1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later 2 /* 3 * Security plug functions 4 * 5 * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com> 6 * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> 7 * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com> 8 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies 9 * Copyright (C) 2023 Microsoft Corporation <paul@paul-moore.com> 10 */ 11 12 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt 13 14 #include <linux/bpf.h> 15 #include <linux/capability.h> 16 #include <linux/dcache.h> 17 #include <linux/export.h> 18 #include <linux/init.h> 19 #include <linux/kernel.h> 20 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> 21 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> 22 #include <linux/integrity.h> 23 #include <linux/ima.h> 24 #include <linux/evm.h> 25 #include <linux/fsnotify.h> 26 #include <linux/mman.h> 27 #include <linux/mount.h> 28 #include <linux/personality.h> 29 #include <linux/backing-dev.h> 30 #include <linux/string.h> 31 #include <linux/msg.h> 32 #include <net/flow.h> 33 34 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 35 36 /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ 37 #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) 38 39 /* 40 * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the 41 * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows 42 * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing 43 * purposes. 44 */ 45 const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { 46 [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", 47 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", 48 [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", 49 [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access", 50 [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", 51 [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", 52 [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", 53 [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", 54 [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", 55 [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", 56 [LOCKDOWN_DEVICE_TREE] = "modifying device tree contents", 57 [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage", 58 [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO", 59 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters", 60 [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio", 61 [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access", 62 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access", 63 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM", 64 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM", 65 [LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection", 66 [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", 67 [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", 68 [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", 69 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", 70 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM", 71 [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", 72 [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", 73 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access", 74 [LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret", 75 [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", 76 }; 77 78 struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init; 79 static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain); 80 81 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; 82 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; 83 84 char *lsm_names; 85 static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init; 86 87 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ 88 static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; 89 static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm; 90 91 static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM; 92 93 /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ 94 static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms; 95 static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive; 96 97 static __initdata bool debug; 98 #define init_debug(...) \ 99 do { \ 100 if (debug) \ 101 pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \ 102 } while (0) 103 104 static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm) 105 { 106 if (!lsm->enabled) 107 return false; 108 109 return *lsm->enabled; 110 } 111 112 /* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */ 113 static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1; 114 static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0; 115 static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled) 116 { 117 /* 118 * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use 119 * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state. 120 */ 121 if (!lsm->enabled) { 122 if (enabled) 123 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 124 else 125 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 126 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) { 127 if (!enabled) 128 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 129 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) { 130 if (enabled) 131 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 132 } else { 133 *lsm->enabled = enabled; 134 } 135 } 136 137 /* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */ 138 static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 139 { 140 struct lsm_info **check; 141 142 for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++) 143 if (*check == lsm) 144 return true; 145 146 return false; 147 } 148 149 /* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */ 150 static int last_lsm __initdata; 151 static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from) 152 { 153 /* Ignore duplicate selections. */ 154 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 155 return; 156 157 if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from)) 158 return; 159 160 /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */ 161 if (!lsm->enabled) 162 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 163 ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm; 164 165 init_debug("%s ordered: %s (%s)\n", from, lsm->name, 166 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 167 } 168 169 /* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */ 170 static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm) 171 { 172 /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */ 173 if (!is_enabled(lsm)) 174 return false; 175 176 /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */ 177 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) { 178 init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name); 179 return false; 180 } 181 182 return true; 183 } 184 185 static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs) 186 { 187 int offset; 188 189 if (*need <= 0) 190 return; 191 192 offset = ALIGN(*lbs, sizeof(void *)); 193 *lbs = offset + *need; 194 *need = offset; 195 } 196 197 static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) 198 { 199 if (!needed) 200 return; 201 202 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 203 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file); 204 /* 205 * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to 206 * what the modules might need. 207 */ 208 if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0) 209 blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head); 210 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 211 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 212 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 213 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 214 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); 215 } 216 217 /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ 218 static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 219 { 220 int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm); 221 222 /* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */ 223 set_enabled(lsm, enabled); 224 225 /* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */ 226 if (enabled) { 227 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) { 228 exclusive = lsm; 229 init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name); 230 } 231 232 lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs); 233 } 234 } 235 236 /* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */ 237 static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 238 { 239 if (is_enabled(lsm)) { 240 int ret; 241 242 init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name); 243 ret = lsm->init(); 244 WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret); 245 } 246 } 247 248 /* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */ 249 static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) 250 { 251 struct lsm_info *lsm; 252 char *sep, *name, *next; 253 254 /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */ 255 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 256 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST) 257 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " first"); 258 } 259 260 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 261 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 262 struct lsm_info *major; 263 264 /* 265 * To match the original "security=" behavior, this 266 * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major 267 * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable 268 * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs. 269 */ 270 for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info; 271 major++) { 272 if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) && 273 strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) { 274 set_enabled(major, false); 275 init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s (only one legacy major LSM)\n", 276 chosen_major_lsm, major->name); 277 } 278 } 279 } 280 281 sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL); 282 next = sep; 283 /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */ 284 while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) { 285 bool found = false; 286 287 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 288 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE && 289 strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) { 290 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin); 291 found = true; 292 } 293 } 294 295 if (!found) 296 init_debug("%s ignored: %s (not built into kernel)\n", 297 origin, name); 298 } 299 300 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 301 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 302 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 303 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 304 continue; 305 if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0) 306 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security="); 307 } 308 } 309 310 /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */ 311 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 312 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 313 continue; 314 set_enabled(lsm, false); 315 init_debug("%s skipped: %s (not in requested order)\n", 316 origin, lsm->name); 317 } 318 319 kfree(sep); 320 } 321 322 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred); 323 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task); 324 325 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result); 326 327 static void __init report_lsm_order(void) 328 { 329 struct lsm_info **lsm, *early; 330 int first = 0; 331 332 pr_info("initializing lsm="); 333 334 /* Report each enabled LSM name, comma separated. */ 335 for (early = __start_early_lsm_info; early < __end_early_lsm_info; early++) 336 if (is_enabled(early)) 337 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", early->name); 338 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 339 if (is_enabled(*lsm)) 340 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", (*lsm)->name); 341 342 pr_cont("\n"); 343 } 344 345 static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) 346 { 347 struct lsm_info **lsm; 348 349 ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms), 350 GFP_KERNEL); 351 352 if (chosen_lsm_order) { 353 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 354 pr_warn("security=%s is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=%s\n", 355 chosen_major_lsm, chosen_lsm_order); 356 chosen_major_lsm = NULL; 357 } 358 ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline"); 359 } else 360 ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin"); 361 362 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 363 prepare_lsm(*lsm); 364 365 report_lsm_order(); 366 367 init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 368 init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file); 369 init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 370 init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 371 init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 372 init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 373 init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); 374 375 /* 376 * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs 377 */ 378 if (blob_sizes.lbs_file) 379 lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache", 380 blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0, 381 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 382 if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode) 383 lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache", 384 blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0, 385 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 386 387 lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred); 388 lsm_early_task(current); 389 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 390 initialize_lsm(*lsm); 391 392 kfree(ordered_lsms); 393 } 394 395 int __init early_security_init(void) 396 { 397 struct lsm_info *lsm; 398 399 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 400 INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&security_hook_heads.NAME); 401 #include "linux/lsm_hook_defs.h" 402 #undef LSM_HOOK 403 404 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 405 if (!lsm->enabled) 406 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 407 prepare_lsm(lsm); 408 initialize_lsm(lsm); 409 } 410 411 return 0; 412 } 413 414 /** 415 * security_init - initializes the security framework 416 * 417 * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence. 418 */ 419 int __init security_init(void) 420 { 421 struct lsm_info *lsm; 422 423 init_debug("legacy security=%s\n", chosen_major_lsm ?: " *unspecified*"); 424 init_debug(" CONFIG_LSM=%s\n", builtin_lsm_order); 425 init_debug("boot arg lsm=%s\n", chosen_lsm_order ?: " *unspecified*"); 426 427 /* 428 * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is 429 * available 430 */ 431 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 432 init_debug(" early started: %s (%s)\n", lsm->name, 433 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 434 if (lsm->enabled) 435 lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names); 436 } 437 438 /* Load LSMs in specified order. */ 439 ordered_lsm_init(); 440 441 return 0; 442 } 443 444 /* Save user chosen LSM */ 445 static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str) 446 { 447 chosen_major_lsm = str; 448 return 1; 449 } 450 __setup("security=", choose_major_lsm); 451 452 /* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */ 453 static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str) 454 { 455 chosen_lsm_order = str; 456 return 1; 457 } 458 __setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order); 459 460 /* Enable LSM order debugging. */ 461 static int __init enable_debug(char *str) 462 { 463 debug = true; 464 return 1; 465 } 466 __setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug); 467 468 static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm) 469 { 470 const char *last; 471 472 if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm)) 473 return false; 474 last = strrchr(list, ','); 475 if (last) 476 /* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */ 477 last++; 478 else 479 last = list; 480 return !strcmp(last, lsm); 481 } 482 483 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) 484 { 485 char *cp; 486 487 if (*result == NULL) { 488 *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL); 489 if (*result == NULL) 490 return -ENOMEM; 491 } else { 492 /* Check if it is the last registered name */ 493 if (match_last_lsm(*result, new)) 494 return 0; 495 cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new); 496 if (cp == NULL) 497 return -ENOMEM; 498 kfree(*result); 499 *result = cp; 500 } 501 return 0; 502 } 503 504 /** 505 * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. 506 * @hooks: the hooks to add 507 * @count: the number of hooks to add 508 * @lsm: the name of the security module 509 * 510 * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. 511 */ 512 void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, 513 const char *lsm) 514 { 515 int i; 516 517 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { 518 hooks[i].lsm = lsm; 519 hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); 520 } 521 522 /* 523 * Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back 524 * and fix this up afterwards. 525 */ 526 if (slab_is_available()) { 527 if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0) 528 panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__); 529 } 530 } 531 532 int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) 533 { 534 return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 535 event, data); 536 } 537 EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier); 538 539 int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 540 { 541 return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 542 nb); 543 } 544 EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier); 545 546 int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 547 { 548 return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 549 nb); 550 } 551 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier); 552 553 /** 554 * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob 555 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 556 * @gfp: allocation type 557 * 558 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 559 * 560 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 561 */ 562 static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 563 { 564 if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) { 565 cred->security = NULL; 566 return 0; 567 } 568 569 cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp); 570 if (cred->security == NULL) 571 return -ENOMEM; 572 return 0; 573 } 574 575 /** 576 * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob 577 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 578 * 579 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 580 */ 581 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred) 582 { 583 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL); 584 585 if (rc) 586 panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__); 587 } 588 589 /** 590 * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob 591 * @file: the file that needs a blob 592 * 593 * Allocate the file blob for all the modules 594 * 595 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 596 */ 597 static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file) 598 { 599 if (!lsm_file_cache) { 600 file->f_security = NULL; 601 return 0; 602 } 603 604 file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL); 605 if (file->f_security == NULL) 606 return -ENOMEM; 607 return 0; 608 } 609 610 /** 611 * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob 612 * @inode: the inode that needs a blob 613 * 614 * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules 615 * 616 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 617 */ 618 int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 619 { 620 if (!lsm_inode_cache) { 621 inode->i_security = NULL; 622 return 0; 623 } 624 625 inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); 626 if (inode->i_security == NULL) 627 return -ENOMEM; 628 return 0; 629 } 630 631 /** 632 * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob 633 * @task: the task that needs a blob 634 * 635 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 636 * 637 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 638 */ 639 static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) 640 { 641 if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) { 642 task->security = NULL; 643 return 0; 644 } 645 646 task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL); 647 if (task->security == NULL) 648 return -ENOMEM; 649 return 0; 650 } 651 652 /** 653 * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob 654 * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob 655 * 656 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 657 * 658 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 659 */ 660 static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip) 661 { 662 if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) { 663 kip->security = NULL; 664 return 0; 665 } 666 667 kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL); 668 if (kip->security == NULL) 669 return -ENOMEM; 670 return 0; 671 } 672 673 /** 674 * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob 675 * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob 676 * 677 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 678 * 679 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 680 */ 681 static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp) 682 { 683 if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) { 684 mp->security = NULL; 685 return 0; 686 } 687 688 mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL); 689 if (mp->security == NULL) 690 return -ENOMEM; 691 return 0; 692 } 693 694 /** 695 * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob 696 * @task: the task that needs a blob 697 * 698 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 699 */ 700 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) 701 { 702 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 703 704 if (rc) 705 panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__); 706 } 707 708 /** 709 * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob 710 * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob 711 * 712 * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules 713 * 714 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 715 */ 716 static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 717 { 718 if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) { 719 sb->s_security = NULL; 720 return 0; 721 } 722 723 sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL); 724 if (sb->s_security == NULL) 725 return -ENOMEM; 726 return 0; 727 } 728 729 /* 730 * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and 731 * can be accessed with: 732 * 733 * LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) 734 * 735 * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each 736 * LSM hook. 737 */ 738 #define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default) 739 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME) 740 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \ 741 static const int __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT); 742 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 743 DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME) 744 745 #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h> 746 #undef LSM_HOOK 747 748 /* 749 * Hook list operation macros. 750 * 751 * call_void_hook: 752 * This is a hook that does not return a value. 753 * 754 * call_int_hook: 755 * This is a hook that returns a value. 756 */ 757 758 #define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \ 759 do { \ 760 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 761 \ 762 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \ 763 P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 764 } while (0) 765 766 #define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \ 767 int RC = IRC; \ 768 do { \ 769 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 770 \ 771 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ 772 RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 773 if (RC != 0) \ 774 break; \ 775 } \ 776 } while (0); \ 777 RC; \ 778 }) 779 780 /* Security operations */ 781 782 /** 783 * security_binder_set_context_mgr() - Check if becoming binder ctx mgr is ok 784 * @mgr: task credentials of current binder process 785 * 786 * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager. 787 * 788 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 789 */ 790 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr) 791 { 792 return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr); 793 } 794 795 /** 796 * security_binder_transaction() - Check if a binder transaction is allowed 797 * @from: sending process 798 * @to: receiving process 799 * 800 * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call to @to. 801 * 802 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 803 */ 804 int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from, 805 const struct cred *to) 806 { 807 return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to); 808 } 809 810 /** 811 * security_binder_transfer_binder() - Check if a binder transfer is allowed 812 * @from: sending process 813 * @to: receiving process 814 * 815 * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to. 816 * 817 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 818 */ 819 int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, 820 const struct cred *to) 821 { 822 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to); 823 } 824 825 /** 826 * security_binder_transfer_file() - Check if a binder file xfer is allowed 827 * @from: sending process 828 * @to: receiving process 829 * @file: file being transferred 830 * 831 * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to. 832 * 833 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 834 */ 835 int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, 836 const struct cred *to, struct file *file) 837 { 838 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file); 839 } 840 841 /** 842 * security_ptrace_access_check() - Check if tracing is allowed 843 * @child: target process 844 * @mode: PTRACE_MODE flags 845 * 846 * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the @child 847 * process. Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check 848 * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of tracing check 849 * during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of binprm_security_ops if the 850 * process is being traced and its security attributes would be changed by the 851 * execve. 852 * 853 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 854 */ 855 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) 856 { 857 return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode); 858 } 859 860 /** 861 * security_ptrace_traceme() - Check if tracing is allowed 862 * @parent: tracing process 863 * 864 * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the 865 * current process before allowing the current process to present itself to the 866 * @parent process for tracing. 867 * 868 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 869 */ 870 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) 871 { 872 return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent); 873 } 874 875 /** 876 * security_capget() - Get the capability sets for a process 877 * @target: target process 878 * @effective: effective capability set 879 * @inheritable: inheritable capability set 880 * @permitted: permitted capability set 881 * 882 * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the 883 * @target process. The hook may also perform permission checking to determine 884 * if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets of the @target 885 * process. 886 * 887 * Return: Returns 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained. 888 */ 889 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, 890 kernel_cap_t *effective, 891 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 892 kernel_cap_t *permitted) 893 { 894 return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target, 895 effective, inheritable, permitted); 896 } 897 898 /** 899 * security_capset() - Set the capability sets for a process 900 * @new: new credentials for the target process 901 * @old: current credentials of the target process 902 * @effective: effective capability set 903 * @inheritable: inheritable capability set 904 * @permitted: permitted capability set 905 * 906 * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the 907 * current process. 908 * 909 * Return: Returns 0 and update @new if permission is granted. 910 */ 911 int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 912 const kernel_cap_t *effective, 913 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 914 const kernel_cap_t *permitted) 915 { 916 return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old, 917 effective, inheritable, permitted); 918 } 919 920 /** 921 * security_capable() - Check if a process has the necessary capability 922 * @cred: credentials to examine 923 * @ns: user namespace 924 * @cap: capability requested 925 * @opts: capability check options 926 * 927 * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated 928 * credentials. @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. 929 * @opts contains options for the capable check <include/linux/security.h>. 930 * 931 * Return: Returns 0 if the capability is granted. 932 */ 933 int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, 934 struct user_namespace *ns, 935 int cap, 936 unsigned int opts) 937 { 938 return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); 939 } 940 941 /** 942 * security_quotactl() - Check if a quotactl() syscall is allowed for this fs 943 * @cmds: commands 944 * @type: type 945 * @id: id 946 * @sb: filesystem 947 * 948 * Check whether the quotactl syscall is allowed for this @sb. 949 * 950 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 951 */ 952 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) 953 { 954 return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb); 955 } 956 957 /** 958 * security_quota_on() - Check if QUOTAON is allowed for a dentry 959 * @dentry: dentry 960 * 961 * Check whether QUOTAON is allowed for @dentry. 962 * 963 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 964 */ 965 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) 966 { 967 return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry); 968 } 969 970 /** 971 * security_syslog() - Check if accessing the kernel message ring is allowed 972 * @type: SYSLOG_ACTION_* type 973 * 974 * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing 975 * logging to the console. See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of 976 * the @type values. 977 * 978 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 979 */ 980 int security_syslog(int type) 981 { 982 return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type); 983 } 984 985 /** 986 * security_settime64() - Check if changing the system time is allowed 987 * @ts: new time 988 * @tz: timezone 989 * 990 * Check permission to change the system time, struct timespec64 is defined in 991 * <include/linux/time64.h> and timezone is defined in <include/linux/time.h>. 992 * 993 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 994 */ 995 int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz) 996 { 997 return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz); 998 } 999 1000 /** 1001 * security_vm_enough_memory_mm() - Check if allocating a new mem map is allowed 1002 * @mm: mm struct 1003 * @pages: number of pages 1004 * 1005 * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping. If all LSMs return 1006 * a positive value, __vm_enough_memory() will be called with cap_sys_admin 1007 * set. If at least one LSM returns 0 or negative, __vm_enough_memory() will be 1008 * called with cap_sys_admin cleared. 1009 * 1010 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted by the LSM infrastructure to the 1011 * caller. 1012 */ 1013 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) 1014 { 1015 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1016 int cap_sys_admin = 1; 1017 int rc; 1018 1019 /* 1020 * The module will respond with a positive value if 1021 * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be 1022 * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules 1023 * agree that it should be set it will. If any module 1024 * thinks it should not be set it won't. 1025 */ 1026 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) { 1027 rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); 1028 if (rc <= 0) { 1029 cap_sys_admin = 0; 1030 break; 1031 } 1032 } 1033 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); 1034 } 1035 1036 /** 1037 * security_bprm_creds_for_exec() - Prepare the credentials for exec() 1038 * @bprm: binary program information 1039 * 1040 * If the setup in prepare_exec_creds did not setup @bprm->cred->security 1041 * properly for executing @bprm->file, update the LSM's portion of 1042 * @bprm->cred->security to be what commit_creds needs to install for the new 1043 * program. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 1044 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 1045 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. @bprm 1046 * contains the linux_binprm structure. 1047 * 1048 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1049 */ 1050 int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1051 { 1052 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm); 1053 } 1054 1055 /** 1056 * security_bprm_creds_from_file() - Update linux_binprm creds based on file 1057 * @bprm: binary program information 1058 * @file: associated file 1059 * 1060 * If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change privilege upon 1061 * exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change. This is called after 1062 * finding the binary that will be executed without an interpreter. This 1063 * ensures that the credentials will not be derived from a script that the 1064 * binary will need to reopen, which when reopend may end up being a completely 1065 * different file. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 1066 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 1067 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. The 1068 * hook must add to @bprm->per_clear any personality flags that should be 1069 * cleared from current->personality. @bprm contains the linux_binprm 1070 * structure. 1071 * 1072 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1073 */ 1074 int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) 1075 { 1076 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file); 1077 } 1078 1079 /** 1080 * security_bprm_check() - Mediate binary handler search 1081 * @bprm: binary program information 1082 * 1083 * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will begin. 1084 * It allows a check against the @bprm->cred->security value which was set in 1085 * the preceding creds_for_exec call. The argv list and envp list are reliably 1086 * available in @bprm. This hook may be called multiple times during a single 1087 * execve. @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. 1088 * 1089 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1090 */ 1091 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1092 { 1093 int ret; 1094 1095 ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); 1096 if (ret) 1097 return ret; 1098 return ima_bprm_check(bprm); 1099 } 1100 1101 /** 1102 * security_bprm_committing_creds() - Install creds for a process during exec() 1103 * @bprm: binary program information 1104 * 1105 * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being 1106 * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials pointed to 1107 * by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by the 1108 * bprm_creds_for_exec hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure. This 1109 * hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such as closing 1110 * open file descriptors to which access will no longer be granted when the 1111 * attributes are changed. This is called immediately before commit_creds(). 1112 */ 1113 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1114 { 1115 call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm); 1116 } 1117 1118 /** 1119 * security_bprm_committed_creds() - Tidy up after cred install during exec() 1120 * @bprm: binary program information 1121 * 1122 * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a process 1123 * being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials have, by this 1124 * point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the linux_binprm 1125 * structure. This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the 1126 * process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal state. This is called 1127 * immediately after commit_creds(). 1128 */ 1129 void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1130 { 1131 call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm); 1132 } 1133 1134 /** 1135 * security_fs_context_dup() - Duplicate a fs_context LSM blob 1136 * @fc: destination filesystem context 1137 * @src_fc: source filesystem context 1138 * 1139 * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer is 1140 * initialised to NULL by the caller. @fc indicates the new filesystem context. 1141 * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context. 1142 * 1143 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure. 1144 */ 1145 int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) 1146 { 1147 return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc); 1148 } 1149 1150 /** 1151 * security_fs_context_parse_param() - Configure a filesystem context 1152 * @fc: filesystem context 1153 * @param: filesystem parameter 1154 * 1155 * Userspace provided a parameter to configure a superblock. The LSM can 1156 * consume the parameter or return it to the caller for use elsewhere. 1157 * 1158 * Return: If the parameter is used by the LSM it should return 0, if it is 1159 * returned to the caller -ENOPARAM is returned, otherwise a negative 1160 * error code is returned. 1161 */ 1162 int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, 1163 struct fs_parameter *param) 1164 { 1165 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1166 int trc; 1167 int rc = -ENOPARAM; 1168 1169 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.fs_context_parse_param, 1170 list) { 1171 trc = hp->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param); 1172 if (trc == 0) 1173 rc = 0; 1174 else if (trc != -ENOPARAM) 1175 return trc; 1176 } 1177 return rc; 1178 } 1179 1180 /** 1181 * security_sb_alloc() - Allocate a super_block LSM blob 1182 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1183 * 1184 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field. The 1185 * s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is allocated. 1186 * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. 1187 * 1188 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. 1189 */ 1190 int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 1191 { 1192 int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb); 1193 1194 if (unlikely(rc)) 1195 return rc; 1196 rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb); 1197 if (unlikely(rc)) 1198 security_sb_free(sb); 1199 return rc; 1200 } 1201 1202 /** 1203 * security_sb_delete() - Release super_block LSM associated objects 1204 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1205 * 1206 * Release objects tied to a superblock (e.g. inodes). @sb contains the 1207 * super_block structure being released. 1208 */ 1209 void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb) 1210 { 1211 call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb); 1212 } 1213 1214 /** 1215 * security_sb_free() - Free a super_block LSM blob 1216 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1217 * 1218 * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field. @sb contains the super_block 1219 * structure to be modified. 1220 */ 1221 void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) 1222 { 1223 call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb); 1224 kfree(sb->s_security); 1225 sb->s_security = NULL; 1226 } 1227 1228 /** 1229 * security_free_mnt_opts() - Free memory associated with mount options 1230 * @mnt_ops: LSM processed mount options 1231 * 1232 * Free memory associated with @mnt_ops. 1233 */ 1234 void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts) 1235 { 1236 if (!*mnt_opts) 1237 return; 1238 call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts); 1239 *mnt_opts = NULL; 1240 } 1241 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts); 1242 1243 /** 1244 * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() - Consume LSM mount options 1245 * @options: mount options 1246 * @mnt_ops: LSM processed mount options 1247 * 1248 * Eat (scan @options) and save them in @mnt_opts. 1249 * 1250 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1251 */ 1252 int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) 1253 { 1254 return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts); 1255 } 1256 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts); 1257 1258 /** 1259 * security_sb_mnt_opts_compat() - Check if new mount options are allowed 1260 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1261 * @mnt_opts: new mount options 1262 * 1263 * Determine if the new mount options in @mnt_opts are allowed given the 1264 * existing mounted filesystem at @sb. @sb superblock being compared. 1265 * 1266 * Return: Returns 0 if options are compatible. 1267 */ 1268 int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, 1269 void *mnt_opts) 1270 { 1271 return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1272 } 1273 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat); 1274 1275 /** 1276 * security_sb_remount() - Verify no incompatible mount changes during remount 1277 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1278 * @mnt_opts: (re)mount options 1279 * 1280 * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes are 1281 * being made to those options. 1282 * 1283 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1284 */ 1285 int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, 1286 void *mnt_opts) 1287 { 1288 return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1289 } 1290 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount); 1291 1292 /** 1293 * security_sb_kern_mount() - Check if a kernel mount is allowed 1294 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1295 * 1296 * Mount this @sb if allowed by permissions. 1297 * 1298 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1299 */ 1300 int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb) 1301 { 1302 return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb); 1303 } 1304 1305 /** 1306 * security_sb_show_options() - Output the mount options for a superblock 1307 * @m: output file 1308 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1309 * 1310 * Show (print on @m) mount options for this @sb. 1311 * 1312 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1313 */ 1314 int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) 1315 { 1316 return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb); 1317 } 1318 1319 /** 1320 * security_sb_statfs() - Check if accessing fs stats is allowed 1321 * @dentry: superblock handle 1322 * 1323 * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt 1324 * mountpoint. @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem. 1325 * 1326 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1327 */ 1328 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) 1329 { 1330 return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry); 1331 } 1332 1333 /** 1334 * security_sb_mount() - Check permission for mounting a filesystem 1335 * @dev_name: filesystem backing device 1336 * @path: mount point 1337 * @type: filesystem type 1338 * @flags: mount flags 1339 * @data: filesystem specific data 1340 * 1341 * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on the 1342 * mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name identifies a 1343 * device if the file system type requires a device. For a remount 1344 * (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a loopback/bind mount 1345 * (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the pathname of the object being 1346 * mounted. 1347 * 1348 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1349 */ 1350 int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, 1351 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) 1352 { 1353 return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data); 1354 } 1355 1356 /** 1357 * security_sb_umount() - Check permission for unmounting a filesystem 1358 * @mnt: mounted filesystem 1359 * @flags: unmount flags 1360 * 1361 * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted. 1362 * 1363 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1364 */ 1365 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) 1366 { 1367 return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags); 1368 } 1369 1370 /** 1371 * security_sb_pivotroot() - Check permissions for pivoting the rootfs 1372 * @old_path: new location for current rootfs 1373 * @new_path: location of the new rootfs 1374 * 1375 * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem. 1376 * 1377 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1378 */ 1379 int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path) 1380 { 1381 return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path); 1382 } 1383 1384 /** 1385 * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() - Set the mount options for a filesystem 1386 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1387 * @mnt_opts: binary mount options 1388 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1389 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1390 * 1391 * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock. 1392 * 1393 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1394 */ 1395 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, 1396 void *mnt_opts, 1397 unsigned long kern_flags, 1398 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1399 { 1400 return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts, 1401 mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb, 1402 mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1403 } 1404 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts); 1405 1406 /** 1407 * security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() - Duplicate superblock mount options 1408 * @olddb: source superblock 1409 * @newdb: destination superblock 1410 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1411 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1412 * 1413 * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another. 1414 * 1415 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1416 */ 1417 int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, 1418 struct super_block *newsb, 1419 unsigned long kern_flags, 1420 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1421 { 1422 return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb, 1423 kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1424 } 1425 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts); 1426 1427 /** 1428 * security_move_mount() - Check permissions for moving a mount 1429 * @from_path: source mount point 1430 * @to_path: destination mount point 1431 * 1432 * Check permission before a mount is moved. 1433 * 1434 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1435 */ 1436 int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path) 1437 { 1438 return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path); 1439 } 1440 1441 /** 1442 * security_path_notify() - Check if setting a watch is allowed 1443 * @path: file path 1444 * @mask: event mask 1445 * @obj_type: file path type 1446 * 1447 * Check permissions before setting a watch on events as defined by @mask, on 1448 * an object at @path, whose type is defined by @obj_type. 1449 * 1450 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1451 */ 1452 int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, 1453 unsigned int obj_type) 1454 { 1455 return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type); 1456 } 1457 1458 /** 1459 * security_inode_alloc() - Allocate an inode LSM blob 1460 * @inode: the inode 1461 * 1462 * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The 1463 * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is 1464 * allocated. 1465 * 1466 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 1467 */ 1468 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 1469 { 1470 int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode); 1471 1472 if (unlikely(rc)) 1473 return rc; 1474 rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode); 1475 if (unlikely(rc)) 1476 security_inode_free(inode); 1477 return rc; 1478 } 1479 1480 static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) 1481 { 1482 /* 1483 * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob 1484 */ 1485 kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head); 1486 } 1487 1488 /** 1489 * security_inode_free() - Free an inode's LSM blob 1490 * @inode: the inode 1491 * 1492 * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to NULL. 1493 */ 1494 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) 1495 { 1496 integrity_inode_free(inode); 1497 call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode); 1498 /* 1499 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and 1500 * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made 1501 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS 1502 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder 1503 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and 1504 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact. 1505 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too. 1506 */ 1507 if (inode->i_security) 1508 call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security, 1509 inode_free_by_rcu); 1510 } 1511 1512 /** 1513 * security_dentry_init_security() - Perform dentry initialization 1514 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1515 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1516 * @name: name of the last path component 1517 * @xattr_name: name of the security/LSM xattr 1518 * @ctx: pointer to the resulting LSM context 1519 * @ctxlen: length of @ctx 1520 * 1521 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available since NFSv4 1522 * has no label backed by an EA anyway. It is important to note that 1523 * @xattr_name does not need to be free'd by the caller, it is a static string. 1524 * 1525 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1526 */ 1527 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1528 const struct qstr *name, 1529 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx, 1530 u32 *ctxlen) 1531 { 1532 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1533 int rc; 1534 1535 /* 1536 * Only one module will provide a security context. 1537 */ 1538 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security, list) { 1539 rc = hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name, 1540 xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen); 1541 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security)) 1542 return rc; 1543 } 1544 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security); 1545 } 1546 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security); 1547 1548 /** 1549 * security_dentry_create_files_as() - Perform dentry initialization 1550 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1551 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1552 * @name: name of the last path component 1553 * @old: creds to use for LSM context calculations 1554 * @new: creds to modify 1555 * 1556 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available and set 1557 * that context in passed in creds so that new files are created using that 1558 * context. Context is calculated using the passed in creds and not the creds 1559 * of the caller. 1560 * 1561 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1562 */ 1563 int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1564 struct qstr *name, 1565 const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) 1566 { 1567 return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode, 1568 name, old, new); 1569 } 1570 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as); 1571 1572 /** 1573 * security_inode_init_security() - Initialize an inode's LSM context 1574 * @inode: the inode 1575 * @dir: parent directory 1576 * @qstr: last component of the pathname 1577 * @initxattrs: callback function to write xattrs 1578 * @fs_data: filesystem specific data 1579 * 1580 * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly 1581 * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode. This 1582 * hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation transaction and 1583 * provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike the post_create/mkdir/... 1584 * hooks called by the VFS. The hook function is expected to allocate the name 1585 * and value via kmalloc, with the caller being responsible for calling kfree 1586 * after using them. If the security module does not use security attributes 1587 * or does not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode, then 1588 * it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. 1589 * 1590 * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is 1591 * needed, or -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure. 1592 */ 1593 int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1594 const struct qstr *qstr, 1595 const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) 1596 { 1597 struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1]; 1598 struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr; 1599 int ret; 1600 1601 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1602 return 0; 1603 1604 if (!initxattrs) 1605 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, 1606 dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL); 1607 memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs)); 1608 lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; 1609 ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, 1610 &lsm_xattr->name, 1611 &lsm_xattr->value, 1612 &lsm_xattr->value_len); 1613 if (ret) 1614 goto out; 1615 1616 evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1; 1617 ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr); 1618 if (ret) 1619 goto out; 1620 ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); 1621 out: 1622 for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) 1623 kfree(xattr->value); 1624 return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret; 1625 } 1626 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); 1627 1628 /** 1629 * security_inode_init_security_anon() - Initialize an anonymous inode 1630 * @inode: the inode 1631 * @name: the anonymous inode class 1632 * @context_inode: an optional related inode 1633 * 1634 * Set up the incore security field for the new anonymous inode and return 1635 * whether the inode creation is permitted by the security module or not. 1636 * 1637 * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EACCES if the security module denies the 1638 * creation of this inode, or another -errno upon other errors. 1639 */ 1640 int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, 1641 const struct qstr *name, 1642 const struct inode *context_inode) 1643 { 1644 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, name, 1645 context_inode); 1646 } 1647 1648 int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1649 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, 1650 void **value, size_t *len) 1651 { 1652 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1653 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 1654 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, 1655 qstr, name, value, len); 1656 } 1657 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security); 1658 1659 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH 1660 /** 1661 * security_path_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 1662 * @dir: parent directory 1663 * @dentry: new file 1664 * @mode: new file mode 1665 * @dev: device number 1666 * 1667 * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called even 1668 * if mknod operation is being done for a regular file. 1669 * 1670 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1671 */ 1672 int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, 1673 unsigned int dev) 1674 { 1675 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1676 return 0; 1677 return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1678 } 1679 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod); 1680 1681 /** 1682 * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed 1683 * @dir: parent directory 1684 * @dentry: new directory 1685 * @mode: new directory mode 1686 * 1687 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory. 1688 * 1689 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1690 */ 1691 int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1692 { 1693 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1694 return 0; 1695 return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1696 } 1697 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir); 1698 1699 /** 1700 * security_path_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 1701 * @dir: parent directory 1702 * @dentry: directory to remove 1703 * 1704 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 1705 * 1706 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1707 */ 1708 int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1709 { 1710 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1711 return 0; 1712 return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1713 } 1714 1715 /** 1716 * security_path_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 1717 * @dir: parent directory 1718 * @dentry: file 1719 * 1720 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 1721 * 1722 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1723 */ 1724 int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1725 { 1726 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1727 return 0; 1728 return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1729 } 1730 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink); 1731 1732 /** 1733 * security_path_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 1734 * @dir: parent directory 1735 * @dentry: symbolic link 1736 * @old_name: file pathname 1737 * 1738 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 1739 * 1740 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1741 */ 1742 int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1743 const char *old_name) 1744 { 1745 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1746 return 0; 1747 return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1748 } 1749 1750 /** 1751 * security_path_link - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 1752 * @old_dentry: existing file 1753 * @new_dir: new parent directory 1754 * @new_dentry: new link 1755 * 1756 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 1757 * 1758 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1759 */ 1760 int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, 1761 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1762 { 1763 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1764 return 0; 1765 return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); 1766 } 1767 1768 /** 1769 * security_path_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 1770 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 1771 * @old_dentry: the old file 1772 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 1773 * @new_dentry: the new file 1774 * @flags: flags 1775 * 1776 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 1777 * 1778 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1779 */ 1780 int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 1781 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 1782 unsigned int flags) 1783 { 1784 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 1785 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 1786 return 0; 1787 1788 return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, 1789 new_dentry, flags); 1790 } 1791 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename); 1792 1793 /** 1794 * security_path_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 1795 * @path: file 1796 * 1797 * Check permission before truncating the file indicated by path. Note that 1798 * truncation permissions may also be checked based on already opened files, 1799 * using the security_file_truncate() hook. 1800 * 1801 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1802 */ 1803 int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path) 1804 { 1805 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1806 return 0; 1807 return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path); 1808 } 1809 1810 /** 1811 * security_path_chmod() - Check if changing the file's mode is allowed 1812 * @path: file 1813 * @mode: new mode 1814 * 1815 * Check for permission to change a mode of the file @path. The new mode is 1816 * specified in @mode which is a bitmask of constants from 1817 * <include/uapi/linux/stat.h>. 1818 * 1819 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1820 */ 1821 int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) 1822 { 1823 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1824 return 0; 1825 return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode); 1826 } 1827 1828 /** 1829 * security_path_chown() - Check if changing the file's owner/group is allowed 1830 * @path: file 1831 * @uid: file owner 1832 * @gid: file group 1833 * 1834 * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory. 1835 * 1836 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1837 */ 1838 int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) 1839 { 1840 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1841 return 0; 1842 return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid); 1843 } 1844 1845 /** 1846 * security_path_chroot() - Check if changing the root directory is allowed 1847 * @path: directory 1848 * 1849 * Check for permission to change root directory. 1850 * 1851 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1852 */ 1853 int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path) 1854 { 1855 return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path); 1856 } 1857 #endif 1858 1859 /** 1860 * security_inode_create() - Check if creating a file is allowed 1861 * @dir: the parent directory 1862 * @dentry: the file being created 1863 * @mode: requested file mode 1864 * 1865 * Check permission to create a regular file. 1866 * 1867 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1868 */ 1869 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1870 { 1871 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1872 return 0; 1873 return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1874 } 1875 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create); 1876 1877 /** 1878 * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 1879 * @old_dentry: existing file 1880 * @dir: new parent directory 1881 * @new_dentry: new link 1882 * 1883 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 1884 * 1885 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1886 */ 1887 int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, 1888 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1889 { 1890 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1891 return 0; 1892 return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); 1893 } 1894 1895 /** 1896 * security_inode_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 1897 * @dir: parent directory 1898 * @dentry: file 1899 * 1900 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 1901 * 1902 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1903 */ 1904 int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1905 { 1906 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1907 return 0; 1908 return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1909 } 1910 1911 /** 1912 * security_inode_symlink() Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 1913 * @dir: parent directory 1914 * @dentry: symbolic link 1915 * @old_name: existing filename 1916 * 1917 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 1918 * 1919 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1920 */ 1921 int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1922 const char *old_name) 1923 { 1924 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1925 return 0; 1926 return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1927 } 1928 1929 /** 1930 * security_inode_mkdir() - Check if creation a new director is allowed 1931 * @dir: parent directory 1932 * @dentry: new directory 1933 * @mode: new directory mode 1934 * 1935 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory 1936 * associated with inode structure @dir. 1937 * 1938 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1939 */ 1940 int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1941 { 1942 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1943 return 0; 1944 return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1945 } 1946 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir); 1947 1948 /** 1949 * security_inode_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 1950 * @dir: parent directory 1951 * @dentry: directory to be removed 1952 * 1953 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 1954 * 1955 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1956 */ 1957 int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1958 { 1959 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1960 return 0; 1961 return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1962 } 1963 1964 /** 1965 * security_inode_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 1966 * @dir: parent directory 1967 * @dentry: new file 1968 * @mode: new file mode 1969 * @dev: device number 1970 * 1971 * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo file 1972 * created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation is being 1973 * done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called and not this 1974 * hook. 1975 * 1976 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1977 */ 1978 int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev) 1979 { 1980 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1981 return 0; 1982 return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1983 } 1984 1985 /** 1986 * security_inode_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 1987 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 1988 * @old_dentry: the old file 1989 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 1990 * @new_dentry: the new file 1991 * @flags: flags 1992 * 1993 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 1994 * 1995 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1996 */ 1997 int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 1998 struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 1999 unsigned int flags) 2000 { 2001 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 2002 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 2003 return 0; 2004 2005 if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { 2006 int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry, 2007 old_dir, old_dentry); 2008 if (err) 2009 return err; 2010 } 2011 2012 return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, 2013 new_dir, new_dentry); 2014 } 2015 2016 /** 2017 * security_inode_readlink() - Check if reading a symbolic link is allowed 2018 * @dentry: link 2019 * 2020 * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. 2021 * 2022 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2023 */ 2024 int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) 2025 { 2026 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2027 return 0; 2028 return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry); 2029 } 2030 2031 /** 2032 * security_inode_follow_link() - Check if following a symbolic link is allowed 2033 * @dentry: link dentry 2034 * @inode: link inode 2035 * @rcu: true if in RCU-walk mode 2036 * 2037 * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname. If 2038 * @rcu is true, @inode is not stable. 2039 * 2040 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2041 */ 2042 int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, 2043 bool rcu) 2044 { 2045 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2046 return 0; 2047 return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu); 2048 } 2049 2050 /** 2051 * security_inode_permission() - Check if accessing an inode is allowed 2052 * @inode: inode 2053 * @mask: access mask 2054 * 2055 * Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the 2056 * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to 2057 * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks. Notice 2058 * that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many other 2059 * operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is called when 2060 * the actual read/write operations are performed. 2061 * 2062 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2063 */ 2064 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) 2065 { 2066 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2067 return 0; 2068 return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask); 2069 } 2070 2071 /** 2072 * security_inode_setattr() - Check if setting file attributes is allowed 2073 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2074 * @dentry: file 2075 * @attr: new attributes 2076 * 2077 * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel call 2078 * to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever file 2079 * attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod operations, 2080 * transferring disk quotas, etc). 2081 * 2082 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2083 */ 2084 int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2085 struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 2086 { 2087 int ret; 2088 2089 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2090 return 0; 2091 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr); 2092 if (ret) 2093 return ret; 2094 return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); 2095 } 2096 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); 2097 2098 /** 2099 * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed 2100 * @path: file 2101 * 2102 * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. 2103 * 2104 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2105 */ 2106 int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) 2107 { 2108 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 2109 return 0; 2110 return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path); 2111 } 2112 2113 /** 2114 * security_inode_setxattr() - Check if setting file xattrs is allowed 2115 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2116 * @dentry: file 2117 * @name: xattr name 2118 * @value: xattr value 2119 * @flags: flags 2120 * 2121 * Check permission before setting the extended attributes. 2122 * 2123 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2124 */ 2125 int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2126 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 2127 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2128 { 2129 int ret; 2130 2131 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2132 return 0; 2133 /* 2134 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 2135 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 2136 */ 2137 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name, value, 2138 size, flags); 2139 2140 if (ret == 1) 2141 ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); 2142 if (ret) 2143 return ret; 2144 ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 2145 if (ret) 2146 return ret; 2147 return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size); 2148 } 2149 2150 /** 2151 * security_inode_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed 2152 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2153 * @dentry: file 2154 * @acl_name: acl name 2155 * @kacl: acl struct 2156 * 2157 * Check permission before setting posix acls, the posix acls in @kacl are 2158 * identified by @acl_name. 2159 * 2160 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2161 */ 2162 int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2163 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, 2164 struct posix_acl *kacl) 2165 { 2166 int ret; 2167 2168 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2169 return 0; 2170 ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, 2171 kacl); 2172 if (ret) 2173 return ret; 2174 ret = ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2175 if (ret) 2176 return ret; 2177 return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2178 } 2179 2180 /** 2181 * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed 2182 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2183 * @dentry: file 2184 * @acl_name: acl name 2185 * 2186 * Check permission before getting osix acls, the posix acls are identified by 2187 * @acl_name. 2188 * 2189 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2190 */ 2191 int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2192 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2193 { 2194 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2195 return 0; 2196 return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2197 } 2198 2199 /** 2200 * security_inode_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed 2201 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2202 * @dentry: file 2203 * @acl_name: acl name 2204 * 2205 * Check permission before removing posix acls, the posix acls are identified 2206 * by @acl_name. 2207 * 2208 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2209 */ 2210 int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2211 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2212 { 2213 int ret; 2214 2215 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2216 return 0; 2217 ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2218 if (ret) 2219 return ret; 2220 ret = ima_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2221 if (ret) 2222 return ret; 2223 return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2224 } 2225 2226 /** 2227 * security_inode_post_setxattr() - Update the inode after a setxattr operation 2228 * @dentry: file 2229 * @name: xattr name 2230 * @value: xattr value 2231 * @size: xattr value size 2232 * @flags: flags 2233 * 2234 * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation. 2235 */ 2236 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 2237 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2238 { 2239 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2240 return; 2241 call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); 2242 evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 2243 } 2244 2245 /** 2246 * security_inode_getxattr() - Check if xattr access is allowed 2247 * @dentry: file 2248 * @name: xattr name 2249 * 2250 * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes identified by 2251 * @name for @dentry. 2252 * 2253 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2254 */ 2255 int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2256 { 2257 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2258 return 0; 2259 return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name); 2260 } 2261 2262 /** 2263 * security_inode_listxattr() - Check if listing xattrs is allowed 2264 * @dentry: file 2265 * 2266 * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute names for 2267 * @dentry. 2268 * 2269 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2270 */ 2271 int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) 2272 { 2273 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2274 return 0; 2275 return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry); 2276 } 2277 2278 /** 2279 * security_inode_removexattr() - Check if removing an xattr is allowed 2280 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2281 * @dentry: file 2282 * @name: xattr name 2283 * 2284 * Check permission before removing the extended attribute identified by @name 2285 * for @dentry. 2286 * 2287 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2288 */ 2289 int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2290 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2291 { 2292 int ret; 2293 2294 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2295 return 0; 2296 /* 2297 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 2298 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 2299 */ 2300 ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); 2301 if (ret == 1) 2302 ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 2303 if (ret) 2304 return ret; 2305 ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); 2306 if (ret) 2307 return ret; 2308 return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 2309 } 2310 2311 /** 2312 * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required 2313 * @dentry: associated dentry 2314 * 2315 * Called when an inode has been changed to determine if 2316 * security_inode_killpriv() should be called. 2317 * 2318 * Return: Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation, return 0 if 2319 * security_inode_killpriv() does not need to be called, return >0 if 2320 * security_inode_killpriv() does need to be called. 2321 */ 2322 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) 2323 { 2324 return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry); 2325 } 2326 2327 /** 2328 * security_inode_killpriv() - The setuid bit is removed, update LSM state 2329 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2330 * @dentry: associated dentry 2331 * 2332 * The @dentry's setuid bit is being removed. Remove similar security labels. 2333 * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held. 2334 * 2335 * Return: Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation 2336 * causing setuid bit removal is failed. 2337 */ 2338 int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2339 struct dentry *dentry) 2340 { 2341 return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, idmap, dentry); 2342 } 2343 2344 /** 2345 * security_inode_getsecurity() - Get the xattr security label of an inode 2346 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2347 * @inode: inode 2348 * @name: xattr name 2349 * @buffer: security label buffer 2350 * @alloc: allocation flag 2351 * 2352 * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the security 2353 * label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that @name is the 2354 * remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix has been removed. 2355 * @alloc is used to specify if the call should return a value via the buffer 2356 * or just the value length. 2357 * 2358 * Return: Returns size of buffer on success. 2359 */ 2360 int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2361 struct inode *inode, const char *name, 2362 void **buffer, bool alloc) 2363 { 2364 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2365 int rc; 2366 2367 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2368 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 2369 /* 2370 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 2371 */ 2372 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) { 2373 rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name, buffer, alloc); 2374 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity)) 2375 return rc; 2376 } 2377 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 2378 } 2379 2380 /** 2381 * security_inode_setsecurity() - Set the xattr security label of an inode 2382 * @inode: inode 2383 * @name: xattr name 2384 * @value: security label 2385 * @size: length of security label 2386 * @flags: flags 2387 * 2388 * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the extended 2389 * attribute value @value. @size indicates the size of the @value in bytes. 2390 * @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0. Note that @name is the 2391 * remainder of the attribute name after the security. prefix has been removed. 2392 * 2393 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2394 */ 2395 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2396 { 2397 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2398 int rc; 2399 2400 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2401 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 2402 /* 2403 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 2404 */ 2405 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) { 2406 rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, 2407 flags); 2408 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity)) 2409 return rc; 2410 } 2411 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 2412 } 2413 2414 /** 2415 * security_inode_listsecurity() - List the xattr security label names 2416 * @inode: inode 2417 * @buffer: buffer 2418 * @buffer_size: size of buffer 2419 * 2420 * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels associated with 2421 * @inode into @buffer. The maximum size of @buffer is specified by 2422 * @buffer_size. @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer 2423 * required. 2424 * 2425 * Return: Returns number of bytes used/required on success. 2426 */ 2427 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) 2428 { 2429 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2430 return 0; 2431 return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size); 2432 } 2433 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity); 2434 2435 /** 2436 * security_inode_getsecid() - Get an inode's secid 2437 * @inode: inode 2438 * @secid: secid to return 2439 * 2440 * Get the secid associated with the node. In case of failure, @secid will be 2441 * set to zero. 2442 */ 2443 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) 2444 { 2445 call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid); 2446 } 2447 2448 /** 2449 * security_inode_copy_up() - Create new creds for an overlayfs copy-up op 2450 * @src: union dentry of copy-up file 2451 * @new: newly created creds 2452 * 2453 * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of overlay 2454 * filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds and modify as 2455 * need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to new creds temporarily to 2456 * create new file and release newly allocated creds. 2457 * 2458 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error. 2459 */ 2460 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) 2461 { 2462 return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new); 2463 } 2464 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up); 2465 2466 /** 2467 * security_inode_copy_up_xattr() - Filter xattrs in an overlayfs copy-up op 2468 * @name: xattr name 2469 * 2470 * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied up from a 2471 * lower layer to the union/overlay layer. The caller is responsible for 2472 * reading and writing the xattrs, this hook is merely a filter. 2473 * 2474 * Return: Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP 2475 * if the security module does not know about attribute, or a negative 2476 * error code to abort the copy up. 2477 */ 2478 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) 2479 { 2480 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2481 int rc; 2482 2483 /* 2484 * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the 2485 * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or 2486 * any other error code incase of an error. 2487 */ 2488 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, 2489 &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) { 2490 rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name); 2491 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr)) 2492 return rc; 2493 } 2494 2495 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr); 2496 } 2497 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr); 2498 2499 /** 2500 * security_kernfs_init_security() - Init LSM context for a kernfs node 2501 * @kn_dir: parent kernfs node 2502 * @kn: the kernfs node to initialize 2503 * 2504 * Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based on its 2505 * own and its parent's attributes. 2506 * 2507 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2508 */ 2509 int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, 2510 struct kernfs_node *kn) 2511 { 2512 return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn); 2513 } 2514 2515 /** 2516 * security_file_permission() - Check file permissions 2517 * @file: file 2518 * @mask: requested permissions 2519 * 2520 * Check file permissions before accessing an open file. This hook is called 2521 * by various operations that read or write files. A security module can use 2522 * this hook to perform additional checking on these operations, e.g. to 2523 * revalidate permissions on use to support privilege bracketing or policy 2524 * changes. Notice that this hook is used when the actual read/write 2525 * operations are performed, whereas the inode_security_ops hook is called when 2526 * a file is opened (as well as many other operations). Although this hook can 2527 * be used to revalidate permissions for various system call operations that 2528 * read or write files, it does not address the revalidation of permissions for 2529 * memory-mapped files. Security modules must handle this separately if they 2530 * need such revalidation. 2531 * 2532 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2533 */ 2534 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) 2535 { 2536 int ret; 2537 2538 ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask); 2539 if (ret) 2540 return ret; 2541 2542 return fsnotify_perm(file, mask); 2543 } 2544 2545 /** 2546 * security_file_alloc() - Allocate and init a file's LSM blob 2547 * @file: the file 2548 * 2549 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field. The 2550 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 2551 * 2552 * Return: Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 2553 */ 2554 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) 2555 { 2556 int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file); 2557 2558 if (rc) 2559 return rc; 2560 rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file); 2561 if (unlikely(rc)) 2562 security_file_free(file); 2563 return rc; 2564 } 2565 2566 /** 2567 * security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob 2568 * @file: the file 2569 * 2570 * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security. 2571 */ 2572 void security_file_free(struct file *file) 2573 { 2574 void *blob; 2575 2576 call_void_hook(file_free_security, file); 2577 2578 blob = file->f_security; 2579 if (blob) { 2580 file->f_security = NULL; 2581 kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob); 2582 } 2583 } 2584 2585 /** 2586 * security_file_ioctl() - Check if an ioctl is allowed 2587 * @file: associated file 2588 * @cmd: ioctl cmd 2589 * @arg: ioctl arguments 2590 * 2591 * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file. Note that @arg sometimes 2592 * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer 2593 * value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used 2594 * by the security module. 2595 * 2596 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2597 */ 2598 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2599 { 2600 return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 2601 } 2602 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl); 2603 2604 static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) 2605 { 2606 /* 2607 * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect 2608 * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about... 2609 */ 2610 if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ) 2611 return prot; 2612 if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) 2613 return prot; 2614 /* 2615 * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it. 2616 */ 2617 if (!file) 2618 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2619 /* 2620 * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need 2621 * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case 2622 */ 2623 if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) { 2624 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU 2625 if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) { 2626 unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file); 2627 if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC)) 2628 return prot; 2629 } 2630 #endif 2631 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2632 } 2633 /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */ 2634 return prot; 2635 } 2636 2637 /** 2638 * security_mmap_file() - Check if mmap'ing a file is allowed 2639 * @file: file 2640 * @prot: protection applied by the kernel 2641 * @flags: flags 2642 * 2643 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. if 2644 * mapping anonymous memory. 2645 * 2646 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2647 */ 2648 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, 2649 unsigned long flags) 2650 { 2651 unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot); 2652 int ret; 2653 2654 ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 2655 if (ret) 2656 return ret; 2657 return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 2658 } 2659 2660 /** 2661 * security_mmap_addr() - Check if mmap'ing an address is allowed 2662 * @addr: address 2663 * 2664 * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr. 2665 * 2666 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2667 */ 2668 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) 2669 { 2670 return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr); 2671 } 2672 2673 /** 2674 * security_file_mprotect() - Check if changing memory protections is allowed 2675 * @vma: memory region 2676 * @reqprot: application requested protection 2677 * @prog: protection applied by the kernel 2678 * 2679 * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions. 2680 * 2681 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2682 */ 2683 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, 2684 unsigned long prot) 2685 { 2686 int ret; 2687 2688 ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); 2689 if (ret) 2690 return ret; 2691 return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot); 2692 } 2693 2694 /** 2695 * security_file_lock() - Check if a file lock is allowed 2696 * @file: file 2697 * @cmd: lock operation (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK) 2698 * 2699 * Check permission before performing file locking operations. Note the hook 2700 * mediates both flock and fcntl style locks. 2701 * 2702 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2703 */ 2704 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) 2705 { 2706 return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd); 2707 } 2708 2709 /** 2710 * security_file_fcntl() - Check if fcntl() op is allowed 2711 * @file: file 2712 * @cmd: fnctl command 2713 * @arg: command argument 2714 * 2715 * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd from 2716 * being performed on the file @file. Note that @arg sometimes represents a 2717 * user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer value. When 2718 * @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used by the 2719 * security module. 2720 * 2721 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2722 */ 2723 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2724 { 2725 return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 2726 } 2727 2728 /** 2729 * security_file_set_fowner() - Set the file owner info in the LSM blob 2730 * @file: the file 2731 * 2732 * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in 2733 * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook. 2734 * 2735 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2736 */ 2737 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) 2738 { 2739 call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file); 2740 } 2741 2742 /** 2743 * security_file_send_sigiotask() - Check if sending SIGIO/SIGURG is allowed 2744 * @tsk: target task 2745 * @fown: signal sender 2746 * @sig: signal to be sent, SIGIO is sent if 0 2747 * 2748 * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the 2749 * process @tsk. Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt. Note 2750 * that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a struct file, 2751 * so the file structure (and associated security information) can always be 2752 * obtained: container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner). 2753 * 2754 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2755 */ 2756 int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, 2757 struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) 2758 { 2759 return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig); 2760 } 2761 2762 /** 2763 * security_file_receive() - Check is receiving a file via IPC is allowed 2764 * @file: file being received 2765 * 2766 * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process to 2767 * receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC. 2768 * 2769 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2770 */ 2771 int security_file_receive(struct file *file) 2772 { 2773 return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file); 2774 } 2775 2776 /** 2777 * security_file_open() - Save open() time state for late use by the LSM 2778 * @file: 2779 * 2780 * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon file_permission, 2781 * and recheck access if anything has changed since inode_permission. 2782 * 2783 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2784 */ 2785 int security_file_open(struct file *file) 2786 { 2787 int ret; 2788 2789 ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file); 2790 if (ret) 2791 return ret; 2792 2793 return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN); 2794 } 2795 2796 /** 2797 * security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 2798 * @file: file 2799 * 2800 * Check permission before truncating a file, i.e. using ftruncate. Note that 2801 * truncation permission may also be checked based on the path, using the 2802 * @path_truncate hook. 2803 * 2804 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2805 */ 2806 int security_file_truncate(struct file *file) 2807 { 2808 return call_int_hook(file_truncate, 0, file); 2809 } 2810 2811 /** 2812 * security_task_alloc() - Allocate a task's LSM blob 2813 * @task: the task 2814 * @clone_flags: flags indicating what is being shared 2815 * 2816 * Handle allocation of task-related resources. 2817 * 2818 * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. 2819 */ 2820 int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) 2821 { 2822 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 2823 2824 if (rc) 2825 return rc; 2826 rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags); 2827 if (unlikely(rc)) 2828 security_task_free(task); 2829 return rc; 2830 } 2831 2832 /** 2833 * security_task_free() - Free a task's LSM blob and related resources 2834 * @task: task 2835 * 2836 * Handle release of task-related resources. Note that this can be called from 2837 * interrupt context. 2838 */ 2839 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) 2840 { 2841 call_void_hook(task_free, task); 2842 2843 kfree(task->security); 2844 task->security = NULL; 2845 } 2846 2847 /** 2848 * security_cred_alloc_blank() - Allocate the min memory to allow cred_transfer 2849 * @cred: credentials 2850 * @gfp: gfp flags 2851 * 2852 * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that 2853 * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM. 2854 * 2855 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 2856 */ 2857 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 2858 { 2859 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp); 2860 2861 if (rc) 2862 return rc; 2863 2864 rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp); 2865 if (unlikely(rc)) 2866 security_cred_free(cred); 2867 return rc; 2868 } 2869 2870 /** 2871 * security_cred_free() - Free the cred's LSM blob and associated resources 2872 * @cred: credentials 2873 * 2874 * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials. 2875 */ 2876 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) 2877 { 2878 /* 2879 * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that 2880 * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL. 2881 */ 2882 if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL)) 2883 return; 2884 2885 call_void_hook(cred_free, cred); 2886 2887 kfree(cred->security); 2888 cred->security = NULL; 2889 } 2890 2891 /** 2892 * security_prepare_creds() - Prepare a new set of credentials 2893 * @new: new credentials 2894 * @old: original credentials 2895 * @gfp: gfp flags 2896 * 2897 * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set. 2898 * 2899 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 2900 */ 2901 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) 2902 { 2903 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp); 2904 2905 if (rc) 2906 return rc; 2907 2908 rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp); 2909 if (unlikely(rc)) 2910 security_cred_free(new); 2911 return rc; 2912 } 2913 2914 /** 2915 * security_transfer_creds() - Transfer creds 2916 * @new: target credentials 2917 * @old: original credentials 2918 * 2919 * Transfer data from original creds to new creds. 2920 */ 2921 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 2922 { 2923 call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); 2924 } 2925 2926 /** 2927 * security_cred_getsecid() - Get the secid from a set of credentials 2928 * @c: credentials 2929 * @secid: secid value 2930 * 2931 * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c. In case of 2932 * failure, @secid will be set to zero. 2933 */ 2934 void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) 2935 { 2936 *secid = 0; 2937 call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); 2938 } 2939 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); 2940 2941 /** 2942 * security_kernel_act_as() - Set the kernel credentials to act as secid 2943 * @new: credentials 2944 * @secid: secid 2945 * 2946 * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). 2947 * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid. 2948 * 2949 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2950 */ 2951 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) 2952 { 2953 return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); 2954 } 2955 2956 /** 2957 * security_kernel_create_files_as() - Set file creation context using an inode 2958 * @new: target credentials 2959 * @inode: reference inode 2960 * 2961 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as the 2962 * objective context of the specified inode. The current task must be the one 2963 * that nominated @inode. 2964 * 2965 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2966 */ 2967 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) 2968 { 2969 return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode); 2970 } 2971 2972 /** 2973 * security_kernel_module_request() - Check is loading a module is allowed 2974 * @kmod_name: module name 2975 * 2976 * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for 2977 * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. 2978 * 2979 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2980 */ 2981 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) 2982 { 2983 int ret; 2984 2985 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); 2986 if (ret) 2987 return ret; 2988 return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); 2989 } 2990 2991 /** 2992 * security_kernel_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 2993 * @file: file 2994 * @id: file identifier 2995 * @contents: trust if security_kernel_post_read_file() will be called 2996 * 2997 * Read a file specified by userspace. 2998 * 2999 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3000 */ 3001 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, 3002 bool contents) 3003 { 3004 int ret; 3005 3006 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); 3007 if (ret) 3008 return ret; 3009 return ima_read_file(file, id, contents); 3010 } 3011 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); 3012 3013 /** 3014 * security_kernel_post_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 3015 * @file: file 3016 * @buf: file contents 3017 * @size: size of file contents 3018 * @id: file identifier 3019 * 3020 * Read a file specified by userspace. This must be paired with a prior call 3021 * to security_kernel_read_file() call that indicated this hook would also be 3022 * called, see security_kernel_read_file() for more information. 3023 * 3024 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3025 */ 3026 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, 3027 enum kernel_read_file_id id) 3028 { 3029 int ret; 3030 3031 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id); 3032 if (ret) 3033 return ret; 3034 return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id); 3035 } 3036 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); 3037 3038 /** 3039 * security_kernel_load_data() - Load data provided by userspace 3040 * @id: data identifier 3041 * @contents: true if security_kernel_post_load_data() will be called 3042 * 3043 * Load data provided by userspace. 3044 * 3045 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3046 */ 3047 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) 3048 { 3049 int ret; 3050 3051 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents); 3052 if (ret) 3053 return ret; 3054 return ima_load_data(id, contents); 3055 } 3056 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); 3057 3058 /** 3059 * security_kernel_post_load_data() - Load userspace data from a non-file source 3060 * @buf: data 3061 * @size: size of data 3062 * @id: data identifier 3063 * @description: text description of data, specific to the id value 3064 * 3065 * Load data provided by a non-file source (usually userspace buffer). This 3066 * must be paired with a prior security_kernel_load_data() call that indicated 3067 * this hook would also be called, see security_kernel_load_data() for more 3068 * information. 3069 * 3070 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3071 */ 3072 int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, 3073 enum kernel_load_data_id id, 3074 char *description) 3075 { 3076 int ret; 3077 3078 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id, 3079 description); 3080 if (ret) 3081 return ret; 3082 return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description); 3083 } 3084 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data); 3085 3086 /** 3087 * security_task_fix_setuid() - Update LSM with new user id attributes 3088 * @new: updated credentials 3089 * @old: credentials being replaced 3090 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag values 3091 * 3092 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user identity 3093 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 3094 * the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If @new is the set of 3095 * credentials that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this 3096 * rather than to @current->cred. 3097 * 3098 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3099 */ 3100 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 3101 int flags) 3102 { 3103 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags); 3104 } 3105 3106 /** 3107 * security_task_fix_setgid() - Update LSM with new group id attributes 3108 * @new: updated credentials 3109 * @old: credentials being replaced 3110 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag value 3111 * 3112 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the group identity 3113 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 3114 * the set*gid system calls invoked this hook. @new is the set of credentials 3115 * that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 3116 * @current->cred. 3117 * 3118 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3119 */ 3120 int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 3121 int flags) 3122 { 3123 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags); 3124 } 3125 3126 /** 3127 * security_task_fix_setgroups() - Update LSM with new supplementary groups 3128 * @new: updated credentials 3129 * @old: credentials being replaced 3130 * 3131 * Update the module's state after setting the supplementary group identity 3132 * attributes of the current process. @new is the set of credentials that will 3133 * be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 3134 * @current->cred. 3135 * 3136 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3137 */ 3138 int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 3139 { 3140 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, 0, new, old); 3141 } 3142 3143 /** 3144 * security_task_setpgid() - Check if setting the pgid is allowed 3145 * @p: task being modified 3146 * @pgid: new pgid 3147 * 3148 * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the process 3149 * @p to @pgid. 3150 * 3151 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3152 */ 3153 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) 3154 { 3155 return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid); 3156 } 3157 3158 /** 3159 * security_task_getpgid() - Check if getting the pgid is allowed 3160 * @p: task 3161 * 3162 * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the process 3163 * @p. 3164 * 3165 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3166 */ 3167 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) 3168 { 3169 return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p); 3170 } 3171 3172 /** 3173 * security_task_getsid() - Check if getting the session id is allowed 3174 * @p: task 3175 * 3176 * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process @p. 3177 * 3178 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3179 */ 3180 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) 3181 { 3182 return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); 3183 } 3184 3185 /** 3186 * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid 3187 * @secid: secid value 3188 * 3189 * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return 3190 * it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3191 */ 3192 void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) 3193 { 3194 *secid = 0; 3195 call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid); 3196 } 3197 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj); 3198 3199 /** 3200 * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid 3201 * @p: target task 3202 * @secid: secid value 3203 * 3204 * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and 3205 * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3206 */ 3207 void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) 3208 { 3209 *secid = 0; 3210 call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); 3211 } 3212 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj); 3213 3214 /** 3215 * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed 3216 * @p: target task 3217 * @nice: nice value 3218 * 3219 * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice. 3220 * 3221 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3222 */ 3223 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) 3224 { 3225 return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice); 3226 } 3227 3228 /** 3229 * security_task_setioprio() - Check if setting a task's ioprio is allowed 3230 * @p: target task 3231 * @ioprio: ioprio value 3232 * 3233 * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio. 3234 * 3235 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3236 */ 3237 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) 3238 { 3239 return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio); 3240 } 3241 3242 /** 3243 * security_task_getioprio() - Check if getting a task's ioprio is allowed 3244 * @p: task 3245 * 3246 * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p. 3247 * 3248 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3249 */ 3250 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) 3251 { 3252 return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p); 3253 } 3254 3255 /** 3256 * security_task_prlimit() - Check if get/setting resources limits is allowed 3257 * @cred: current task credentials 3258 * @tcred: target task credentials 3259 * @flags: LSM_PRLIMIT_* flag bits indicating a get/set/both 3260 * 3261 * Check permission before getting and/or setting the resource limits of 3262 * another task. 3263 * 3264 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3265 */ 3266 int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, 3267 unsigned int flags) 3268 { 3269 return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags); 3270 } 3271 3272 /** 3273 * security_task_setrlimit() - Check if setting a new rlimit value is allowed 3274 * @p: target task's group leader 3275 * @resource: resource whose limit is being set 3276 * @new_rlim: new resource limit 3277 * 3278 * Check permission before setting the resource limits of process @p for 3279 * @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can be examined by 3280 * dereferencing (p->signal->rlim + resource). 3281 * 3282 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3283 */ 3284 int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, 3285 struct rlimit *new_rlim) 3286 { 3287 return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim); 3288 } 3289 3290 /** 3291 * security_task_setscheduler() - Check if setting sched policy/param is allowed 3292 * @p: target task 3293 * 3294 * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of 3295 * process @p. 3296 * 3297 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3298 */ 3299 int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3300 { 3301 return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p); 3302 } 3303 3304 /** 3305 * security_task_getscheduler() - Check if getting scheduling info is allowed 3306 * @p: target task 3307 * 3308 * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process @p. 3309 * 3310 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3311 */ 3312 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3313 { 3314 return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p); 3315 } 3316 3317 /** 3318 * security_task_movememory() - Check if moving memory is allowed 3319 * @p: task 3320 * 3321 * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p. 3322 * 3323 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3324 */ 3325 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) 3326 { 3327 return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p); 3328 } 3329 3330 /** 3331 * security_task_kill() - Check if sending a signal is allowed 3332 * @p: target process 3333 * @info: signal information 3334 * @sig: signal value 3335 * @cred: credentials of the signal sender, NULL if @current 3336 * 3337 * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p. @info can be NULL, the 3338 * constant 1, or a pointer to a kernel_siginfo structure. If @info is 1 or 3339 * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming from 3340 * the kernel and should typically be permitted. SIGIO signals are handled 3341 * separately by the send_sigiotask hook in file_security_ops. 3342 * 3343 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3344 */ 3345 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, 3346 int sig, const struct cred *cred) 3347 { 3348 return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred); 3349 } 3350 3351 /** 3352 * security_task_prctl() - Check if a prctl op is allowed 3353 * @option: operation 3354 * @arg2: argument 3355 * @arg3: argument 3356 * @arg4: argument 3357 * @arg5: argument 3358 * 3359 * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the 3360 * current process. 3361 * 3362 * Return: Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value 3363 * to cause prctl() to return immediately with that value. 3364 */ 3365 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, 3366 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) 3367 { 3368 int thisrc; 3369 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl); 3370 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3371 3372 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) { 3373 thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); 3374 if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) { 3375 rc = thisrc; 3376 if (thisrc != 0) 3377 break; 3378 } 3379 } 3380 return rc; 3381 } 3382 3383 /** 3384 * security_task_to_inode() - Set the security attributes of a task's inode 3385 * @p: task 3386 * @inode: inode 3387 * 3388 * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's 3389 * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes. 3390 */ 3391 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) 3392 { 3393 call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode); 3394 } 3395 3396 /** 3397 * security_create_user_ns() - Check if creating a new userns is allowed 3398 * @cred: prepared creds 3399 * 3400 * Check permission prior to creating a new user namespace. 3401 * 3402 * Return: Returns 0 if successful, otherwise < 0 error code. 3403 */ 3404 int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred) 3405 { 3406 return call_int_hook(userns_create, 0, cred); 3407 } 3408 3409 /** 3410 * security_ipc_permission() - Check if sysv ipc access is allowed 3411 * @ipcp: ipc permission structure 3412 * @flags: requested permissions 3413 * 3414 * Check permissions for access to IPC. 3415 * 3416 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3417 */ 3418 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) 3419 { 3420 return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag); 3421 } 3422 3423 /** 3424 * security_ipc_getsecid() - Get the sysv ipc object's secid 3425 * @ipcp: ipc permission structure 3426 * @secid: secid pointer 3427 * 3428 * Get the secid associated with the ipc object. In case of failure, @secid 3429 * will be set to zero. 3430 */ 3431 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) 3432 { 3433 *secid = 0; 3434 call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); 3435 } 3436 3437 /** 3438 * security_msg_msg_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc message LSM blob 3439 * @msg: message structure 3440 * 3441 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field. The 3442 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3443 * 3444 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3445 */ 3446 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) 3447 { 3448 int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg); 3449 3450 if (unlikely(rc)) 3451 return rc; 3452 rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg); 3453 if (unlikely(rc)) 3454 security_msg_msg_free(msg); 3455 return rc; 3456 } 3457 3458 /** 3459 * security_msg_msg_free() - Free a sysv ipc message LSM blob 3460 * @msg: message structure 3461 * 3462 * Deallocate the security structure for this message. 3463 */ 3464 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg) 3465 { 3466 call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg); 3467 kfree(msg->security); 3468 msg->security = NULL; 3469 } 3470 3471 /** 3472 * security_msg_queue_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob 3473 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3474 * 3475 * Allocate and attach a security structure to @msg. The security field is 3476 * initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3477 * 3478 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3479 */ 3480 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3481 { 3482 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq); 3483 3484 if (unlikely(rc)) 3485 return rc; 3486 rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq); 3487 if (unlikely(rc)) 3488 security_msg_queue_free(msq); 3489 return rc; 3490 } 3491 3492 /** 3493 * security_msg_queue_free() - Free a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob 3494 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3495 * 3496 * Deallocate security field @perm->security for the message queue. 3497 */ 3498 void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3499 { 3500 call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq); 3501 kfree(msq->security); 3502 msq->security = NULL; 3503 } 3504 3505 /** 3506 * security_msg_queue_associate() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed 3507 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3508 * @msqflg: operation flags 3509 * 3510 * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the msgget system 3511 * call. This hook is only called when returning the message queue identifier 3512 * for an existing message queue, not when a new message queue is created. 3513 * 3514 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 3515 */ 3516 int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) 3517 { 3518 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg); 3519 } 3520 3521 /** 3522 * security_msg_queue_msgctl() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed 3523 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3524 * @cmd: operation 3525 * 3526 * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd is to be 3527 * performed on the message queue with permissions. 3528 * 3529 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3530 */ 3531 int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) 3532 { 3533 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd); 3534 } 3535 3536 /** 3537 * security_msg_queue_msgsnd() - Check if sending a sysv ipc message is allowed 3538 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3539 * @msg: message 3540 * @msqflg: operation flags 3541 * 3542 * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message queue 3543 * with permissions specified in @msq. 3544 * 3545 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3546 */ 3547 int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, 3548 struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) 3549 { 3550 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg); 3551 } 3552 3553 /** 3554 * security_msg_queue_msgrcv() - Check if receiving a sysv ipc msg is allowed 3555 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3556 * @msg: message 3557 * @target: target task 3558 * @type: type of message requested 3559 * @mode: operation flags 3560 * 3561 * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message queue. 3562 * The @target task structure contains a pointer to the process that will be 3563 * receiving the message (not equal to the current process when inline receives 3564 * are being performed). 3565 * 3566 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3567 */ 3568 int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, 3569 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) 3570 { 3571 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode); 3572 } 3573 3574 /** 3575 * security_shm_alloc() - Allocate a sysv shm LSM blob 3576 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3577 * 3578 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @shp security field. The 3579 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3580 * 3581 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3582 */ 3583 int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3584 { 3585 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp); 3586 3587 if (unlikely(rc)) 3588 return rc; 3589 rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp); 3590 if (unlikely(rc)) 3591 security_shm_free(shp); 3592 return rc; 3593 } 3594 3595 /** 3596 * security_shm_free() - Free a sysv shm LSM blob 3597 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3598 * 3599 * Deallocate the security structure @perm->security for the memory segment. 3600 */ 3601 void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3602 { 3603 call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp); 3604 kfree(shp->security); 3605 shp->security = NULL; 3606 } 3607 3608 /** 3609 * security_shm_associate() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed 3610 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3611 * @shmflg: operation flags 3612 * 3613 * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the shmget 3614 * system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared memory 3615 * region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared memory 3616 * region is created. 3617 * 3618 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3619 */ 3620 int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) 3621 { 3622 return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg); 3623 } 3624 3625 /** 3626 * security_shm_shmctl() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed 3627 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3628 * @cmd: operation 3629 * 3630 * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by @cmd is 3631 * to be performed on the shared memory region with permissions in @shp. 3632 * 3633 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 3634 */ 3635 int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) 3636 { 3637 return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd); 3638 } 3639 3640 /** 3641 * security_shm_shmat() - Check if a sysv shm attach operation is allowed 3642 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3643 * @shmaddr: address of memory region to attach 3644 * @shmflg: operation flags 3645 * 3646 * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the 3647 * shared memory segment with permissions @shp to the data segment of the 3648 * calling process. The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr. 3649 * 3650 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3651 */ 3652 int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) 3653 { 3654 return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg); 3655 } 3656 3657 /** 3658 * security_sem_alloc() - Allocate a sysv semaphore LSM blob 3659 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3660 * 3661 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @sma security field. The 3662 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3663 * 3664 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3665 */ 3666 int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3667 { 3668 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma); 3669 3670 if (unlikely(rc)) 3671 return rc; 3672 rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma); 3673 if (unlikely(rc)) 3674 security_sem_free(sma); 3675 return rc; 3676 } 3677 3678 /** 3679 * security_sem_free() - Free a sysv semaphore LSM blob 3680 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3681 * 3682 * Deallocate security structure @sma->security for the semaphore. 3683 */ 3684 void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3685 { 3686 call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma); 3687 kfree(sma->security); 3688 sma->security = NULL; 3689 } 3690 3691 /** 3692 * security_sem_associate() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3693 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3694 * @semflg: operation flags 3695 * 3696 * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget system 3697 * call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore identifier for 3698 * an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be created. 3699 * 3700 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3701 */ 3702 int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) 3703 { 3704 return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg); 3705 } 3706 3707 /** 3708 * security_sem_ctl() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3709 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3710 * @cmd: operation 3711 * 3712 * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be 3713 * performed on the semaphore. 3714 * 3715 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3716 */ 3717 int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) 3718 { 3719 return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd); 3720 } 3721 3722 /** 3723 * security_sem_semop() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3724 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3725 * @sops: operations to perform 3726 * @nsops: number of operations 3727 * @alter: flag indicating changes will be made 3728 * 3729 * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the semaphore 3730 * set. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set may be modified. 3731 * 3732 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3733 */ 3734 int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, 3735 unsigned nsops, int alter) 3736 { 3737 return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter); 3738 } 3739 3740 /** 3741 * security_d_instantiate() - Populate an inode's LSM state based on a dentry 3742 * @dentry: dentry 3743 * @inode: inode 3744 * 3745 * Fill in @inode security information for a @dentry if allowed. 3746 */ 3747 void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) 3748 { 3749 if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 3750 return; 3751 call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode); 3752 } 3753 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); 3754 3755 /** 3756 * security_getprocattr() - Read an attribute for a task 3757 * @p: the task 3758 * @lsm: LSM name 3759 * @name: attribute name 3760 * @value: attribute value 3761 * 3762 * Read attribute @name for task @p and store it into @value if allowed. 3763 * 3764 * Return: Returns the length of @value on success, a negative value otherwise. 3765 */ 3766 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, 3767 const char *name, char **value) 3768 { 3769 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3770 3771 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { 3772 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 3773 continue; 3774 return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); 3775 } 3776 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr); 3777 } 3778 3779 /** 3780 * security_setprocattr() - Set an attribute for a task 3781 * @lsm: LSM name 3782 * @name: attribute name 3783 * @value: attribute value 3784 * @size: attribute value size 3785 * 3786 * Write (set) the current task's attribute @name to @value, size @size if 3787 * allowed. 3788 * 3789 * Return: Returns bytes written on success, a negative value otherwise. 3790 */ 3791 int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, 3792 size_t size) 3793 { 3794 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3795 3796 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { 3797 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 3798 continue; 3799 return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); 3800 } 3801 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr); 3802 } 3803 3804 /** 3805 * security_netlink_send() - Save info and check if netlink sending is allowed 3806 * @sk: sending socket 3807 * @skb: netlink message 3808 * 3809 * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission checking 3810 * can be performed when the message is processed. The security information 3811 * can be saved using the eff_cap field of the netlink_skb_parms structure. 3812 * Also may be used to provide fine grained control over message transmission. 3813 * 3814 * Return: Returns 0 if the information was successfully saved and message is 3815 * allowed to be transmitted. 3816 */ 3817 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 3818 { 3819 return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb); 3820 } 3821 3822 /** 3823 * security_ismaclabel() - Check is the named attribute is a MAC label 3824 * @name: full extended attribute name 3825 * 3826 * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name represents a MAC label. 3827 * 3828 * Return: Returns 1 if name is a MAC attribute otherwise returns 0. 3829 */ 3830 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) 3831 { 3832 return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name); 3833 } 3834 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); 3835 3836 /** 3837 * security_secid_to_secctx() - Convert a secid to a secctx 3838 * @secid: secid 3839 * @secdata: secctx 3840 * @seclen: secctx length 3841 * 3842 * Convert secid to security context. If @secdata is NULL the length of the 3843 * result will be returned in @seclen, but no @secdata will be returned. This 3844 * does mean that the length could change between calls to check the length and 3845 * the next call which actually allocates and returns the @secdata. 3846 * 3847 * Return: Return 0 on success, error on failure. 3848 */ 3849 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) 3850 { 3851 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3852 int rc; 3853 3854 /* 3855 * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this 3856 * LSM hook is not "stackable"). 3857 */ 3858 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { 3859 rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); 3860 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx)) 3861 return rc; 3862 } 3863 3864 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx); 3865 } 3866 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); 3867 3868 /** 3869 * security_secctx_to_secid() - Convert a secctx to a secid 3870 * @secdata: secctx 3871 * @seclen: length of secctx 3872 * @secid: secid 3873 * 3874 * Convert security context to secid. 3875 * 3876 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3877 */ 3878 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) 3879 { 3880 *secid = 0; 3881 return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid); 3882 } 3883 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); 3884 3885 /** 3886 * security_release_secctx() - Free a secctx buffer 3887 * @secdata: secctx 3888 * @seclen: length of secctx 3889 * 3890 * Release the security context. 3891 */ 3892 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) 3893 { 3894 call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); 3895 } 3896 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); 3897 3898 /** 3899 * security_inode_invalidate_secctx() - Invalidate an inode's security label 3900 * @inode: inode 3901 * 3902 * Notify the security module that it must revalidate the security context of 3903 * an inode. 3904 */ 3905 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) 3906 { 3907 call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode); 3908 } 3909 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx); 3910 3911 /** 3912 * security_inode_notifysecctx() - Nofify the LSM of an inode's security label 3913 * @inode: inode 3914 * @ctx: secctx 3915 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 3916 * 3917 * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should 3918 * be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module 3919 * for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize 3920 * the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server 3921 * for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. 3922 * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked. 3923 * 3924 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3925 */ 3926 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 3927 { 3928 return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 3929 } 3930 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx); 3931 3932 /** 3933 * security_inode_setsecctx() - Change the security label of an inode 3934 * @dentry: inode 3935 * @ctx: secctx 3936 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 3937 * 3938 * Change the security context of an inode. Updates the incore security 3939 * context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed 3940 * (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the 3941 * context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security 3942 * context in its incore inode and on the backing filesystem to a value 3943 * provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. Must be called with 3944 * inode->i_mutex locked. 3945 * 3946 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3947 */ 3948 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 3949 { 3950 return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen); 3951 } 3952 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx); 3953 3954 /** 3955 * security_inode_getsecctx() - Get the security label of an inode 3956 * @inode: inode 3957 * @ctx: secctx 3958 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 3959 * 3960 * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security 3961 * context for the given @inode. 3962 * 3963 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3964 */ 3965 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) 3966 { 3967 return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 3968 } 3969 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx); 3970 3971 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE 3972 /** 3973 * security_post_notification() - Check if a watch notification can be posted 3974 * @w_cred: credentials of the task that set the watch 3975 * @cred: credentials of the task which triggered the watch 3976 * @n: the notification 3977 * 3978 * Check to see if a watch notification can be posted to a particular queue. 3979 * 3980 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3981 */ 3982 int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, 3983 const struct cred *cred, 3984 struct watch_notification *n) 3985 { 3986 return call_int_hook(post_notification, 0, w_cred, cred, n); 3987 } 3988 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */ 3989 3990 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS 3991 /** 3992 * security_watch_key() - Check if a task is allowed to watch for key events 3993 * @key: the key to watch 3994 * 3995 * Check to see if a process is allowed to watch for event notifications from 3996 * a key or keyring. 3997 * 3998 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3999 */ 4000 int security_watch_key(struct key *key) 4001 { 4002 return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key); 4003 } 4004 #endif 4005 4006 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK 4007 /** 4008 * security_unix_stream_connect() - Check if a AF_UNIX stream is allowed 4009 * @sock: originating sock 4010 * @other: peer sock 4011 * @newsk: new sock 4012 * 4013 * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection 4014 * between @sock and @other. 4015 * 4016 * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because 4017 * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix 4018 * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name 4019 * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod 4020 * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to 4021 * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient 4022 * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible 4023 * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target 4024 * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. 4025 * 4026 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4027 */ 4028 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) 4029 { 4030 return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk); 4031 } 4032 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect); 4033 4034 /** 4035 * security_unix_may_send() - Check if AF_UNIX socket can send datagrams 4036 * @sock: originating sock 4037 * @other: peer sock 4038 * 4039 * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to 4040 * @other. 4041 * 4042 * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because 4043 * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix 4044 * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name 4045 * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod 4046 * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to 4047 * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient 4048 * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible 4049 * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target 4050 * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. 4051 * 4052 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4053 */ 4054 int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) 4055 { 4056 return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other); 4057 } 4058 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send); 4059 4060 /** 4061 * security_socket_create() - Check if creating a new socket is allowed 4062 * @family: protocol family 4063 * @type: communications type 4064 * @protocol: requested protocol 4065 * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested 4066 * 4067 * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket. 4068 * 4069 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4070 */ 4071 int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) 4072 { 4073 return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern); 4074 } 4075 4076 /** 4077 * security_socket_create() - Initialize a newly created socket 4078 * @sock: socket 4079 * @family: protocol family 4080 * @type: communications type 4081 * @protocol: requested protocol 4082 * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested 4083 * 4084 * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security 4085 * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the socket 4086 * structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored in the 4087 * associated inode. Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will allocate 4088 * and attach security information to SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security. This hook 4089 * may be used to update the SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security field with additional 4090 * information that wasn't available when the inode was allocated. 4091 * 4092 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4093 */ 4094 int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, 4095 int type, int protocol, int kern) 4096 { 4097 return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type, 4098 protocol, kern); 4099 } 4100 4101 /** 4102 * security_socket_socketpair() - Check if creating a socketpair is allowed 4103 * @socka: first socket 4104 * @sockb: second socket 4105 * 4106 * Check permissions before creating a fresh pair of sockets. 4107 * 4108 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted and the connection was 4109 * established. 4110 */ 4111 int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) 4112 { 4113 return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb); 4114 } 4115 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair); 4116 4117 /** 4118 * security_socket_bind() - Check if a socket bind operation is allowed 4119 * @sock: socket 4120 * @address: requested bind address 4121 * @addrlen: length of address 4122 * 4123 * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is performed 4124 * and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the @address 4125 * parameter. 4126 * 4127 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4128 */ 4129 int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4130 { 4131 return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 4132 } 4133 4134 /** 4135 * security_socket_connect() - Check if a socket connect operation is allowed 4136 * @sock: socket 4137 * @address: address of remote connection point 4138 * @addrlen: length of address 4139 * 4140 * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation attempts to 4141 * connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address. 4142 * 4143 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4144 */ 4145 int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4146 { 4147 return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 4148 } 4149 4150 /** 4151 * security_socket_listen() - Check if a socket is allowed to listen 4152 * @sock: socket 4153 * @backlog: connection queue size 4154 * 4155 * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation. 4156 * 4157 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4158 */ 4159 int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) 4160 { 4161 return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog); 4162 } 4163 4164 /** 4165 * security_socket_accept() - Check if a socket is allowed to accept connections 4166 * @sock: listening socket 4167 * @newsock: newly creation connection socket 4168 * 4169 * Check permission before accepting a new connection. Note that the new 4170 * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it, but 4171 * the accept operation has not actually been performed. 4172 * 4173 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4174 */ 4175 int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) 4176 { 4177 return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock); 4178 } 4179 4180 /** 4181 * security_socket_sendmsg() - Check is sending a message is allowed 4182 * @sock: sending socket 4183 * @msg: message to send 4184 * @size: size of message 4185 * 4186 * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket. 4187 * 4188 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4189 */ 4190 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) 4191 { 4192 return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size); 4193 } 4194 4195 /** 4196 * security_socket_recvmsg() - Check if receiving a message is allowed 4197 * @sock: receiving socket 4198 * @msg: message to receive 4199 * @size: size of message 4200 * @flags: operational flags 4201 * 4202 * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket. 4203 * 4204 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4205 */ 4206 int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, 4207 int size, int flags) 4208 { 4209 return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags); 4210 } 4211 4212 /** 4213 * security_socket_getsockname() - Check if reading the socket addr is allowed 4214 * @sock: socket 4215 * 4216 * Check permission before reading the local address (name) of the socket 4217 * object. 4218 * 4219 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4220 */ 4221 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) 4222 { 4223 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock); 4224 } 4225 4226 /** 4227 * security_socket_getpeername() - Check if reading the peer's addr is allowed 4228 * @sock: socket 4229 * 4230 * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object. 4231 * 4232 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4233 */ 4234 int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) 4235 { 4236 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock); 4237 } 4238 4239 /** 4240 * security_socket_getsockopt() - Check if reading a socket option is allowed 4241 * @sock: socket 4242 * @level: option's protocol level 4243 * @optname: option name 4244 * 4245 * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket 4246 * @sock. 4247 * 4248 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4249 */ 4250 int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 4251 { 4252 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 4253 } 4254 4255 /** 4256 * security_socket_setsockopt() - Check if setting a socket option is allowed 4257 * @sock: socket 4258 * @level: option's protocol level 4259 * @optname: option name 4260 * 4261 * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket @sock. 4262 * 4263 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4264 */ 4265 int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 4266 { 4267 return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 4268 } 4269 4270 /** 4271 * security_socket_shutdown() - Checks if shutting down the socket is allowed 4272 * @sock: socket 4273 * @how: flag indicating how sends and receives are handled 4274 * 4275 * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket @sock is 4276 * shut down. 4277 * 4278 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4279 */ 4280 int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) 4281 { 4282 return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how); 4283 } 4284 4285 /** 4286 * security_sock_rcv_skb() - Check if an incoming network packet is allowed 4287 * @sk: destination sock 4288 * @skb: incoming packet 4289 * 4290 * Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct from 4291 * Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the incoming 4292 * sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk. Must not 4293 * sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks. 4294 * 4295 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4296 */ 4297 int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 4298 { 4299 return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb); 4300 } 4301 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); 4302 4303 /** 4304 * security_socket_getpeersec_stream() - Get the remote peer label 4305 * @sock: socket 4306 * @optval: destination buffer 4307 * @optlen: size of peer label copied into the buffer 4308 * @len: maximum size of the destination buffer 4309 * 4310 * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state 4311 * for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC. 4312 * For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the socket is associated with an 4313 * ipsec SA. 4314 * 4315 * Return: Returns 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return 4316 * values. 4317 */ 4318 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval, 4319 sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len) 4320 { 4321 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 4322 optval, optlen, len); 4323 } 4324 4325 /** 4326 * security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() - Get the remote peer label 4327 * @sock: socket 4328 * @skb: datagram packet 4329 * @secid: remote peer label secid 4330 * 4331 * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state 4332 * for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via getsockopt 4333 * SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated the IP_PASSSEC 4334 * option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the security state returned by 4335 * this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY ancillary message type. 4336 * 4337 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4338 */ 4339 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 4340 { 4341 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 4342 skb, secid); 4343 } 4344 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram); 4345 4346 /** 4347 * security_sk_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a sock's LSM blob 4348 * @sk: sock 4349 * @family: protocol family 4350 * @priotity: gfp flags 4351 * 4352 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field, which 4353 * is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets. 4354 * 4355 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4356 */ 4357 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) 4358 { 4359 return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority); 4360 } 4361 4362 /** 4363 * security_sk_free() - Free the sock's LSM blob 4364 * @sk: sock 4365 * 4366 * Deallocate security structure. 4367 */ 4368 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk) 4369 { 4370 call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk); 4371 } 4372 4373 /** 4374 * security_sk_clone() - Clone a sock's LSM state 4375 * @sk: original sock 4376 * @newsk: target sock 4377 * 4378 * Clone/copy security structure. 4379 */ 4380 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) 4381 { 4382 call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk); 4383 } 4384 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone); 4385 4386 void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic) 4387 { 4388 call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid); 4389 } 4390 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow); 4391 4392 /** 4393 * security_req_classify_flow() - Set a flow's secid based on request_sock 4394 * @req: request_sock 4395 * @flic: target flow 4396 * 4397 * Sets @flic's secid to @req's secid. 4398 */ 4399 void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, 4400 struct flowi_common *flic) 4401 { 4402 call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic); 4403 } 4404 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow); 4405 4406 /** 4407 * security_sock_graft() - Reconcile LSM state when grafting a sock on a socket 4408 * @sk: sock being grafted 4409 * @sock: target socket 4410 * 4411 * Sets @sock's inode secid to @sk's secid and update @sk with any necessary 4412 * LSM state from @sock. 4413 */ 4414 void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) 4415 { 4416 call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent); 4417 } 4418 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft); 4419 4420 /** 4421 * security_inet_conn_request() - Set request_sock state using incoming connect 4422 * @sk: parent listening sock 4423 * @skb: incoming connection 4424 * @req: new request_sock 4425 * 4426 * Initialize the @req LSM state based on @sk and the incoming connect in @skb. 4427 * 4428 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4429 */ 4430 int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, 4431 struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) 4432 { 4433 return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req); 4434 } 4435 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request); 4436 4437 /** 4438 * security_inet_csk_clone() - Set new sock LSM state based on request_sock 4439 * @newsk: new sock 4440 * @req: connection request_sock 4441 * 4442 * Set that LSM state of @sock using the LSM state from @req. 4443 */ 4444 void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, 4445 const struct request_sock *req) 4446 { 4447 call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req); 4448 } 4449 4450 /** 4451 * security_inet_conn_established() - Update sock's LSM state with connection 4452 * @sk: sock 4453 * @skb: connection packet 4454 * 4455 * Update @sock's LSM state to represent a new connection from @skb. 4456 */ 4457 void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, 4458 struct sk_buff *skb) 4459 { 4460 call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb); 4461 } 4462 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established); 4463 4464 /** 4465 * security_secmark_relabel_packet() - Check if setting a secmark is allowed 4466 * @secid: new secmark value 4467 * 4468 * Check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to @secid. 4469 * 4470 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4471 */ 4472 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid) 4473 { 4474 return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid); 4475 } 4476 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet); 4477 4478 /** 4479 * security_secmark_refcount_inc() - Increment the secmark labeling rule count 4480 * 4481 * Tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. 4482 */ 4483 void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void) 4484 { 4485 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc); 4486 } 4487 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc); 4488 4489 /** 4490 * security_secmark_refcount_dec() - Decrement the secmark labeling rule count 4491 * 4492 * Tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. 4493 */ 4494 void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void) 4495 { 4496 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec); 4497 } 4498 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec); 4499 4500 /** 4501 * security_tun_dev_alloc_security() - Allocate a LSM blob for a TUN device 4502 * @security: pointer to the LSM blob 4503 * 4504 * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN device, 4505 * returning the pointer in @security. 4506 * 4507 * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. 4508 */ 4509 int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) 4510 { 4511 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security); 4512 } 4513 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security); 4514 4515 /** 4516 * security_tun_dev_free_security() - Free a TUN device LSM blob 4517 * @security: LSM blob 4518 * 4519 * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN device. 4520 */ 4521 void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) 4522 { 4523 call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security); 4524 } 4525 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security); 4526 4527 /** 4528 * security_tun_dev_create() - Check if creating a TUN device is allowed 4529 * 4530 * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device. 4531 * 4532 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4533 */ 4534 int security_tun_dev_create(void) 4535 { 4536 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0); 4537 } 4538 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create); 4539 4540 /** 4541 * security_tun_dev_attach_queue() - Check if attaching a TUN queue is allowed 4542 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4543 * 4544 * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue. 4545 * 4546 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4547 */ 4548 int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) 4549 { 4550 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security); 4551 } 4552 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue); 4553 4554 /** 4555 * security_tun_dev_attach() - Update TUN device LSM state on attach 4556 * @sk: associated sock 4557 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4558 * 4559 * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated 4560 * with the TUN device's sock structure. 4561 * 4562 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4563 */ 4564 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) 4565 { 4566 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security); 4567 } 4568 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach); 4569 4570 /** 4571 * security_tun_dev_open() - Update TUN device LSM state on open 4572 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4573 * 4574 * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated 4575 * with the TUN device's security structure. 4576 * 4577 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4578 */ 4579 int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) 4580 { 4581 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security); 4582 } 4583 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open); 4584 4585 /** 4586 * security_sctp_assoc_request() - Update the LSM on a SCTP association req 4587 * @asoc: SCTP association 4588 * @skb: packet requesting the association 4589 * 4590 * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association INIT packet to the LSM. 4591 * 4592 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4593 */ 4594 int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sk_buff *skb) 4595 { 4596 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, asoc, skb); 4597 } 4598 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request); 4599 4600 /** 4601 * security_sctp_bind_connect() - Validate a list of addrs for a SCTP option 4602 * @sk: socket 4603 * @optname: SCTP option to validate 4604 * @address: list of IP addresses to validate 4605 * @addrlen: length of the address list 4606 * 4607 * Validiate permissions required for each address associated with sock @sk. 4608 * Depending on @optname, the addresses will be treated as either a connect or 4609 * bind service. The @addrlen is calculated on each IPv4 and IPv6 address using 4610 * sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6). 4611 * 4612 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4613 */ 4614 int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, 4615 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4616 { 4617 return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname, 4618 address, addrlen); 4619 } 4620 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect); 4621 4622 /** 4623 * security_sctp_sk_clone() - Clone a SCTP sock's LSM state 4624 * @asoc: SCTP association 4625 * @sk: original sock 4626 * @newsk: target sock 4627 * 4628 * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) (i.e. a TCP style 4629 * socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls 4630 * sctp_peeloff(3). 4631 */ 4632 void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk, 4633 struct sock *newsk) 4634 { 4635 call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, asoc, sk, newsk); 4636 } 4637 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone); 4638 4639 /** 4640 * security_sctp_assoc_established() - Update LSM state when assoc established 4641 * @asoc: SCTP association 4642 * @skb: packet establishing the association 4643 * 4644 * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association COOKIE_ACK packet to the 4645 * security module. 4646 * 4647 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4648 */ 4649 int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc, 4650 struct sk_buff *skb) 4651 { 4652 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, 0, asoc, skb); 4653 } 4654 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established); 4655 4656 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ 4657 4658 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND 4659 4660 /** 4661 * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed 4662 * @sec: LSM blob 4663 * @subnet_prefix: subnet prefix of the port 4664 * @pkey: IB pkey 4665 * 4666 * Check permission to access a pkey when modifing a QP. 4667 * 4668 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4669 */ 4670 int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey) 4671 { 4672 return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey); 4673 } 4674 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access); 4675 4676 /** 4677 * security_ib_endport_manage_subnet() - Check if SMPs traffic is allowed 4678 * @sec: LSM blob 4679 * @dev_name: IB device name 4680 * @port_num: port number 4681 * 4682 * Check permissions to send and receive SMPs on a end port. 4683 * 4684 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4685 */ 4686 int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) 4687 { 4688 return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec, dev_name, port_num); 4689 } 4690 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet); 4691 4692 /** 4693 * security_ib_alloc_security() - Allocate an Infiniband LSM blob 4694 * @sec: LSM blob 4695 * 4696 * Allocate a security structure for Infiniband objects. 4697 * 4698 * Return: Returns 0 on success, non-zero on failure. 4699 */ 4700 int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec) 4701 { 4702 return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec); 4703 } 4704 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security); 4705 4706 /** 4707 * security_ib_free_security() - Free an Infiniband LSM blob 4708 * @sec: LSM blob 4709 * 4710 * Deallocate an Infiniband security structure. 4711 */ 4712 void security_ib_free_security(void *sec) 4713 { 4714 call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec); 4715 } 4716 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security); 4717 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ 4718 4719 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM 4720 4721 /** 4722 * security_xfrm_policy_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm policy LSM blob 4723 * @ctxp: xfrm security context being added to the SPD 4724 * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace 4725 * @gfp: gfp flags 4726 * 4727 * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security field 4728 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated. 4729 * 4730 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4731 */ 4732 int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, 4733 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, 4734 gfp_t gfp) 4735 { 4736 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp); 4737 } 4738 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc); 4739 4740 /** 4741 * security_xfrm_policy_clone() - Clone xfrm policy LSM state 4742 * @old_ctx: xfrm security context 4743 * @new_ctxp: target xfrm security context 4744 * 4745 * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the information from 4746 * the old_ctx structure. 4747 * 4748 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4749 */ 4750 int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, 4751 struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) 4752 { 4753 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp); 4754 } 4755 4756 /** 4757 * security_xfrm_policy_free() - Free a xfrm security context 4758 * @ctx: xfrm security context 4759 * 4760 * Free LSM resources associated with @ctx. 4761 */ 4762 void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 4763 { 4764 call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx); 4765 } 4766 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free); 4767 4768 /** 4769 * security_xfrm_policy_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm policy is allowed 4770 * @ctx: xfrm security context 4771 * 4772 * Authorize deletion of a SPD entry. 4773 * 4774 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4775 */ 4776 int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 4777 { 4778 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx); 4779 } 4780 4781 /** 4782 * security_xfrm_state_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob 4783 * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD 4784 * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace 4785 * 4786 * Allocate a security structure to the @x->security field; the security field 4787 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to 4788 * correspond to @sec_ctx. 4789 * 4790 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4791 */ 4792 int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, 4793 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) 4794 { 4795 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx); 4796 } 4797 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc); 4798 4799 /** 4800 * security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob 4801 * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD 4802 * @polsec: associated policy's security context 4803 * @secid: secid from the flow 4804 * 4805 * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security field 4806 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to 4807 * correspond to secid. 4808 * 4809 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. 4810 */ 4811 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, 4812 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) 4813 { 4814 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid); 4815 } 4816 4817 /** 4818 * security_xfrm_state_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm state is allowed 4819 * @x: xfrm state 4820 * 4821 * Authorize deletion of x->security. 4822 * 4823 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4824 */ 4825 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) 4826 { 4827 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x); 4828 } 4829 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete); 4830 4831 /** 4832 * security_xfrm_state_free() - Free a xfrm state 4833 * @x: xfrm state 4834 * 4835 * Deallocate x->security. 4836 */ 4837 void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) 4838 { 4839 call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x); 4840 } 4841 4842 /** 4843 * security_xfrm_policy_lookup() - Check if using a xfrm policy is allowed 4844 * @ctx: target xfrm security context 4845 * @fl_secid: flow secid used to authorize access 4846 * 4847 * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing XFRMs on a 4848 * packet. The hook is called when selecting either a per-socket policy or a 4849 * generic xfrm policy. 4850 * 4851 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno on 4852 * other errors. 4853 */ 4854 int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid) 4855 { 4856 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid); 4857 } 4858 4859 /** 4860 * security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() - Check for a xfrm match 4861 * @x: xfrm state to match 4862 * @xp xfrm policy to check for a match 4863 * @flic: flow to check for a match. 4864 * 4865 * Check @xp and @flic for a match with @x. 4866 * 4867 * Return: Returns 1 if there is a match. 4868 */ 4869 int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, 4870 struct xfrm_policy *xp, 4871 const struct flowi_common *flic) 4872 { 4873 struct security_hook_list *hp; 4874 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); 4875 4876 /* 4877 * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment 4878 * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately, 4879 * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux 4880 * supplies this call. 4881 * 4882 * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than 4883 * using the macro 4884 */ 4885 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, 4886 list) { 4887 rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic); 4888 break; 4889 } 4890 return rc; 4891 } 4892 4893 /** 4894 * security_xfrm_decode_session() - Determine the xfrm secid for a packet 4895 * @skb: xfrm packet 4896 * @secid: secid 4897 * 4898 * Decode the packet in @skb and return the security label in @secid. 4899 * 4900 * Return: Return 0 if all xfrms used have the same secid. 4901 */ 4902 int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 4903 { 4904 return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1); 4905 } 4906 4907 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic) 4908 { 4909 int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid, 4910 0); 4911 4912 BUG_ON(rc); 4913 } 4914 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow); 4915 4916 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ 4917 4918 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS 4919 4920 /** 4921 * security_key_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a kernel key LSM blob 4922 * @key: key 4923 * @cred: credentials 4924 * @flags: allocation flags 4925 * 4926 * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does not 4927 * have a serial number assigned at this point. 4928 * 4929 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. 4930 */ 4931 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, 4932 unsigned long flags) 4933 { 4934 return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags); 4935 } 4936 4937 /** 4938 * security_key_free() - Free a kernel key LSM blob 4939 * @key: key 4940 * 4941 * Notification of destruction; free security data. 4942 */ 4943 void security_key_free(struct key *key) 4944 { 4945 call_void_hook(key_free, key); 4946 } 4947 4948 /** 4949 * security_key_permission() - Check if a kernel key operation is allowed 4950 * @key_ref: key reference 4951 * @cred: credentials of actor requesting access 4952 * @need_perm: requested permissions 4953 * 4954 * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a key. 4955 * 4956 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. 4957 */ 4958 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, 4959 enum key_need_perm need_perm) 4960 { 4961 return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm); 4962 } 4963 4964 /** 4965 * security_key_getsecurity() - Get the key's security label 4966 * @key: key 4967 * @buffer: security label buffer 4968 * 4969 * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key for 4970 * the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function allocates the 4971 * storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller should free it. 4972 * 4973 * Return: Returns the length of @buffer (including terminating NUL) or -ve if 4974 * an error occurs. May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if 4975 * there is no security label assigned to the key. 4976 */ 4977 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) 4978 { 4979 *_buffer = NULL; 4980 return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer); 4981 } 4982 4983 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ 4984 4985 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT 4986 4987 /** 4988 * security_audit_rule_init() - Allocate and init an LSM audit rule struct 4989 * @field: audit action 4990 * @op: rule operator 4991 * @rulestr: rule context 4992 * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct 4993 * 4994 * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. 4995 * 4996 * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of 4997 * an invalid rule. 4998 */ 4999 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) 5000 { 5001 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); 5002 } 5003 5004 /** 5005 * security_audit_rule_known() - Check if an audit rule contains LSM fields 5006 * @krule: audit rule 5007 * 5008 * Specifies whether given @krule contains any fields related to the current 5009 * LSM. 5010 * 5011 * Return: Returns 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise. 5012 */ 5013 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) 5014 { 5015 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule); 5016 } 5017 5018 /** 5019 * security_audit_rule_free() - Free an LSM audit rule struct 5020 * @lsmrule: audit rule struct 5021 * 5022 * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by 5023 * audit_rule_init(). 5024 */ 5025 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) 5026 { 5027 call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); 5028 } 5029 5030 /** 5031 * security_audit_rule_match() - Check if a label matches an audit rule 5032 * @secid: security label 5033 * @field: LSM audit field 5034 * @op: matching operator 5035 * @lsmrule: audit rule 5036 * 5037 * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved by 5038 * security_audit_rule_known(). 5039 * 5040 * Return: Returns 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on 5041 * failure. 5042 */ 5043 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) 5044 { 5045 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule); 5046 } 5047 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ 5048 5049 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL 5050 /** 5051 * security_bpf() - Check if the bpf syscall operation is allowed 5052 * @cmd: command 5053 * @attr: bpf attribute 5054 * @size: size 5055 * 5056 * Do a initial check for all bpf syscalls after the attribute is copied into 5057 * the kernel. The actual security module can implement their own rules to 5058 * check the specific cmd they need. 5059 * 5060 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5061 */ 5062 int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) 5063 { 5064 return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size); 5065 } 5066 5067 /** 5068 * security_bpf_map() - Check if access to a bpf map is allowed 5069 * @map: bpf map 5070 * @fmode: mode 5071 * 5072 * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF 5073 * maps. 5074 * 5075 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5076 */ 5077 int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) 5078 { 5079 return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode); 5080 } 5081 5082 /** 5083 * security_bpf_prog() - Check if access to a bpf program is allowed 5084 * @prog: bpf program 5085 * 5086 * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF 5087 * programs. 5088 * 5089 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5090 */ 5091 int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) 5092 { 5093 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog); 5094 } 5095 5096 /** 5097 * security_bpf_map_alloc() - Allocate a bpf map LSM blob 5098 * @map: bpf map 5099 * 5100 * Initialize the security field inside bpf map. 5101 * 5102 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5103 */ 5104 int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) 5105 { 5106 return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map); 5107 } 5108 5109 /** 5110 * security_bpf_prog_alloc() - Allocate a bpf program LSM blob 5111 * @aux: bpf program aux info struct 5112 * 5113 * Initialize the security field inside bpf program. 5114 * 5115 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5116 */ 5117 int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 5118 { 5119 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux); 5120 } 5121 5122 /** 5123 * security_bpf_map_free() - Free a bpf map's LSM blob 5124 * @map: bpf map 5125 * 5126 * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf map. 5127 */ 5128 void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) 5129 { 5130 call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map); 5131 } 5132 5133 /** 5134 * security_bpf_prog_free() - Free a bpf program's LSM blob 5135 * @aux: bpf program aux info struct 5136 * 5137 * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog. 5138 */ 5139 void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 5140 { 5141 call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); 5142 } 5143 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ 5144 5145 /** 5146 * security_locked_down() - Check if a kernel feature is allowed 5147 * @what: requested kernel feature 5148 * 5149 * Determine whether a kernel feature that potentially enables arbitrary code 5150 * execution in kernel space should be permitted. 5151 * 5152 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5153 */ 5154 int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) 5155 { 5156 return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what); 5157 } 5158 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down); 5159 5160 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 5161 /** 5162 * security_perf_event_open() - Check if a perf event open is allowed 5163 * @attr: perf event attribute 5164 * @type: type of event 5165 * 5166 * Check whether the @type of perf_event_open syscall is allowed. 5167 * 5168 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5169 */ 5170 int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) 5171 { 5172 return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type); 5173 } 5174 5175 /** 5176 * security_perf_event_alloc() - Allocate a perf event LSM blob 5177 * @event: perf event 5178 * 5179 * Allocate and save perf_event security info. 5180 * 5181 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5182 */ 5183 int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) 5184 { 5185 return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event); 5186 } 5187 5188 /** 5189 * security_perf_event_free() - Free a perf event LSM blob 5190 * @event: perf event 5191 * 5192 * Release (free) perf_event security info. 5193 */ 5194 void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) 5195 { 5196 call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event); 5197 } 5198 5199 /** 5200 * security_perf_event_read() - Check if reading a perf event label is allowed 5201 * @event: perf event 5202 * 5203 * Read perf_event security info if allowed. 5204 * 5205 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5206 */ 5207 int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) 5208 { 5209 return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event); 5210 } 5211 5212 /** 5213 * security_perf_event_write() - Check if writing a perf event label is allowed 5214 * @event: perf event 5215 * 5216 * Write perf_event security info if allowed. 5217 * 5218 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5219 */ 5220 int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) 5221 { 5222 return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event); 5223 } 5224 #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */ 5225 5226 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING 5227 /** 5228 * security_uring_override_creds() - Check if overriding creds is allowed 5229 * @new: new credentials 5230 * 5231 * Check if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to 5232 * override it's credentials with @new. 5233 * 5234 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5235 */ 5236 int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) 5237 { 5238 return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, 0, new); 5239 } 5240 5241 /** 5242 * security_uring_sqpoll() - Check if IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL is allowed 5243 * 5244 * Check whether the current task is allowed to spawn a io_uring polling thread 5245 * (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). 5246 * 5247 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5248 */ 5249 int security_uring_sqpoll(void) 5250 { 5251 return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0); 5252 } 5253 5254 /** 5255 * security_uring_cmd() - Check if a io_uring passthrough command is allowed 5256 * @ioucmd: command 5257 * 5258 * Check whether the file_operations uring_cmd is allowed to run. 5259 * 5260 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5261 */ 5262 int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) 5263 { 5264 return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd); 5265 } 5266 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ 5267