Revision tags: v6.6.25, v6.6.24, v6.6.23 |
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#
77018fb9 |
| 11-Mar-2024 |
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> |
x86/rfds: Mitigate Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)
commit 8076fcde016c9c0e0660543e67bff86cb48a7c9c upstream.
RFDS is a CPU vulnerability that may allow userspace to infer kernel stale data previ
x86/rfds: Mitigate Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)
commit 8076fcde016c9c0e0660543e67bff86cb48a7c9c upstream.
RFDS is a CPU vulnerability that may allow userspace to infer kernel stale data previously used in floating point registers, vector registers and integer registers. RFDS only affects certain Intel Atom processors.
Intel released a microcode update that uses VERW instruction to clear the affected CPU buffers. Unlike MDS, none of the affected cores support SMT.
Add RFDS bug infrastructure and enable the VERW based mitigation by default, that clears the affected buffers just before exiting to userspace. Also add sysfs reporting and cmdline parameter "reg_file_data_sampling" to control the mitigation.
For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Revision tags: v6.6.16, v6.6.15, v6.6.14, v6.6.13, v6.6.12, v6.6.11, v6.6.10, v6.6.9, v6.6.8, v6.6.7, v6.6.6, v6.6.5, v6.6.4, v6.6.3, v6.6.2, v6.5.11, v6.6.1, v6.5.10, v6.6, v6.5.9, v6.5.8, v6.5.7, v6.5.6, v6.5.5, v6.5.4, v6.5.3, v6.5.2, v6.1.51, v6.5.1, v6.1.50, v6.5, v6.1.49, v6.1.48, v6.1.46 |
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#
88a6f899 |
| 14-Aug-2023 |
Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com> |
crash: memory and CPU hotplug sysfs attributes
Introduce the crash_hotplug attribute for memory and CPUs for use by userspace. These attributes directly facilitate the udev rule for managing usersp
crash: memory and CPU hotplug sysfs attributes
Introduce the crash_hotplug attribute for memory and CPUs for use by userspace. These attributes directly facilitate the udev rule for managing userspace re-loading of the crash kernel upon hot un/plug changes.
For memory, expose the crash_hotplug attribute to the /sys/devices/system/memory directory. For example:
# udevadm info --attribute-walk /sys/devices/system/memory/memory81 looking at device '/devices/system/memory/memory81': KERNEL=="memory81" SUBSYSTEM=="memory" DRIVER=="" ATTR{online}=="1" ATTR{phys_device}=="0" ATTR{phys_index}=="00000051" ATTR{removable}=="1" ATTR{state}=="online" ATTR{valid_zones}=="Movable"
looking at parent device '/devices/system/memory': KERNELS=="memory" SUBSYSTEMS=="" DRIVERS=="" ATTRS{auto_online_blocks}=="offline" ATTRS{block_size_bytes}=="8000000" ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1"
For CPUs, expose the crash_hotplug attribute to the /sys/devices/system/cpu directory. For example:
# udevadm info --attribute-walk /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0 looking at device '/devices/system/cpu/cpu0': KERNEL=="cpu0" SUBSYSTEM=="cpu" DRIVER=="processor" ATTR{crash_notes}=="277c38600" ATTR{crash_notes_size}=="368" ATTR{online}=="1"
looking at parent device '/devices/system/cpu': KERNELS=="cpu" SUBSYSTEMS=="" DRIVERS=="" ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1" ATTRS{isolated}=="" ATTRS{kernel_max}=="8191" ATTRS{nohz_full}==" (null)" ATTRS{offline}=="4-7" ATTRS{online}=="0-3" ATTRS{possible}=="0-7" ATTRS{present}=="0-3"
With these sysfs attributes in place, it is possible to efficiently instruct the udev rule to skip crash kernel reloading for kernels configured with crash hotplug support.
For example, the following is the proposed udev rule change for RHEL system 98-kexec.rules (as the first lines of the rule file):
# The kernel updates the crash elfcorehdr for CPU and memory changes SUBSYSTEM=="cpu", ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1", GOTO="kdump_reload_end" SUBSYSTEM=="memory", ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1", GOTO="kdump_reload_end"
When examined in the context of 98-kexec.rules, the above rules test if crash_hotplug is set, and if so, the userspace initiated unload-then-reload of the crash kernel is skipped.
CPU and memory checks are separated in accordance with CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU and CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG kernel config options. If an architecture supports, for example, memory hotplug but not CPU hotplug, then the /sys/devices/system/memory/crash_hotplug attribute file is present, but the /sys/devices/system/cpu/crash_hotplug attribute file will NOT be present. Thus the udev rule skips userspace processing of memory hot un/plug events, but the udev rule will evaluate false for CPU events, thus allowing userspace to process CPU hot un/plug events (ie the unload-then-reload of the kdump capture kernel).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814214446.6659-5-eric.devolder@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Akhil Raj <lf32.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net> Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Revision tags: v6.1.45, v6.1.44, v6.1.43, v6.1.42, v6.1.41, v6.1.40, v6.1.39, v6.1.38 |
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#
7f48405c |
| 05-Jul-2023 |
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> |
cpu/SMT: Allow enabling partial SMT states via sysfs
Add support to the /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control interface for enabling a specified number of SMT threads per core, including partial SMT s
cpu/SMT: Allow enabling partial SMT states via sysfs
Add support to the /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control interface for enabling a specified number of SMT threads per core, including partial SMT states where not all threads are brought online.
The current interface accepts "on" and "off", to enable either 1 or all SMT threads per core.
This commit allows writing an integer, between 1 and the number of SMT threads supported by the machine. Writing 1 is a synonym for "off", 2 or more enables SMT with the specified number of threads.
When reading the file, if all threads are online "on" is returned, to avoid changing behaviour for existing users. If some other number of threads is online then the integer value is returned.
Architectures like x86 only supporting 1 thread or all threads, should not define CONFIG_SMT_NUM_THREADS_DYNAMIC. Architecture supporting partial SMT states, like PowerPC, should define it.
[ ldufour: Slightly reword the commit's description ] [ ldufour: Remove switch() in __store_smt_control() ] [ ldufour: Rix build issue in control_show() ]
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230705145143.40545-8-ldufour@linux.ibm.com
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#
8974eb58 |
| 12-Jul-2023 |
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> |
x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation
Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector
x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation
Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector registers.
Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical side channel techniques like cache timing attacks.
This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons. First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it. This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control bit alone.
Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX. It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be mitigated against GDS.
The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
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Revision tags: v6.1.37, v6.1.36, v6.4, v6.1.35, v6.1.34 |
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#
e4624435 |
| 12-Jun-2023 |
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> |
docs: arm64: Move arm64 documentation under Documentation/arch/
Architecture-specific documentation is being moved into Documentation/arch/ as a way of cleaning up the top-level documentation direct
docs: arm64: Move arm64 documentation under Documentation/arch/
Architecture-specific documentation is being moved into Documentation/arch/ as a way of cleaning up the top-level documentation directory and making the docs hierarchy more closely match the source hierarchy. Move Documentation/arm64 into arch/ (along with the Chinese equvalent translations) and fix up documentation references.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Alex Shi <alexs@kernel.org> Cc: Hu Haowen <src.res@email.cn> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Yantengsi <siyanteng@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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Revision tags: v6.1.33, v6.1.32, v6.1.31, v6.1.30, v6.1.29, v6.1.28, v6.1.27, v6.1.26, v6.3, v6.1.25, v6.1.24, v6.1.23, v6.1.22, v6.1.21, v6.1.20, v6.1.19, v6.1.18, v6.1.17, v6.1.16, v6.1.15, v6.1.14, v6.1.13, v6.2, v6.1.12, v6.1.11, v6.1.10, v6.1.9, v6.1.8, v6.1.7, v6.1.6, v6.1.5, v6.0.19, v6.0.18, v6.1.4, v6.1.3, v6.0.17, v6.1.2, v6.0.16, v6.1.1, v6.0.15, v6.0.14, v6.0.13, v6.1, v6.0.12, v6.0.11, v6.0.10, v5.15.80, v6.0.9, v5.15.79, v6.0.8, v5.15.78, v6.0.7, v5.15.77, v5.15.76, v6.0.6, v6.0.5, v5.15.75, v6.0.4, v6.0.3, v6.0.2, v5.15.74, v5.15.73, v6.0.1, v5.15.72, v6.0, v5.15.71, v5.15.70, v5.15.69, v5.15.68, v5.15.67, v5.15.66, v5.15.65, v5.15.64, v5.15.63, v5.15.62, v5.15.61, v5.15.60, v5.15.59 |
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8a7f0e8a |
| 31-Jul-2022 |
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> |
Documentation/ABI: correct possessive "its" typos
Correct all uses of "it's" that are meant to be possessive "its".
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@l
Documentation/ABI: correct possessive "its" typos
Correct all uses of "it's" that are meant to be possessive "its".
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801025207.29971-1-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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#
00da0cb3 |
| 01-Aug-2022 |
Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> |
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.
Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability") Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org
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Revision tags: v5.19, v5.15.58, v5.15.57, v5.15.56, v5.15.55, v5.15.54, v5.15.53, v5.15.52, v5.15.51 |
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1d248d23 |
| 26-Jun-2022 |
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> |
ABI: testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu: remove duplicated core_id
This was already defined at stable/sysfs-devices-system-cpu with the same description, as pointed by get_abi.pl:
Warning: /sys/devi
ABI: testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu: remove duplicated core_id
This was already defined at stable/sysfs-devices-system-cpu with the same description, as pointed by get_abi.pl:
Warning: /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpuX/topology/core_id is defined 2 times: Documentation/ABI/stable/sysfs-devices-system-cpu:38 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu:69
Remove the duplicated one.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1e92337c1ef74f5eb9e1c1871e20b858b490d269.1656235926.git.mchehab@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Revision tags: v5.15.50, v5.15.49, v5.15.48, v5.15.47, v5.15.46 |
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d69d5649 |
| 07-Jun-2022 |
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> |
arm64/sme: Expose SMIDR through sysfs
We currently expose MIDR and REVID to userspace through sysfs to enable it to make decisions based on the specific implementation. Since SME supports implementa
arm64/sme: Expose SMIDR through sysfs
We currently expose MIDR and REVID to userspace through sysfs to enable it to make decisions based on the specific implementation. Since SME supports implementations where streaming mode is provided by a separate hardware unit called a SMCU it provides a similar ID register SMIDR. Expose it to userspace via sysfs when the system supports SME along with the other ID registers.
Since we disable the SME priority mapping feature if it is supported by hardware we currently mask out the SMPS bit which reports that it is supported.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607132857.1358361-1-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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Revision tags: v5.15.45, v5.15.44, v5.15.43, v5.15.42, v5.18 |
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8d50cdf8 |
| 19-May-2022 |
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> |
x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data
Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state si
x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data
Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Revision tags: v5.15.41, v5.15.40, v5.15.39, v5.15.38, v5.15.37, v5.15.36, v5.15.35, v5.15.34, v5.15.33, v5.15.32, v5.15.31, v5.17, v5.15.30, v5.15.29, v5.15.28 |
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9986c765 |
| 09-Mar-2022 |
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> |
docs: sysfs-devices-system-cpu: document "asymm" value for mte_tcf_preferred
It was added in commit 766121ba5de3 ("arm64/mte: Add userspace interface for enabling asymmetric mode").
Signed-off-by:
docs: sysfs-devices-system-cpu: document "asymm" value for mte_tcf_preferred
It was added in commit 766121ba5de3 ("arm64/mte: Add userspace interface for enabling asymmetric mode").
Signed-off-by: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220309215943.87831-1-eugenis@google.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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Revision tags: v5.15.27, v5.15.26, v5.15.25, v5.15.24, v5.15.23, v5.15.22, v5.15.21, v5.15.20, v5.15.19 |
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ab28e944 |
| 31-Jan-2022 |
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> |
topology/sysfs: Add PPIN in sysfs under cpu topology
PPIN is the Protected Processor Identification Number. This is used to identify the socket as a Field Replaceable Unit (FRU).
Existing code only
topology/sysfs: Add PPIN in sysfs under cpu topology
PPIN is the Protected Processor Identification Number. This is used to identify the socket as a Field Replaceable Unit (FRU).
Existing code only displays this when reporting errors. But this makes it inconvenient for large clusters to use it for its intended purpose of inventory control.
Add ppin to /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/topology to make what is already available using RDMSR more easily accessible. Make the file read only for root in case there are still people concerned about making a unique system "serial number" available.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131230111.2004669-6-tony.luck@intel.com
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Revision tags: v5.15.18, v5.15.17, v5.4.173, v5.15.16, v5.15.15, v5.16, v5.15.10, v5.15.9, v5.15.8, v5.15.7 |
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#
02bf6074 |
| 01-Dec-2021 |
Kohei Tarumizu <tarumizu.kohei@fujitsu.com> |
docs: document the sysfs ABI for "isolated"
Add missing documentation of sysfs ABI for "isolated". It was added by commit 59f30abe94bf("show isolated cpus in sysfs"). However, there is no documentat
docs: document the sysfs ABI for "isolated"
Add missing documentation of sysfs ABI for "isolated". It was added by commit 59f30abe94bf("show isolated cpus in sysfs"). However, there is no documentation for these interface.
Signed-off-by: Kohei Tarumizu <tarumizu.kohei@fujitsu.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211201115957.254224-3-tarumizu.kohei@fujitsu.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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#
3722e7c3 |
| 01-Dec-2021 |
Kohei Tarumizu <tarumizu.kohei@fujitsu.com> |
docs: document the sysfs ABI for "nohz_full"
Add missing documentation of sysfs ABI for "nohz_full". It was added by commit 6570a9a1ce3a("show nohz_full cpus in sysfs"). However, there is no documen
docs: document the sysfs ABI for "nohz_full"
Add missing documentation of sysfs ABI for "nohz_full". It was added by commit 6570a9a1ce3a("show nohz_full cpus in sysfs"). However, there is no documentation for these interface.
Signed-off-by: Kohei Tarumizu <tarumizu.kohei@fujitsu.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211201115957.254224-2-tarumizu.kohei@fujitsu.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Revision tags: v5.15.6, v5.15.5, v5.15.4, v5.15.3, v5.15.2, v5.15.1, v5.15, v5.14.14, v5.14.13, v5.14.12, v5.14.11, v5.14.10 |
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#
abcb948d |
| 30-Sep-2021 |
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> |
ABI: sysfs-devices-system-cpu: use cpuX instead of cpu#
Some What entries here use cpu# as a wildcard, while others use, instead, cpuX.
As scripts/get_abi.pl doesn't consider "#" as a wildcard, rep
ABI: sysfs-devices-system-cpu: use cpuX instead of cpu#
Some What entries here use cpu# as a wildcard, while others use, instead, cpuX.
As scripts/get_abi.pl doesn't consider "#" as a wildcard, replace:
cpu# -> cpuX
inside the file.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/60b1a79189d1a9d9f1c9c9c299770e69b18972fd.1632994837.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Revision tags: v5.14.9, v5.14.8, v5.14.7, v5.14.6, v5.10.67, v5.10.66, v5.14.5 |
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#
26d6ba2f |
| 16-Sep-2021 |
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> |
ABI: sysfs-devices-system-cpu: use wildcards on What definitions
An "N" upper letter is not a wildcard, nor can easily be identified by script, specially since the USB sysfs define things like. bNum
ABI: sysfs-devices-system-cpu: use wildcards on What definitions
An "N" upper letter is not a wildcard, nor can easily be identified by script, specially since the USB sysfs define things like. bNumInterfaces. Use, instead, <N>, in order to let script/get_abi.pl to convert it into a Regex.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d18385a391b6797373a5d1382ea024857fb29987.1631782432.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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#
4428d15c |
| 01-Aug-2022 |
Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> |
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.
Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability") Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
show more ...
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#
4428d15c |
| 01-Aug-2022 |
Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> |
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.
Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability") Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
show more ...
|
#
4428d15c |
| 01-Aug-2022 |
Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> |
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.
Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability") Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
show more ...
|
#
4428d15c |
| 01-Aug-2022 |
Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> |
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.
Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability") Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
show more ...
|
#
4428d15c |
| 01-Aug-2022 |
Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> |
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.
Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability") Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
show more ...
|
#
4428d15c |
| 01-Aug-2022 |
Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> |
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.
Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability") Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
show more ...
|
#
4428d15c |
| 01-Aug-2022 |
Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> |
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.
Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability") Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
show more ...
|
#
4428d15c |
| 01-Aug-2022 |
Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> |
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.
Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability") Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
show more ...
|
#
4428d15c |
| 01-Aug-2022 |
Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> |
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b
Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs
commit 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 upstream.
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.
Fixes: 6b80b59b3555 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability") Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
show more ...
|