Revision tags: v6.6.25, v6.6.24, v6.6.23, v6.6.16, v6.6.15, v6.6.14, v6.6.13, v6.6.12, v6.6.11, v6.6.10, v6.6.9, v6.6.8, v6.6.7, v6.6.6, v6.6.5, v6.6.4, v6.6.3, v6.6.2, v6.5.11, v6.6.1, v6.5.10, v6.6, v6.5.9, v6.5.8, v6.5.7, v6.5.6, v6.5.5, v6.5.4, v6.5.3, v6.5.2, v6.1.51, v6.5.1, v6.1.50, v6.5, v6.1.49, v6.1.48, v6.1.46, v6.1.45, v6.1.44, v6.1.43, v6.1.42, v6.1.41, v6.1.40 |
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#
0fe53224 |
| 19-Jul-2023 |
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> |
selinux: update my email address
Update my email address; MAINTAINERS was updated some time ago.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul
selinux: update my email address
Update my email address; MAINTAINERS was updated some time ago.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v6.1.39 |
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#
90aa4f5e |
| 18-Jul-2023 |
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> |
selinux: de-brand SELinux
Change "NSA SELinux" to just "SELinux" in Kconfig help text and comments. While NSA was the original primary developer and continues to help maintain SELinux, SELinux has l
selinux: de-brand SELinux
Change "NSA SELinux" to just "SELinux" in Kconfig help text and comments. While NSA was the original primary developer and continues to help maintain SELinux, SELinux has long since transitioned to a wide community of developers and maintainers. SELinux has been part of the mainline Linux kernel for nearly 20 years now [1] and has received contributions from many individuals and organizations.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Pine.LNX.4.44.0308082228470.1852-100000@home.osdl.org/
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v6.1.38, v6.1.37, v6.1.36, v6.4, v6.1.35, v6.1.34, v6.1.33, v6.1.32, v6.1.31, v6.1.30, v6.1.29, v6.1.28, v6.1.27, v6.1.26, v6.3, v6.1.25, v6.1.24, v6.1.23, v6.1.22, v6.1.21, v6.1.20, v6.1.19, v6.1.18, v6.1.17, v6.1.16, v6.1.15, v6.1.14, v6.1.13, v6.2, v6.1.12, v6.1.11, v6.1.10, v6.1.9, v6.1.8, v6.1.7, v6.1.6, v6.1.5, v6.0.19, v6.0.18, v6.1.4, v6.1.3, v6.0.17, v6.1.2, v6.0.16, v6.1.1, v6.0.15, v6.0.14, v6.0.13, v6.1, v6.0.12, v6.0.11, v6.0.10, v5.15.80, v6.0.9, v5.15.79, v6.0.8, v5.15.78, v6.0.7, v5.15.77, v5.15.76, v6.0.6, v6.0.5, v5.15.75, v6.0.4, v6.0.3, v6.0.2, v5.15.74, v5.15.73, v6.0.1, v5.15.72, v6.0, v5.15.71, v5.15.70, v5.15.69, v5.15.68, v5.15.67, v5.15.66, v5.15.65, v5.15.64, v5.15.63, v5.15.62, v5.15.61, v5.15.60, v5.15.59, v5.19, v5.15.58, v5.15.57, v5.15.56, v5.15.55, v5.15.54, v5.15.53, v5.15.52, v5.15.51, v5.15.50, v5.15.49, v5.15.48, v5.15.47, v5.15.46, v5.15.45, v5.15.44, v5.15.43, v5.15.42, v5.18, v5.15.41, v5.15.40, v5.15.39, v5.15.38, v5.15.37, v5.15.36, v5.15.35, v5.15.34, v5.15.33, v5.15.32, v5.15.31, v5.17, v5.15.30, v5.15.29, v5.15.28, v5.15.27, v5.15.26, v5.15.25, v5.15.24, v5.15.23, v5.15.22, v5.15.21, v5.15.20, v5.15.19, v5.15.18, v5.15.17, v5.4.173, v5.15.16, v5.15.15, v5.16, v5.15.10, v5.15.9, v5.15.8, v5.15.7, v5.15.6, v5.15.5, v5.15.4, v5.15.3, v5.15.2, v5.15.1, v5.15, v5.14.14, v5.14.13, v5.14.12, v5.14.11, v5.14.10, v5.14.9, v5.14.8, v5.14.7, v5.14.6, v5.10.67, v5.10.66, v5.14.5, v5.14.4, v5.10.65, v5.14.3, v5.10.64, v5.14.2, v5.10.63, v5.14.1, v5.10.62, v5.14, v5.10.61, v5.10.60, v5.10.53, v5.10.52, v5.10.51, v5.10.50, v5.10.49, v5.13, v5.10.46, v5.10.43, v5.10.42, v5.10.41, v5.10.40, v5.10.39, v5.4.119, v5.10.36, v5.10.35, v5.10.34, v5.4.116, v5.10.33, v5.12 |
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#
1aea7808 |
| 22-Apr-2021 |
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> |
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocatin
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
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Revision tags: v5.10.32, v5.10.31, v5.10.30, v5.10.27, v5.10.26, v5.10.25, v5.10.24, v5.10.23, v5.10.22, v5.10.21, v5.10.20, v5.10.19, v5.4.101, v5.10.18, v5.10.17, v5.11, v5.10.16, v5.10.15, v5.10.14, v5.10 |
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b159e86b |
| 04-Nov-2020 |
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> |
selinux: drop super_block backpointer from superblock_security_struct
It appears to have been needed for selinux_complete_init() in the past, but today it's useless.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek
selinux: drop super_block backpointer from superblock_security_struct
It appears to have been needed for selinux_complete_init() in the past, but today it's useless.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v5.8.17, v5.8.16, v5.8.15, v5.9, v5.8.14, v5.8.13, v5.8.12, v5.8.11, v5.8.10, v5.8.9, v5.8.8, v5.8.7, v5.8.6, v5.4.62, v5.8.5, v5.8.4, v5.4.61, v5.8.3, v5.4.60, v5.8.2, v5.4.59, v5.8.1, v5.4.58, v5.4.57, v5.4.56, v5.8, v5.7.12, v5.4.55, v5.7.11, v5.4.54, v5.7.10, v5.4.53, v5.4.52, v5.7.9, v5.7.8, v5.4.51, v5.4.50, v5.7.7, v5.4.49, v5.7.6, v5.7.5, v5.4.48, v5.7.4, v5.7.3, v5.4.47, v5.4.46, v5.7.2, v5.4.45, v5.7.1, v5.4.44, v5.7, v5.4.43, v5.4.42, v5.4.41, v5.4.40, v5.4.39, v5.4.38, v5.4.37, v5.4.36, v5.4.35, v5.4.34, v5.4.33, v5.4.32, v5.4.31, v5.4.30, v5.4.29, v5.6, v5.4.28, v5.4.27, v5.4.26, v5.4.25, v5.4.24, v5.4.23, v5.4.22, v5.4.21, v5.4.20, v5.4.19, v5.4.18, v5.4.17, v5.4.16, v5.5, v5.4.15, v5.4.14, v5.4.13, v5.4.12, v5.4.11, v5.4.10, v5.4.9, v5.4.8, v5.4.7, v5.4.6, v5.4.5, v5.4.4 |
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5c108d4e |
| 13-Dec-2019 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: randomize layout of key structures
Randomize the layout of key selinux data structures. Initially this is applied to the selinux_state, selinux_ss, policydb, and task_security_struct data s
selinux: randomize layout of key structures
Randomize the layout of key selinux data structures. Initially this is applied to the selinux_state, selinux_ss, policydb, and task_security_struct data structures.
NB To test/use this mechanism, one must install the necessary build-time dependencies, e.g. gcc-plugin-devel on Fedora, and enable CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT in the kernel configuration.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [PM: double semi-colon fixed] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v5.4.3, v5.3.15, v5.4.2, v5.4.1, v5.3.14, v5.4, v5.3.13, v5.3.12, v5.3.11, v5.3.10, v5.3.9, v5.3.8, v5.3.7 |
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#
da97e184 |
| 14-Oct-2019 |
Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> |
perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks
In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limita
perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks
In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations:
1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues.
This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems.
5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016.
2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access.
3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed.
4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event.
5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/
Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below.
To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
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Revision tags: v5.3.6, v5.3.5, v5.3.4, v5.3.3, v5.3.2, v5.3.1, v5.3, v5.2.14, v5.3-rc8, v5.2.13, v5.2.12 |
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#
169ce0c0 |
| 04-Sep-2019 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob
We need to use selinux_cred() to fetch the SELinux cred blob instead of directly using current->security or current_security().
selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob
We need to use selinux_cred() to fetch the SELinux cred blob instead of directly using current->security or current_security(). There were a couple of lingering uses of current_security() in the SELinux code that were apparently missed during the earlier conversions. IIUC, this would only manifest as a bug if multiple security modules including SELinux are enabled and SELinux is not first in the lsm order. After this change, there appear to be no other users of current_security() in-tree; perhaps we should remove it altogether.
Fixes: bbd3662a8348 ("Infrastructure management of the cred security blob") Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v5.2.11, v5.2.10, v5.2.9, v5.2.8, v5.2.7, v5.2.6, v5.2.5, v5.2.4, v5.2.3, v5.2.2, v5.2.1, v5.2, v5.1.16, v5.1.15, v5.1.14, v5.1.13, v5.1.12, v5.1.11, v5.1.10, v5.1.9, v5.1.8 |
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#
d2912cb1 |
| 04-Jun-2019 |
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of th
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Revision tags: v5.1.7, v5.1.6, v5.1.5, v5.1.4, v5.1.3, v5.1.2, v5.1.1, v5.0.14, v5.1, v5.0.13, v5.0.12, v5.0.11, v5.0.10, v5.0.9, v5.0.8, v5.0.7, v5.0.6, v5.0.5, v5.0.4, v5.0.3, v4.19.29, v5.0.2, v4.19.28, v5.0.1, v4.19.27, v5.0, v4.19.26, v4.19.25, v4.19.24, v4.19.23, v4.19.22, v4.19.21, v4.19.20, v4.19.19, v4.19.18, v4.19.17, v4.19.16, v4.19.15, v4.19.14, v4.19.13, v4.19.12, v4.19.11, v4.19.10, v4.19.9, v4.19.8, v4.19.7, v4.19.6, v4.19.5, v4.19.4, v4.18.20, v4.19.3 |
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#
ecd5f82e |
| 20-Nov-2018 |
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> |
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob
Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infras
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob
Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Revision tags: v4.18.19, v4.19.2, v4.18.18, v4.18.17, v4.19.1, v4.19, v4.18.16, v4.18.15, v4.18.14, v4.18.13, v4.18.12, v4.18.11, v4.18.10 |
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#
7c653828 |
| 21-Sep-2018 |
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> |
SELinux: Abstract use of ipc security blobs
Don't use the ipc->security pointer directly. Don't use the msg_msg->security pointer directly. Provide helper functions that provides the security blob p
SELinux: Abstract use of ipc security blobs
Don't use the ipc->security pointer directly. Don't use the msg_msg->security pointer directly. Provide helper functions that provides the security blob pointers.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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#
afb1cbe3 |
| 21-Sep-2018 |
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> |
LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security
Move management of the inode->i_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating
LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security
Move management of the inode->i_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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#
80788c22 |
| 21-Sep-2018 |
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> |
SELinux: Abstract use of inode security blob
Don't use the inode->i_security pointer directly. Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cas
SELinux: Abstract use of inode security blob
Don't use the inode->i_security pointer directly. Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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#
33bf60ca |
| 12-Nov-2018 |
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> |
LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security
Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the infrastructure. The modules no longer allocate or
LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security
Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the infrastructure. The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead they tell the infrastructure how much space they require.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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#
bb6c6b02 |
| 21-Sep-2018 |
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> |
SELinux: Abstract use of file security blob
Don't use the file->f_security pointer directly. Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey
SELinux: Abstract use of file security blob
Don't use the file->f_security pointer directly. Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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#
bbd3662a |
| 12-Nov-2018 |
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> |
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob
Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob
Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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#
0c6cfa62 |
| 21-Sep-2018 |
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> |
SELinux: Abstract use of cred security blob
Don't use the cred->security pointer directly. Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@s
SELinux: Abstract use of cred security blob
Don't use the cred->security pointer directly. Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Revision tags: v4.18.9, v4.18.7, v4.18.6, v4.18.5, v4.17.18, v4.18.4, v4.18.3, v4.17.17, v4.18.2, v4.17.16, v4.17.15, v4.18.1, v4.18, v4.17.14, v4.17.13, v4.17.12, v4.17.11, v4.17.10, v4.17.9, v4.17.8, v4.17.7, v4.17.6, v4.17.5, v4.17.4, v4.17.3, v4.17.2, v4.17.1, v4.17, v4.16 |
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aa8e712c |
| 01-Mar-2018 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: wrap global selinux state
Define a selinux state structure (struct selinux_state) for global SELinux state and pass it explicitly to all security server functions. The public portion of th
selinux: wrap global selinux state
Define a selinux state structure (struct selinux_state) for global SELinux state and pass it explicitly to all security server functions. The public portion of the structure contains state that is used throughout the SELinux code, such as the enforcing mode. The structure also contains a pointer to a selinux_ss structure whose definition is private to the security server and contains security server specific state such as the policy database and SID table.
This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs (userspace or LSM). It merely wraps SELinux state and passes it explicitly as needed.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: minor fixups needed due to collisions with the SCTP patches] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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d452930f |
| 13-Feb-2018 |
Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> |
selinux: Add SCTP support
The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in: Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Pau
selinux: Add SCTP support
The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in: Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v4.15, v4.13.16, v4.14 |
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ec27c356 |
| 18-Oct-2017 |
Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> |
selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations
Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls. This implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a s
selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations
Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls. This implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a sid that identify the bpf object. And when processes try to access the object, selinux will check if processes have the right privileges. The creation of eBPF object are also checked at the general bpf check hook and new cmd introduced to eBPF domain can also be checked there.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Revision tags: v4.13.5, v4.13 |
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7efbb60b |
| 17-Aug-2017 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: update my email address
Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists. MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signe
selinux: update my email address
Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists. MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v4.12, v4.10.17 |
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409dcf31 |
| 19-May-2017 |
Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> |
selinux: Add a cache for quicker retreival of PKey SIDs
It is likely that the SID for the same PKey will be requested many times. To reduce the time to modify QPs and process MADs use a cache to sto
selinux: Add a cache for quicker retreival of PKey SIDs
It is likely that the SID for the same PKey will be requested many times. To reduce the time to modify QPs and process MADs use a cache to store PKey SIDs.
This code is heavily based on the "netif" and "netport" concept originally developed by James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> and Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (see security/selinux/netif.c and security/selinux/netport.c for more information)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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3a976fa6 |
| 19-May-2017 |
Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> |
selinux: Allocate and free infiniband security hooks
Implement and attach hooks to allocate and free Infiniband object security structures.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Revi
selinux: Allocate and free infiniband security hooks
Implement and attach hooks to allocate and free Infiniband object security structures.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v4.10.16, v4.10.15, v4.10.14, v4.10.13, v4.10.12, v4.10.11, v4.10.10, v4.10.9, v4.10.8, v4.10.7, v4.10.6, v4.10.5, v4.10.4, v4.10.3, v4.10.2, v4.10.1, v4.10 |
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be0554c9 |
| 09-Jan-2017 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: clean up cred usage and simplify
SELinux was sometimes using the task "objective" credentials when it could/should use the "subjective" credentials. This was sometimes hidden by the fact t
selinux: clean up cred usage and simplify
SELinux was sometimes using the task "objective" credentials when it could/should use the "subjective" credentials. This was sometimes hidden by the fact that we were unnecessarily passing around pointers to the current task, making it appear as if the task could be something other than current, so eliminate all such passing of current. Inline various permission checking helper functions that can be reduced to a single avc_has_perm() call.
Since the credentials infrastructure only allows a task to alter its own credentials, we can always assume that current must be the same as the target task in selinux_setprocattr after the check. We likely should move this check from selinux_setprocattr() to proc_pid_attr_write() and drop the task argument to the security hook altogether; it can only serve to confuse things.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v4.9, openbmc-4.4-20161121-1, v4.4.33 |
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9287aed2 |
| 15-Nov-2016 |
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> |
selinux: Convert isec->lock into a spinlock
Convert isec->lock from a mutex into a spinlock. Instead of holding the lock while sleeping in inode_doinit_with_dentry, set isec->initialized to LABEL_P
selinux: Convert isec->lock into a spinlock
Convert isec->lock from a mutex into a spinlock. Instead of holding the lock while sleeping in inode_doinit_with_dentry, set isec->initialized to LABEL_PENDING and release the lock. Then, when the sid has been determined, re-acquire the lock. If isec->initialized is still set to LABEL_PENDING, set isec->sid; otherwise, the sid has been set by another task (LABEL_INITIALIZED) or invalidated (LABEL_INVALID) in the meantime.
This fixes a deadlock on gfs2 where
* one task is in inode_doinit_with_dentry -> gfs2_getxattr, holds isec->lock, and tries to acquire the inode's glock, and
* another task is in do_xmote -> inode_go_inval -> selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx, holds the inode's glock, and tries to acquire isec->lock.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> [PM: minor tweaks to keep checkpatch.pl happy] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v4.4.32, v4.4.31, v4.4.30, v4.4.29, v4.4.28, v4.4.27, v4.7.10, openbmc-4.4-20161021-1, v4.7.9, v4.4.26, v4.7.8, v4.4.25, v4.4.24, v4.7.7, v4.8, v4.4.23, v4.7.6, v4.7.5, v4.4.22, v4.4.21, v4.7.4, v4.7.3, v4.4.20, v4.7.2, v4.4.19, openbmc-4.4-20160819-1, v4.7.1, v4.4.18, v4.4.17, openbmc-4.4-20160804-1, v4.4.16, v4.7, openbmc-4.4-20160722-1, openbmc-20160722-1, openbmc-20160713-1, v4.4.15, v4.6.4, v4.6.3, v4.4.14, v4.6.2, v4.4.13, openbmc-20160606-1, v4.6.1, v4.4.12, openbmc-20160521-1, v4.4.11, openbmc-20160518-1, v4.6, v4.4.10, openbmc-20160511-1, openbmc-20160505-1, v4.4.9, v4.4.8, v4.4.7, openbmc-20160329-2, openbmc-20160329-1 |
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4b57d6bc |
| 28-Mar-2016 |
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
selinux: simply inode label states to INVALID and INITIALIZED
There really is no need for LABEL_MISSING as we really only care if the inode's label is INVALID or INITIALIZED. Also adjust the revali
selinux: simply inode label states to INVALID and INITIALIZED
There really is no need for LABEL_MISSING as we really only care if the inode's label is INVALID or INITIALIZED. Also adjust the revalidate code to reload the label whenever the label is not INITIALIZED so we are less sensitive to label state in the future.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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