Revision tags: v6.6.25, v6.6.24, v6.6.23, v6.6.16, v6.6.15, v6.6.14, v6.6.13, v6.6.12, v6.6.11, v6.6.10, v6.6.9, v6.6.8, v6.6.7, v6.6.6, v6.6.5, v6.6.4, v6.6.3, v6.6.2, v6.5.11, v6.6.1, v6.5.10, v6.6, v6.5.9, v6.5.8, v6.5.7, v6.5.6, v6.5.5, v6.5.4, v6.5.3, v6.5.2, v6.1.51, v6.5.1, v6.1.50, v6.5, v6.1.49, v6.1.48, v6.1.46, v6.1.45, v6.1.44, v6.1.43, v6.1.42, v6.1.41, v6.1.40, v6.1.39, v6.1.38, v6.1.37, v6.1.36, v6.4, v6.1.35, v6.1.34, v6.1.33, v6.1.32, v6.1.31, v6.1.30 |
|
#
604b8e75 |
| 17-May-2023 |
Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com> |
KEYS: Replace all non-returning strlcpy with strscpy
strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first. This read may exceed the destination size limit. This is both inefficient and can lead to linear
KEYS: Replace all non-returning strlcpy with strscpy
strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first. This read may exceed the destination size limit. This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1]. In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace strlcpy() here with strscpy(). No return values were used, so direct replacement is safe.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy [2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Revision tags: v6.1.29, v6.1.28, v6.1.27, v6.1.26, v6.3, v6.1.25, v6.1.24, v6.1.23, v6.1.22, v6.1.21, v6.1.20, v6.1.19, v6.1.18, v6.1.17, v6.1.16, v6.1.15, v6.1.14, v6.1.13, v6.2, v6.1.12, v6.1.11, v6.1.10, v6.1.9, v6.1.8, v6.1.7, v6.1.6, v6.1.5, v6.0.19, v6.0.18, v6.1.4, v6.1.3, v6.0.17, v6.1.2, v6.0.16, v6.1.1, v6.0.15, v6.0.14, v6.0.13, v6.1, v6.0.12, v6.0.11, v6.0.10, v5.15.80, v6.0.9, v5.15.79, v6.0.8, v5.15.78, v6.0.7, v5.15.77, v5.15.76, v6.0.6, v6.0.5, v5.15.75, v6.0.4, v6.0.3, v6.0.2, v5.15.74, v5.15.73, v6.0.1, v5.15.72, v6.0, v5.15.71, v5.15.70, v5.15.69, v5.15.68, v5.15.67, v5.15.66, v5.15.65, v5.15.64, v5.15.63, v5.15.62, v5.15.61, v5.15.60, v5.15.59, v5.19, v5.15.58, v5.15.57, v5.15.56, v5.15.55, v5.15.54, v5.15.53, v5.15.52, v5.15.51, v5.15.50, v5.15.49, v5.15.48, v5.15.47, v5.15.46, v5.15.45, v5.15.44, v5.15.43, v5.15.42, v5.18, v5.15.41, v5.15.40, v5.15.39, v5.15.38, v5.15.37, v5.15.36, v5.15.35, v5.15.34, v5.15.33, v5.15.32, v5.15.31, v5.17, v5.15.30, v5.15.29, v5.15.28, v5.15.27, v5.15.26, v5.15.25, v5.15.24, v5.15.23, v5.15.22, v5.15.21, v5.15.20, v5.15.19, v5.15.18, v5.15.17, v5.4.173, v5.15.16, v5.15.15, v5.16, v5.15.10, v5.15.9, v5.15.8, v5.15.7, v5.15.6, v5.15.5, v5.15.4, v5.15.3, v5.15.2, v5.15.1, v5.15, v5.14.14, v5.14.13, v5.14.12, v5.14.11, v5.14.10, v5.14.9, v5.14.8, v5.14.7, v5.14.6, v5.10.67, v5.10.66, v5.14.5, v5.14.4, v5.10.65, v5.14.3, v5.10.64, v5.14.2, v5.10.63, v5.14.1, v5.10.62, v5.14, v5.10.61, v5.10.60, v5.10.53, v5.10.52, v5.10.51, v5.10.50, v5.10.49, v5.13, v5.10.46, v5.10.43, v5.10.42, v5.10.41, v5.10.40, v5.10.39, v5.4.119, v5.10.36, v5.10.35, v5.10.34, v5.4.116, v5.10.33, v5.12, v5.10.32, v5.10.31, v5.10.30, v5.10.27, v5.10.26, v5.10.25, v5.10.24, v5.10.23, v5.10.22, v5.10.21, v5.10.20, v5.10.19, v5.4.101, v5.10.18, v5.10.17, v5.11, v5.10.16, v5.10.15, v5.10.14, v5.10, v5.8.17, v5.8.16, v5.8.15, v5.9, v5.8.14, v5.8.13, v5.8.12, v5.8.11, v5.8.10, v5.8.9, v5.8.8, v5.8.7, v5.8.6, v5.4.62, v5.8.5, v5.8.4, v5.4.61, v5.8.3, v5.4.60, v5.8.2, v5.4.59, v5.8.1, v5.4.58, v5.4.57, v5.4.56, v5.8, v5.7.12, v5.4.55, v5.7.11, v5.4.54, v5.7.10, v5.4.53, v5.4.52, v5.7.9, v5.7.8, v5.4.51, v5.4.50, v5.7.7, v5.4.49, v5.7.6, v5.7.5, v5.4.48, v5.7.4, v5.7.3, v5.4.47, v5.4.46, v5.7.2, v5.4.45, v5.7.1, v5.4.44, v5.7, v5.4.43, v5.4.42, v5.4.41, v5.4.40, v5.4.39, v5.4.38, v5.4.37, v5.4.36, v5.4.35, v5.4.34, v5.4.33, v5.4.32, v5.4.31, v5.4.30, v5.4.29, v5.6, v5.4.28 |
|
#
d3ec10aa |
| 21-Mar-2020 |
Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> |
KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore
A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a keyutils test:
[12537.027242] ===================================
KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore
A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a keyutils test:
[12537.027242] ====================================================== [12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE --------- - - [12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------ [12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock: [12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12537.208365] [12537.208365] but task is already holding lock: [12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12537.270476] [12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock. [12537.270476] [12537.307209] [12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [12537.340754] [12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}: [12537.367434] down_write+0x4d/0x110 [12537.385202] __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280 [12537.405232] request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70 [12537.427221] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.444839] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.468445] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.496731] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.519418] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.546263] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.573551] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.601045] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.617906] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.636225] [12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}: [12537.664525] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.683734] request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70 [12537.705640] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.723304] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.746773] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.775607] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.798322] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.823369] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.847262] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.873477] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.890281] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.908649] [12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}: [12537.935225] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.954450] cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs] [12537.977250] smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs] [12538.000659] cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs] [12538.023920] read_pages+0xf5/0x560 [12538.041583] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0 [12538.067047] ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10 [12538.092069] filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830 [12538.111637] __do_fault+0x82/0x260 [12538.129216] do_fault+0x419/0xfb0 [12538.146390] __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0 [12538.167408] handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550 [12538.187401] __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60 [12538.207395] do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0 [12538.225777] page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [12538.243010] [12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: [12538.267875] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12538.286848] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12538.306006] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12538.327936] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12538.352154] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12538.370558] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12538.391470] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12538.410511] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf [12538.435535] [12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this: [12538.435535] [12538.472829] Chain exists of: [12538.472829] &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class [12538.472829] [12538.524820] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [12538.524820] [12538.551431] CPU0 CPU1 [12538.572654] ---- ---- [12538.595865] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.613737] lock(root_key_user.cons_lock); [12538.644234] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.672410] lock(&mm->mmap_sem); [12538.687758] [12538.687758] *** DEADLOCK *** [12538.687758] [12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598: [12538.732097] #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12538.770573] [12538.770573] stack backtrace: [12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G [12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015 [12538.881963] Call Trace: [12538.892897] dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0 [12538.907908] print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279 [12538.932891] ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250 [12538.948979] check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0 [12538.971643] ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190 [12538.992738] ? check_usage+0x550/0x550 [12539.009845] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 [12539.025484] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0 [12539.043555] __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0 [12539.061551] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10 [12539.080554] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12539.100330] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.119079] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12539.135869] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.153234] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12539.172787] ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110 [12539.190059] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12539.211526] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12539.227561] ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0 [12539.249076] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12539.266660] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12539.283091] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead, an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding the lock.
That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace write helpers. That is,
1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy. 2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy(). 3) All the fault handling code is removed.
Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch.
Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Revision tags: v5.4.27, v5.4.26, v5.4.25, v5.4.24, v5.4.23, v5.4.22, v5.4.21, v5.4.20, v5.4.19, v5.4.18, v5.4.17, v5.4.16, v5.5, v5.4.15, v5.4.14, v5.4.13, v5.4.12, v5.4.11, v5.4.10, v5.4.9, v5.4.8, v5.4.7, v5.4.6, v5.4.5, v5.4.4, v5.4.3, v5.3.15, v5.4.2, v5.4.1, v5.3.14, v5.4, v5.3.13, v5.3.12, v5.3.11, v5.3.10, v5.3.9, v5.3.8, v5.3.7, v5.3.6, v5.3.5, v5.3.4, v5.3.3, v5.3.2, v5.3.1, v5.3, v5.2.14, v5.3-rc8, v5.2.13, v5.2.12 |
|
#
d41a3eff |
| 02-Sep-2019 |
Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> |
keys: Fix missing null pointer check in request_key_auth_describe()
If a request_key authentication token key gets revoked, there's a window in which request_key_auth_describe() can see it with a NU
keys: Fix missing null pointer check in request_key_auth_describe()
If a request_key authentication token key gets revoked, there's a window in which request_key_auth_describe() can see it with a NULL payload - but it makes no check for this and something like the following oops may occur:
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000038 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000004ddf30 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... NIP [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x90/0xd0 LR [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 Call Trace: [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 (unreliable) [...] proc_keys_show+0x308/0x4c0 [...] seq_read+0x3d0/0x540 [...] proc_reg_read+0x90/0x110 [...] __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70 [...] vfs_read+0xb4/0x1b0 [...] ksys_read+0x7c/0x130 [...] system_call+0x5c/0x70
Fix this by checking for a NULL pointer when describing such a key.
Also make the read routine check for a NULL pointer to be on the safe side.
[DH: Modified to not take already-held rcu lock and modified to also check in the read routine]
Fixes: 04c567d9313e ("[PATCH] Keys: Fix race between two instantiators of a key") Reported-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Revision tags: v5.2.11, v5.2.10, v5.2.9, v5.2.8, v5.2.7, v5.2.6, v5.2.5, v5.2.4, v5.2.3, v5.2.2, v5.2.1 |
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#
028db3e2 |
| 10-Jul-2019 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
Revert "Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs"
This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus effectively commits
Revert "Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs"
This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus effectively commits
7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION") 2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL")
that the merge brought in).
It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of in-kernel X.509 certificates [2].
The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in order to not impact the rest of the merge window.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Revision tags: v5.2, v5.1.16 |
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#
2e12256b |
| 27-Jun-2019 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will als
keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a greater range of subjects to represented.
============ WHY DO THIS? ============
The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of which should be grouped together.
For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a key:
(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with controlling access to that key.
Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however, be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is probably okay.
As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really need to be controlled separately.
Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.
=============== WHAT IS CHANGED ===============
The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.
(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be added, removed and replaced in a keyring.
(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.
(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:
(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key (*) Owner - permitted to the key owner (*) Group - permitted to the key group (*) Everyone - permitted to everyone
Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to everyone else.
Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata READ Can read the key content WRITE Can update/modify the key content SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting LINK Can make a link to the key SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry INVAL Can invalidate REVOKE Can revoke JOIN Can join this keyring CLEAR Can clear this keyring
The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set, or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.
The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an existing keyring.
The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually created keyrings only.
====================== BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY ======================
To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be returned.
It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.
SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned on if a keyring is being altered.
The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.
It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.
======= TESTING =======
This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the key.
(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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#
dcf49dbc |
| 26-Jun-2019 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches
Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches so that the flag can be omitted and recursion disabled, thereby allowing just the nominated keyring to be se
keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches
Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches so that the flag can be omitted and recursion disabled, thereby allowing just the nominated keyring to be searched and none of the children.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Revision tags: v5.1.15, v5.1.14, v5.1.13 |
|
#
e59428f7 |
| 19-Jun-2019 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
keys: Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions
Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so that it will become possible to provide an RCU-capable partial re
keys: Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions
Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so that it will become possible to provide an RCU-capable partial request_key() function in a later commit.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Revision tags: v5.1.12, v5.1.11, v5.1.10, v5.1.9, v5.1.8, v5.1.7, v5.1.6, v5.1.5, v5.1.4 |
|
#
f7f13945 |
| 20-May-2019 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
keys: Grant Link permission to possessers of request_key auth keys
Grant Link permission to the possessers of request_key authentication keys, thereby allowing a daemon that is servicing upcalls to
keys: Grant Link permission to possessers of request_key auth keys
Grant Link permission to the possessers of request_key authentication keys, thereby allowing a daemon that is servicing upcalls to arrange things such that only the necessary auth key is passed to the actual service program and not all the daemon's pending auth keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
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#
2874c5fd |
| 27-May-2019 |
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of th
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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#
7936d16d |
| 22-May-2019 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
keys: sparse: Fix incorrect RCU accesses
Fix a pair of accesses that should be using RCU protection.
rcu_dereference_protected() is needed to access task_struct::real_parent.
current_cred() should
keys: sparse: Fix incorrect RCU accesses
Fix a pair of accesses that should be using RCU protection.
rcu_dereference_protected() is needed to access task_struct::real_parent.
current_cred() should be used to access current->cred.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
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Revision tags: v5.1.3, v5.1.2, v5.1.1, v5.0.14, v5.1, v5.0.13, v5.0.12, v5.0.11, v5.0.10, v5.0.9, v5.0.8, v5.0.7, v5.0.6, v5.0.5, v5.0.4, v5.0.3, v4.19.29, v5.0.2, v4.19.28, v5.0.1, v4.19.27, v5.0, v4.19.26, v4.19.25 |
|
#
ede0fa98 |
| 22-Feb-2019 |
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> |
KEYS: always initialize keyring_index_key::desc_len
syzbot hit the 'BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0);' in __key_link_begin() called from construct_alloc_key() during sys_request_key(), because the l
KEYS: always initialize keyring_index_key::desc_len
syzbot hit the 'BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0);' in __key_link_begin() called from construct_alloc_key() during sys_request_key(), because the length of the key description was never calculated.
The problem is that we rely on ->desc_len being initialized by search_process_keyrings(), specifically by search_nested_keyrings(). But, if the process isn't subscribed to any keyrings that never happens.
Fix it by always initializing keyring_index_key::desc_len as soon as the description is set, like we already do in some places.
The following program reproduces the BUG_ON() when it's run as root and no session keyring has been installed. If it doesn't work, try removing pam_keyinit.so from /etc/pam.d/login and rebooting.
#include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <keyutils.h>
int main(void) { int id = add_key("keyring", "syz", NULL, 0, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
keyctl_setperm(id, KEY_OTH_WRITE); setreuid(5000, 5000); request_key("user", "desc", "", id); }
Reported-by: syzbot+ec24e95ea483de0a24da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Revision tags: v4.19.24, v4.19.23, v4.19.22 |
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#
822ad64d |
| 14-Feb-2019 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key
In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and
keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key
In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and the userspace side manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned.
Fix this by the following changes:
(1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead.
(2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the payload available outside of security/keys/.
(3) The ->request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons record and operation name.
Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked.
Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Revision tags: v4.19.21, v4.19.20, v4.19.19, v4.19.18, v4.19.17, v4.19.16, v4.19.15, v4.19.14, v4.19.13, v4.19.12, v4.19.11, v4.19.10, v4.19.9 |
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#
876979c9 |
| 09-Dec-2018 |
Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> |
security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.h
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing support to
security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.h
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends. That changed when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file. This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.
The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using.
Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h (for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each instance for the presence of either and replace as needed.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Revision tags: v4.19.8, v4.19.7, v4.19.6, v4.19.5, v4.19.4, v4.18.20, v4.19.3, v4.18.19, v4.19.2, v4.18.18, v4.18.17, v4.19.1, v4.19, v4.18.16, v4.18.15, v4.18.14, v4.18.13, v4.18.12, v4.18.11, v4.18.10, v4.18.9, v4.18.7, v4.18.6, v4.18.5, v4.17.18, v4.18.4, v4.18.3, v4.17.17, v4.18.2, v4.17.16, v4.17.15, v4.18.1, v4.18, v4.17.14, v4.17.13, v4.17.12, v4.17.11, v4.17.10, v4.17.9, v4.17.8, v4.17.7, v4.17.6, v4.17.5, v4.17.4, v4.17.3, v4.17.2, v4.17.1, v4.17, v4.16, v4.15, v4.13.16, v4.14, v4.13.5 |
|
#
363b02da |
| 04-Oct-2017 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be
KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated() function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+ Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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#
e007ce9c |
| 21-Sep-2017 |
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> |
KEYS: use kmemdup() in request_key_auth_new()
kmemdup() is preferred to kmalloc() followed by memcpy().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redh
KEYS: use kmemdup() in request_key_auth_new()
kmemdup() is preferred to kmalloc() followed by memcpy().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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#
f7b48cf0 |
| 21-Sep-2017 |
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> |
KEYS: don't revoke uninstantiated key in request_key_auth_new()
If key_instantiate_and_link() were to fail (which fortunately isn't possible currently), the call to key_revoke(authkey) would crash w
KEYS: don't revoke uninstantiated key in request_key_auth_new()
If key_instantiate_and_link() were to fail (which fortunately isn't possible currently), the call to key_revoke(authkey) would crash with a NULL pointer dereference in request_key_auth_revoke() because the key has not yet been instantiated.
Fix this by removing the call to key_revoke(). key_put() is sufficient, as it's not possible for an uninstantiated authkey to have been used for anything yet.
Fixes: b5f545c880a2 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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#
44d81433 |
| 21-Sep-2017 |
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> |
KEYS: fix cred refcount leak in request_key_auth_new()
In request_key_auth_new(), if key_alloc() or key_instantiate_and_link() were to fail, we would leak a reference to the 'struct cred'. Currentl
KEYS: fix cred refcount leak in request_key_auth_new()
In request_key_auth_new(), if key_alloc() or key_instantiate_and_link() were to fail, we would leak a reference to the 'struct cred'. Currently this can only happen if key_alloc() fails to allocate memory. But it still should be fixed, as it is a more severe bug waiting to happen.
Fix it by cleaning things up to use a helper function which frees a 'struct request_key_auth' correctly.
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Revision tags: v4.13, v4.12, v4.10.17, v4.10.16 |
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#
3db38ed7 |
| 13-May-2017 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
doc: ReSTify keys-request-key.txt
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-
doc: ReSTify keys-request-key.txt
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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Revision tags: v4.10.15, v4.10.14, v4.10.13, v4.10.12, v4.10.11, v4.10.10, v4.10.9 |
|
#
fff29291 |
| 31-Mar-2017 |
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> |
security, keys: convert key.usage from atomic_t to refcount_t
refcount_t type and corresponding API should be used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as a reference counter. This allows t
security, keys: convert key.usage from atomic_t to refcount_t
refcount_t type and corresponding API should be used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free situations.
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Revision tags: v4.10.8, v4.10.7, v4.10.6, v4.10.5, v4.10.4, v4.10.3, v4.10.2, v4.10.1, v4.10 |
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#
7c0f6ba6 |
| 24-Dec-2016 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
Replace <asm/uaccess.h> with <linux/uaccess.h> globally
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>' sed -i -e "s!$PA
Replace <asm/uaccess.h> with <linux/uaccess.h> globally
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>' sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \ $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Revision tags: v4.9, openbmc-4.4-20161121-1, v4.4.33, v4.4.32, v4.4.31, v4.4.30, v4.4.29, v4.4.28, v4.4.27, v4.7.10, openbmc-4.4-20161021-1, v4.7.9, v4.4.26, v4.7.8, v4.4.25, v4.4.24, v4.7.7, v4.8, v4.4.23, v4.7.6, v4.7.5, v4.4.22, v4.4.21, v4.7.4, v4.7.3, v4.4.20, v4.7.2, v4.4.19, openbmc-4.4-20160819-1, v4.7.1, v4.4.18, v4.4.17, openbmc-4.4-20160804-1, v4.4.16, v4.7, openbmc-4.4-20160722-1, openbmc-20160722-1, openbmc-20160713-1, v4.4.15, v4.6.4, v4.6.3, v4.4.14, v4.6.2, v4.4.13, openbmc-20160606-1, v4.6.1, v4.4.12, openbmc-20160521-1, v4.4.11, openbmc-20160518-1, v4.6, v4.4.10, openbmc-20160511-1, openbmc-20160505-1, v4.4.9, v4.4.8, v4.4.7 |
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#
5ac7eace |
| 06-Apr-2016 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be
KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide blacklisting.
This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.
To this end:
(1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to the vetting function. This is called as:
int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *key_type, unsigned long key_flags, const union key_payload *key_payload),
where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.
[*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.
The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the link.
The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set through keyring_alloc().
Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function is called.
(2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the restriction check.
(3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.
(4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL.
(5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for authoritative keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Revision tags: openbmc-20160329-2, openbmc-20160329-1, openbmc-20160321-1, v4.4.6, v4.5, v4.4.5, v4.4.4, v4.4.3, openbmc-20160222-1, v4.4.2, openbmc-20160212-1, openbmc-20160210-1, openbmc-20160202-2, openbmc-20160202-1, v4.4.1, openbmc-20160127-1, openbmc-20160120-1, v4.4, openbmc-20151217-1, openbmc-20151210-1, openbmc-20151202-1, openbmc-20151123-1, openbmc-20151118-1, openbmc-20151104-1, v4.3, openbmc-20151102-1, openbmc-20151028-1 |
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#
146aa8b1 |
| 21-Oct-2015 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk as it seems pointless to keep them separate.
Use user_key_payloa
KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk as it seems pointless to keep them separate.
Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded user-defined keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
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|
Revision tags: v4.3-rc1, v4.2, v4.2-rc8, v4.2-rc7, v4.2-rc6, v4.2-rc5, v4.2-rc4, v4.2-rc3, v4.2-rc2, v4.2-rc1, v4.1, v4.1-rc8, v4.1-rc7, v4.1-rc6, v4.1-rc5, v4.1-rc4, v4.1-rc3, v4.1-rc2, v4.1-rc1, v4.0, v4.0-rc7, v4.0-rc6, v4.0-rc5, v4.0-rc4, v4.0-rc3, v4.0-rc2, v4.0-rc1, v3.19, v3.19-rc7, v3.19-rc6, v3.19-rc5, v3.19-rc4, v3.19-rc3, v3.19-rc2, v3.19-rc1, v3.18 |
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#
054f6180 |
| 01-Dec-2014 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
KEYS: Simplify KEYRING_SEARCH_{NO,DO}_STATE_CHECK flags
Simplify KEYRING_SEARCH_{NO,DO}_STATE_CHECK flags to be two variations of the same flag. They are effectively mutually exclusive and one or t
KEYS: Simplify KEYRING_SEARCH_{NO,DO}_STATE_CHECK flags
Simplify KEYRING_SEARCH_{NO,DO}_STATE_CHECK flags to be two variations of the same flag. They are effectively mutually exclusive and one or the other should be provided, but not both.
Keyring cycle detection and key possession determination are the only things that set NO_STATE_CHECK, except that neither flag really does anything there because neither purpose makes use of the keyring_search_iterator() function, but rather provides their own.
For cycle detection we definitely want to check inside of expired keyrings, just so that we don't create a cycle we can't get rid of. Revoked keyrings are cleared at revocation time and can't then be reused, so shouldn't be a problem either way.
For possession determination, we *might* want to validate each keyring before searching it: do you possess a key that's hidden behind an expired or just plain inaccessible keyring? Currently, the answer is yes. Note that you cannot, however, possess a key behind a revoked keyring because they are cleared on revocation.
keyring_search() sets DO_STATE_CHECK, which is correct.
request_key_and_link() currently doesn't specify whether to check the key state or not - but it should set DO_STATE_CHECK.
key_get_instantiation_authkey() also currently doesn't specify whether to check the key state or not - but it probably should also set DO_STATE_CHECK.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Revision tags: v3.18-rc7, v3.18-rc6, v3.18-rc5, v3.18-rc4, v3.18-rc3, v3.18-rc2, v3.18-rc1, v3.17, v3.17-rc7, v3.17-rc6 |
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c06cfb08 |
| 16-Sep-2014 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is allowed to override the function called by
KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm. Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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46291959 |
| 16-Sep-2014 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
KEYS: Preparse match data
Preparse the match data. This provides several advantages:
(1) The preparser can reject invalid criteria up front.
(2) The preparser can convert the criteria to binary
KEYS: Preparse match data
Preparse the match data. This provides several advantages:
(1) The preparser can reject invalid criteria up front.
(2) The preparser can convert the criteria to binary data if necessary (the asymmetric key type really wants to do binary comparison of the key IDs).
(3) The preparser can set the type of search to be performed. This means that it's not then a one-off setting in the key type.
(4) The preparser can set an appropriate comparator function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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