy is enabled
migration: introduce snapshot-{save, load, delete} QMP commands
iotests: fix loading of common.config from tests/ subdir
iotests: add support for capturing and matching QMP events
migration: introduce a delete_snapshot wrapper
migration: wire up support for snapshot device selection
migration: control whether snapshots are ovewritten
block: rename and alter bdrv_all_find_snapshot semantics
block: allow specifying name of block device for vmstate storage
block: add ability to specify list of blockdevs during snapshot
migration: stop returning errno from load_snapshot()
migration: Make save_snapshot() return bool, not 0/-1
block: push error reporting into bdrv_all_*_snapshot functions
migration: Display the migration blockers
migration: Add blocker information
migration: Fix a few absurdly defective error messages
migration: Fix cache_init()'s "Failed to allocate" error messages
migration: Clean up signed vs. unsigned XBZRLE cache-size
migration: Fix migrate-set-parameters argument validation
migration: introduce 'userfaultfd-wrlat.py' script
...

Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

show more ...

Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/stsquad/tags/pull-testing-gdbstub-docs-080221-1' into staging

Testing, gdbstub and doc tweaks:

- increase timeout on replay kernel acceptance

Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/stsquad/tags/pull-testing-gdbstub-docs-080221-1' into staging

Testing, gdbstub and doc tweaks:

- increase timeout on replay kernel acceptance test
- fixes for binfmt_misc docker images
- better gdb version detection
- don't silently skip gdb tests
- fix for gdbstub auxv handling
- cleaner handling of check-tcg on tcg disabled builds
- expand vexpress/versitile docs with examples

# gpg: Signature made Mon 08 Feb 2021 11:12:03 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key 6685AE99E75167BCAFC8DF35FBD0DB095A9E2A44
# gpg: Good signature from "Alex Bennée (Master Work Key) <alex.bennee@linaro.org>" [full]
# Primary key fingerprint: 6685 AE99 E751 67BC AFC8 DF35 FBD0 DB09 5A9E 2A44

* remotes/stsquad/tags/pull-testing-gdbstub-docs-080221-1:
docs/system: document an example booting the versatilepb machine
docs/system: document an example vexpress-a15 invocation
tests/Makefile.include: don't use TARGET_DIRS for check-tcg
scripts/mtest2make.py: export all-%s-targets variable and use it
tests/tcg: Replace /bin/true by true (required on macOS)
gdbstub: Fix handle_query_xfer_auxv
tests/tcg: don't silently skip the gdb tests
configure: bump the minimum gdb version for check-tcg to 9.1
configure: make version_ge more tolerant of shady version input
tests/docker: add a docker-exec-copy-test
tests/docker: alias docker-help target for consistency
tests/docker: preserve original name when copying libs
tests/docker: make _copy_with_mkdir accept missing files
tests/docker: Fix typo in help message
tests/docker: Fix _get_so_libs() for docker-binfmt-image
tests/acceptance: Increase the timeout in the replay tests

Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

show more ...

Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/dg-gitlab/tags/cgs-pull-request' into staging

Generalize memory encryption models

A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms wh

Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/dg-gitlab/tags/cgs-pull-request' into staging

Generalize memory encryption models

A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the
hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order
to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor.

AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has
its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism
to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection
level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected
execution environment.

The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each
platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem
ideal for users, or particularly for management layers.

AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option
"machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other
than SEV.

This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration
for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's
"memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a
"confidential-guest-support" property pointing to a platform specific
object which configures and manages the specific details.

Note to Ram Pai: the documentation I've included for PEF is very
minimal. If you could send a patch expanding on that, it would be
very helpful.

Changes since v8:
* Rebase
* Fixed some cosmetic typos
Changes since v7:
* Tweaked and clarified meaning of the 'ready' flag
* Polished the interface to the PEF internals
* Shifted initialization for s390 PV later (I hope I've finally got
this after apply_cpu_model() where it needs to be)
Changes since v6:
* Moved to using OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE and OBJECT_DEFINE_TYPE macros
* Assorted minor fixes
Changes since v5:
* Renamed from "securable guest memory" to "confidential guest
support"
* Simpler reworking of x86 boot time flash encryption
* Added a bunch of documentation
* Fixed some compile errors on POWER
Changes since v4:
* Renamed from "host trust limitation" to "securable guest memory",
which I think is marginally more descriptive
* Re-organized initialization, because the previous model called at
kvm_init didn't work for s390
* Assorted fixes to the s390 implementation; rudimentary testing
(gitlab CI) only
Changes since v3:
* Rebased
* Added first cut at handling of s390 protected virtualization
Changes since RFCv2:
* Rebased
* Removed preliminary SEV cleanups (they've been merged)
* Changed name to "host trust limitation"
* Added migration blocker to the PEF code (based on SEV's version)
Changes since RFCv1:
* Rebased
* Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert

# gpg: Signature made Mon 08 Feb 2021 06:07:27 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key 75F46586AE61A66CC44E87DC6C38CACA20D9B392
# gpg: Good signature from "David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>" [full]
# gpg: aka "David Gibson (Red Hat) <dgibson@redhat.com>" [full]
# gpg: aka "David Gibson (ozlabs.org) <dgibson@ozlabs.org>" [full]
# gpg: aka "David Gibson (kernel.org) <dwg@kernel.org>" [unknown]
# Primary key fingerprint: 75F4 6586 AE61 A66C C44E 87DC 6C38 CACA 20D9 B392

* remotes/dg-gitlab/tags/cgs-pull-request:
s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option
confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests
spapr: PEF: prevent migration
spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support
confidential guest support: Update documentation
confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code
confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag
sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init()
confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property
confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption()
sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption
confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class
qom: Allow optional sugar props

Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

show more ...

confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class

Several architectures have mechanisms which are designed to protect
guest memory from interference or eavesdrop

confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class

Several architectures have mechanisms which are designed to protect
guest memory from interference or eavesdropping by a compromised
hypervisor. AMD SEV does this with in-chip memory encryption and
Intel's TDX can do similar things. POWER's Protected Execution
Framework (PEF) accomplishes a similar goal using an ultravisor and
new memory protection features, instead of encryption.

To (partially) unify handling for these, this introduces a new
ConfidentialGuestSupport QOM base class. "Confidential" is kind of vague,
but "confidential computing" seems to be the buzzword about these schemes,
and "secure" or "protected" are often used in connection to unrelated
things (such as hypervisor-from-guest or guest-from-guest security).

The "support" in the name is significant because in at least some of the
cases it requires the guest to take specific actions in order to protect
itself from hypervisor eavesdropping.

Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>

show more ...