1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later 2 /* 3 * Security plug functions 4 * 5 * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com> 6 * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> 7 * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com> 8 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies 9 * Copyright (C) 2023 Microsoft Corporation <paul@paul-moore.com> 10 */ 11 12 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt 13 14 #include <linux/bpf.h> 15 #include <linux/capability.h> 16 #include <linux/dcache.h> 17 #include <linux/export.h> 18 #include <linux/init.h> 19 #include <linux/kernel.h> 20 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> 21 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> 22 #include <linux/integrity.h> 23 #include <linux/ima.h> 24 #include <linux/evm.h> 25 #include <linux/fsnotify.h> 26 #include <linux/mman.h> 27 #include <linux/mount.h> 28 #include <linux/personality.h> 29 #include <linux/backing-dev.h> 30 #include <linux/string.h> 31 #include <linux/msg.h> 32 #include <net/flow.h> 33 34 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 35 36 /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ 37 #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) 38 39 /* 40 * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the 41 * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows 42 * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing 43 * purposes. 44 */ 45 const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX + 1] = { 46 [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", 47 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", 48 [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", 49 [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access", 50 [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", 51 [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", 52 [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", 53 [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", 54 [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", 55 [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", 56 [LOCKDOWN_DEVICE_TREE] = "modifying device tree contents", 57 [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage", 58 [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO", 59 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters", 60 [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio", 61 [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access", 62 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access", 63 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM", 64 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM", 65 [LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection", 66 [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", 67 [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", 68 [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", 69 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", 70 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM", 71 [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", 72 [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", 73 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access", 74 [LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret", 75 [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", 76 }; 77 78 struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init; 79 static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain); 80 81 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; 82 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; 83 84 char *lsm_names; 85 static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init; 86 87 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ 88 static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; 89 static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm; 90 91 static __initconst const char *const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM; 92 93 /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ 94 static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms; 95 static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive; 96 97 static __initdata bool debug; 98 #define init_debug(...) \ 99 do { \ 100 if (debug) \ 101 pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \ 102 } while (0) 103 104 static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm) 105 { 106 if (!lsm->enabled) 107 return false; 108 109 return *lsm->enabled; 110 } 111 112 /* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */ 113 static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1; 114 static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0; 115 static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled) 116 { 117 /* 118 * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use 119 * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state. 120 */ 121 if (!lsm->enabled) { 122 if (enabled) 123 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 124 else 125 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 126 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) { 127 if (!enabled) 128 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 129 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) { 130 if (enabled) 131 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 132 } else { 133 *lsm->enabled = enabled; 134 } 135 } 136 137 /* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */ 138 static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 139 { 140 struct lsm_info **check; 141 142 for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++) 143 if (*check == lsm) 144 return true; 145 146 return false; 147 } 148 149 /* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */ 150 static int last_lsm __initdata; 151 static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from) 152 { 153 /* Ignore duplicate selections. */ 154 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 155 return; 156 157 if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from)) 158 return; 159 160 /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */ 161 if (!lsm->enabled) 162 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 163 ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm; 164 165 init_debug("%s ordered: %s (%s)\n", from, lsm->name, 166 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 167 } 168 169 /* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */ 170 static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm) 171 { 172 /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */ 173 if (!is_enabled(lsm)) 174 return false; 175 176 /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */ 177 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) { 178 init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name); 179 return false; 180 } 181 182 return true; 183 } 184 185 static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs) 186 { 187 int offset; 188 189 if (*need <= 0) 190 return; 191 192 offset = ALIGN(*lbs, sizeof(void *)); 193 *lbs = offset + *need; 194 *need = offset; 195 } 196 197 static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) 198 { 199 if (!needed) 200 return; 201 202 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 203 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file); 204 /* 205 * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to 206 * what the modules might need. 207 */ 208 if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0) 209 blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head); 210 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 211 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 212 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 213 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 214 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); 215 } 216 217 /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ 218 static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 219 { 220 int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm); 221 222 /* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */ 223 set_enabled(lsm, enabled); 224 225 /* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */ 226 if (enabled) { 227 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) { 228 exclusive = lsm; 229 init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name); 230 } 231 232 lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs); 233 } 234 } 235 236 /* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */ 237 static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 238 { 239 if (is_enabled(lsm)) { 240 int ret; 241 242 init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name); 243 ret = lsm->init(); 244 WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret); 245 } 246 } 247 248 /* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */ 249 static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) 250 { 251 struct lsm_info *lsm; 252 char *sep, *name, *next; 253 254 /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */ 255 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 256 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST) 257 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " first"); 258 } 259 260 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 261 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 262 struct lsm_info *major; 263 264 /* 265 * To match the original "security=" behavior, this 266 * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major 267 * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable 268 * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs. 269 */ 270 for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info; 271 major++) { 272 if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) && 273 strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) { 274 set_enabled(major, false); 275 init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s (only one legacy major LSM)\n", 276 chosen_major_lsm, major->name); 277 } 278 } 279 } 280 281 sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL); 282 next = sep; 283 /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */ 284 while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) { 285 bool found = false; 286 287 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 288 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE && 289 strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) { 290 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin); 291 found = true; 292 } 293 } 294 295 if (!found) 296 init_debug("%s ignored: %s (not built into kernel)\n", 297 origin, name); 298 } 299 300 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 301 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 302 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 303 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 304 continue; 305 if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0) 306 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security="); 307 } 308 } 309 310 /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */ 311 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 312 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 313 continue; 314 set_enabled(lsm, false); 315 init_debug("%s skipped: %s (not in requested order)\n", 316 origin, lsm->name); 317 } 318 319 kfree(sep); 320 } 321 322 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred); 323 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task); 324 325 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result); 326 327 static void __init report_lsm_order(void) 328 { 329 struct lsm_info **lsm, *early; 330 int first = 0; 331 332 pr_info("initializing lsm="); 333 334 /* Report each enabled LSM name, comma separated. */ 335 for (early = __start_early_lsm_info; 336 early < __end_early_lsm_info; early++) 337 if (is_enabled(early)) 338 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", early->name); 339 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 340 if (is_enabled(*lsm)) 341 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", (*lsm)->name); 342 343 pr_cont("\n"); 344 } 345 346 static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) 347 { 348 struct lsm_info **lsm; 349 350 ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms), 351 GFP_KERNEL); 352 353 if (chosen_lsm_order) { 354 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 355 pr_warn("security=%s is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=%s\n", 356 chosen_major_lsm, chosen_lsm_order); 357 chosen_major_lsm = NULL; 358 } 359 ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline"); 360 } else 361 ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin"); 362 363 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 364 prepare_lsm(*lsm); 365 366 report_lsm_order(); 367 368 init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 369 init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file); 370 init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 371 init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 372 init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 373 init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 374 init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); 375 376 /* 377 * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs 378 */ 379 if (blob_sizes.lbs_file) 380 lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache", 381 blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0, 382 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 383 if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode) 384 lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache", 385 blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0, 386 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 387 388 lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred); 389 lsm_early_task(current); 390 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 391 initialize_lsm(*lsm); 392 393 kfree(ordered_lsms); 394 } 395 396 int __init early_security_init(void) 397 { 398 struct lsm_info *lsm; 399 400 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 401 INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&security_hook_heads.NAME); 402 #include "linux/lsm_hook_defs.h" 403 #undef LSM_HOOK 404 405 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 406 if (!lsm->enabled) 407 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 408 prepare_lsm(lsm); 409 initialize_lsm(lsm); 410 } 411 412 return 0; 413 } 414 415 /** 416 * security_init - initializes the security framework 417 * 418 * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence. 419 */ 420 int __init security_init(void) 421 { 422 struct lsm_info *lsm; 423 424 init_debug("legacy security=%s\n", chosen_major_lsm ? : " *unspecified*"); 425 init_debug(" CONFIG_LSM=%s\n", builtin_lsm_order); 426 init_debug("boot arg lsm=%s\n", chosen_lsm_order ? : " *unspecified*"); 427 428 /* 429 * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is 430 * available 431 */ 432 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 433 init_debug(" early started: %s (%s)\n", lsm->name, 434 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 435 if (lsm->enabled) 436 lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names); 437 } 438 439 /* Load LSMs in specified order. */ 440 ordered_lsm_init(); 441 442 return 0; 443 } 444 445 /* Save user chosen LSM */ 446 static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str) 447 { 448 chosen_major_lsm = str; 449 return 1; 450 } 451 __setup("security=", choose_major_lsm); 452 453 /* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */ 454 static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str) 455 { 456 chosen_lsm_order = str; 457 return 1; 458 } 459 __setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order); 460 461 /* Enable LSM order debugging. */ 462 static int __init enable_debug(char *str) 463 { 464 debug = true; 465 return 1; 466 } 467 __setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug); 468 469 static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm) 470 { 471 const char *last; 472 473 if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm)) 474 return false; 475 last = strrchr(list, ','); 476 if (last) 477 /* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */ 478 last++; 479 else 480 last = list; 481 return !strcmp(last, lsm); 482 } 483 484 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) 485 { 486 char *cp; 487 488 if (*result == NULL) { 489 *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL); 490 if (*result == NULL) 491 return -ENOMEM; 492 } else { 493 /* Check if it is the last registered name */ 494 if (match_last_lsm(*result, new)) 495 return 0; 496 cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new); 497 if (cp == NULL) 498 return -ENOMEM; 499 kfree(*result); 500 *result = cp; 501 } 502 return 0; 503 } 504 505 /** 506 * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. 507 * @hooks: the hooks to add 508 * @count: the number of hooks to add 509 * @lsm: the name of the security module 510 * 511 * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. 512 */ 513 void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, 514 const char *lsm) 515 { 516 int i; 517 518 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { 519 hooks[i].lsm = lsm; 520 hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); 521 } 522 523 /* 524 * Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back 525 * and fix this up afterwards. 526 */ 527 if (slab_is_available()) { 528 if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0) 529 panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__); 530 } 531 } 532 533 int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) 534 { 535 return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 536 event, data); 537 } 538 EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier); 539 540 int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 541 { 542 return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 543 nb); 544 } 545 EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier); 546 547 int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 548 { 549 return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 550 nb); 551 } 552 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier); 553 554 /** 555 * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob 556 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 557 * @gfp: allocation type 558 * 559 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 560 * 561 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 562 */ 563 static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 564 { 565 if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) { 566 cred->security = NULL; 567 return 0; 568 } 569 570 cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp); 571 if (cred->security == NULL) 572 return -ENOMEM; 573 return 0; 574 } 575 576 /** 577 * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob 578 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 579 * 580 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 581 */ 582 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred) 583 { 584 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL); 585 586 if (rc) 587 panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__); 588 } 589 590 /** 591 * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob 592 * @file: the file that needs a blob 593 * 594 * Allocate the file blob for all the modules 595 * 596 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 597 */ 598 static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file) 599 { 600 if (!lsm_file_cache) { 601 file->f_security = NULL; 602 return 0; 603 } 604 605 file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL); 606 if (file->f_security == NULL) 607 return -ENOMEM; 608 return 0; 609 } 610 611 /** 612 * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob 613 * @inode: the inode that needs a blob 614 * 615 * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules 616 * 617 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 618 */ 619 int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 620 { 621 if (!lsm_inode_cache) { 622 inode->i_security = NULL; 623 return 0; 624 } 625 626 inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); 627 if (inode->i_security == NULL) 628 return -ENOMEM; 629 return 0; 630 } 631 632 /** 633 * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob 634 * @task: the task that needs a blob 635 * 636 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 637 * 638 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 639 */ 640 static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) 641 { 642 if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) { 643 task->security = NULL; 644 return 0; 645 } 646 647 task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL); 648 if (task->security == NULL) 649 return -ENOMEM; 650 return 0; 651 } 652 653 /** 654 * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob 655 * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob 656 * 657 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 658 * 659 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 660 */ 661 static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip) 662 { 663 if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) { 664 kip->security = NULL; 665 return 0; 666 } 667 668 kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL); 669 if (kip->security == NULL) 670 return -ENOMEM; 671 return 0; 672 } 673 674 /** 675 * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob 676 * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob 677 * 678 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 679 * 680 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 681 */ 682 static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp) 683 { 684 if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) { 685 mp->security = NULL; 686 return 0; 687 } 688 689 mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL); 690 if (mp->security == NULL) 691 return -ENOMEM; 692 return 0; 693 } 694 695 /** 696 * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob 697 * @task: the task that needs a blob 698 * 699 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 700 */ 701 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) 702 { 703 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 704 705 if (rc) 706 panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__); 707 } 708 709 /** 710 * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob 711 * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob 712 * 713 * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules 714 * 715 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 716 */ 717 static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 718 { 719 if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) { 720 sb->s_security = NULL; 721 return 0; 722 } 723 724 sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL); 725 if (sb->s_security == NULL) 726 return -ENOMEM; 727 return 0; 728 } 729 730 /* 731 * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and 732 * can be accessed with: 733 * 734 * LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) 735 * 736 * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each 737 * LSM hook. 738 */ 739 #define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default) 740 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME) 741 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \ 742 static const int __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT); 743 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 744 DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME) 745 746 #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h> 747 #undef LSM_HOOK 748 749 /* 750 * Hook list operation macros. 751 * 752 * call_void_hook: 753 * This is a hook that does not return a value. 754 * 755 * call_int_hook: 756 * This is a hook that returns a value. 757 */ 758 759 #define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \ 760 do { \ 761 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 762 \ 763 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \ 764 P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 765 } while (0) 766 767 #define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \ 768 int RC = IRC; \ 769 do { \ 770 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 771 \ 772 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ 773 RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 774 if (RC != 0) \ 775 break; \ 776 } \ 777 } while (0); \ 778 RC; \ 779 }) 780 781 /* Security operations */ 782 783 /** 784 * security_binder_set_context_mgr() - Check if becoming binder ctx mgr is ok 785 * @mgr: task credentials of current binder process 786 * 787 * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager. 788 * 789 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 790 */ 791 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr) 792 { 793 return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr); 794 } 795 796 /** 797 * security_binder_transaction() - Check if a binder transaction is allowed 798 * @from: sending process 799 * @to: receiving process 800 * 801 * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call to @to. 802 * 803 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 804 */ 805 int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from, 806 const struct cred *to) 807 { 808 return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to); 809 } 810 811 /** 812 * security_binder_transfer_binder() - Check if a binder transfer is allowed 813 * @from: sending process 814 * @to: receiving process 815 * 816 * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to. 817 * 818 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 819 */ 820 int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, 821 const struct cred *to) 822 { 823 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to); 824 } 825 826 /** 827 * security_binder_transfer_file() - Check if a binder file xfer is allowed 828 * @from: sending process 829 * @to: receiving process 830 * @file: file being transferred 831 * 832 * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to. 833 * 834 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 835 */ 836 int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, 837 const struct cred *to, struct file *file) 838 { 839 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file); 840 } 841 842 /** 843 * security_ptrace_access_check() - Check if tracing is allowed 844 * @child: target process 845 * @mode: PTRACE_MODE flags 846 * 847 * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the @child 848 * process. Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check 849 * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of tracing check 850 * during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of binprm_security_ops if the 851 * process is being traced and its security attributes would be changed by the 852 * execve. 853 * 854 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 855 */ 856 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) 857 { 858 return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode); 859 } 860 861 /** 862 * security_ptrace_traceme() - Check if tracing is allowed 863 * @parent: tracing process 864 * 865 * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the 866 * current process before allowing the current process to present itself to the 867 * @parent process for tracing. 868 * 869 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 870 */ 871 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) 872 { 873 return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent); 874 } 875 876 /** 877 * security_capget() - Get the capability sets for a process 878 * @target: target process 879 * @effective: effective capability set 880 * @inheritable: inheritable capability set 881 * @permitted: permitted capability set 882 * 883 * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the 884 * @target process. The hook may also perform permission checking to determine 885 * if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets of the @target 886 * process. 887 * 888 * Return: Returns 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained. 889 */ 890 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, 891 kernel_cap_t *effective, 892 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 893 kernel_cap_t *permitted) 894 { 895 return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target, 896 effective, inheritable, permitted); 897 } 898 899 /** 900 * security_capset() - Set the capability sets for a process 901 * @new: new credentials for the target process 902 * @old: current credentials of the target process 903 * @effective: effective capability set 904 * @inheritable: inheritable capability set 905 * @permitted: permitted capability set 906 * 907 * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the 908 * current process. 909 * 910 * Return: Returns 0 and update @new if permission is granted. 911 */ 912 int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 913 const kernel_cap_t *effective, 914 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 915 const kernel_cap_t *permitted) 916 { 917 return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old, 918 effective, inheritable, permitted); 919 } 920 921 /** 922 * security_capable() - Check if a process has the necessary capability 923 * @cred: credentials to examine 924 * @ns: user namespace 925 * @cap: capability requested 926 * @opts: capability check options 927 * 928 * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated 929 * credentials. @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. 930 * @opts contains options for the capable check <include/linux/security.h>. 931 * 932 * Return: Returns 0 if the capability is granted. 933 */ 934 int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, 935 struct user_namespace *ns, 936 int cap, 937 unsigned int opts) 938 { 939 return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); 940 } 941 942 /** 943 * security_quotactl() - Check if a quotactl() syscall is allowed for this fs 944 * @cmds: commands 945 * @type: type 946 * @id: id 947 * @sb: filesystem 948 * 949 * Check whether the quotactl syscall is allowed for this @sb. 950 * 951 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 952 */ 953 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) 954 { 955 return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb); 956 } 957 958 /** 959 * security_quota_on() - Check if QUOTAON is allowed for a dentry 960 * @dentry: dentry 961 * 962 * Check whether QUOTAON is allowed for @dentry. 963 * 964 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 965 */ 966 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) 967 { 968 return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry); 969 } 970 971 /** 972 * security_syslog() - Check if accessing the kernel message ring is allowed 973 * @type: SYSLOG_ACTION_* type 974 * 975 * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing 976 * logging to the console. See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of 977 * the @type values. 978 * 979 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 980 */ 981 int security_syslog(int type) 982 { 983 return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type); 984 } 985 986 /** 987 * security_settime64() - Check if changing the system time is allowed 988 * @ts: new time 989 * @tz: timezone 990 * 991 * Check permission to change the system time, struct timespec64 is defined in 992 * <include/linux/time64.h> and timezone is defined in <include/linux/time.h>. 993 * 994 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 995 */ 996 int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz) 997 { 998 return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz); 999 } 1000 1001 /** 1002 * security_vm_enough_memory_mm() - Check if allocating a new mem map is allowed 1003 * @mm: mm struct 1004 * @pages: number of pages 1005 * 1006 * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping. If all LSMs return 1007 * a positive value, __vm_enough_memory() will be called with cap_sys_admin 1008 * set. If at least one LSM returns 0 or negative, __vm_enough_memory() will be 1009 * called with cap_sys_admin cleared. 1010 * 1011 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted by the LSM infrastructure to the 1012 * caller. 1013 */ 1014 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) 1015 { 1016 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1017 int cap_sys_admin = 1; 1018 int rc; 1019 1020 /* 1021 * The module will respond with a positive value if 1022 * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be 1023 * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules 1024 * agree that it should be set it will. If any module 1025 * thinks it should not be set it won't. 1026 */ 1027 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) { 1028 rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); 1029 if (rc <= 0) { 1030 cap_sys_admin = 0; 1031 break; 1032 } 1033 } 1034 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); 1035 } 1036 1037 /** 1038 * security_bprm_creds_for_exec() - Prepare the credentials for exec() 1039 * @bprm: binary program information 1040 * 1041 * If the setup in prepare_exec_creds did not setup @bprm->cred->security 1042 * properly for executing @bprm->file, update the LSM's portion of 1043 * @bprm->cred->security to be what commit_creds needs to install for the new 1044 * program. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 1045 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 1046 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. @bprm 1047 * contains the linux_binprm structure. 1048 * 1049 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1050 */ 1051 int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1052 { 1053 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm); 1054 } 1055 1056 /** 1057 * security_bprm_creds_from_file() - Update linux_binprm creds based on file 1058 * @bprm: binary program information 1059 * @file: associated file 1060 * 1061 * If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change privilege upon 1062 * exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change. This is called after 1063 * finding the binary that will be executed without an interpreter. This 1064 * ensures that the credentials will not be derived from a script that the 1065 * binary will need to reopen, which when reopend may end up being a completely 1066 * different file. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 1067 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 1068 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. The 1069 * hook must add to @bprm->per_clear any personality flags that should be 1070 * cleared from current->personality. @bprm contains the linux_binprm 1071 * structure. 1072 * 1073 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1074 */ 1075 int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) 1076 { 1077 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file); 1078 } 1079 1080 /** 1081 * security_bprm_check() - Mediate binary handler search 1082 * @bprm: binary program information 1083 * 1084 * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will begin. 1085 * It allows a check against the @bprm->cred->security value which was set in 1086 * the preceding creds_for_exec call. The argv list and envp list are reliably 1087 * available in @bprm. This hook may be called multiple times during a single 1088 * execve. @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. 1089 * 1090 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1091 */ 1092 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1093 { 1094 int ret; 1095 1096 ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); 1097 if (ret) 1098 return ret; 1099 return ima_bprm_check(bprm); 1100 } 1101 1102 /** 1103 * security_bprm_committing_creds() - Install creds for a process during exec() 1104 * @bprm: binary program information 1105 * 1106 * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being 1107 * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials pointed to 1108 * by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by the 1109 * bprm_creds_for_exec hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure. This 1110 * hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such as closing 1111 * open file descriptors to which access will no longer be granted when the 1112 * attributes are changed. This is called immediately before commit_creds(). 1113 */ 1114 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1115 { 1116 call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm); 1117 } 1118 1119 /** 1120 * security_bprm_committed_creds() - Tidy up after cred install during exec() 1121 * @bprm: binary program information 1122 * 1123 * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a process 1124 * being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials have, by this 1125 * point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the linux_binprm 1126 * structure. This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the 1127 * process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal state. This is called 1128 * immediately after commit_creds(). 1129 */ 1130 void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1131 { 1132 call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm); 1133 } 1134 1135 /** 1136 * security_fs_context_dup() - Duplicate a fs_context LSM blob 1137 * @fc: destination filesystem context 1138 * @src_fc: source filesystem context 1139 * 1140 * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer is 1141 * initialised to NULL by the caller. @fc indicates the new filesystem context. 1142 * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context. 1143 * 1144 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure. 1145 */ 1146 int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) 1147 { 1148 return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc); 1149 } 1150 1151 /** 1152 * security_fs_context_parse_param() - Configure a filesystem context 1153 * @fc: filesystem context 1154 * @param: filesystem parameter 1155 * 1156 * Userspace provided a parameter to configure a superblock. The LSM can 1157 * consume the parameter or return it to the caller for use elsewhere. 1158 * 1159 * Return: If the parameter is used by the LSM it should return 0, if it is 1160 * returned to the caller -ENOPARAM is returned, otherwise a negative 1161 * error code is returned. 1162 */ 1163 int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, 1164 struct fs_parameter *param) 1165 { 1166 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1167 int trc; 1168 int rc = -ENOPARAM; 1169 1170 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.fs_context_parse_param, 1171 list) { 1172 trc = hp->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param); 1173 if (trc == 0) 1174 rc = 0; 1175 else if (trc != -ENOPARAM) 1176 return trc; 1177 } 1178 return rc; 1179 } 1180 1181 /** 1182 * security_sb_alloc() - Allocate a super_block LSM blob 1183 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1184 * 1185 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field. The 1186 * s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is allocated. 1187 * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. 1188 * 1189 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. 1190 */ 1191 int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 1192 { 1193 int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb); 1194 1195 if (unlikely(rc)) 1196 return rc; 1197 rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb); 1198 if (unlikely(rc)) 1199 security_sb_free(sb); 1200 return rc; 1201 } 1202 1203 /** 1204 * security_sb_delete() - Release super_block LSM associated objects 1205 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1206 * 1207 * Release objects tied to a superblock (e.g. inodes). @sb contains the 1208 * super_block structure being released. 1209 */ 1210 void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb) 1211 { 1212 call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb); 1213 } 1214 1215 /** 1216 * security_sb_free() - Free a super_block LSM blob 1217 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1218 * 1219 * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field. @sb contains the super_block 1220 * structure to be modified. 1221 */ 1222 void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) 1223 { 1224 call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb); 1225 kfree(sb->s_security); 1226 sb->s_security = NULL; 1227 } 1228 1229 /** 1230 * security_free_mnt_opts() - Free memory associated with mount options 1231 * @mnt_ops: LSM processed mount options 1232 * 1233 * Free memory associated with @mnt_ops. 1234 */ 1235 void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts) 1236 { 1237 if (!*mnt_opts) 1238 return; 1239 call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts); 1240 *mnt_opts = NULL; 1241 } 1242 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts); 1243 1244 /** 1245 * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() - Consume LSM mount options 1246 * @options: mount options 1247 * @mnt_ops: LSM processed mount options 1248 * 1249 * Eat (scan @options) and save them in @mnt_opts. 1250 * 1251 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1252 */ 1253 int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) 1254 { 1255 return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts); 1256 } 1257 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts); 1258 1259 /** 1260 * security_sb_mnt_opts_compat() - Check if new mount options are allowed 1261 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1262 * @mnt_opts: new mount options 1263 * 1264 * Determine if the new mount options in @mnt_opts are allowed given the 1265 * existing mounted filesystem at @sb. @sb superblock being compared. 1266 * 1267 * Return: Returns 0 if options are compatible. 1268 */ 1269 int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, 1270 void *mnt_opts) 1271 { 1272 return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1273 } 1274 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat); 1275 1276 /** 1277 * security_sb_remount() - Verify no incompatible mount changes during remount 1278 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1279 * @mnt_opts: (re)mount options 1280 * 1281 * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes are 1282 * being made to those options. 1283 * 1284 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1285 */ 1286 int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, 1287 void *mnt_opts) 1288 { 1289 return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1290 } 1291 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount); 1292 1293 /** 1294 * security_sb_kern_mount() - Check if a kernel mount is allowed 1295 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1296 * 1297 * Mount this @sb if allowed by permissions. 1298 * 1299 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1300 */ 1301 int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb) 1302 { 1303 return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb); 1304 } 1305 1306 /** 1307 * security_sb_show_options() - Output the mount options for a superblock 1308 * @m: output file 1309 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1310 * 1311 * Show (print on @m) mount options for this @sb. 1312 * 1313 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1314 */ 1315 int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) 1316 { 1317 return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb); 1318 } 1319 1320 /** 1321 * security_sb_statfs() - Check if accessing fs stats is allowed 1322 * @dentry: superblock handle 1323 * 1324 * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt 1325 * mountpoint. @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem. 1326 * 1327 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1328 */ 1329 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) 1330 { 1331 return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry); 1332 } 1333 1334 /** 1335 * security_sb_mount() - Check permission for mounting a filesystem 1336 * @dev_name: filesystem backing device 1337 * @path: mount point 1338 * @type: filesystem type 1339 * @flags: mount flags 1340 * @data: filesystem specific data 1341 * 1342 * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on the 1343 * mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name identifies a 1344 * device if the file system type requires a device. For a remount 1345 * (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a loopback/bind mount 1346 * (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the pathname of the object being 1347 * mounted. 1348 * 1349 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1350 */ 1351 int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, 1352 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) 1353 { 1354 return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data); 1355 } 1356 1357 /** 1358 * security_sb_umount() - Check permission for unmounting a filesystem 1359 * @mnt: mounted filesystem 1360 * @flags: unmount flags 1361 * 1362 * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted. 1363 * 1364 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1365 */ 1366 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) 1367 { 1368 return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags); 1369 } 1370 1371 /** 1372 * security_sb_pivotroot() - Check permissions for pivoting the rootfs 1373 * @old_path: new location for current rootfs 1374 * @new_path: location of the new rootfs 1375 * 1376 * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem. 1377 * 1378 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1379 */ 1380 int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, 1381 const struct path *new_path) 1382 { 1383 return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path); 1384 } 1385 1386 /** 1387 * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() - Set the mount options for a filesystem 1388 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1389 * @mnt_opts: binary mount options 1390 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1391 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1392 * 1393 * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock. 1394 * 1395 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1396 */ 1397 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, 1398 void *mnt_opts, 1399 unsigned long kern_flags, 1400 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1401 { 1402 return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts, 1403 mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb, 1404 mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1405 } 1406 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts); 1407 1408 /** 1409 * security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() - Duplicate superblock mount options 1410 * @olddb: source superblock 1411 * @newdb: destination superblock 1412 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1413 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1414 * 1415 * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another. 1416 * 1417 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1418 */ 1419 int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, 1420 struct super_block *newsb, 1421 unsigned long kern_flags, 1422 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1423 { 1424 return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb, 1425 kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1426 } 1427 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts); 1428 1429 /** 1430 * security_move_mount() - Check permissions for moving a mount 1431 * @from_path: source mount point 1432 * @to_path: destination mount point 1433 * 1434 * Check permission before a mount is moved. 1435 * 1436 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1437 */ 1438 int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, 1439 const struct path *to_path) 1440 { 1441 return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path); 1442 } 1443 1444 /** 1445 * security_path_notify() - Check if setting a watch is allowed 1446 * @path: file path 1447 * @mask: event mask 1448 * @obj_type: file path type 1449 * 1450 * Check permissions before setting a watch on events as defined by @mask, on 1451 * an object at @path, whose type is defined by @obj_type. 1452 * 1453 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1454 */ 1455 int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, 1456 unsigned int obj_type) 1457 { 1458 return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type); 1459 } 1460 1461 /** 1462 * security_inode_alloc() - Allocate an inode LSM blob 1463 * @inode: the inode 1464 * 1465 * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The 1466 * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is 1467 * allocated. 1468 * 1469 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 1470 */ 1471 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 1472 { 1473 int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode); 1474 1475 if (unlikely(rc)) 1476 return rc; 1477 rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode); 1478 if (unlikely(rc)) 1479 security_inode_free(inode); 1480 return rc; 1481 } 1482 1483 static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) 1484 { 1485 /* 1486 * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob 1487 */ 1488 kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head); 1489 } 1490 1491 /** 1492 * security_inode_free() - Free an inode's LSM blob 1493 * @inode: the inode 1494 * 1495 * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to NULL. 1496 */ 1497 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) 1498 { 1499 integrity_inode_free(inode); 1500 call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode); 1501 /* 1502 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and 1503 * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made 1504 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS 1505 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder 1506 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and 1507 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact. 1508 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too. 1509 */ 1510 if (inode->i_security) 1511 call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security, 1512 inode_free_by_rcu); 1513 } 1514 1515 /** 1516 * security_dentry_init_security() - Perform dentry initialization 1517 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1518 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1519 * @name: name of the last path component 1520 * @xattr_name: name of the security/LSM xattr 1521 * @ctx: pointer to the resulting LSM context 1522 * @ctxlen: length of @ctx 1523 * 1524 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available since NFSv4 1525 * has no label backed by an EA anyway. It is important to note that 1526 * @xattr_name does not need to be free'd by the caller, it is a static string. 1527 * 1528 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1529 */ 1530 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1531 const struct qstr *name, 1532 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx, 1533 u32 *ctxlen) 1534 { 1535 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1536 int rc; 1537 1538 /* 1539 * Only one module will provide a security context. 1540 */ 1541 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security, 1542 list) { 1543 rc = hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name, 1544 xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen); 1545 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security)) 1546 return rc; 1547 } 1548 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security); 1549 } 1550 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security); 1551 1552 /** 1553 * security_dentry_create_files_as() - Perform dentry initialization 1554 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1555 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1556 * @name: name of the last path component 1557 * @old: creds to use for LSM context calculations 1558 * @new: creds to modify 1559 * 1560 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available and set 1561 * that context in passed in creds so that new files are created using that 1562 * context. Context is calculated using the passed in creds and not the creds 1563 * of the caller. 1564 * 1565 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1566 */ 1567 int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1568 struct qstr *name, 1569 const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) 1570 { 1571 return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode, 1572 name, old, new); 1573 } 1574 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as); 1575 1576 /** 1577 * security_inode_init_security() - Initialize an inode's LSM context 1578 * @inode: the inode 1579 * @dir: parent directory 1580 * @qstr: last component of the pathname 1581 * @initxattrs: callback function to write xattrs 1582 * @fs_data: filesystem specific data 1583 * 1584 * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly 1585 * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode. This 1586 * hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation transaction and 1587 * provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike the post_create/mkdir/... 1588 * hooks called by the VFS. The hook function is expected to allocate the name 1589 * and value via kmalloc, with the caller being responsible for calling kfree 1590 * after using them. If the security module does not use security attributes 1591 * or does not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode, then 1592 * it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. 1593 * 1594 * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is 1595 * needed, or -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure. 1596 */ 1597 int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1598 const struct qstr *qstr, 1599 const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) 1600 { 1601 struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1]; 1602 struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr; 1603 int ret; 1604 1605 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1606 return 0; 1607 1608 if (!initxattrs) 1609 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, 1610 dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL); 1611 memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs)); 1612 lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; 1613 ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, 1614 &lsm_xattr->name, 1615 &lsm_xattr->value, 1616 &lsm_xattr->value_len); 1617 if (ret) 1618 goto out; 1619 1620 evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1; 1621 ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr); 1622 if (ret) 1623 goto out; 1624 ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); 1625 out: 1626 for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) 1627 kfree(xattr->value); 1628 return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret; 1629 } 1630 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); 1631 1632 /** 1633 * security_inode_init_security_anon() - Initialize an anonymous inode 1634 * @inode: the inode 1635 * @name: the anonymous inode class 1636 * @context_inode: an optional related inode 1637 * 1638 * Set up the incore security field for the new anonymous inode and return 1639 * whether the inode creation is permitted by the security module or not. 1640 * 1641 * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EACCES if the security module denies the 1642 * creation of this inode, or another -errno upon other errors. 1643 */ 1644 int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, 1645 const struct qstr *name, 1646 const struct inode *context_inode) 1647 { 1648 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, name, 1649 context_inode); 1650 } 1651 1652 int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1653 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, 1654 void **value, size_t *len) 1655 { 1656 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1657 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 1658 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, 1659 qstr, name, value, len); 1660 } 1661 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security); 1662 1663 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH 1664 /** 1665 * security_path_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 1666 * @dir: parent directory 1667 * @dentry: new file 1668 * @mode: new file mode 1669 * @dev: device number 1670 * 1671 * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called even 1672 * if mknod operation is being done for a regular file. 1673 * 1674 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1675 */ 1676 int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1677 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) 1678 { 1679 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1680 return 0; 1681 return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1682 } 1683 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod); 1684 1685 /** 1686 * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed 1687 * @dir: parent directory 1688 * @dentry: new directory 1689 * @mode: new directory mode 1690 * 1691 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory. 1692 * 1693 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1694 */ 1695 int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1696 umode_t mode) 1697 { 1698 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1699 return 0; 1700 return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1701 } 1702 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir); 1703 1704 /** 1705 * security_path_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 1706 * @dir: parent directory 1707 * @dentry: directory to remove 1708 * 1709 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 1710 * 1711 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1712 */ 1713 int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1714 { 1715 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1716 return 0; 1717 return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1718 } 1719 1720 /** 1721 * security_path_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 1722 * @dir: parent directory 1723 * @dentry: file 1724 * 1725 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 1726 * 1727 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1728 */ 1729 int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1730 { 1731 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1732 return 0; 1733 return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1734 } 1735 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink); 1736 1737 /** 1738 * security_path_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 1739 * @dir: parent directory 1740 * @dentry: symbolic link 1741 * @old_name: file pathname 1742 * 1743 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 1744 * 1745 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1746 */ 1747 int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1748 const char *old_name) 1749 { 1750 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1751 return 0; 1752 return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1753 } 1754 1755 /** 1756 * security_path_link - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 1757 * @old_dentry: existing file 1758 * @new_dir: new parent directory 1759 * @new_dentry: new link 1760 * 1761 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 1762 * 1763 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1764 */ 1765 int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, 1766 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1767 { 1768 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1769 return 0; 1770 return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); 1771 } 1772 1773 /** 1774 * security_path_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 1775 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 1776 * @old_dentry: the old file 1777 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 1778 * @new_dentry: the new file 1779 * @flags: flags 1780 * 1781 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 1782 * 1783 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1784 */ 1785 int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 1786 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 1787 unsigned int flags) 1788 { 1789 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 1790 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && 1791 IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 1792 return 0; 1793 1794 return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, 1795 new_dentry, flags); 1796 } 1797 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename); 1798 1799 /** 1800 * security_path_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 1801 * @path: file 1802 * 1803 * Check permission before truncating the file indicated by path. Note that 1804 * truncation permissions may also be checked based on already opened files, 1805 * using the security_file_truncate() hook. 1806 * 1807 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1808 */ 1809 int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path) 1810 { 1811 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1812 return 0; 1813 return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path); 1814 } 1815 1816 /** 1817 * security_path_chmod() - Check if changing the file's mode is allowed 1818 * @path: file 1819 * @mode: new mode 1820 * 1821 * Check for permission to change a mode of the file @path. The new mode is 1822 * specified in @mode which is a bitmask of constants from 1823 * <include/uapi/linux/stat.h>. 1824 * 1825 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1826 */ 1827 int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) 1828 { 1829 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1830 return 0; 1831 return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode); 1832 } 1833 1834 /** 1835 * security_path_chown() - Check if changing the file's owner/group is allowed 1836 * @path: file 1837 * @uid: file owner 1838 * @gid: file group 1839 * 1840 * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory. 1841 * 1842 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1843 */ 1844 int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) 1845 { 1846 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1847 return 0; 1848 return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid); 1849 } 1850 1851 /** 1852 * security_path_chroot() - Check if changing the root directory is allowed 1853 * @path: directory 1854 * 1855 * Check for permission to change root directory. 1856 * 1857 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1858 */ 1859 int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path) 1860 { 1861 return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path); 1862 } 1863 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */ 1864 1865 /** 1866 * security_inode_create() - Check if creating a file is allowed 1867 * @dir: the parent directory 1868 * @dentry: the file being created 1869 * @mode: requested file mode 1870 * 1871 * Check permission to create a regular file. 1872 * 1873 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1874 */ 1875 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1876 umode_t mode) 1877 { 1878 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1879 return 0; 1880 return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1881 } 1882 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create); 1883 1884 /** 1885 * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 1886 * @old_dentry: existing file 1887 * @dir: new parent directory 1888 * @new_dentry: new link 1889 * 1890 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 1891 * 1892 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1893 */ 1894 int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, 1895 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1896 { 1897 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1898 return 0; 1899 return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); 1900 } 1901 1902 /** 1903 * security_inode_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 1904 * @dir: parent directory 1905 * @dentry: file 1906 * 1907 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 1908 * 1909 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1910 */ 1911 int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1912 { 1913 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1914 return 0; 1915 return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1916 } 1917 1918 /** 1919 * security_inode_symlink() Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 1920 * @dir: parent directory 1921 * @dentry: symbolic link 1922 * @old_name: existing filename 1923 * 1924 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 1925 * 1926 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1927 */ 1928 int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1929 const char *old_name) 1930 { 1931 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1932 return 0; 1933 return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1934 } 1935 1936 /** 1937 * security_inode_mkdir() - Check if creation a new director is allowed 1938 * @dir: parent directory 1939 * @dentry: new directory 1940 * @mode: new directory mode 1941 * 1942 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory 1943 * associated with inode structure @dir. 1944 * 1945 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1946 */ 1947 int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1948 { 1949 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1950 return 0; 1951 return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1952 } 1953 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir); 1954 1955 /** 1956 * security_inode_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 1957 * @dir: parent directory 1958 * @dentry: directory to be removed 1959 * 1960 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 1961 * 1962 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1963 */ 1964 int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1965 { 1966 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1967 return 0; 1968 return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1969 } 1970 1971 /** 1972 * security_inode_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 1973 * @dir: parent directory 1974 * @dentry: new file 1975 * @mode: new file mode 1976 * @dev: device number 1977 * 1978 * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo file 1979 * created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation is being 1980 * done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called and not this 1981 * hook. 1982 * 1983 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1984 */ 1985 int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1986 umode_t mode, dev_t dev) 1987 { 1988 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1989 return 0; 1990 return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1991 } 1992 1993 /** 1994 * security_inode_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 1995 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 1996 * @old_dentry: the old file 1997 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 1998 * @new_dentry: the new file 1999 * @flags: flags 2000 * 2001 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 2002 * 2003 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2004 */ 2005 int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 2006 struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 2007 unsigned int flags) 2008 { 2009 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 2010 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && 2011 IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 2012 return 0; 2013 2014 if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { 2015 int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry, 2016 old_dir, old_dentry); 2017 if (err) 2018 return err; 2019 } 2020 2021 return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, 2022 new_dir, new_dentry); 2023 } 2024 2025 /** 2026 * security_inode_readlink() - Check if reading a symbolic link is allowed 2027 * @dentry: link 2028 * 2029 * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. 2030 * 2031 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2032 */ 2033 int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) 2034 { 2035 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2036 return 0; 2037 return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry); 2038 } 2039 2040 /** 2041 * security_inode_follow_link() - Check if following a symbolic link is allowed 2042 * @dentry: link dentry 2043 * @inode: link inode 2044 * @rcu: true if in RCU-walk mode 2045 * 2046 * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname. If 2047 * @rcu is true, @inode is not stable. 2048 * 2049 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2050 */ 2051 int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, 2052 bool rcu) 2053 { 2054 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2055 return 0; 2056 return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu); 2057 } 2058 2059 /** 2060 * security_inode_permission() - Check if accessing an inode is allowed 2061 * @inode: inode 2062 * @mask: access mask 2063 * 2064 * Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the 2065 * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to 2066 * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks. Notice 2067 * that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many other 2068 * operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is called when 2069 * the actual read/write operations are performed. 2070 * 2071 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2072 */ 2073 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) 2074 { 2075 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2076 return 0; 2077 return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask); 2078 } 2079 2080 /** 2081 * security_inode_setattr() - Check if setting file attributes is allowed 2082 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2083 * @dentry: file 2084 * @attr: new attributes 2085 * 2086 * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel call 2087 * to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever file 2088 * attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod operations, 2089 * transferring disk quotas, etc). 2090 * 2091 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2092 */ 2093 int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2094 struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 2095 { 2096 int ret; 2097 2098 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2099 return 0; 2100 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr); 2101 if (ret) 2102 return ret; 2103 return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); 2104 } 2105 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); 2106 2107 /** 2108 * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed 2109 * @path: file 2110 * 2111 * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. 2112 * 2113 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2114 */ 2115 int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) 2116 { 2117 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 2118 return 0; 2119 return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path); 2120 } 2121 2122 /** 2123 * security_inode_setxattr() - Check if setting file xattrs is allowed 2124 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2125 * @dentry: file 2126 * @name: xattr name 2127 * @value: xattr value 2128 * @flags: flags 2129 * 2130 * Check permission before setting the extended attributes. 2131 * 2132 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2133 */ 2134 int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2135 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 2136 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2137 { 2138 int ret; 2139 2140 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2141 return 0; 2142 /* 2143 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 2144 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 2145 */ 2146 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name, value, 2147 size, flags); 2148 2149 if (ret == 1) 2150 ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); 2151 if (ret) 2152 return ret; 2153 ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 2154 if (ret) 2155 return ret; 2156 return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size); 2157 } 2158 2159 /** 2160 * security_inode_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed 2161 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2162 * @dentry: file 2163 * @acl_name: acl name 2164 * @kacl: acl struct 2165 * 2166 * Check permission before setting posix acls, the posix acls in @kacl are 2167 * identified by @acl_name. 2168 * 2169 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2170 */ 2171 int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2172 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, 2173 struct posix_acl *kacl) 2174 { 2175 int ret; 2176 2177 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2178 return 0; 2179 ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, 2180 kacl); 2181 if (ret) 2182 return ret; 2183 ret = ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2184 if (ret) 2185 return ret; 2186 return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2187 } 2188 2189 /** 2190 * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed 2191 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2192 * @dentry: file 2193 * @acl_name: acl name 2194 * 2195 * Check permission before getting osix acls, the posix acls are identified by 2196 * @acl_name. 2197 * 2198 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2199 */ 2200 int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2201 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2202 { 2203 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2204 return 0; 2205 return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2206 } 2207 2208 /** 2209 * security_inode_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed 2210 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2211 * @dentry: file 2212 * @acl_name: acl name 2213 * 2214 * Check permission before removing posix acls, the posix acls are identified 2215 * by @acl_name. 2216 * 2217 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2218 */ 2219 int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2220 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2221 { 2222 int ret; 2223 2224 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2225 return 0; 2226 ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2227 if (ret) 2228 return ret; 2229 ret = ima_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2230 if (ret) 2231 return ret; 2232 return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2233 } 2234 2235 /** 2236 * security_inode_post_setxattr() - Update the inode after a setxattr operation 2237 * @dentry: file 2238 * @name: xattr name 2239 * @value: xattr value 2240 * @size: xattr value size 2241 * @flags: flags 2242 * 2243 * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation. 2244 */ 2245 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 2246 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2247 { 2248 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2249 return; 2250 call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); 2251 evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 2252 } 2253 2254 /** 2255 * security_inode_getxattr() - Check if xattr access is allowed 2256 * @dentry: file 2257 * @name: xattr name 2258 * 2259 * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes identified by 2260 * @name for @dentry. 2261 * 2262 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2263 */ 2264 int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2265 { 2266 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2267 return 0; 2268 return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name); 2269 } 2270 2271 /** 2272 * security_inode_listxattr() - Check if listing xattrs is allowed 2273 * @dentry: file 2274 * 2275 * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute names for 2276 * @dentry. 2277 * 2278 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2279 */ 2280 int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) 2281 { 2282 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2283 return 0; 2284 return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry); 2285 } 2286 2287 /** 2288 * security_inode_removexattr() - Check if removing an xattr is allowed 2289 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2290 * @dentry: file 2291 * @name: xattr name 2292 * 2293 * Check permission before removing the extended attribute identified by @name 2294 * for @dentry. 2295 * 2296 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2297 */ 2298 int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2299 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2300 { 2301 int ret; 2302 2303 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2304 return 0; 2305 /* 2306 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 2307 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 2308 */ 2309 ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); 2310 if (ret == 1) 2311 ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 2312 if (ret) 2313 return ret; 2314 ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); 2315 if (ret) 2316 return ret; 2317 return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 2318 } 2319 2320 /** 2321 * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required 2322 * @dentry: associated dentry 2323 * 2324 * Called when an inode has been changed to determine if 2325 * security_inode_killpriv() should be called. 2326 * 2327 * Return: Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation, return 0 if 2328 * security_inode_killpriv() does not need to be called, return >0 if 2329 * security_inode_killpriv() does need to be called. 2330 */ 2331 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) 2332 { 2333 return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry); 2334 } 2335 2336 /** 2337 * security_inode_killpriv() - The setuid bit is removed, update LSM state 2338 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2339 * @dentry: associated dentry 2340 * 2341 * The @dentry's setuid bit is being removed. Remove similar security labels. 2342 * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held. 2343 * 2344 * Return: Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation 2345 * causing setuid bit removal is failed. 2346 */ 2347 int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2348 struct dentry *dentry) 2349 { 2350 return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, idmap, dentry); 2351 } 2352 2353 /** 2354 * security_inode_getsecurity() - Get the xattr security label of an inode 2355 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2356 * @inode: inode 2357 * @name: xattr name 2358 * @buffer: security label buffer 2359 * @alloc: allocation flag 2360 * 2361 * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the security 2362 * label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that @name is the 2363 * remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix has been removed. 2364 * @alloc is used to specify if the call should return a value via the buffer 2365 * or just the value length. 2366 * 2367 * Return: Returns size of buffer on success. 2368 */ 2369 int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2370 struct inode *inode, const char *name, 2371 void **buffer, bool alloc) 2372 { 2373 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2374 int rc; 2375 2376 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2377 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 2378 /* 2379 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 2380 */ 2381 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) { 2382 rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name, buffer, 2383 alloc); 2384 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity)) 2385 return rc; 2386 } 2387 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 2388 } 2389 2390 /** 2391 * security_inode_setsecurity() - Set the xattr security label of an inode 2392 * @inode: inode 2393 * @name: xattr name 2394 * @value: security label 2395 * @size: length of security label 2396 * @flags: flags 2397 * 2398 * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the extended 2399 * attribute value @value. @size indicates the size of the @value in bytes. 2400 * @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0. Note that @name is the 2401 * remainder of the attribute name after the security. prefix has been removed. 2402 * 2403 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2404 */ 2405 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, 2406 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2407 { 2408 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2409 int rc; 2410 2411 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2412 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 2413 /* 2414 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 2415 */ 2416 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) { 2417 rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, 2418 flags); 2419 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity)) 2420 return rc; 2421 } 2422 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 2423 } 2424 2425 /** 2426 * security_inode_listsecurity() - List the xattr security label names 2427 * @inode: inode 2428 * @buffer: buffer 2429 * @buffer_size: size of buffer 2430 * 2431 * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels associated with 2432 * @inode into @buffer. The maximum size of @buffer is specified by 2433 * @buffer_size. @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer 2434 * required. 2435 * 2436 * Return: Returns number of bytes used/required on success. 2437 */ 2438 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, 2439 char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) 2440 { 2441 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2442 return 0; 2443 return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size); 2444 } 2445 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity); 2446 2447 /** 2448 * security_inode_getsecid() - Get an inode's secid 2449 * @inode: inode 2450 * @secid: secid to return 2451 * 2452 * Get the secid associated with the node. In case of failure, @secid will be 2453 * set to zero. 2454 */ 2455 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) 2456 { 2457 call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid); 2458 } 2459 2460 /** 2461 * security_inode_copy_up() - Create new creds for an overlayfs copy-up op 2462 * @src: union dentry of copy-up file 2463 * @new: newly created creds 2464 * 2465 * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of overlay 2466 * filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds and modify as 2467 * need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to new creds temporarily to 2468 * create new file and release newly allocated creds. 2469 * 2470 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error. 2471 */ 2472 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) 2473 { 2474 return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new); 2475 } 2476 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up); 2477 2478 /** 2479 * security_inode_copy_up_xattr() - Filter xattrs in an overlayfs copy-up op 2480 * @name: xattr name 2481 * 2482 * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied up from a 2483 * lower layer to the union/overlay layer. The caller is responsible for 2484 * reading and writing the xattrs, this hook is merely a filter. 2485 * 2486 * Return: Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP 2487 * if the security module does not know about attribute, or a negative 2488 * error code to abort the copy up. 2489 */ 2490 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) 2491 { 2492 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2493 int rc; 2494 2495 /* 2496 * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the 2497 * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or 2498 * any other error code incase of an error. 2499 */ 2500 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, 2501 &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) { 2502 rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name); 2503 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr)) 2504 return rc; 2505 } 2506 2507 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr); 2508 } 2509 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr); 2510 2511 /** 2512 * security_kernfs_init_security() - Init LSM context for a kernfs node 2513 * @kn_dir: parent kernfs node 2514 * @kn: the kernfs node to initialize 2515 * 2516 * Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based on its 2517 * own and its parent's attributes. 2518 * 2519 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2520 */ 2521 int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, 2522 struct kernfs_node *kn) 2523 { 2524 return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn); 2525 } 2526 2527 /** 2528 * security_file_permission() - Check file permissions 2529 * @file: file 2530 * @mask: requested permissions 2531 * 2532 * Check file permissions before accessing an open file. This hook is called 2533 * by various operations that read or write files. A security module can use 2534 * this hook to perform additional checking on these operations, e.g. to 2535 * revalidate permissions on use to support privilege bracketing or policy 2536 * changes. Notice that this hook is used when the actual read/write 2537 * operations are performed, whereas the inode_security_ops hook is called when 2538 * a file is opened (as well as many other operations). Although this hook can 2539 * be used to revalidate permissions for various system call operations that 2540 * read or write files, it does not address the revalidation of permissions for 2541 * memory-mapped files. Security modules must handle this separately if they 2542 * need such revalidation. 2543 * 2544 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2545 */ 2546 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) 2547 { 2548 int ret; 2549 2550 ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask); 2551 if (ret) 2552 return ret; 2553 2554 return fsnotify_perm(file, mask); 2555 } 2556 2557 /** 2558 * security_file_alloc() - Allocate and init a file's LSM blob 2559 * @file: the file 2560 * 2561 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field. The 2562 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 2563 * 2564 * Return: Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 2565 */ 2566 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) 2567 { 2568 int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file); 2569 2570 if (rc) 2571 return rc; 2572 rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file); 2573 if (unlikely(rc)) 2574 security_file_free(file); 2575 return rc; 2576 } 2577 2578 /** 2579 * security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob 2580 * @file: the file 2581 * 2582 * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security. 2583 */ 2584 void security_file_free(struct file *file) 2585 { 2586 void *blob; 2587 2588 call_void_hook(file_free_security, file); 2589 2590 blob = file->f_security; 2591 if (blob) { 2592 file->f_security = NULL; 2593 kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob); 2594 } 2595 } 2596 2597 /** 2598 * security_file_ioctl() - Check if an ioctl is allowed 2599 * @file: associated file 2600 * @cmd: ioctl cmd 2601 * @arg: ioctl arguments 2602 * 2603 * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file. Note that @arg sometimes 2604 * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer 2605 * value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used 2606 * by the security module. 2607 * 2608 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2609 */ 2610 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2611 { 2612 return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 2613 } 2614 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl); 2615 2616 static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) 2617 { 2618 /* 2619 * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect 2620 * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about... 2621 */ 2622 if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ) 2623 return prot; 2624 if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) 2625 return prot; 2626 /* 2627 * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it. 2628 */ 2629 if (!file) 2630 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2631 /* 2632 * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need 2633 * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case 2634 */ 2635 if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) { 2636 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU 2637 if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) { 2638 unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file); 2639 if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC)) 2640 return prot; 2641 } 2642 #endif 2643 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2644 } 2645 /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */ 2646 return prot; 2647 } 2648 2649 /** 2650 * security_mmap_file() - Check if mmap'ing a file is allowed 2651 * @file: file 2652 * @prot: protection applied by the kernel 2653 * @flags: flags 2654 * 2655 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. if 2656 * mapping anonymous memory. 2657 * 2658 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2659 */ 2660 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, 2661 unsigned long flags) 2662 { 2663 unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot); 2664 int ret; 2665 2666 ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 2667 if (ret) 2668 return ret; 2669 return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 2670 } 2671 2672 /** 2673 * security_mmap_addr() - Check if mmap'ing an address is allowed 2674 * @addr: address 2675 * 2676 * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr. 2677 * 2678 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2679 */ 2680 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) 2681 { 2682 return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr); 2683 } 2684 2685 /** 2686 * security_file_mprotect() - Check if changing memory protections is allowed 2687 * @vma: memory region 2688 * @reqprot: application requested protection 2689 * @prog: protection applied by the kernel 2690 * 2691 * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions. 2692 * 2693 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2694 */ 2695 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, 2696 unsigned long prot) 2697 { 2698 int ret; 2699 2700 ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); 2701 if (ret) 2702 return ret; 2703 return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot); 2704 } 2705 2706 /** 2707 * security_file_lock() - Check if a file lock is allowed 2708 * @file: file 2709 * @cmd: lock operation (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK) 2710 * 2711 * Check permission before performing file locking operations. Note the hook 2712 * mediates both flock and fcntl style locks. 2713 * 2714 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2715 */ 2716 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) 2717 { 2718 return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd); 2719 } 2720 2721 /** 2722 * security_file_fcntl() - Check if fcntl() op is allowed 2723 * @file: file 2724 * @cmd: fnctl command 2725 * @arg: command argument 2726 * 2727 * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd from 2728 * being performed on the file @file. Note that @arg sometimes represents a 2729 * user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer value. When 2730 * @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used by the 2731 * security module. 2732 * 2733 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2734 */ 2735 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2736 { 2737 return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 2738 } 2739 2740 /** 2741 * security_file_set_fowner() - Set the file owner info in the LSM blob 2742 * @file: the file 2743 * 2744 * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in 2745 * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook. 2746 * 2747 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2748 */ 2749 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) 2750 { 2751 call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file); 2752 } 2753 2754 /** 2755 * security_file_send_sigiotask() - Check if sending SIGIO/SIGURG is allowed 2756 * @tsk: target task 2757 * @fown: signal sender 2758 * @sig: signal to be sent, SIGIO is sent if 0 2759 * 2760 * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the 2761 * process @tsk. Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt. Note 2762 * that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a struct file, 2763 * so the file structure (and associated security information) can always be 2764 * obtained: container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner). 2765 * 2766 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2767 */ 2768 int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, 2769 struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) 2770 { 2771 return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig); 2772 } 2773 2774 /** 2775 * security_file_receive() - Check is receiving a file via IPC is allowed 2776 * @file: file being received 2777 * 2778 * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process to 2779 * receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC. 2780 * 2781 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2782 */ 2783 int security_file_receive(struct file *file) 2784 { 2785 return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file); 2786 } 2787 2788 /** 2789 * security_file_open() - Save open() time state for late use by the LSM 2790 * @file: 2791 * 2792 * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon file_permission, 2793 * and recheck access if anything has changed since inode_permission. 2794 * 2795 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2796 */ 2797 int security_file_open(struct file *file) 2798 { 2799 int ret; 2800 2801 ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file); 2802 if (ret) 2803 return ret; 2804 2805 return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN); 2806 } 2807 2808 /** 2809 * security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 2810 * @file: file 2811 * 2812 * Check permission before truncating a file, i.e. using ftruncate. Note that 2813 * truncation permission may also be checked based on the path, using the 2814 * @path_truncate hook. 2815 * 2816 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2817 */ 2818 int security_file_truncate(struct file *file) 2819 { 2820 return call_int_hook(file_truncate, 0, file); 2821 } 2822 2823 /** 2824 * security_task_alloc() - Allocate a task's LSM blob 2825 * @task: the task 2826 * @clone_flags: flags indicating what is being shared 2827 * 2828 * Handle allocation of task-related resources. 2829 * 2830 * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. 2831 */ 2832 int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) 2833 { 2834 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 2835 2836 if (rc) 2837 return rc; 2838 rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags); 2839 if (unlikely(rc)) 2840 security_task_free(task); 2841 return rc; 2842 } 2843 2844 /** 2845 * security_task_free() - Free a task's LSM blob and related resources 2846 * @task: task 2847 * 2848 * Handle release of task-related resources. Note that this can be called from 2849 * interrupt context. 2850 */ 2851 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) 2852 { 2853 call_void_hook(task_free, task); 2854 2855 kfree(task->security); 2856 task->security = NULL; 2857 } 2858 2859 /** 2860 * security_cred_alloc_blank() - Allocate the min memory to allow cred_transfer 2861 * @cred: credentials 2862 * @gfp: gfp flags 2863 * 2864 * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that 2865 * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM. 2866 * 2867 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 2868 */ 2869 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 2870 { 2871 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp); 2872 2873 if (rc) 2874 return rc; 2875 2876 rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp); 2877 if (unlikely(rc)) 2878 security_cred_free(cred); 2879 return rc; 2880 } 2881 2882 /** 2883 * security_cred_free() - Free the cred's LSM blob and associated resources 2884 * @cred: credentials 2885 * 2886 * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials. 2887 */ 2888 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) 2889 { 2890 /* 2891 * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that 2892 * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL. 2893 */ 2894 if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL)) 2895 return; 2896 2897 call_void_hook(cred_free, cred); 2898 2899 kfree(cred->security); 2900 cred->security = NULL; 2901 } 2902 2903 /** 2904 * security_prepare_creds() - Prepare a new set of credentials 2905 * @new: new credentials 2906 * @old: original credentials 2907 * @gfp: gfp flags 2908 * 2909 * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set. 2910 * 2911 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 2912 */ 2913 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) 2914 { 2915 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp); 2916 2917 if (rc) 2918 return rc; 2919 2920 rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp); 2921 if (unlikely(rc)) 2922 security_cred_free(new); 2923 return rc; 2924 } 2925 2926 /** 2927 * security_transfer_creds() - Transfer creds 2928 * @new: target credentials 2929 * @old: original credentials 2930 * 2931 * Transfer data from original creds to new creds. 2932 */ 2933 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 2934 { 2935 call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); 2936 } 2937 2938 /** 2939 * security_cred_getsecid() - Get the secid from a set of credentials 2940 * @c: credentials 2941 * @secid: secid value 2942 * 2943 * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c. In case of 2944 * failure, @secid will be set to zero. 2945 */ 2946 void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) 2947 { 2948 *secid = 0; 2949 call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); 2950 } 2951 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); 2952 2953 /** 2954 * security_kernel_act_as() - Set the kernel credentials to act as secid 2955 * @new: credentials 2956 * @secid: secid 2957 * 2958 * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). 2959 * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid. 2960 * 2961 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2962 */ 2963 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) 2964 { 2965 return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); 2966 } 2967 2968 /** 2969 * security_kernel_create_files_as() - Set file creation context using an inode 2970 * @new: target credentials 2971 * @inode: reference inode 2972 * 2973 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as the 2974 * objective context of the specified inode. The current task must be the one 2975 * that nominated @inode. 2976 * 2977 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2978 */ 2979 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) 2980 { 2981 return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode); 2982 } 2983 2984 /** 2985 * security_kernel_module_request() - Check is loading a module is allowed 2986 * @kmod_name: module name 2987 * 2988 * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for 2989 * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. 2990 * 2991 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2992 */ 2993 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) 2994 { 2995 int ret; 2996 2997 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); 2998 if (ret) 2999 return ret; 3000 return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); 3001 } 3002 3003 /** 3004 * security_kernel_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 3005 * @file: file 3006 * @id: file identifier 3007 * @contents: trust if security_kernel_post_read_file() will be called 3008 * 3009 * Read a file specified by userspace. 3010 * 3011 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3012 */ 3013 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, 3014 bool contents) 3015 { 3016 int ret; 3017 3018 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); 3019 if (ret) 3020 return ret; 3021 return ima_read_file(file, id, contents); 3022 } 3023 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); 3024 3025 /** 3026 * security_kernel_post_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 3027 * @file: file 3028 * @buf: file contents 3029 * @size: size of file contents 3030 * @id: file identifier 3031 * 3032 * Read a file specified by userspace. This must be paired with a prior call 3033 * to security_kernel_read_file() call that indicated this hook would also be 3034 * called, see security_kernel_read_file() for more information. 3035 * 3036 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3037 */ 3038 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, 3039 enum kernel_read_file_id id) 3040 { 3041 int ret; 3042 3043 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id); 3044 if (ret) 3045 return ret; 3046 return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id); 3047 } 3048 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); 3049 3050 /** 3051 * security_kernel_load_data() - Load data provided by userspace 3052 * @id: data identifier 3053 * @contents: true if security_kernel_post_load_data() will be called 3054 * 3055 * Load data provided by userspace. 3056 * 3057 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3058 */ 3059 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) 3060 { 3061 int ret; 3062 3063 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents); 3064 if (ret) 3065 return ret; 3066 return ima_load_data(id, contents); 3067 } 3068 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); 3069 3070 /** 3071 * security_kernel_post_load_data() - Load userspace data from a non-file source 3072 * @buf: data 3073 * @size: size of data 3074 * @id: data identifier 3075 * @description: text description of data, specific to the id value 3076 * 3077 * Load data provided by a non-file source (usually userspace buffer). This 3078 * must be paired with a prior security_kernel_load_data() call that indicated 3079 * this hook would also be called, see security_kernel_load_data() for more 3080 * information. 3081 * 3082 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3083 */ 3084 int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, 3085 enum kernel_load_data_id id, 3086 char *description) 3087 { 3088 int ret; 3089 3090 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id, 3091 description); 3092 if (ret) 3093 return ret; 3094 return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description); 3095 } 3096 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data); 3097 3098 /** 3099 * security_task_fix_setuid() - Update LSM with new user id attributes 3100 * @new: updated credentials 3101 * @old: credentials being replaced 3102 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag values 3103 * 3104 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user identity 3105 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 3106 * the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If @new is the set of 3107 * credentials that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this 3108 * rather than to @current->cred. 3109 * 3110 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3111 */ 3112 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 3113 int flags) 3114 { 3115 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags); 3116 } 3117 3118 /** 3119 * security_task_fix_setgid() - Update LSM with new group id attributes 3120 * @new: updated credentials 3121 * @old: credentials being replaced 3122 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag value 3123 * 3124 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the group identity 3125 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 3126 * the set*gid system calls invoked this hook. @new is the set of credentials 3127 * that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 3128 * @current->cred. 3129 * 3130 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3131 */ 3132 int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 3133 int flags) 3134 { 3135 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags); 3136 } 3137 3138 /** 3139 * security_task_fix_setgroups() - Update LSM with new supplementary groups 3140 * @new: updated credentials 3141 * @old: credentials being replaced 3142 * 3143 * Update the module's state after setting the supplementary group identity 3144 * attributes of the current process. @new is the set of credentials that will 3145 * be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 3146 * @current->cred. 3147 * 3148 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3149 */ 3150 int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 3151 { 3152 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, 0, new, old); 3153 } 3154 3155 /** 3156 * security_task_setpgid() - Check if setting the pgid is allowed 3157 * @p: task being modified 3158 * @pgid: new pgid 3159 * 3160 * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the process 3161 * @p to @pgid. 3162 * 3163 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3164 */ 3165 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) 3166 { 3167 return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid); 3168 } 3169 3170 /** 3171 * security_task_getpgid() - Check if getting the pgid is allowed 3172 * @p: task 3173 * 3174 * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the process 3175 * @p. 3176 * 3177 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3178 */ 3179 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) 3180 { 3181 return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p); 3182 } 3183 3184 /** 3185 * security_task_getsid() - Check if getting the session id is allowed 3186 * @p: task 3187 * 3188 * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process @p. 3189 * 3190 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3191 */ 3192 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) 3193 { 3194 return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); 3195 } 3196 3197 /** 3198 * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid 3199 * @secid: secid value 3200 * 3201 * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return 3202 * it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3203 */ 3204 void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) 3205 { 3206 *secid = 0; 3207 call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid); 3208 } 3209 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj); 3210 3211 /** 3212 * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid 3213 * @p: target task 3214 * @secid: secid value 3215 * 3216 * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and 3217 * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3218 */ 3219 void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) 3220 { 3221 *secid = 0; 3222 call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); 3223 } 3224 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj); 3225 3226 /** 3227 * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed 3228 * @p: target task 3229 * @nice: nice value 3230 * 3231 * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice. 3232 * 3233 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3234 */ 3235 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) 3236 { 3237 return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice); 3238 } 3239 3240 /** 3241 * security_task_setioprio() - Check if setting a task's ioprio is allowed 3242 * @p: target task 3243 * @ioprio: ioprio value 3244 * 3245 * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio. 3246 * 3247 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3248 */ 3249 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) 3250 { 3251 return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio); 3252 } 3253 3254 /** 3255 * security_task_getioprio() - Check if getting a task's ioprio is allowed 3256 * @p: task 3257 * 3258 * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p. 3259 * 3260 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3261 */ 3262 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) 3263 { 3264 return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p); 3265 } 3266 3267 /** 3268 * security_task_prlimit() - Check if get/setting resources limits is allowed 3269 * @cred: current task credentials 3270 * @tcred: target task credentials 3271 * @flags: LSM_PRLIMIT_* flag bits indicating a get/set/both 3272 * 3273 * Check permission before getting and/or setting the resource limits of 3274 * another task. 3275 * 3276 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3277 */ 3278 int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, 3279 unsigned int flags) 3280 { 3281 return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags); 3282 } 3283 3284 /** 3285 * security_task_setrlimit() - Check if setting a new rlimit value is allowed 3286 * @p: target task's group leader 3287 * @resource: resource whose limit is being set 3288 * @new_rlim: new resource limit 3289 * 3290 * Check permission before setting the resource limits of process @p for 3291 * @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can be examined by 3292 * dereferencing (p->signal->rlim + resource). 3293 * 3294 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3295 */ 3296 int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, 3297 struct rlimit *new_rlim) 3298 { 3299 return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim); 3300 } 3301 3302 /** 3303 * security_task_setscheduler() - Check if setting sched policy/param is allowed 3304 * @p: target task 3305 * 3306 * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of 3307 * process @p. 3308 * 3309 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3310 */ 3311 int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3312 { 3313 return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p); 3314 } 3315 3316 /** 3317 * security_task_getscheduler() - Check if getting scheduling info is allowed 3318 * @p: target task 3319 * 3320 * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process @p. 3321 * 3322 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3323 */ 3324 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3325 { 3326 return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p); 3327 } 3328 3329 /** 3330 * security_task_movememory() - Check if moving memory is allowed 3331 * @p: task 3332 * 3333 * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p. 3334 * 3335 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3336 */ 3337 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) 3338 { 3339 return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p); 3340 } 3341 3342 /** 3343 * security_task_kill() - Check if sending a signal is allowed 3344 * @p: target process 3345 * @info: signal information 3346 * @sig: signal value 3347 * @cred: credentials of the signal sender, NULL if @current 3348 * 3349 * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p. @info can be NULL, the 3350 * constant 1, or a pointer to a kernel_siginfo structure. If @info is 1 or 3351 * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming from 3352 * the kernel and should typically be permitted. SIGIO signals are handled 3353 * separately by the send_sigiotask hook in file_security_ops. 3354 * 3355 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3356 */ 3357 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, 3358 int sig, const struct cred *cred) 3359 { 3360 return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred); 3361 } 3362 3363 /** 3364 * security_task_prctl() - Check if a prctl op is allowed 3365 * @option: operation 3366 * @arg2: argument 3367 * @arg3: argument 3368 * @arg4: argument 3369 * @arg5: argument 3370 * 3371 * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the 3372 * current process. 3373 * 3374 * Return: Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value 3375 * to cause prctl() to return immediately with that value. 3376 */ 3377 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, 3378 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) 3379 { 3380 int thisrc; 3381 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl); 3382 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3383 3384 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) { 3385 thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); 3386 if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) { 3387 rc = thisrc; 3388 if (thisrc != 0) 3389 break; 3390 } 3391 } 3392 return rc; 3393 } 3394 3395 /** 3396 * security_task_to_inode() - Set the security attributes of a task's inode 3397 * @p: task 3398 * @inode: inode 3399 * 3400 * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's 3401 * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes. 3402 */ 3403 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) 3404 { 3405 call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode); 3406 } 3407 3408 /** 3409 * security_create_user_ns() - Check if creating a new userns is allowed 3410 * @cred: prepared creds 3411 * 3412 * Check permission prior to creating a new user namespace. 3413 * 3414 * Return: Returns 0 if successful, otherwise < 0 error code. 3415 */ 3416 int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred) 3417 { 3418 return call_int_hook(userns_create, 0, cred); 3419 } 3420 3421 /** 3422 * security_ipc_permission() - Check if sysv ipc access is allowed 3423 * @ipcp: ipc permission structure 3424 * @flags: requested permissions 3425 * 3426 * Check permissions for access to IPC. 3427 * 3428 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3429 */ 3430 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) 3431 { 3432 return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag); 3433 } 3434 3435 /** 3436 * security_ipc_getsecid() - Get the sysv ipc object's secid 3437 * @ipcp: ipc permission structure 3438 * @secid: secid pointer 3439 * 3440 * Get the secid associated with the ipc object. In case of failure, @secid 3441 * will be set to zero. 3442 */ 3443 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) 3444 { 3445 *secid = 0; 3446 call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); 3447 } 3448 3449 /** 3450 * security_msg_msg_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc message LSM blob 3451 * @msg: message structure 3452 * 3453 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field. The 3454 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3455 * 3456 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3457 */ 3458 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) 3459 { 3460 int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg); 3461 3462 if (unlikely(rc)) 3463 return rc; 3464 rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg); 3465 if (unlikely(rc)) 3466 security_msg_msg_free(msg); 3467 return rc; 3468 } 3469 3470 /** 3471 * security_msg_msg_free() - Free a sysv ipc message LSM blob 3472 * @msg: message structure 3473 * 3474 * Deallocate the security structure for this message. 3475 */ 3476 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg) 3477 { 3478 call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg); 3479 kfree(msg->security); 3480 msg->security = NULL; 3481 } 3482 3483 /** 3484 * security_msg_queue_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob 3485 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3486 * 3487 * Allocate and attach a security structure to @msg. The security field is 3488 * initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3489 * 3490 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3491 */ 3492 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3493 { 3494 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq); 3495 3496 if (unlikely(rc)) 3497 return rc; 3498 rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq); 3499 if (unlikely(rc)) 3500 security_msg_queue_free(msq); 3501 return rc; 3502 } 3503 3504 /** 3505 * security_msg_queue_free() - Free a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob 3506 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3507 * 3508 * Deallocate security field @perm->security for the message queue. 3509 */ 3510 void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3511 { 3512 call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq); 3513 kfree(msq->security); 3514 msq->security = NULL; 3515 } 3516 3517 /** 3518 * security_msg_queue_associate() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed 3519 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3520 * @msqflg: operation flags 3521 * 3522 * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the msgget system 3523 * call. This hook is only called when returning the message queue identifier 3524 * for an existing message queue, not when a new message queue is created. 3525 * 3526 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 3527 */ 3528 int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) 3529 { 3530 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg); 3531 } 3532 3533 /** 3534 * security_msg_queue_msgctl() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed 3535 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3536 * @cmd: operation 3537 * 3538 * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd is to be 3539 * performed on the message queue with permissions. 3540 * 3541 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3542 */ 3543 int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) 3544 { 3545 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd); 3546 } 3547 3548 /** 3549 * security_msg_queue_msgsnd() - Check if sending a sysv ipc message is allowed 3550 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3551 * @msg: message 3552 * @msqflg: operation flags 3553 * 3554 * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message queue 3555 * with permissions specified in @msq. 3556 * 3557 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3558 */ 3559 int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, 3560 struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) 3561 { 3562 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg); 3563 } 3564 3565 /** 3566 * security_msg_queue_msgrcv() - Check if receiving a sysv ipc msg is allowed 3567 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3568 * @msg: message 3569 * @target: target task 3570 * @type: type of message requested 3571 * @mode: operation flags 3572 * 3573 * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message queue. 3574 * The @target task structure contains a pointer to the process that will be 3575 * receiving the message (not equal to the current process when inline receives 3576 * are being performed). 3577 * 3578 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3579 */ 3580 int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, 3581 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) 3582 { 3583 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode); 3584 } 3585 3586 /** 3587 * security_shm_alloc() - Allocate a sysv shm LSM blob 3588 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3589 * 3590 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @shp security field. The 3591 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3592 * 3593 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3594 */ 3595 int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3596 { 3597 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp); 3598 3599 if (unlikely(rc)) 3600 return rc; 3601 rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp); 3602 if (unlikely(rc)) 3603 security_shm_free(shp); 3604 return rc; 3605 } 3606 3607 /** 3608 * security_shm_free() - Free a sysv shm LSM blob 3609 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3610 * 3611 * Deallocate the security structure @perm->security for the memory segment. 3612 */ 3613 void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3614 { 3615 call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp); 3616 kfree(shp->security); 3617 shp->security = NULL; 3618 } 3619 3620 /** 3621 * security_shm_associate() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed 3622 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3623 * @shmflg: operation flags 3624 * 3625 * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the shmget 3626 * system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared memory 3627 * region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared memory 3628 * region is created. 3629 * 3630 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3631 */ 3632 int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) 3633 { 3634 return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg); 3635 } 3636 3637 /** 3638 * security_shm_shmctl() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed 3639 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3640 * @cmd: operation 3641 * 3642 * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by @cmd is 3643 * to be performed on the shared memory region with permissions in @shp. 3644 * 3645 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 3646 */ 3647 int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) 3648 { 3649 return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd); 3650 } 3651 3652 /** 3653 * security_shm_shmat() - Check if a sysv shm attach operation is allowed 3654 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3655 * @shmaddr: address of memory region to attach 3656 * @shmflg: operation flags 3657 * 3658 * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the 3659 * shared memory segment with permissions @shp to the data segment of the 3660 * calling process. The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr. 3661 * 3662 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3663 */ 3664 int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, 3665 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) 3666 { 3667 return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg); 3668 } 3669 3670 /** 3671 * security_sem_alloc() - Allocate a sysv semaphore LSM blob 3672 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3673 * 3674 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @sma security field. The 3675 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3676 * 3677 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3678 */ 3679 int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3680 { 3681 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma); 3682 3683 if (unlikely(rc)) 3684 return rc; 3685 rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma); 3686 if (unlikely(rc)) 3687 security_sem_free(sma); 3688 return rc; 3689 } 3690 3691 /** 3692 * security_sem_free() - Free a sysv semaphore LSM blob 3693 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3694 * 3695 * Deallocate security structure @sma->security for the semaphore. 3696 */ 3697 void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3698 { 3699 call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma); 3700 kfree(sma->security); 3701 sma->security = NULL; 3702 } 3703 3704 /** 3705 * security_sem_associate() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3706 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3707 * @semflg: operation flags 3708 * 3709 * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget system 3710 * call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore identifier for 3711 * an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be created. 3712 * 3713 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3714 */ 3715 int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) 3716 { 3717 return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg); 3718 } 3719 3720 /** 3721 * security_sem_ctl() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3722 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3723 * @cmd: operation 3724 * 3725 * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be 3726 * performed on the semaphore. 3727 * 3728 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3729 */ 3730 int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) 3731 { 3732 return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd); 3733 } 3734 3735 /** 3736 * security_sem_semop() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3737 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3738 * @sops: operations to perform 3739 * @nsops: number of operations 3740 * @alter: flag indicating changes will be made 3741 * 3742 * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the semaphore 3743 * set. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set may be modified. 3744 * 3745 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3746 */ 3747 int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, 3748 unsigned nsops, int alter) 3749 { 3750 return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter); 3751 } 3752 3753 /** 3754 * security_d_instantiate() - Populate an inode's LSM state based on a dentry 3755 * @dentry: dentry 3756 * @inode: inode 3757 * 3758 * Fill in @inode security information for a @dentry if allowed. 3759 */ 3760 void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) 3761 { 3762 if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 3763 return; 3764 call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode); 3765 } 3766 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); 3767 3768 /** 3769 * security_getprocattr() - Read an attribute for a task 3770 * @p: the task 3771 * @lsm: LSM name 3772 * @name: attribute name 3773 * @value: attribute value 3774 * 3775 * Read attribute @name for task @p and store it into @value if allowed. 3776 * 3777 * Return: Returns the length of @value on success, a negative value otherwise. 3778 */ 3779 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, 3780 const char *name, char **value) 3781 { 3782 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3783 3784 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { 3785 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 3786 continue; 3787 return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); 3788 } 3789 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr); 3790 } 3791 3792 /** 3793 * security_setprocattr() - Set an attribute for a task 3794 * @lsm: LSM name 3795 * @name: attribute name 3796 * @value: attribute value 3797 * @size: attribute value size 3798 * 3799 * Write (set) the current task's attribute @name to @value, size @size if 3800 * allowed. 3801 * 3802 * Return: Returns bytes written on success, a negative value otherwise. 3803 */ 3804 int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, 3805 size_t size) 3806 { 3807 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3808 3809 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { 3810 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 3811 continue; 3812 return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); 3813 } 3814 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr); 3815 } 3816 3817 /** 3818 * security_netlink_send() - Save info and check if netlink sending is allowed 3819 * @sk: sending socket 3820 * @skb: netlink message 3821 * 3822 * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission checking 3823 * can be performed when the message is processed. The security information 3824 * can be saved using the eff_cap field of the netlink_skb_parms structure. 3825 * Also may be used to provide fine grained control over message transmission. 3826 * 3827 * Return: Returns 0 if the information was successfully saved and message is 3828 * allowed to be transmitted. 3829 */ 3830 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 3831 { 3832 return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb); 3833 } 3834 3835 /** 3836 * security_ismaclabel() - Check is the named attribute is a MAC label 3837 * @name: full extended attribute name 3838 * 3839 * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name represents a MAC label. 3840 * 3841 * Return: Returns 1 if name is a MAC attribute otherwise returns 0. 3842 */ 3843 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) 3844 { 3845 return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name); 3846 } 3847 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); 3848 3849 /** 3850 * security_secid_to_secctx() - Convert a secid to a secctx 3851 * @secid: secid 3852 * @secdata: secctx 3853 * @seclen: secctx length 3854 * 3855 * Convert secid to security context. If @secdata is NULL the length of the 3856 * result will be returned in @seclen, but no @secdata will be returned. This 3857 * does mean that the length could change between calls to check the length and 3858 * the next call which actually allocates and returns the @secdata. 3859 * 3860 * Return: Return 0 on success, error on failure. 3861 */ 3862 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) 3863 { 3864 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3865 int rc; 3866 3867 /* 3868 * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this 3869 * LSM hook is not "stackable"). 3870 */ 3871 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { 3872 rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); 3873 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx)) 3874 return rc; 3875 } 3876 3877 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx); 3878 } 3879 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); 3880 3881 /** 3882 * security_secctx_to_secid() - Convert a secctx to a secid 3883 * @secdata: secctx 3884 * @seclen: length of secctx 3885 * @secid: secid 3886 * 3887 * Convert security context to secid. 3888 * 3889 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3890 */ 3891 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) 3892 { 3893 *secid = 0; 3894 return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid); 3895 } 3896 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); 3897 3898 /** 3899 * security_release_secctx() - Free a secctx buffer 3900 * @secdata: secctx 3901 * @seclen: length of secctx 3902 * 3903 * Release the security context. 3904 */ 3905 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) 3906 { 3907 call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); 3908 } 3909 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); 3910 3911 /** 3912 * security_inode_invalidate_secctx() - Invalidate an inode's security label 3913 * @inode: inode 3914 * 3915 * Notify the security module that it must revalidate the security context of 3916 * an inode. 3917 */ 3918 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) 3919 { 3920 call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode); 3921 } 3922 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx); 3923 3924 /** 3925 * security_inode_notifysecctx() - Nofify the LSM of an inode's security label 3926 * @inode: inode 3927 * @ctx: secctx 3928 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 3929 * 3930 * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should 3931 * be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module 3932 * for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize 3933 * the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server 3934 * for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. 3935 * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked. 3936 * 3937 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3938 */ 3939 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 3940 { 3941 return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 3942 } 3943 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx); 3944 3945 /** 3946 * security_inode_setsecctx() - Change the security label of an inode 3947 * @dentry: inode 3948 * @ctx: secctx 3949 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 3950 * 3951 * Change the security context of an inode. Updates the incore security 3952 * context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed 3953 * (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the 3954 * context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security 3955 * context in its incore inode and on the backing filesystem to a value 3956 * provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. Must be called with 3957 * inode->i_mutex locked. 3958 * 3959 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3960 */ 3961 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 3962 { 3963 return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen); 3964 } 3965 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx); 3966 3967 /** 3968 * security_inode_getsecctx() - Get the security label of an inode 3969 * @inode: inode 3970 * @ctx: secctx 3971 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 3972 * 3973 * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security 3974 * context for the given @inode. 3975 * 3976 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3977 */ 3978 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) 3979 { 3980 return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 3981 } 3982 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx); 3983 3984 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE 3985 /** 3986 * security_post_notification() - Check if a watch notification can be posted 3987 * @w_cred: credentials of the task that set the watch 3988 * @cred: credentials of the task which triggered the watch 3989 * @n: the notification 3990 * 3991 * Check to see if a watch notification can be posted to a particular queue. 3992 * 3993 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3994 */ 3995 int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, 3996 const struct cred *cred, 3997 struct watch_notification *n) 3998 { 3999 return call_int_hook(post_notification, 0, w_cred, cred, n); 4000 } 4001 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */ 4002 4003 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS 4004 /** 4005 * security_watch_key() - Check if a task is allowed to watch for key events 4006 * @key: the key to watch 4007 * 4008 * Check to see if a process is allowed to watch for event notifications from 4009 * a key or keyring. 4010 * 4011 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4012 */ 4013 int security_watch_key(struct key *key) 4014 { 4015 return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key); 4016 } 4017 #endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */ 4018 4019 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK 4020 /** 4021 * security_unix_stream_connect() - Check if a AF_UNIX stream is allowed 4022 * @sock: originating sock 4023 * @other: peer sock 4024 * @newsk: new sock 4025 * 4026 * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection 4027 * between @sock and @other. 4028 * 4029 * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because 4030 * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix 4031 * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name 4032 * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod 4033 * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to 4034 * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient 4035 * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible 4036 * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target 4037 * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. 4038 * 4039 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4040 */ 4041 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, 4042 struct sock *newsk) 4043 { 4044 return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk); 4045 } 4046 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect); 4047 4048 /** 4049 * security_unix_may_send() - Check if AF_UNIX socket can send datagrams 4050 * @sock: originating sock 4051 * @other: peer sock 4052 * 4053 * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to 4054 * @other. 4055 * 4056 * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because 4057 * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix 4058 * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name 4059 * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod 4060 * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to 4061 * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient 4062 * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible 4063 * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target 4064 * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. 4065 * 4066 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4067 */ 4068 int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) 4069 { 4070 return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other); 4071 } 4072 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send); 4073 4074 /** 4075 * security_socket_create() - Check if creating a new socket is allowed 4076 * @family: protocol family 4077 * @type: communications type 4078 * @protocol: requested protocol 4079 * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested 4080 * 4081 * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket. 4082 * 4083 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4084 */ 4085 int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) 4086 { 4087 return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern); 4088 } 4089 4090 /** 4091 * security_socket_create() - Initialize a newly created socket 4092 * @sock: socket 4093 * @family: protocol family 4094 * @type: communications type 4095 * @protocol: requested protocol 4096 * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested 4097 * 4098 * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security 4099 * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the socket 4100 * structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored in the 4101 * associated inode. Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will allocate 4102 * and attach security information to SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security. This hook 4103 * may be used to update the SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security field with additional 4104 * information that wasn't available when the inode was allocated. 4105 * 4106 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4107 */ 4108 int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, 4109 int type, int protocol, int kern) 4110 { 4111 return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type, 4112 protocol, kern); 4113 } 4114 4115 /** 4116 * security_socket_socketpair() - Check if creating a socketpair is allowed 4117 * @socka: first socket 4118 * @sockb: second socket 4119 * 4120 * Check permissions before creating a fresh pair of sockets. 4121 * 4122 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted and the connection was 4123 * established. 4124 */ 4125 int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) 4126 { 4127 return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb); 4128 } 4129 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair); 4130 4131 /** 4132 * security_socket_bind() - Check if a socket bind operation is allowed 4133 * @sock: socket 4134 * @address: requested bind address 4135 * @addrlen: length of address 4136 * 4137 * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is performed 4138 * and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the @address 4139 * parameter. 4140 * 4141 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4142 */ 4143 int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, 4144 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4145 { 4146 return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 4147 } 4148 4149 /** 4150 * security_socket_connect() - Check if a socket connect operation is allowed 4151 * @sock: socket 4152 * @address: address of remote connection point 4153 * @addrlen: length of address 4154 * 4155 * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation attempts to 4156 * connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address. 4157 * 4158 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4159 */ 4160 int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, 4161 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4162 { 4163 return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 4164 } 4165 4166 /** 4167 * security_socket_listen() - Check if a socket is allowed to listen 4168 * @sock: socket 4169 * @backlog: connection queue size 4170 * 4171 * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation. 4172 * 4173 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4174 */ 4175 int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) 4176 { 4177 return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog); 4178 } 4179 4180 /** 4181 * security_socket_accept() - Check if a socket is allowed to accept connections 4182 * @sock: listening socket 4183 * @newsock: newly creation connection socket 4184 * 4185 * Check permission before accepting a new connection. Note that the new 4186 * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it, but 4187 * the accept operation has not actually been performed. 4188 * 4189 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4190 */ 4191 int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) 4192 { 4193 return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock); 4194 } 4195 4196 /** 4197 * security_socket_sendmsg() - Check is sending a message is allowed 4198 * @sock: sending socket 4199 * @msg: message to send 4200 * @size: size of message 4201 * 4202 * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket. 4203 * 4204 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4205 */ 4206 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) 4207 { 4208 return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size); 4209 } 4210 4211 /** 4212 * security_socket_recvmsg() - Check if receiving a message is allowed 4213 * @sock: receiving socket 4214 * @msg: message to receive 4215 * @size: size of message 4216 * @flags: operational flags 4217 * 4218 * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket. 4219 * 4220 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4221 */ 4222 int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, 4223 int size, int flags) 4224 { 4225 return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags); 4226 } 4227 4228 /** 4229 * security_socket_getsockname() - Check if reading the socket addr is allowed 4230 * @sock: socket 4231 * 4232 * Check permission before reading the local address (name) of the socket 4233 * object. 4234 * 4235 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4236 */ 4237 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) 4238 { 4239 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock); 4240 } 4241 4242 /** 4243 * security_socket_getpeername() - Check if reading the peer's addr is allowed 4244 * @sock: socket 4245 * 4246 * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object. 4247 * 4248 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4249 */ 4250 int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) 4251 { 4252 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock); 4253 } 4254 4255 /** 4256 * security_socket_getsockopt() - Check if reading a socket option is allowed 4257 * @sock: socket 4258 * @level: option's protocol level 4259 * @optname: option name 4260 * 4261 * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket 4262 * @sock. 4263 * 4264 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4265 */ 4266 int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 4267 { 4268 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 4269 } 4270 4271 /** 4272 * security_socket_setsockopt() - Check if setting a socket option is allowed 4273 * @sock: socket 4274 * @level: option's protocol level 4275 * @optname: option name 4276 * 4277 * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket @sock. 4278 * 4279 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4280 */ 4281 int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 4282 { 4283 return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 4284 } 4285 4286 /** 4287 * security_socket_shutdown() - Checks if shutting down the socket is allowed 4288 * @sock: socket 4289 * @how: flag indicating how sends and receives are handled 4290 * 4291 * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket @sock is 4292 * shut down. 4293 * 4294 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4295 */ 4296 int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) 4297 { 4298 return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how); 4299 } 4300 4301 /** 4302 * security_sock_rcv_skb() - Check if an incoming network packet is allowed 4303 * @sk: destination sock 4304 * @skb: incoming packet 4305 * 4306 * Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct from 4307 * Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the incoming 4308 * sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk. Must not 4309 * sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks. 4310 * 4311 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4312 */ 4313 int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 4314 { 4315 return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb); 4316 } 4317 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); 4318 4319 /** 4320 * security_socket_getpeersec_stream() - Get the remote peer label 4321 * @sock: socket 4322 * @optval: destination buffer 4323 * @optlen: size of peer label copied into the buffer 4324 * @len: maximum size of the destination buffer 4325 * 4326 * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state 4327 * for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC. 4328 * For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the socket is associated with an 4329 * ipsec SA. 4330 * 4331 * Return: Returns 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return 4332 * values. 4333 */ 4334 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval, 4335 sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len) 4336 { 4337 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 4338 optval, optlen, len); 4339 } 4340 4341 /** 4342 * security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() - Get the remote peer label 4343 * @sock: socket 4344 * @skb: datagram packet 4345 * @secid: remote peer label secid 4346 * 4347 * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state 4348 * for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via getsockopt 4349 * SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated the IP_PASSSEC 4350 * option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the security state returned by 4351 * this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY ancillary message type. 4352 * 4353 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4354 */ 4355 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, 4356 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 4357 { 4358 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 4359 skb, secid); 4360 } 4361 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram); 4362 4363 /** 4364 * security_sk_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a sock's LSM blob 4365 * @sk: sock 4366 * @family: protocol family 4367 * @priotity: gfp flags 4368 * 4369 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field, which 4370 * is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets. 4371 * 4372 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4373 */ 4374 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) 4375 { 4376 return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority); 4377 } 4378 4379 /** 4380 * security_sk_free() - Free the sock's LSM blob 4381 * @sk: sock 4382 * 4383 * Deallocate security structure. 4384 */ 4385 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk) 4386 { 4387 call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk); 4388 } 4389 4390 /** 4391 * security_sk_clone() - Clone a sock's LSM state 4392 * @sk: original sock 4393 * @newsk: target sock 4394 * 4395 * Clone/copy security structure. 4396 */ 4397 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) 4398 { 4399 call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk); 4400 } 4401 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone); 4402 4403 void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic) 4404 { 4405 call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid); 4406 } 4407 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow); 4408 4409 /** 4410 * security_req_classify_flow() - Set a flow's secid based on request_sock 4411 * @req: request_sock 4412 * @flic: target flow 4413 * 4414 * Sets @flic's secid to @req's secid. 4415 */ 4416 void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, 4417 struct flowi_common *flic) 4418 { 4419 call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic); 4420 } 4421 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow); 4422 4423 /** 4424 * security_sock_graft() - Reconcile LSM state when grafting a sock on a socket 4425 * @sk: sock being grafted 4426 * @sock: target socket 4427 * 4428 * Sets @sock's inode secid to @sk's secid and update @sk with any necessary 4429 * LSM state from @sock. 4430 */ 4431 void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) 4432 { 4433 call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent); 4434 } 4435 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft); 4436 4437 /** 4438 * security_inet_conn_request() - Set request_sock state using incoming connect 4439 * @sk: parent listening sock 4440 * @skb: incoming connection 4441 * @req: new request_sock 4442 * 4443 * Initialize the @req LSM state based on @sk and the incoming connect in @skb. 4444 * 4445 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4446 */ 4447 int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, 4448 struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) 4449 { 4450 return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req); 4451 } 4452 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request); 4453 4454 /** 4455 * security_inet_csk_clone() - Set new sock LSM state based on request_sock 4456 * @newsk: new sock 4457 * @req: connection request_sock 4458 * 4459 * Set that LSM state of @sock using the LSM state from @req. 4460 */ 4461 void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, 4462 const struct request_sock *req) 4463 { 4464 call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req); 4465 } 4466 4467 /** 4468 * security_inet_conn_established() - Update sock's LSM state with connection 4469 * @sk: sock 4470 * @skb: connection packet 4471 * 4472 * Update @sock's LSM state to represent a new connection from @skb. 4473 */ 4474 void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, 4475 struct sk_buff *skb) 4476 { 4477 call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb); 4478 } 4479 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established); 4480 4481 /** 4482 * security_secmark_relabel_packet() - Check if setting a secmark is allowed 4483 * @secid: new secmark value 4484 * 4485 * Check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to @secid. 4486 * 4487 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4488 */ 4489 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid) 4490 { 4491 return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid); 4492 } 4493 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet); 4494 4495 /** 4496 * security_secmark_refcount_inc() - Increment the secmark labeling rule count 4497 * 4498 * Tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. 4499 */ 4500 void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void) 4501 { 4502 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc); 4503 } 4504 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc); 4505 4506 /** 4507 * security_secmark_refcount_dec() - Decrement the secmark labeling rule count 4508 * 4509 * Tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. 4510 */ 4511 void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void) 4512 { 4513 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec); 4514 } 4515 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec); 4516 4517 /** 4518 * security_tun_dev_alloc_security() - Allocate a LSM blob for a TUN device 4519 * @security: pointer to the LSM blob 4520 * 4521 * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN device, 4522 * returning the pointer in @security. 4523 * 4524 * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. 4525 */ 4526 int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) 4527 { 4528 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security); 4529 } 4530 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security); 4531 4532 /** 4533 * security_tun_dev_free_security() - Free a TUN device LSM blob 4534 * @security: LSM blob 4535 * 4536 * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN device. 4537 */ 4538 void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) 4539 { 4540 call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security); 4541 } 4542 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security); 4543 4544 /** 4545 * security_tun_dev_create() - Check if creating a TUN device is allowed 4546 * 4547 * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device. 4548 * 4549 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4550 */ 4551 int security_tun_dev_create(void) 4552 { 4553 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0); 4554 } 4555 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create); 4556 4557 /** 4558 * security_tun_dev_attach_queue() - Check if attaching a TUN queue is allowed 4559 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4560 * 4561 * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue. 4562 * 4563 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4564 */ 4565 int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) 4566 { 4567 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security); 4568 } 4569 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue); 4570 4571 /** 4572 * security_tun_dev_attach() - Update TUN device LSM state on attach 4573 * @sk: associated sock 4574 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4575 * 4576 * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated 4577 * with the TUN device's sock structure. 4578 * 4579 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4580 */ 4581 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) 4582 { 4583 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security); 4584 } 4585 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach); 4586 4587 /** 4588 * security_tun_dev_open() - Update TUN device LSM state on open 4589 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4590 * 4591 * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated 4592 * with the TUN device's security structure. 4593 * 4594 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4595 */ 4596 int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) 4597 { 4598 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security); 4599 } 4600 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open); 4601 4602 /** 4603 * security_sctp_assoc_request() - Update the LSM on a SCTP association req 4604 * @asoc: SCTP association 4605 * @skb: packet requesting the association 4606 * 4607 * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association INIT packet to the LSM. 4608 * 4609 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4610 */ 4611 int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, 4612 struct sk_buff *skb) 4613 { 4614 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, asoc, skb); 4615 } 4616 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request); 4617 4618 /** 4619 * security_sctp_bind_connect() - Validate a list of addrs for a SCTP option 4620 * @sk: socket 4621 * @optname: SCTP option to validate 4622 * @address: list of IP addresses to validate 4623 * @addrlen: length of the address list 4624 * 4625 * Validiate permissions required for each address associated with sock @sk. 4626 * Depending on @optname, the addresses will be treated as either a connect or 4627 * bind service. The @addrlen is calculated on each IPv4 and IPv6 address using 4628 * sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6). 4629 * 4630 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4631 */ 4632 int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, 4633 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4634 { 4635 return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname, 4636 address, addrlen); 4637 } 4638 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect); 4639 4640 /** 4641 * security_sctp_sk_clone() - Clone a SCTP sock's LSM state 4642 * @asoc: SCTP association 4643 * @sk: original sock 4644 * @newsk: target sock 4645 * 4646 * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) (i.e. a TCP style 4647 * socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls 4648 * sctp_peeloff(3). 4649 */ 4650 void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk, 4651 struct sock *newsk) 4652 { 4653 call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, asoc, sk, newsk); 4654 } 4655 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone); 4656 4657 /** 4658 * security_sctp_assoc_established() - Update LSM state when assoc established 4659 * @asoc: SCTP association 4660 * @skb: packet establishing the association 4661 * 4662 * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association COOKIE_ACK packet to the 4663 * security module. 4664 * 4665 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4666 */ 4667 int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc, 4668 struct sk_buff *skb) 4669 { 4670 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, 0, asoc, skb); 4671 } 4672 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established); 4673 4674 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ 4675 4676 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND 4677 /** 4678 * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed 4679 * @sec: LSM blob 4680 * @subnet_prefix: subnet prefix of the port 4681 * @pkey: IB pkey 4682 * 4683 * Check permission to access a pkey when modifing a QP. 4684 * 4685 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4686 */ 4687 int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey) 4688 { 4689 return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey); 4690 } 4691 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access); 4692 4693 /** 4694 * security_ib_endport_manage_subnet() - Check if SMPs traffic is allowed 4695 * @sec: LSM blob 4696 * @dev_name: IB device name 4697 * @port_num: port number 4698 * 4699 * Check permissions to send and receive SMPs on a end port. 4700 * 4701 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4702 */ 4703 int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, 4704 const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) 4705 { 4706 return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec, 4707 dev_name, port_num); 4708 } 4709 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet); 4710 4711 /** 4712 * security_ib_alloc_security() - Allocate an Infiniband LSM blob 4713 * @sec: LSM blob 4714 * 4715 * Allocate a security structure for Infiniband objects. 4716 * 4717 * Return: Returns 0 on success, non-zero on failure. 4718 */ 4719 int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec) 4720 { 4721 return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec); 4722 } 4723 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security); 4724 4725 /** 4726 * security_ib_free_security() - Free an Infiniband LSM blob 4727 * @sec: LSM blob 4728 * 4729 * Deallocate an Infiniband security structure. 4730 */ 4731 void security_ib_free_security(void *sec) 4732 { 4733 call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec); 4734 } 4735 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security); 4736 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ 4737 4738 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM 4739 /** 4740 * security_xfrm_policy_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm policy LSM blob 4741 * @ctxp: xfrm security context being added to the SPD 4742 * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace 4743 * @gfp: gfp flags 4744 * 4745 * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security field 4746 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated. 4747 * 4748 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4749 */ 4750 int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, 4751 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, 4752 gfp_t gfp) 4753 { 4754 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp); 4755 } 4756 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc); 4757 4758 /** 4759 * security_xfrm_policy_clone() - Clone xfrm policy LSM state 4760 * @old_ctx: xfrm security context 4761 * @new_ctxp: target xfrm security context 4762 * 4763 * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the information from 4764 * the old_ctx structure. 4765 * 4766 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4767 */ 4768 int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, 4769 struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) 4770 { 4771 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp); 4772 } 4773 4774 /** 4775 * security_xfrm_policy_free() - Free a xfrm security context 4776 * @ctx: xfrm security context 4777 * 4778 * Free LSM resources associated with @ctx. 4779 */ 4780 void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 4781 { 4782 call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx); 4783 } 4784 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free); 4785 4786 /** 4787 * security_xfrm_policy_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm policy is allowed 4788 * @ctx: xfrm security context 4789 * 4790 * Authorize deletion of a SPD entry. 4791 * 4792 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4793 */ 4794 int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 4795 { 4796 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx); 4797 } 4798 4799 /** 4800 * security_xfrm_state_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob 4801 * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD 4802 * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace 4803 * 4804 * Allocate a security structure to the @x->security field; the security field 4805 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to 4806 * correspond to @sec_ctx. 4807 * 4808 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4809 */ 4810 int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, 4811 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) 4812 { 4813 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx); 4814 } 4815 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc); 4816 4817 /** 4818 * security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob 4819 * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD 4820 * @polsec: associated policy's security context 4821 * @secid: secid from the flow 4822 * 4823 * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security field 4824 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to 4825 * correspond to secid. 4826 * 4827 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. 4828 */ 4829 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, 4830 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) 4831 { 4832 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid); 4833 } 4834 4835 /** 4836 * security_xfrm_state_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm state is allowed 4837 * @x: xfrm state 4838 * 4839 * Authorize deletion of x->security. 4840 * 4841 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4842 */ 4843 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) 4844 { 4845 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x); 4846 } 4847 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete); 4848 4849 /** 4850 * security_xfrm_state_free() - Free a xfrm state 4851 * @x: xfrm state 4852 * 4853 * Deallocate x->security. 4854 */ 4855 void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) 4856 { 4857 call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x); 4858 } 4859 4860 /** 4861 * security_xfrm_policy_lookup() - Check if using a xfrm policy is allowed 4862 * @ctx: target xfrm security context 4863 * @fl_secid: flow secid used to authorize access 4864 * 4865 * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing XFRMs on a 4866 * packet. The hook is called when selecting either a per-socket policy or a 4867 * generic xfrm policy. 4868 * 4869 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno on 4870 * other errors. 4871 */ 4872 int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid) 4873 { 4874 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid); 4875 } 4876 4877 /** 4878 * security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() - Check for a xfrm match 4879 * @x: xfrm state to match 4880 * @xp xfrm policy to check for a match 4881 * @flic: flow to check for a match. 4882 * 4883 * Check @xp and @flic for a match with @x. 4884 * 4885 * Return: Returns 1 if there is a match. 4886 */ 4887 int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, 4888 struct xfrm_policy *xp, 4889 const struct flowi_common *flic) 4890 { 4891 struct security_hook_list *hp; 4892 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); 4893 4894 /* 4895 * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment 4896 * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately, 4897 * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux 4898 * supplies this call. 4899 * 4900 * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than 4901 * using the macro 4902 */ 4903 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, 4904 list) { 4905 rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic); 4906 break; 4907 } 4908 return rc; 4909 } 4910 4911 /** 4912 * security_xfrm_decode_session() - Determine the xfrm secid for a packet 4913 * @skb: xfrm packet 4914 * @secid: secid 4915 * 4916 * Decode the packet in @skb and return the security label in @secid. 4917 * 4918 * Return: Return 0 if all xfrms used have the same secid. 4919 */ 4920 int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 4921 { 4922 return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1); 4923 } 4924 4925 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic) 4926 { 4927 int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid, 4928 0); 4929 4930 BUG_ON(rc); 4931 } 4932 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow); 4933 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ 4934 4935 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS 4936 /** 4937 * security_key_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a kernel key LSM blob 4938 * @key: key 4939 * @cred: credentials 4940 * @flags: allocation flags 4941 * 4942 * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does not 4943 * have a serial number assigned at this point. 4944 * 4945 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. 4946 */ 4947 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, 4948 unsigned long flags) 4949 { 4950 return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags); 4951 } 4952 4953 /** 4954 * security_key_free() - Free a kernel key LSM blob 4955 * @key: key 4956 * 4957 * Notification of destruction; free security data. 4958 */ 4959 void security_key_free(struct key *key) 4960 { 4961 call_void_hook(key_free, key); 4962 } 4963 4964 /** 4965 * security_key_permission() - Check if a kernel key operation is allowed 4966 * @key_ref: key reference 4967 * @cred: credentials of actor requesting access 4968 * @need_perm: requested permissions 4969 * 4970 * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a key. 4971 * 4972 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. 4973 */ 4974 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, 4975 enum key_need_perm need_perm) 4976 { 4977 return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm); 4978 } 4979 4980 /** 4981 * security_key_getsecurity() - Get the key's security label 4982 * @key: key 4983 * @buffer: security label buffer 4984 * 4985 * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key for 4986 * the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function allocates the 4987 * storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller should free it. 4988 * 4989 * Return: Returns the length of @buffer (including terminating NUL) or -ve if 4990 * an error occurs. May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if 4991 * there is no security label assigned to the key. 4992 */ 4993 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) 4994 { 4995 *_buffer = NULL; 4996 return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer); 4997 } 4998 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ 4999 5000 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT 5001 /** 5002 * security_audit_rule_init() - Allocate and init an LSM audit rule struct 5003 * @field: audit action 5004 * @op: rule operator 5005 * @rulestr: rule context 5006 * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct 5007 * 5008 * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. 5009 * 5010 * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of 5011 * an invalid rule. 5012 */ 5013 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) 5014 { 5015 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); 5016 } 5017 5018 /** 5019 * security_audit_rule_known() - Check if an audit rule contains LSM fields 5020 * @krule: audit rule 5021 * 5022 * Specifies whether given @krule contains any fields related to the current 5023 * LSM. 5024 * 5025 * Return: Returns 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise. 5026 */ 5027 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) 5028 { 5029 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule); 5030 } 5031 5032 /** 5033 * security_audit_rule_free() - Free an LSM audit rule struct 5034 * @lsmrule: audit rule struct 5035 * 5036 * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by 5037 * audit_rule_init(). 5038 */ 5039 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) 5040 { 5041 call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); 5042 } 5043 5044 /** 5045 * security_audit_rule_match() - Check if a label matches an audit rule 5046 * @secid: security label 5047 * @field: LSM audit field 5048 * @op: matching operator 5049 * @lsmrule: audit rule 5050 * 5051 * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved by 5052 * security_audit_rule_known(). 5053 * 5054 * Return: Returns 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on 5055 * failure. 5056 */ 5057 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) 5058 { 5059 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule); 5060 } 5061 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ 5062 5063 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL 5064 /** 5065 * security_bpf() - Check if the bpf syscall operation is allowed 5066 * @cmd: command 5067 * @attr: bpf attribute 5068 * @size: size 5069 * 5070 * Do a initial check for all bpf syscalls after the attribute is copied into 5071 * the kernel. The actual security module can implement their own rules to 5072 * check the specific cmd they need. 5073 * 5074 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5075 */ 5076 int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) 5077 { 5078 return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size); 5079 } 5080 5081 /** 5082 * security_bpf_map() - Check if access to a bpf map is allowed 5083 * @map: bpf map 5084 * @fmode: mode 5085 * 5086 * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF 5087 * maps. 5088 * 5089 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5090 */ 5091 int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) 5092 { 5093 return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode); 5094 } 5095 5096 /** 5097 * security_bpf_prog() - Check if access to a bpf program is allowed 5098 * @prog: bpf program 5099 * 5100 * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF 5101 * programs. 5102 * 5103 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5104 */ 5105 int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) 5106 { 5107 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog); 5108 } 5109 5110 /** 5111 * security_bpf_map_alloc() - Allocate a bpf map LSM blob 5112 * @map: bpf map 5113 * 5114 * Initialize the security field inside bpf map. 5115 * 5116 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5117 */ 5118 int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) 5119 { 5120 return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map); 5121 } 5122 5123 /** 5124 * security_bpf_prog_alloc() - Allocate a bpf program LSM blob 5125 * @aux: bpf program aux info struct 5126 * 5127 * Initialize the security field inside bpf program. 5128 * 5129 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5130 */ 5131 int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 5132 { 5133 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux); 5134 } 5135 5136 /** 5137 * security_bpf_map_free() - Free a bpf map's LSM blob 5138 * @map: bpf map 5139 * 5140 * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf map. 5141 */ 5142 void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) 5143 { 5144 call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map); 5145 } 5146 5147 /** 5148 * security_bpf_prog_free() - Free a bpf program's LSM blob 5149 * @aux: bpf program aux info struct 5150 * 5151 * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog. 5152 */ 5153 void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 5154 { 5155 call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); 5156 } 5157 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ 5158 5159 /** 5160 * security_locked_down() - Check if a kernel feature is allowed 5161 * @what: requested kernel feature 5162 * 5163 * Determine whether a kernel feature that potentially enables arbitrary code 5164 * execution in kernel space should be permitted. 5165 * 5166 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5167 */ 5168 int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) 5169 { 5170 return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what); 5171 } 5172 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down); 5173 5174 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 5175 /** 5176 * security_perf_event_open() - Check if a perf event open is allowed 5177 * @attr: perf event attribute 5178 * @type: type of event 5179 * 5180 * Check whether the @type of perf_event_open syscall is allowed. 5181 * 5182 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5183 */ 5184 int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) 5185 { 5186 return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type); 5187 } 5188 5189 /** 5190 * security_perf_event_alloc() - Allocate a perf event LSM blob 5191 * @event: perf event 5192 * 5193 * Allocate and save perf_event security info. 5194 * 5195 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5196 */ 5197 int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) 5198 { 5199 return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event); 5200 } 5201 5202 /** 5203 * security_perf_event_free() - Free a perf event LSM blob 5204 * @event: perf event 5205 * 5206 * Release (free) perf_event security info. 5207 */ 5208 void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) 5209 { 5210 call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event); 5211 } 5212 5213 /** 5214 * security_perf_event_read() - Check if reading a perf event label is allowed 5215 * @event: perf event 5216 * 5217 * Read perf_event security info if allowed. 5218 * 5219 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5220 */ 5221 int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) 5222 { 5223 return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event); 5224 } 5225 5226 /** 5227 * security_perf_event_write() - Check if writing a perf event label is allowed 5228 * @event: perf event 5229 * 5230 * Write perf_event security info if allowed. 5231 * 5232 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5233 */ 5234 int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) 5235 { 5236 return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event); 5237 } 5238 #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */ 5239 5240 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING 5241 /** 5242 * security_uring_override_creds() - Check if overriding creds is allowed 5243 * @new: new credentials 5244 * 5245 * Check if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to 5246 * override it's credentials with @new. 5247 * 5248 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5249 */ 5250 int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) 5251 { 5252 return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, 0, new); 5253 } 5254 5255 /** 5256 * security_uring_sqpoll() - Check if IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL is allowed 5257 * 5258 * Check whether the current task is allowed to spawn a io_uring polling thread 5259 * (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). 5260 * 5261 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5262 */ 5263 int security_uring_sqpoll(void) 5264 { 5265 return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0); 5266 } 5267 5268 /** 5269 * security_uring_cmd() - Check if a io_uring passthrough command is allowed 5270 * @ioucmd: command 5271 * 5272 * Check whether the file_operations uring_cmd is allowed to run. 5273 * 5274 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5275 */ 5276 int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) 5277 { 5278 return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd); 5279 } 5280 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ 5281