Revision tags: v6.6.25, v6.6.24, v6.6.23, v6.6.16, v6.6.15 |
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8df43e53 |
| 26-Jan-2024 |
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> |
lsm: fix default return value of the socket_getpeersec_*() hooks
commit 5a287d3d2b9de2b3e747132c615599907ba5c3c1 upstream.
For these hooks the true "neutral" value is -EOPNOTSUPP, which is currentl
lsm: fix default return value of the socket_getpeersec_*() hooks
commit 5a287d3d2b9de2b3e747132c615599907ba5c3c1 upstream.
For these hooks the true "neutral" value is -EOPNOTSUPP, which is currently what is returned when no LSM provides this hook and what LSMs return when there is no security context set on the socket. Correct the value in <linux/lsm_hooks.h> and adjust the dispatch functions in security/security.c to avoid issues when the BPF LSM is enabled.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Revision tags: v6.6.14, v6.6.13, v6.6.12, v6.6.11, v6.6.10, v6.6.9, v6.6.8 |
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820831de |
| 19-Dec-2023 |
Alfred Piccioni <alpic@google.com> |
lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook
commit f1bb47a31dff6d4b34fb14e99850860ee74bb003 upstream.
Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to other permissions such as
lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook
commit f1bb47a31dff6d4b34fb14e99850860ee74bb003 upstream.
Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*).
However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits 32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file permissions.
This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back - "/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */".
This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed to support this hook.
Reviewing the three places where we are currently using security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"") Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni <alpic@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> [PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Revision tags: v6.6.7, v6.6.6, v6.6.5, v6.6.4, v6.6.3, v6.6.2, v6.5.11, v6.6.1, v6.5.10 |
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37dab33f |
| 31-Oct-2023 |
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> |
lsm: fix default return value for inode_getsecctx
commit b36995b8609a5a8fe5cf259a1ee768fcaed919f8 upstream.
-EOPNOTSUPP is the return value that implements a "no-op" hook, not 0.
Without this fix
lsm: fix default return value for inode_getsecctx
commit b36995b8609a5a8fe5cf259a1ee768fcaed919f8 upstream.
-EOPNOTSUPP is the return value that implements a "no-op" hook, not 0.
Without this fix having only the BPF LSM enabled (with no programs attached) can cause uninitialized variable reads in nfsd4_encode_fattr(), because the BPF hook returns 0 without touching the 'ctxlen' variable and the corresponding 'contextlen' variable in nfsd4_encode_fattr() remains uninitialized, yet being treated as valid based on the 0 return value.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks") Reported-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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64d84030 |
| 31-Oct-2023 |
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> |
lsm: fix default return value for vm_enough_memory
commit 866d648059d5faf53f1cd960b43fe8365ad93ea7 upstream.
1 is the return value that implements a "no-op" hook, not 0.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
lsm: fix default return value for vm_enough_memory
commit 866d648059d5faf53f1cd960b43fe8365ad93ea7 upstream.
1 is the return value that implements a "no-op" hook, not 0.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Revision tags: v6.6, v6.5.9, v6.5.8, v6.5.7, v6.5.6, v6.5.5, v6.5.4, v6.5.3, v6.5.2, v6.1.51, v6.5.1, v6.1.50, v6.5, v6.1.49, v6.1.48, v6.1.46 |
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8e4672d6 |
| 12-Aug-2023 |
Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> |
lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file()
SELinux registers the implementation for the "binder_transfer_file" hook. Looking at the function implementation we observe that
lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file()
SELinux registers the implementation for the "binder_transfer_file" hook. Looking at the function implementation we observe that the parameter "file" is not changing.
Mark the "file" parameter of LSM hook security_binder_transfer_file() as "const" since it will not be changing in the LSM hook.
Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> [PM: subject line whitespace fix] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v6.1.45, v6.1.44 |
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d80a8f1b |
| 08-Aug-2023 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb sharing
When NFS superblocks are created by automounting, their LSM parameters aren't set in the fs_context struct prior t
vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb sharing
When NFS superblocks are created by automounting, their LSM parameters aren't set in the fs_context struct prior to sget_fc() being called, leading to failure to match existing superblocks.
This bug leads to messages like the following appearing in dmesg when fscache is enabled:
NFS: Cache volume key already in use (nfs,4.2,2,108,106a8c0,1,,,,100000,100000,2ee,3a98,1d4c,3a98,1)
Fix this by adding a new LSM hook to load fc->security for submount creation.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962680944.3334508.6610023900349142034.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962729225.3357250.14350728846471527137.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165970659095.2812394.6868894171102318796.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166133579016.3678898.6283195019480567275.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/217595.1662033775@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v5 Fixes: 9bc61ab18b1d ("vfs: Introduce fs_context, switch vfs_kern_mount() to it.") Fixes: 779df6a5480f ("NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode") Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Message-Id: <20230808-master-v9-1-e0ecde888221@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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6672efbb |
| 07-Aug-2023 |
Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> |
lsm: constify the 'target' parameter in security_capget()
Three LSMs register the implementations for the "capget" hook: AppArmor, SELinux, and the normal capability code. Looking at the function im
lsm: constify the 'target' parameter in security_capget()
Three LSMs register the implementations for the "capget" hook: AppArmor, SELinux, and the normal capability code. Looking at the function implementations we may observe that the first parameter "target" is not changing.
Mark the first argument "target" of LSM hook security_capget() as "const" since it will not be changing in the LSM hook.
cap_capget() LSM hook declaration exceeds the 80 characters per line limit. Split the function declaration to multiple lines to decrease the line length.
Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> [PM: align the cap_capget() declaration, spelling fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v6.1.43, v6.1.42, v6.1.41, v6.1.40, v6.1.39 |
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5b52ad34 |
| 11-Jul-2023 |
Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> |
security: Constify sk in the sk_getsecid hook.
The sk_getsecid hook shouldn't need to modify its socket argument. Make it const so that callers of security_sk_classify_flow() can use a const struct
security: Constify sk in the sk_getsecid hook.
The sk_getsecid hook shouldn't need to modify its socket argument. Make it const so that callers of security_sk_classify_flow() can use a const struct sock *.
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Revision tags: v6.1.38, v6.1.37, v6.1.36, v6.4, v6.1.35, v6.1.34 |
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6bcdfd2c |
| 10-Jun-2023 |
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> |
security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook
Currently, the LSM infrastructure supports only one LSM providing an xattr and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus ot
security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook
Currently, the LSM infrastructure supports only one LSM providing an xattr and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus other inode metadata.
Allow all LSMs to provide one or multiple xattrs, by extending the security blob reservation mechanism. Introduce the new lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure, so that each LSM can specify how many xattrs it needs, and the LSM infrastructure knows how many xattr slots it should allocate.
Modify the inode_init_security hook definition, by passing the full xattr array allocated in security_inode_init_security(), and the current number of xattr slots in that array filled by LSMs. The first parameter would allow EVM to access and calculate the HMAC on xattrs supplied by other LSMs, the second to not leave gaps in the xattr array, when an LSM requested but did not provide xattrs (e.g. if it is not initialized).
Introduce lsm_get_xattr_slot(), which LSMs can call as many times as the number specified in the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure. During each call, lsm_get_xattr_slot() increments the number of filled xattrs, so that at the next invocation it returns the next xattr slot to fill.
Cleanup security_inode_init_security(). Unify the !initxattrs and initxattrs case by simply not allocating the new_xattrs array in the former. Update the documentation to reflect the changes, and fix the description of the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore.
Adapt both SELinux and Smack to use the new definition of the inode_init_security hook, and to call lsm_get_xattr_slot() to obtain and fill the reserved slots in the xattr array.
Move the xattr->name assignment after the xattr->value one, so that it is done only in case of successful memory allocation.
Finally, change the default return value of the inode_init_security hook from zero to -EOPNOTSUPP, so that BPF LSM correctly follows the hook conventions.
Reported-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/ Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: minor comment and variable tweaks, approved by RS] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v6.1.33, v6.1.32, v6.1.31, v6.1.30, v6.1.29, v6.1.28, v6.1.27, v6.1.26, v6.3 |
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e3d9387f |
| 20-Apr-2023 |
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> |
security, lsm: Introduce security_mptcp_add_subflow()
MPTCP can create subflows in kernel context, and later indirectly expose them to user-space, via the owning MPTCP socket.
As discussed in the r
security, lsm: Introduce security_mptcp_add_subflow()
MPTCP can create subflows in kernel context, and later indirectly expose them to user-space, via the owning MPTCP socket.
As discussed in the reported link, the above causes unexpected failures for server, MPTCP-enabled applications.
Let's introduce a new LSM hook to allow the security module to relabel the subflow according to the owning user-space process, via the MPTCP socket owning the subflow.
Note that the new hook requires both the MPTCP socket and the new subflow. This could allow future extensions, e.g. explicitly validating the MPTCP <-> subflow linkage.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/mptcp/CAHC9VhTNh-YwiyTds=P1e3rixEDqbRTFj22bpya=+qJqfcaMfg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v6.1.25, v6.1.24, v6.1.23, v6.1.22, v6.1.21, v6.1.20, v6.1.19, v6.1.18, v6.1.17, v6.1.16 |
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b3816cf8 |
| 08-Mar-2023 |
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
lsm: fix a badly named parameter in security_get_getsecurity()
There is no good reason for why the "_buffer" parameter needs an underscore, get rid of it.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore
lsm: fix a badly named parameter in security_get_getsecurity()
There is no good reason for why the "_buffer" parameter needs an underscore, get rid of it.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v6.1.15, v6.1.14, v6.1.13, v6.2, v6.1.12, v6.1.11, v6.1.10, v6.1.9, v6.1.8, v6.1.7, v6.1.6 |
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700b7940 |
| 13-Jan-2023 |
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> |
fs: port acl to mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversi
fs: port acl to mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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39f60c1c |
| 13-Jan-2023 |
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> |
fs: port xattr to mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conver
fs: port xattr to mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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4609e1f1 |
| 13-Jan-2023 |
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> |
fs: port ->permission() to pass mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is j
fs: port ->permission() to pass mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Revision tags: v6.1.5, v6.0.19, v6.0.18, v6.1.4, v6.1.3, v6.0.17, v6.1.2, v6.0.16, v6.1.1, v6.0.15, v6.0.14, v6.0.13, v6.1, v6.0.12, v6.0.11, v6.0.10, v5.15.80, v6.0.9, v5.15.79, v6.0.8, v5.15.78, v6.0.7, v5.15.77, v5.15.76, v6.0.6, v6.0.5, v5.15.75, v6.0.4, v6.0.3, v6.0.2, v5.15.74, v5.15.73, v6.0.1 |
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b10b9c34 |
| 10-Oct-2022 |
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe
Commit 4ff09db1b79b ("bpf: net: Change sk_getsockopt() to take the sockptr_t argument") made it possible to call sk_getsockopt() with bot
lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe
Commit 4ff09db1b79b ("bpf: net: Change sk_getsockopt() to take the sockptr_t argument") made it possible to call sk_getsockopt() with both user and kernel address space buffers through the use of the sockptr_t type. Unfortunately at the time of conversion the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook was written to only accept userspace buffers, and in a desire to avoid having to change the LSM hook the commit author simply passed the sockptr_t's userspace buffer pointer. Since the only sk_getsockopt() callers at the time of conversion which used kernel sockptr_t buffers did not allow SO_PEERSEC, and hence the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() hook, this was acceptable but also very fragile as future changes presented the possibility of silently passing kernel space pointers to the LSM hook.
There are several ways to protect against this, including careful code review of future commits, but since relying on code review to catch bugs is a recipe for disaster and the upstream eBPF maintainer is "strongly against defensive programming", this patch updates the LSM hook, and all of the implementations to support sockptr_t and safely handle both user and kernel space buffers.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v5.15.72, v6.0, v5.15.71, v5.15.70 |
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72b3897e |
| 22-Sep-2022 |
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> |
security: add get, remove and set acl hook
The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup
security: add get, remove and set acl hook
The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1].
So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void pointer stored in the uapi format.
In the next patches we implement the hooks for the few security modules that do actually have restrictions on posix acls.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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3350607d |
| 18-Oct-2022 |
Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> |
security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook
Like path_truncate, the file_truncate hook also restricts file truncation, but is called in the cases where truncation is attempted on an
security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook
Like path_truncate, the file_truncate hook also restricts file truncation, but is called in the cases where truncation is attempted on an already-opened file.
This is required in a subsequent commit to handle ftruncate() operations differently to truncate() operations.
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-2-gnoack3000@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Revision tags: v5.15.69, v5.15.68, v5.15.67, v5.15.66, v5.15.65, v5.15.64, v5.15.63, v5.15.62, v5.15.61, v5.15.60, v5.15.59, v5.19, v5.15.58, v5.15.57, v5.15.56, v5.15.55, v5.15.54, v5.15.53, v5.15.52, v5.15.51, v5.15.50, v5.15.49, v5.15.48, v5.15.47, v5.15.46, v5.15.45, v5.15.44, v5.15.43, v5.15.42, v5.18, v5.15.41, v5.15.40, v5.15.39, v5.15.38, v5.15.37, v5.15.36, v5.15.35, v5.15.34, v5.15.33, v5.15.32, v5.15.31, v5.17, v5.15.30, v5.15.29, v5.15.28, v5.15.27, v5.15.26, v5.15.25, v5.15.24, v5.15.23, v5.15.22, v5.15.21, v5.15.20, v5.15.19 |
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c8e477c6 |
| 30-Jan-2022 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM...
cast of ->d_name.name to char * is completely wrong - nothing is allowed to modify its contents.
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft)
->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM...
cast of ->d_name.name to char * is completely wrong - nothing is allowed to modify its contents.
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
2a584012 |
| 15-Jul-2022 |
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> |
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for the new uring_cmd file op
io-uring cmd support was added through ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd"), this extended the struct file_operati
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for the new uring_cmd file op
io-uring cmd support was added through ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd"), this extended the struct file_operations to allow a new command which each subsystem can use to enable command passthrough. Add an LSM specific for the command passthrough which enables LSMs to inspect the command details.
This was discussed long ago without no clear pointer for something conclusive, so this enables LSMs to at least reject this new file operation.
[0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8adf55db-7bab-f59d-d612-ed906b948d19@schaufler-ca.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd") Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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#
7cd4c5c2 |
| 15-Aug-2022 |
Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com> |
security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns()
User namespaces are an effective tool to allow programs to run with permission without requiring the need for a program to run as root. User namesp
security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns()
User namespaces are an effective tool to allow programs to run with permission without requiring the need for a program to run as root. User namespaces may also be used as a sandboxing technique. However, attackers sometimes leverage user namespaces as an initial attack vector to perform some exploit. [1,2,3]
While it is not the unprivileged user namespace functionality, which causes the kernel to be exploitable, users/administrators might want to more granularly limit or at least monitor how various processes use this functionality, while vulnerable kernel subsystems are being patched.
Preventing user namespace already creation comes in a few of forms in order of granularity:
1. /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces sysctl 2. Distro specific patch(es) 3. CONFIG_USER_NS
To block a task based on its attributes, the LSM hook cred_prepare is a decent candidate for use because it provides more granular control, and it is called before create_user_ns():
cred = prepare_creds() security_prepare_creds() call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ... if (cred) create_user_ns(cred)
Since security_prepare_creds() is meant for LSMs to copy and prepare credentials, access control is an unintended use of the hook. [4] Further, security_prepare_creds() will always return a ENOMEM if the hook returns any non-zero error code.
This hook also does not handle the clone3 case which requires us to access a user space pointer to know if we're in the CLONE_NEW_USER call path which may be subject to a TOCTTOU attack.
Lastly, cred_prepare is called in many call paths, and a targeted hook further limits the frequency of calls which is a beneficial outcome. Therefore introduce a new function security_create_user_ns() with an accompanying userns_create LSM hook.
With the new userns_create hook, users will have more control over the observability and access control over user namespace creation. Users should expect that normal operation of user namespaces will behave as usual, and only be impacted when controls are implemented by users or administrators.
This hook takes the prepared creds for LSM authors to write policy against. On success, the new namespace is applied to credentials, otherwise an error is returned.
Links: 1. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0492 2. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25636 3. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34918 4. https://lore.kernel.org/all/1c4b1c0d-12f6-6e9e-a6a3-cdce7418110c@schaufler-ca.com/
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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#
fcfe0ac2 |
| 08-Jun-2022 |
Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> |
security: Add LSM hook to setgroups() syscall
Give the LSM framework the ability to filter setgroups() syscalls. There are already analagous hooks for the set*uid() and set*gid() syscalls. The SafeS
security: Add LSM hook to setgroups() syscall
Give the LSM framework the ability to filter setgroups() syscalls. There are already analagous hooks for the set*uid() and set*gid() syscalls. The SafeSetID LSM will use this new hook to ensure setgroups() calls are allowed by the installed security policy. Tested by putting print statement in security_task_fix_setgroups() hook and confirming that it gets hit when userspace does a setgroups() syscall.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
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#
100f59d9 |
| 06-May-2022 |
Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> |
LSM: Remove double path_rename hook calls for RENAME_EXCHANGE
In order to be able to identify a file exchange with renameat2(2) and RENAME_EXCHANGE, which will be useful for Landlock [1], propagate
LSM: Remove double path_rename hook calls for RENAME_EXCHANGE
In order to be able to identify a file exchange with renameat2(2) and RENAME_EXCHANGE, which will be useful for Landlock [1], propagate the rename flags to LSMs. This may also improve performance because of the switch from two set of LSM hook calls to only one, and because LSMs using this hook may optimize the double check (e.g. only one lock, reduce the number of path walks).
AppArmor, Landlock and Tomoyo are updated to leverage this change. This should not change the current behavior (same check order), except (different level of) speed boosts.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220221212522.320243-1-mic@digikod.net
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-7-mic@digikod.net
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#
5e50f5d4 |
| 12-Feb-2022 |
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> |
security: add sctp_assoc_established hook
security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace security_inet_conn_established() called in sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in secur
security: add sctp_assoc_established hook
security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace security_inet_conn_established() called in sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in security subsystem and save the peer secid to asoc->peer_secid.
Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks") Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com> Based-on-patch-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Revision tags: v5.15.18, v5.15.17 |
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#
7f5056b9 |
| 26-Jan-2022 |
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> |
security, lsm: dentry_init_security() Handle multi LSM registration
A ceph user has reported that ceph is crashing with kernel NULL pointer dereference. Following is the backtrace.
/proc/version: L
security, lsm: dentry_init_security() Handle multi LSM registration
A ceph user has reported that ceph is crashing with kernel NULL pointer dereference. Following is the backtrace.
/proc/version: Linux version 5.16.2-arch1-1 (linux@archlinux) (gcc (GCC) 11.1.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils) 2.36.1) #1 SMP PREEMPT Thu, 20 Jan 2022 16:18:29 +0000 distro / arch: Arch Linux / x86_64 SELinux is not enabled ceph cluster version: 16.2.7 (dd0603118f56ab514f133c8d2e3adfc983942503)
relevant dmesg output: [ 30.947129] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 30.947206] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 30.947258] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 30.947310] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 30.947342] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 30.947388] CPU: 5 PID: 778 Comm: touch Not tainted 5.16.2-arch1-1 #1 86fbf2c313cc37a553d65deb81d98e9dcc2a3659 [ 30.947486] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. B365M DS3H/B365M DS3H, BIOS F5 08/13/2019 [ 30.947569] RIP: 0010:strlen+0x0/0x20 [ 30.947616] Code: b6 07 38 d0 74 16 48 83 c7 01 84 c0 74 05 48 39 f7 75 ec 31 c0 31 d2 89 d6 89 d7 c3 48 89 f8 31 d2 89 d6 89 d7 c3 0 f 1f 40 00 <80> 3f 00 74 12 48 89 f8 48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 29 f8 31 ff [ 30.947782] RSP: 0018:ffffa4ed80ffbbb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 30.947836] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa4ed80ffbc60 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 30.947904] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 30.947971] RBP: ffff94b0d15c0ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 30.948040] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 30.948106] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffa4ed80ffbc60 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 30.948174] FS: 00007fc7520f0740(0000) GS:ffff94b7ced40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 30.948252] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 30.948308] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000104a40001 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [ 30.948376] Call Trace: [ 30.948404] <TASK> [ 30.948431] ceph_security_init_secctx+0x7b/0x240 [ceph 49f9c4b9bf5be8760f19f1747e26da33920bce4b] [ 30.948582] ceph_atomic_open+0x51e/0x8a0 [ceph 49f9c4b9bf5be8760f19f1747e26da33920bce4b] [ 30.948708] ? get_cached_acl+0x4d/0xa0 [ 30.948759] path_openat+0x60d/0x1030 [ 30.948809] do_filp_open+0xa5/0x150 [ 30.948859] do_sys_openat2+0xc4/0x190 [ 30.948904] __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0 [ 30.948948] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 [ 30.948989] ? exc_page_fault+0x72/0x180 [ 30.949034] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 30.949091] RIP: 0033:0x7fc7521e25bb [ 30.950849] Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4b 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 67 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 0 0 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 91 00 00 00 48 8b 54 24 28 64 48 2b 14 25
Core of the problem is that ceph checks for return code from security_dentry_init_security() and if return code is 0, it assumes everything is fine and continues to call strlen(name), which crashes.
Typically SELinux LSM returns 0 and sets name to "security.selinux" and it is not a problem. Or if selinux is not compiled in or disabled, it returns -EOPNOTSUP and ceph deals with it.
But somehow in this configuration, 0 is being returned and "name" is not being initialized and that's creating the problem.
Our suspicion is that BPF LSM is registering a hook for dentry_init_security() and returns hook default of 0.
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, dentry_init_security, struct dentry *dentry,...)
I have not been able to reproduce it just by doing CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y. Stephen has tested the patch though and confirms it solves the problem for him.
dentry_init_security() is written in such a way that it expects only one LSM to register the hook. Atleast that's the expectation with current code.
If another LSM returns a hook and returns default, it will simply return 0 as of now and that will break ceph.
Hence, suggestion is that change semantics of this hook a bit. If there are no LSMs or no LSM is taking ownership and initializing security context, then return -EOPNOTSUP. Also allow at max one LSM to initialize security context. This hook can't deal with multiple LSMs trying to init security context. This patch implements this new behavior.
Reported-by: Stephen Muth <smuth4@gmail.com> Tested-by: Stephen Muth <smuth4@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.16.0 Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Revision tags: v5.4.173, v5.15.16, v5.15.15, v5.16, v5.15.10, v5.15.9, v5.15.8, v5.15.7 |
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#
52f982f0 |
| 06-Dec-2021 |
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> |
security,selinux: remove security_add_mnt_opt()
Its last user has been removed in commit f2aedb713c28 ("NFS: Add fs_context support.").
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed
security,selinux: remove security_add_mnt_opt()
Its last user has been removed in commit f2aedb713c28 ("NFS: Add fs_context support.").
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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