1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later 2 /* 3 * Security plug functions 4 * 5 * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com> 6 * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> 7 * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com> 8 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies 9 * Copyright (C) 2023 Microsoft Corporation <paul@paul-moore.com> 10 */ 11 12 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt 13 14 #include <linux/bpf.h> 15 #include <linux/capability.h> 16 #include <linux/dcache.h> 17 #include <linux/export.h> 18 #include <linux/init.h> 19 #include <linux/kernel.h> 20 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> 21 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> 22 #include <linux/integrity.h> 23 #include <linux/ima.h> 24 #include <linux/evm.h> 25 #include <linux/fsnotify.h> 26 #include <linux/mman.h> 27 #include <linux/mount.h> 28 #include <linux/personality.h> 29 #include <linux/backing-dev.h> 30 #include <linux/string.h> 31 #include <linux/msg.h> 32 #include <net/flow.h> 33 34 /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ 35 #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) 36 37 /* 38 * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the 39 * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows 40 * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing 41 * purposes. 42 */ 43 const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX + 1] = { 44 [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", 45 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", 46 [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", 47 [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access", 48 [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", 49 [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", 50 [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", 51 [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", 52 [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", 53 [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", 54 [LOCKDOWN_DEVICE_TREE] = "modifying device tree contents", 55 [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage", 56 [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO", 57 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters", 58 [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio", 59 [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access", 60 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access", 61 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM", 62 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM", 63 [LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection", 64 [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", 65 [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", 66 [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", 67 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", 68 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM", 69 [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", 70 [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", 71 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access", 72 [LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret", 73 [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", 74 }; 75 76 struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __ro_after_init; 77 static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain); 78 79 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; 80 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; 81 82 char *lsm_names; 83 static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __ro_after_init; 84 85 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ 86 static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; 87 static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm; 88 89 static __initconst const char *const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM; 90 91 /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ 92 static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms; 93 static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive; 94 95 static __initdata bool debug; 96 #define init_debug(...) \ 97 do { \ 98 if (debug) \ 99 pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \ 100 } while (0) 101 102 static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm) 103 { 104 if (!lsm->enabled) 105 return false; 106 107 return *lsm->enabled; 108 } 109 110 /* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */ 111 static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1; 112 static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0; 113 static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled) 114 { 115 /* 116 * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use 117 * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state. 118 */ 119 if (!lsm->enabled) { 120 if (enabled) 121 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 122 else 123 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 124 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) { 125 if (!enabled) 126 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 127 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) { 128 if (enabled) 129 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 130 } else { 131 *lsm->enabled = enabled; 132 } 133 } 134 135 /* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */ 136 static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 137 { 138 struct lsm_info **check; 139 140 for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++) 141 if (*check == lsm) 142 return true; 143 144 return false; 145 } 146 147 /* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */ 148 static int last_lsm __initdata; 149 static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from) 150 { 151 /* Ignore duplicate selections. */ 152 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 153 return; 154 155 if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from)) 156 return; 157 158 /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */ 159 if (!lsm->enabled) 160 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 161 ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm; 162 163 init_debug("%s ordered: %s (%s)\n", from, lsm->name, 164 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 165 } 166 167 /* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */ 168 static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm) 169 { 170 /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */ 171 if (!is_enabled(lsm)) 172 return false; 173 174 /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */ 175 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) { 176 init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name); 177 return false; 178 } 179 180 return true; 181 } 182 183 static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs) 184 { 185 int offset; 186 187 if (*need <= 0) 188 return; 189 190 offset = ALIGN(*lbs, sizeof(void *)); 191 *lbs = offset + *need; 192 *need = offset; 193 } 194 195 static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) 196 { 197 if (!needed) 198 return; 199 200 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 201 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file); 202 /* 203 * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to 204 * what the modules might need. 205 */ 206 if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0) 207 blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head); 208 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 209 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 210 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 211 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 212 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); 213 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_xattr_count, 214 &blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count); 215 } 216 217 /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ 218 static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 219 { 220 int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm); 221 222 /* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */ 223 set_enabled(lsm, enabled); 224 225 /* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */ 226 if (enabled) { 227 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) { 228 exclusive = lsm; 229 init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name); 230 } 231 232 lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs); 233 } 234 } 235 236 /* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */ 237 static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 238 { 239 if (is_enabled(lsm)) { 240 int ret; 241 242 init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name); 243 ret = lsm->init(); 244 WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret); 245 } 246 } 247 248 /* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */ 249 static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) 250 { 251 struct lsm_info *lsm; 252 char *sep, *name, *next; 253 254 /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */ 255 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 256 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST) 257 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " first"); 258 } 259 260 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 261 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 262 struct lsm_info *major; 263 264 /* 265 * To match the original "security=" behavior, this 266 * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major 267 * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable 268 * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs. 269 */ 270 for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info; 271 major++) { 272 if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) && 273 strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) { 274 set_enabled(major, false); 275 init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s (only one legacy major LSM)\n", 276 chosen_major_lsm, major->name); 277 } 278 } 279 } 280 281 sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL); 282 next = sep; 283 /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */ 284 while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) { 285 bool found = false; 286 287 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 288 if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) { 289 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE) 290 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin); 291 found = true; 292 } 293 } 294 295 if (!found) 296 init_debug("%s ignored: %s (not built into kernel)\n", 297 origin, name); 298 } 299 300 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 301 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 302 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 303 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 304 continue; 305 if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0) 306 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security="); 307 } 308 } 309 310 /* LSM_ORDER_LAST is always last. */ 311 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 312 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST) 313 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " last"); 314 } 315 316 /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */ 317 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 318 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 319 continue; 320 set_enabled(lsm, false); 321 init_debug("%s skipped: %s (not in requested order)\n", 322 origin, lsm->name); 323 } 324 325 kfree(sep); 326 } 327 328 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred); 329 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task); 330 331 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result); 332 333 static void __init report_lsm_order(void) 334 { 335 struct lsm_info **lsm, *early; 336 int first = 0; 337 338 pr_info("initializing lsm="); 339 340 /* Report each enabled LSM name, comma separated. */ 341 for (early = __start_early_lsm_info; 342 early < __end_early_lsm_info; early++) 343 if (is_enabled(early)) 344 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", early->name); 345 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 346 if (is_enabled(*lsm)) 347 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", (*lsm)->name); 348 349 pr_cont("\n"); 350 } 351 352 static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) 353 { 354 struct lsm_info **lsm; 355 356 ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms), 357 GFP_KERNEL); 358 359 if (chosen_lsm_order) { 360 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 361 pr_warn("security=%s is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=%s\n", 362 chosen_major_lsm, chosen_lsm_order); 363 chosen_major_lsm = NULL; 364 } 365 ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline"); 366 } else 367 ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin"); 368 369 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 370 prepare_lsm(*lsm); 371 372 report_lsm_order(); 373 374 init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 375 init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file); 376 init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 377 init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 378 init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 379 init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 380 init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); 381 init_debug("xattr slots = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count); 382 383 /* 384 * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs 385 */ 386 if (blob_sizes.lbs_file) 387 lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache", 388 blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0, 389 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 390 if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode) 391 lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache", 392 blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0, 393 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 394 395 lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred); 396 lsm_early_task(current); 397 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 398 initialize_lsm(*lsm); 399 400 kfree(ordered_lsms); 401 } 402 403 int __init early_security_init(void) 404 { 405 struct lsm_info *lsm; 406 407 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 408 INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&security_hook_heads.NAME); 409 #include "linux/lsm_hook_defs.h" 410 #undef LSM_HOOK 411 412 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 413 if (!lsm->enabled) 414 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 415 prepare_lsm(lsm); 416 initialize_lsm(lsm); 417 } 418 419 return 0; 420 } 421 422 /** 423 * security_init - initializes the security framework 424 * 425 * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence. 426 */ 427 int __init security_init(void) 428 { 429 struct lsm_info *lsm; 430 431 init_debug("legacy security=%s\n", chosen_major_lsm ? : " *unspecified*"); 432 init_debug(" CONFIG_LSM=%s\n", builtin_lsm_order); 433 init_debug("boot arg lsm=%s\n", chosen_lsm_order ? : " *unspecified*"); 434 435 /* 436 * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is 437 * available 438 */ 439 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 440 init_debug(" early started: %s (%s)\n", lsm->name, 441 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 442 if (lsm->enabled) 443 lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names); 444 } 445 446 /* Load LSMs in specified order. */ 447 ordered_lsm_init(); 448 449 return 0; 450 } 451 452 /* Save user chosen LSM */ 453 static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str) 454 { 455 chosen_major_lsm = str; 456 return 1; 457 } 458 __setup("security=", choose_major_lsm); 459 460 /* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */ 461 static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str) 462 { 463 chosen_lsm_order = str; 464 return 1; 465 } 466 __setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order); 467 468 /* Enable LSM order debugging. */ 469 static int __init enable_debug(char *str) 470 { 471 debug = true; 472 return 1; 473 } 474 __setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug); 475 476 static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm) 477 { 478 const char *last; 479 480 if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm)) 481 return false; 482 last = strrchr(list, ','); 483 if (last) 484 /* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */ 485 last++; 486 else 487 last = list; 488 return !strcmp(last, lsm); 489 } 490 491 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) 492 { 493 char *cp; 494 495 if (*result == NULL) { 496 *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL); 497 if (*result == NULL) 498 return -ENOMEM; 499 } else { 500 /* Check if it is the last registered name */ 501 if (match_last_lsm(*result, new)) 502 return 0; 503 cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new); 504 if (cp == NULL) 505 return -ENOMEM; 506 kfree(*result); 507 *result = cp; 508 } 509 return 0; 510 } 511 512 /** 513 * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. 514 * @hooks: the hooks to add 515 * @count: the number of hooks to add 516 * @lsm: the name of the security module 517 * 518 * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. 519 */ 520 void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, 521 const char *lsm) 522 { 523 int i; 524 525 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { 526 hooks[i].lsm = lsm; 527 hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); 528 } 529 530 /* 531 * Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back 532 * and fix this up afterwards. 533 */ 534 if (slab_is_available()) { 535 if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0) 536 panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__); 537 } 538 } 539 540 int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) 541 { 542 return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 543 event, data); 544 } 545 EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier); 546 547 int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 548 { 549 return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 550 nb); 551 } 552 EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier); 553 554 int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 555 { 556 return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 557 nb); 558 } 559 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier); 560 561 /** 562 * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob 563 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 564 * @gfp: allocation type 565 * 566 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 567 * 568 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 569 */ 570 static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 571 { 572 if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) { 573 cred->security = NULL; 574 return 0; 575 } 576 577 cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp); 578 if (cred->security == NULL) 579 return -ENOMEM; 580 return 0; 581 } 582 583 /** 584 * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob 585 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 586 * 587 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 588 */ 589 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred) 590 { 591 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL); 592 593 if (rc) 594 panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__); 595 } 596 597 /** 598 * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob 599 * @file: the file that needs a blob 600 * 601 * Allocate the file blob for all the modules 602 * 603 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 604 */ 605 static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file) 606 { 607 if (!lsm_file_cache) { 608 file->f_security = NULL; 609 return 0; 610 } 611 612 file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL); 613 if (file->f_security == NULL) 614 return -ENOMEM; 615 return 0; 616 } 617 618 /** 619 * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob 620 * @inode: the inode that needs a blob 621 * 622 * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules 623 * 624 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 625 */ 626 int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 627 { 628 if (!lsm_inode_cache) { 629 inode->i_security = NULL; 630 return 0; 631 } 632 633 inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); 634 if (inode->i_security == NULL) 635 return -ENOMEM; 636 return 0; 637 } 638 639 /** 640 * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob 641 * @task: the task that needs a blob 642 * 643 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 644 * 645 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 646 */ 647 static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) 648 { 649 if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) { 650 task->security = NULL; 651 return 0; 652 } 653 654 task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL); 655 if (task->security == NULL) 656 return -ENOMEM; 657 return 0; 658 } 659 660 /** 661 * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob 662 * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob 663 * 664 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 665 * 666 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 667 */ 668 static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip) 669 { 670 if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) { 671 kip->security = NULL; 672 return 0; 673 } 674 675 kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL); 676 if (kip->security == NULL) 677 return -ENOMEM; 678 return 0; 679 } 680 681 /** 682 * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob 683 * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob 684 * 685 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 686 * 687 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 688 */ 689 static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp) 690 { 691 if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) { 692 mp->security = NULL; 693 return 0; 694 } 695 696 mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL); 697 if (mp->security == NULL) 698 return -ENOMEM; 699 return 0; 700 } 701 702 /** 703 * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob 704 * @task: the task that needs a blob 705 * 706 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 707 */ 708 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) 709 { 710 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 711 712 if (rc) 713 panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__); 714 } 715 716 /** 717 * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob 718 * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob 719 * 720 * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules 721 * 722 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 723 */ 724 static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 725 { 726 if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) { 727 sb->s_security = NULL; 728 return 0; 729 } 730 731 sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL); 732 if (sb->s_security == NULL) 733 return -ENOMEM; 734 return 0; 735 } 736 737 /* 738 * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and 739 * can be accessed with: 740 * 741 * LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) 742 * 743 * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each 744 * LSM hook. 745 */ 746 #define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default) 747 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME) 748 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \ 749 static const int __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT); 750 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 751 DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME) 752 753 #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h> 754 #undef LSM_HOOK 755 756 /* 757 * Hook list operation macros. 758 * 759 * call_void_hook: 760 * This is a hook that does not return a value. 761 * 762 * call_int_hook: 763 * This is a hook that returns a value. 764 */ 765 766 #define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \ 767 do { \ 768 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 769 \ 770 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \ 771 P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 772 } while (0) 773 774 #define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \ 775 int RC = IRC; \ 776 do { \ 777 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 778 \ 779 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ 780 RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 781 if (RC != 0) \ 782 break; \ 783 } \ 784 } while (0); \ 785 RC; \ 786 }) 787 788 /* Security operations */ 789 790 /** 791 * security_binder_set_context_mgr() - Check if becoming binder ctx mgr is ok 792 * @mgr: task credentials of current binder process 793 * 794 * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager. 795 * 796 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 797 */ 798 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr) 799 { 800 return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr); 801 } 802 803 /** 804 * security_binder_transaction() - Check if a binder transaction is allowed 805 * @from: sending process 806 * @to: receiving process 807 * 808 * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call to @to. 809 * 810 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 811 */ 812 int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from, 813 const struct cred *to) 814 { 815 return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to); 816 } 817 818 /** 819 * security_binder_transfer_binder() - Check if a binder transfer is allowed 820 * @from: sending process 821 * @to: receiving process 822 * 823 * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to. 824 * 825 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 826 */ 827 int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, 828 const struct cred *to) 829 { 830 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to); 831 } 832 833 /** 834 * security_binder_transfer_file() - Check if a binder file xfer is allowed 835 * @from: sending process 836 * @to: receiving process 837 * @file: file being transferred 838 * 839 * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to. 840 * 841 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 842 */ 843 int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, 844 const struct cred *to, struct file *file) 845 { 846 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file); 847 } 848 849 /** 850 * security_ptrace_access_check() - Check if tracing is allowed 851 * @child: target process 852 * @mode: PTRACE_MODE flags 853 * 854 * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the @child 855 * process. Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check 856 * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of tracing check 857 * during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of binprm_security_ops if the 858 * process is being traced and its security attributes would be changed by the 859 * execve. 860 * 861 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 862 */ 863 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) 864 { 865 return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode); 866 } 867 868 /** 869 * security_ptrace_traceme() - Check if tracing is allowed 870 * @parent: tracing process 871 * 872 * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the 873 * current process before allowing the current process to present itself to the 874 * @parent process for tracing. 875 * 876 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 877 */ 878 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) 879 { 880 return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent); 881 } 882 883 /** 884 * security_capget() - Get the capability sets for a process 885 * @target: target process 886 * @effective: effective capability set 887 * @inheritable: inheritable capability set 888 * @permitted: permitted capability set 889 * 890 * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the 891 * @target process. The hook may also perform permission checking to determine 892 * if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets of the @target 893 * process. 894 * 895 * Return: Returns 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained. 896 */ 897 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, 898 kernel_cap_t *effective, 899 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 900 kernel_cap_t *permitted) 901 { 902 return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target, 903 effective, inheritable, permitted); 904 } 905 906 /** 907 * security_capset() - Set the capability sets for a process 908 * @new: new credentials for the target process 909 * @old: current credentials of the target process 910 * @effective: effective capability set 911 * @inheritable: inheritable capability set 912 * @permitted: permitted capability set 913 * 914 * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the 915 * current process. 916 * 917 * Return: Returns 0 and update @new if permission is granted. 918 */ 919 int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 920 const kernel_cap_t *effective, 921 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 922 const kernel_cap_t *permitted) 923 { 924 return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old, 925 effective, inheritable, permitted); 926 } 927 928 /** 929 * security_capable() - Check if a process has the necessary capability 930 * @cred: credentials to examine 931 * @ns: user namespace 932 * @cap: capability requested 933 * @opts: capability check options 934 * 935 * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated 936 * credentials. @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. 937 * @opts contains options for the capable check <include/linux/security.h>. 938 * 939 * Return: Returns 0 if the capability is granted. 940 */ 941 int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, 942 struct user_namespace *ns, 943 int cap, 944 unsigned int opts) 945 { 946 return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); 947 } 948 949 /** 950 * security_quotactl() - Check if a quotactl() syscall is allowed for this fs 951 * @cmds: commands 952 * @type: type 953 * @id: id 954 * @sb: filesystem 955 * 956 * Check whether the quotactl syscall is allowed for this @sb. 957 * 958 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 959 */ 960 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) 961 { 962 return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb); 963 } 964 965 /** 966 * security_quota_on() - Check if QUOTAON is allowed for a dentry 967 * @dentry: dentry 968 * 969 * Check whether QUOTAON is allowed for @dentry. 970 * 971 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 972 */ 973 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) 974 { 975 return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry); 976 } 977 978 /** 979 * security_syslog() - Check if accessing the kernel message ring is allowed 980 * @type: SYSLOG_ACTION_* type 981 * 982 * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing 983 * logging to the console. See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of 984 * the @type values. 985 * 986 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 987 */ 988 int security_syslog(int type) 989 { 990 return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type); 991 } 992 993 /** 994 * security_settime64() - Check if changing the system time is allowed 995 * @ts: new time 996 * @tz: timezone 997 * 998 * Check permission to change the system time, struct timespec64 is defined in 999 * <include/linux/time64.h> and timezone is defined in <include/linux/time.h>. 1000 * 1001 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1002 */ 1003 int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz) 1004 { 1005 return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz); 1006 } 1007 1008 /** 1009 * security_vm_enough_memory_mm() - Check if allocating a new mem map is allowed 1010 * @mm: mm struct 1011 * @pages: number of pages 1012 * 1013 * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping. If all LSMs return 1014 * a positive value, __vm_enough_memory() will be called with cap_sys_admin 1015 * set. If at least one LSM returns 0 or negative, __vm_enough_memory() will be 1016 * called with cap_sys_admin cleared. 1017 * 1018 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted by the LSM infrastructure to the 1019 * caller. 1020 */ 1021 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) 1022 { 1023 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1024 int cap_sys_admin = 1; 1025 int rc; 1026 1027 /* 1028 * The module will respond with a positive value if 1029 * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be 1030 * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules 1031 * agree that it should be set it will. If any module 1032 * thinks it should not be set it won't. 1033 */ 1034 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) { 1035 rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); 1036 if (rc <= 0) { 1037 cap_sys_admin = 0; 1038 break; 1039 } 1040 } 1041 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); 1042 } 1043 1044 /** 1045 * security_bprm_creds_for_exec() - Prepare the credentials for exec() 1046 * @bprm: binary program information 1047 * 1048 * If the setup in prepare_exec_creds did not setup @bprm->cred->security 1049 * properly for executing @bprm->file, update the LSM's portion of 1050 * @bprm->cred->security to be what commit_creds needs to install for the new 1051 * program. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 1052 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 1053 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. @bprm 1054 * contains the linux_binprm structure. 1055 * 1056 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1057 */ 1058 int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1059 { 1060 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm); 1061 } 1062 1063 /** 1064 * security_bprm_creds_from_file() - Update linux_binprm creds based on file 1065 * @bprm: binary program information 1066 * @file: associated file 1067 * 1068 * If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change privilege upon 1069 * exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change. This is called after 1070 * finding the binary that will be executed without an interpreter. This 1071 * ensures that the credentials will not be derived from a script that the 1072 * binary will need to reopen, which when reopend may end up being a completely 1073 * different file. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 1074 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 1075 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. The 1076 * hook must add to @bprm->per_clear any personality flags that should be 1077 * cleared from current->personality. @bprm contains the linux_binprm 1078 * structure. 1079 * 1080 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1081 */ 1082 int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) 1083 { 1084 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file); 1085 } 1086 1087 /** 1088 * security_bprm_check() - Mediate binary handler search 1089 * @bprm: binary program information 1090 * 1091 * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will begin. 1092 * It allows a check against the @bprm->cred->security value which was set in 1093 * the preceding creds_for_exec call. The argv list and envp list are reliably 1094 * available in @bprm. This hook may be called multiple times during a single 1095 * execve. @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. 1096 * 1097 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1098 */ 1099 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1100 { 1101 int ret; 1102 1103 ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); 1104 if (ret) 1105 return ret; 1106 return ima_bprm_check(bprm); 1107 } 1108 1109 /** 1110 * security_bprm_committing_creds() - Install creds for a process during exec() 1111 * @bprm: binary program information 1112 * 1113 * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being 1114 * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials pointed to 1115 * by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by the 1116 * bprm_creds_for_exec hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure. This 1117 * hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such as closing 1118 * open file descriptors to which access will no longer be granted when the 1119 * attributes are changed. This is called immediately before commit_creds(). 1120 */ 1121 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1122 { 1123 call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm); 1124 } 1125 1126 /** 1127 * security_bprm_committed_creds() - Tidy up after cred install during exec() 1128 * @bprm: binary program information 1129 * 1130 * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a process 1131 * being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials have, by this 1132 * point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the linux_binprm 1133 * structure. This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the 1134 * process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal state. This is called 1135 * immediately after commit_creds(). 1136 */ 1137 void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1138 { 1139 call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm); 1140 } 1141 1142 /** 1143 * security_fs_context_dup() - Duplicate a fs_context LSM blob 1144 * @fc: destination filesystem context 1145 * @src_fc: source filesystem context 1146 * 1147 * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer is 1148 * initialised to NULL by the caller. @fc indicates the new filesystem context. 1149 * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context. 1150 * 1151 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure. 1152 */ 1153 int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) 1154 { 1155 return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc); 1156 } 1157 1158 /** 1159 * security_fs_context_parse_param() - Configure a filesystem context 1160 * @fc: filesystem context 1161 * @param: filesystem parameter 1162 * 1163 * Userspace provided a parameter to configure a superblock. The LSM can 1164 * consume the parameter or return it to the caller for use elsewhere. 1165 * 1166 * Return: If the parameter is used by the LSM it should return 0, if it is 1167 * returned to the caller -ENOPARAM is returned, otherwise a negative 1168 * error code is returned. 1169 */ 1170 int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, 1171 struct fs_parameter *param) 1172 { 1173 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1174 int trc; 1175 int rc = -ENOPARAM; 1176 1177 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.fs_context_parse_param, 1178 list) { 1179 trc = hp->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param); 1180 if (trc == 0) 1181 rc = 0; 1182 else if (trc != -ENOPARAM) 1183 return trc; 1184 } 1185 return rc; 1186 } 1187 1188 /** 1189 * security_sb_alloc() - Allocate a super_block LSM blob 1190 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1191 * 1192 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field. The 1193 * s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is allocated. 1194 * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. 1195 * 1196 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. 1197 */ 1198 int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 1199 { 1200 int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb); 1201 1202 if (unlikely(rc)) 1203 return rc; 1204 rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb); 1205 if (unlikely(rc)) 1206 security_sb_free(sb); 1207 return rc; 1208 } 1209 1210 /** 1211 * security_sb_delete() - Release super_block LSM associated objects 1212 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1213 * 1214 * Release objects tied to a superblock (e.g. inodes). @sb contains the 1215 * super_block structure being released. 1216 */ 1217 void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb) 1218 { 1219 call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb); 1220 } 1221 1222 /** 1223 * security_sb_free() - Free a super_block LSM blob 1224 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1225 * 1226 * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field. @sb contains the super_block 1227 * structure to be modified. 1228 */ 1229 void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) 1230 { 1231 call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb); 1232 kfree(sb->s_security); 1233 sb->s_security = NULL; 1234 } 1235 1236 /** 1237 * security_free_mnt_opts() - Free memory associated with mount options 1238 * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options 1239 * 1240 * Free memory associated with @mnt_ops. 1241 */ 1242 void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts) 1243 { 1244 if (!*mnt_opts) 1245 return; 1246 call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts); 1247 *mnt_opts = NULL; 1248 } 1249 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts); 1250 1251 /** 1252 * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() - Consume LSM mount options 1253 * @options: mount options 1254 * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options 1255 * 1256 * Eat (scan @options) and save them in @mnt_opts. 1257 * 1258 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1259 */ 1260 int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) 1261 { 1262 return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts); 1263 } 1264 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts); 1265 1266 /** 1267 * security_sb_mnt_opts_compat() - Check if new mount options are allowed 1268 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1269 * @mnt_opts: new mount options 1270 * 1271 * Determine if the new mount options in @mnt_opts are allowed given the 1272 * existing mounted filesystem at @sb. @sb superblock being compared. 1273 * 1274 * Return: Returns 0 if options are compatible. 1275 */ 1276 int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, 1277 void *mnt_opts) 1278 { 1279 return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1280 } 1281 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat); 1282 1283 /** 1284 * security_sb_remount() - Verify no incompatible mount changes during remount 1285 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1286 * @mnt_opts: (re)mount options 1287 * 1288 * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes are 1289 * being made to those options. 1290 * 1291 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1292 */ 1293 int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, 1294 void *mnt_opts) 1295 { 1296 return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1297 } 1298 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount); 1299 1300 /** 1301 * security_sb_kern_mount() - Check if a kernel mount is allowed 1302 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1303 * 1304 * Mount this @sb if allowed by permissions. 1305 * 1306 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1307 */ 1308 int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb) 1309 { 1310 return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb); 1311 } 1312 1313 /** 1314 * security_sb_show_options() - Output the mount options for a superblock 1315 * @m: output file 1316 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1317 * 1318 * Show (print on @m) mount options for this @sb. 1319 * 1320 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1321 */ 1322 int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) 1323 { 1324 return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb); 1325 } 1326 1327 /** 1328 * security_sb_statfs() - Check if accessing fs stats is allowed 1329 * @dentry: superblock handle 1330 * 1331 * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt 1332 * mountpoint. @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem. 1333 * 1334 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1335 */ 1336 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) 1337 { 1338 return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry); 1339 } 1340 1341 /** 1342 * security_sb_mount() - Check permission for mounting a filesystem 1343 * @dev_name: filesystem backing device 1344 * @path: mount point 1345 * @type: filesystem type 1346 * @flags: mount flags 1347 * @data: filesystem specific data 1348 * 1349 * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on the 1350 * mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name identifies a 1351 * device if the file system type requires a device. For a remount 1352 * (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a loopback/bind mount 1353 * (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the pathname of the object being 1354 * mounted. 1355 * 1356 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1357 */ 1358 int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, 1359 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) 1360 { 1361 return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data); 1362 } 1363 1364 /** 1365 * security_sb_umount() - Check permission for unmounting a filesystem 1366 * @mnt: mounted filesystem 1367 * @flags: unmount flags 1368 * 1369 * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted. 1370 * 1371 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1372 */ 1373 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) 1374 { 1375 return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags); 1376 } 1377 1378 /** 1379 * security_sb_pivotroot() - Check permissions for pivoting the rootfs 1380 * @old_path: new location for current rootfs 1381 * @new_path: location of the new rootfs 1382 * 1383 * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem. 1384 * 1385 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1386 */ 1387 int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, 1388 const struct path *new_path) 1389 { 1390 return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path); 1391 } 1392 1393 /** 1394 * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() - Set the mount options for a filesystem 1395 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1396 * @mnt_opts: binary mount options 1397 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1398 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1399 * 1400 * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock. 1401 * 1402 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1403 */ 1404 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, 1405 void *mnt_opts, 1406 unsigned long kern_flags, 1407 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1408 { 1409 return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts, 1410 mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb, 1411 mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1412 } 1413 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts); 1414 1415 /** 1416 * security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() - Duplicate superblock mount options 1417 * @oldsb: source superblock 1418 * @newsb: destination superblock 1419 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1420 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1421 * 1422 * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another. 1423 * 1424 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1425 */ 1426 int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, 1427 struct super_block *newsb, 1428 unsigned long kern_flags, 1429 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1430 { 1431 return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb, 1432 kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1433 } 1434 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts); 1435 1436 /** 1437 * security_move_mount() - Check permissions for moving a mount 1438 * @from_path: source mount point 1439 * @to_path: destination mount point 1440 * 1441 * Check permission before a mount is moved. 1442 * 1443 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1444 */ 1445 int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, 1446 const struct path *to_path) 1447 { 1448 return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path); 1449 } 1450 1451 /** 1452 * security_path_notify() - Check if setting a watch is allowed 1453 * @path: file path 1454 * @mask: event mask 1455 * @obj_type: file path type 1456 * 1457 * Check permissions before setting a watch on events as defined by @mask, on 1458 * an object at @path, whose type is defined by @obj_type. 1459 * 1460 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1461 */ 1462 int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, 1463 unsigned int obj_type) 1464 { 1465 return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type); 1466 } 1467 1468 /** 1469 * security_inode_alloc() - Allocate an inode LSM blob 1470 * @inode: the inode 1471 * 1472 * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The 1473 * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is 1474 * allocated. 1475 * 1476 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 1477 */ 1478 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 1479 { 1480 int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode); 1481 1482 if (unlikely(rc)) 1483 return rc; 1484 rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode); 1485 if (unlikely(rc)) 1486 security_inode_free(inode); 1487 return rc; 1488 } 1489 1490 static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) 1491 { 1492 /* 1493 * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob 1494 */ 1495 kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head); 1496 } 1497 1498 /** 1499 * security_inode_free() - Free an inode's LSM blob 1500 * @inode: the inode 1501 * 1502 * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to NULL. 1503 */ 1504 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) 1505 { 1506 integrity_inode_free(inode); 1507 call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode); 1508 /* 1509 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and 1510 * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made 1511 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS 1512 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder 1513 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and 1514 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact. 1515 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too. 1516 */ 1517 if (inode->i_security) 1518 call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security, 1519 inode_free_by_rcu); 1520 } 1521 1522 /** 1523 * security_dentry_init_security() - Perform dentry initialization 1524 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1525 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1526 * @name: name of the last path component 1527 * @xattr_name: name of the security/LSM xattr 1528 * @ctx: pointer to the resulting LSM context 1529 * @ctxlen: length of @ctx 1530 * 1531 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available since NFSv4 1532 * has no label backed by an EA anyway. It is important to note that 1533 * @xattr_name does not need to be free'd by the caller, it is a static string. 1534 * 1535 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1536 */ 1537 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1538 const struct qstr *name, 1539 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx, 1540 u32 *ctxlen) 1541 { 1542 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1543 int rc; 1544 1545 /* 1546 * Only one module will provide a security context. 1547 */ 1548 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security, 1549 list) { 1550 rc = hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name, 1551 xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen); 1552 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security)) 1553 return rc; 1554 } 1555 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security); 1556 } 1557 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security); 1558 1559 /** 1560 * security_dentry_create_files_as() - Perform dentry initialization 1561 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1562 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1563 * @name: name of the last path component 1564 * @old: creds to use for LSM context calculations 1565 * @new: creds to modify 1566 * 1567 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available and set 1568 * that context in passed in creds so that new files are created using that 1569 * context. Context is calculated using the passed in creds and not the creds 1570 * of the caller. 1571 * 1572 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1573 */ 1574 int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1575 struct qstr *name, 1576 const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) 1577 { 1578 return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode, 1579 name, old, new); 1580 } 1581 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as); 1582 1583 /** 1584 * security_inode_init_security() - Initialize an inode's LSM context 1585 * @inode: the inode 1586 * @dir: parent directory 1587 * @qstr: last component of the pathname 1588 * @initxattrs: callback function to write xattrs 1589 * @fs_data: filesystem specific data 1590 * 1591 * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly 1592 * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode. This 1593 * hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation transaction and 1594 * provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike the post_create/mkdir/... 1595 * hooks called by the VFS. 1596 * 1597 * The hook function is expected to populate the xattrs array, by calling 1598 * lsm_get_xattr_slot() to retrieve the slots reserved by the security module 1599 * with the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure. For each 1600 * slot, the hook function should set ->name to the attribute name suffix 1601 * (e.g. selinux), to allocate ->value (will be freed by the caller) and set it 1602 * to the attribute value, to set ->value_len to the length of the value. If 1603 * the security module does not use security attributes or does not wish to put 1604 * a security attribute on this particular inode, then it should return 1605 * -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. 1606 * 1607 * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is 1608 * needed, or -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure. 1609 */ 1610 int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1611 const struct qstr *qstr, 1612 const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) 1613 { 1614 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1615 struct xattr *new_xattrs = NULL; 1616 int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP, xattr_count = 0; 1617 1618 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1619 return 0; 1620 1621 if (!blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count) 1622 return 0; 1623 1624 if (initxattrs) { 1625 /* Allocate +1 for EVM and +1 as terminator. */ 1626 new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 2, 1627 sizeof(*new_xattrs), GFP_NOFS); 1628 if (!new_xattrs) 1629 return -ENOMEM; 1630 } 1631 1632 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security, 1633 list) { 1634 ret = hp->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs, 1635 &xattr_count); 1636 if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) 1637 goto out; 1638 /* 1639 * As documented in lsm_hooks.h, -EOPNOTSUPP in this context 1640 * means that the LSM is not willing to provide an xattr, not 1641 * that it wants to signal an error. Thus, continue to invoke 1642 * the remaining LSMs. 1643 */ 1644 } 1645 1646 /* If initxattrs() is NULL, xattr_count is zero, skip the call. */ 1647 if (!xattr_count) 1648 goto out; 1649 1650 ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, 1651 &new_xattrs[xattr_count]); 1652 if (ret) 1653 goto out; 1654 ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); 1655 out: 1656 for (; xattr_count > 0; xattr_count--) 1657 kfree(new_xattrs[xattr_count - 1].value); 1658 kfree(new_xattrs); 1659 return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret; 1660 } 1661 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); 1662 1663 /** 1664 * security_inode_init_security_anon() - Initialize an anonymous inode 1665 * @inode: the inode 1666 * @name: the anonymous inode class 1667 * @context_inode: an optional related inode 1668 * 1669 * Set up the incore security field for the new anonymous inode and return 1670 * whether the inode creation is permitted by the security module or not. 1671 * 1672 * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EACCES if the security module denies the 1673 * creation of this inode, or another -errno upon other errors. 1674 */ 1675 int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, 1676 const struct qstr *name, 1677 const struct inode *context_inode) 1678 { 1679 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, name, 1680 context_inode); 1681 } 1682 1683 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH 1684 /** 1685 * security_path_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 1686 * @dir: parent directory 1687 * @dentry: new file 1688 * @mode: new file mode 1689 * @dev: device number 1690 * 1691 * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called even 1692 * if mknod operation is being done for a regular file. 1693 * 1694 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1695 */ 1696 int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1697 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) 1698 { 1699 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1700 return 0; 1701 return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1702 } 1703 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod); 1704 1705 /** 1706 * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed 1707 * @dir: parent directory 1708 * @dentry: new directory 1709 * @mode: new directory mode 1710 * 1711 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory. 1712 * 1713 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1714 */ 1715 int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1716 umode_t mode) 1717 { 1718 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1719 return 0; 1720 return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1721 } 1722 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir); 1723 1724 /** 1725 * security_path_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 1726 * @dir: parent directory 1727 * @dentry: directory to remove 1728 * 1729 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 1730 * 1731 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1732 */ 1733 int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1734 { 1735 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1736 return 0; 1737 return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1738 } 1739 1740 /** 1741 * security_path_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 1742 * @dir: parent directory 1743 * @dentry: file 1744 * 1745 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 1746 * 1747 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1748 */ 1749 int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1750 { 1751 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1752 return 0; 1753 return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1754 } 1755 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink); 1756 1757 /** 1758 * security_path_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 1759 * @dir: parent directory 1760 * @dentry: symbolic link 1761 * @old_name: file pathname 1762 * 1763 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 1764 * 1765 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1766 */ 1767 int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1768 const char *old_name) 1769 { 1770 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1771 return 0; 1772 return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1773 } 1774 1775 /** 1776 * security_path_link - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 1777 * @old_dentry: existing file 1778 * @new_dir: new parent directory 1779 * @new_dentry: new link 1780 * 1781 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 1782 * 1783 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1784 */ 1785 int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, 1786 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1787 { 1788 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1789 return 0; 1790 return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); 1791 } 1792 1793 /** 1794 * security_path_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 1795 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 1796 * @old_dentry: the old file 1797 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 1798 * @new_dentry: the new file 1799 * @flags: flags 1800 * 1801 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 1802 * 1803 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1804 */ 1805 int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 1806 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 1807 unsigned int flags) 1808 { 1809 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 1810 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && 1811 IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 1812 return 0; 1813 1814 return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, 1815 new_dentry, flags); 1816 } 1817 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename); 1818 1819 /** 1820 * security_path_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 1821 * @path: file 1822 * 1823 * Check permission before truncating the file indicated by path. Note that 1824 * truncation permissions may also be checked based on already opened files, 1825 * using the security_file_truncate() hook. 1826 * 1827 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1828 */ 1829 int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path) 1830 { 1831 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1832 return 0; 1833 return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path); 1834 } 1835 1836 /** 1837 * security_path_chmod() - Check if changing the file's mode is allowed 1838 * @path: file 1839 * @mode: new mode 1840 * 1841 * Check for permission to change a mode of the file @path. The new mode is 1842 * specified in @mode which is a bitmask of constants from 1843 * <include/uapi/linux/stat.h>. 1844 * 1845 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1846 */ 1847 int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) 1848 { 1849 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1850 return 0; 1851 return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode); 1852 } 1853 1854 /** 1855 * security_path_chown() - Check if changing the file's owner/group is allowed 1856 * @path: file 1857 * @uid: file owner 1858 * @gid: file group 1859 * 1860 * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory. 1861 * 1862 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1863 */ 1864 int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) 1865 { 1866 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1867 return 0; 1868 return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid); 1869 } 1870 1871 /** 1872 * security_path_chroot() - Check if changing the root directory is allowed 1873 * @path: directory 1874 * 1875 * Check for permission to change root directory. 1876 * 1877 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1878 */ 1879 int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path) 1880 { 1881 return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path); 1882 } 1883 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */ 1884 1885 /** 1886 * security_inode_create() - Check if creating a file is allowed 1887 * @dir: the parent directory 1888 * @dentry: the file being created 1889 * @mode: requested file mode 1890 * 1891 * Check permission to create a regular file. 1892 * 1893 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1894 */ 1895 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1896 umode_t mode) 1897 { 1898 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1899 return 0; 1900 return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1901 } 1902 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create); 1903 1904 /** 1905 * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 1906 * @old_dentry: existing file 1907 * @dir: new parent directory 1908 * @new_dentry: new link 1909 * 1910 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 1911 * 1912 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1913 */ 1914 int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, 1915 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1916 { 1917 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1918 return 0; 1919 return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); 1920 } 1921 1922 /** 1923 * security_inode_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 1924 * @dir: parent directory 1925 * @dentry: file 1926 * 1927 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 1928 * 1929 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1930 */ 1931 int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1932 { 1933 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1934 return 0; 1935 return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1936 } 1937 1938 /** 1939 * security_inode_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 1940 * @dir: parent directory 1941 * @dentry: symbolic link 1942 * @old_name: existing filename 1943 * 1944 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 1945 * 1946 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1947 */ 1948 int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1949 const char *old_name) 1950 { 1951 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1952 return 0; 1953 return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1954 } 1955 1956 /** 1957 * security_inode_mkdir() - Check if creation a new director is allowed 1958 * @dir: parent directory 1959 * @dentry: new directory 1960 * @mode: new directory mode 1961 * 1962 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory 1963 * associated with inode structure @dir. 1964 * 1965 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1966 */ 1967 int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1968 { 1969 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1970 return 0; 1971 return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1972 } 1973 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir); 1974 1975 /** 1976 * security_inode_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 1977 * @dir: parent directory 1978 * @dentry: directory to be removed 1979 * 1980 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 1981 * 1982 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1983 */ 1984 int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1985 { 1986 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1987 return 0; 1988 return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1989 } 1990 1991 /** 1992 * security_inode_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 1993 * @dir: parent directory 1994 * @dentry: new file 1995 * @mode: new file mode 1996 * @dev: device number 1997 * 1998 * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo file 1999 * created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation is being 2000 * done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called and not this 2001 * hook. 2002 * 2003 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2004 */ 2005 int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 2006 umode_t mode, dev_t dev) 2007 { 2008 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 2009 return 0; 2010 return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 2011 } 2012 2013 /** 2014 * security_inode_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 2015 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 2016 * @old_dentry: the old file 2017 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 2018 * @new_dentry: the new file 2019 * @flags: flags 2020 * 2021 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 2022 * 2023 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2024 */ 2025 int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 2026 struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 2027 unsigned int flags) 2028 { 2029 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 2030 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && 2031 IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 2032 return 0; 2033 2034 if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { 2035 int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry, 2036 old_dir, old_dentry); 2037 if (err) 2038 return err; 2039 } 2040 2041 return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, 2042 new_dir, new_dentry); 2043 } 2044 2045 /** 2046 * security_inode_readlink() - Check if reading a symbolic link is allowed 2047 * @dentry: link 2048 * 2049 * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. 2050 * 2051 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2052 */ 2053 int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) 2054 { 2055 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2056 return 0; 2057 return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry); 2058 } 2059 2060 /** 2061 * security_inode_follow_link() - Check if following a symbolic link is allowed 2062 * @dentry: link dentry 2063 * @inode: link inode 2064 * @rcu: true if in RCU-walk mode 2065 * 2066 * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname. If 2067 * @rcu is true, @inode is not stable. 2068 * 2069 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2070 */ 2071 int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, 2072 bool rcu) 2073 { 2074 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2075 return 0; 2076 return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu); 2077 } 2078 2079 /** 2080 * security_inode_permission() - Check if accessing an inode is allowed 2081 * @inode: inode 2082 * @mask: access mask 2083 * 2084 * Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the 2085 * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to 2086 * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks. Notice 2087 * that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many other 2088 * operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is called when 2089 * the actual read/write operations are performed. 2090 * 2091 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2092 */ 2093 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) 2094 { 2095 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2096 return 0; 2097 return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask); 2098 } 2099 2100 /** 2101 * security_inode_setattr() - Check if setting file attributes is allowed 2102 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2103 * @dentry: file 2104 * @attr: new attributes 2105 * 2106 * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel call 2107 * to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever file 2108 * attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod operations, 2109 * transferring disk quotas, etc). 2110 * 2111 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2112 */ 2113 int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2114 struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 2115 { 2116 int ret; 2117 2118 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2119 return 0; 2120 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr); 2121 if (ret) 2122 return ret; 2123 return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); 2124 } 2125 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); 2126 2127 /** 2128 * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed 2129 * @path: file 2130 * 2131 * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. 2132 * 2133 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2134 */ 2135 int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) 2136 { 2137 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 2138 return 0; 2139 return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path); 2140 } 2141 2142 /** 2143 * security_inode_setxattr() - Check if setting file xattrs is allowed 2144 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2145 * @dentry: file 2146 * @name: xattr name 2147 * @value: xattr value 2148 * @size: size of xattr value 2149 * @flags: flags 2150 * 2151 * Check permission before setting the extended attributes. 2152 * 2153 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2154 */ 2155 int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2156 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 2157 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2158 { 2159 int ret; 2160 2161 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2162 return 0; 2163 /* 2164 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 2165 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 2166 */ 2167 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name, value, 2168 size, flags); 2169 2170 if (ret == 1) 2171 ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); 2172 if (ret) 2173 return ret; 2174 ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 2175 if (ret) 2176 return ret; 2177 return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size); 2178 } 2179 2180 /** 2181 * security_inode_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed 2182 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2183 * @dentry: file 2184 * @acl_name: acl name 2185 * @kacl: acl struct 2186 * 2187 * Check permission before setting posix acls, the posix acls in @kacl are 2188 * identified by @acl_name. 2189 * 2190 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2191 */ 2192 int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2193 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, 2194 struct posix_acl *kacl) 2195 { 2196 int ret; 2197 2198 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2199 return 0; 2200 ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, 2201 kacl); 2202 if (ret) 2203 return ret; 2204 ret = ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2205 if (ret) 2206 return ret; 2207 return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2208 } 2209 2210 /** 2211 * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed 2212 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2213 * @dentry: file 2214 * @acl_name: acl name 2215 * 2216 * Check permission before getting osix acls, the posix acls are identified by 2217 * @acl_name. 2218 * 2219 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2220 */ 2221 int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2222 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2223 { 2224 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2225 return 0; 2226 return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2227 } 2228 2229 /** 2230 * security_inode_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed 2231 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2232 * @dentry: file 2233 * @acl_name: acl name 2234 * 2235 * Check permission before removing posix acls, the posix acls are identified 2236 * by @acl_name. 2237 * 2238 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2239 */ 2240 int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2241 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2242 { 2243 int ret; 2244 2245 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2246 return 0; 2247 ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2248 if (ret) 2249 return ret; 2250 ret = ima_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2251 if (ret) 2252 return ret; 2253 return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2254 } 2255 2256 /** 2257 * security_inode_post_setxattr() - Update the inode after a setxattr operation 2258 * @dentry: file 2259 * @name: xattr name 2260 * @value: xattr value 2261 * @size: xattr value size 2262 * @flags: flags 2263 * 2264 * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation. 2265 */ 2266 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 2267 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2268 { 2269 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2270 return; 2271 call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); 2272 evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 2273 } 2274 2275 /** 2276 * security_inode_getxattr() - Check if xattr access is allowed 2277 * @dentry: file 2278 * @name: xattr name 2279 * 2280 * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes identified by 2281 * @name for @dentry. 2282 * 2283 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2284 */ 2285 int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2286 { 2287 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2288 return 0; 2289 return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name); 2290 } 2291 2292 /** 2293 * security_inode_listxattr() - Check if listing xattrs is allowed 2294 * @dentry: file 2295 * 2296 * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute names for 2297 * @dentry. 2298 * 2299 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2300 */ 2301 int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) 2302 { 2303 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2304 return 0; 2305 return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry); 2306 } 2307 2308 /** 2309 * security_inode_removexattr() - Check if removing an xattr is allowed 2310 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2311 * @dentry: file 2312 * @name: xattr name 2313 * 2314 * Check permission before removing the extended attribute identified by @name 2315 * for @dentry. 2316 * 2317 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2318 */ 2319 int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2320 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2321 { 2322 int ret; 2323 2324 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2325 return 0; 2326 /* 2327 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 2328 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 2329 */ 2330 ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); 2331 if (ret == 1) 2332 ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 2333 if (ret) 2334 return ret; 2335 ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); 2336 if (ret) 2337 return ret; 2338 return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 2339 } 2340 2341 /** 2342 * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required 2343 * @dentry: associated dentry 2344 * 2345 * Called when an inode has been changed to determine if 2346 * security_inode_killpriv() should be called. 2347 * 2348 * Return: Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation, return 0 if 2349 * security_inode_killpriv() does not need to be called, return >0 if 2350 * security_inode_killpriv() does need to be called. 2351 */ 2352 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) 2353 { 2354 return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry); 2355 } 2356 2357 /** 2358 * security_inode_killpriv() - The setuid bit is removed, update LSM state 2359 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2360 * @dentry: associated dentry 2361 * 2362 * The @dentry's setuid bit is being removed. Remove similar security labels. 2363 * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held. 2364 * 2365 * Return: Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation 2366 * causing setuid bit removal is failed. 2367 */ 2368 int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2369 struct dentry *dentry) 2370 { 2371 return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, idmap, dentry); 2372 } 2373 2374 /** 2375 * security_inode_getsecurity() - Get the xattr security label of an inode 2376 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2377 * @inode: inode 2378 * @name: xattr name 2379 * @buffer: security label buffer 2380 * @alloc: allocation flag 2381 * 2382 * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the security 2383 * label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that @name is the 2384 * remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix has been removed. 2385 * @alloc is used to specify if the call should return a value via the buffer 2386 * or just the value length. 2387 * 2388 * Return: Returns size of buffer on success. 2389 */ 2390 int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2391 struct inode *inode, const char *name, 2392 void **buffer, bool alloc) 2393 { 2394 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2395 int rc; 2396 2397 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2398 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 2399 /* 2400 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 2401 */ 2402 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) { 2403 rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name, buffer, 2404 alloc); 2405 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity)) 2406 return rc; 2407 } 2408 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 2409 } 2410 2411 /** 2412 * security_inode_setsecurity() - Set the xattr security label of an inode 2413 * @inode: inode 2414 * @name: xattr name 2415 * @value: security label 2416 * @size: length of security label 2417 * @flags: flags 2418 * 2419 * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the extended 2420 * attribute value @value. @size indicates the size of the @value in bytes. 2421 * @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0. Note that @name is the 2422 * remainder of the attribute name after the security. prefix has been removed. 2423 * 2424 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2425 */ 2426 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, 2427 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2428 { 2429 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2430 int rc; 2431 2432 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2433 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 2434 /* 2435 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 2436 */ 2437 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) { 2438 rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, 2439 flags); 2440 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity)) 2441 return rc; 2442 } 2443 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 2444 } 2445 2446 /** 2447 * security_inode_listsecurity() - List the xattr security label names 2448 * @inode: inode 2449 * @buffer: buffer 2450 * @buffer_size: size of buffer 2451 * 2452 * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels associated with 2453 * @inode into @buffer. The maximum size of @buffer is specified by 2454 * @buffer_size. @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer 2455 * required. 2456 * 2457 * Return: Returns number of bytes used/required on success. 2458 */ 2459 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, 2460 char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) 2461 { 2462 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2463 return 0; 2464 return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size); 2465 } 2466 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity); 2467 2468 /** 2469 * security_inode_getsecid() - Get an inode's secid 2470 * @inode: inode 2471 * @secid: secid to return 2472 * 2473 * Get the secid associated with the node. In case of failure, @secid will be 2474 * set to zero. 2475 */ 2476 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) 2477 { 2478 call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid); 2479 } 2480 2481 /** 2482 * security_inode_copy_up() - Create new creds for an overlayfs copy-up op 2483 * @src: union dentry of copy-up file 2484 * @new: newly created creds 2485 * 2486 * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of overlay 2487 * filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds and modify as 2488 * need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to new creds temporarily to 2489 * create new file and release newly allocated creds. 2490 * 2491 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error. 2492 */ 2493 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) 2494 { 2495 return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new); 2496 } 2497 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up); 2498 2499 /** 2500 * security_inode_copy_up_xattr() - Filter xattrs in an overlayfs copy-up op 2501 * @name: xattr name 2502 * 2503 * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied up from a 2504 * lower layer to the union/overlay layer. The caller is responsible for 2505 * reading and writing the xattrs, this hook is merely a filter. 2506 * 2507 * Return: Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP 2508 * if the security module does not know about attribute, or a negative 2509 * error code to abort the copy up. 2510 */ 2511 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) 2512 { 2513 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2514 int rc; 2515 2516 /* 2517 * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the 2518 * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or 2519 * any other error code in case of an error. 2520 */ 2521 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, 2522 &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) { 2523 rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name); 2524 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr)) 2525 return rc; 2526 } 2527 2528 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr); 2529 } 2530 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr); 2531 2532 /** 2533 * security_kernfs_init_security() - Init LSM context for a kernfs node 2534 * @kn_dir: parent kernfs node 2535 * @kn: the kernfs node to initialize 2536 * 2537 * Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based on its 2538 * own and its parent's attributes. 2539 * 2540 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2541 */ 2542 int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, 2543 struct kernfs_node *kn) 2544 { 2545 return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn); 2546 } 2547 2548 /** 2549 * security_file_permission() - Check file permissions 2550 * @file: file 2551 * @mask: requested permissions 2552 * 2553 * Check file permissions before accessing an open file. This hook is called 2554 * by various operations that read or write files. A security module can use 2555 * this hook to perform additional checking on these operations, e.g. to 2556 * revalidate permissions on use to support privilege bracketing or policy 2557 * changes. Notice that this hook is used when the actual read/write 2558 * operations are performed, whereas the inode_security_ops hook is called when 2559 * a file is opened (as well as many other operations). Although this hook can 2560 * be used to revalidate permissions for various system call operations that 2561 * read or write files, it does not address the revalidation of permissions for 2562 * memory-mapped files. Security modules must handle this separately if they 2563 * need such revalidation. 2564 * 2565 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2566 */ 2567 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) 2568 { 2569 int ret; 2570 2571 ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask); 2572 if (ret) 2573 return ret; 2574 2575 return fsnotify_perm(file, mask); 2576 } 2577 2578 /** 2579 * security_file_alloc() - Allocate and init a file's LSM blob 2580 * @file: the file 2581 * 2582 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field. The 2583 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 2584 * 2585 * Return: Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 2586 */ 2587 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) 2588 { 2589 int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file); 2590 2591 if (rc) 2592 return rc; 2593 rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file); 2594 if (unlikely(rc)) 2595 security_file_free(file); 2596 return rc; 2597 } 2598 2599 /** 2600 * security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob 2601 * @file: the file 2602 * 2603 * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security. 2604 */ 2605 void security_file_free(struct file *file) 2606 { 2607 void *blob; 2608 2609 call_void_hook(file_free_security, file); 2610 2611 blob = file->f_security; 2612 if (blob) { 2613 file->f_security = NULL; 2614 kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob); 2615 } 2616 } 2617 2618 /** 2619 * security_file_ioctl() - Check if an ioctl is allowed 2620 * @file: associated file 2621 * @cmd: ioctl cmd 2622 * @arg: ioctl arguments 2623 * 2624 * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file. Note that @arg sometimes 2625 * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer 2626 * value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used 2627 * by the security module. 2628 * 2629 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2630 */ 2631 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2632 { 2633 return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 2634 } 2635 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl); 2636 2637 static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) 2638 { 2639 /* 2640 * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect 2641 * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about... 2642 */ 2643 if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ) 2644 return prot; 2645 if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) 2646 return prot; 2647 /* 2648 * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it. 2649 */ 2650 if (!file) 2651 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2652 /* 2653 * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need 2654 * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case 2655 */ 2656 if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) { 2657 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU 2658 if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) { 2659 unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file); 2660 if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC)) 2661 return prot; 2662 } 2663 #endif 2664 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2665 } 2666 /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */ 2667 return prot; 2668 } 2669 2670 /** 2671 * security_mmap_file() - Check if mmap'ing a file is allowed 2672 * @file: file 2673 * @prot: protection applied by the kernel 2674 * @flags: flags 2675 * 2676 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. if 2677 * mapping anonymous memory. 2678 * 2679 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2680 */ 2681 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, 2682 unsigned long flags) 2683 { 2684 unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot); 2685 int ret; 2686 2687 ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 2688 if (ret) 2689 return ret; 2690 return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 2691 } 2692 2693 /** 2694 * security_mmap_addr() - Check if mmap'ing an address is allowed 2695 * @addr: address 2696 * 2697 * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr. 2698 * 2699 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2700 */ 2701 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) 2702 { 2703 return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr); 2704 } 2705 2706 /** 2707 * security_file_mprotect() - Check if changing memory protections is allowed 2708 * @vma: memory region 2709 * @reqprot: application requested protection 2710 * @prot: protection applied by the kernel 2711 * 2712 * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions. 2713 * 2714 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2715 */ 2716 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, 2717 unsigned long prot) 2718 { 2719 int ret; 2720 2721 ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); 2722 if (ret) 2723 return ret; 2724 return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot); 2725 } 2726 2727 /** 2728 * security_file_lock() - Check if a file lock is allowed 2729 * @file: file 2730 * @cmd: lock operation (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK) 2731 * 2732 * Check permission before performing file locking operations. Note the hook 2733 * mediates both flock and fcntl style locks. 2734 * 2735 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2736 */ 2737 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) 2738 { 2739 return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd); 2740 } 2741 2742 /** 2743 * security_file_fcntl() - Check if fcntl() op is allowed 2744 * @file: file 2745 * @cmd: fcntl command 2746 * @arg: command argument 2747 * 2748 * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd from 2749 * being performed on the file @file. Note that @arg sometimes represents a 2750 * user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer value. When 2751 * @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used by the 2752 * security module. 2753 * 2754 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2755 */ 2756 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2757 { 2758 return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 2759 } 2760 2761 /** 2762 * security_file_set_fowner() - Set the file owner info in the LSM blob 2763 * @file: the file 2764 * 2765 * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in 2766 * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook. 2767 * 2768 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2769 */ 2770 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) 2771 { 2772 call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file); 2773 } 2774 2775 /** 2776 * security_file_send_sigiotask() - Check if sending SIGIO/SIGURG is allowed 2777 * @tsk: target task 2778 * @fown: signal sender 2779 * @sig: signal to be sent, SIGIO is sent if 0 2780 * 2781 * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the 2782 * process @tsk. Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt. Note 2783 * that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a struct file, 2784 * so the file structure (and associated security information) can always be 2785 * obtained: container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner). 2786 * 2787 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2788 */ 2789 int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, 2790 struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) 2791 { 2792 return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig); 2793 } 2794 2795 /** 2796 * security_file_receive() - Check is receiving a file via IPC is allowed 2797 * @file: file being received 2798 * 2799 * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process to 2800 * receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC. 2801 * 2802 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2803 */ 2804 int security_file_receive(struct file *file) 2805 { 2806 return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file); 2807 } 2808 2809 /** 2810 * security_file_open() - Save open() time state for late use by the LSM 2811 * @file: 2812 * 2813 * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon file_permission, 2814 * and recheck access if anything has changed since inode_permission. 2815 * 2816 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2817 */ 2818 int security_file_open(struct file *file) 2819 { 2820 int ret; 2821 2822 ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file); 2823 if (ret) 2824 return ret; 2825 2826 return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN); 2827 } 2828 2829 /** 2830 * security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 2831 * @file: file 2832 * 2833 * Check permission before truncating a file, i.e. using ftruncate. Note that 2834 * truncation permission may also be checked based on the path, using the 2835 * @path_truncate hook. 2836 * 2837 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2838 */ 2839 int security_file_truncate(struct file *file) 2840 { 2841 return call_int_hook(file_truncate, 0, file); 2842 } 2843 2844 /** 2845 * security_task_alloc() - Allocate a task's LSM blob 2846 * @task: the task 2847 * @clone_flags: flags indicating what is being shared 2848 * 2849 * Handle allocation of task-related resources. 2850 * 2851 * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. 2852 */ 2853 int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) 2854 { 2855 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 2856 2857 if (rc) 2858 return rc; 2859 rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags); 2860 if (unlikely(rc)) 2861 security_task_free(task); 2862 return rc; 2863 } 2864 2865 /** 2866 * security_task_free() - Free a task's LSM blob and related resources 2867 * @task: task 2868 * 2869 * Handle release of task-related resources. Note that this can be called from 2870 * interrupt context. 2871 */ 2872 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) 2873 { 2874 call_void_hook(task_free, task); 2875 2876 kfree(task->security); 2877 task->security = NULL; 2878 } 2879 2880 /** 2881 * security_cred_alloc_blank() - Allocate the min memory to allow cred_transfer 2882 * @cred: credentials 2883 * @gfp: gfp flags 2884 * 2885 * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that 2886 * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM. 2887 * 2888 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 2889 */ 2890 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 2891 { 2892 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp); 2893 2894 if (rc) 2895 return rc; 2896 2897 rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp); 2898 if (unlikely(rc)) 2899 security_cred_free(cred); 2900 return rc; 2901 } 2902 2903 /** 2904 * security_cred_free() - Free the cred's LSM blob and associated resources 2905 * @cred: credentials 2906 * 2907 * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials. 2908 */ 2909 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) 2910 { 2911 /* 2912 * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that 2913 * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL. 2914 */ 2915 if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL)) 2916 return; 2917 2918 call_void_hook(cred_free, cred); 2919 2920 kfree(cred->security); 2921 cred->security = NULL; 2922 } 2923 2924 /** 2925 * security_prepare_creds() - Prepare a new set of credentials 2926 * @new: new credentials 2927 * @old: original credentials 2928 * @gfp: gfp flags 2929 * 2930 * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set. 2931 * 2932 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 2933 */ 2934 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) 2935 { 2936 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp); 2937 2938 if (rc) 2939 return rc; 2940 2941 rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp); 2942 if (unlikely(rc)) 2943 security_cred_free(new); 2944 return rc; 2945 } 2946 2947 /** 2948 * security_transfer_creds() - Transfer creds 2949 * @new: target credentials 2950 * @old: original credentials 2951 * 2952 * Transfer data from original creds to new creds. 2953 */ 2954 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 2955 { 2956 call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); 2957 } 2958 2959 /** 2960 * security_cred_getsecid() - Get the secid from a set of credentials 2961 * @c: credentials 2962 * @secid: secid value 2963 * 2964 * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c. In case of 2965 * failure, @secid will be set to zero. 2966 */ 2967 void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) 2968 { 2969 *secid = 0; 2970 call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); 2971 } 2972 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); 2973 2974 /** 2975 * security_kernel_act_as() - Set the kernel credentials to act as secid 2976 * @new: credentials 2977 * @secid: secid 2978 * 2979 * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). 2980 * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid. 2981 * 2982 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2983 */ 2984 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) 2985 { 2986 return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); 2987 } 2988 2989 /** 2990 * security_kernel_create_files_as() - Set file creation context using an inode 2991 * @new: target credentials 2992 * @inode: reference inode 2993 * 2994 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as the 2995 * objective context of the specified inode. The current task must be the one 2996 * that nominated @inode. 2997 * 2998 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2999 */ 3000 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) 3001 { 3002 return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode); 3003 } 3004 3005 /** 3006 * security_kernel_module_request() - Check is loading a module is allowed 3007 * @kmod_name: module name 3008 * 3009 * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for 3010 * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. 3011 * 3012 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 3013 */ 3014 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) 3015 { 3016 int ret; 3017 3018 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); 3019 if (ret) 3020 return ret; 3021 return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); 3022 } 3023 3024 /** 3025 * security_kernel_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 3026 * @file: file 3027 * @id: file identifier 3028 * @contents: trust if security_kernel_post_read_file() will be called 3029 * 3030 * Read a file specified by userspace. 3031 * 3032 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3033 */ 3034 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, 3035 bool contents) 3036 { 3037 int ret; 3038 3039 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); 3040 if (ret) 3041 return ret; 3042 return ima_read_file(file, id, contents); 3043 } 3044 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); 3045 3046 /** 3047 * security_kernel_post_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 3048 * @file: file 3049 * @buf: file contents 3050 * @size: size of file contents 3051 * @id: file identifier 3052 * 3053 * Read a file specified by userspace. This must be paired with a prior call 3054 * to security_kernel_read_file() call that indicated this hook would also be 3055 * called, see security_kernel_read_file() for more information. 3056 * 3057 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3058 */ 3059 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, 3060 enum kernel_read_file_id id) 3061 { 3062 int ret; 3063 3064 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id); 3065 if (ret) 3066 return ret; 3067 return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id); 3068 } 3069 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); 3070 3071 /** 3072 * security_kernel_load_data() - Load data provided by userspace 3073 * @id: data identifier 3074 * @contents: true if security_kernel_post_load_data() will be called 3075 * 3076 * Load data provided by userspace. 3077 * 3078 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3079 */ 3080 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) 3081 { 3082 int ret; 3083 3084 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents); 3085 if (ret) 3086 return ret; 3087 return ima_load_data(id, contents); 3088 } 3089 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); 3090 3091 /** 3092 * security_kernel_post_load_data() - Load userspace data from a non-file source 3093 * @buf: data 3094 * @size: size of data 3095 * @id: data identifier 3096 * @description: text description of data, specific to the id value 3097 * 3098 * Load data provided by a non-file source (usually userspace buffer). This 3099 * must be paired with a prior security_kernel_load_data() call that indicated 3100 * this hook would also be called, see security_kernel_load_data() for more 3101 * information. 3102 * 3103 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3104 */ 3105 int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, 3106 enum kernel_load_data_id id, 3107 char *description) 3108 { 3109 int ret; 3110 3111 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id, 3112 description); 3113 if (ret) 3114 return ret; 3115 return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description); 3116 } 3117 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data); 3118 3119 /** 3120 * security_task_fix_setuid() - Update LSM with new user id attributes 3121 * @new: updated credentials 3122 * @old: credentials being replaced 3123 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag values 3124 * 3125 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user identity 3126 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 3127 * the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If @new is the set of 3128 * credentials that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this 3129 * rather than to @current->cred. 3130 * 3131 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3132 */ 3133 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 3134 int flags) 3135 { 3136 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags); 3137 } 3138 3139 /** 3140 * security_task_fix_setgid() - Update LSM with new group id attributes 3141 * @new: updated credentials 3142 * @old: credentials being replaced 3143 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag value 3144 * 3145 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the group identity 3146 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 3147 * the set*gid system calls invoked this hook. @new is the set of credentials 3148 * that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 3149 * @current->cred. 3150 * 3151 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3152 */ 3153 int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 3154 int flags) 3155 { 3156 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags); 3157 } 3158 3159 /** 3160 * security_task_fix_setgroups() - Update LSM with new supplementary groups 3161 * @new: updated credentials 3162 * @old: credentials being replaced 3163 * 3164 * Update the module's state after setting the supplementary group identity 3165 * attributes of the current process. @new is the set of credentials that will 3166 * be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 3167 * @current->cred. 3168 * 3169 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3170 */ 3171 int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 3172 { 3173 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, 0, new, old); 3174 } 3175 3176 /** 3177 * security_task_setpgid() - Check if setting the pgid is allowed 3178 * @p: task being modified 3179 * @pgid: new pgid 3180 * 3181 * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the process 3182 * @p to @pgid. 3183 * 3184 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3185 */ 3186 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) 3187 { 3188 return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid); 3189 } 3190 3191 /** 3192 * security_task_getpgid() - Check if getting the pgid is allowed 3193 * @p: task 3194 * 3195 * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the process 3196 * @p. 3197 * 3198 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3199 */ 3200 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) 3201 { 3202 return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p); 3203 } 3204 3205 /** 3206 * security_task_getsid() - Check if getting the session id is allowed 3207 * @p: task 3208 * 3209 * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process @p. 3210 * 3211 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3212 */ 3213 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) 3214 { 3215 return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); 3216 } 3217 3218 /** 3219 * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid 3220 * @secid: secid value 3221 * 3222 * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return 3223 * it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3224 */ 3225 void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) 3226 { 3227 *secid = 0; 3228 call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid); 3229 } 3230 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj); 3231 3232 /** 3233 * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid 3234 * @p: target task 3235 * @secid: secid value 3236 * 3237 * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and 3238 * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3239 */ 3240 void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) 3241 { 3242 *secid = 0; 3243 call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); 3244 } 3245 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj); 3246 3247 /** 3248 * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed 3249 * @p: target task 3250 * @nice: nice value 3251 * 3252 * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice. 3253 * 3254 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3255 */ 3256 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) 3257 { 3258 return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice); 3259 } 3260 3261 /** 3262 * security_task_setioprio() - Check if setting a task's ioprio is allowed 3263 * @p: target task 3264 * @ioprio: ioprio value 3265 * 3266 * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio. 3267 * 3268 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3269 */ 3270 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) 3271 { 3272 return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio); 3273 } 3274 3275 /** 3276 * security_task_getioprio() - Check if getting a task's ioprio is allowed 3277 * @p: task 3278 * 3279 * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p. 3280 * 3281 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3282 */ 3283 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) 3284 { 3285 return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p); 3286 } 3287 3288 /** 3289 * security_task_prlimit() - Check if get/setting resources limits is allowed 3290 * @cred: current task credentials 3291 * @tcred: target task credentials 3292 * @flags: LSM_PRLIMIT_* flag bits indicating a get/set/both 3293 * 3294 * Check permission before getting and/or setting the resource limits of 3295 * another task. 3296 * 3297 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3298 */ 3299 int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, 3300 unsigned int flags) 3301 { 3302 return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags); 3303 } 3304 3305 /** 3306 * security_task_setrlimit() - Check if setting a new rlimit value is allowed 3307 * @p: target task's group leader 3308 * @resource: resource whose limit is being set 3309 * @new_rlim: new resource limit 3310 * 3311 * Check permission before setting the resource limits of process @p for 3312 * @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can be examined by 3313 * dereferencing (p->signal->rlim + resource). 3314 * 3315 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3316 */ 3317 int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, 3318 struct rlimit *new_rlim) 3319 { 3320 return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim); 3321 } 3322 3323 /** 3324 * security_task_setscheduler() - Check if setting sched policy/param is allowed 3325 * @p: target task 3326 * 3327 * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of 3328 * process @p. 3329 * 3330 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3331 */ 3332 int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3333 { 3334 return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p); 3335 } 3336 3337 /** 3338 * security_task_getscheduler() - Check if getting scheduling info is allowed 3339 * @p: target task 3340 * 3341 * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process @p. 3342 * 3343 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3344 */ 3345 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3346 { 3347 return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p); 3348 } 3349 3350 /** 3351 * security_task_movememory() - Check if moving memory is allowed 3352 * @p: task 3353 * 3354 * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p. 3355 * 3356 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3357 */ 3358 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) 3359 { 3360 return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p); 3361 } 3362 3363 /** 3364 * security_task_kill() - Check if sending a signal is allowed 3365 * @p: target process 3366 * @info: signal information 3367 * @sig: signal value 3368 * @cred: credentials of the signal sender, NULL if @current 3369 * 3370 * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p. @info can be NULL, the 3371 * constant 1, or a pointer to a kernel_siginfo structure. If @info is 1 or 3372 * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming from 3373 * the kernel and should typically be permitted. SIGIO signals are handled 3374 * separately by the send_sigiotask hook in file_security_ops. 3375 * 3376 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3377 */ 3378 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, 3379 int sig, const struct cred *cred) 3380 { 3381 return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred); 3382 } 3383 3384 /** 3385 * security_task_prctl() - Check if a prctl op is allowed 3386 * @option: operation 3387 * @arg2: argument 3388 * @arg3: argument 3389 * @arg4: argument 3390 * @arg5: argument 3391 * 3392 * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the 3393 * current process. 3394 * 3395 * Return: Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value 3396 * to cause prctl() to return immediately with that value. 3397 */ 3398 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, 3399 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) 3400 { 3401 int thisrc; 3402 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl); 3403 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3404 3405 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) { 3406 thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); 3407 if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) { 3408 rc = thisrc; 3409 if (thisrc != 0) 3410 break; 3411 } 3412 } 3413 return rc; 3414 } 3415 3416 /** 3417 * security_task_to_inode() - Set the security attributes of a task's inode 3418 * @p: task 3419 * @inode: inode 3420 * 3421 * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's 3422 * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes. 3423 */ 3424 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) 3425 { 3426 call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode); 3427 } 3428 3429 /** 3430 * security_create_user_ns() - Check if creating a new userns is allowed 3431 * @cred: prepared creds 3432 * 3433 * Check permission prior to creating a new user namespace. 3434 * 3435 * Return: Returns 0 if successful, otherwise < 0 error code. 3436 */ 3437 int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred) 3438 { 3439 return call_int_hook(userns_create, 0, cred); 3440 } 3441 3442 /** 3443 * security_ipc_permission() - Check if sysv ipc access is allowed 3444 * @ipcp: ipc permission structure 3445 * @flag: requested permissions 3446 * 3447 * Check permissions for access to IPC. 3448 * 3449 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3450 */ 3451 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) 3452 { 3453 return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag); 3454 } 3455 3456 /** 3457 * security_ipc_getsecid() - Get the sysv ipc object's secid 3458 * @ipcp: ipc permission structure 3459 * @secid: secid pointer 3460 * 3461 * Get the secid associated with the ipc object. In case of failure, @secid 3462 * will be set to zero. 3463 */ 3464 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) 3465 { 3466 *secid = 0; 3467 call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); 3468 } 3469 3470 /** 3471 * security_msg_msg_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc message LSM blob 3472 * @msg: message structure 3473 * 3474 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field. The 3475 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3476 * 3477 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3478 */ 3479 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) 3480 { 3481 int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg); 3482 3483 if (unlikely(rc)) 3484 return rc; 3485 rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg); 3486 if (unlikely(rc)) 3487 security_msg_msg_free(msg); 3488 return rc; 3489 } 3490 3491 /** 3492 * security_msg_msg_free() - Free a sysv ipc message LSM blob 3493 * @msg: message structure 3494 * 3495 * Deallocate the security structure for this message. 3496 */ 3497 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg) 3498 { 3499 call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg); 3500 kfree(msg->security); 3501 msg->security = NULL; 3502 } 3503 3504 /** 3505 * security_msg_queue_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob 3506 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3507 * 3508 * Allocate and attach a security structure to @msg. The security field is 3509 * initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3510 * 3511 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3512 */ 3513 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3514 { 3515 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq); 3516 3517 if (unlikely(rc)) 3518 return rc; 3519 rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq); 3520 if (unlikely(rc)) 3521 security_msg_queue_free(msq); 3522 return rc; 3523 } 3524 3525 /** 3526 * security_msg_queue_free() - Free a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob 3527 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3528 * 3529 * Deallocate security field @perm->security for the message queue. 3530 */ 3531 void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3532 { 3533 call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq); 3534 kfree(msq->security); 3535 msq->security = NULL; 3536 } 3537 3538 /** 3539 * security_msg_queue_associate() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed 3540 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3541 * @msqflg: operation flags 3542 * 3543 * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the msgget system 3544 * call. This hook is only called when returning the message queue identifier 3545 * for an existing message queue, not when a new message queue is created. 3546 * 3547 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 3548 */ 3549 int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) 3550 { 3551 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg); 3552 } 3553 3554 /** 3555 * security_msg_queue_msgctl() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed 3556 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3557 * @cmd: operation 3558 * 3559 * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd is to be 3560 * performed on the message queue with permissions. 3561 * 3562 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3563 */ 3564 int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) 3565 { 3566 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd); 3567 } 3568 3569 /** 3570 * security_msg_queue_msgsnd() - Check if sending a sysv ipc message is allowed 3571 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3572 * @msg: message 3573 * @msqflg: operation flags 3574 * 3575 * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message queue 3576 * with permissions specified in @msq. 3577 * 3578 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3579 */ 3580 int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, 3581 struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) 3582 { 3583 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg); 3584 } 3585 3586 /** 3587 * security_msg_queue_msgrcv() - Check if receiving a sysv ipc msg is allowed 3588 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3589 * @msg: message 3590 * @target: target task 3591 * @type: type of message requested 3592 * @mode: operation flags 3593 * 3594 * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message queue. 3595 * The @target task structure contains a pointer to the process that will be 3596 * receiving the message (not equal to the current process when inline receives 3597 * are being performed). 3598 * 3599 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3600 */ 3601 int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, 3602 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) 3603 { 3604 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode); 3605 } 3606 3607 /** 3608 * security_shm_alloc() - Allocate a sysv shm LSM blob 3609 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3610 * 3611 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @shp security field. The 3612 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3613 * 3614 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3615 */ 3616 int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3617 { 3618 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp); 3619 3620 if (unlikely(rc)) 3621 return rc; 3622 rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp); 3623 if (unlikely(rc)) 3624 security_shm_free(shp); 3625 return rc; 3626 } 3627 3628 /** 3629 * security_shm_free() - Free a sysv shm LSM blob 3630 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3631 * 3632 * Deallocate the security structure @perm->security for the memory segment. 3633 */ 3634 void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3635 { 3636 call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp); 3637 kfree(shp->security); 3638 shp->security = NULL; 3639 } 3640 3641 /** 3642 * security_shm_associate() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed 3643 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3644 * @shmflg: operation flags 3645 * 3646 * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the shmget 3647 * system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared memory 3648 * region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared memory 3649 * region is created. 3650 * 3651 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3652 */ 3653 int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) 3654 { 3655 return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg); 3656 } 3657 3658 /** 3659 * security_shm_shmctl() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed 3660 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3661 * @cmd: operation 3662 * 3663 * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by @cmd is 3664 * to be performed on the shared memory region with permissions in @shp. 3665 * 3666 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 3667 */ 3668 int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) 3669 { 3670 return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd); 3671 } 3672 3673 /** 3674 * security_shm_shmat() - Check if a sysv shm attach operation is allowed 3675 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3676 * @shmaddr: address of memory region to attach 3677 * @shmflg: operation flags 3678 * 3679 * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the 3680 * shared memory segment with permissions @shp to the data segment of the 3681 * calling process. The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr. 3682 * 3683 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3684 */ 3685 int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, 3686 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) 3687 { 3688 return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg); 3689 } 3690 3691 /** 3692 * security_sem_alloc() - Allocate a sysv semaphore LSM blob 3693 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3694 * 3695 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @sma security field. The 3696 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3697 * 3698 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3699 */ 3700 int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3701 { 3702 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma); 3703 3704 if (unlikely(rc)) 3705 return rc; 3706 rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma); 3707 if (unlikely(rc)) 3708 security_sem_free(sma); 3709 return rc; 3710 } 3711 3712 /** 3713 * security_sem_free() - Free a sysv semaphore LSM blob 3714 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3715 * 3716 * Deallocate security structure @sma->security for the semaphore. 3717 */ 3718 void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3719 { 3720 call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma); 3721 kfree(sma->security); 3722 sma->security = NULL; 3723 } 3724 3725 /** 3726 * security_sem_associate() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3727 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3728 * @semflg: operation flags 3729 * 3730 * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget system 3731 * call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore identifier for 3732 * an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be created. 3733 * 3734 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3735 */ 3736 int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) 3737 { 3738 return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg); 3739 } 3740 3741 /** 3742 * security_sem_semctl() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3743 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3744 * @cmd: operation 3745 * 3746 * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be 3747 * performed on the semaphore. 3748 * 3749 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3750 */ 3751 int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) 3752 { 3753 return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd); 3754 } 3755 3756 /** 3757 * security_sem_semop() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3758 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3759 * @sops: operations to perform 3760 * @nsops: number of operations 3761 * @alter: flag indicating changes will be made 3762 * 3763 * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the semaphore 3764 * set. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set may be modified. 3765 * 3766 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3767 */ 3768 int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, 3769 unsigned nsops, int alter) 3770 { 3771 return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter); 3772 } 3773 3774 /** 3775 * security_d_instantiate() - Populate an inode's LSM state based on a dentry 3776 * @dentry: dentry 3777 * @inode: inode 3778 * 3779 * Fill in @inode security information for a @dentry if allowed. 3780 */ 3781 void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) 3782 { 3783 if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 3784 return; 3785 call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode); 3786 } 3787 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); 3788 3789 /** 3790 * security_getprocattr() - Read an attribute for a task 3791 * @p: the task 3792 * @lsm: LSM name 3793 * @name: attribute name 3794 * @value: attribute value 3795 * 3796 * Read attribute @name for task @p and store it into @value if allowed. 3797 * 3798 * Return: Returns the length of @value on success, a negative value otherwise. 3799 */ 3800 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, 3801 const char *name, char **value) 3802 { 3803 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3804 3805 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { 3806 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 3807 continue; 3808 return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); 3809 } 3810 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr); 3811 } 3812 3813 /** 3814 * security_setprocattr() - Set an attribute for a task 3815 * @lsm: LSM name 3816 * @name: attribute name 3817 * @value: attribute value 3818 * @size: attribute value size 3819 * 3820 * Write (set) the current task's attribute @name to @value, size @size if 3821 * allowed. 3822 * 3823 * Return: Returns bytes written on success, a negative value otherwise. 3824 */ 3825 int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, 3826 size_t size) 3827 { 3828 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3829 3830 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { 3831 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 3832 continue; 3833 return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); 3834 } 3835 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr); 3836 } 3837 3838 /** 3839 * security_netlink_send() - Save info and check if netlink sending is allowed 3840 * @sk: sending socket 3841 * @skb: netlink message 3842 * 3843 * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission checking 3844 * can be performed when the message is processed. The security information 3845 * can be saved using the eff_cap field of the netlink_skb_parms structure. 3846 * Also may be used to provide fine grained control over message transmission. 3847 * 3848 * Return: Returns 0 if the information was successfully saved and message is 3849 * allowed to be transmitted. 3850 */ 3851 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 3852 { 3853 return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb); 3854 } 3855 3856 /** 3857 * security_ismaclabel() - Check is the named attribute is a MAC label 3858 * @name: full extended attribute name 3859 * 3860 * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name represents a MAC label. 3861 * 3862 * Return: Returns 1 if name is a MAC attribute otherwise returns 0. 3863 */ 3864 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) 3865 { 3866 return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name); 3867 } 3868 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); 3869 3870 /** 3871 * security_secid_to_secctx() - Convert a secid to a secctx 3872 * @secid: secid 3873 * @secdata: secctx 3874 * @seclen: secctx length 3875 * 3876 * Convert secid to security context. If @secdata is NULL the length of the 3877 * result will be returned in @seclen, but no @secdata will be returned. This 3878 * does mean that the length could change between calls to check the length and 3879 * the next call which actually allocates and returns the @secdata. 3880 * 3881 * Return: Return 0 on success, error on failure. 3882 */ 3883 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) 3884 { 3885 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3886 int rc; 3887 3888 /* 3889 * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this 3890 * LSM hook is not "stackable"). 3891 */ 3892 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { 3893 rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); 3894 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx)) 3895 return rc; 3896 } 3897 3898 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx); 3899 } 3900 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); 3901 3902 /** 3903 * security_secctx_to_secid() - Convert a secctx to a secid 3904 * @secdata: secctx 3905 * @seclen: length of secctx 3906 * @secid: secid 3907 * 3908 * Convert security context to secid. 3909 * 3910 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3911 */ 3912 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) 3913 { 3914 *secid = 0; 3915 return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid); 3916 } 3917 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); 3918 3919 /** 3920 * security_release_secctx() - Free a secctx buffer 3921 * @secdata: secctx 3922 * @seclen: length of secctx 3923 * 3924 * Release the security context. 3925 */ 3926 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) 3927 { 3928 call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); 3929 } 3930 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); 3931 3932 /** 3933 * security_inode_invalidate_secctx() - Invalidate an inode's security label 3934 * @inode: inode 3935 * 3936 * Notify the security module that it must revalidate the security context of 3937 * an inode. 3938 */ 3939 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) 3940 { 3941 call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode); 3942 } 3943 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx); 3944 3945 /** 3946 * security_inode_notifysecctx() - Nofify the LSM of an inode's security label 3947 * @inode: inode 3948 * @ctx: secctx 3949 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 3950 * 3951 * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should 3952 * be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module 3953 * for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize 3954 * the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server 3955 * for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. 3956 * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked. 3957 * 3958 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3959 */ 3960 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 3961 { 3962 return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 3963 } 3964 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx); 3965 3966 /** 3967 * security_inode_setsecctx() - Change the security label of an inode 3968 * @dentry: inode 3969 * @ctx: secctx 3970 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 3971 * 3972 * Change the security context of an inode. Updates the incore security 3973 * context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed 3974 * (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the 3975 * context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security 3976 * context in its incore inode and on the backing filesystem to a value 3977 * provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. Must be called with 3978 * inode->i_mutex locked. 3979 * 3980 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3981 */ 3982 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 3983 { 3984 return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen); 3985 } 3986 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx); 3987 3988 /** 3989 * security_inode_getsecctx() - Get the security label of an inode 3990 * @inode: inode 3991 * @ctx: secctx 3992 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 3993 * 3994 * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security 3995 * context for the given @inode. 3996 * 3997 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3998 */ 3999 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) 4000 { 4001 return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 4002 } 4003 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx); 4004 4005 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE 4006 /** 4007 * security_post_notification() - Check if a watch notification can be posted 4008 * @w_cred: credentials of the task that set the watch 4009 * @cred: credentials of the task which triggered the watch 4010 * @n: the notification 4011 * 4012 * Check to see if a watch notification can be posted to a particular queue. 4013 * 4014 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4015 */ 4016 int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, 4017 const struct cred *cred, 4018 struct watch_notification *n) 4019 { 4020 return call_int_hook(post_notification, 0, w_cred, cred, n); 4021 } 4022 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */ 4023 4024 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS 4025 /** 4026 * security_watch_key() - Check if a task is allowed to watch for key events 4027 * @key: the key to watch 4028 * 4029 * Check to see if a process is allowed to watch for event notifications from 4030 * a key or keyring. 4031 * 4032 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4033 */ 4034 int security_watch_key(struct key *key) 4035 { 4036 return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key); 4037 } 4038 #endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */ 4039 4040 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK 4041 /** 4042 * security_unix_stream_connect() - Check if a AF_UNIX stream is allowed 4043 * @sock: originating sock 4044 * @other: peer sock 4045 * @newsk: new sock 4046 * 4047 * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection 4048 * between @sock and @other. 4049 * 4050 * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because 4051 * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix 4052 * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name 4053 * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod 4054 * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to 4055 * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient 4056 * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible 4057 * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target 4058 * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. 4059 * 4060 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4061 */ 4062 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, 4063 struct sock *newsk) 4064 { 4065 return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk); 4066 } 4067 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect); 4068 4069 /** 4070 * security_unix_may_send() - Check if AF_UNIX socket can send datagrams 4071 * @sock: originating sock 4072 * @other: peer sock 4073 * 4074 * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to 4075 * @other. 4076 * 4077 * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because 4078 * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix 4079 * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name 4080 * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod 4081 * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to 4082 * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient 4083 * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible 4084 * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target 4085 * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. 4086 * 4087 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4088 */ 4089 int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) 4090 { 4091 return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other); 4092 } 4093 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send); 4094 4095 /** 4096 * security_socket_create() - Check if creating a new socket is allowed 4097 * @family: protocol family 4098 * @type: communications type 4099 * @protocol: requested protocol 4100 * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested 4101 * 4102 * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket. 4103 * 4104 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4105 */ 4106 int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) 4107 { 4108 return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern); 4109 } 4110 4111 /** 4112 * security_socket_post_create() - Initialize a newly created socket 4113 * @sock: socket 4114 * @family: protocol family 4115 * @type: communications type 4116 * @protocol: requested protocol 4117 * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested 4118 * 4119 * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security 4120 * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the socket 4121 * structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored in the 4122 * associated inode. Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will allocate 4123 * and attach security information to SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security. This hook 4124 * may be used to update the SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security field with additional 4125 * information that wasn't available when the inode was allocated. 4126 * 4127 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4128 */ 4129 int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, 4130 int type, int protocol, int kern) 4131 { 4132 return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type, 4133 protocol, kern); 4134 } 4135 4136 /** 4137 * security_socket_socketpair() - Check if creating a socketpair is allowed 4138 * @socka: first socket 4139 * @sockb: second socket 4140 * 4141 * Check permissions before creating a fresh pair of sockets. 4142 * 4143 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted and the connection was 4144 * established. 4145 */ 4146 int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) 4147 { 4148 return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb); 4149 } 4150 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair); 4151 4152 /** 4153 * security_socket_bind() - Check if a socket bind operation is allowed 4154 * @sock: socket 4155 * @address: requested bind address 4156 * @addrlen: length of address 4157 * 4158 * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is performed 4159 * and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the @address 4160 * parameter. 4161 * 4162 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4163 */ 4164 int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, 4165 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4166 { 4167 return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 4168 } 4169 4170 /** 4171 * security_socket_connect() - Check if a socket connect operation is allowed 4172 * @sock: socket 4173 * @address: address of remote connection point 4174 * @addrlen: length of address 4175 * 4176 * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation attempts to 4177 * connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address. 4178 * 4179 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4180 */ 4181 int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, 4182 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4183 { 4184 return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 4185 } 4186 4187 /** 4188 * security_socket_listen() - Check if a socket is allowed to listen 4189 * @sock: socket 4190 * @backlog: connection queue size 4191 * 4192 * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation. 4193 * 4194 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4195 */ 4196 int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) 4197 { 4198 return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog); 4199 } 4200 4201 /** 4202 * security_socket_accept() - Check if a socket is allowed to accept connections 4203 * @sock: listening socket 4204 * @newsock: newly creation connection socket 4205 * 4206 * Check permission before accepting a new connection. Note that the new 4207 * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it, but 4208 * the accept operation has not actually been performed. 4209 * 4210 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4211 */ 4212 int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) 4213 { 4214 return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock); 4215 } 4216 4217 /** 4218 * security_socket_sendmsg() - Check is sending a message is allowed 4219 * @sock: sending socket 4220 * @msg: message to send 4221 * @size: size of message 4222 * 4223 * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket. 4224 * 4225 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4226 */ 4227 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) 4228 { 4229 return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size); 4230 } 4231 4232 /** 4233 * security_socket_recvmsg() - Check if receiving a message is allowed 4234 * @sock: receiving socket 4235 * @msg: message to receive 4236 * @size: size of message 4237 * @flags: operational flags 4238 * 4239 * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket. 4240 * 4241 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4242 */ 4243 int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, 4244 int size, int flags) 4245 { 4246 return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags); 4247 } 4248 4249 /** 4250 * security_socket_getsockname() - Check if reading the socket addr is allowed 4251 * @sock: socket 4252 * 4253 * Check permission before reading the local address (name) of the socket 4254 * object. 4255 * 4256 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4257 */ 4258 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) 4259 { 4260 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock); 4261 } 4262 4263 /** 4264 * security_socket_getpeername() - Check if reading the peer's addr is allowed 4265 * @sock: socket 4266 * 4267 * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object. 4268 * 4269 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4270 */ 4271 int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) 4272 { 4273 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock); 4274 } 4275 4276 /** 4277 * security_socket_getsockopt() - Check if reading a socket option is allowed 4278 * @sock: socket 4279 * @level: option's protocol level 4280 * @optname: option name 4281 * 4282 * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket 4283 * @sock. 4284 * 4285 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4286 */ 4287 int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 4288 { 4289 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 4290 } 4291 4292 /** 4293 * security_socket_setsockopt() - Check if setting a socket option is allowed 4294 * @sock: socket 4295 * @level: option's protocol level 4296 * @optname: option name 4297 * 4298 * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket @sock. 4299 * 4300 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4301 */ 4302 int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 4303 { 4304 return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 4305 } 4306 4307 /** 4308 * security_socket_shutdown() - Checks if shutting down the socket is allowed 4309 * @sock: socket 4310 * @how: flag indicating how sends and receives are handled 4311 * 4312 * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket @sock is 4313 * shut down. 4314 * 4315 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4316 */ 4317 int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) 4318 { 4319 return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how); 4320 } 4321 4322 /** 4323 * security_sock_rcv_skb() - Check if an incoming network packet is allowed 4324 * @sk: destination sock 4325 * @skb: incoming packet 4326 * 4327 * Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct from 4328 * Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the incoming 4329 * sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk. Must not 4330 * sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks. 4331 * 4332 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4333 */ 4334 int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 4335 { 4336 return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb); 4337 } 4338 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); 4339 4340 /** 4341 * security_socket_getpeersec_stream() - Get the remote peer label 4342 * @sock: socket 4343 * @optval: destination buffer 4344 * @optlen: size of peer label copied into the buffer 4345 * @len: maximum size of the destination buffer 4346 * 4347 * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state 4348 * for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC. 4349 * For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the socket is associated with an 4350 * ipsec SA. 4351 * 4352 * Return: Returns 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return 4353 * values. 4354 */ 4355 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval, 4356 sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len) 4357 { 4358 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 4359 optval, optlen, len); 4360 } 4361 4362 /** 4363 * security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() - Get the remote peer label 4364 * @sock: socket 4365 * @skb: datagram packet 4366 * @secid: remote peer label secid 4367 * 4368 * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state 4369 * for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via getsockopt 4370 * SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated the IP_PASSSEC 4371 * option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the security state returned by 4372 * this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY ancillary message type. 4373 * 4374 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4375 */ 4376 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, 4377 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 4378 { 4379 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 4380 skb, secid); 4381 } 4382 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram); 4383 4384 /** 4385 * security_sk_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a sock's LSM blob 4386 * @sk: sock 4387 * @family: protocol family 4388 * @priority: gfp flags 4389 * 4390 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field, which 4391 * is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets. 4392 * 4393 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4394 */ 4395 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) 4396 { 4397 return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority); 4398 } 4399 4400 /** 4401 * security_sk_free() - Free the sock's LSM blob 4402 * @sk: sock 4403 * 4404 * Deallocate security structure. 4405 */ 4406 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk) 4407 { 4408 call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk); 4409 } 4410 4411 /** 4412 * security_sk_clone() - Clone a sock's LSM state 4413 * @sk: original sock 4414 * @newsk: target sock 4415 * 4416 * Clone/copy security structure. 4417 */ 4418 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) 4419 { 4420 call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk); 4421 } 4422 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone); 4423 4424 void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic) 4425 { 4426 call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid); 4427 } 4428 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow); 4429 4430 /** 4431 * security_req_classify_flow() - Set a flow's secid based on request_sock 4432 * @req: request_sock 4433 * @flic: target flow 4434 * 4435 * Sets @flic's secid to @req's secid. 4436 */ 4437 void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, 4438 struct flowi_common *flic) 4439 { 4440 call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic); 4441 } 4442 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow); 4443 4444 /** 4445 * security_sock_graft() - Reconcile LSM state when grafting a sock on a socket 4446 * @sk: sock being grafted 4447 * @parent: target parent socket 4448 * 4449 * Sets @parent's inode secid to @sk's secid and update @sk with any necessary 4450 * LSM state from @parent. 4451 */ 4452 void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) 4453 { 4454 call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent); 4455 } 4456 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft); 4457 4458 /** 4459 * security_inet_conn_request() - Set request_sock state using incoming connect 4460 * @sk: parent listening sock 4461 * @skb: incoming connection 4462 * @req: new request_sock 4463 * 4464 * Initialize the @req LSM state based on @sk and the incoming connect in @skb. 4465 * 4466 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4467 */ 4468 int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, 4469 struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) 4470 { 4471 return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req); 4472 } 4473 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request); 4474 4475 /** 4476 * security_inet_csk_clone() - Set new sock LSM state based on request_sock 4477 * @newsk: new sock 4478 * @req: connection request_sock 4479 * 4480 * Set that LSM state of @sock using the LSM state from @req. 4481 */ 4482 void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, 4483 const struct request_sock *req) 4484 { 4485 call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req); 4486 } 4487 4488 /** 4489 * security_inet_conn_established() - Update sock's LSM state with connection 4490 * @sk: sock 4491 * @skb: connection packet 4492 * 4493 * Update @sock's LSM state to represent a new connection from @skb. 4494 */ 4495 void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, 4496 struct sk_buff *skb) 4497 { 4498 call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb); 4499 } 4500 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established); 4501 4502 /** 4503 * security_secmark_relabel_packet() - Check if setting a secmark is allowed 4504 * @secid: new secmark value 4505 * 4506 * Check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to @secid. 4507 * 4508 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4509 */ 4510 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid) 4511 { 4512 return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid); 4513 } 4514 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet); 4515 4516 /** 4517 * security_secmark_refcount_inc() - Increment the secmark labeling rule count 4518 * 4519 * Tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. 4520 */ 4521 void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void) 4522 { 4523 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc); 4524 } 4525 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc); 4526 4527 /** 4528 * security_secmark_refcount_dec() - Decrement the secmark labeling rule count 4529 * 4530 * Tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. 4531 */ 4532 void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void) 4533 { 4534 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec); 4535 } 4536 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec); 4537 4538 /** 4539 * security_tun_dev_alloc_security() - Allocate a LSM blob for a TUN device 4540 * @security: pointer to the LSM blob 4541 * 4542 * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN device, 4543 * returning the pointer in @security. 4544 * 4545 * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. 4546 */ 4547 int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) 4548 { 4549 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security); 4550 } 4551 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security); 4552 4553 /** 4554 * security_tun_dev_free_security() - Free a TUN device LSM blob 4555 * @security: LSM blob 4556 * 4557 * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN device. 4558 */ 4559 void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) 4560 { 4561 call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security); 4562 } 4563 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security); 4564 4565 /** 4566 * security_tun_dev_create() - Check if creating a TUN device is allowed 4567 * 4568 * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device. 4569 * 4570 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4571 */ 4572 int security_tun_dev_create(void) 4573 { 4574 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0); 4575 } 4576 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create); 4577 4578 /** 4579 * security_tun_dev_attach_queue() - Check if attaching a TUN queue is allowed 4580 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4581 * 4582 * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue. 4583 * 4584 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4585 */ 4586 int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) 4587 { 4588 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security); 4589 } 4590 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue); 4591 4592 /** 4593 * security_tun_dev_attach() - Update TUN device LSM state on attach 4594 * @sk: associated sock 4595 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4596 * 4597 * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated 4598 * with the TUN device's sock structure. 4599 * 4600 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4601 */ 4602 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) 4603 { 4604 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security); 4605 } 4606 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach); 4607 4608 /** 4609 * security_tun_dev_open() - Update TUN device LSM state on open 4610 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4611 * 4612 * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated 4613 * with the TUN device's security structure. 4614 * 4615 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4616 */ 4617 int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) 4618 { 4619 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security); 4620 } 4621 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open); 4622 4623 /** 4624 * security_sctp_assoc_request() - Update the LSM on a SCTP association req 4625 * @asoc: SCTP association 4626 * @skb: packet requesting the association 4627 * 4628 * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association INIT packet to the LSM. 4629 * 4630 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4631 */ 4632 int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, 4633 struct sk_buff *skb) 4634 { 4635 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, asoc, skb); 4636 } 4637 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request); 4638 4639 /** 4640 * security_sctp_bind_connect() - Validate a list of addrs for a SCTP option 4641 * @sk: socket 4642 * @optname: SCTP option to validate 4643 * @address: list of IP addresses to validate 4644 * @addrlen: length of the address list 4645 * 4646 * Validiate permissions required for each address associated with sock @sk. 4647 * Depending on @optname, the addresses will be treated as either a connect or 4648 * bind service. The @addrlen is calculated on each IPv4 and IPv6 address using 4649 * sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6). 4650 * 4651 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4652 */ 4653 int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, 4654 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4655 { 4656 return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname, 4657 address, addrlen); 4658 } 4659 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect); 4660 4661 /** 4662 * security_sctp_sk_clone() - Clone a SCTP sock's LSM state 4663 * @asoc: SCTP association 4664 * @sk: original sock 4665 * @newsk: target sock 4666 * 4667 * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) (i.e. a TCP style 4668 * socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls 4669 * sctp_peeloff(3). 4670 */ 4671 void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk, 4672 struct sock *newsk) 4673 { 4674 call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, asoc, sk, newsk); 4675 } 4676 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone); 4677 4678 /** 4679 * security_sctp_assoc_established() - Update LSM state when assoc established 4680 * @asoc: SCTP association 4681 * @skb: packet establishing the association 4682 * 4683 * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association COOKIE_ACK packet to the 4684 * security module. 4685 * 4686 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4687 */ 4688 int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc, 4689 struct sk_buff *skb) 4690 { 4691 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, 0, asoc, skb); 4692 } 4693 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established); 4694 4695 /** 4696 * security_mptcp_add_subflow() - Inherit the LSM label from the MPTCP socket 4697 * @sk: the owning MPTCP socket 4698 * @ssk: the new subflow 4699 * 4700 * Update the labeling for the given MPTCP subflow, to match the one of the 4701 * owning MPTCP socket. This hook has to be called after the socket creation and 4702 * initialization via the security_socket_create() and 4703 * security_socket_post_create() LSM hooks. 4704 * 4705 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure. 4706 */ 4707 int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk) 4708 { 4709 return call_int_hook(mptcp_add_subflow, 0, sk, ssk); 4710 } 4711 4712 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ 4713 4714 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND 4715 /** 4716 * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed 4717 * @sec: LSM blob 4718 * @subnet_prefix: subnet prefix of the port 4719 * @pkey: IB pkey 4720 * 4721 * Check permission to access a pkey when modifying a QP. 4722 * 4723 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4724 */ 4725 int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey) 4726 { 4727 return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey); 4728 } 4729 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access); 4730 4731 /** 4732 * security_ib_endport_manage_subnet() - Check if SMPs traffic is allowed 4733 * @sec: LSM blob 4734 * @dev_name: IB device name 4735 * @port_num: port number 4736 * 4737 * Check permissions to send and receive SMPs on a end port. 4738 * 4739 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4740 */ 4741 int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, 4742 const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) 4743 { 4744 return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec, 4745 dev_name, port_num); 4746 } 4747 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet); 4748 4749 /** 4750 * security_ib_alloc_security() - Allocate an Infiniband LSM blob 4751 * @sec: LSM blob 4752 * 4753 * Allocate a security structure for Infiniband objects. 4754 * 4755 * Return: Returns 0 on success, non-zero on failure. 4756 */ 4757 int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec) 4758 { 4759 return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec); 4760 } 4761 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security); 4762 4763 /** 4764 * security_ib_free_security() - Free an Infiniband LSM blob 4765 * @sec: LSM blob 4766 * 4767 * Deallocate an Infiniband security structure. 4768 */ 4769 void security_ib_free_security(void *sec) 4770 { 4771 call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec); 4772 } 4773 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security); 4774 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ 4775 4776 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM 4777 /** 4778 * security_xfrm_policy_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm policy LSM blob 4779 * @ctxp: xfrm security context being added to the SPD 4780 * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace 4781 * @gfp: gfp flags 4782 * 4783 * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security field 4784 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated. 4785 * 4786 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4787 */ 4788 int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, 4789 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, 4790 gfp_t gfp) 4791 { 4792 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp); 4793 } 4794 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc); 4795 4796 /** 4797 * security_xfrm_policy_clone() - Clone xfrm policy LSM state 4798 * @old_ctx: xfrm security context 4799 * @new_ctxp: target xfrm security context 4800 * 4801 * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the information from 4802 * the old_ctx structure. 4803 * 4804 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4805 */ 4806 int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, 4807 struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) 4808 { 4809 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp); 4810 } 4811 4812 /** 4813 * security_xfrm_policy_free() - Free a xfrm security context 4814 * @ctx: xfrm security context 4815 * 4816 * Free LSM resources associated with @ctx. 4817 */ 4818 void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 4819 { 4820 call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx); 4821 } 4822 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free); 4823 4824 /** 4825 * security_xfrm_policy_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm policy is allowed 4826 * @ctx: xfrm security context 4827 * 4828 * Authorize deletion of a SPD entry. 4829 * 4830 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4831 */ 4832 int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 4833 { 4834 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx); 4835 } 4836 4837 /** 4838 * security_xfrm_state_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob 4839 * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD 4840 * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace 4841 * 4842 * Allocate a security structure to the @x->security field; the security field 4843 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to 4844 * correspond to @sec_ctx. 4845 * 4846 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4847 */ 4848 int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, 4849 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) 4850 { 4851 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx); 4852 } 4853 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc); 4854 4855 /** 4856 * security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob 4857 * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD 4858 * @polsec: associated policy's security context 4859 * @secid: secid from the flow 4860 * 4861 * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security field 4862 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to 4863 * correspond to secid. 4864 * 4865 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. 4866 */ 4867 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, 4868 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) 4869 { 4870 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid); 4871 } 4872 4873 /** 4874 * security_xfrm_state_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm state is allowed 4875 * @x: xfrm state 4876 * 4877 * Authorize deletion of x->security. 4878 * 4879 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4880 */ 4881 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) 4882 { 4883 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x); 4884 } 4885 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete); 4886 4887 /** 4888 * security_xfrm_state_free() - Free a xfrm state 4889 * @x: xfrm state 4890 * 4891 * Deallocate x->security. 4892 */ 4893 void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) 4894 { 4895 call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x); 4896 } 4897 4898 /** 4899 * security_xfrm_policy_lookup() - Check if using a xfrm policy is allowed 4900 * @ctx: target xfrm security context 4901 * @fl_secid: flow secid used to authorize access 4902 * 4903 * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing XFRMs on a 4904 * packet. The hook is called when selecting either a per-socket policy or a 4905 * generic xfrm policy. 4906 * 4907 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno on 4908 * other errors. 4909 */ 4910 int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid) 4911 { 4912 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid); 4913 } 4914 4915 /** 4916 * security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() - Check for a xfrm match 4917 * @x: xfrm state to match 4918 * @xp: xfrm policy to check for a match 4919 * @flic: flow to check for a match. 4920 * 4921 * Check @xp and @flic for a match with @x. 4922 * 4923 * Return: Returns 1 if there is a match. 4924 */ 4925 int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, 4926 struct xfrm_policy *xp, 4927 const struct flowi_common *flic) 4928 { 4929 struct security_hook_list *hp; 4930 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); 4931 4932 /* 4933 * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment 4934 * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately, 4935 * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux 4936 * supplies this call. 4937 * 4938 * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than 4939 * using the macro 4940 */ 4941 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, 4942 list) { 4943 rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic); 4944 break; 4945 } 4946 return rc; 4947 } 4948 4949 /** 4950 * security_xfrm_decode_session() - Determine the xfrm secid for a packet 4951 * @skb: xfrm packet 4952 * @secid: secid 4953 * 4954 * Decode the packet in @skb and return the security label in @secid. 4955 * 4956 * Return: Return 0 if all xfrms used have the same secid. 4957 */ 4958 int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 4959 { 4960 return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1); 4961 } 4962 4963 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic) 4964 { 4965 int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid, 4966 0); 4967 4968 BUG_ON(rc); 4969 } 4970 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow); 4971 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ 4972 4973 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS 4974 /** 4975 * security_key_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a kernel key LSM blob 4976 * @key: key 4977 * @cred: credentials 4978 * @flags: allocation flags 4979 * 4980 * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does not 4981 * have a serial number assigned at this point. 4982 * 4983 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. 4984 */ 4985 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, 4986 unsigned long flags) 4987 { 4988 return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags); 4989 } 4990 4991 /** 4992 * security_key_free() - Free a kernel key LSM blob 4993 * @key: key 4994 * 4995 * Notification of destruction; free security data. 4996 */ 4997 void security_key_free(struct key *key) 4998 { 4999 call_void_hook(key_free, key); 5000 } 5001 5002 /** 5003 * security_key_permission() - Check if a kernel key operation is allowed 5004 * @key_ref: key reference 5005 * @cred: credentials of actor requesting access 5006 * @need_perm: requested permissions 5007 * 5008 * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a key. 5009 * 5010 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. 5011 */ 5012 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, 5013 enum key_need_perm need_perm) 5014 { 5015 return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm); 5016 } 5017 5018 /** 5019 * security_key_getsecurity() - Get the key's security label 5020 * @key: key 5021 * @buffer: security label buffer 5022 * 5023 * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key for 5024 * the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function allocates the 5025 * storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller should free it. 5026 * 5027 * Return: Returns the length of @buffer (including terminating NUL) or -ve if 5028 * an error occurs. May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if 5029 * there is no security label assigned to the key. 5030 */ 5031 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer) 5032 { 5033 *buffer = NULL; 5034 return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, buffer); 5035 } 5036 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ 5037 5038 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT 5039 /** 5040 * security_audit_rule_init() - Allocate and init an LSM audit rule struct 5041 * @field: audit action 5042 * @op: rule operator 5043 * @rulestr: rule context 5044 * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct 5045 * 5046 * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. 5047 * 5048 * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of 5049 * an invalid rule. 5050 */ 5051 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) 5052 { 5053 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); 5054 } 5055 5056 /** 5057 * security_audit_rule_known() - Check if an audit rule contains LSM fields 5058 * @krule: audit rule 5059 * 5060 * Specifies whether given @krule contains any fields related to the current 5061 * LSM. 5062 * 5063 * Return: Returns 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise. 5064 */ 5065 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) 5066 { 5067 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule); 5068 } 5069 5070 /** 5071 * security_audit_rule_free() - Free an LSM audit rule struct 5072 * @lsmrule: audit rule struct 5073 * 5074 * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by 5075 * audit_rule_init(). 5076 */ 5077 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) 5078 { 5079 call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); 5080 } 5081 5082 /** 5083 * security_audit_rule_match() - Check if a label matches an audit rule 5084 * @secid: security label 5085 * @field: LSM audit field 5086 * @op: matching operator 5087 * @lsmrule: audit rule 5088 * 5089 * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved by 5090 * security_audit_rule_known(). 5091 * 5092 * Return: Returns 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on 5093 * failure. 5094 */ 5095 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) 5096 { 5097 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule); 5098 } 5099 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ 5100 5101 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL 5102 /** 5103 * security_bpf() - Check if the bpf syscall operation is allowed 5104 * @cmd: command 5105 * @attr: bpf attribute 5106 * @size: size 5107 * 5108 * Do a initial check for all bpf syscalls after the attribute is copied into 5109 * the kernel. The actual security module can implement their own rules to 5110 * check the specific cmd they need. 5111 * 5112 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5113 */ 5114 int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) 5115 { 5116 return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size); 5117 } 5118 5119 /** 5120 * security_bpf_map() - Check if access to a bpf map is allowed 5121 * @map: bpf map 5122 * @fmode: mode 5123 * 5124 * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF 5125 * maps. 5126 * 5127 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5128 */ 5129 int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) 5130 { 5131 return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode); 5132 } 5133 5134 /** 5135 * security_bpf_prog() - Check if access to a bpf program is allowed 5136 * @prog: bpf program 5137 * 5138 * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF 5139 * programs. 5140 * 5141 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5142 */ 5143 int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) 5144 { 5145 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog); 5146 } 5147 5148 /** 5149 * security_bpf_map_alloc() - Allocate a bpf map LSM blob 5150 * @map: bpf map 5151 * 5152 * Initialize the security field inside bpf map. 5153 * 5154 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5155 */ 5156 int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) 5157 { 5158 return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map); 5159 } 5160 5161 /** 5162 * security_bpf_prog_alloc() - Allocate a bpf program LSM blob 5163 * @aux: bpf program aux info struct 5164 * 5165 * Initialize the security field inside bpf program. 5166 * 5167 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5168 */ 5169 int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 5170 { 5171 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux); 5172 } 5173 5174 /** 5175 * security_bpf_map_free() - Free a bpf map's LSM blob 5176 * @map: bpf map 5177 * 5178 * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf map. 5179 */ 5180 void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) 5181 { 5182 call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map); 5183 } 5184 5185 /** 5186 * security_bpf_prog_free() - Free a bpf program's LSM blob 5187 * @aux: bpf program aux info struct 5188 * 5189 * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog. 5190 */ 5191 void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 5192 { 5193 call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); 5194 } 5195 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ 5196 5197 /** 5198 * security_locked_down() - Check if a kernel feature is allowed 5199 * @what: requested kernel feature 5200 * 5201 * Determine whether a kernel feature that potentially enables arbitrary code 5202 * execution in kernel space should be permitted. 5203 * 5204 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5205 */ 5206 int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) 5207 { 5208 return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what); 5209 } 5210 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down); 5211 5212 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 5213 /** 5214 * security_perf_event_open() - Check if a perf event open is allowed 5215 * @attr: perf event attribute 5216 * @type: type of event 5217 * 5218 * Check whether the @type of perf_event_open syscall is allowed. 5219 * 5220 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5221 */ 5222 int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) 5223 { 5224 return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type); 5225 } 5226 5227 /** 5228 * security_perf_event_alloc() - Allocate a perf event LSM blob 5229 * @event: perf event 5230 * 5231 * Allocate and save perf_event security info. 5232 * 5233 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5234 */ 5235 int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) 5236 { 5237 return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event); 5238 } 5239 5240 /** 5241 * security_perf_event_free() - Free a perf event LSM blob 5242 * @event: perf event 5243 * 5244 * Release (free) perf_event security info. 5245 */ 5246 void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) 5247 { 5248 call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event); 5249 } 5250 5251 /** 5252 * security_perf_event_read() - Check if reading a perf event label is allowed 5253 * @event: perf event 5254 * 5255 * Read perf_event security info if allowed. 5256 * 5257 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5258 */ 5259 int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) 5260 { 5261 return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event); 5262 } 5263 5264 /** 5265 * security_perf_event_write() - Check if writing a perf event label is allowed 5266 * @event: perf event 5267 * 5268 * Write perf_event security info if allowed. 5269 * 5270 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5271 */ 5272 int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) 5273 { 5274 return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event); 5275 } 5276 #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */ 5277 5278 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING 5279 /** 5280 * security_uring_override_creds() - Check if overriding creds is allowed 5281 * @new: new credentials 5282 * 5283 * Check if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to 5284 * override it's credentials with @new. 5285 * 5286 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5287 */ 5288 int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) 5289 { 5290 return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, 0, new); 5291 } 5292 5293 /** 5294 * security_uring_sqpoll() - Check if IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL is allowed 5295 * 5296 * Check whether the current task is allowed to spawn a io_uring polling thread 5297 * (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). 5298 * 5299 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5300 */ 5301 int security_uring_sqpoll(void) 5302 { 5303 return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0); 5304 } 5305 5306 /** 5307 * security_uring_cmd() - Check if a io_uring passthrough command is allowed 5308 * @ioucmd: command 5309 * 5310 * Check whether the file_operations uring_cmd is allowed to run. 5311 * 5312 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5313 */ 5314 int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) 5315 { 5316 return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd); 5317 } 5318 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ 5319