x86/rfds: Mitigate Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)

commit 8076fcde016c9c0e0660543e67bff86cb48a7c9c upstream.

RFDS is a CPU vulnerability that may allow userspace to infer kernel
stale data previ

x86/rfds: Mitigate Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)

commit 8076fcde016c9c0e0660543e67bff86cb48a7c9c upstream.

RFDS is a CPU vulnerability that may allow userspace to infer kernel
stale data previously used in floating point registers, vector registers
and integer registers. RFDS only affects certain Intel Atom processors.

Intel released a microcode update that uses VERW instruction to clear
the affected CPU buffers. Unlike MDS, none of the affected cores support
SMT.

Add RFDS bug infrastructure and enable the VERW based mitigation by
default, that clears the affected buffers just before exiting to
userspace. Also add sysfs reporting and cmdline parameter
"reg_file_data_sampling" to control the mitigation.

For details see:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...

drivers/base/cpu: crash data showing should depends on KEXEC_CORE

commit 4e9e2e4c65136dfd32dd0afe555961433d1cf906 upstream.

After commit 88a6f8994421 ("crash: memory and CPU hotplug sysfs
attribute

drivers/base/cpu: crash data showing should depends on KEXEC_CORE

commit 4e9e2e4c65136dfd32dd0afe555961433d1cf906 upstream.

After commit 88a6f8994421 ("crash: memory and CPU hotplug sysfs
attributes"), on x86_64, if only below kernel configs related to kdump are
set, compiling error are triggered.

----
CONFIG_CRASH_CORE=y
CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE=y
CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP=y
CONFIG_CRASH_HOTPLUG=y
------

------------------------------------------------------
drivers/base/cpu.c: In function `crash_hotplug_show':
drivers/base/cpu.c:309:40: error: implicit declaration of function `crash_hotplug_cpu_support'; did you mean `crash_hotplug_show'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
309 | return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", crash_hotplug_cpu_support());
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| crash_hotplug_show
cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
------------------------------------------------------

CONFIG_KEXEC is used to enable kexec_load interface, the
crash_notes/crash_notes_size/crash_hotplug showing depends on
CONFIG_KEXEC is incorrect. It should depend on KEXEC_CORE instead.

Fix it now.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231128055248.659808-1-bhe@redhat.com
Fixes: 88a6f8994421 ("crash: memory and CPU hotplug sysfs attributes")
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com> [compile-time only]
Tested-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric DeVolder <eric_devolder@yahoo.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...

crash: memory and CPU hotplug sysfs attributes

Introduce the crash_hotplug attribute for memory and CPUs for use by
userspace. These attributes directly facilitate the udev rule for
managing usersp

crash: memory and CPU hotplug sysfs attributes

Introduce the crash_hotplug attribute for memory and CPUs for use by
userspace. These attributes directly facilitate the udev rule for
managing userspace re-loading of the crash kernel upon hot un/plug
changes.

For memory, expose the crash_hotplug attribute to the
/sys/devices/system/memory directory. For example:

# udevadm info --attribute-walk /sys/devices/system/memory/memory81
looking at device '/devices/system/memory/memory81':
KERNEL=="memory81"
SUBSYSTEM=="memory"
DRIVER==""
ATTR{online}=="1"
ATTR{phys_device}=="0"
ATTR{phys_index}=="00000051"
ATTR{removable}=="1"
ATTR{state}=="online"
ATTR{valid_zones}=="Movable"

looking at parent device '/devices/system/memory':
KERNELS=="memory"
SUBSYSTEMS==""
DRIVERS==""
ATTRS{auto_online_blocks}=="offline"
ATTRS{block_size_bytes}=="8000000"
ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1"

For CPUs, expose the crash_hotplug attribute to the
/sys/devices/system/cpu directory. For example:

# udevadm info --attribute-walk /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0
looking at device '/devices/system/cpu/cpu0':
KERNEL=="cpu0"
SUBSYSTEM=="cpu"
DRIVER=="processor"
ATTR{crash_notes}=="277c38600"
ATTR{crash_notes_size}=="368"
ATTR{online}=="1"

looking at parent device '/devices/system/cpu':
KERNELS=="cpu"
SUBSYSTEMS==""
DRIVERS==""
ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1"
ATTRS{isolated}==""
ATTRS{kernel_max}=="8191"
ATTRS{nohz_full}==" (null)"
ATTRS{offline}=="4-7"
ATTRS{online}=="0-3"
ATTRS{possible}=="0-7"
ATTRS{present}=="0-3"

With these sysfs attributes in place, it is possible to efficiently
instruct the udev rule to skip crash kernel reloading for kernels
configured with crash hotplug support.

For example, the following is the proposed udev rule change for RHEL
system 98-kexec.rules (as the first lines of the rule file):

# The kernel updates the crash elfcorehdr for CPU and memory changes
SUBSYSTEM=="cpu", ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1", GOTO="kdump_reload_end"
SUBSYSTEM=="memory", ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1", GOTO="kdump_reload_end"

When examined in the context of 98-kexec.rules, the above rules test if
crash_hotplug is set, and if so, the userspace initiated
unload-then-reload of the crash kernel is skipped.

CPU and memory checks are separated in accordance with CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
and CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG kernel config options. If an architecture
supports, for example, memory hotplug but not CPU hotplug, then the
/sys/devices/system/memory/crash_hotplug attribute file is present, but
the /sys/devices/system/cpu/crash_hotplug attribute file will NOT be
present. Thus the udev rule skips userspace processing of memory hot
un/plug events, but the udev rule will evaluate false for CPU events, thus
allowing userspace to process CPU hot un/plug events (ie the
unload-then-reload of the kdump capture kernel).

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814214446.6659-5-eric.devolder@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Akhil Raj <lf32.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

show more ...

driver core: cpu: Fix the fallback cpu_show_gds() name

In

6524c798b727 ("driver core: cpu: Make cpu_show_not_affected() static")

I fat-fingered the name of cpu_show_gds(). Usually, I'd rebase bu

driver core: cpu: Fix the fallback cpu_show_gds() name

In

6524c798b727 ("driver core: cpu: Make cpu_show_not_affected() static")

I fat-fingered the name of cpu_show_gds(). Usually, I'd rebase but since
those are extraordinary embargoed times, the commit above was already
pulled into another tree so no no.

Therefore, fix it ontop.

Fixes: 6524c798b727 ("driver core: cpu: Make cpu_show_not_affected() static")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230811095831.27513-1-bp@alien8.de

show more ...

driver core: cpu: Make cpu_show_not_affected() static

Fix a -Wmissing-prototypes warning and add the gather_data_sampling()
stub macro call for real.

Fixes: 0fddfe338210 ("driver core: cpu: Unify r

driver core: cpu: Make cpu_show_not_affected() static

Fix a -Wmissing-prototypes warning and add the gather_data_sampling()
stub macro call for real.

Fixes: 0fddfe338210 ("driver core: cpu: Unify redundant silly stubs")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202308101956.oRj1ls7s-lkp@intel.com
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202308101956.oRj1ls7s-lkp@intel.com

show more ...

driver core: cpu: Unify redundant silly stubs

Make them all a weak function, aliasing to a single function which
issues the "Not affected" string.

No functional changes.

Suggested-by: Linus Torval

driver core: cpu: Unify redundant silly stubs

Make them all a weak function, aliasing to a single function which
issues the "Not affected" string.

No functional changes.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809102700.29449-3-bp@alien8.de

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driver/base/cpu: Retry online operation if -EBUSY

Booting the kernel with "maxcpus=1" is a common technique for CPU
partitioning and isolation. It delays the CPU bringup process until
when the bootu

driver/base/cpu: Retry online operation if -EBUSY

Booting the kernel with "maxcpus=1" is a common technique for CPU
partitioning and isolation. It delays the CPU bringup process until
when the bootup scripts are ready to bring CPUs online by writing 1 to
/sys/device/system/cpu/cpu<X>/online. However, it was found that not
all the CPUs were online after bootup. The collection of offline CPUs
are different after every reboot.

Further investigation reveals that some "online" write operations
fail with an -EBUSY error. This error is returned when CPU hotplug is
temporiarly disabled when cpu_hotplug_disable() is called.

During bootup, the main caller of cpu_hotplug_disable() is
pci_call_probe() for PCI device initialization. By measuring the times
spent with cpu_hotplug_disabled set in a typical 2-socket server, most
of them last less than 10ms. However, there are a few that can last
hundreds of ms. Note that the cpu_hotplug_disabled period of different
devices can overlap leading to longer cpu_hotplug_disabled hold time.

Since the CPU hotplug disable condition is transient and it is not
that easy to modify all the existing bootup scripts to handle this
condition, the kernel can help by retrying the online operation when
an -EBUSY error is returned. This patch retries the online operation
in cpu_subsys_online() when an -EBUSY error is returned for up to 5
times after an exponentially increasing delay that can last a total of
at least 620ms of waiting time by calling msleep().

With this patch in place, booting up the patched kernel with "maxcpus=1"
does not leave any CPU in an offline state in 10 reboot attempts.

Reported-by: Vishal Agrawal <vagrawal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230724143826.3996163-1-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...

x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation

Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow
vulnerability found on AMD processors.

The mitigation works by ensuring all RE

x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation

Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow
vulnerability found on AMD processors.

The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
retpoline sequence. To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
sequence.

To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.

In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
srso_safe_ret().

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>

show more ...

x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation

Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector

x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation

Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector registers.

Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions
that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable
hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and
encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector
registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector
register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical
side channel techniques like cache timing attacks.

This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons.
First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it.
This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can
be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control
bit alone.

Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the
mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX.
It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be
mitigated against GDS.

The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by
setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with
mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading:

/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling

Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>

show more ...

tick/nohz: Fix cpu_is_hotpluggable() by checking with nohz subsystem

For CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL systems, the tick_do_timer_cpu cannot be offlined.
However, cpu_is_hotpluggable() still returns true for th

tick/nohz: Fix cpu_is_hotpluggable() by checking with nohz subsystem

For CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL systems, the tick_do_timer_cpu cannot be offlined.
However, cpu_is_hotpluggable() still returns true for those CPUs. This causes
torture tests that do offlining to end up trying to offline this CPU causing
test failures. Such failure happens on all architectures.

Fix the repeated error messages thrown by this (even if the hotplug errors are
harmless) by asking the opinion of the nohz subsystem on whether the CPU can be
hotplugged.

[ Apply Frederic Weisbecker feedback on refactoring tick_nohz_cpu_down(). ]

For drivers/base/ portion:
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Zhouyi Zhou <zhouzhouyi@gmail.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: rcu <rcu@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2987557f52b9 ("driver-core/cpu: Expose hotpluggability to the rest of the kernel")
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>

show more ...

driver core: cpu: don't hand-override the uevent bus_type callback.

Instead of having to change the uevent bus_type callback by hand at
runtime, set it at build time based on the build configuration

driver core: cpu: don't hand-override the uevent bus_type callback.

Instead of having to change the uevent bus_type callback by hand at
runtime, set it at build time based on the build configuration options,
making this much simpler to maintain and understand (and allow to make
the structure constant.)

Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210102408.1083177-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...

driver core: bus: add bus_get_dev_root() function

Instead of poking around in the struct bus_type directly for the
dev_root pointer, provide a function to return it properly reference
counted, if it

driver core: bus: add bus_get_dev_root() function

Instead of poking around in the struct bus_type directly for the
dev_root pointer, provide a function to return it properly reference
counted, if it is present in the bus. This will be needed to move the
pointer out of struct bus_type in the future.

Use the function in the driver core code at the same time it is
introduced to verify that it works properly.

Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230209093556.19132-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...

driver core: make struct bus_type.uevent() take a const *

The uevent() callback in struct bus_type should not be modifying the
device that is passed into it, so mark it as a const * and propagate th

driver core: make struct bus_type.uevent() take a const *

The uevent() callback in struct bus_type should not be modifying the
device that is passed into it, so mark it as a const * and propagate the
function signature changes out into all relevant subsystems that use
this callback.

Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230111113018.459199-16-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

[peterz: add hygon]
[

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

[peterz: add hygon]
[kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

show more ...

x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data

Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data
vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state si

x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data

Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data
vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar
to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

show more ...

sched/isolation: Use single feature type while referring to housekeeping cpumask

Refer to housekeeping APIs using single feature types instead of flags.
This prevents from passing multiple isolation

sched/isolation: Use single feature type while referring to housekeeping cpumask

Refer to housekeeping APIs using single feature types instead of flags.
This prevents from passing multiple isolation features at once to
housekeeping interfaces, which soon won't be possible anymore as each
isolation features will have their own cpumask.

Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220207155910.527133-5-frederic@kernel.org

show more ...

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution w

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

[peterz: add hygon]
[kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution w

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

[peterz: add hygon]
[kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution w

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

[peterz: add hygon]
[kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution w

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

[peterz: add hygon]
[kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution w

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

[peterz: add hygon]
[kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution w

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

[peterz: add hygon]
[kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution w

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

[peterz: add hygon]
[kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution w

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

[peterz: add hygon]
[kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution w

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

[peterz: add hygon]
[kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...