Revision tags: v6.6.25, v6.6.24, v6.6.23, v6.6.16, v6.6.15, v6.6.14, v6.6.13, v6.6.12, v6.6.11, v6.6.10, v6.6.9, v6.6.8, v6.6.7, v6.6.6, v6.6.5, v6.6.4, v6.6.3, v6.6.2, v6.5.11, v6.6.1, v6.5.10, v6.6, v6.5.9, v6.5.8, v6.5.7, v6.5.6, v6.5.5, v6.5.4, v6.5.3, v6.5.2, v6.1.51, v6.5.1, v6.1.50, v6.5, v6.1.49, v6.1.48, v6.1.46, v6.1.45, v6.1.44, v6.1.43, v6.1.42 |
|
#
f20765fd |
| 26-Jul-2023 |
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> |
integrity: Always reference the blacklist keyring with appraisal
Commit 273df864cf746 ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig") introduced an appraise_flag option for referenci
integrity: Always reference the blacklist keyring with appraisal
Commit 273df864cf746 ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig") introduced an appraise_flag option for referencing the blacklist keyring. Any matching binary found on this keyring fails signature validation. This flag only works with module appended signatures.
An important part of a PKI infrastructure is to have the ability to do revocation at a later time should a vulnerability be found. Expand the revocation flag usage to all appraisal functions. The flag is now enabled by default. Setting the flag with an IMA policy has been deprecated. Without a revocation capability like this in place, only authenticity can be maintained. With this change, integrity can now be achieved with digital signature based IMA appraisal.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Revision tags: v6.1.41, v6.1.40, v6.1.39, v6.1.38, v6.1.37, v6.1.36, v6.4, v6.1.35, v6.1.34, v6.1.33, v6.1.32, v6.1.31, v6.1.30, v6.1.29, v6.1.28, v6.1.27, v6.1.26, v6.3, v6.1.25, v6.1.24, v6.1.23, v6.1.22, v6.1.21, v6.1.20, v6.1.19, v6.1.18, v6.1.17, v6.1.16, v6.1.15, v6.1.14, v6.1.13, v6.2, v6.1.12, v6.1.11, v6.1.10, v6.1.9, v6.1.8, v6.1.7, v6.1.6, v6.1.5, v6.0.19, v6.0.18, v6.1.4, v6.1.3, v6.0.17, v6.1.2, v6.0.16, v6.1.1, v6.0.15, v6.0.14, v6.0.13, v6.1, v6.0.12, v6.0.11, v6.0.10, v5.15.80, v6.0.9, v5.15.79, v6.0.8, v5.15.78, v6.0.7, v5.15.77, v5.15.76, v6.0.6, v6.0.5, v5.15.75, v6.0.4, v6.0.3, v6.0.2, v5.15.74, v5.15.73, v6.0.1, v5.15.72, v6.0, v5.15.71, v5.15.70, v5.15.69, v5.15.68, v5.15.67, v5.15.66, v5.15.65, v5.15.64, v5.15.63, v5.15.62, v5.15.61, v5.15.60, v5.15.59, v5.19, v5.15.58, v5.15.57, v5.15.56, v5.15.55, v5.15.54, v5.15.53, v5.15.52, v5.15.51, v5.15.50, v5.15.49, v5.15.48, v5.15.47, v5.15.46, v5.15.45, v5.15.44, v5.15.43, v5.15.42, v5.18, v5.15.41, v5.15.40, v5.15.39, v5.15.38, v5.15.37, v5.15.36, v5.15.35, v5.15.34, v5.15.33, v5.15.32, v5.15.31, v5.17, v5.15.30, v5.15.29, v5.15.28, v5.15.27, v5.15.26, v5.15.25, v5.15.24, v5.15.23, v5.15.22, v5.15.21, v5.15.20, v5.15.19, v5.15.18, v5.15.17, v5.4.173, v5.15.16, v5.15.15, v5.16, v5.15.10, v5.15.9, v5.15.8, v5.15.7, v5.15.6, v5.15.5, v5.15.4, v5.15.3, v5.15.2, v5.15.1, v5.15, v5.14.14, v5.14.13, v5.14.12, v5.14.11, v5.14.10, v5.14.9, v5.14.8, v5.14.7, v5.14.6, v5.10.67, v5.10.66, v5.14.5, v5.14.4, v5.10.65, v5.14.3, v5.10.64, v5.14.2, v5.10.63, v5.14.1, v5.10.62, v5.14, v5.10.61, v5.10.60, v5.10.53, v5.10.52, v5.10.51, v5.10.50, v5.10.49, v5.13, v5.10.46, v5.10.43, v5.10.42, v5.10.41, v5.10.40, v5.10.39, v5.4.119, v5.10.36, v5.10.35, v5.10.34, v5.4.116, v5.10.33, v5.12, v5.10.32, v5.10.31, v5.10.30, v5.10.27, v5.10.26, v5.10.25, v5.10.24, v5.10.23, v5.10.22, v5.10.21, v5.10.20, v5.10.19, v5.4.101, v5.10.18, v5.10.17, v5.11, v5.10.16, v5.10.15, v5.10.14, v5.10, v5.8.17, v5.8.16, v5.8.15, v5.9, v5.8.14, v5.8.13, v5.8.12, v5.8.11, v5.8.10, v5.8.9, v5.8.8, v5.8.7, v5.8.6, v5.4.62, v5.8.5, v5.8.4, v5.4.61, v5.8.3, v5.4.60, v5.8.2, v5.4.59, v5.8.1, v5.4.58, v5.4.57, v5.4.56, v5.8, v5.7.12, v5.4.55, v5.7.11, v5.4.54, v5.7.10, v5.4.53, v5.4.52, v5.7.9, v5.7.8, v5.4.51, v5.4.50, v5.7.7, v5.4.49, v5.7.6, v5.7.5, v5.4.48, v5.7.4, v5.7.3, v5.4.47, v5.4.46, v5.7.2, v5.4.45, v5.7.1, v5.4.44, v5.7, v5.4.43, v5.4.42, v5.4.41, v5.4.40, v5.4.39, v5.4.38, v5.4.37 |
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#
fa4f3f56 |
| 01-May-2020 |
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> |
powerpc/ima: Fix secure boot rules in ima arch policy
To prevent verifying the kernel module appended signature twice (finit_module), once by the module_sig_check() and again by IMA, powerpc secure
powerpc/ima: Fix secure boot rules in ima arch policy
To prevent verifying the kernel module appended signature twice (finit_module), once by the module_sig_check() and again by IMA, powerpc secure boot rules define an IMA architecture specific policy rule only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is not enabled. This, unfortunately, does not take into account the ability of enabling "sig_enforce" on the boot command line (module.sig_enforce=1).
Including the IMA module appraise rule results in failing the finit_module syscall, unless the module signing public key is loaded onto the IMA keyring.
This patch fixes secure boot policy rules to be based on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG instead.
Fixes: 4238fad366a6 ("powerpc/ima: Add support to initialize ima policy rules") Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1588342612-14532-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
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Revision tags: v5.4.36, v5.4.35, v5.4.34, v5.4.33, v5.4.32, v5.4.31, v5.4.30, v5.4.29, v5.6, v5.4.28, v5.4.27, v5.4.26, v5.4.25, v5.4.24, v5.4.23, v5.4.22, v5.4.21, v5.4.20, v5.4.19, v5.4.18, v5.4.17, v5.4.16, v5.5, v5.4.15, v5.4.14, v5.4.13, v5.4.12, v5.4.11, v5.4.10, v5.4.9, v5.4.8, v5.4.7, v5.4.6, v5.4.5, v5.4.4, v5.4.3, v5.3.15, v5.4.2, v5.4.1, v5.3.14, v5.4, v5.3.13, v5.3.12, v5.3.11, v5.3.10, v5.3.9 |
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#
d72ea491 |
| 30-Oct-2019 |
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> |
powerpc/ima: Indicate kernel modules appended signatures are enforced
The arch specific kernel module policy rule requires kernel modules to be signed, either as an IMA signature, stored as an xattr
powerpc/ima: Indicate kernel modules appended signatures are enforced
The arch specific kernel module policy rule requires kernel modules to be signed, either as an IMA signature, stored as an xattr, or as an appended signature. As a result, kernel modules appended signatures could be enforced without "sig_enforce" being set or reflected in /sys/module/module/parameters/sig_enforce. This patch sets "sig_enforce".
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-10-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
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#
dc87f186 |
| 30-Oct-2019 |
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> |
powerpc/ima: Update ima arch policy to check for blacklist
This patch updates the arch-specific policies for PowerNV system to make sure that the binary hash is not blacklisted.
Signed-off-by: Nayn
powerpc/ima: Update ima arch policy to check for blacklist
This patch updates the arch-specific policies for PowerNV system to make sure that the binary hash is not blacklisted.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-9-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
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#
1917855f |
| 30-Oct-2019 |
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> |
powerpc/ima: Define trusted boot policy
This patch defines an arch-specific trusted boot only policy and a combined secure and trusted boot policy.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> S
powerpc/ima: Define trusted boot policy
This patch defines an arch-specific trusted boot only policy and a combined secure and trusted boot policy.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-5-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
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#
4238fad3 |
| 30-Oct-2019 |
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> |
powerpc/ima: Add support to initialize ima policy rules
PowerNV systems use a Linux-based bootloader, which rely on the IMA subsystem to enforce different secure boot modes. Since the verification p
powerpc/ima: Add support to initialize ima policy rules
PowerNV systems use a Linux-based bootloader, which rely on the IMA subsystem to enforce different secure boot modes. Since the verification policy may differ based on the secure boot mode of the system, the policies must be defined at runtime.
This patch implements arch-specific support to define IMA policy rules based on the runtime secure boot mode of the system.
This patch provides arch-specific IMA policies if PPC_SECURE_BOOT config is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
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Revision tags: v6.1.41, v6.1.40, v6.1.39, v6.1.38, v6.1.37, v6.1.36, v6.4, v6.1.35, v6.1.34, v6.1.33, v6.1.32, v6.1.31, v6.1.30, v6.1.29, v6.1.28, v6.1.27, v6.1.26, v6.3, v6.1.25, v6.1.24, v6.1.23, v6.1.22, v6.1.21, v6.1.20, v6.1.19, v6.1.18, v6.1.17, v6.1.16, v6.1.15, v6.1.14, v6.1.13, v6.2, v6.1.12, v6.1.11, v6.1.10, v6.1.9, v6.1.8, v6.1.7, v6.1.6, v6.1.5, v6.0.19, v6.0.18, v6.1.4, v6.1.3, v6.0.17, v6.1.2, v6.0.16, v6.1.1, v6.0.15, v6.0.14, v6.0.13, v6.1, v6.0.12, v6.0.11, v6.0.10, v5.15.80, v6.0.9, v5.15.79, v6.0.8, v5.15.78, v6.0.7, v5.15.77, v5.15.76, v6.0.6, v6.0.5, v5.15.75, v6.0.4, v6.0.3, v6.0.2, v5.15.74, v5.15.73, v6.0.1, v5.15.72, v6.0, v5.15.71, v5.15.70, v5.15.69, v5.15.68, v5.15.67, v5.15.66, v5.15.65, v5.15.64, v5.15.63, v5.15.62, v5.15.61, v5.15.60, v5.15.59, v5.19, v5.15.58, v5.15.57, v5.15.56, v5.15.55, v5.15.54, v5.15.53, v5.15.52, v5.15.51, v5.15.50, v5.15.49, v5.15.48, v5.15.47, v5.15.46, v5.15.45, v5.15.44, v5.15.43, v5.15.42, v5.18, v5.15.41, v5.15.40, v5.15.39, v5.15.38, v5.15.37, v5.15.36, v5.15.35, v5.15.34, v5.15.33, v5.15.32, v5.15.31, v5.17, v5.15.30, v5.15.29, v5.15.28, v5.15.27, v5.15.26, v5.15.25, v5.15.24, v5.15.23, v5.15.22, v5.15.21, v5.15.20, v5.15.19, v5.15.18, v5.15.17, v5.4.173, v5.15.16, v5.15.15, v5.16, v5.15.10, v5.15.9, v5.15.8, v5.15.7, v5.15.6, v5.15.5, v5.15.4, v5.15.3, v5.15.2, v5.15.1, v5.15, v5.14.14, v5.14.13, v5.14.12, v5.14.11, v5.14.10, v5.14.9, v5.14.8, v5.14.7, v5.14.6, v5.10.67, v5.10.66, v5.14.5, v5.14.4, v5.10.65, v5.14.3, v5.10.64, v5.14.2, v5.10.63, v5.14.1, v5.10.62, v5.14, v5.10.61, v5.10.60, v5.10.53, v5.10.52, v5.10.51, v5.10.50, v5.10.49, v5.13, v5.10.46, v5.10.43, v5.10.42, v5.10.41, v5.10.40, v5.10.39, v5.4.119, v5.10.36, v5.10.35, v5.10.34, v5.4.116, v5.10.33, v5.12, v5.10.32, v5.10.31, v5.10.30, v5.10.27, v5.10.26, v5.10.25, v5.10.24, v5.10.23, v5.10.22, v5.10.21, v5.10.20, v5.10.19, v5.4.101, v5.10.18, v5.10.17, v5.11, v5.10.16, v5.10.15, v5.10.14, v5.10, v5.8.17, v5.8.16, v5.8.15, v5.9, v5.8.14, v5.8.13, v5.8.12, v5.8.11, v5.8.10, v5.8.9, v5.8.8, v5.8.7, v5.8.6, v5.4.62, v5.8.5, v5.8.4, v5.4.61, v5.8.3, v5.4.60, v5.8.2, v5.4.59, v5.8.1, v5.4.58, v5.4.57, v5.4.56, v5.8, v5.7.12, v5.4.55, v5.7.11, v5.4.54, v5.7.10, v5.4.53, v5.4.52, v5.7.9, v5.7.8, v5.4.51, v5.4.50, v5.7.7, v5.4.49, v5.7.6, v5.7.5, v5.4.48, v5.7.4, v5.7.3, v5.4.47, v5.4.46, v5.7.2, v5.4.45, v5.7.1, v5.4.44, v5.7, v5.4.43, v5.4.42, v5.4.41, v5.4.40, v5.4.39, v5.4.38, v5.4.37 |
|
#
fa4f3f56 |
| 01-May-2020 |
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> |
powerpc/ima: Fix secure boot rules in ima arch policy To prevent verifying the kernel module appended signature twice (finit_module), once by the module_sig_check() and again by IMA,
powerpc/ima: Fix secure boot rules in ima arch policy To prevent verifying the kernel module appended signature twice (finit_module), once by the module_sig_check() and again by IMA, powerpc secure boot rules define an IMA architecture specific policy rule only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is not enabled. This, unfortunately, does not take into account the ability of enabling "sig_enforce" on the boot command line (module.sig_enforce=1). Including the IMA module appraise rule results in failing the finit_module syscall, unless the module signing public key is loaded onto the IMA keyring. This patch fixes secure boot policy rules to be based on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG instead. Fixes: 4238fad366a6 ("powerpc/ima: Add support to initialize ima policy rules") Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1588342612-14532-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
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Revision tags: v5.4.36, v5.4.35, v5.4.34, v5.4.33, v5.4.32, v5.4.31, v5.4.30, v5.4.29, v5.6, v5.4.28, v5.4.27, v5.4.26, v5.4.25, v5.4.24, v5.4.23, v5.4.22, v5.4.21, v5.4.20, v5.4.19, v5.4.18, v5.4.17, v5.4.16, v5.5, v5.4.15, v5.4.14, v5.4.13, v5.4.12, v5.4.11, v5.4.10, v5.4.9, v5.4.8, v5.4.7, v5.4.6, v5.4.5, v5.4.4, v5.4.3, v5.3.15, v5.4.2, v5.4.1, v5.3.14, v5.4, v5.3.13, v5.3.12, v5.3.11, v5.3.10, v5.3.9 |
|
#
d72ea491 |
| 30-Oct-2019 |
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> |
powerpc/ima: Indicate kernel modules appended signatures are enforced The arch specific kernel module policy rule requires kernel modules to be signed, either as an IMA signature, stored
powerpc/ima: Indicate kernel modules appended signatures are enforced The arch specific kernel module policy rule requires kernel modules to be signed, either as an IMA signature, stored as an xattr, or as an appended signature. As a result, kernel modules appended signatures could be enforced without "sig_enforce" being set or reflected in /sys/module/module/parameters/sig_enforce. This patch sets "sig_enforce". Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-10-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
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#
dc87f186 |
| 30-Oct-2019 |
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> |
powerpc/ima: Update ima arch policy to check for blacklist This patch updates the arch-specific policies for PowerNV system to make sure that the binary hash is not blacklisted.
powerpc/ima: Update ima arch policy to check for blacklist This patch updates the arch-specific policies for PowerNV system to make sure that the binary hash is not blacklisted. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-9-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
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#
1917855f |
| 30-Oct-2019 |
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> |
powerpc/ima: Define trusted boot policy This patch defines an arch-specific trusted boot only policy and a combined secure and trusted boot policy. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <na
powerpc/ima: Define trusted boot policy This patch defines an arch-specific trusted boot only policy and a combined secure and trusted boot policy. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-5-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
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#
4238fad3 |
| 30-Oct-2019 |
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> |
powerpc/ima: Add support to initialize ima policy rules PowerNV systems use a Linux-based bootloader, which rely on the IMA subsystem to enforce different secure boot modes. Since the
powerpc/ima: Add support to initialize ima policy rules PowerNV systems use a Linux-based bootloader, which rely on the IMA subsystem to enforce different secure boot modes. Since the verification policy may differ based on the secure boot mode of the system, the policies must be defined at runtime. This patch implements arch-specific support to define IMA policy rules based on the runtime secure boot mode of the system. This patch provides arch-specific IMA policies if PPC_SECURE_BOOT config is enabled. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
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