selinux: update my email address

Update my email address; MAINTAINERS was updated some time ago.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul

selinux: update my email address

Update my email address; MAINTAINERS was updated some time ago.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

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selinux: de-brand SELinux

Change "NSA SELinux" to just "SELinux" in Kconfig help text and
comments. While NSA was the original primary developer and continues to
help maintain SELinux, SELinux has l

selinux: de-brand SELinux

Change "NSA SELinux" to just "SELinux" in Kconfig help text and
comments. While NSA was the original primary developer and continues to
help maintain SELinux, SELinux has long since transitioned to a wide
community of developers and maintainers. SELinux has been part of the
mainline Linux kernel for nearly 20 years now [1] and has received
contributions from many individuals and organizations.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Pine.LNX.4.44.0308082228470.1852-100000@home.osdl.org/

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

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LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock

Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the security infrastructure.
Instead of allocatin

LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock

Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the security infrastructure.
Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules
tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is
allocated there.

Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>

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selinux: drop super_block backpointer from superblock_security_struct

It appears to have been needed for selinux_complete_init() in the past,
but today it's useless.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek

selinux: drop super_block backpointer from superblock_security_struct

It appears to have been needed for selinux_complete_init() in the past,
but today it's useless.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

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selinux: randomize layout of key structures

Randomize the layout of key selinux data structures.
Initially this is applied to the selinux_state, selinux_ss,
policydb, and task_security_struct data s

selinux: randomize layout of key structures

Randomize the layout of key selinux data structures.
Initially this is applied to the selinux_state, selinux_ss,
policydb, and task_security_struct data structures.

NB To test/use this mechanism, one must install the
necessary build-time dependencies, e.g. gcc-plugin-devel on Fedora,
and enable CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT in the kernel configuration.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[PM: double semi-colon fixed]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

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perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks

In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system
call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of
limita

perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks

In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system
call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of
limitations:

1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled
based on the single value thus making the control very limited and
coarse grained.
2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means
all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to
security issues.

This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in
Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF
programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from
userspace. These operations are intended for production systems.

5 new LSM hooks are added:
1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2)
syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the
perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the
systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU,
kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and
tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl).
Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to
perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other
distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016.

2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event
which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when
the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may
try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access.

3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed.

4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event.

5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event.

[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/

Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his
Suggested-by tag below.

To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then
apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then
add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future
we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether.

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: jeffv@google.com
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: primiano@google.com
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: rsavitski@google.com
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org

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selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob

We need to use selinux_cred() to fetch the SELinux cred blob instead
of directly using current->security or current_security().

selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob

We need to use selinux_cred() to fetch the SELinux cred blob instead
of directly using current->security or current_security(). There
were a couple of lingering uses of current_security() in the SELinux code
that were apparently missed during the earlier conversions. IIUC, this
would only manifest as a bug if multiple security modules including
SELinux are enabled and SELinux is not first in the lsm order. After
this change, there appear to be no other users of current_security()
in-tree; perhaps we should remove it altogether.

Fixes: bbd3662a8348 ("Infrastructure management of the cred security blob")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

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treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500

Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):

this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of th

treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500

Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):

this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation

this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob

Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and
msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security
modules and into the security infras

LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob

Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and
msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security
modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead
of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules
tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and
the space is allocated there.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

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SELinux: Abstract use of ipc security blobs

Don't use the ipc->security pointer directly.
Don't use the msg_msg->security pointer directly.
Provide helper functions that provides the security blob p

SELinux: Abstract use of ipc security blobs

Don't use the ipc->security pointer directly.
Don't use the msg_msg->security pointer directly.
Provide helper functions that provides the security blob pointers.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

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LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security

Move management of the inode->i_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating

LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security

Move management of the inode->i_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

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SELinux: Abstract use of inode security blob

Don't use the inode->i_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cas

SELinux: Abstract use of inode security blob

Don't use the inode->i_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

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LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security

Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the infrastructure.
The modules no longer allocate or

LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security

Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the infrastructure.
The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead
they tell the infrastructure how much space they require.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

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SELinux: Abstract use of file security blob

Don't use the file->f_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey

SELinux: Abstract use of file security blob

Don't use the file->f_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

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Infrastructure management of the cred security blob

Move management of the cred security blob out of the
security modules and into the security infrastructre.
Instead of allocating and freeing space

Infrastructure management of the cred security blob

Move management of the cred security blob out of the
security modules and into the security infrastructre.
Instead of allocating and freeing space the security
modules tell the infrastructure how much space they
require.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

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SELinux: Abstract use of cred security blob

Don't use the cred->security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@s

SELinux: Abstract use of cred security blob

Don't use the cred->security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

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selinux: wrap global selinux state

Define a selinux state structure (struct selinux_state) for
global SELinux state and pass it explicitly to all security server
functions. The public portion of th

selinux: wrap global selinux state

Define a selinux state structure (struct selinux_state) for
global SELinux state and pass it explicitly to all security server
functions. The public portion of the structure contains state
that is used throughout the SELinux code, such as the enforcing mode.
The structure also contains a pointer to a selinux_ss structure whose
definition is private to the security server and contains security
server specific state such as the policy database and SID table.

This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs
(userspace or LSM). It merely wraps SELinux state and passes it
explicitly as needed.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: minor fixups needed due to collisions with the SCTP patches]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

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selinux: Add SCTP support

The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in:
Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst

Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Pau

selinux: Add SCTP support

The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in:
Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst

Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

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selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations

Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls. This
implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a s

selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations

Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls. This
implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a sid that
identify the bpf object. And when processes try to access the object,
selinux will check if processes have the right privileges. The creation
of eBPF object are also checked at the general bpf check hook and new
cmd introduced to eBPF domain can also be checked there.

Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

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selinux: update my email address

Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists.
MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signe

selinux: update my email address

Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists.
MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

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selinux: Add a cache for quicker retreival of PKey SIDs

It is likely that the SID for the same PKey will be requested many
times. To reduce the time to modify QPs and process MADs use a cache to
sto

selinux: Add a cache for quicker retreival of PKey SIDs

It is likely that the SID for the same PKey will be requested many
times. To reduce the time to modify QPs and process MADs use a cache to
store PKey SIDs.

This code is heavily based on the "netif" and "netport" concept
originally developed by James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> and Paul Moore
<paul@paul-moore.com> (see security/selinux/netif.c and
security/selinux/netport.c for more information)

Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

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selinux: Allocate and free infiniband security hooks

Implement and attach hooks to allocate and free Infiniband object
security structures.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Revi

selinux: Allocate and free infiniband security hooks

Implement and attach hooks to allocate and free Infiniband object
security structures.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

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selinux: clean up cred usage and simplify

SELinux was sometimes using the task "objective" credentials when
it could/should use the "subjective" credentials. This was sometimes
hidden by the fact t

selinux: clean up cred usage and simplify

SELinux was sometimes using the task "objective" credentials when
it could/should use the "subjective" credentials. This was sometimes
hidden by the fact that we were unnecessarily passing around pointers
to the current task, making it appear as if the task could be something
other than current, so eliminate all such passing of current. Inline
various permission checking helper functions that can be reduced to a
single avc_has_perm() call.

Since the credentials infrastructure only allows a task to alter
its own credentials, we can always assume that current must be the same
as the target task in selinux_setprocattr after the check. We likely
should move this check from selinux_setprocattr() to proc_pid_attr_write()
and drop the task argument to the security hook altogether; it can only
serve to confuse things.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

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selinux: Convert isec->lock into a spinlock

Convert isec->lock from a mutex into a spinlock. Instead of holding
the lock while sleeping in inode_doinit_with_dentry, set
isec->initialized to LABEL_P

selinux: Convert isec->lock into a spinlock

Convert isec->lock from a mutex into a spinlock. Instead of holding
the lock while sleeping in inode_doinit_with_dentry, set
isec->initialized to LABEL_PENDING and release the lock. Then, when
the sid has been determined, re-acquire the lock. If isec->initialized
is still set to LABEL_PENDING, set isec->sid; otherwise, the sid has
been set by another task (LABEL_INITIALIZED) or invalidated
(LABEL_INVALID) in the meantime.

This fixes a deadlock on gfs2 where

* one task is in inode_doinit_with_dentry -> gfs2_getxattr, holds
isec->lock, and tries to acquire the inode's glock, and

* another task is in do_xmote -> inode_go_inval ->
selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx, holds the inode's glock, and
tries to acquire isec->lock.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
[PM: minor tweaks to keep checkpatch.pl happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

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selinux: simply inode label states to INVALID and INITIALIZED

There really is no need for LABEL_MISSING as we really only care if
the inode's label is INVALID or INITIALIZED. Also adjust the
revali

selinux: simply inode label states to INVALID and INITIALIZED

There really is no need for LABEL_MISSING as we really only care if
the inode's label is INVALID or INITIALIZED. Also adjust the
revalidate code to reload the label whenever the label is not
INITIALIZED so we are less sensitive to label state in the future.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

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