History log of /openbmc/linux/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu (Results 1 – 25 of 146)
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Revision tags: v6.6.25, v6.6.24, v6.6.23
# 77018fb9 11-Mar-2024 Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>

x86/rfds: Mitigate Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)

commit 8076fcde016c9c0e0660543e67bff86cb48a7c9c upstream.

RFDS is a CPU vulnerability that may allow userspace to infer kernel
stale data previ

x86/rfds: Mitigate Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)

commit 8076fcde016c9c0e0660543e67bff86cb48a7c9c upstream.

RFDS is a CPU vulnerability that may allow userspace to infer kernel
stale data previously used in floating point registers, vector registers
and integer registers. RFDS only affects certain Intel Atom processors.

Intel released a microcode update that uses VERW instruction to clear
the affected CPU buffers. Unlike MDS, none of the affected cores support
SMT.

Add RFDS bug infrastructure and enable the VERW based mitigation by
default, that clears the affected buffers just before exiting to
userspace. Also add sysfs reporting and cmdline parameter
"reg_file_data_sampling" to control the mitigation.

For details see:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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Revision tags: v6.6.16, v6.6.15, v6.6.14, v6.6.13, v6.6.12, v6.6.11, v6.6.10, v6.6.9, v6.6.8, v6.6.7, v6.6.6, v6.6.5, v6.6.4, v6.6.3, v6.6.2, v6.5.11, v6.6.1, v6.5.10, v6.6, v6.5.9, v6.5.8, v6.5.7, v6.5.6, v6.5.5, v6.5.4, v6.5.3, v6.5.2, v6.1.51, v6.5.1, v6.1.50, v6.5, v6.1.49, v6.1.48, v6.1.46
# 88a6f899 14-Aug-2023 Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com>

crash: memory and CPU hotplug sysfs attributes

Introduce the crash_hotplug attribute for memory and CPUs for use by
userspace. These attributes directly facilitate the udev rule for
managing usersp

crash: memory and CPU hotplug sysfs attributes

Introduce the crash_hotplug attribute for memory and CPUs for use by
userspace. These attributes directly facilitate the udev rule for
managing userspace re-loading of the crash kernel upon hot un/plug
changes.

For memory, expose the crash_hotplug attribute to the
/sys/devices/system/memory directory. For example:

# udevadm info --attribute-walk /sys/devices/system/memory/memory81
looking at device '/devices/system/memory/memory81':
KERNEL=="memory81"
SUBSYSTEM=="memory"
DRIVER==""
ATTR{online}=="1"
ATTR{phys_device}=="0"
ATTR{phys_index}=="00000051"
ATTR{removable}=="1"
ATTR{state}=="online"
ATTR{valid_zones}=="Movable"

looking at parent device '/devices/system/memory':
KERNELS=="memory"
SUBSYSTEMS==""
DRIVERS==""
ATTRS{auto_online_blocks}=="offline"
ATTRS{block_size_bytes}=="8000000"
ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1"

For CPUs, expose the crash_hotplug attribute to the
/sys/devices/system/cpu directory. For example:

# udevadm info --attribute-walk /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0
looking at device '/devices/system/cpu/cpu0':
KERNEL=="cpu0"
SUBSYSTEM=="cpu"
DRIVER=="processor"
ATTR{crash_notes}=="277c38600"
ATTR{crash_notes_size}=="368"
ATTR{online}=="1"

looking at parent device '/devices/system/cpu':
KERNELS=="cpu"
SUBSYSTEMS==""
DRIVERS==""
ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1"
ATTRS{isolated}==""
ATTRS{kernel_max}=="8191"
ATTRS{nohz_full}==" (null)"
ATTRS{offline}=="4-7"
ATTRS{online}=="0-3"
ATTRS{possible}=="0-7"
ATTRS{present}=="0-3"

With these sysfs attributes in place, it is possible to efficiently
instruct the udev rule to skip crash kernel reloading for kernels
configured with crash hotplug support.

For example, the following is the proposed udev rule change for RHEL
system 98-kexec.rules (as the first lines of the rule file):

# The kernel updates the crash elfcorehdr for CPU and memory changes
SUBSYSTEM=="cpu", ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1", GOTO="kdump_reload_end"
SUBSYSTEM=="memory", ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1", GOTO="kdump_reload_end"

When examined in the context of 98-kexec.rules, the above rules test if
crash_hotplug is set, and if so, the userspace initiated
unload-then-reload of the crash kernel is skipped.

CPU and memory checks are separated in accordance with CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
and CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG kernel config options. If an architecture
supports, for example, memory hotplug but not CPU hotplug, then the
/sys/devices/system/memory/crash_hotplug attribute file is present, but
the /sys/devices/system/cpu/crash_hotplug attribute file will NOT be
present. Thus the udev rule skips userspace processing of memory hot
un/plug events, but the udev rule will evaluate false for CPU events, thus
allowing userspace to process CPU hot un/plug events (ie the
unload-then-reload of the kdump capture kernel).

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814214446.6659-5-eric.devolder@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Akhil Raj <lf32.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

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Revision tags: v6.1.45, v6.1.44, v6.1.43, v6.1.42, v6.1.41, v6.1.40, v6.1.39, v6.1.38
# 7f48405c 05-Jul-2023 Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

cpu/SMT: Allow enabling partial SMT states via sysfs

Add support to the /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control interface for
enabling a specified number of SMT threads per core, including partial
SMT s

cpu/SMT: Allow enabling partial SMT states via sysfs

Add support to the /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control interface for
enabling a specified number of SMT threads per core, including partial
SMT states where not all threads are brought online.

The current interface accepts "on" and "off", to enable either 1 or all
SMT threads per core.

This commit allows writing an integer, between 1 and the number of SMT
threads supported by the machine. Writing 1 is a synonym for "off", 2 or
more enables SMT with the specified number of threads.

When reading the file, if all threads are online "on" is returned, to
avoid changing behaviour for existing users. If some other number of
threads is online then the integer value is returned.

Architectures like x86 only supporting 1 thread or all threads, should not
define CONFIG_SMT_NUM_THREADS_DYNAMIC. Architecture supporting partial SMT
states, like PowerPC, should define it.

[ ldufour: Slightly reword the commit's description ]
[ ldufour: Remove switch() in __store_smt_control() ]
[ ldufour: Rix build issue in control_show() ]

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230705145143.40545-8-ldufour@linux.ibm.com

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# 8974eb58 12-Jul-2023 Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>

x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation

Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector

x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation

Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector registers.

Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions
that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable
hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and
encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector
registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector
register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical
side channel techniques like cache timing attacks.

This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons.
First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it.
This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can
be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control
bit alone.

Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the
mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX.
It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be
mitigated against GDS.

The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by
setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with
mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading:

/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling

Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>

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Revision tags: v6.1.37, v6.1.36, v6.4, v6.1.35, v6.1.34
# e4624435 12-Jun-2023 Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>

docs: arm64: Move arm64 documentation under Documentation/arch/

Architecture-specific documentation is being moved into Documentation/arch/
as a way of cleaning up the top-level documentation direct

docs: arm64: Move arm64 documentation under Documentation/arch/

Architecture-specific documentation is being moved into Documentation/arch/
as a way of cleaning up the top-level documentation directory and making
the docs hierarchy more closely match the source hierarchy. Move
Documentation/arm64 into arch/ (along with the Chinese equvalent
translations) and fix up documentation references.

Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Alex Shi <alexs@kernel.org>
Cc: Hu Haowen <src.res@email.cn>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Yantengsi <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>

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Revision tags: v6.1.33, v6.1.32, v6.1.31, v6.1.30, v6.1.29, v6.1.28, v6.1.27, v6.1.26, v6.3, v6.1.25, v6.1.24, v6.1.23, v6.1.22, v6.1.21, v6.1.20, v6.1.19, v6.1.18, v6.1.17, v6.1.16, v6.1.15, v6.1.14, v6.1.13, v6.2, v6.1.12, v6.1.11, v6.1.10, v6.1.9, v6.1.8, v6.1.7, v6.1.6, v6.1.5, v6.0.19, v6.0.18, v6.1.4, v6.1.3, v6.0.17, v6.1.2, v6.0.16, v6.1.1, v6.0.15, v6.0.14, v6.0.13, v6.1, v6.0.12, v6.0.11, v6.0.10, v5.15.80, v6.0.9, v5.15.79, v6.0.8, v5.15.78, v6.0.7, v5.15.77, v5.15.76, v6.0.6, v6.0.5, v5.15.75, v6.0.4, v6.0.3, v6.0.2, v5.15.74, v5.15.73, v6.0.1, v5.15.72, v6.0, v5.15.71, v5.15.70, v5.15.69, v5.15.68, v5.15.67, v5.15.66, v5.15.65, v5.15.64, v5.15.63, v5.15.62, v5.15.61, v5.15.60, v5.15.59
# 8a7f0e8a 31-Jul-2022 Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>

Documentation/ABI: correct possessive "its" typos

Correct all uses of "it's" that are meant to be possessive "its".

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@l

Documentation/ABI: correct possessive "its" typos

Correct all uses of "it's" that are meant to be possessive "its".

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801025207.29971-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>

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# 00da0cb3 01-Aug-2022 Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")

the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for
sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.

Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org

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Revision tags: v5.19, v5.15.58, v5.15.57, v5.15.56, v5.15.55, v5.15.54, v5.15.53, v5.15.52, v5.15.51
# 1d248d23 26-Jun-2022 Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>

ABI: testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu: remove duplicated core_id

This was already defined at stable/sysfs-devices-system-cpu with
the same description, as pointed by get_abi.pl:

Warning: /sys/devi

ABI: testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu: remove duplicated core_id

This was already defined at stable/sysfs-devices-system-cpu with
the same description, as pointed by get_abi.pl:

Warning: /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpuX/topology/core_id is defined 2 times: Documentation/ABI/stable/sysfs-devices-system-cpu:38 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu:69

Remove the duplicated one.

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1e92337c1ef74f5eb9e1c1871e20b858b490d269.1656235926.git.mchehab@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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Revision tags: v5.15.50, v5.15.49, v5.15.48, v5.15.47, v5.15.46
# d69d5649 07-Jun-2022 Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>

arm64/sme: Expose SMIDR through sysfs

We currently expose MIDR and REVID to userspace through sysfs to enable it
to make decisions based on the specific implementation. Since SME supports
implementa

arm64/sme: Expose SMIDR through sysfs

We currently expose MIDR and REVID to userspace through sysfs to enable it
to make decisions based on the specific implementation. Since SME supports
implementations where streaming mode is provided by a separate hardware
unit called a SMCU it provides a similar ID register SMIDR. Expose it to
userspace via sysfs when the system supports SME along with the other ID
registers.

Since we disable the SME priority mapping feature if it is supported by
hardware we currently mask out the SMPS bit which reports that it is
supported.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607132857.1358361-1-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

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Revision tags: v5.15.45, v5.15.44, v5.15.43, v5.15.42, v5.18
# 8d50cdf8 19-May-2022 Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>

x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data

Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data
vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state si

x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data

Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data
vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar
to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

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Revision tags: v5.15.41, v5.15.40, v5.15.39, v5.15.38, v5.15.37, v5.15.36, v5.15.35, v5.15.34, v5.15.33, v5.15.32, v5.15.31, v5.17, v5.15.30, v5.15.29, v5.15.28
# 9986c765 09-Mar-2022 Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>

docs: sysfs-devices-system-cpu: document "asymm" value for mte_tcf_preferred

It was added in commit 766121ba5de3 ("arm64/mte: Add userspace interface
for enabling asymmetric mode").

Signed-off-by:

docs: sysfs-devices-system-cpu: document "asymm" value for mte_tcf_preferred

It was added in commit 766121ba5de3 ("arm64/mte: Add userspace interface
for enabling asymmetric mode").

Signed-off-by: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220309215943.87831-1-eugenis@google.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

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Revision tags: v5.15.27, v5.15.26, v5.15.25, v5.15.24, v5.15.23, v5.15.22, v5.15.21, v5.15.20, v5.15.19
# ab28e944 31-Jan-2022 Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>

topology/sysfs: Add PPIN in sysfs under cpu topology

PPIN is the Protected Processor Identification Number.
This is used to identify the socket as a Field Replaceable Unit (FRU).

Existing code only

topology/sysfs: Add PPIN in sysfs under cpu topology

PPIN is the Protected Processor Identification Number.
This is used to identify the socket as a Field Replaceable Unit (FRU).

Existing code only displays this when reporting errors. But this makes
it inconvenient for large clusters to use it for its intended purpose
of inventory control.

Add ppin to /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/topology to make what
is already available using RDMSR more easily accessible. Make
the file read only for root in case there are still people
concerned about making a unique system "serial number" available.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131230111.2004669-6-tony.luck@intel.com

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Revision tags: v5.15.18, v5.15.17, v5.4.173, v5.15.16, v5.15.15, v5.16, v5.15.10, v5.15.9, v5.15.8, v5.15.7
# 02bf6074 01-Dec-2021 Kohei Tarumizu <tarumizu.kohei@fujitsu.com>

docs: document the sysfs ABI for "isolated"

Add missing documentation of sysfs ABI for "isolated". It was added by
commit 59f30abe94bf("show isolated cpus in sysfs"). However, there is
no documentat

docs: document the sysfs ABI for "isolated"

Add missing documentation of sysfs ABI for "isolated". It was added by
commit 59f30abe94bf("show isolated cpus in sysfs"). However, there is
no documentation for these interface.

Signed-off-by: Kohei Tarumizu <tarumizu.kohei@fujitsu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211201115957.254224-3-tarumizu.kohei@fujitsu.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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# 3722e7c3 01-Dec-2021 Kohei Tarumizu <tarumizu.kohei@fujitsu.com>

docs: document the sysfs ABI for "nohz_full"

Add missing documentation of sysfs ABI for "nohz_full". It was added
by commit 6570a9a1ce3a("show nohz_full cpus in sysfs"). However,
there is no documen

docs: document the sysfs ABI for "nohz_full"

Add missing documentation of sysfs ABI for "nohz_full". It was added
by commit 6570a9a1ce3a("show nohz_full cpus in sysfs"). However,
there is no documentation for these interface.

Signed-off-by: Kohei Tarumizu <tarumizu.kohei@fujitsu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211201115957.254224-2-tarumizu.kohei@fujitsu.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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Revision tags: v5.15.6, v5.15.5, v5.15.4, v5.15.3, v5.15.2, v5.15.1, v5.15, v5.14.14, v5.14.13, v5.14.12, v5.14.11, v5.14.10
# abcb948d 30-Sep-2021 Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>

ABI: sysfs-devices-system-cpu: use cpuX instead of cpu#

Some What entries here use cpu# as a wildcard, while others
use, instead, cpuX.

As scripts/get_abi.pl doesn't consider "#" as a wildcard,
rep

ABI: sysfs-devices-system-cpu: use cpuX instead of cpu#

Some What entries here use cpu# as a wildcard, while others
use, instead, cpuX.

As scripts/get_abi.pl doesn't consider "#" as a wildcard,
replace:

cpu# -> cpuX

inside the file.

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/60b1a79189d1a9d9f1c9c9c299770e69b18972fd.1632994837.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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Revision tags: v5.14.9, v5.14.8, v5.14.7, v5.14.6, v5.10.67, v5.10.66, v5.14.5
# 26d6ba2f 16-Sep-2021 Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>

ABI: sysfs-devices-system-cpu: use wildcards on What definitions

An "N" upper letter is not a wildcard, nor can easily be identified
by script, specially since the USB sysfs define things like.
bNum

ABI: sysfs-devices-system-cpu: use wildcards on What definitions

An "N" upper letter is not a wildcard, nor can easily be identified
by script, specially since the USB sysfs define things like.
bNumInterfaces. Use, instead, <N>, in order to let script/get_abi.pl
to convert it into a Regex.

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d18385a391b6797373a5d1382ea024857fb29987.1631782432.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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# 4428d15c 01-Aug-2022 Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")

the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for
sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.

Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...


# 4428d15c 01-Aug-2022 Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")

the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for
sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.

Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...


# 4428d15c 01-Aug-2022 Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")

the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for
sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.

Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...


# 4428d15c 01-Aug-2022 Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")

the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for
sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.

Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...


# 4428d15c 01-Aug-2022 Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")

the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for
sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.

Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...


# 4428d15c 01-Aug-2022 Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")

the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for
sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.

Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...


# 4428d15c 01-Aug-2022 Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")

the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for
sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.

Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...


# 4428d15c 01-Aug-2022 Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")

the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for
sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.

Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...


# 4428d15c 01-Aug-2022 Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b

Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.

While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in

6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")

the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for
sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.

Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...


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