xref: /openbmc/linux/security/smack/smack_lsm.c (revision f3a8b664)
1 /*
2  *  Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
3  *
4  *  This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
5  *
6  *  Authors:
7  *	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
8  *	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
9  *
10  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
11  *  Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
12  *                Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
13  *  Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
14  *  Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
15  *
16  *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17  *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18  *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
19  */
20 
21 #include <linux/xattr.h>
22 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
23 #include <linux/mount.h>
24 #include <linux/stat.h>
25 #include <linux/kd.h>
26 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
27 #include <linux/ip.h>
28 #include <linux/tcp.h>
29 #include <linux/udp.h>
30 #include <linux/dccp.h>
31 #include <linux/slab.h>
32 #include <linux/mutex.h>
33 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
34 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
35 #include <net/ip.h>
36 #include <net/ipv6.h>
37 #include <linux/audit.h>
38 #include <linux/magic.h>
39 #include <linux/dcache.h>
40 #include <linux/personality.h>
41 #include <linux/msg.h>
42 #include <linux/shm.h>
43 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
44 #include <linux/parser.h>
45 #include "smack.h"
46 
47 #define TRANS_TRUE	"TRUE"
48 #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE	4
49 
50 #define SMK_CONNECTING	0
51 #define SMK_RECEIVING	1
52 #define SMK_SENDING	2
53 
54 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
55 static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
56 #endif
57 static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
58 int smack_enabled;
59 
60 static const match_table_t smk_mount_tokens = {
61 	{Opt_fsdefault, SMK_FSDEFAULT "%s"},
62 	{Opt_fsfloor, SMK_FSFLOOR "%s"},
63 	{Opt_fshat, SMK_FSHAT "%s"},
64 	{Opt_fsroot, SMK_FSROOT "%s"},
65 	{Opt_fstransmute, SMK_FSTRANS "%s"},
66 	{Opt_error, NULL},
67 };
68 
69 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
70 static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
71 	"Bringup Error",	/* Unused */
72 	"Bringup",		/* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
73 	"Unconfined Subject",	/* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
74 	"Unconfined Object",	/* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
75 };
76 
77 static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
78 {
79 	int i = 0;
80 
81 	if (mode & MAY_READ)
82 		s[i++] = 'r';
83 	if (mode & MAY_WRITE)
84 		s[i++] = 'w';
85 	if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
86 		s[i++] = 'x';
87 	if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
88 		s[i++] = 'a';
89 	if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
90 		s[i++] = 't';
91 	if (mode & MAY_LOCK)
92 		s[i++] = 'l';
93 	if (i == 0)
94 		s[i++] = '-';
95 	s[i] = '\0';
96 }
97 #endif
98 
99 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
100 static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
101 		       struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
102 {
103 	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
104 
105 	if (rc <= 0)
106 		return rc;
107 	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
108 		rc = 0;
109 
110 	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
111 	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
112 		sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
113 	return 0;
114 }
115 #else
116 #define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
117 #endif
118 
119 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
120 static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
121 			  int mode, int rc)
122 {
123 	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
124 	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
125 
126 	if (rc <= 0)
127 		return rc;
128 	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
129 		rc = 0;
130 
131 	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
132 	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
133 		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
134 		acc, current->comm, note);
135 	return 0;
136 }
137 #else
138 #define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
139 #endif
140 
141 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
142 static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
143 {
144 	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
145 	struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
146 	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
147 
148 	if (rc <= 0)
149 		return rc;
150 	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
151 		rc = 0;
152 
153 	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
154 	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
155 		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
156 		current->comm, otp->comm);
157 	return 0;
158 }
159 #else
160 #define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
161 #endif
162 
163 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
164 static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
165 {
166 	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
167 	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
168 	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
169 
170 	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
171 		pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
172 			inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
173 
174 	if (rc <= 0)
175 		return rc;
176 	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
177 		rc = 0;
178 	if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
179 	    (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
180 		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
181 
182 	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
183 
184 	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
185 		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
186 		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
187 	return 0;
188 }
189 #else
190 #define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
191 #endif
192 
193 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
194 static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
195 {
196 	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
197 	struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
198 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
199 	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
200 	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
201 
202 	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
203 		pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
204 			inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
205 
206 	if (rc <= 0)
207 		return rc;
208 	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
209 		rc = 0;
210 
211 	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
212 	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
213 		sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
214 		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
215 		current->comm);
216 	return 0;
217 }
218 #else
219 #define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
220 #endif
221 
222 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
223 static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
224 				int mode, int rc)
225 {
226 	struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
227 	struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
228 	struct inode *inode = file->f_inode;
229 	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
230 	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
231 
232 	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
233 		pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
234 			inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
235 
236 	if (rc <= 0)
237 		return rc;
238 	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
239 		rc = 0;
240 
241 	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
242 	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
243 		sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
244 		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
245 		current->comm);
246 	return 0;
247 }
248 #else
249 #define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
250 #endif
251 
252 /**
253  * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
254  * @name: type of the label (attribute)
255  * @ip: a pointer to the inode
256  * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
257  *
258  * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
259  * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
260  */
261 static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
262 					struct dentry *dp)
263 {
264 	int rc;
265 	char *buffer;
266 	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
267 
268 	if (!(ip->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
269 		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
270 
271 	buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_KERNEL);
272 	if (buffer == NULL)
273 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
274 
275 	rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, ip, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
276 	if (rc < 0)
277 		skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
278 	else if (rc == 0)
279 		skp = NULL;
280 	else
281 		skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
282 
283 	kfree(buffer);
284 
285 	return skp;
286 }
287 
288 /**
289  * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
290  * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
291  *
292  * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
293  */
294 static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
295 {
296 	struct inode_smack *isp;
297 
298 	isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
299 	if (isp == NULL)
300 		return NULL;
301 
302 	isp->smk_inode = skp;
303 	isp->smk_flags = 0;
304 	mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
305 
306 	return isp;
307 }
308 
309 /**
310  * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
311  * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
312  * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
313  * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
314  *
315  * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
316  */
317 static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task,
318 					struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp)
319 {
320 	struct task_smack *tsp;
321 
322 	tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
323 	if (tsp == NULL)
324 		return NULL;
325 
326 	tsp->smk_task = task;
327 	tsp->smk_forked = forked;
328 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
329 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
330 	mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
331 
332 	return tsp;
333 }
334 
335 /**
336  * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
337  * @nhead: new rules header pointer
338  * @ohead: old rules header pointer
339  * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
340  *
341  * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
342  */
343 static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
344 				gfp_t gfp)
345 {
346 	struct smack_rule *nrp;
347 	struct smack_rule *orp;
348 	int rc = 0;
349 
350 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
351 
352 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
353 		nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
354 		if (nrp == NULL) {
355 			rc = -ENOMEM;
356 			break;
357 		}
358 		*nrp = *orp;
359 		list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
360 	}
361 	return rc;
362 }
363 
364 /**
365  * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
366  * @nhead: new rules header pointer
367  * @ohead: old rules header pointer
368  * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
369  *
370  * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
371  */
372 static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
373 				gfp_t gfp)
374 {
375 	struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
376 	struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
377 
378 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
379 
380 	list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
381 		nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp);
382 		if (nklep == NULL) {
383 			smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
384 			return -ENOMEM;
385 		}
386 		nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
387 		list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
388 	}
389 
390 	return 0;
391 }
392 
393 /**
394  * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
395  * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
396  *
397  * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
398  */
399 static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
400 {
401 	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
402 		return MAY_READWRITE;
403 	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
404 		return MAY_READ;
405 
406 	return 0;
407 }
408 
409 /**
410  * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
411  * @tracer: tracer process
412  * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
413  * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
414  * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
415  *
416  * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
417  */
418 static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
419 				 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
420 				 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
421 {
422 	int rc;
423 	struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
424 	struct task_smack *tsp;
425 	struct smack_known *tracer_known;
426 
427 	if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
428 		smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
429 		smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
430 		saip = &ad;
431 	}
432 
433 	rcu_read_lock();
434 	tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
435 	tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
436 
437 	if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
438 	    (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
439 	     smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
440 		if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
441 			rc = 0;
442 		else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
443 			rc = -EACCES;
444 		else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
445 			rc = 0;
446 		else
447 			rc = -EACCES;
448 
449 		if (saip)
450 			smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
451 				  tracee_known->smk_known,
452 				  0, rc, saip);
453 
454 		rcu_read_unlock();
455 		return rc;
456 	}
457 
458 	/* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
459 	rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
460 
461 	rcu_read_unlock();
462 	return rc;
463 }
464 
465 /*
466  * LSM hooks.
467  * We he, that is fun!
468  */
469 
470 /**
471  * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
472  * @ctp: child task pointer
473  * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
474  *
475  * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
476  *
477  * Do the capability checks.
478  */
479 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
480 {
481 	struct smack_known *skp;
482 
483 	skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
484 
485 	return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
486 }
487 
488 /**
489  * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
490  * @ptp: parent task pointer
491  *
492  * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
493  *
494  * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
495  */
496 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
497 {
498 	int rc;
499 	struct smack_known *skp;
500 
501 	skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
502 
503 	rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
504 	return rc;
505 }
506 
507 /**
508  * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
509  * @type: message type
510  *
511  * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
512  */
513 static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
514 {
515 	int rc = 0;
516 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
517 
518 	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
519 		return 0;
520 
521 	if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
522 		rc = -EACCES;
523 
524 	return rc;
525 }
526 
527 
528 /*
529  * Superblock Hooks.
530  */
531 
532 /**
533  * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
534  * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
535  *
536  * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
537  */
538 static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
539 {
540 	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
541 
542 	sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
543 
544 	if (sbsp == NULL)
545 		return -ENOMEM;
546 
547 	sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
548 	sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
549 	sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
550 	sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
551 	/*
552 	 * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
553 	 */
554 	sb->s_security = sbsp;
555 
556 	return 0;
557 }
558 
559 /**
560  * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
561  * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
562  *
563  */
564 static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
565 {
566 	kfree(sb->s_security);
567 	sb->s_security = NULL;
568 }
569 
570 /**
571  * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
572  * @orig: where to start
573  * @smackopts: mount options string
574  *
575  * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
576  *
577  * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
578  * options list.
579  */
580 static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
581 {
582 	char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
583 
584 	otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
585 	if (otheropts == NULL)
586 		return -ENOMEM;
587 
588 	for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
589 		if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
590 			dp = smackopts;
591 		else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
592 			dp = smackopts;
593 		else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
594 			dp = smackopts;
595 		else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
596 			dp = smackopts;
597 		else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSTRANS) == cp)
598 			dp = smackopts;
599 		else
600 			dp = otheropts;
601 
602 		commap = strchr(cp, ',');
603 		if (commap != NULL)
604 			*commap = '\0';
605 
606 		if (*dp != '\0')
607 			strcat(dp, ",");
608 		strcat(dp, cp);
609 	}
610 
611 	strcpy(orig, otheropts);
612 	free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
613 
614 	return 0;
615 }
616 
617 /**
618  * smack_parse_opts_str - parse Smack specific mount options
619  * @options: mount options string
620  * @opts: where to store converted mount opts
621  *
622  * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
623  *
624  * converts Smack specific mount options to generic security option format
625  */
626 static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options,
627 		struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
628 {
629 	char *p;
630 	char *fsdefault = NULL;
631 	char *fsfloor = NULL;
632 	char *fshat = NULL;
633 	char *fsroot = NULL;
634 	char *fstransmute = NULL;
635 	int rc = -ENOMEM;
636 	int num_mnt_opts = 0;
637 	int token;
638 
639 	opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
640 
641 	if (!options)
642 		return 0;
643 
644 	while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
645 		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
646 
647 		if (!*p)
648 			continue;
649 
650 		token = match_token(p, smk_mount_tokens, args);
651 
652 		switch (token) {
653 		case Opt_fsdefault:
654 			if (fsdefault)
655 				goto out_opt_err;
656 			fsdefault = match_strdup(&args[0]);
657 			if (!fsdefault)
658 				goto out_err;
659 			break;
660 		case Opt_fsfloor:
661 			if (fsfloor)
662 				goto out_opt_err;
663 			fsfloor = match_strdup(&args[0]);
664 			if (!fsfloor)
665 				goto out_err;
666 			break;
667 		case Opt_fshat:
668 			if (fshat)
669 				goto out_opt_err;
670 			fshat = match_strdup(&args[0]);
671 			if (!fshat)
672 				goto out_err;
673 			break;
674 		case Opt_fsroot:
675 			if (fsroot)
676 				goto out_opt_err;
677 			fsroot = match_strdup(&args[0]);
678 			if (!fsroot)
679 				goto out_err;
680 			break;
681 		case Opt_fstransmute:
682 			if (fstransmute)
683 				goto out_opt_err;
684 			fstransmute = match_strdup(&args[0]);
685 			if (!fstransmute)
686 				goto out_err;
687 			break;
688 		default:
689 			rc = -EINVAL;
690 			pr_warn("Smack:  unknown mount option\n");
691 			goto out_err;
692 		}
693 	}
694 
695 	opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
696 	if (!opts->mnt_opts)
697 		goto out_err;
698 
699 	opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
700 			GFP_ATOMIC);
701 	if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
702 		kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
703 		goto out_err;
704 	}
705 
706 	if (fsdefault) {
707 		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsdefault;
708 		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSDEFAULT_MNT;
709 	}
710 	if (fsfloor) {
711 		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsfloor;
712 		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSFLOOR_MNT;
713 	}
714 	if (fshat) {
715 		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fshat;
716 		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSHAT_MNT;
717 	}
718 	if (fsroot) {
719 		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsroot;
720 		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSROOT_MNT;
721 	}
722 	if (fstransmute) {
723 		opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fstransmute;
724 		opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSTRANS_MNT;
725 	}
726 
727 	opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
728 	return 0;
729 
730 out_opt_err:
731 	rc = -EINVAL;
732 	pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
733 
734 out_err:
735 	kfree(fsdefault);
736 	kfree(fsfloor);
737 	kfree(fshat);
738 	kfree(fsroot);
739 	kfree(fstransmute);
740 	return rc;
741 }
742 
743 /**
744  * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
745  * @sb: the file system superblock
746  * @opts: Smack mount options
747  * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
748  * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
749  *
750  * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
751  *
752  * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
753  * labels.
754  */
755 static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
756 		struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
757 		unsigned long kern_flags,
758 		unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
759 {
760 	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
761 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
762 	struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
763 	struct inode_smack *isp;
764 	struct smack_known *skp;
765 	int i;
766 	int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
767 	int transmute = 0;
768 
769 	if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
770 		return 0;
771 
772 	sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
773 
774 	for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
775 		switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
776 		case FSDEFAULT_MNT:
777 			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
778 			if (IS_ERR(skp))
779 				return PTR_ERR(skp);
780 			sp->smk_default = skp;
781 			break;
782 		case FSFLOOR_MNT:
783 			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
784 			if (IS_ERR(skp))
785 				return PTR_ERR(skp);
786 			sp->smk_floor = skp;
787 			break;
788 		case FSHAT_MNT:
789 			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
790 			if (IS_ERR(skp))
791 				return PTR_ERR(skp);
792 			sp->smk_hat = skp;
793 			break;
794 		case FSROOT_MNT:
795 			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
796 			if (IS_ERR(skp))
797 				return PTR_ERR(skp);
798 			sp->smk_root = skp;
799 			break;
800 		case FSTRANS_MNT:
801 			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
802 			if (IS_ERR(skp))
803 				return PTR_ERR(skp);
804 			sp->smk_root = skp;
805 			transmute = 1;
806 			break;
807 		default:
808 			break;
809 		}
810 	}
811 
812 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
813 		/*
814 		 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
815 		 */
816 		if (num_opts)
817 			return -EPERM;
818 		/*
819 		 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
820 		 */
821 		skp = smk_of_current();
822 		sp->smk_root = skp;
823 		sp->smk_default = skp;
824 		/*
825 		 * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
826 		 * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
827 		 * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
828 		 */
829 		if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
830 		    sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
831 		    sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
832 			transmute = 1;
833 			sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
834 		}
835 	}
836 
837 	/*
838 	 * Initialize the root inode.
839 	 */
840 	isp = inode->i_security;
841 	if (isp == NULL) {
842 		isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
843 		if (isp == NULL)
844 			return -ENOMEM;
845 		inode->i_security = isp;
846 	} else
847 		isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
848 
849 	if (transmute)
850 		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
851 
852 	return 0;
853 }
854 
855 /**
856  * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
857  * @sb: the file system superblock
858  * @flags: the mount flags
859  * @data: the smack mount options
860  *
861  * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
862  */
863 static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
864 {
865 	int rc = 0;
866 	char *options = data;
867 	struct security_mnt_opts opts;
868 
869 	security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
870 
871 	if (!options)
872 		goto out;
873 
874 	rc = smack_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
875 	if (rc)
876 		goto out_err;
877 
878 out:
879 	rc = smack_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
880 
881 out_err:
882 	security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
883 	return rc;
884 }
885 
886 /**
887  * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
888  * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
889  *
890  * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
891  * and error code otherwise
892  */
893 static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
894 {
895 	struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
896 	int rc;
897 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
898 
899 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
900 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
901 
902 	rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
903 	rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
904 	return rc;
905 }
906 
907 /*
908  * BPRM hooks
909  */
910 
911 /**
912  * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
913  * @bprm: the exec information
914  *
915  * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
916  */
917 static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
918 {
919 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
920 	struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
921 	struct inode_smack *isp;
922 	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
923 	int rc;
924 
925 	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
926 		return 0;
927 
928 	isp = inode->i_security;
929 	if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
930 		return 0;
931 
932 	sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
933 	if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
934 	    isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
935 		return 0;
936 
937 	if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
938 		struct task_struct *tracer;
939 		rc = 0;
940 
941 		rcu_read_lock();
942 		tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
943 		if (likely(tracer != NULL))
944 			rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
945 						   isp->smk_task,
946 						   PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
947 						   __func__);
948 		rcu_read_unlock();
949 
950 		if (rc != 0)
951 			return rc;
952 	} else if (bprm->unsafe)
953 		return -EPERM;
954 
955 	bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
956 	bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
957 
958 	return 0;
959 }
960 
961 /**
962  * smack_bprm_committing_creds - Prepare to install the new credentials
963  * from bprm.
964  *
965  * @bprm: binprm for exec
966  */
967 static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
968 {
969 	struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
970 
971 	if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
972 		current->pdeath_signal = 0;
973 }
974 
975 /**
976  * smack_bprm_secureexec - Return the decision to use secureexec.
977  * @bprm: binprm for exec
978  *
979  * Returns 0 on success.
980  */
981 static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
982 {
983 	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
984 
985 	if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked)
986 		return 1;
987 
988 	return 0;
989 }
990 
991 /*
992  * Inode hooks
993  */
994 
995 /**
996  * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
997  * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
998  *
999  * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
1000  */
1001 static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
1002 {
1003 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1004 
1005 	inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp);
1006 	if (inode->i_security == NULL)
1007 		return -ENOMEM;
1008 	return 0;
1009 }
1010 
1011 /**
1012  * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
1013  * @inode: the inode with a blob
1014  *
1015  * Clears the blob pointer in inode
1016  */
1017 static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
1018 {
1019 	kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, inode->i_security);
1020 	inode->i_security = NULL;
1021 }
1022 
1023 /**
1024  * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
1025  * @inode: the newly created inode
1026  * @dir: containing directory object
1027  * @qstr: unused
1028  * @name: where to put the attribute name
1029  * @value: where to put the attribute value
1030  * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
1031  *
1032  * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
1033  */
1034 static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1035 				     const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
1036 				     void **value, size_t *len)
1037 {
1038 	struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
1039 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1040 	struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1041 	struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
1042 	int may;
1043 
1044 	if (name)
1045 		*name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
1046 
1047 	if (value && len) {
1048 		rcu_read_lock();
1049 		may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
1050 				       &skp->smk_rules);
1051 		rcu_read_unlock();
1052 
1053 		/*
1054 		 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
1055 		 * the directory requests transmutation then
1056 		 * by all means transmute.
1057 		 * Mark the inode as changed.
1058 		 */
1059 		if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
1060 		    smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) {
1061 			isp = dsp;
1062 			issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
1063 		}
1064 
1065 		*value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
1066 		if (*value == NULL)
1067 			return -ENOMEM;
1068 
1069 		*len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1070 	}
1071 
1072 	return 0;
1073 }
1074 
1075 /**
1076  * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
1077  * @old_dentry: the existing object
1078  * @dir: unused
1079  * @new_dentry: the new object
1080  *
1081  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1082  */
1083 static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
1084 			    struct dentry *new_dentry)
1085 {
1086 	struct smack_known *isp;
1087 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1088 	int rc;
1089 
1090 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1091 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1092 
1093 	isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1094 	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1095 	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1096 
1097 	if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1098 		isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1099 		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1100 		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1101 		rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1102 	}
1103 
1104 	return rc;
1105 }
1106 
1107 /**
1108  * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
1109  * @dir: containing directory object
1110  * @dentry: file to unlink
1111  *
1112  * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1113  * and the object, error code otherwise
1114  */
1115 static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1116 {
1117 	struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1118 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1119 	int rc;
1120 
1121 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1122 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1123 
1124 	/*
1125 	 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
1126 	 */
1127 	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1128 	rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1129 	if (rc == 0) {
1130 		/*
1131 		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1132 		 */
1133 		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1134 		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1135 		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1136 		rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1137 	}
1138 	return rc;
1139 }
1140 
1141 /**
1142  * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
1143  * @dir: containing directory object
1144  * @dentry: directory to unlink
1145  *
1146  * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1147  * and the directory, error code otherwise
1148  */
1149 static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1150 {
1151 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1152 	int rc;
1153 
1154 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1155 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1156 
1157 	/*
1158 	 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
1159 	 */
1160 	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1161 	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1162 	if (rc == 0) {
1163 		/*
1164 		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1165 		 */
1166 		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1167 		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1168 		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1169 		rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1170 	}
1171 
1172 	return rc;
1173 }
1174 
1175 /**
1176  * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
1177  * @old_inode: unused
1178  * @old_dentry: the old object
1179  * @new_inode: unused
1180  * @new_dentry: the new object
1181  *
1182  * Read and write access is required on both the old and
1183  * new directories.
1184  *
1185  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1186  */
1187 static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
1188 			      struct dentry *old_dentry,
1189 			      struct inode *new_inode,
1190 			      struct dentry *new_dentry)
1191 {
1192 	int rc;
1193 	struct smack_known *isp;
1194 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1195 
1196 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1197 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1198 
1199 	isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1200 	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1201 	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1202 
1203 	if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1204 		isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1205 		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1206 		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1207 		rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1208 	}
1209 	return rc;
1210 }
1211 
1212 /**
1213  * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
1214  * @inode: the inode in question
1215  * @mask: the access requested
1216  *
1217  * This is the important Smack hook.
1218  *
1219  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
1220  */
1221 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
1222 {
1223 	struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1224 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1225 	int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
1226 	int rc;
1227 
1228 	mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
1229 	/*
1230 	 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
1231 	 */
1232 	if (mask == 0)
1233 		return 0;
1234 
1235 	if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) {
1236 		if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root)
1237 			return -EACCES;
1238 	}
1239 
1240 	/* May be droppable after audit */
1241 	if (no_block)
1242 		return -ECHILD;
1243 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1244 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
1245 	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
1246 	rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
1247 	return rc;
1248 }
1249 
1250 /**
1251  * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
1252  * @dentry: the object
1253  * @iattr: for the force flag
1254  *
1255  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1256  */
1257 static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
1258 {
1259 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1260 	int rc;
1261 
1262 	/*
1263 	 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
1264 	 */
1265 	if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
1266 		return 0;
1267 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1268 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1269 
1270 	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1271 	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1272 	return rc;
1273 }
1274 
1275 /**
1276  * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
1277  * @mnt: vfsmount of the object
1278  * @dentry: the object
1279  *
1280  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1281  */
1282 static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
1283 {
1284 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1285 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1286 	int rc;
1287 
1288 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1289 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
1290 	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1291 	rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
1292 	return rc;
1293 }
1294 
1295 /**
1296  * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
1297  * @dentry: the object
1298  * @name: name of the attribute
1299  * @value: value of the attribute
1300  * @size: size of the value
1301  * @flags: unused
1302  *
1303  * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
1304  *
1305  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1306  */
1307 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1308 				const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1309 {
1310 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1311 	struct smack_known *skp;
1312 	int check_priv = 0;
1313 	int check_import = 0;
1314 	int check_star = 0;
1315 	int rc = 0;
1316 
1317 	/*
1318 	 * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
1319 	 */
1320 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1321 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1322 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
1323 		check_priv = 1;
1324 		check_import = 1;
1325 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1326 		   strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1327 		check_priv = 1;
1328 		check_import = 1;
1329 		check_star = 1;
1330 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1331 		check_priv = 1;
1332 		if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
1333 		    strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
1334 			rc = -EINVAL;
1335 	} else
1336 		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
1337 
1338 	if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1339 		rc = -EPERM;
1340 
1341 	if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
1342 		skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
1343 		if (IS_ERR(skp))
1344 			rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
1345 		else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
1346 		    (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
1347 			rc = -EINVAL;
1348 	}
1349 
1350 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1351 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1352 
1353 	if (rc == 0) {
1354 		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1355 		rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1356 	}
1357 
1358 	return rc;
1359 }
1360 
1361 /**
1362  * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
1363  * @dentry: object
1364  * @name: attribute name
1365  * @value: attribute value
1366  * @size: attribute size
1367  * @flags: unused
1368  *
1369  * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
1370  * in the master label list.
1371  */
1372 static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1373 				      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1374 {
1375 	struct smack_known *skp;
1376 	struct inode_smack *isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1377 
1378 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1379 		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1380 		return;
1381 	}
1382 
1383 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1384 		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1385 		if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1386 			isp->smk_inode = skp;
1387 		else
1388 			isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_invalid;
1389 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
1390 		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1391 		if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1392 			isp->smk_task = skp;
1393 		else
1394 			isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid;
1395 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1396 		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1397 		if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1398 			isp->smk_mmap = skp;
1399 		else
1400 			isp->smk_mmap = &smack_known_invalid;
1401 	}
1402 
1403 	return;
1404 }
1405 
1406 /**
1407  * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
1408  * @dentry: the object
1409  * @name: unused
1410  *
1411  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1412  */
1413 static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1414 {
1415 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1416 	int rc;
1417 
1418 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1419 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1420 
1421 	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
1422 	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
1423 	return rc;
1424 }
1425 
1426 /**
1427  * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
1428  * @dentry: the object
1429  * @name: name of the attribute
1430  *
1431  * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
1432  *
1433  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1434  */
1435 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1436 {
1437 	struct inode_smack *isp;
1438 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1439 	int rc = 0;
1440 
1441 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1442 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1443 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
1444 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1445 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
1446 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1447 		if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1448 			rc = -EPERM;
1449 	} else
1450 		rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
1451 
1452 	if (rc != 0)
1453 		return rc;
1454 
1455 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1456 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1457 
1458 	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1459 	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1460 	if (rc != 0)
1461 		return rc;
1462 
1463 	isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1464 	/*
1465 	 * Don't do anything special for these.
1466 	 *	XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
1467 	 *	XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
1468 	 */
1469 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1470 		struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
1471 		struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
1472 
1473 		isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
1474 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
1475 		isp->smk_task = NULL;
1476 	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
1477 		isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
1478 	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
1479 		isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1480 
1481 	return 0;
1482 }
1483 
1484 /**
1485  * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
1486  * @inode: the object
1487  * @name: attribute name
1488  * @buffer: where to put the result
1489  * @alloc: unused
1490  *
1491  * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
1492  */
1493 static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
1494 				   const char *name, void **buffer,
1495 				   bool alloc)
1496 {
1497 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
1498 	struct socket *sock;
1499 	struct super_block *sbp;
1500 	struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
1501 	struct smack_known *isp;
1502 	int ilen;
1503 	int rc = 0;
1504 
1505 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
1506 		isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1507 		ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1508 		*buffer = isp->smk_known;
1509 		return ilen;
1510 	}
1511 
1512 	/*
1513 	 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1514 	 */
1515 	sbp = ip->i_sb;
1516 	if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1517 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1518 
1519 	sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
1520 	if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
1521 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1522 
1523 	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1524 
1525 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1526 		isp = ssp->smk_in;
1527 	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
1528 		isp = ssp->smk_out;
1529 	else
1530 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1531 
1532 	ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1533 	if (rc == 0) {
1534 		*buffer = isp->smk_known;
1535 		rc = ilen;
1536 	}
1537 
1538 	return rc;
1539 }
1540 
1541 
1542 /**
1543  * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
1544  * @inode: the object
1545  * @buffer: where they go
1546  * @buffer_size: size of buffer
1547  */
1548 static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
1549 				    size_t buffer_size)
1550 {
1551 	int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
1552 
1553 	if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
1554 		memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
1555 
1556 	return len;
1557 }
1558 
1559 /**
1560  * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
1561  * @inode: inode to extract the info from
1562  * @secid: where result will be saved
1563  */
1564 static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
1565 {
1566 	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
1567 
1568 	*secid = isp->smk_inode->smk_secid;
1569 }
1570 
1571 /*
1572  * File Hooks
1573  */
1574 
1575 /*
1576  * There is no smack_file_permission hook
1577  *
1578  * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1579  * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1580  * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1581  *
1582  * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1583  * label changing that SELinux does.
1584  */
1585 
1586 /**
1587  * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1588  * @file: the object
1589  *
1590  * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1591  * label list, so no allocation is done.
1592  *
1593  * f_security is the owner security information. It
1594  * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
1595  *
1596  * Returns 0
1597  */
1598 static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1599 {
1600 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1601 
1602 	file->f_security = skp;
1603 	return 0;
1604 }
1605 
1606 /**
1607  * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
1608  * @file: the object
1609  *
1610  * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1611  * label list, so no memory is freed.
1612  */
1613 static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
1614 {
1615 	file->f_security = NULL;
1616 }
1617 
1618 /**
1619  * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1620  * @file: the object
1621  * @cmd: what to do
1622  * @arg: unused
1623  *
1624  * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1625  *
1626  * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1627  */
1628 static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1629 			    unsigned long arg)
1630 {
1631 	int rc = 0;
1632 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1633 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1634 
1635 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1636 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1637 
1638 	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
1639 		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1640 		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1641 	}
1642 
1643 	if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
1644 		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1645 		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
1646 	}
1647 
1648 	return rc;
1649 }
1650 
1651 /**
1652  * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1653  * @file: the object
1654  * @cmd: unused
1655  *
1656  * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
1657  */
1658 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1659 {
1660 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1661 	int rc;
1662 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1663 
1664 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1665 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1666 	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1667 	rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1668 	return rc;
1669 }
1670 
1671 /**
1672  * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1673  * @file: the object
1674  * @cmd: what action to check
1675  * @arg: unused
1676  *
1677  * Generally these operations are harmless.
1678  * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
1679  * for passing information, so they require write access.
1680  *
1681  * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1682  */
1683 static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1684 			    unsigned long arg)
1685 {
1686 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1687 	int rc = 0;
1688 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1689 
1690 	switch (cmd) {
1691 	case F_GETLK:
1692 		break;
1693 	case F_SETLK:
1694 	case F_SETLKW:
1695 		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1696 		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1697 		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1698 		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1699 		break;
1700 	case F_SETOWN:
1701 	case F_SETSIG:
1702 		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1703 		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1704 		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1705 		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1706 		break;
1707 	default:
1708 		break;
1709 	}
1710 
1711 	return rc;
1712 }
1713 
1714 /**
1715  * smack_mmap_file :
1716  * Check permissions for a mmap operation.  The @file may be NULL, e.g.
1717  * if mapping anonymous memory.
1718  * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1719  * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
1720  * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1721  * @flags contains the operational flags.
1722  * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1723  */
1724 static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
1725 			   unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1726 			   unsigned long flags)
1727 {
1728 	struct smack_known *skp;
1729 	struct smack_known *mkp;
1730 	struct smack_rule *srp;
1731 	struct task_smack *tsp;
1732 	struct smack_known *okp;
1733 	struct inode_smack *isp;
1734 	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
1735 	int may;
1736 	int mmay;
1737 	int tmay;
1738 	int rc;
1739 
1740 	if (file == NULL)
1741 		return 0;
1742 
1743 	isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
1744 	if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1745 		return 0;
1746 	sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
1747 	if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
1748 	    isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
1749 		return -EACCES;
1750 	mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
1751 
1752 	tsp = current_security();
1753 	skp = smk_of_current();
1754 	rc = 0;
1755 
1756 	rcu_read_lock();
1757 	/*
1758 	 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1759 	 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1760 	 * to that rule's object label.
1761 	 */
1762 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
1763 		okp = srp->smk_object;
1764 		/*
1765 		 * Matching labels always allows access.
1766 		 */
1767 		if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
1768 			continue;
1769 		/*
1770 		 * If there is a matching local rule take
1771 		 * that into account as well.
1772 		 */
1773 		may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
1774 				       okp->smk_known,
1775 				       &tsp->smk_rules);
1776 		if (may == -ENOENT)
1777 			may = srp->smk_access;
1778 		else
1779 			may &= srp->smk_access;
1780 		/*
1781 		 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1782 		 * possibly have less access.
1783 		 */
1784 		if (may == 0)
1785 			continue;
1786 
1787 		/*
1788 		 * Fetch the global list entry.
1789 		 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1790 		 * can't have as much access as current.
1791 		 */
1792 		mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1793 					&mkp->smk_rules);
1794 		if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1795 			rc = -EACCES;
1796 			break;
1797 		}
1798 		/*
1799 		 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1800 		 * potential access, too.
1801 		 */
1802 		tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1803 					&tsp->smk_rules);
1804 		if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1805 			mmay &= tmay;
1806 
1807 		/*
1808 		 * If there is any access available to current that is
1809 		 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1810 		 * deny access.
1811 		 */
1812 		if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1813 			rc = -EACCES;
1814 			break;
1815 		}
1816 	}
1817 
1818 	rcu_read_unlock();
1819 
1820 	return rc;
1821 }
1822 
1823 /**
1824  * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1825  * @file: object in question
1826  *
1827  */
1828 static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1829 {
1830 	file->f_security = smk_of_current();
1831 }
1832 
1833 /**
1834  * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1835  * @tsk: The target task
1836  * @fown: the object the signal come from
1837  * @signum: unused
1838  *
1839  * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1840  *
1841  * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1842  * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1843  */
1844 static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1845 				     struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1846 {
1847 	struct smack_known *skp;
1848 	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
1849 	struct file *file;
1850 	int rc;
1851 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1852 
1853 	/*
1854 	 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1855 	 */
1856 	file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
1857 
1858 	/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1859 	skp = file->f_security;
1860 	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
1861 	rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
1862 	if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1863 		rc = 0;
1864 
1865 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1866 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1867 	smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_DELIVER, rc, &ad);
1868 	return rc;
1869 }
1870 
1871 /**
1872  * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1873  * @file: the object
1874  *
1875  * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1876  */
1877 static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1878 {
1879 	int rc;
1880 	int may = 0;
1881 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1882 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1883 	struct socket *sock;
1884 	struct task_smack *tsp;
1885 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
1886 
1887 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1888 		return 0;
1889 
1890 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1891 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1892 
1893 	if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
1894 		sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
1895 		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1896 		tsp = current_security();
1897 		/*
1898 		 * If the receiving process can't write to the
1899 		 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
1900 		 * write to the receiving process don't accept
1901 		 * the passed socket.
1902 		 */
1903 		rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1904 		rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1905 		if (rc < 0)
1906 			return rc;
1907 		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1908 		rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1909 		return rc;
1910 	}
1911 	/*
1912 	 * This code relies on bitmasks.
1913 	 */
1914 	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1915 		may = MAY_READ;
1916 	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1917 		may |= MAY_WRITE;
1918 
1919 	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
1920 	rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1921 	return rc;
1922 }
1923 
1924 /**
1925  * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
1926  * @file: the object
1927  * @cred: task credential
1928  *
1929  * Set the security blob in the file structure.
1930  * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
1931  * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
1932  * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
1933  *
1934  * Returns 0
1935  */
1936 static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
1937 {
1938 	struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1939 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1940 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
1941 	int rc;
1942 
1943 	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1944 		return 0;
1945 
1946 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1947 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1948 	rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1949 	rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
1950 
1951 	return rc;
1952 }
1953 
1954 /*
1955  * Task hooks
1956  */
1957 
1958 /**
1959  * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
1960  * @new: the new credentials
1961  * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1962  *
1963  * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification.  This must allocate all
1964  * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
1965  * complete without error.
1966  */
1967 static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1968 {
1969 	struct task_smack *tsp;
1970 
1971 	tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
1972 	if (tsp == NULL)
1973 		return -ENOMEM;
1974 
1975 	cred->security = tsp;
1976 
1977 	return 0;
1978 }
1979 
1980 
1981 /**
1982  * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
1983  * @cred: the credentials in question
1984  *
1985  */
1986 static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
1987 {
1988 	struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1989 	struct smack_rule *rp;
1990 	struct list_head *l;
1991 	struct list_head *n;
1992 
1993 	if (tsp == NULL)
1994 		return;
1995 	cred->security = NULL;
1996 
1997 	smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
1998 
1999 	list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
2000 		rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
2001 		list_del(&rp->list);
2002 		kfree(rp);
2003 	}
2004 	kfree(tsp);
2005 }
2006 
2007 /**
2008  * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
2009  * @new: the new credentials
2010  * @old: the original credentials
2011  * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
2012  *
2013  * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
2014  */
2015 static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2016 			      gfp_t gfp)
2017 {
2018 	struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
2019 	struct task_smack *new_tsp;
2020 	int rc;
2021 
2022 	new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
2023 	if (new_tsp == NULL)
2024 		return -ENOMEM;
2025 
2026 	rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
2027 	if (rc != 0)
2028 		return rc;
2029 
2030 	rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
2031 				gfp);
2032 	if (rc != 0)
2033 		return rc;
2034 
2035 	new->security = new_tsp;
2036 	return 0;
2037 }
2038 
2039 /**
2040  * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
2041  * @new: the new credentials
2042  * @old: the original credentials
2043  *
2044  * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
2045  */
2046 static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2047 {
2048 	struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
2049 	struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2050 
2051 	new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
2052 	new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
2053 	mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
2054 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
2055 
2056 
2057 	/* cbs copy rule list */
2058 }
2059 
2060 /**
2061  * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
2062  * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
2063  * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
2064  *
2065  * Set the security data for a kernel service.
2066  */
2067 static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
2068 {
2069 	struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2070 	struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
2071 
2072 	if (skp == NULL)
2073 		return -EINVAL;
2074 
2075 	new_tsp->smk_task = skp;
2076 	return 0;
2077 }
2078 
2079 /**
2080  * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
2081  * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
2082  * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
2083  *
2084  * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
2085  * as the objective context of the specified inode
2086  */
2087 static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
2088 					struct inode *inode)
2089 {
2090 	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2091 	struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
2092 
2093 	tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
2094 	tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
2095 	return 0;
2096 }
2097 
2098 /**
2099  * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
2100  * @p: the task object
2101  * @access: the access requested
2102  * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
2103  *
2104  * Return 0 if access is permitted
2105  */
2106 static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
2107 				const char *caller)
2108 {
2109 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
2110 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2111 	int rc;
2112 
2113 	smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2114 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2115 	rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
2116 	rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
2117 	return rc;
2118 }
2119 
2120 /**
2121  * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
2122  * @p: the task object
2123  * @pgid: unused
2124  *
2125  * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2126  */
2127 static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2128 {
2129 	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2130 }
2131 
2132 /**
2133  * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
2134  * @p: the object task
2135  *
2136  * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2137  */
2138 static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2139 {
2140 	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2141 }
2142 
2143 /**
2144  * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
2145  * @p: the object task
2146  *
2147  * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2148  */
2149 static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2150 {
2151 	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2152 }
2153 
2154 /**
2155  * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
2156  * @p: the object task
2157  * @secid: where to put the result
2158  *
2159  * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
2160  */
2161 static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2162 {
2163 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2164 
2165 	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
2166 }
2167 
2168 /**
2169  * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
2170  * @p: the task object
2171  * @nice: unused
2172  *
2173  * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2174  */
2175 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2176 {
2177 	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2178 }
2179 
2180 /**
2181  * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
2182  * @p: the task object
2183  * @ioprio: unused
2184  *
2185  * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2186  */
2187 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2188 {
2189 	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2190 }
2191 
2192 /**
2193  * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
2194  * @p: the task object
2195  *
2196  * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2197  */
2198 static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2199 {
2200 	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2201 }
2202 
2203 /**
2204  * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
2205  * @p: the task object
2206  * @policy: unused
2207  * @lp: unused
2208  *
2209  * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2210  */
2211 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2212 {
2213 	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2214 }
2215 
2216 /**
2217  * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
2218  * @p: the task object
2219  *
2220  * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2221  */
2222 static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2223 {
2224 	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2225 }
2226 
2227 /**
2228  * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
2229  * @p: the task object
2230  *
2231  * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2232  */
2233 static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2234 {
2235 	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2236 }
2237 
2238 /**
2239  * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
2240  * @p: the task object
2241  * @info: unused
2242  * @sig: unused
2243  * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
2244  *
2245  * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2246  *
2247  * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
2248  * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
2249  */
2250 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2251 			   int sig, u32 secid)
2252 {
2253 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
2254 	struct smack_known *skp;
2255 	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2256 	int rc;
2257 
2258 	if (!sig)
2259 		return 0; /* null signal; existence test */
2260 
2261 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2262 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2263 	/*
2264 	 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
2265 	 * can write the receiver.
2266 	 */
2267 	if (secid == 0) {
2268 		rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2269 		rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2270 		return rc;
2271 	}
2272 	/*
2273 	 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
2274 	 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
2275 	 * we can't take privilege into account.
2276 	 */
2277 	skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
2278 	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2279 	rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2280 	return rc;
2281 }
2282 
2283 /**
2284  * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
2285  * @p: task to wait for
2286  *
2287  * Returns 0
2288  */
2289 static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2290 {
2291 	/*
2292 	 * Allow the operation to succeed.
2293 	 * Zombies are bad.
2294 	 * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs
2295 	 * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent
2296 	 * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still
2297 	 * may expect to know when the child exits.
2298 	 */
2299 	return 0;
2300 }
2301 
2302 /**
2303  * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
2304  * @p: task to copy from
2305  * @inode: inode to copy to
2306  *
2307  * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
2308  */
2309 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
2310 {
2311 	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2312 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2313 
2314 	isp->smk_inode = skp;
2315 }
2316 
2317 /*
2318  * Socket hooks.
2319  */
2320 
2321 /**
2322  * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
2323  * @sk: the socket
2324  * @family: unused
2325  * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
2326  *
2327  * Assign Smack pointers to current
2328  *
2329  * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
2330  */
2331 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
2332 {
2333 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2334 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
2335 
2336 	ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
2337 	if (ssp == NULL)
2338 		return -ENOMEM;
2339 
2340 	ssp->smk_in = skp;
2341 	ssp->smk_out = skp;
2342 	ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
2343 
2344 	sk->sk_security = ssp;
2345 
2346 	return 0;
2347 }
2348 
2349 /**
2350  * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
2351  * @sk: the socket
2352  *
2353  * Clears the blob pointer
2354  */
2355 static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
2356 {
2357 	kfree(sk->sk_security);
2358 }
2359 
2360 /**
2361 * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
2362 * @sip: the object end
2363 *
2364 * looks for host based access restrictions
2365 *
2366 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2367 * hosts.  The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2368 * taken before calling this function.
2369 *
2370 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2371 */
2372 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
2373 {
2374 	struct smk_net4addr *snp;
2375 	struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
2376 
2377 	if (siap->s_addr == 0)
2378 		return NULL;
2379 
2380 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
2381 		/*
2382 		 * we break after finding the first match because
2383 		 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2384 		 * so we have found the most specific match
2385 		 */
2386 		if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
2387 		    (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
2388 			return snp->smk_label;
2389 
2390 	return NULL;
2391 }
2392 
2393 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2394 /*
2395  * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
2396  * @sip: the address
2397  *
2398  * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
2399  */
2400 static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2401 {
2402 	__be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2403 	__be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2404 
2405 	if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
2406 	    ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
2407 		return true;
2408 	return false;
2409 }
2410 
2411 /**
2412 * smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
2413 * @sip: the object end
2414 *
2415 * looks for host based access restrictions
2416 *
2417 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2418 * hosts.  The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2419 * taken before calling this function.
2420 *
2421 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2422 */
2423 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2424 {
2425 	struct smk_net6addr *snp;
2426 	struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
2427 	int i;
2428 	int found = 0;
2429 
2430 	/*
2431 	 * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
2432 	 */
2433 	if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
2434 		return NULL;
2435 
2436 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
2437 		/*
2438 		* we break after finding the first match because
2439 		* the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2440 		* so we have found the most specific match
2441 		*/
2442 		for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
2443 			/*
2444 			 * If the label is NULL the entry has
2445 			 * been renounced. Ignore it.
2446 			 */
2447 			if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
2448 				continue;
2449 			if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
2450 			    snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
2451 				found = 0;
2452 				break;
2453 			}
2454 		}
2455 		if (found)
2456 			return snp->smk_label;
2457 	}
2458 
2459 	return NULL;
2460 }
2461 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2462 
2463 /**
2464  * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
2465  * @sk: the socket
2466  * @labeled: socket label scheme
2467  *
2468  * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
2469  * secattr and attach it to the socket.
2470  *
2471  * Returns 0 on success or an error code
2472  */
2473 static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
2474 {
2475 	struct smack_known *skp;
2476 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2477 	int rc = 0;
2478 
2479 	/*
2480 	 * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
2481 	 * packet labeling based on the label.
2482 	 * The case of a single label host is different, because
2483 	 * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
2484 	 * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
2485 	 * label.
2486 	 */
2487 	local_bh_disable();
2488 	bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2489 
2490 	if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
2491 	    labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
2492 		netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
2493 	else {
2494 		skp = ssp->smk_out;
2495 		rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
2496 	}
2497 
2498 	bh_unlock_sock(sk);
2499 	local_bh_enable();
2500 
2501 	return rc;
2502 }
2503 
2504 /**
2505  * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
2506  * @sk: the socket
2507  * @sap: the destination address
2508  *
2509  * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
2510  * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
2511  *
2512  * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
2513  *
2514  */
2515 static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
2516 {
2517 	struct smack_known *skp;
2518 	int rc;
2519 	int sk_lbl;
2520 	struct smack_known *hkp;
2521 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2522 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
2523 
2524 	rcu_read_lock();
2525 	hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
2526 	if (hkp != NULL) {
2527 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2528 		struct lsm_network_audit net;
2529 
2530 		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2531 		ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
2532 		ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
2533 		ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
2534 #endif
2535 		sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
2536 		skp = ssp->smk_out;
2537 		rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2538 		rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2539 	} else {
2540 		sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
2541 		rc = 0;
2542 	}
2543 	rcu_read_unlock();
2544 	if (rc != 0)
2545 		return rc;
2546 
2547 	return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
2548 }
2549 
2550 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2551 /**
2552  * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
2553  * @subject: subject Smack label
2554  * @object: object Smack label
2555  * @address: address
2556  * @act: the action being taken
2557  *
2558  * Check an IPv6 access
2559  */
2560 static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
2561 				struct smack_known *object,
2562 				struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
2563 {
2564 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2565 	struct lsm_network_audit net;
2566 #endif
2567 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
2568 	int rc;
2569 
2570 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2571 	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2572 	ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
2573 	ad.a.u.net->dport = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2574 	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2575 		ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
2576 	else
2577 		ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
2578 #endif
2579 	rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2580 	rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2581 	return rc;
2582 }
2583 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2584 
2585 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2586 /**
2587  * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
2588  * @sock: socket
2589  * @address: address
2590  *
2591  * Create or update the port list entry
2592  */
2593 static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
2594 {
2595 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2596 	struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
2597 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2598 	struct smk_port_label *spp;
2599 	unsigned short port = 0;
2600 
2601 	if (address == NULL) {
2602 		/*
2603 		 * This operation is changing the Smack information
2604 		 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
2605 		 * as well.
2606 		 */
2607 		list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2608 			if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
2609 				continue;
2610 			spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2611 			spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2612 			return;
2613 		}
2614 		/*
2615 		 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
2616 		 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
2617 		 */
2618 		return;
2619 	}
2620 
2621 	addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
2622 	port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
2623 	/*
2624 	 * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
2625 	 */
2626 	if (port == 0)
2627 		return;
2628 
2629 	/*
2630 	 * Look for an existing port list entry.
2631 	 * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
2632 	 */
2633 	list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2634 		if (spp->smk_port != port)
2635 			continue;
2636 		spp->smk_port = port;
2637 		spp->smk_sock = sk;
2638 		spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2639 		spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2640 		return;
2641 	}
2642 
2643 	/*
2644 	 * A new port entry is required.
2645 	 */
2646 	spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
2647 	if (spp == NULL)
2648 		return;
2649 
2650 	spp->smk_port = port;
2651 	spp->smk_sock = sk;
2652 	spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2653 	spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2654 
2655 	list_add(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
2656 	return;
2657 }
2658 
2659 /**
2660  * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
2661  * @sock: socket
2662  * @address: address
2663  *
2664  * Create or update the port list entry
2665  */
2666 static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
2667 				int act)
2668 {
2669 	struct smk_port_label *spp;
2670 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2671 	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
2672 	unsigned short port;
2673 	struct smack_known *object;
2674 
2675 	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
2676 		skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2677 		object = ssp->smk_in;
2678 	} else {
2679 		skp = ssp->smk_out;
2680 		object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2681 	}
2682 
2683 	/*
2684 	 * The other end is a single label host.
2685 	 */
2686 	if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
2687 		return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2688 	if (skp == NULL)
2689 		skp = smack_net_ambient;
2690 	if (object == NULL)
2691 		object = smack_net_ambient;
2692 
2693 	/*
2694 	 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
2695 	 */
2696 	if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
2697 		return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2698 
2699 	/*
2700 	 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
2701 	 */
2702 	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2703 		return 0;
2704 
2705 	port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2706 	list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2707 		if (spp->smk_port != port)
2708 			continue;
2709 		object = spp->smk_in;
2710 		if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
2711 			ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
2712 		break;
2713 	}
2714 
2715 	return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2716 }
2717 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2718 
2719 /**
2720  * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
2721  * @inode: the object
2722  * @name: attribute name
2723  * @value: attribute value
2724  * @size: size of the attribute
2725  * @flags: unused
2726  *
2727  * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
2728  *
2729  * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
2730  */
2731 static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2732 				   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2733 {
2734 	struct smack_known *skp;
2735 	struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
2736 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
2737 	struct socket *sock;
2738 	int rc = 0;
2739 
2740 	if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
2741 		return -EINVAL;
2742 
2743 	skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
2744 	if (IS_ERR(skp))
2745 		return PTR_ERR(skp);
2746 
2747 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
2748 		nsp->smk_inode = skp;
2749 		nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2750 		return 0;
2751 	}
2752 	/*
2753 	 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
2754 	 */
2755 	if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2756 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2757 
2758 	sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2759 	if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
2760 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2761 
2762 	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2763 
2764 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
2765 		ssp->smk_in = skp;
2766 	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
2767 		ssp->smk_out = skp;
2768 		if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
2769 			rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2770 			if (rc != 0)
2771 				printk(KERN_WARNING
2772 					"Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
2773 					__func__, -rc);
2774 		}
2775 	} else
2776 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2777 
2778 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2779 	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2780 		smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
2781 #endif
2782 
2783 	return 0;
2784 }
2785 
2786 /**
2787  * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
2788  * @sock: the socket
2789  * @family: protocol family
2790  * @type: unused
2791  * @protocol: unused
2792  * @kern: unused
2793  *
2794  * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
2795  *
2796  * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2797  */
2798 static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2799 				    int type, int protocol, int kern)
2800 {
2801 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
2802 
2803 	if (sock->sk == NULL)
2804 		return 0;
2805 
2806 	/*
2807 	 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2808 	 */
2809 	if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2810 		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2811 		ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2812 		ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2813 	}
2814 
2815 	if (family != PF_INET)
2816 		return 0;
2817 	/*
2818 	 * Set the outbound netlbl.
2819 	 */
2820 	return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2821 }
2822 
2823 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2824 /**
2825  * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
2826  * @sock: the socket
2827  * @address: the port address
2828  * @addrlen: size of the address
2829  *
2830  * Records the label bound to a port.
2831  *
2832  * Returns 0
2833  */
2834 static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
2835 				int addrlen)
2836 {
2837 	if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2838 		smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
2839 	return 0;
2840 }
2841 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2842 
2843 /**
2844  * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
2845  * @sock: the socket
2846  * @sap: the other end
2847  * @addrlen: size of sap
2848  *
2849  * Verifies that a connection may be possible
2850  *
2851  * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2852  */
2853 static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
2854 				int addrlen)
2855 {
2856 	int rc = 0;
2857 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2858 	struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
2859 #endif
2860 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2861 	struct smack_known *rsp;
2862 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2863 #endif
2864 
2865 	if (sock->sk == NULL)
2866 		return 0;
2867 
2868 	switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
2869 	case PF_INET:
2870 		if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
2871 			return -EINVAL;
2872 		rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
2873 		break;
2874 	case PF_INET6:
2875 		if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
2876 			return -EINVAL;
2877 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2878 		rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
2879 		if (rsp != NULL)
2880 			rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
2881 						SMK_CONNECTING);
2882 #endif
2883 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2884 		rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
2885 #endif
2886 		break;
2887 	}
2888 	return rc;
2889 }
2890 
2891 /**
2892  * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
2893  * @flags: the S_ value
2894  *
2895  * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
2896  */
2897 static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
2898 {
2899 	int may = 0;
2900 
2901 	if (flags & S_IRUGO)
2902 		may |= MAY_READ;
2903 	if (flags & S_IWUGO)
2904 		may |= MAY_WRITE;
2905 	if (flags & S_IXUGO)
2906 		may |= MAY_EXEC;
2907 
2908 	return may;
2909 }
2910 
2911 /**
2912  * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
2913  * @msg: the object
2914  *
2915  * Returns 0
2916  */
2917 static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2918 {
2919 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2920 
2921 	msg->security = skp;
2922 	return 0;
2923 }
2924 
2925 /**
2926  * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
2927  * @msg: the object
2928  *
2929  * Clears the blob pointer
2930  */
2931 static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2932 {
2933 	msg->security = NULL;
2934 }
2935 
2936 /**
2937  * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
2938  * @shp: the object
2939  *
2940  * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2941  */
2942 static struct smack_known *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2943 {
2944 	return (struct smack_known *)shp->shm_perm.security;
2945 }
2946 
2947 /**
2948  * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
2949  * @shp: the object
2950  *
2951  * Returns 0
2952  */
2953 static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2954 {
2955 	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2956 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2957 
2958 	isp->security = skp;
2959 	return 0;
2960 }
2961 
2962 /**
2963  * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
2964  * @shp: the object
2965  *
2966  * Clears the blob pointer
2967  */
2968 static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2969 {
2970 	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2971 
2972 	isp->security = NULL;
2973 }
2974 
2975 /**
2976  * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
2977  * @shp : the object
2978  * @access : access requested
2979  *
2980  * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2981  */
2982 static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
2983 {
2984 	struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
2985 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
2986 	int rc;
2987 
2988 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2989 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2990 	ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
2991 #endif
2992 	rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2993 	rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
2994 	return rc;
2995 }
2996 
2997 /**
2998  * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
2999  * @shp: the object
3000  * @shmflg: access requested
3001  *
3002  * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3003  */
3004 static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
3005 {
3006 	int may;
3007 
3008 	may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3009 	return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3010 }
3011 
3012 /**
3013  * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
3014  * @shp: the object
3015  * @cmd: what it wants to do
3016  *
3017  * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3018  */
3019 static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
3020 {
3021 	int may;
3022 
3023 	switch (cmd) {
3024 	case IPC_STAT:
3025 	case SHM_STAT:
3026 		may = MAY_READ;
3027 		break;
3028 	case IPC_SET:
3029 	case SHM_LOCK:
3030 	case SHM_UNLOCK:
3031 	case IPC_RMID:
3032 		may = MAY_READWRITE;
3033 		break;
3034 	case IPC_INFO:
3035 	case SHM_INFO:
3036 		/*
3037 		 * System level information.
3038 		 */
3039 		return 0;
3040 	default:
3041 		return -EINVAL;
3042 	}
3043 	return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3044 }
3045 
3046 /**
3047  * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
3048  * @shp: the object
3049  * @shmaddr: unused
3050  * @shmflg: access requested
3051  *
3052  * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3053  */
3054 static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
3055 			   int shmflg)
3056 {
3057 	int may;
3058 
3059 	may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3060 	return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3061 }
3062 
3063 /**
3064  * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
3065  * @sma: the object
3066  *
3067  * Returns a pointer to the smack value
3068  */
3069 static struct smack_known *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
3070 {
3071 	return (struct smack_known *)sma->sem_perm.security;
3072 }
3073 
3074 /**
3075  * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
3076  * @sma: the object
3077  *
3078  * Returns 0
3079  */
3080 static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3081 {
3082 	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3083 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3084 
3085 	isp->security = skp;
3086 	return 0;
3087 }
3088 
3089 /**
3090  * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
3091  * @sma: the object
3092  *
3093  * Clears the blob pointer
3094  */
3095 static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3096 {
3097 	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3098 
3099 	isp->security = NULL;
3100 }
3101 
3102 /**
3103  * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
3104  * @sma : the object
3105  * @access : access requested
3106  *
3107  * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3108  */
3109 static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
3110 {
3111 	struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
3112 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
3113 	int rc;
3114 
3115 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3116 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3117 	ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
3118 #endif
3119 	rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3120 	rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
3121 	return rc;
3122 }
3123 
3124 /**
3125  * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
3126  * @sma: the object
3127  * @semflg: access requested
3128  *
3129  * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3130  */
3131 static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
3132 {
3133 	int may;
3134 
3135 	may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
3136 	return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3137 }
3138 
3139 /**
3140  * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
3141  * @sma: the object
3142  * @cmd: what it wants to do
3143  *
3144  * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3145  */
3146 static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
3147 {
3148 	int may;
3149 
3150 	switch (cmd) {
3151 	case GETPID:
3152 	case GETNCNT:
3153 	case GETZCNT:
3154 	case GETVAL:
3155 	case GETALL:
3156 	case IPC_STAT:
3157 	case SEM_STAT:
3158 		may = MAY_READ;
3159 		break;
3160 	case SETVAL:
3161 	case SETALL:
3162 	case IPC_RMID:
3163 	case IPC_SET:
3164 		may = MAY_READWRITE;
3165 		break;
3166 	case IPC_INFO:
3167 	case SEM_INFO:
3168 		/*
3169 		 * System level information
3170 		 */
3171 		return 0;
3172 	default:
3173 		return -EINVAL;
3174 	}
3175 
3176 	return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3177 }
3178 
3179 /**
3180  * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
3181  * @sma: the object
3182  * @sops: unused
3183  * @nsops: unused
3184  * @alter: unused
3185  *
3186  * Treated as read and write in all cases.
3187  *
3188  * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
3189  */
3190 static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
3191 			   unsigned nsops, int alter)
3192 {
3193 	return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
3194 }
3195 
3196 /**
3197  * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
3198  * @msq: the object
3199  *
3200  * Returns 0
3201  */
3202 static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3203 {
3204 	struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3205 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3206 
3207 	kisp->security = skp;
3208 	return 0;
3209 }
3210 
3211 /**
3212  * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
3213  * @msq: the object
3214  *
3215  * Clears the blob pointer
3216  */
3217 static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3218 {
3219 	struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3220 
3221 	kisp->security = NULL;
3222 }
3223 
3224 /**
3225  * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
3226  * @msq: the object
3227  *
3228  * Returns a pointer to the smack label entry
3229  */
3230 static struct smack_known *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
3231 {
3232 	return (struct smack_known *)msq->q_perm.security;
3233 }
3234 
3235 /**
3236  * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
3237  * @msq : the msq
3238  * @access : access requested
3239  *
3240  * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
3241  */
3242 static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
3243 {
3244 	struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
3245 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
3246 	int rc;
3247 
3248 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3249 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3250 	ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
3251 #endif
3252 	rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
3253 	rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
3254 	return rc;
3255 }
3256 
3257 /**
3258  * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
3259  * @msq: the object
3260  * @msqflg: access requested
3261  *
3262  * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3263  */
3264 static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3265 {
3266 	int may;
3267 
3268 	may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3269 	return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3270 }
3271 
3272 /**
3273  * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
3274  * @msq: the object
3275  * @cmd: what it wants to do
3276  *
3277  * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3278  */
3279 static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3280 {
3281 	int may;
3282 
3283 	switch (cmd) {
3284 	case IPC_STAT:
3285 	case MSG_STAT:
3286 		may = MAY_READ;
3287 		break;
3288 	case IPC_SET:
3289 	case IPC_RMID:
3290 		may = MAY_READWRITE;
3291 		break;
3292 	case IPC_INFO:
3293 	case MSG_INFO:
3294 		/*
3295 		 * System level information
3296 		 */
3297 		return 0;
3298 	default:
3299 		return -EINVAL;
3300 	}
3301 
3302 	return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3303 }
3304 
3305 /**
3306  * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3307  * @msq: the object
3308  * @msg: unused
3309  * @msqflg: access requested
3310  *
3311  * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3312  */
3313 static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3314 				  int msqflg)
3315 {
3316 	int may;
3317 
3318 	may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3319 	return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3320 }
3321 
3322 /**
3323  * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3324  * @msq: the object
3325  * @msg: unused
3326  * @target: unused
3327  * @type: unused
3328  * @mode: unused
3329  *
3330  * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3331  */
3332 static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3333 			struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
3334 {
3335 	return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
3336 }
3337 
3338 /**
3339  * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
3340  * @ipp: the object permissions
3341  * @flag: access requested
3342  *
3343  * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3344  */
3345 static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
3346 {
3347 	struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3348 	int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
3349 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
3350 	int rc;
3351 
3352 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3353 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3354 	ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
3355 #endif
3356 	rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
3357 	rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
3358 	return rc;
3359 }
3360 
3361 /**
3362  * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
3363  * @ipp: the object permissions
3364  * @secid: where result will be saved
3365  */
3366 static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
3367 {
3368 	struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3369 
3370 	*secid = iskp->smk_secid;
3371 }
3372 
3373 /**
3374  * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
3375  * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
3376  * @inode: the object
3377  *
3378  * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
3379  */
3380 static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
3381 {
3382 	struct super_block *sbp;
3383 	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
3384 	struct inode_smack *isp;
3385 	struct smack_known *skp;
3386 	struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
3387 	struct smack_known *final;
3388 	char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
3389 	int transflag = 0;
3390 	int rc;
3391 	struct dentry *dp;
3392 
3393 	if (inode == NULL)
3394 		return;
3395 
3396 	isp = inode->i_security;
3397 
3398 	mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
3399 	/*
3400 	 * If the inode is already instantiated
3401 	 * take the quick way out
3402 	 */
3403 	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
3404 		goto unlockandout;
3405 
3406 	sbp = inode->i_sb;
3407 	sbsp = sbp->s_security;
3408 	/*
3409 	 * We're going to use the superblock default label
3410 	 * if there's no label on the file.
3411 	 */
3412 	final = sbsp->smk_default;
3413 
3414 	/*
3415 	 * If this is the root inode the superblock
3416 	 * may be in the process of initialization.
3417 	 * If that is the case use the root value out
3418 	 * of the superblock.
3419 	 */
3420 	if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
3421 		switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3422 		case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3423 			/*
3424 			 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
3425 			 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
3426 			 * options.
3427 			 */
3428 			sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
3429 			sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
3430 			isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3431 			break;
3432 		case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3433 			/*
3434 			 * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
3435 			 * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
3436 			 */
3437 			isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3438 			break;
3439 		case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
3440 			isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3441 			break;
3442 		default:
3443 			isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3444 			break;
3445 		}
3446 		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
3447 		goto unlockandout;
3448 	}
3449 
3450 	/*
3451 	 * This is pretty hackish.
3452 	 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
3453 	 * file system specific code, but it does help
3454 	 * with keeping it simple.
3455 	 */
3456 	switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3457 	case SMACK_MAGIC:
3458 	case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
3459 	case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
3460 	case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3461 		/*
3462 		 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
3463 		 * that the smack file system doesn't do
3464 		 * extended attributes.
3465 		 *
3466 		 * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
3467 		 *
3468 		 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
3469 		 * structures associated with the task involved.
3470 		 *
3471 		 * Cgroupfs is special
3472 		 */
3473 		final = &smack_known_star;
3474 		break;
3475 	case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
3476 		/*
3477 		 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
3478 		 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
3479 		 * pty with respect.
3480 		 */
3481 		final = ckp;
3482 		break;
3483 	case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
3484 		/*
3485 		 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
3486 		 * The superblock default suffices.
3487 		 */
3488 		break;
3489 	case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3490 		/*
3491 		 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
3492 		 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
3493 		 * getting recreated on every reboot.
3494 		 */
3495 		final = &smack_known_star;
3496 		/*
3497 		 * No break.
3498 		 *
3499 		 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
3500 		 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
3501 		 * to set mount options simulate setting the
3502 		 * superblock default.
3503 		 */
3504 	default:
3505 		/*
3506 		 * This isn't an understood special case.
3507 		 * Get the value from the xattr.
3508 		 */
3509 
3510 		/*
3511 		 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
3512 		 */
3513 		if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
3514 			final = &smack_known_star;
3515 			break;
3516 		}
3517 		/*
3518 		 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
3519 		 * Use the aforeapplied default.
3520 		 * It would be curious if the label of the task
3521 		 * does not match that assigned.
3522 		 */
3523 		if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
3524 		        break;
3525 		/*
3526 		 * Get the dentry for xattr.
3527 		 */
3528 		dp = dget(opt_dentry);
3529 		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
3530 		if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
3531 			final = skp;
3532 
3533 		/*
3534 		 * Transmuting directory
3535 		 */
3536 		if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
3537 			/*
3538 			 * If this is a new directory and the label was
3539 			 * transmuted when the inode was initialized
3540 			 * set the transmute attribute on the directory
3541 			 * and mark the inode.
3542 			 *
3543 			 * If there is a transmute attribute on the
3544 			 * directory mark the inode.
3545 			 */
3546 			if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
3547 				isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
3548 				rc = __vfs_setxattr(dp, inode,
3549 					XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
3550 					TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
3551 					0);
3552 			} else {
3553 				rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode,
3554 					XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
3555 					TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
3556 				if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
3557 						       TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
3558 					rc = -EINVAL;
3559 			}
3560 			if (rc >= 0)
3561 				transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
3562 		}
3563 		/*
3564 		 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
3565 		 */
3566 		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
3567 		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3568 		    skp == &smack_known_web)
3569 			skp = NULL;
3570 		isp->smk_task = skp;
3571 
3572 		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
3573 		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3574 		    skp == &smack_known_web)
3575 			skp = NULL;
3576 		isp->smk_mmap = skp;
3577 
3578 		dput(dp);
3579 		break;
3580 	}
3581 
3582 	if (final == NULL)
3583 		isp->smk_inode = ckp;
3584 	else
3585 		isp->smk_inode = final;
3586 
3587 	isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
3588 
3589 unlockandout:
3590 	mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
3591 	return;
3592 }
3593 
3594 /**
3595  * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
3596  * @p: the object task
3597  * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3598  * @value: where to put the result
3599  *
3600  * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
3601  *
3602  * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3603  */
3604 static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
3605 {
3606 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
3607 	char *cp;
3608 	int slen;
3609 
3610 	if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3611 		return -EINVAL;
3612 
3613 	cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3614 	if (cp == NULL)
3615 		return -ENOMEM;
3616 
3617 	slen = strlen(cp);
3618 	*value = cp;
3619 	return slen;
3620 }
3621 
3622 /**
3623  * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
3624  * @p: the object task
3625  * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3626  * @value: the value to set
3627  * @size: the size of the value
3628  *
3629  * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
3630  * is permitted and only with privilege
3631  *
3632  * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3633  */
3634 static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
3635 			     void *value, size_t size)
3636 {
3637 	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
3638 	struct cred *new;
3639 	struct smack_known *skp;
3640 	struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
3641 	int rc;
3642 
3643 	/*
3644 	 * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
3645 	 * and supports no sane use case.
3646 	 */
3647 	if (p != current)
3648 		return -EPERM;
3649 
3650 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
3651 		return -EPERM;
3652 
3653 	if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
3654 		return -EINVAL;
3655 
3656 	if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3657 		return -EINVAL;
3658 
3659 	skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
3660 	if (IS_ERR(skp))
3661 		return PTR_ERR(skp);
3662 
3663 	/*
3664 	 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
3665 	 */
3666 	if (skp == &smack_known_web)
3667 		return -EPERM;
3668 
3669 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3670 		rc = -EPERM;
3671 		list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list)
3672 			if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
3673 				rc = 0;
3674 				break;
3675 			}
3676 		if (rc)
3677 			return rc;
3678 	}
3679 
3680 	new = prepare_creds();
3681 	if (new == NULL)
3682 		return -ENOMEM;
3683 
3684 	tsp = new->security;
3685 	tsp->smk_task = skp;
3686 	/*
3687 	 * process can change its label only once
3688 	 */
3689 	smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
3690 
3691 	commit_creds(new);
3692 	return size;
3693 }
3694 
3695 /**
3696  * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
3697  * @sock: one sock
3698  * @other: the other sock
3699  * @newsk: unused
3700  *
3701  * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3702  * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3703  */
3704 static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
3705 				     struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
3706 {
3707 	struct smack_known *skp;
3708 	struct smack_known *okp;
3709 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
3710 	struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
3711 	struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
3712 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
3713 	int rc = 0;
3714 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3715 	struct lsm_network_audit net;
3716 #endif
3717 
3718 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
3719 		skp = ssp->smk_out;
3720 		okp = osp->smk_in;
3721 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3722 		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3723 		smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
3724 #endif
3725 		rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3726 		rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3727 		if (rc == 0) {
3728 			okp = osp->smk_out;
3729 			skp = ssp->smk_in;
3730 			rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3731 			rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
3732 						MAY_WRITE, rc);
3733 		}
3734 	}
3735 
3736 	/*
3737 	 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
3738 	 */
3739 	if (rc == 0) {
3740 		nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
3741 		ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
3742 	}
3743 
3744 	return rc;
3745 }
3746 
3747 /**
3748  * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
3749  * @sock: one socket
3750  * @other: the other socket
3751  *
3752  * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3753  * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3754  */
3755 static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
3756 {
3757 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3758 	struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
3759 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
3760 	int rc;
3761 
3762 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3763 	struct lsm_network_audit net;
3764 
3765 	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3766 	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
3767 #endif
3768 
3769 	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
3770 		return 0;
3771 
3772 	rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3773 	rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3774 	return rc;
3775 }
3776 
3777 /**
3778  * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
3779  * @sock: the socket
3780  * @msg: the message
3781  * @size: the size of the message
3782  *
3783  * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
3784  * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
3785  * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
3786  */
3787 static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3788 				int size)
3789 {
3790 	struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
3791 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3792 	struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
3793 #endif
3794 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3795 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3796 	struct smack_known *rsp;
3797 #endif
3798 	int rc = 0;
3799 
3800 	/*
3801 	 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
3802 	 */
3803 	if (sip == NULL)
3804 		return 0;
3805 
3806 	switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
3807 	case AF_INET:
3808 		rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
3809 		break;
3810 	case AF_INET6:
3811 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3812 		rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
3813 		if (rsp != NULL)
3814 			rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
3815 						SMK_CONNECTING);
3816 #endif
3817 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3818 		rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
3819 #endif
3820 		break;
3821 	}
3822 	return rc;
3823 }
3824 
3825 /**
3826  * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
3827  * @sap: netlabel secattr
3828  * @ssp: socket security information
3829  *
3830  * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
3831  */
3832 static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
3833 						struct socket_smack *ssp)
3834 {
3835 	struct smack_known *skp;
3836 	int found = 0;
3837 	int acat;
3838 	int kcat;
3839 
3840 	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
3841 		/*
3842 		 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
3843 		 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
3844 		 * behaving the way we expect it to.
3845 		 *
3846 		 * Look it up in the label table
3847 		 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3848 		 * for the packet fall back on the network
3849 		 * ambient value.
3850 		 */
3851 		rcu_read_lock();
3852 		list_for_each_entry(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
3853 			if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
3854 				continue;
3855 			/*
3856 			 * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
3857 			 */
3858 			if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
3859 				if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
3860 				     NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
3861 					found = 1;
3862 				break;
3863 			}
3864 			for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
3865 				acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
3866 							  acat + 1);
3867 				kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
3868 					skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
3869 					kcat + 1);
3870 				if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
3871 					break;
3872 			}
3873 			if (acat == kcat) {
3874 				found = 1;
3875 				break;
3876 			}
3877 		}
3878 		rcu_read_unlock();
3879 
3880 		if (found)
3881 			return skp;
3882 
3883 		if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
3884 			return &smack_known_web;
3885 		return &smack_known_star;
3886 	}
3887 	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
3888 		/*
3889 		 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
3890 		 */
3891 		skp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
3892 		/*
3893 		 * This has got to be a bug because it is
3894 		 * impossible to specify a fallback without
3895 		 * specifying the label, which will ensure
3896 		 * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
3897 		 * secid is from a fallback.
3898 		 */
3899 		BUG_ON(skp == NULL);
3900 		return skp;
3901 	}
3902 	/*
3903 	 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3904 	 * for the packet fall back on the network
3905 	 * ambient value.
3906 	 */
3907 	return smack_net_ambient;
3908 }
3909 
3910 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3911 static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
3912 {
3913 	u8 nexthdr;
3914 	int offset;
3915 	int proto = -EINVAL;
3916 	struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
3917 	struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
3918 	__be16 frag_off;
3919 	struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3920 	struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3921 	struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3922 
3923 	sip->sin6_port = 0;
3924 
3925 	offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3926 	ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3927 	if (ip6 == NULL)
3928 		return -EINVAL;
3929 	sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
3930 
3931 	nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3932 	offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3933 	offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3934 	if (offset < 0)
3935 		return -EINVAL;
3936 
3937 	proto = nexthdr;
3938 	switch (proto) {
3939 	case IPPROTO_TCP:
3940 		th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3941 		if (th != NULL)
3942 			sip->sin6_port = th->source;
3943 		break;
3944 	case IPPROTO_UDP:
3945 		uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3946 		if (uh != NULL)
3947 			sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
3948 		break;
3949 	case IPPROTO_DCCP:
3950 		dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3951 		if (dh != NULL)
3952 			sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
3953 		break;
3954 	}
3955 	return proto;
3956 }
3957 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3958 
3959 /**
3960  * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
3961  * @sk: socket
3962  * @skb: packet
3963  *
3964  * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
3965  */
3966 static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3967 {
3968 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3969 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3970 	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
3971 	int rc = 0;
3972 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
3973 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3974 	struct lsm_network_audit net;
3975 #endif
3976 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3977 	struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
3978 	int proto;
3979 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3980 
3981 	switch (sk->sk_family) {
3982 	case PF_INET:
3983 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
3984 		/*
3985 		 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
3986 		 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
3987 		 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
3988 		 */
3989 		if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
3990 			skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
3991 			goto access_check;
3992 		}
3993 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
3994 		/*
3995 		 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
3996 		 */
3997 		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3998 
3999 		rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
4000 		if (rc == 0)
4001 			skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4002 		else
4003 			skp = smack_net_ambient;
4004 
4005 		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4006 
4007 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4008 access_check:
4009 #endif
4010 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4011 		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4012 		ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4013 		ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4014 		ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4015 #endif
4016 		/*
4017 		 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
4018 		 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
4019 		 * This is the simplist possible security model
4020 		 * for networking.
4021 		 */
4022 		rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4023 		rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4024 					MAY_WRITE, rc);
4025 		if (rc != 0)
4026 			netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, sk->sk_family, rc, 0);
4027 		break;
4028 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4029 	case PF_INET6:
4030 		proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
4031 		if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
4032 			break;
4033 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4034 		if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
4035 			skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4036 		else
4037 			skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
4038 		if (skp == NULL)
4039 			skp = smack_net_ambient;
4040 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4041 		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4042 		ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4043 		ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4044 		ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4045 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4046 		rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4047 		rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4048 					MAY_WRITE, rc);
4049 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
4050 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4051 		rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
4052 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
4053 		break;
4054 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4055 	}
4056 
4057 	return rc;
4058 }
4059 
4060 /**
4061  * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
4062  * @sock: the socket
4063  * @optval: user's destination
4064  * @optlen: size thereof
4065  * @len: max thereof
4066  *
4067  * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
4068  */
4069 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
4070 					  char __user *optval,
4071 					  int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4072 {
4073 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
4074 	char *rcp = "";
4075 	int slen = 1;
4076 	int rc = 0;
4077 
4078 	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4079 	if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
4080 		rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
4081 		slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
4082 	}
4083 
4084 	if (slen > len)
4085 		rc = -ERANGE;
4086 	else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
4087 		rc = -EFAULT;
4088 
4089 	if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
4090 		rc = -EFAULT;
4091 
4092 	return rc;
4093 }
4094 
4095 
4096 /**
4097  * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
4098  * @sock: the peer socket
4099  * @skb: packet data
4100  * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
4101  *
4102  * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
4103  */
4104 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
4105 					 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4106 
4107 {
4108 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4109 	struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
4110 	struct smack_known *skp;
4111 	int family = PF_UNSPEC;
4112 	u32 s = 0;	/* 0 is the invalid secid */
4113 	int rc;
4114 
4115 	if (skb != NULL) {
4116 		if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4117 			family = PF_INET;
4118 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4119 		else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4120 			family = PF_INET6;
4121 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4122 	}
4123 	if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
4124 		family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4125 
4126 	switch (family) {
4127 	case PF_UNIX:
4128 		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4129 		s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
4130 		break;
4131 	case PF_INET:
4132 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4133 		s = skb->secmark;
4134 		if (s != 0)
4135 			break;
4136 #endif
4137 		/*
4138 		 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
4139 		 */
4140 		if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
4141 			ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4142 		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4143 		rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4144 		if (rc == 0) {
4145 			skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4146 			s = skp->smk_secid;
4147 		}
4148 		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4149 		break;
4150 	case PF_INET6:
4151 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4152 		s = skb->secmark;
4153 #endif
4154 		break;
4155 	}
4156 	*secid = s;
4157 	if (s == 0)
4158 		return -EINVAL;
4159 	return 0;
4160 }
4161 
4162 /**
4163  * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
4164  * @sk: child sock
4165  * @parent: parent socket
4166  *
4167  * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
4168  * is creating the new socket.
4169  */
4170 static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4171 {
4172 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
4173 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
4174 
4175 	if (sk == NULL ||
4176 	    (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
4177 		return;
4178 
4179 	ssp = sk->sk_security;
4180 	ssp->smk_in = skp;
4181 	ssp->smk_out = skp;
4182 	/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
4183 }
4184 
4185 /**
4186  * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
4187  * @sk: socket involved
4188  * @skb: packet
4189  * @req: unused
4190  *
4191  * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
4192  * the socket, otherwise an error code
4193  */
4194 static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4195 				   struct request_sock *req)
4196 {
4197 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4198 	struct smack_known *skp;
4199 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4200 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4201 	struct sockaddr_in addr;
4202 	struct iphdr *hdr;
4203 	struct smack_known *hskp;
4204 	int rc;
4205 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
4206 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4207 	struct lsm_network_audit net;
4208 #endif
4209 
4210 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4211 	if (family == PF_INET6) {
4212 		/*
4213 		 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
4214 		 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
4215 		 * processing on IPv6.
4216 		 */
4217 		if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4218 			family = PF_INET;
4219 		else
4220 			return 0;
4221 	}
4222 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4223 
4224 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4225 	/*
4226 	 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4227 	 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4228 	 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4229 	 */
4230 	if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
4231 		skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4232 		goto access_check;
4233 	}
4234 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
4235 
4236 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4237 	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4238 	if (rc == 0)
4239 		skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4240 	else
4241 		skp = &smack_known_huh;
4242 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4243 
4244 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4245 access_check:
4246 #endif
4247 
4248 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4249 	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4250 	ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4251 	ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4252 	ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4253 #endif
4254 	/*
4255 	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
4256 	 * here. Read access is not required.
4257 	 */
4258 	rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4259 	rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4260 	if (rc != 0)
4261 		return rc;
4262 
4263 	/*
4264 	 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
4265 	 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
4266 	 */
4267 	req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
4268 
4269 	/*
4270 	 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
4271 	 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
4272 	 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
4273 	 */
4274 	hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
4275 	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
4276 	rcu_read_lock();
4277 	hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
4278 	rcu_read_unlock();
4279 
4280 	if (hskp == NULL)
4281 		rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
4282 	else
4283 		netlbl_req_delattr(req);
4284 
4285 	return rc;
4286 }
4287 
4288 /**
4289  * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
4290  * @sk: the new socket
4291  * @req: the connection's request_sock
4292  *
4293  * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
4294  */
4295 static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
4296 				 const struct request_sock *req)
4297 {
4298 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4299 	struct smack_known *skp;
4300 
4301 	if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
4302 		skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
4303 		ssp->smk_packet = skp;
4304 	} else
4305 		ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
4306 }
4307 
4308 /*
4309  * Key management security hooks
4310  *
4311  * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
4312  * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
4313  * If you care about keys please have a look.
4314  */
4315 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4316 
4317 /**
4318  * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
4319  * @key: object
4320  * @cred: the credentials to use
4321  * @flags: unused
4322  *
4323  * No allocation required
4324  *
4325  * Returns 0
4326  */
4327 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
4328 			   unsigned long flags)
4329 {
4330 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4331 
4332 	key->security = skp;
4333 	return 0;
4334 }
4335 
4336 /**
4337  * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
4338  * @key: the object
4339  *
4340  * Clear the blob pointer
4341  */
4342 static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
4343 {
4344 	key->security = NULL;
4345 }
4346 
4347 /**
4348  * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
4349  * @key_ref: gets to the object
4350  * @cred: the credentials to use
4351  * @perm: requested key permissions
4352  *
4353  * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
4354  * an error code otherwise
4355  */
4356 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4357 				const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
4358 {
4359 	struct key *keyp;
4360 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
4361 	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4362 	int request = 0;
4363 	int rc;
4364 
4365 	keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4366 	if (keyp == NULL)
4367 		return -EINVAL;
4368 	/*
4369 	 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4370 	 * it may do so.
4371 	 */
4372 	if (keyp->security == NULL)
4373 		return 0;
4374 	/*
4375 	 * This should not occur
4376 	 */
4377 	if (tkp == NULL)
4378 		return -EACCES;
4379 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4380 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4381 	ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
4382 	ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
4383 #endif
4384 	if (perm & KEY_NEED_READ)
4385 		request = MAY_READ;
4386 	if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
4387 		request = MAY_WRITE;
4388 	rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
4389 	rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
4390 	return rc;
4391 }
4392 
4393 /*
4394  * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
4395  * @key points to the key to be queried
4396  * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
4397  * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
4398  * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
4399  * an error.
4400  * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
4401  */
4402 static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
4403 {
4404 	struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
4405 	size_t length;
4406 	char *copy;
4407 
4408 	if (key->security == NULL) {
4409 		*_buffer = NULL;
4410 		return 0;
4411 	}
4412 
4413 	copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
4414 	if (copy == NULL)
4415 		return -ENOMEM;
4416 	length = strlen(copy) + 1;
4417 
4418 	*_buffer = copy;
4419 	return length;
4420 }
4421 
4422 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4423 
4424 /*
4425  * Smack Audit hooks
4426  *
4427  * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
4428  * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
4429  * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
4430  * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
4431  *
4432  * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
4433  * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
4434  * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
4435  * model where nearly everything is a label.
4436  */
4437 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4438 
4439 /**
4440  * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
4441  * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
4442  * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
4443  * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
4444  * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
4445  *
4446  * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
4447  * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
4448  */
4449 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
4450 {
4451 	struct smack_known *skp;
4452 	char **rule = (char **)vrule;
4453 	*rule = NULL;
4454 
4455 	if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4456 		return -EINVAL;
4457 
4458 	if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
4459 		return -EINVAL;
4460 
4461 	skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
4462 	if (IS_ERR(skp))
4463 		return PTR_ERR(skp);
4464 
4465 	*rule = skp->smk_known;
4466 
4467 	return 0;
4468 }
4469 
4470 /**
4471  * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
4472  * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
4473  *
4474  * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
4475  * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
4476  * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
4477  */
4478 static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
4479 {
4480 	struct audit_field *f;
4481 	int i;
4482 
4483 	for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
4484 		f = &krule->fields[i];
4485 
4486 		if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4487 			return 1;
4488 	}
4489 
4490 	return 0;
4491 }
4492 
4493 /**
4494  * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
4495  * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
4496  * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
4497  * @op: required testing operator
4498  * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
4499  * @actx: audit context associated with the check
4500  *
4501  * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
4502  * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
4503  */
4504 static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
4505 				  struct audit_context *actx)
4506 {
4507 	struct smack_known *skp;
4508 	char *rule = vrule;
4509 
4510 	if (unlikely(!rule)) {
4511 		WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
4512 		return -ENOENT;
4513 	}
4514 
4515 	if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4516 		return 0;
4517 
4518 	skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4519 
4520 	/*
4521 	 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
4522 	 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
4523 	 * label.
4524 	 */
4525 	if (op == Audit_equal)
4526 		return (rule == skp->smk_known);
4527 	if (op == Audit_not_equal)
4528 		return (rule != skp->smk_known);
4529 
4530 	return 0;
4531 }
4532 
4533 /*
4534  * There is no need for a smack_audit_rule_free hook.
4535  * No memory was allocated.
4536  */
4537 
4538 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4539 
4540 /**
4541  * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
4542  * @name: Full xattr name to check.
4543  */
4544 static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
4545 {
4546 	return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
4547 }
4548 
4549 
4550 /**
4551  * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
4552  * @secid: incoming integer
4553  * @secdata: destination
4554  * @seclen: how long it is
4555  *
4556  * Exists for networking code.
4557  */
4558 static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4559 {
4560 	struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4561 
4562 	if (secdata)
4563 		*secdata = skp->smk_known;
4564 	*seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4565 	return 0;
4566 }
4567 
4568 /**
4569  * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
4570  * @secdata: smack label
4571  * @seclen: how long result is
4572  * @secid: outgoing integer
4573  *
4574  * Exists for audit and networking code.
4575  */
4576 static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
4577 {
4578 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
4579 
4580 	if (skp)
4581 		*secid = skp->smk_secid;
4582 	else
4583 		*secid = 0;
4584 	return 0;
4585 }
4586 
4587 /*
4588  * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
4589  * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
4590  * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
4591  */
4592 
4593 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4594 {
4595 	return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4596 }
4597 
4598 static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4599 {
4600 	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4601 }
4602 
4603 static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
4604 {
4605 	int len = 0;
4606 	len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
4607 
4608 	if (len < 0)
4609 		return len;
4610 	*ctxlen = len;
4611 	return 0;
4612 }
4613 
4614 static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
4615 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
4616 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
4617 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
4618 
4619 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
4620 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
4621 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
4622 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
4623 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
4624 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
4625 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, smack_parse_opts_str),
4626 
4627 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
4628 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds),
4629 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, smack_bprm_secureexec),
4630 
4631 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
4632 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
4633 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
4634 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
4635 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
4636 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
4637 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
4638 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
4639 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
4640 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
4641 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
4642 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
4643 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
4644 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
4645 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
4646 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
4647 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
4648 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
4649 
4650 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
4651 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security),
4652 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
4653 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
4654 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
4655 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
4656 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
4657 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
4658 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
4659 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
4660 
4661 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
4662 
4663 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
4664 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
4665 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
4666 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
4667 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
4668 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
4669 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
4670 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
4671 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
4672 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
4673 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
4674 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
4675 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
4676 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
4677 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
4678 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
4679 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
4680 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait),
4681 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
4682 
4683 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
4684 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
4685 
4686 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
4687 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, smack_msg_msg_free_security),
4688 
4689 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_msg_queue_alloc_security),
4690 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, smack_msg_queue_free_security),
4691 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
4692 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
4693 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
4694 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
4695 
4696 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_shm_alloc_security),
4697 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, smack_shm_free_security),
4698 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
4699 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
4700 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
4701 
4702 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security),
4703 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, smack_sem_free_security),
4704 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
4705 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
4706 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
4707 
4708 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
4709 
4710 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
4711 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
4712 
4713 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
4714 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
4715 
4716 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
4717 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4718 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
4719 #endif
4720 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
4721 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
4722 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
4723 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
4724 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
4725 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
4726 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
4727 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
4728 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
4729 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
4730 
4731  /* key management security hooks */
4732 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4733 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
4734 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
4735 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
4736 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
4737 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4738 
4739  /* Audit hooks */
4740 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4741 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
4742 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
4743 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
4744 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4745 
4746 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
4747 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
4748 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
4749 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
4750 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
4751 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
4752 };
4753 
4754 
4755 static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
4756 {
4757 	/*
4758 	 * Initialize rule list locks
4759 	 */
4760 	mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
4761 	mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
4762 	mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
4763 	mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
4764 	mutex_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules_lock);
4765 	mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
4766 	/*
4767 	 * Initialize rule lists
4768 	 */
4769 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
4770 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
4771 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
4772 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
4773 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules);
4774 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
4775 	/*
4776 	 * Create the known labels list
4777 	 */
4778 	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
4779 	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
4780 	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
4781 	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
4782 	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_invalid);
4783 	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
4784 }
4785 
4786 /**
4787  * smack_init - initialize the smack system
4788  *
4789  * Returns 0
4790  */
4791 static __init int smack_init(void)
4792 {
4793 	struct cred *cred;
4794 	struct task_smack *tsp;
4795 
4796 	if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
4797 		return 0;
4798 
4799 	smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
4800 	if (!smack_inode_cache)
4801 		return -ENOMEM;
4802 
4803 	tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
4804 				GFP_KERNEL);
4805 	if (tsp == NULL) {
4806 		kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache);
4807 		return -ENOMEM;
4808 	}
4809 
4810 	smack_enabled = 1;
4811 
4812 	pr_info("Smack:  Initializing.\n");
4813 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4814 	pr_info("Smack:  Netfilter enabled.\n");
4815 #endif
4816 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4817 	pr_info("Smack:  IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
4818 #endif
4819 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4820 	pr_info("Smack:  IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
4821 #endif
4822 
4823 	/*
4824 	 * Set the security state for the initial task.
4825 	 */
4826 	cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
4827 	cred->security = tsp;
4828 
4829 	/* initialize the smack_known_list */
4830 	init_smack_known_list();
4831 
4832 	/*
4833 	 * Register with LSM
4834 	 */
4835 	security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks));
4836 
4837 	return 0;
4838 }
4839 
4840 /*
4841  * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
4842  * all processes and objects when they are created.
4843  */
4844 security_initcall(smack_init);
4845