1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later 2 /* 3 * Security plug functions 4 * 5 * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com> 6 * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> 7 * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com> 8 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies 9 * Copyright (C) 2023 Microsoft Corporation <paul@paul-moore.com> 10 */ 11 12 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt 13 14 #include <linux/bpf.h> 15 #include <linux/capability.h> 16 #include <linux/dcache.h> 17 #include <linux/export.h> 18 #include <linux/init.h> 19 #include <linux/kernel.h> 20 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> 21 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> 22 #include <linux/integrity.h> 23 #include <linux/ima.h> 24 #include <linux/evm.h> 25 #include <linux/fsnotify.h> 26 #include <linux/mman.h> 27 #include <linux/mount.h> 28 #include <linux/personality.h> 29 #include <linux/backing-dev.h> 30 #include <linux/string.h> 31 #include <linux/msg.h> 32 #include <net/flow.h> 33 34 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 35 36 /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ 37 #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) 38 39 /* 40 * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the 41 * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows 42 * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing 43 * purposes. 44 */ 45 const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX + 1] = { 46 [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", 47 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", 48 [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", 49 [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access", 50 [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", 51 [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", 52 [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", 53 [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", 54 [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", 55 [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", 56 [LOCKDOWN_DEVICE_TREE] = "modifying device tree contents", 57 [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage", 58 [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO", 59 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters", 60 [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio", 61 [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access", 62 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access", 63 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM", 64 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM", 65 [LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection", 66 [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", 67 [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", 68 [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", 69 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", 70 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM", 71 [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", 72 [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", 73 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access", 74 [LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret", 75 [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", 76 }; 77 78 struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init; 79 static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain); 80 81 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; 82 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; 83 84 char *lsm_names; 85 static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init; 86 87 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ 88 static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; 89 static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm; 90 91 static __initconst const char *const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM; 92 93 /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ 94 static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms; 95 static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive; 96 97 static __initdata bool debug; 98 #define init_debug(...) \ 99 do { \ 100 if (debug) \ 101 pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \ 102 } while (0) 103 104 static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm) 105 { 106 if (!lsm->enabled) 107 return false; 108 109 return *lsm->enabled; 110 } 111 112 /* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */ 113 static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1; 114 static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0; 115 static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled) 116 { 117 /* 118 * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use 119 * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state. 120 */ 121 if (!lsm->enabled) { 122 if (enabled) 123 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 124 else 125 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 126 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) { 127 if (!enabled) 128 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 129 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) { 130 if (enabled) 131 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 132 } else { 133 *lsm->enabled = enabled; 134 } 135 } 136 137 /* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */ 138 static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 139 { 140 struct lsm_info **check; 141 142 for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++) 143 if (*check == lsm) 144 return true; 145 146 return false; 147 } 148 149 /* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */ 150 static int last_lsm __initdata; 151 static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from) 152 { 153 /* Ignore duplicate selections. */ 154 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 155 return; 156 157 if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from)) 158 return; 159 160 /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */ 161 if (!lsm->enabled) 162 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 163 ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm; 164 165 init_debug("%s ordered: %s (%s)\n", from, lsm->name, 166 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 167 } 168 169 /* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */ 170 static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm) 171 { 172 /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */ 173 if (!is_enabled(lsm)) 174 return false; 175 176 /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */ 177 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) { 178 init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name); 179 return false; 180 } 181 182 return true; 183 } 184 185 static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs) 186 { 187 int offset; 188 189 if (*need <= 0) 190 return; 191 192 offset = ALIGN(*lbs, sizeof(void *)); 193 *lbs = offset + *need; 194 *need = offset; 195 } 196 197 static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) 198 { 199 if (!needed) 200 return; 201 202 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 203 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file); 204 /* 205 * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to 206 * what the modules might need. 207 */ 208 if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0) 209 blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head); 210 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 211 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 212 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 213 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 214 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); 215 } 216 217 /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ 218 static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 219 { 220 int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm); 221 222 /* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */ 223 set_enabled(lsm, enabled); 224 225 /* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */ 226 if (enabled) { 227 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) { 228 exclusive = lsm; 229 init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name); 230 } 231 232 lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs); 233 } 234 } 235 236 /* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */ 237 static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 238 { 239 if (is_enabled(lsm)) { 240 int ret; 241 242 init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name); 243 ret = lsm->init(); 244 WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret); 245 } 246 } 247 248 /* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */ 249 static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) 250 { 251 struct lsm_info *lsm; 252 char *sep, *name, *next; 253 254 /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */ 255 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 256 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST) 257 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " first"); 258 } 259 260 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 261 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 262 struct lsm_info *major; 263 264 /* 265 * To match the original "security=" behavior, this 266 * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major 267 * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable 268 * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs. 269 */ 270 for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info; 271 major++) { 272 if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) && 273 strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) { 274 set_enabled(major, false); 275 init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s (only one legacy major LSM)\n", 276 chosen_major_lsm, major->name); 277 } 278 } 279 } 280 281 sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL); 282 next = sep; 283 /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */ 284 while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) { 285 bool found = false; 286 287 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 288 if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) { 289 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE) 290 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin); 291 found = true; 292 } 293 } 294 295 if (!found) 296 init_debug("%s ignored: %s (not built into kernel)\n", 297 origin, name); 298 } 299 300 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 301 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 302 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 303 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 304 continue; 305 if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0) 306 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security="); 307 } 308 } 309 310 /* LSM_ORDER_LAST is always last. */ 311 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 312 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST) 313 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " last"); 314 } 315 316 /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */ 317 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 318 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 319 continue; 320 set_enabled(lsm, false); 321 init_debug("%s skipped: %s (not in requested order)\n", 322 origin, lsm->name); 323 } 324 325 kfree(sep); 326 } 327 328 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred); 329 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task); 330 331 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result); 332 333 static void __init report_lsm_order(void) 334 { 335 struct lsm_info **lsm, *early; 336 int first = 0; 337 338 pr_info("initializing lsm="); 339 340 /* Report each enabled LSM name, comma separated. */ 341 for (early = __start_early_lsm_info; 342 early < __end_early_lsm_info; early++) 343 if (is_enabled(early)) 344 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", early->name); 345 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 346 if (is_enabled(*lsm)) 347 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", (*lsm)->name); 348 349 pr_cont("\n"); 350 } 351 352 static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) 353 { 354 struct lsm_info **lsm; 355 356 ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms), 357 GFP_KERNEL); 358 359 if (chosen_lsm_order) { 360 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 361 pr_warn("security=%s is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=%s\n", 362 chosen_major_lsm, chosen_lsm_order); 363 chosen_major_lsm = NULL; 364 } 365 ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline"); 366 } else 367 ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin"); 368 369 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 370 prepare_lsm(*lsm); 371 372 report_lsm_order(); 373 374 init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 375 init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file); 376 init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 377 init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 378 init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 379 init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 380 init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); 381 382 /* 383 * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs 384 */ 385 if (blob_sizes.lbs_file) 386 lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache", 387 blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0, 388 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 389 if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode) 390 lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache", 391 blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0, 392 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 393 394 lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred); 395 lsm_early_task(current); 396 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 397 initialize_lsm(*lsm); 398 399 kfree(ordered_lsms); 400 } 401 402 int __init early_security_init(void) 403 { 404 struct lsm_info *lsm; 405 406 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 407 INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&security_hook_heads.NAME); 408 #include "linux/lsm_hook_defs.h" 409 #undef LSM_HOOK 410 411 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 412 if (!lsm->enabled) 413 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 414 prepare_lsm(lsm); 415 initialize_lsm(lsm); 416 } 417 418 return 0; 419 } 420 421 /** 422 * security_init - initializes the security framework 423 * 424 * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence. 425 */ 426 int __init security_init(void) 427 { 428 struct lsm_info *lsm; 429 430 init_debug("legacy security=%s\n", chosen_major_lsm ? : " *unspecified*"); 431 init_debug(" CONFIG_LSM=%s\n", builtin_lsm_order); 432 init_debug("boot arg lsm=%s\n", chosen_lsm_order ? : " *unspecified*"); 433 434 /* 435 * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is 436 * available 437 */ 438 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 439 init_debug(" early started: %s (%s)\n", lsm->name, 440 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 441 if (lsm->enabled) 442 lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names); 443 } 444 445 /* Load LSMs in specified order. */ 446 ordered_lsm_init(); 447 448 return 0; 449 } 450 451 /* Save user chosen LSM */ 452 static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str) 453 { 454 chosen_major_lsm = str; 455 return 1; 456 } 457 __setup("security=", choose_major_lsm); 458 459 /* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */ 460 static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str) 461 { 462 chosen_lsm_order = str; 463 return 1; 464 } 465 __setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order); 466 467 /* Enable LSM order debugging. */ 468 static int __init enable_debug(char *str) 469 { 470 debug = true; 471 return 1; 472 } 473 __setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug); 474 475 static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm) 476 { 477 const char *last; 478 479 if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm)) 480 return false; 481 last = strrchr(list, ','); 482 if (last) 483 /* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */ 484 last++; 485 else 486 last = list; 487 return !strcmp(last, lsm); 488 } 489 490 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) 491 { 492 char *cp; 493 494 if (*result == NULL) { 495 *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL); 496 if (*result == NULL) 497 return -ENOMEM; 498 } else { 499 /* Check if it is the last registered name */ 500 if (match_last_lsm(*result, new)) 501 return 0; 502 cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new); 503 if (cp == NULL) 504 return -ENOMEM; 505 kfree(*result); 506 *result = cp; 507 } 508 return 0; 509 } 510 511 /** 512 * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. 513 * @hooks: the hooks to add 514 * @count: the number of hooks to add 515 * @lsm: the name of the security module 516 * 517 * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. 518 */ 519 void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, 520 const char *lsm) 521 { 522 int i; 523 524 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { 525 hooks[i].lsm = lsm; 526 hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); 527 } 528 529 /* 530 * Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back 531 * and fix this up afterwards. 532 */ 533 if (slab_is_available()) { 534 if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0) 535 panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__); 536 } 537 } 538 539 int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) 540 { 541 return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 542 event, data); 543 } 544 EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier); 545 546 int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 547 { 548 return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 549 nb); 550 } 551 EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier); 552 553 int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 554 { 555 return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 556 nb); 557 } 558 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier); 559 560 /** 561 * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob 562 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 563 * @gfp: allocation type 564 * 565 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 566 * 567 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 568 */ 569 static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 570 { 571 if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) { 572 cred->security = NULL; 573 return 0; 574 } 575 576 cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp); 577 if (cred->security == NULL) 578 return -ENOMEM; 579 return 0; 580 } 581 582 /** 583 * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob 584 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 585 * 586 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 587 */ 588 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred) 589 { 590 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL); 591 592 if (rc) 593 panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__); 594 } 595 596 /** 597 * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob 598 * @file: the file that needs a blob 599 * 600 * Allocate the file blob for all the modules 601 * 602 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 603 */ 604 static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file) 605 { 606 if (!lsm_file_cache) { 607 file->f_security = NULL; 608 return 0; 609 } 610 611 file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL); 612 if (file->f_security == NULL) 613 return -ENOMEM; 614 return 0; 615 } 616 617 /** 618 * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob 619 * @inode: the inode that needs a blob 620 * 621 * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules 622 * 623 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 624 */ 625 int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 626 { 627 if (!lsm_inode_cache) { 628 inode->i_security = NULL; 629 return 0; 630 } 631 632 inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); 633 if (inode->i_security == NULL) 634 return -ENOMEM; 635 return 0; 636 } 637 638 /** 639 * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob 640 * @task: the task that needs a blob 641 * 642 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 643 * 644 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 645 */ 646 static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) 647 { 648 if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) { 649 task->security = NULL; 650 return 0; 651 } 652 653 task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL); 654 if (task->security == NULL) 655 return -ENOMEM; 656 return 0; 657 } 658 659 /** 660 * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob 661 * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob 662 * 663 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 664 * 665 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 666 */ 667 static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip) 668 { 669 if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) { 670 kip->security = NULL; 671 return 0; 672 } 673 674 kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL); 675 if (kip->security == NULL) 676 return -ENOMEM; 677 return 0; 678 } 679 680 /** 681 * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob 682 * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob 683 * 684 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 685 * 686 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 687 */ 688 static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp) 689 { 690 if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) { 691 mp->security = NULL; 692 return 0; 693 } 694 695 mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL); 696 if (mp->security == NULL) 697 return -ENOMEM; 698 return 0; 699 } 700 701 /** 702 * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob 703 * @task: the task that needs a blob 704 * 705 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 706 */ 707 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) 708 { 709 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 710 711 if (rc) 712 panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__); 713 } 714 715 /** 716 * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob 717 * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob 718 * 719 * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules 720 * 721 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 722 */ 723 static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 724 { 725 if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) { 726 sb->s_security = NULL; 727 return 0; 728 } 729 730 sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL); 731 if (sb->s_security == NULL) 732 return -ENOMEM; 733 return 0; 734 } 735 736 /* 737 * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and 738 * can be accessed with: 739 * 740 * LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) 741 * 742 * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each 743 * LSM hook. 744 */ 745 #define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default) 746 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME) 747 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \ 748 static const int __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT); 749 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 750 DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME) 751 752 #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h> 753 #undef LSM_HOOK 754 755 /* 756 * Hook list operation macros. 757 * 758 * call_void_hook: 759 * This is a hook that does not return a value. 760 * 761 * call_int_hook: 762 * This is a hook that returns a value. 763 */ 764 765 #define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \ 766 do { \ 767 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 768 \ 769 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \ 770 P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 771 } while (0) 772 773 #define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \ 774 int RC = IRC; \ 775 do { \ 776 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 777 \ 778 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ 779 RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 780 if (RC != 0) \ 781 break; \ 782 } \ 783 } while (0); \ 784 RC; \ 785 }) 786 787 /* Security operations */ 788 789 /** 790 * security_binder_set_context_mgr() - Check if becoming binder ctx mgr is ok 791 * @mgr: task credentials of current binder process 792 * 793 * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager. 794 * 795 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 796 */ 797 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr) 798 { 799 return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr); 800 } 801 802 /** 803 * security_binder_transaction() - Check if a binder transaction is allowed 804 * @from: sending process 805 * @to: receiving process 806 * 807 * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call to @to. 808 * 809 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 810 */ 811 int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from, 812 const struct cred *to) 813 { 814 return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to); 815 } 816 817 /** 818 * security_binder_transfer_binder() - Check if a binder transfer is allowed 819 * @from: sending process 820 * @to: receiving process 821 * 822 * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to. 823 * 824 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 825 */ 826 int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, 827 const struct cred *to) 828 { 829 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to); 830 } 831 832 /** 833 * security_binder_transfer_file() - Check if a binder file xfer is allowed 834 * @from: sending process 835 * @to: receiving process 836 * @file: file being transferred 837 * 838 * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to. 839 * 840 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 841 */ 842 int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, 843 const struct cred *to, struct file *file) 844 { 845 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file); 846 } 847 848 /** 849 * security_ptrace_access_check() - Check if tracing is allowed 850 * @child: target process 851 * @mode: PTRACE_MODE flags 852 * 853 * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the @child 854 * process. Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check 855 * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of tracing check 856 * during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of binprm_security_ops if the 857 * process is being traced and its security attributes would be changed by the 858 * execve. 859 * 860 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 861 */ 862 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) 863 { 864 return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode); 865 } 866 867 /** 868 * security_ptrace_traceme() - Check if tracing is allowed 869 * @parent: tracing process 870 * 871 * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the 872 * current process before allowing the current process to present itself to the 873 * @parent process for tracing. 874 * 875 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 876 */ 877 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) 878 { 879 return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent); 880 } 881 882 /** 883 * security_capget() - Get the capability sets for a process 884 * @target: target process 885 * @effective: effective capability set 886 * @inheritable: inheritable capability set 887 * @permitted: permitted capability set 888 * 889 * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the 890 * @target process. The hook may also perform permission checking to determine 891 * if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets of the @target 892 * process. 893 * 894 * Return: Returns 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained. 895 */ 896 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, 897 kernel_cap_t *effective, 898 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 899 kernel_cap_t *permitted) 900 { 901 return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target, 902 effective, inheritable, permitted); 903 } 904 905 /** 906 * security_capset() - Set the capability sets for a process 907 * @new: new credentials for the target process 908 * @old: current credentials of the target process 909 * @effective: effective capability set 910 * @inheritable: inheritable capability set 911 * @permitted: permitted capability set 912 * 913 * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the 914 * current process. 915 * 916 * Return: Returns 0 and update @new if permission is granted. 917 */ 918 int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 919 const kernel_cap_t *effective, 920 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 921 const kernel_cap_t *permitted) 922 { 923 return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old, 924 effective, inheritable, permitted); 925 } 926 927 /** 928 * security_capable() - Check if a process has the necessary capability 929 * @cred: credentials to examine 930 * @ns: user namespace 931 * @cap: capability requested 932 * @opts: capability check options 933 * 934 * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated 935 * credentials. @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. 936 * @opts contains options for the capable check <include/linux/security.h>. 937 * 938 * Return: Returns 0 if the capability is granted. 939 */ 940 int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, 941 struct user_namespace *ns, 942 int cap, 943 unsigned int opts) 944 { 945 return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); 946 } 947 948 /** 949 * security_quotactl() - Check if a quotactl() syscall is allowed for this fs 950 * @cmds: commands 951 * @type: type 952 * @id: id 953 * @sb: filesystem 954 * 955 * Check whether the quotactl syscall is allowed for this @sb. 956 * 957 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 958 */ 959 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) 960 { 961 return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb); 962 } 963 964 /** 965 * security_quota_on() - Check if QUOTAON is allowed for a dentry 966 * @dentry: dentry 967 * 968 * Check whether QUOTAON is allowed for @dentry. 969 * 970 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 971 */ 972 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) 973 { 974 return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry); 975 } 976 977 /** 978 * security_syslog() - Check if accessing the kernel message ring is allowed 979 * @type: SYSLOG_ACTION_* type 980 * 981 * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing 982 * logging to the console. See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of 983 * the @type values. 984 * 985 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 986 */ 987 int security_syslog(int type) 988 { 989 return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type); 990 } 991 992 /** 993 * security_settime64() - Check if changing the system time is allowed 994 * @ts: new time 995 * @tz: timezone 996 * 997 * Check permission to change the system time, struct timespec64 is defined in 998 * <include/linux/time64.h> and timezone is defined in <include/linux/time.h>. 999 * 1000 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1001 */ 1002 int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz) 1003 { 1004 return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz); 1005 } 1006 1007 /** 1008 * security_vm_enough_memory_mm() - Check if allocating a new mem map is allowed 1009 * @mm: mm struct 1010 * @pages: number of pages 1011 * 1012 * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping. If all LSMs return 1013 * a positive value, __vm_enough_memory() will be called with cap_sys_admin 1014 * set. If at least one LSM returns 0 or negative, __vm_enough_memory() will be 1015 * called with cap_sys_admin cleared. 1016 * 1017 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted by the LSM infrastructure to the 1018 * caller. 1019 */ 1020 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) 1021 { 1022 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1023 int cap_sys_admin = 1; 1024 int rc; 1025 1026 /* 1027 * The module will respond with a positive value if 1028 * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be 1029 * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules 1030 * agree that it should be set it will. If any module 1031 * thinks it should not be set it won't. 1032 */ 1033 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) { 1034 rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); 1035 if (rc <= 0) { 1036 cap_sys_admin = 0; 1037 break; 1038 } 1039 } 1040 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); 1041 } 1042 1043 /** 1044 * security_bprm_creds_for_exec() - Prepare the credentials for exec() 1045 * @bprm: binary program information 1046 * 1047 * If the setup in prepare_exec_creds did not setup @bprm->cred->security 1048 * properly for executing @bprm->file, update the LSM's portion of 1049 * @bprm->cred->security to be what commit_creds needs to install for the new 1050 * program. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 1051 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 1052 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. @bprm 1053 * contains the linux_binprm structure. 1054 * 1055 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1056 */ 1057 int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1058 { 1059 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm); 1060 } 1061 1062 /** 1063 * security_bprm_creds_from_file() - Update linux_binprm creds based on file 1064 * @bprm: binary program information 1065 * @file: associated file 1066 * 1067 * If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change privilege upon 1068 * exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change. This is called after 1069 * finding the binary that will be executed without an interpreter. This 1070 * ensures that the credentials will not be derived from a script that the 1071 * binary will need to reopen, which when reopend may end up being a completely 1072 * different file. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 1073 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 1074 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. The 1075 * hook must add to @bprm->per_clear any personality flags that should be 1076 * cleared from current->personality. @bprm contains the linux_binprm 1077 * structure. 1078 * 1079 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1080 */ 1081 int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) 1082 { 1083 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file); 1084 } 1085 1086 /** 1087 * security_bprm_check() - Mediate binary handler search 1088 * @bprm: binary program information 1089 * 1090 * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will begin. 1091 * It allows a check against the @bprm->cred->security value which was set in 1092 * the preceding creds_for_exec call. The argv list and envp list are reliably 1093 * available in @bprm. This hook may be called multiple times during a single 1094 * execve. @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. 1095 * 1096 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1097 */ 1098 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1099 { 1100 int ret; 1101 1102 ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); 1103 if (ret) 1104 return ret; 1105 return ima_bprm_check(bprm); 1106 } 1107 1108 /** 1109 * security_bprm_committing_creds() - Install creds for a process during exec() 1110 * @bprm: binary program information 1111 * 1112 * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being 1113 * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials pointed to 1114 * by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by the 1115 * bprm_creds_for_exec hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure. This 1116 * hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such as closing 1117 * open file descriptors to which access will no longer be granted when the 1118 * attributes are changed. This is called immediately before commit_creds(). 1119 */ 1120 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1121 { 1122 call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm); 1123 } 1124 1125 /** 1126 * security_bprm_committed_creds() - Tidy up after cred install during exec() 1127 * @bprm: binary program information 1128 * 1129 * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a process 1130 * being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials have, by this 1131 * point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the linux_binprm 1132 * structure. This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the 1133 * process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal state. This is called 1134 * immediately after commit_creds(). 1135 */ 1136 void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1137 { 1138 call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm); 1139 } 1140 1141 /** 1142 * security_fs_context_dup() - Duplicate a fs_context LSM blob 1143 * @fc: destination filesystem context 1144 * @src_fc: source filesystem context 1145 * 1146 * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer is 1147 * initialised to NULL by the caller. @fc indicates the new filesystem context. 1148 * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context. 1149 * 1150 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure. 1151 */ 1152 int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) 1153 { 1154 return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc); 1155 } 1156 1157 /** 1158 * security_fs_context_parse_param() - Configure a filesystem context 1159 * @fc: filesystem context 1160 * @param: filesystem parameter 1161 * 1162 * Userspace provided a parameter to configure a superblock. The LSM can 1163 * consume the parameter or return it to the caller for use elsewhere. 1164 * 1165 * Return: If the parameter is used by the LSM it should return 0, if it is 1166 * returned to the caller -ENOPARAM is returned, otherwise a negative 1167 * error code is returned. 1168 */ 1169 int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, 1170 struct fs_parameter *param) 1171 { 1172 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1173 int trc; 1174 int rc = -ENOPARAM; 1175 1176 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.fs_context_parse_param, 1177 list) { 1178 trc = hp->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param); 1179 if (trc == 0) 1180 rc = 0; 1181 else if (trc != -ENOPARAM) 1182 return trc; 1183 } 1184 return rc; 1185 } 1186 1187 /** 1188 * security_sb_alloc() - Allocate a super_block LSM blob 1189 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1190 * 1191 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field. The 1192 * s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is allocated. 1193 * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. 1194 * 1195 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. 1196 */ 1197 int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 1198 { 1199 int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb); 1200 1201 if (unlikely(rc)) 1202 return rc; 1203 rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb); 1204 if (unlikely(rc)) 1205 security_sb_free(sb); 1206 return rc; 1207 } 1208 1209 /** 1210 * security_sb_delete() - Release super_block LSM associated objects 1211 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1212 * 1213 * Release objects tied to a superblock (e.g. inodes). @sb contains the 1214 * super_block structure being released. 1215 */ 1216 void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb) 1217 { 1218 call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb); 1219 } 1220 1221 /** 1222 * security_sb_free() - Free a super_block LSM blob 1223 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1224 * 1225 * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field. @sb contains the super_block 1226 * structure to be modified. 1227 */ 1228 void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) 1229 { 1230 call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb); 1231 kfree(sb->s_security); 1232 sb->s_security = NULL; 1233 } 1234 1235 /** 1236 * security_free_mnt_opts() - Free memory associated with mount options 1237 * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options 1238 * 1239 * Free memory associated with @mnt_ops. 1240 */ 1241 void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts) 1242 { 1243 if (!*mnt_opts) 1244 return; 1245 call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts); 1246 *mnt_opts = NULL; 1247 } 1248 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts); 1249 1250 /** 1251 * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() - Consume LSM mount options 1252 * @options: mount options 1253 * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options 1254 * 1255 * Eat (scan @options) and save them in @mnt_opts. 1256 * 1257 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1258 */ 1259 int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) 1260 { 1261 return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts); 1262 } 1263 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts); 1264 1265 /** 1266 * security_sb_mnt_opts_compat() - Check if new mount options are allowed 1267 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1268 * @mnt_opts: new mount options 1269 * 1270 * Determine if the new mount options in @mnt_opts are allowed given the 1271 * existing mounted filesystem at @sb. @sb superblock being compared. 1272 * 1273 * Return: Returns 0 if options are compatible. 1274 */ 1275 int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, 1276 void *mnt_opts) 1277 { 1278 return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1279 } 1280 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat); 1281 1282 /** 1283 * security_sb_remount() - Verify no incompatible mount changes during remount 1284 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1285 * @mnt_opts: (re)mount options 1286 * 1287 * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes are 1288 * being made to those options. 1289 * 1290 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1291 */ 1292 int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, 1293 void *mnt_opts) 1294 { 1295 return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1296 } 1297 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount); 1298 1299 /** 1300 * security_sb_kern_mount() - Check if a kernel mount is allowed 1301 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1302 * 1303 * Mount this @sb if allowed by permissions. 1304 * 1305 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1306 */ 1307 int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb) 1308 { 1309 return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb); 1310 } 1311 1312 /** 1313 * security_sb_show_options() - Output the mount options for a superblock 1314 * @m: output file 1315 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1316 * 1317 * Show (print on @m) mount options for this @sb. 1318 * 1319 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1320 */ 1321 int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) 1322 { 1323 return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb); 1324 } 1325 1326 /** 1327 * security_sb_statfs() - Check if accessing fs stats is allowed 1328 * @dentry: superblock handle 1329 * 1330 * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt 1331 * mountpoint. @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem. 1332 * 1333 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1334 */ 1335 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) 1336 { 1337 return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry); 1338 } 1339 1340 /** 1341 * security_sb_mount() - Check permission for mounting a filesystem 1342 * @dev_name: filesystem backing device 1343 * @path: mount point 1344 * @type: filesystem type 1345 * @flags: mount flags 1346 * @data: filesystem specific data 1347 * 1348 * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on the 1349 * mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name identifies a 1350 * device if the file system type requires a device. For a remount 1351 * (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a loopback/bind mount 1352 * (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the pathname of the object being 1353 * mounted. 1354 * 1355 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1356 */ 1357 int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, 1358 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) 1359 { 1360 return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data); 1361 } 1362 1363 /** 1364 * security_sb_umount() - Check permission for unmounting a filesystem 1365 * @mnt: mounted filesystem 1366 * @flags: unmount flags 1367 * 1368 * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted. 1369 * 1370 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1371 */ 1372 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) 1373 { 1374 return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags); 1375 } 1376 1377 /** 1378 * security_sb_pivotroot() - Check permissions for pivoting the rootfs 1379 * @old_path: new location for current rootfs 1380 * @new_path: location of the new rootfs 1381 * 1382 * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem. 1383 * 1384 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1385 */ 1386 int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, 1387 const struct path *new_path) 1388 { 1389 return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path); 1390 } 1391 1392 /** 1393 * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() - Set the mount options for a filesystem 1394 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1395 * @mnt_opts: binary mount options 1396 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1397 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1398 * 1399 * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock. 1400 * 1401 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1402 */ 1403 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, 1404 void *mnt_opts, 1405 unsigned long kern_flags, 1406 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1407 { 1408 return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts, 1409 mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb, 1410 mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1411 } 1412 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts); 1413 1414 /** 1415 * security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() - Duplicate superblock mount options 1416 * @oldsb: source superblock 1417 * @newsb: destination superblock 1418 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1419 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1420 * 1421 * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another. 1422 * 1423 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1424 */ 1425 int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, 1426 struct super_block *newsb, 1427 unsigned long kern_flags, 1428 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1429 { 1430 return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb, 1431 kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1432 } 1433 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts); 1434 1435 /** 1436 * security_move_mount() - Check permissions for moving a mount 1437 * @from_path: source mount point 1438 * @to_path: destination mount point 1439 * 1440 * Check permission before a mount is moved. 1441 * 1442 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1443 */ 1444 int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, 1445 const struct path *to_path) 1446 { 1447 return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path); 1448 } 1449 1450 /** 1451 * security_path_notify() - Check if setting a watch is allowed 1452 * @path: file path 1453 * @mask: event mask 1454 * @obj_type: file path type 1455 * 1456 * Check permissions before setting a watch on events as defined by @mask, on 1457 * an object at @path, whose type is defined by @obj_type. 1458 * 1459 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1460 */ 1461 int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, 1462 unsigned int obj_type) 1463 { 1464 return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type); 1465 } 1466 1467 /** 1468 * security_inode_alloc() - Allocate an inode LSM blob 1469 * @inode: the inode 1470 * 1471 * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The 1472 * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is 1473 * allocated. 1474 * 1475 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 1476 */ 1477 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 1478 { 1479 int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode); 1480 1481 if (unlikely(rc)) 1482 return rc; 1483 rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode); 1484 if (unlikely(rc)) 1485 security_inode_free(inode); 1486 return rc; 1487 } 1488 1489 static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) 1490 { 1491 /* 1492 * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob 1493 */ 1494 kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head); 1495 } 1496 1497 /** 1498 * security_inode_free() - Free an inode's LSM blob 1499 * @inode: the inode 1500 * 1501 * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to NULL. 1502 */ 1503 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) 1504 { 1505 integrity_inode_free(inode); 1506 call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode); 1507 /* 1508 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and 1509 * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made 1510 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS 1511 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder 1512 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and 1513 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact. 1514 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too. 1515 */ 1516 if (inode->i_security) 1517 call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security, 1518 inode_free_by_rcu); 1519 } 1520 1521 /** 1522 * security_dentry_init_security() - Perform dentry initialization 1523 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1524 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1525 * @name: name of the last path component 1526 * @xattr_name: name of the security/LSM xattr 1527 * @ctx: pointer to the resulting LSM context 1528 * @ctxlen: length of @ctx 1529 * 1530 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available since NFSv4 1531 * has no label backed by an EA anyway. It is important to note that 1532 * @xattr_name does not need to be free'd by the caller, it is a static string. 1533 * 1534 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1535 */ 1536 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1537 const struct qstr *name, 1538 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx, 1539 u32 *ctxlen) 1540 { 1541 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1542 int rc; 1543 1544 /* 1545 * Only one module will provide a security context. 1546 */ 1547 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security, 1548 list) { 1549 rc = hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name, 1550 xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen); 1551 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security)) 1552 return rc; 1553 } 1554 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security); 1555 } 1556 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security); 1557 1558 /** 1559 * security_dentry_create_files_as() - Perform dentry initialization 1560 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1561 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1562 * @name: name of the last path component 1563 * @old: creds to use for LSM context calculations 1564 * @new: creds to modify 1565 * 1566 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available and set 1567 * that context in passed in creds so that new files are created using that 1568 * context. Context is calculated using the passed in creds and not the creds 1569 * of the caller. 1570 * 1571 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1572 */ 1573 int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1574 struct qstr *name, 1575 const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) 1576 { 1577 return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode, 1578 name, old, new); 1579 } 1580 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as); 1581 1582 /** 1583 * security_inode_init_security() - Initialize an inode's LSM context 1584 * @inode: the inode 1585 * @dir: parent directory 1586 * @qstr: last component of the pathname 1587 * @initxattrs: callback function to write xattrs 1588 * @fs_data: filesystem specific data 1589 * 1590 * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly 1591 * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode. This 1592 * hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation transaction and 1593 * provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike the post_create/mkdir/... 1594 * hooks called by the VFS. The hook function is expected to allocate the name 1595 * and value via kmalloc, with the caller being responsible for calling kfree 1596 * after using them. If the security module does not use security attributes 1597 * or does not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode, then 1598 * it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. 1599 * 1600 * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is 1601 * needed, or -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure. 1602 */ 1603 int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1604 const struct qstr *qstr, 1605 const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) 1606 { 1607 struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1]; 1608 struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr; 1609 int ret; 1610 1611 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1612 return 0; 1613 1614 if (!initxattrs) 1615 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, 1616 dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL); 1617 memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs)); 1618 lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; 1619 ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, 1620 &lsm_xattr->name, 1621 &lsm_xattr->value, 1622 &lsm_xattr->value_len); 1623 if (ret) 1624 goto out; 1625 1626 evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1; 1627 ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr); 1628 if (ret) 1629 goto out; 1630 ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); 1631 out: 1632 for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) 1633 kfree(xattr->value); 1634 return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret; 1635 } 1636 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); 1637 1638 /** 1639 * security_inode_init_security_anon() - Initialize an anonymous inode 1640 * @inode: the inode 1641 * @name: the anonymous inode class 1642 * @context_inode: an optional related inode 1643 * 1644 * Set up the incore security field for the new anonymous inode and return 1645 * whether the inode creation is permitted by the security module or not. 1646 * 1647 * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EACCES if the security module denies the 1648 * creation of this inode, or another -errno upon other errors. 1649 */ 1650 int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, 1651 const struct qstr *name, 1652 const struct inode *context_inode) 1653 { 1654 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, name, 1655 context_inode); 1656 } 1657 1658 int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1659 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, 1660 void **value, size_t *len) 1661 { 1662 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1663 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 1664 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, 1665 qstr, name, value, len); 1666 } 1667 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security); 1668 1669 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH 1670 /** 1671 * security_path_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 1672 * @dir: parent directory 1673 * @dentry: new file 1674 * @mode: new file mode 1675 * @dev: device number 1676 * 1677 * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called even 1678 * if mknod operation is being done for a regular file. 1679 * 1680 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1681 */ 1682 int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1683 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) 1684 { 1685 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1686 return 0; 1687 return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1688 } 1689 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod); 1690 1691 /** 1692 * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed 1693 * @dir: parent directory 1694 * @dentry: new directory 1695 * @mode: new directory mode 1696 * 1697 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory. 1698 * 1699 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1700 */ 1701 int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1702 umode_t mode) 1703 { 1704 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1705 return 0; 1706 return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1707 } 1708 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir); 1709 1710 /** 1711 * security_path_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 1712 * @dir: parent directory 1713 * @dentry: directory to remove 1714 * 1715 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 1716 * 1717 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1718 */ 1719 int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1720 { 1721 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1722 return 0; 1723 return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1724 } 1725 1726 /** 1727 * security_path_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 1728 * @dir: parent directory 1729 * @dentry: file 1730 * 1731 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 1732 * 1733 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1734 */ 1735 int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1736 { 1737 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1738 return 0; 1739 return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1740 } 1741 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink); 1742 1743 /** 1744 * security_path_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 1745 * @dir: parent directory 1746 * @dentry: symbolic link 1747 * @old_name: file pathname 1748 * 1749 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 1750 * 1751 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1752 */ 1753 int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1754 const char *old_name) 1755 { 1756 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1757 return 0; 1758 return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1759 } 1760 1761 /** 1762 * security_path_link - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 1763 * @old_dentry: existing file 1764 * @new_dir: new parent directory 1765 * @new_dentry: new link 1766 * 1767 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 1768 * 1769 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1770 */ 1771 int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, 1772 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1773 { 1774 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1775 return 0; 1776 return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); 1777 } 1778 1779 /** 1780 * security_path_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 1781 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 1782 * @old_dentry: the old file 1783 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 1784 * @new_dentry: the new file 1785 * @flags: flags 1786 * 1787 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 1788 * 1789 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1790 */ 1791 int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 1792 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 1793 unsigned int flags) 1794 { 1795 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 1796 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && 1797 IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 1798 return 0; 1799 1800 return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, 1801 new_dentry, flags); 1802 } 1803 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename); 1804 1805 /** 1806 * security_path_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 1807 * @path: file 1808 * 1809 * Check permission before truncating the file indicated by path. Note that 1810 * truncation permissions may also be checked based on already opened files, 1811 * using the security_file_truncate() hook. 1812 * 1813 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1814 */ 1815 int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path) 1816 { 1817 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1818 return 0; 1819 return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path); 1820 } 1821 1822 /** 1823 * security_path_chmod() - Check if changing the file's mode is allowed 1824 * @path: file 1825 * @mode: new mode 1826 * 1827 * Check for permission to change a mode of the file @path. The new mode is 1828 * specified in @mode which is a bitmask of constants from 1829 * <include/uapi/linux/stat.h>. 1830 * 1831 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1832 */ 1833 int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) 1834 { 1835 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1836 return 0; 1837 return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode); 1838 } 1839 1840 /** 1841 * security_path_chown() - Check if changing the file's owner/group is allowed 1842 * @path: file 1843 * @uid: file owner 1844 * @gid: file group 1845 * 1846 * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory. 1847 * 1848 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1849 */ 1850 int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) 1851 { 1852 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1853 return 0; 1854 return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid); 1855 } 1856 1857 /** 1858 * security_path_chroot() - Check if changing the root directory is allowed 1859 * @path: directory 1860 * 1861 * Check for permission to change root directory. 1862 * 1863 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1864 */ 1865 int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path) 1866 { 1867 return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path); 1868 } 1869 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */ 1870 1871 /** 1872 * security_inode_create() - Check if creating a file is allowed 1873 * @dir: the parent directory 1874 * @dentry: the file being created 1875 * @mode: requested file mode 1876 * 1877 * Check permission to create a regular file. 1878 * 1879 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1880 */ 1881 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1882 umode_t mode) 1883 { 1884 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1885 return 0; 1886 return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1887 } 1888 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create); 1889 1890 /** 1891 * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 1892 * @old_dentry: existing file 1893 * @dir: new parent directory 1894 * @new_dentry: new link 1895 * 1896 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 1897 * 1898 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1899 */ 1900 int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, 1901 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1902 { 1903 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1904 return 0; 1905 return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); 1906 } 1907 1908 /** 1909 * security_inode_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 1910 * @dir: parent directory 1911 * @dentry: file 1912 * 1913 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 1914 * 1915 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1916 */ 1917 int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1918 { 1919 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1920 return 0; 1921 return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1922 } 1923 1924 /** 1925 * security_inode_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 1926 * @dir: parent directory 1927 * @dentry: symbolic link 1928 * @old_name: existing filename 1929 * 1930 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 1931 * 1932 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1933 */ 1934 int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1935 const char *old_name) 1936 { 1937 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1938 return 0; 1939 return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1940 } 1941 1942 /** 1943 * security_inode_mkdir() - Check if creation a new director is allowed 1944 * @dir: parent directory 1945 * @dentry: new directory 1946 * @mode: new directory mode 1947 * 1948 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory 1949 * associated with inode structure @dir. 1950 * 1951 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1952 */ 1953 int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1954 { 1955 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1956 return 0; 1957 return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1958 } 1959 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir); 1960 1961 /** 1962 * security_inode_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 1963 * @dir: parent directory 1964 * @dentry: directory to be removed 1965 * 1966 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 1967 * 1968 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1969 */ 1970 int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1971 { 1972 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1973 return 0; 1974 return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1975 } 1976 1977 /** 1978 * security_inode_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 1979 * @dir: parent directory 1980 * @dentry: new file 1981 * @mode: new file mode 1982 * @dev: device number 1983 * 1984 * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo file 1985 * created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation is being 1986 * done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called and not this 1987 * hook. 1988 * 1989 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1990 */ 1991 int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1992 umode_t mode, dev_t dev) 1993 { 1994 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1995 return 0; 1996 return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1997 } 1998 1999 /** 2000 * security_inode_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 2001 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 2002 * @old_dentry: the old file 2003 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 2004 * @new_dentry: the new file 2005 * @flags: flags 2006 * 2007 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 2008 * 2009 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2010 */ 2011 int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 2012 struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 2013 unsigned int flags) 2014 { 2015 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 2016 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && 2017 IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 2018 return 0; 2019 2020 if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { 2021 int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry, 2022 old_dir, old_dentry); 2023 if (err) 2024 return err; 2025 } 2026 2027 return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, 2028 new_dir, new_dentry); 2029 } 2030 2031 /** 2032 * security_inode_readlink() - Check if reading a symbolic link is allowed 2033 * @dentry: link 2034 * 2035 * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. 2036 * 2037 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2038 */ 2039 int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) 2040 { 2041 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2042 return 0; 2043 return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry); 2044 } 2045 2046 /** 2047 * security_inode_follow_link() - Check if following a symbolic link is allowed 2048 * @dentry: link dentry 2049 * @inode: link inode 2050 * @rcu: true if in RCU-walk mode 2051 * 2052 * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname. If 2053 * @rcu is true, @inode is not stable. 2054 * 2055 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2056 */ 2057 int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, 2058 bool rcu) 2059 { 2060 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2061 return 0; 2062 return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu); 2063 } 2064 2065 /** 2066 * security_inode_permission() - Check if accessing an inode is allowed 2067 * @inode: inode 2068 * @mask: access mask 2069 * 2070 * Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the 2071 * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to 2072 * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks. Notice 2073 * that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many other 2074 * operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is called when 2075 * the actual read/write operations are performed. 2076 * 2077 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2078 */ 2079 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) 2080 { 2081 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2082 return 0; 2083 return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask); 2084 } 2085 2086 /** 2087 * security_inode_setattr() - Check if setting file attributes is allowed 2088 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2089 * @dentry: file 2090 * @attr: new attributes 2091 * 2092 * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel call 2093 * to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever file 2094 * attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod operations, 2095 * transferring disk quotas, etc). 2096 * 2097 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2098 */ 2099 int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2100 struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 2101 { 2102 int ret; 2103 2104 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2105 return 0; 2106 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr); 2107 if (ret) 2108 return ret; 2109 return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); 2110 } 2111 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); 2112 2113 /** 2114 * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed 2115 * @path: file 2116 * 2117 * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. 2118 * 2119 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2120 */ 2121 int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) 2122 { 2123 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 2124 return 0; 2125 return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path); 2126 } 2127 2128 /** 2129 * security_inode_setxattr() - Check if setting file xattrs is allowed 2130 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2131 * @dentry: file 2132 * @name: xattr name 2133 * @value: xattr value 2134 * @size: size of xattr value 2135 * @flags: flags 2136 * 2137 * Check permission before setting the extended attributes. 2138 * 2139 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2140 */ 2141 int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2142 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 2143 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2144 { 2145 int ret; 2146 2147 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2148 return 0; 2149 /* 2150 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 2151 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 2152 */ 2153 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name, value, 2154 size, flags); 2155 2156 if (ret == 1) 2157 ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); 2158 if (ret) 2159 return ret; 2160 ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 2161 if (ret) 2162 return ret; 2163 return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size); 2164 } 2165 2166 /** 2167 * security_inode_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed 2168 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2169 * @dentry: file 2170 * @acl_name: acl name 2171 * @kacl: acl struct 2172 * 2173 * Check permission before setting posix acls, the posix acls in @kacl are 2174 * identified by @acl_name. 2175 * 2176 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2177 */ 2178 int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2179 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, 2180 struct posix_acl *kacl) 2181 { 2182 int ret; 2183 2184 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2185 return 0; 2186 ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, 2187 kacl); 2188 if (ret) 2189 return ret; 2190 ret = ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2191 if (ret) 2192 return ret; 2193 return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2194 } 2195 2196 /** 2197 * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed 2198 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2199 * @dentry: file 2200 * @acl_name: acl name 2201 * 2202 * Check permission before getting osix acls, the posix acls are identified by 2203 * @acl_name. 2204 * 2205 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2206 */ 2207 int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2208 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2209 { 2210 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2211 return 0; 2212 return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2213 } 2214 2215 /** 2216 * security_inode_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed 2217 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2218 * @dentry: file 2219 * @acl_name: acl name 2220 * 2221 * Check permission before removing posix acls, the posix acls are identified 2222 * by @acl_name. 2223 * 2224 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2225 */ 2226 int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2227 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2228 { 2229 int ret; 2230 2231 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2232 return 0; 2233 ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2234 if (ret) 2235 return ret; 2236 ret = ima_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2237 if (ret) 2238 return ret; 2239 return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2240 } 2241 2242 /** 2243 * security_inode_post_setxattr() - Update the inode after a setxattr operation 2244 * @dentry: file 2245 * @name: xattr name 2246 * @value: xattr value 2247 * @size: xattr value size 2248 * @flags: flags 2249 * 2250 * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation. 2251 */ 2252 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 2253 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2254 { 2255 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2256 return; 2257 call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); 2258 evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 2259 } 2260 2261 /** 2262 * security_inode_getxattr() - Check if xattr access is allowed 2263 * @dentry: file 2264 * @name: xattr name 2265 * 2266 * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes identified by 2267 * @name for @dentry. 2268 * 2269 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2270 */ 2271 int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2272 { 2273 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2274 return 0; 2275 return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name); 2276 } 2277 2278 /** 2279 * security_inode_listxattr() - Check if listing xattrs is allowed 2280 * @dentry: file 2281 * 2282 * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute names for 2283 * @dentry. 2284 * 2285 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2286 */ 2287 int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) 2288 { 2289 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2290 return 0; 2291 return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry); 2292 } 2293 2294 /** 2295 * security_inode_removexattr() - Check if removing an xattr is allowed 2296 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2297 * @dentry: file 2298 * @name: xattr name 2299 * 2300 * Check permission before removing the extended attribute identified by @name 2301 * for @dentry. 2302 * 2303 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2304 */ 2305 int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2306 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2307 { 2308 int ret; 2309 2310 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2311 return 0; 2312 /* 2313 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 2314 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 2315 */ 2316 ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); 2317 if (ret == 1) 2318 ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 2319 if (ret) 2320 return ret; 2321 ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); 2322 if (ret) 2323 return ret; 2324 return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 2325 } 2326 2327 /** 2328 * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required 2329 * @dentry: associated dentry 2330 * 2331 * Called when an inode has been changed to determine if 2332 * security_inode_killpriv() should be called. 2333 * 2334 * Return: Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation, return 0 if 2335 * security_inode_killpriv() does not need to be called, return >0 if 2336 * security_inode_killpriv() does need to be called. 2337 */ 2338 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) 2339 { 2340 return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry); 2341 } 2342 2343 /** 2344 * security_inode_killpriv() - The setuid bit is removed, update LSM state 2345 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2346 * @dentry: associated dentry 2347 * 2348 * The @dentry's setuid bit is being removed. Remove similar security labels. 2349 * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held. 2350 * 2351 * Return: Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation 2352 * causing setuid bit removal is failed. 2353 */ 2354 int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2355 struct dentry *dentry) 2356 { 2357 return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, idmap, dentry); 2358 } 2359 2360 /** 2361 * security_inode_getsecurity() - Get the xattr security label of an inode 2362 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2363 * @inode: inode 2364 * @name: xattr name 2365 * @buffer: security label buffer 2366 * @alloc: allocation flag 2367 * 2368 * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the security 2369 * label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that @name is the 2370 * remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix has been removed. 2371 * @alloc is used to specify if the call should return a value via the buffer 2372 * or just the value length. 2373 * 2374 * Return: Returns size of buffer on success. 2375 */ 2376 int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2377 struct inode *inode, const char *name, 2378 void **buffer, bool alloc) 2379 { 2380 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2381 int rc; 2382 2383 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2384 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 2385 /* 2386 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 2387 */ 2388 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) { 2389 rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name, buffer, 2390 alloc); 2391 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity)) 2392 return rc; 2393 } 2394 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 2395 } 2396 2397 /** 2398 * security_inode_setsecurity() - Set the xattr security label of an inode 2399 * @inode: inode 2400 * @name: xattr name 2401 * @value: security label 2402 * @size: length of security label 2403 * @flags: flags 2404 * 2405 * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the extended 2406 * attribute value @value. @size indicates the size of the @value in bytes. 2407 * @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0. Note that @name is the 2408 * remainder of the attribute name after the security. prefix has been removed. 2409 * 2410 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2411 */ 2412 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, 2413 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2414 { 2415 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2416 int rc; 2417 2418 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2419 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 2420 /* 2421 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 2422 */ 2423 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) { 2424 rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, 2425 flags); 2426 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity)) 2427 return rc; 2428 } 2429 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 2430 } 2431 2432 /** 2433 * security_inode_listsecurity() - List the xattr security label names 2434 * @inode: inode 2435 * @buffer: buffer 2436 * @buffer_size: size of buffer 2437 * 2438 * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels associated with 2439 * @inode into @buffer. The maximum size of @buffer is specified by 2440 * @buffer_size. @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer 2441 * required. 2442 * 2443 * Return: Returns number of bytes used/required on success. 2444 */ 2445 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, 2446 char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) 2447 { 2448 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2449 return 0; 2450 return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size); 2451 } 2452 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity); 2453 2454 /** 2455 * security_inode_getsecid() - Get an inode's secid 2456 * @inode: inode 2457 * @secid: secid to return 2458 * 2459 * Get the secid associated with the node. In case of failure, @secid will be 2460 * set to zero. 2461 */ 2462 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) 2463 { 2464 call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid); 2465 } 2466 2467 /** 2468 * security_inode_copy_up() - Create new creds for an overlayfs copy-up op 2469 * @src: union dentry of copy-up file 2470 * @new: newly created creds 2471 * 2472 * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of overlay 2473 * filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds and modify as 2474 * need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to new creds temporarily to 2475 * create new file and release newly allocated creds. 2476 * 2477 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error. 2478 */ 2479 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) 2480 { 2481 return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new); 2482 } 2483 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up); 2484 2485 /** 2486 * security_inode_copy_up_xattr() - Filter xattrs in an overlayfs copy-up op 2487 * @name: xattr name 2488 * 2489 * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied up from a 2490 * lower layer to the union/overlay layer. The caller is responsible for 2491 * reading and writing the xattrs, this hook is merely a filter. 2492 * 2493 * Return: Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP 2494 * if the security module does not know about attribute, or a negative 2495 * error code to abort the copy up. 2496 */ 2497 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) 2498 { 2499 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2500 int rc; 2501 2502 /* 2503 * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the 2504 * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or 2505 * any other error code incase of an error. 2506 */ 2507 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, 2508 &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) { 2509 rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name); 2510 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr)) 2511 return rc; 2512 } 2513 2514 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr); 2515 } 2516 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr); 2517 2518 /** 2519 * security_kernfs_init_security() - Init LSM context for a kernfs node 2520 * @kn_dir: parent kernfs node 2521 * @kn: the kernfs node to initialize 2522 * 2523 * Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based on its 2524 * own and its parent's attributes. 2525 * 2526 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2527 */ 2528 int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, 2529 struct kernfs_node *kn) 2530 { 2531 return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn); 2532 } 2533 2534 /** 2535 * security_file_permission() - Check file permissions 2536 * @file: file 2537 * @mask: requested permissions 2538 * 2539 * Check file permissions before accessing an open file. This hook is called 2540 * by various operations that read or write files. A security module can use 2541 * this hook to perform additional checking on these operations, e.g. to 2542 * revalidate permissions on use to support privilege bracketing or policy 2543 * changes. Notice that this hook is used when the actual read/write 2544 * operations are performed, whereas the inode_security_ops hook is called when 2545 * a file is opened (as well as many other operations). Although this hook can 2546 * be used to revalidate permissions for various system call operations that 2547 * read or write files, it does not address the revalidation of permissions for 2548 * memory-mapped files. Security modules must handle this separately if they 2549 * need such revalidation. 2550 * 2551 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2552 */ 2553 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) 2554 { 2555 int ret; 2556 2557 ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask); 2558 if (ret) 2559 return ret; 2560 2561 return fsnotify_perm(file, mask); 2562 } 2563 2564 /** 2565 * security_file_alloc() - Allocate and init a file's LSM blob 2566 * @file: the file 2567 * 2568 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field. The 2569 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 2570 * 2571 * Return: Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 2572 */ 2573 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) 2574 { 2575 int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file); 2576 2577 if (rc) 2578 return rc; 2579 rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file); 2580 if (unlikely(rc)) 2581 security_file_free(file); 2582 return rc; 2583 } 2584 2585 /** 2586 * security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob 2587 * @file: the file 2588 * 2589 * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security. 2590 */ 2591 void security_file_free(struct file *file) 2592 { 2593 void *blob; 2594 2595 call_void_hook(file_free_security, file); 2596 2597 blob = file->f_security; 2598 if (blob) { 2599 file->f_security = NULL; 2600 kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob); 2601 } 2602 } 2603 2604 /** 2605 * security_file_ioctl() - Check if an ioctl is allowed 2606 * @file: associated file 2607 * @cmd: ioctl cmd 2608 * @arg: ioctl arguments 2609 * 2610 * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file. Note that @arg sometimes 2611 * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer 2612 * value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used 2613 * by the security module. 2614 * 2615 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2616 */ 2617 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2618 { 2619 return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 2620 } 2621 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl); 2622 2623 static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) 2624 { 2625 /* 2626 * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect 2627 * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about... 2628 */ 2629 if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ) 2630 return prot; 2631 if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) 2632 return prot; 2633 /* 2634 * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it. 2635 */ 2636 if (!file) 2637 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2638 /* 2639 * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need 2640 * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case 2641 */ 2642 if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) { 2643 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU 2644 if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) { 2645 unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file); 2646 if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC)) 2647 return prot; 2648 } 2649 #endif 2650 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2651 } 2652 /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */ 2653 return prot; 2654 } 2655 2656 /** 2657 * security_mmap_file() - Check if mmap'ing a file is allowed 2658 * @file: file 2659 * @prot: protection applied by the kernel 2660 * @flags: flags 2661 * 2662 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. if 2663 * mapping anonymous memory. 2664 * 2665 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2666 */ 2667 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, 2668 unsigned long flags) 2669 { 2670 unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot); 2671 int ret; 2672 2673 ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 2674 if (ret) 2675 return ret; 2676 return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 2677 } 2678 2679 /** 2680 * security_mmap_addr() - Check if mmap'ing an address is allowed 2681 * @addr: address 2682 * 2683 * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr. 2684 * 2685 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2686 */ 2687 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) 2688 { 2689 return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr); 2690 } 2691 2692 /** 2693 * security_file_mprotect() - Check if changing memory protections is allowed 2694 * @vma: memory region 2695 * @reqprot: application requested protection 2696 * @prot: protection applied by the kernel 2697 * 2698 * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions. 2699 * 2700 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2701 */ 2702 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, 2703 unsigned long prot) 2704 { 2705 int ret; 2706 2707 ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); 2708 if (ret) 2709 return ret; 2710 return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot); 2711 } 2712 2713 /** 2714 * security_file_lock() - Check if a file lock is allowed 2715 * @file: file 2716 * @cmd: lock operation (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK) 2717 * 2718 * Check permission before performing file locking operations. Note the hook 2719 * mediates both flock and fcntl style locks. 2720 * 2721 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2722 */ 2723 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) 2724 { 2725 return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd); 2726 } 2727 2728 /** 2729 * security_file_fcntl() - Check if fcntl() op is allowed 2730 * @file: file 2731 * @cmd: fnctl command 2732 * @arg: command argument 2733 * 2734 * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd from 2735 * being performed on the file @file. Note that @arg sometimes represents a 2736 * user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer value. When 2737 * @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used by the 2738 * security module. 2739 * 2740 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2741 */ 2742 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2743 { 2744 return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 2745 } 2746 2747 /** 2748 * security_file_set_fowner() - Set the file owner info in the LSM blob 2749 * @file: the file 2750 * 2751 * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in 2752 * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook. 2753 * 2754 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2755 */ 2756 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) 2757 { 2758 call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file); 2759 } 2760 2761 /** 2762 * security_file_send_sigiotask() - Check if sending SIGIO/SIGURG is allowed 2763 * @tsk: target task 2764 * @fown: signal sender 2765 * @sig: signal to be sent, SIGIO is sent if 0 2766 * 2767 * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the 2768 * process @tsk. Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt. Note 2769 * that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a struct file, 2770 * so the file structure (and associated security information) can always be 2771 * obtained: container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner). 2772 * 2773 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2774 */ 2775 int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, 2776 struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) 2777 { 2778 return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig); 2779 } 2780 2781 /** 2782 * security_file_receive() - Check is receiving a file via IPC is allowed 2783 * @file: file being received 2784 * 2785 * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process to 2786 * receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC. 2787 * 2788 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2789 */ 2790 int security_file_receive(struct file *file) 2791 { 2792 return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file); 2793 } 2794 2795 /** 2796 * security_file_open() - Save open() time state for late use by the LSM 2797 * @file: 2798 * 2799 * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon file_permission, 2800 * and recheck access if anything has changed since inode_permission. 2801 * 2802 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2803 */ 2804 int security_file_open(struct file *file) 2805 { 2806 int ret; 2807 2808 ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file); 2809 if (ret) 2810 return ret; 2811 2812 return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN); 2813 } 2814 2815 /** 2816 * security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 2817 * @file: file 2818 * 2819 * Check permission before truncating a file, i.e. using ftruncate. Note that 2820 * truncation permission may also be checked based on the path, using the 2821 * @path_truncate hook. 2822 * 2823 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2824 */ 2825 int security_file_truncate(struct file *file) 2826 { 2827 return call_int_hook(file_truncate, 0, file); 2828 } 2829 2830 /** 2831 * security_task_alloc() - Allocate a task's LSM blob 2832 * @task: the task 2833 * @clone_flags: flags indicating what is being shared 2834 * 2835 * Handle allocation of task-related resources. 2836 * 2837 * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. 2838 */ 2839 int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) 2840 { 2841 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 2842 2843 if (rc) 2844 return rc; 2845 rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags); 2846 if (unlikely(rc)) 2847 security_task_free(task); 2848 return rc; 2849 } 2850 2851 /** 2852 * security_task_free() - Free a task's LSM blob and related resources 2853 * @task: task 2854 * 2855 * Handle release of task-related resources. Note that this can be called from 2856 * interrupt context. 2857 */ 2858 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) 2859 { 2860 call_void_hook(task_free, task); 2861 2862 kfree(task->security); 2863 task->security = NULL; 2864 } 2865 2866 /** 2867 * security_cred_alloc_blank() - Allocate the min memory to allow cred_transfer 2868 * @cred: credentials 2869 * @gfp: gfp flags 2870 * 2871 * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that 2872 * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM. 2873 * 2874 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 2875 */ 2876 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 2877 { 2878 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp); 2879 2880 if (rc) 2881 return rc; 2882 2883 rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp); 2884 if (unlikely(rc)) 2885 security_cred_free(cred); 2886 return rc; 2887 } 2888 2889 /** 2890 * security_cred_free() - Free the cred's LSM blob and associated resources 2891 * @cred: credentials 2892 * 2893 * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials. 2894 */ 2895 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) 2896 { 2897 /* 2898 * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that 2899 * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL. 2900 */ 2901 if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL)) 2902 return; 2903 2904 call_void_hook(cred_free, cred); 2905 2906 kfree(cred->security); 2907 cred->security = NULL; 2908 } 2909 2910 /** 2911 * security_prepare_creds() - Prepare a new set of credentials 2912 * @new: new credentials 2913 * @old: original credentials 2914 * @gfp: gfp flags 2915 * 2916 * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set. 2917 * 2918 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 2919 */ 2920 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) 2921 { 2922 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp); 2923 2924 if (rc) 2925 return rc; 2926 2927 rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp); 2928 if (unlikely(rc)) 2929 security_cred_free(new); 2930 return rc; 2931 } 2932 2933 /** 2934 * security_transfer_creds() - Transfer creds 2935 * @new: target credentials 2936 * @old: original credentials 2937 * 2938 * Transfer data from original creds to new creds. 2939 */ 2940 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 2941 { 2942 call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); 2943 } 2944 2945 /** 2946 * security_cred_getsecid() - Get the secid from a set of credentials 2947 * @c: credentials 2948 * @secid: secid value 2949 * 2950 * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c. In case of 2951 * failure, @secid will be set to zero. 2952 */ 2953 void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) 2954 { 2955 *secid = 0; 2956 call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); 2957 } 2958 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); 2959 2960 /** 2961 * security_kernel_act_as() - Set the kernel credentials to act as secid 2962 * @new: credentials 2963 * @secid: secid 2964 * 2965 * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). 2966 * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid. 2967 * 2968 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2969 */ 2970 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) 2971 { 2972 return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); 2973 } 2974 2975 /** 2976 * security_kernel_create_files_as() - Set file creation context using an inode 2977 * @new: target credentials 2978 * @inode: reference inode 2979 * 2980 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as the 2981 * objective context of the specified inode. The current task must be the one 2982 * that nominated @inode. 2983 * 2984 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2985 */ 2986 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) 2987 { 2988 return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode); 2989 } 2990 2991 /** 2992 * security_kernel_module_request() - Check is loading a module is allowed 2993 * @kmod_name: module name 2994 * 2995 * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for 2996 * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. 2997 * 2998 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2999 */ 3000 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) 3001 { 3002 int ret; 3003 3004 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); 3005 if (ret) 3006 return ret; 3007 return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); 3008 } 3009 3010 /** 3011 * security_kernel_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 3012 * @file: file 3013 * @id: file identifier 3014 * @contents: trust if security_kernel_post_read_file() will be called 3015 * 3016 * Read a file specified by userspace. 3017 * 3018 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3019 */ 3020 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, 3021 bool contents) 3022 { 3023 int ret; 3024 3025 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); 3026 if (ret) 3027 return ret; 3028 return ima_read_file(file, id, contents); 3029 } 3030 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); 3031 3032 /** 3033 * security_kernel_post_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 3034 * @file: file 3035 * @buf: file contents 3036 * @size: size of file contents 3037 * @id: file identifier 3038 * 3039 * Read a file specified by userspace. This must be paired with a prior call 3040 * to security_kernel_read_file() call that indicated this hook would also be 3041 * called, see security_kernel_read_file() for more information. 3042 * 3043 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3044 */ 3045 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, 3046 enum kernel_read_file_id id) 3047 { 3048 int ret; 3049 3050 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id); 3051 if (ret) 3052 return ret; 3053 return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id); 3054 } 3055 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); 3056 3057 /** 3058 * security_kernel_load_data() - Load data provided by userspace 3059 * @id: data identifier 3060 * @contents: true if security_kernel_post_load_data() will be called 3061 * 3062 * Load data provided by userspace. 3063 * 3064 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3065 */ 3066 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) 3067 { 3068 int ret; 3069 3070 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents); 3071 if (ret) 3072 return ret; 3073 return ima_load_data(id, contents); 3074 } 3075 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); 3076 3077 /** 3078 * security_kernel_post_load_data() - Load userspace data from a non-file source 3079 * @buf: data 3080 * @size: size of data 3081 * @id: data identifier 3082 * @description: text description of data, specific to the id value 3083 * 3084 * Load data provided by a non-file source (usually userspace buffer). This 3085 * must be paired with a prior security_kernel_load_data() call that indicated 3086 * this hook would also be called, see security_kernel_load_data() for more 3087 * information. 3088 * 3089 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3090 */ 3091 int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, 3092 enum kernel_load_data_id id, 3093 char *description) 3094 { 3095 int ret; 3096 3097 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id, 3098 description); 3099 if (ret) 3100 return ret; 3101 return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description); 3102 } 3103 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data); 3104 3105 /** 3106 * security_task_fix_setuid() - Update LSM with new user id attributes 3107 * @new: updated credentials 3108 * @old: credentials being replaced 3109 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag values 3110 * 3111 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user identity 3112 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 3113 * the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If @new is the set of 3114 * credentials that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this 3115 * rather than to @current->cred. 3116 * 3117 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3118 */ 3119 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 3120 int flags) 3121 { 3122 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags); 3123 } 3124 3125 /** 3126 * security_task_fix_setgid() - Update LSM with new group id attributes 3127 * @new: updated credentials 3128 * @old: credentials being replaced 3129 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag value 3130 * 3131 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the group identity 3132 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 3133 * the set*gid system calls invoked this hook. @new is the set of credentials 3134 * that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 3135 * @current->cred. 3136 * 3137 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3138 */ 3139 int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 3140 int flags) 3141 { 3142 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags); 3143 } 3144 3145 /** 3146 * security_task_fix_setgroups() - Update LSM with new supplementary groups 3147 * @new: updated credentials 3148 * @old: credentials being replaced 3149 * 3150 * Update the module's state after setting the supplementary group identity 3151 * attributes of the current process. @new is the set of credentials that will 3152 * be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 3153 * @current->cred. 3154 * 3155 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3156 */ 3157 int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 3158 { 3159 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, 0, new, old); 3160 } 3161 3162 /** 3163 * security_task_setpgid() - Check if setting the pgid is allowed 3164 * @p: task being modified 3165 * @pgid: new pgid 3166 * 3167 * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the process 3168 * @p to @pgid. 3169 * 3170 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3171 */ 3172 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) 3173 { 3174 return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid); 3175 } 3176 3177 /** 3178 * security_task_getpgid() - Check if getting the pgid is allowed 3179 * @p: task 3180 * 3181 * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the process 3182 * @p. 3183 * 3184 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3185 */ 3186 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) 3187 { 3188 return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p); 3189 } 3190 3191 /** 3192 * security_task_getsid() - Check if getting the session id is allowed 3193 * @p: task 3194 * 3195 * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process @p. 3196 * 3197 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3198 */ 3199 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) 3200 { 3201 return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); 3202 } 3203 3204 /** 3205 * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid 3206 * @secid: secid value 3207 * 3208 * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return 3209 * it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3210 */ 3211 void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) 3212 { 3213 *secid = 0; 3214 call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid); 3215 } 3216 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj); 3217 3218 /** 3219 * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid 3220 * @p: target task 3221 * @secid: secid value 3222 * 3223 * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and 3224 * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3225 */ 3226 void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) 3227 { 3228 *secid = 0; 3229 call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); 3230 } 3231 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj); 3232 3233 /** 3234 * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed 3235 * @p: target task 3236 * @nice: nice value 3237 * 3238 * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice. 3239 * 3240 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3241 */ 3242 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) 3243 { 3244 return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice); 3245 } 3246 3247 /** 3248 * security_task_setioprio() - Check if setting a task's ioprio is allowed 3249 * @p: target task 3250 * @ioprio: ioprio value 3251 * 3252 * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio. 3253 * 3254 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3255 */ 3256 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) 3257 { 3258 return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio); 3259 } 3260 3261 /** 3262 * security_task_getioprio() - Check if getting a task's ioprio is allowed 3263 * @p: task 3264 * 3265 * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p. 3266 * 3267 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3268 */ 3269 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) 3270 { 3271 return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p); 3272 } 3273 3274 /** 3275 * security_task_prlimit() - Check if get/setting resources limits is allowed 3276 * @cred: current task credentials 3277 * @tcred: target task credentials 3278 * @flags: LSM_PRLIMIT_* flag bits indicating a get/set/both 3279 * 3280 * Check permission before getting and/or setting the resource limits of 3281 * another task. 3282 * 3283 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3284 */ 3285 int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, 3286 unsigned int flags) 3287 { 3288 return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags); 3289 } 3290 3291 /** 3292 * security_task_setrlimit() - Check if setting a new rlimit value is allowed 3293 * @p: target task's group leader 3294 * @resource: resource whose limit is being set 3295 * @new_rlim: new resource limit 3296 * 3297 * Check permission before setting the resource limits of process @p for 3298 * @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can be examined by 3299 * dereferencing (p->signal->rlim + resource). 3300 * 3301 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3302 */ 3303 int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, 3304 struct rlimit *new_rlim) 3305 { 3306 return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim); 3307 } 3308 3309 /** 3310 * security_task_setscheduler() - Check if setting sched policy/param is allowed 3311 * @p: target task 3312 * 3313 * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of 3314 * process @p. 3315 * 3316 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3317 */ 3318 int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3319 { 3320 return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p); 3321 } 3322 3323 /** 3324 * security_task_getscheduler() - Check if getting scheduling info is allowed 3325 * @p: target task 3326 * 3327 * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process @p. 3328 * 3329 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3330 */ 3331 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3332 { 3333 return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p); 3334 } 3335 3336 /** 3337 * security_task_movememory() - Check if moving memory is allowed 3338 * @p: task 3339 * 3340 * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p. 3341 * 3342 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3343 */ 3344 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) 3345 { 3346 return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p); 3347 } 3348 3349 /** 3350 * security_task_kill() - Check if sending a signal is allowed 3351 * @p: target process 3352 * @info: signal information 3353 * @sig: signal value 3354 * @cred: credentials of the signal sender, NULL if @current 3355 * 3356 * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p. @info can be NULL, the 3357 * constant 1, or a pointer to a kernel_siginfo structure. If @info is 1 or 3358 * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming from 3359 * the kernel and should typically be permitted. SIGIO signals are handled 3360 * separately by the send_sigiotask hook in file_security_ops. 3361 * 3362 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3363 */ 3364 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, 3365 int sig, const struct cred *cred) 3366 { 3367 return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred); 3368 } 3369 3370 /** 3371 * security_task_prctl() - Check if a prctl op is allowed 3372 * @option: operation 3373 * @arg2: argument 3374 * @arg3: argument 3375 * @arg4: argument 3376 * @arg5: argument 3377 * 3378 * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the 3379 * current process. 3380 * 3381 * Return: Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value 3382 * to cause prctl() to return immediately with that value. 3383 */ 3384 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, 3385 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) 3386 { 3387 int thisrc; 3388 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl); 3389 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3390 3391 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) { 3392 thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); 3393 if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) { 3394 rc = thisrc; 3395 if (thisrc != 0) 3396 break; 3397 } 3398 } 3399 return rc; 3400 } 3401 3402 /** 3403 * security_task_to_inode() - Set the security attributes of a task's inode 3404 * @p: task 3405 * @inode: inode 3406 * 3407 * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's 3408 * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes. 3409 */ 3410 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) 3411 { 3412 call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode); 3413 } 3414 3415 /** 3416 * security_create_user_ns() - Check if creating a new userns is allowed 3417 * @cred: prepared creds 3418 * 3419 * Check permission prior to creating a new user namespace. 3420 * 3421 * Return: Returns 0 if successful, otherwise < 0 error code. 3422 */ 3423 int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred) 3424 { 3425 return call_int_hook(userns_create, 0, cred); 3426 } 3427 3428 /** 3429 * security_ipc_permission() - Check if sysv ipc access is allowed 3430 * @ipcp: ipc permission structure 3431 * @flag: requested permissions 3432 * 3433 * Check permissions for access to IPC. 3434 * 3435 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3436 */ 3437 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) 3438 { 3439 return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag); 3440 } 3441 3442 /** 3443 * security_ipc_getsecid() - Get the sysv ipc object's secid 3444 * @ipcp: ipc permission structure 3445 * @secid: secid pointer 3446 * 3447 * Get the secid associated with the ipc object. In case of failure, @secid 3448 * will be set to zero. 3449 */ 3450 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) 3451 { 3452 *secid = 0; 3453 call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); 3454 } 3455 3456 /** 3457 * security_msg_msg_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc message LSM blob 3458 * @msg: message structure 3459 * 3460 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field. The 3461 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3462 * 3463 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3464 */ 3465 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) 3466 { 3467 int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg); 3468 3469 if (unlikely(rc)) 3470 return rc; 3471 rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg); 3472 if (unlikely(rc)) 3473 security_msg_msg_free(msg); 3474 return rc; 3475 } 3476 3477 /** 3478 * security_msg_msg_free() - Free a sysv ipc message LSM blob 3479 * @msg: message structure 3480 * 3481 * Deallocate the security structure for this message. 3482 */ 3483 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg) 3484 { 3485 call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg); 3486 kfree(msg->security); 3487 msg->security = NULL; 3488 } 3489 3490 /** 3491 * security_msg_queue_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob 3492 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3493 * 3494 * Allocate and attach a security structure to @msg. The security field is 3495 * initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3496 * 3497 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3498 */ 3499 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3500 { 3501 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq); 3502 3503 if (unlikely(rc)) 3504 return rc; 3505 rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq); 3506 if (unlikely(rc)) 3507 security_msg_queue_free(msq); 3508 return rc; 3509 } 3510 3511 /** 3512 * security_msg_queue_free() - Free a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob 3513 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3514 * 3515 * Deallocate security field @perm->security for the message queue. 3516 */ 3517 void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3518 { 3519 call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq); 3520 kfree(msq->security); 3521 msq->security = NULL; 3522 } 3523 3524 /** 3525 * security_msg_queue_associate() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed 3526 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3527 * @msqflg: operation flags 3528 * 3529 * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the msgget system 3530 * call. This hook is only called when returning the message queue identifier 3531 * for an existing message queue, not when a new message queue is created. 3532 * 3533 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 3534 */ 3535 int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) 3536 { 3537 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg); 3538 } 3539 3540 /** 3541 * security_msg_queue_msgctl() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed 3542 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3543 * @cmd: operation 3544 * 3545 * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd is to be 3546 * performed on the message queue with permissions. 3547 * 3548 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3549 */ 3550 int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) 3551 { 3552 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd); 3553 } 3554 3555 /** 3556 * security_msg_queue_msgsnd() - Check if sending a sysv ipc message is allowed 3557 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3558 * @msg: message 3559 * @msqflg: operation flags 3560 * 3561 * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message queue 3562 * with permissions specified in @msq. 3563 * 3564 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3565 */ 3566 int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, 3567 struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) 3568 { 3569 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg); 3570 } 3571 3572 /** 3573 * security_msg_queue_msgrcv() - Check if receiving a sysv ipc msg is allowed 3574 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3575 * @msg: message 3576 * @target: target task 3577 * @type: type of message requested 3578 * @mode: operation flags 3579 * 3580 * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message queue. 3581 * The @target task structure contains a pointer to the process that will be 3582 * receiving the message (not equal to the current process when inline receives 3583 * are being performed). 3584 * 3585 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3586 */ 3587 int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, 3588 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) 3589 { 3590 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode); 3591 } 3592 3593 /** 3594 * security_shm_alloc() - Allocate a sysv shm LSM blob 3595 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3596 * 3597 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @shp security field. The 3598 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3599 * 3600 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3601 */ 3602 int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3603 { 3604 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp); 3605 3606 if (unlikely(rc)) 3607 return rc; 3608 rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp); 3609 if (unlikely(rc)) 3610 security_shm_free(shp); 3611 return rc; 3612 } 3613 3614 /** 3615 * security_shm_free() - Free a sysv shm LSM blob 3616 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3617 * 3618 * Deallocate the security structure @perm->security for the memory segment. 3619 */ 3620 void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3621 { 3622 call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp); 3623 kfree(shp->security); 3624 shp->security = NULL; 3625 } 3626 3627 /** 3628 * security_shm_associate() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed 3629 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3630 * @shmflg: operation flags 3631 * 3632 * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the shmget 3633 * system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared memory 3634 * region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared memory 3635 * region is created. 3636 * 3637 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3638 */ 3639 int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) 3640 { 3641 return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg); 3642 } 3643 3644 /** 3645 * security_shm_shmctl() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed 3646 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3647 * @cmd: operation 3648 * 3649 * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by @cmd is 3650 * to be performed on the shared memory region with permissions in @shp. 3651 * 3652 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 3653 */ 3654 int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) 3655 { 3656 return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd); 3657 } 3658 3659 /** 3660 * security_shm_shmat() - Check if a sysv shm attach operation is allowed 3661 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3662 * @shmaddr: address of memory region to attach 3663 * @shmflg: operation flags 3664 * 3665 * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the 3666 * shared memory segment with permissions @shp to the data segment of the 3667 * calling process. The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr. 3668 * 3669 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3670 */ 3671 int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, 3672 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) 3673 { 3674 return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg); 3675 } 3676 3677 /** 3678 * security_sem_alloc() - Allocate a sysv semaphore LSM blob 3679 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3680 * 3681 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @sma security field. The 3682 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3683 * 3684 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3685 */ 3686 int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3687 { 3688 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma); 3689 3690 if (unlikely(rc)) 3691 return rc; 3692 rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma); 3693 if (unlikely(rc)) 3694 security_sem_free(sma); 3695 return rc; 3696 } 3697 3698 /** 3699 * security_sem_free() - Free a sysv semaphore LSM blob 3700 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3701 * 3702 * Deallocate security structure @sma->security for the semaphore. 3703 */ 3704 void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3705 { 3706 call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma); 3707 kfree(sma->security); 3708 sma->security = NULL; 3709 } 3710 3711 /** 3712 * security_sem_associate() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3713 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3714 * @semflg: operation flags 3715 * 3716 * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget system 3717 * call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore identifier for 3718 * an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be created. 3719 * 3720 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3721 */ 3722 int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) 3723 { 3724 return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg); 3725 } 3726 3727 /** 3728 * security_sem_semctl() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3729 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3730 * @cmd: operation 3731 * 3732 * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be 3733 * performed on the semaphore. 3734 * 3735 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3736 */ 3737 int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) 3738 { 3739 return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd); 3740 } 3741 3742 /** 3743 * security_sem_semop() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3744 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3745 * @sops: operations to perform 3746 * @nsops: number of operations 3747 * @alter: flag indicating changes will be made 3748 * 3749 * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the semaphore 3750 * set. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set may be modified. 3751 * 3752 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3753 */ 3754 int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, 3755 unsigned nsops, int alter) 3756 { 3757 return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter); 3758 } 3759 3760 /** 3761 * security_d_instantiate() - Populate an inode's LSM state based on a dentry 3762 * @dentry: dentry 3763 * @inode: inode 3764 * 3765 * Fill in @inode security information for a @dentry if allowed. 3766 */ 3767 void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) 3768 { 3769 if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 3770 return; 3771 call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode); 3772 } 3773 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); 3774 3775 /** 3776 * security_getprocattr() - Read an attribute for a task 3777 * @p: the task 3778 * @lsm: LSM name 3779 * @name: attribute name 3780 * @value: attribute value 3781 * 3782 * Read attribute @name for task @p and store it into @value if allowed. 3783 * 3784 * Return: Returns the length of @value on success, a negative value otherwise. 3785 */ 3786 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, 3787 const char *name, char **value) 3788 { 3789 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3790 3791 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { 3792 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 3793 continue; 3794 return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); 3795 } 3796 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr); 3797 } 3798 3799 /** 3800 * security_setprocattr() - Set an attribute for a task 3801 * @lsm: LSM name 3802 * @name: attribute name 3803 * @value: attribute value 3804 * @size: attribute value size 3805 * 3806 * Write (set) the current task's attribute @name to @value, size @size if 3807 * allowed. 3808 * 3809 * Return: Returns bytes written on success, a negative value otherwise. 3810 */ 3811 int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, 3812 size_t size) 3813 { 3814 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3815 3816 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { 3817 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 3818 continue; 3819 return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); 3820 } 3821 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr); 3822 } 3823 3824 /** 3825 * security_netlink_send() - Save info and check if netlink sending is allowed 3826 * @sk: sending socket 3827 * @skb: netlink message 3828 * 3829 * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission checking 3830 * can be performed when the message is processed. The security information 3831 * can be saved using the eff_cap field of the netlink_skb_parms structure. 3832 * Also may be used to provide fine grained control over message transmission. 3833 * 3834 * Return: Returns 0 if the information was successfully saved and message is 3835 * allowed to be transmitted. 3836 */ 3837 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 3838 { 3839 return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb); 3840 } 3841 3842 /** 3843 * security_ismaclabel() - Check is the named attribute is a MAC label 3844 * @name: full extended attribute name 3845 * 3846 * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name represents a MAC label. 3847 * 3848 * Return: Returns 1 if name is a MAC attribute otherwise returns 0. 3849 */ 3850 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) 3851 { 3852 return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name); 3853 } 3854 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); 3855 3856 /** 3857 * security_secid_to_secctx() - Convert a secid to a secctx 3858 * @secid: secid 3859 * @secdata: secctx 3860 * @seclen: secctx length 3861 * 3862 * Convert secid to security context. If @secdata is NULL the length of the 3863 * result will be returned in @seclen, but no @secdata will be returned. This 3864 * does mean that the length could change between calls to check the length and 3865 * the next call which actually allocates and returns the @secdata. 3866 * 3867 * Return: Return 0 on success, error on failure. 3868 */ 3869 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) 3870 { 3871 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3872 int rc; 3873 3874 /* 3875 * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this 3876 * LSM hook is not "stackable"). 3877 */ 3878 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { 3879 rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); 3880 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx)) 3881 return rc; 3882 } 3883 3884 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx); 3885 } 3886 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); 3887 3888 /** 3889 * security_secctx_to_secid() - Convert a secctx to a secid 3890 * @secdata: secctx 3891 * @seclen: length of secctx 3892 * @secid: secid 3893 * 3894 * Convert security context to secid. 3895 * 3896 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3897 */ 3898 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) 3899 { 3900 *secid = 0; 3901 return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid); 3902 } 3903 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); 3904 3905 /** 3906 * security_release_secctx() - Free a secctx buffer 3907 * @secdata: secctx 3908 * @seclen: length of secctx 3909 * 3910 * Release the security context. 3911 */ 3912 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) 3913 { 3914 call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); 3915 } 3916 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); 3917 3918 /** 3919 * security_inode_invalidate_secctx() - Invalidate an inode's security label 3920 * @inode: inode 3921 * 3922 * Notify the security module that it must revalidate the security context of 3923 * an inode. 3924 */ 3925 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) 3926 { 3927 call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode); 3928 } 3929 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx); 3930 3931 /** 3932 * security_inode_notifysecctx() - Nofify the LSM of an inode's security label 3933 * @inode: inode 3934 * @ctx: secctx 3935 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 3936 * 3937 * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should 3938 * be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module 3939 * for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize 3940 * the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server 3941 * for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. 3942 * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked. 3943 * 3944 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3945 */ 3946 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 3947 { 3948 return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 3949 } 3950 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx); 3951 3952 /** 3953 * security_inode_setsecctx() - Change the security label of an inode 3954 * @dentry: inode 3955 * @ctx: secctx 3956 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 3957 * 3958 * Change the security context of an inode. Updates the incore security 3959 * context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed 3960 * (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the 3961 * context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security 3962 * context in its incore inode and on the backing filesystem to a value 3963 * provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. Must be called with 3964 * inode->i_mutex locked. 3965 * 3966 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3967 */ 3968 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 3969 { 3970 return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen); 3971 } 3972 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx); 3973 3974 /** 3975 * security_inode_getsecctx() - Get the security label of an inode 3976 * @inode: inode 3977 * @ctx: secctx 3978 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 3979 * 3980 * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security 3981 * context for the given @inode. 3982 * 3983 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3984 */ 3985 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) 3986 { 3987 return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 3988 } 3989 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx); 3990 3991 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE 3992 /** 3993 * security_post_notification() - Check if a watch notification can be posted 3994 * @w_cred: credentials of the task that set the watch 3995 * @cred: credentials of the task which triggered the watch 3996 * @n: the notification 3997 * 3998 * Check to see if a watch notification can be posted to a particular queue. 3999 * 4000 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4001 */ 4002 int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, 4003 const struct cred *cred, 4004 struct watch_notification *n) 4005 { 4006 return call_int_hook(post_notification, 0, w_cred, cred, n); 4007 } 4008 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */ 4009 4010 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS 4011 /** 4012 * security_watch_key() - Check if a task is allowed to watch for key events 4013 * @key: the key to watch 4014 * 4015 * Check to see if a process is allowed to watch for event notifications from 4016 * a key or keyring. 4017 * 4018 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4019 */ 4020 int security_watch_key(struct key *key) 4021 { 4022 return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key); 4023 } 4024 #endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */ 4025 4026 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK 4027 /** 4028 * security_unix_stream_connect() - Check if a AF_UNIX stream is allowed 4029 * @sock: originating sock 4030 * @other: peer sock 4031 * @newsk: new sock 4032 * 4033 * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection 4034 * between @sock and @other. 4035 * 4036 * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because 4037 * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix 4038 * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name 4039 * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod 4040 * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to 4041 * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient 4042 * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible 4043 * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target 4044 * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. 4045 * 4046 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4047 */ 4048 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, 4049 struct sock *newsk) 4050 { 4051 return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk); 4052 } 4053 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect); 4054 4055 /** 4056 * security_unix_may_send() - Check if AF_UNIX socket can send datagrams 4057 * @sock: originating sock 4058 * @other: peer sock 4059 * 4060 * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to 4061 * @other. 4062 * 4063 * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because 4064 * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix 4065 * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name 4066 * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod 4067 * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to 4068 * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient 4069 * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible 4070 * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target 4071 * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. 4072 * 4073 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4074 */ 4075 int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) 4076 { 4077 return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other); 4078 } 4079 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send); 4080 4081 /** 4082 * security_socket_create() - Check if creating a new socket is allowed 4083 * @family: protocol family 4084 * @type: communications type 4085 * @protocol: requested protocol 4086 * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested 4087 * 4088 * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket. 4089 * 4090 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4091 */ 4092 int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) 4093 { 4094 return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern); 4095 } 4096 4097 /** 4098 * security_socket_post_create() - Initialize a newly created socket 4099 * @sock: socket 4100 * @family: protocol family 4101 * @type: communications type 4102 * @protocol: requested protocol 4103 * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested 4104 * 4105 * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security 4106 * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the socket 4107 * structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored in the 4108 * associated inode. Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will allocate 4109 * and attach security information to SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security. This hook 4110 * may be used to update the SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security field with additional 4111 * information that wasn't available when the inode was allocated. 4112 * 4113 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4114 */ 4115 int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, 4116 int type, int protocol, int kern) 4117 { 4118 return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type, 4119 protocol, kern); 4120 } 4121 4122 /** 4123 * security_socket_socketpair() - Check if creating a socketpair is allowed 4124 * @socka: first socket 4125 * @sockb: second socket 4126 * 4127 * Check permissions before creating a fresh pair of sockets. 4128 * 4129 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted and the connection was 4130 * established. 4131 */ 4132 int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) 4133 { 4134 return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb); 4135 } 4136 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair); 4137 4138 /** 4139 * security_socket_bind() - Check if a socket bind operation is allowed 4140 * @sock: socket 4141 * @address: requested bind address 4142 * @addrlen: length of address 4143 * 4144 * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is performed 4145 * and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the @address 4146 * parameter. 4147 * 4148 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4149 */ 4150 int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, 4151 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4152 { 4153 return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 4154 } 4155 4156 /** 4157 * security_socket_connect() - Check if a socket connect operation is allowed 4158 * @sock: socket 4159 * @address: address of remote connection point 4160 * @addrlen: length of address 4161 * 4162 * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation attempts to 4163 * connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address. 4164 * 4165 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4166 */ 4167 int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, 4168 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4169 { 4170 return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 4171 } 4172 4173 /** 4174 * security_socket_listen() - Check if a socket is allowed to listen 4175 * @sock: socket 4176 * @backlog: connection queue size 4177 * 4178 * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation. 4179 * 4180 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4181 */ 4182 int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) 4183 { 4184 return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog); 4185 } 4186 4187 /** 4188 * security_socket_accept() - Check if a socket is allowed to accept connections 4189 * @sock: listening socket 4190 * @newsock: newly creation connection socket 4191 * 4192 * Check permission before accepting a new connection. Note that the new 4193 * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it, but 4194 * the accept operation has not actually been performed. 4195 * 4196 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4197 */ 4198 int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) 4199 { 4200 return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock); 4201 } 4202 4203 /** 4204 * security_socket_sendmsg() - Check is sending a message is allowed 4205 * @sock: sending socket 4206 * @msg: message to send 4207 * @size: size of message 4208 * 4209 * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket. 4210 * 4211 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4212 */ 4213 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) 4214 { 4215 return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size); 4216 } 4217 4218 /** 4219 * security_socket_recvmsg() - Check if receiving a message is allowed 4220 * @sock: receiving socket 4221 * @msg: message to receive 4222 * @size: size of message 4223 * @flags: operational flags 4224 * 4225 * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket. 4226 * 4227 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4228 */ 4229 int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, 4230 int size, int flags) 4231 { 4232 return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags); 4233 } 4234 4235 /** 4236 * security_socket_getsockname() - Check if reading the socket addr is allowed 4237 * @sock: socket 4238 * 4239 * Check permission before reading the local address (name) of the socket 4240 * object. 4241 * 4242 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4243 */ 4244 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) 4245 { 4246 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock); 4247 } 4248 4249 /** 4250 * security_socket_getpeername() - Check if reading the peer's addr is allowed 4251 * @sock: socket 4252 * 4253 * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object. 4254 * 4255 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4256 */ 4257 int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) 4258 { 4259 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock); 4260 } 4261 4262 /** 4263 * security_socket_getsockopt() - Check if reading a socket option is allowed 4264 * @sock: socket 4265 * @level: option's protocol level 4266 * @optname: option name 4267 * 4268 * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket 4269 * @sock. 4270 * 4271 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4272 */ 4273 int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 4274 { 4275 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 4276 } 4277 4278 /** 4279 * security_socket_setsockopt() - Check if setting a socket option is allowed 4280 * @sock: socket 4281 * @level: option's protocol level 4282 * @optname: option name 4283 * 4284 * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket @sock. 4285 * 4286 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4287 */ 4288 int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 4289 { 4290 return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 4291 } 4292 4293 /** 4294 * security_socket_shutdown() - Checks if shutting down the socket is allowed 4295 * @sock: socket 4296 * @how: flag indicating how sends and receives are handled 4297 * 4298 * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket @sock is 4299 * shut down. 4300 * 4301 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4302 */ 4303 int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) 4304 { 4305 return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how); 4306 } 4307 4308 /** 4309 * security_sock_rcv_skb() - Check if an incoming network packet is allowed 4310 * @sk: destination sock 4311 * @skb: incoming packet 4312 * 4313 * Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct from 4314 * Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the incoming 4315 * sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk. Must not 4316 * sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks. 4317 * 4318 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4319 */ 4320 int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 4321 { 4322 return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb); 4323 } 4324 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); 4325 4326 /** 4327 * security_socket_getpeersec_stream() - Get the remote peer label 4328 * @sock: socket 4329 * @optval: destination buffer 4330 * @optlen: size of peer label copied into the buffer 4331 * @len: maximum size of the destination buffer 4332 * 4333 * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state 4334 * for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC. 4335 * For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the socket is associated with an 4336 * ipsec SA. 4337 * 4338 * Return: Returns 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return 4339 * values. 4340 */ 4341 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval, 4342 sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len) 4343 { 4344 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 4345 optval, optlen, len); 4346 } 4347 4348 /** 4349 * security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() - Get the remote peer label 4350 * @sock: socket 4351 * @skb: datagram packet 4352 * @secid: remote peer label secid 4353 * 4354 * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state 4355 * for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via getsockopt 4356 * SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated the IP_PASSSEC 4357 * option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the security state returned by 4358 * this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY ancillary message type. 4359 * 4360 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4361 */ 4362 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, 4363 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 4364 { 4365 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 4366 skb, secid); 4367 } 4368 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram); 4369 4370 /** 4371 * security_sk_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a sock's LSM blob 4372 * @sk: sock 4373 * @family: protocol family 4374 * @priority: gfp flags 4375 * 4376 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field, which 4377 * is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets. 4378 * 4379 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4380 */ 4381 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) 4382 { 4383 return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority); 4384 } 4385 4386 /** 4387 * security_sk_free() - Free the sock's LSM blob 4388 * @sk: sock 4389 * 4390 * Deallocate security structure. 4391 */ 4392 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk) 4393 { 4394 call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk); 4395 } 4396 4397 /** 4398 * security_sk_clone() - Clone a sock's LSM state 4399 * @sk: original sock 4400 * @newsk: target sock 4401 * 4402 * Clone/copy security structure. 4403 */ 4404 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) 4405 { 4406 call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk); 4407 } 4408 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone); 4409 4410 void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic) 4411 { 4412 call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid); 4413 } 4414 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow); 4415 4416 /** 4417 * security_req_classify_flow() - Set a flow's secid based on request_sock 4418 * @req: request_sock 4419 * @flic: target flow 4420 * 4421 * Sets @flic's secid to @req's secid. 4422 */ 4423 void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, 4424 struct flowi_common *flic) 4425 { 4426 call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic); 4427 } 4428 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow); 4429 4430 /** 4431 * security_sock_graft() - Reconcile LSM state when grafting a sock on a socket 4432 * @sk: sock being grafted 4433 * @parent: target parent socket 4434 * 4435 * Sets @parent's inode secid to @sk's secid and update @sk with any necessary 4436 * LSM state from @parent. 4437 */ 4438 void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) 4439 { 4440 call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent); 4441 } 4442 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft); 4443 4444 /** 4445 * security_inet_conn_request() - Set request_sock state using incoming connect 4446 * @sk: parent listening sock 4447 * @skb: incoming connection 4448 * @req: new request_sock 4449 * 4450 * Initialize the @req LSM state based on @sk and the incoming connect in @skb. 4451 * 4452 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4453 */ 4454 int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, 4455 struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) 4456 { 4457 return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req); 4458 } 4459 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request); 4460 4461 /** 4462 * security_inet_csk_clone() - Set new sock LSM state based on request_sock 4463 * @newsk: new sock 4464 * @req: connection request_sock 4465 * 4466 * Set that LSM state of @sock using the LSM state from @req. 4467 */ 4468 void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, 4469 const struct request_sock *req) 4470 { 4471 call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req); 4472 } 4473 4474 /** 4475 * security_inet_conn_established() - Update sock's LSM state with connection 4476 * @sk: sock 4477 * @skb: connection packet 4478 * 4479 * Update @sock's LSM state to represent a new connection from @skb. 4480 */ 4481 void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, 4482 struct sk_buff *skb) 4483 { 4484 call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb); 4485 } 4486 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established); 4487 4488 /** 4489 * security_secmark_relabel_packet() - Check if setting a secmark is allowed 4490 * @secid: new secmark value 4491 * 4492 * Check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to @secid. 4493 * 4494 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4495 */ 4496 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid) 4497 { 4498 return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid); 4499 } 4500 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet); 4501 4502 /** 4503 * security_secmark_refcount_inc() - Increment the secmark labeling rule count 4504 * 4505 * Tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. 4506 */ 4507 void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void) 4508 { 4509 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc); 4510 } 4511 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc); 4512 4513 /** 4514 * security_secmark_refcount_dec() - Decrement the secmark labeling rule count 4515 * 4516 * Tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. 4517 */ 4518 void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void) 4519 { 4520 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec); 4521 } 4522 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec); 4523 4524 /** 4525 * security_tun_dev_alloc_security() - Allocate a LSM blob for a TUN device 4526 * @security: pointer to the LSM blob 4527 * 4528 * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN device, 4529 * returning the pointer in @security. 4530 * 4531 * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. 4532 */ 4533 int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) 4534 { 4535 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security); 4536 } 4537 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security); 4538 4539 /** 4540 * security_tun_dev_free_security() - Free a TUN device LSM blob 4541 * @security: LSM blob 4542 * 4543 * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN device. 4544 */ 4545 void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) 4546 { 4547 call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security); 4548 } 4549 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security); 4550 4551 /** 4552 * security_tun_dev_create() - Check if creating a TUN device is allowed 4553 * 4554 * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device. 4555 * 4556 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4557 */ 4558 int security_tun_dev_create(void) 4559 { 4560 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0); 4561 } 4562 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create); 4563 4564 /** 4565 * security_tun_dev_attach_queue() - Check if attaching a TUN queue is allowed 4566 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4567 * 4568 * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue. 4569 * 4570 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4571 */ 4572 int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) 4573 { 4574 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security); 4575 } 4576 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue); 4577 4578 /** 4579 * security_tun_dev_attach() - Update TUN device LSM state on attach 4580 * @sk: associated sock 4581 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4582 * 4583 * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated 4584 * with the TUN device's sock structure. 4585 * 4586 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4587 */ 4588 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) 4589 { 4590 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security); 4591 } 4592 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach); 4593 4594 /** 4595 * security_tun_dev_open() - Update TUN device LSM state on open 4596 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4597 * 4598 * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated 4599 * with the TUN device's security structure. 4600 * 4601 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4602 */ 4603 int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) 4604 { 4605 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security); 4606 } 4607 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open); 4608 4609 /** 4610 * security_sctp_assoc_request() - Update the LSM on a SCTP association req 4611 * @asoc: SCTP association 4612 * @skb: packet requesting the association 4613 * 4614 * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association INIT packet to the LSM. 4615 * 4616 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4617 */ 4618 int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, 4619 struct sk_buff *skb) 4620 { 4621 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, asoc, skb); 4622 } 4623 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request); 4624 4625 /** 4626 * security_sctp_bind_connect() - Validate a list of addrs for a SCTP option 4627 * @sk: socket 4628 * @optname: SCTP option to validate 4629 * @address: list of IP addresses to validate 4630 * @addrlen: length of the address list 4631 * 4632 * Validiate permissions required for each address associated with sock @sk. 4633 * Depending on @optname, the addresses will be treated as either a connect or 4634 * bind service. The @addrlen is calculated on each IPv4 and IPv6 address using 4635 * sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6). 4636 * 4637 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4638 */ 4639 int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, 4640 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4641 { 4642 return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname, 4643 address, addrlen); 4644 } 4645 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect); 4646 4647 /** 4648 * security_sctp_sk_clone() - Clone a SCTP sock's LSM state 4649 * @asoc: SCTP association 4650 * @sk: original sock 4651 * @newsk: target sock 4652 * 4653 * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) (i.e. a TCP style 4654 * socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls 4655 * sctp_peeloff(3). 4656 */ 4657 void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk, 4658 struct sock *newsk) 4659 { 4660 call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, asoc, sk, newsk); 4661 } 4662 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone); 4663 4664 /** 4665 * security_sctp_assoc_established() - Update LSM state when assoc established 4666 * @asoc: SCTP association 4667 * @skb: packet establishing the association 4668 * 4669 * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association COOKIE_ACK packet to the 4670 * security module. 4671 * 4672 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4673 */ 4674 int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc, 4675 struct sk_buff *skb) 4676 { 4677 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, 0, asoc, skb); 4678 } 4679 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established); 4680 4681 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ 4682 4683 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND 4684 /** 4685 * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed 4686 * @sec: LSM blob 4687 * @subnet_prefix: subnet prefix of the port 4688 * @pkey: IB pkey 4689 * 4690 * Check permission to access a pkey when modifing a QP. 4691 * 4692 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4693 */ 4694 int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey) 4695 { 4696 return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey); 4697 } 4698 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access); 4699 4700 /** 4701 * security_ib_endport_manage_subnet() - Check if SMPs traffic is allowed 4702 * @sec: LSM blob 4703 * @dev_name: IB device name 4704 * @port_num: port number 4705 * 4706 * Check permissions to send and receive SMPs on a end port. 4707 * 4708 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4709 */ 4710 int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, 4711 const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) 4712 { 4713 return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec, 4714 dev_name, port_num); 4715 } 4716 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet); 4717 4718 /** 4719 * security_ib_alloc_security() - Allocate an Infiniband LSM blob 4720 * @sec: LSM blob 4721 * 4722 * Allocate a security structure for Infiniband objects. 4723 * 4724 * Return: Returns 0 on success, non-zero on failure. 4725 */ 4726 int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec) 4727 { 4728 return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec); 4729 } 4730 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security); 4731 4732 /** 4733 * security_ib_free_security() - Free an Infiniband LSM blob 4734 * @sec: LSM blob 4735 * 4736 * Deallocate an Infiniband security structure. 4737 */ 4738 void security_ib_free_security(void *sec) 4739 { 4740 call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec); 4741 } 4742 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security); 4743 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ 4744 4745 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM 4746 /** 4747 * security_xfrm_policy_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm policy LSM blob 4748 * @ctxp: xfrm security context being added to the SPD 4749 * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace 4750 * @gfp: gfp flags 4751 * 4752 * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security field 4753 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated. 4754 * 4755 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4756 */ 4757 int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, 4758 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, 4759 gfp_t gfp) 4760 { 4761 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp); 4762 } 4763 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc); 4764 4765 /** 4766 * security_xfrm_policy_clone() - Clone xfrm policy LSM state 4767 * @old_ctx: xfrm security context 4768 * @new_ctxp: target xfrm security context 4769 * 4770 * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the information from 4771 * the old_ctx structure. 4772 * 4773 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4774 */ 4775 int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, 4776 struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) 4777 { 4778 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp); 4779 } 4780 4781 /** 4782 * security_xfrm_policy_free() - Free a xfrm security context 4783 * @ctx: xfrm security context 4784 * 4785 * Free LSM resources associated with @ctx. 4786 */ 4787 void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 4788 { 4789 call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx); 4790 } 4791 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free); 4792 4793 /** 4794 * security_xfrm_policy_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm policy is allowed 4795 * @ctx: xfrm security context 4796 * 4797 * Authorize deletion of a SPD entry. 4798 * 4799 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4800 */ 4801 int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 4802 { 4803 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx); 4804 } 4805 4806 /** 4807 * security_xfrm_state_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob 4808 * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD 4809 * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace 4810 * 4811 * Allocate a security structure to the @x->security field; the security field 4812 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to 4813 * correspond to @sec_ctx. 4814 * 4815 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4816 */ 4817 int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, 4818 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) 4819 { 4820 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx); 4821 } 4822 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc); 4823 4824 /** 4825 * security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob 4826 * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD 4827 * @polsec: associated policy's security context 4828 * @secid: secid from the flow 4829 * 4830 * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security field 4831 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to 4832 * correspond to secid. 4833 * 4834 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. 4835 */ 4836 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, 4837 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) 4838 { 4839 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid); 4840 } 4841 4842 /** 4843 * security_xfrm_state_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm state is allowed 4844 * @x: xfrm state 4845 * 4846 * Authorize deletion of x->security. 4847 * 4848 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4849 */ 4850 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) 4851 { 4852 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x); 4853 } 4854 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete); 4855 4856 /** 4857 * security_xfrm_state_free() - Free a xfrm state 4858 * @x: xfrm state 4859 * 4860 * Deallocate x->security. 4861 */ 4862 void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) 4863 { 4864 call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x); 4865 } 4866 4867 /** 4868 * security_xfrm_policy_lookup() - Check if using a xfrm policy is allowed 4869 * @ctx: target xfrm security context 4870 * @fl_secid: flow secid used to authorize access 4871 * 4872 * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing XFRMs on a 4873 * packet. The hook is called when selecting either a per-socket policy or a 4874 * generic xfrm policy. 4875 * 4876 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno on 4877 * other errors. 4878 */ 4879 int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid) 4880 { 4881 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid); 4882 } 4883 4884 /** 4885 * security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() - Check for a xfrm match 4886 * @x: xfrm state to match 4887 * @xp: xfrm policy to check for a match 4888 * @flic: flow to check for a match. 4889 * 4890 * Check @xp and @flic for a match with @x. 4891 * 4892 * Return: Returns 1 if there is a match. 4893 */ 4894 int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, 4895 struct xfrm_policy *xp, 4896 const struct flowi_common *flic) 4897 { 4898 struct security_hook_list *hp; 4899 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); 4900 4901 /* 4902 * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment 4903 * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately, 4904 * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux 4905 * supplies this call. 4906 * 4907 * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than 4908 * using the macro 4909 */ 4910 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, 4911 list) { 4912 rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic); 4913 break; 4914 } 4915 return rc; 4916 } 4917 4918 /** 4919 * security_xfrm_decode_session() - Determine the xfrm secid for a packet 4920 * @skb: xfrm packet 4921 * @secid: secid 4922 * 4923 * Decode the packet in @skb and return the security label in @secid. 4924 * 4925 * Return: Return 0 if all xfrms used have the same secid. 4926 */ 4927 int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 4928 { 4929 return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1); 4930 } 4931 4932 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic) 4933 { 4934 int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid, 4935 0); 4936 4937 BUG_ON(rc); 4938 } 4939 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow); 4940 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ 4941 4942 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS 4943 /** 4944 * security_key_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a kernel key LSM blob 4945 * @key: key 4946 * @cred: credentials 4947 * @flags: allocation flags 4948 * 4949 * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does not 4950 * have a serial number assigned at this point. 4951 * 4952 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. 4953 */ 4954 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, 4955 unsigned long flags) 4956 { 4957 return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags); 4958 } 4959 4960 /** 4961 * security_key_free() - Free a kernel key LSM blob 4962 * @key: key 4963 * 4964 * Notification of destruction; free security data. 4965 */ 4966 void security_key_free(struct key *key) 4967 { 4968 call_void_hook(key_free, key); 4969 } 4970 4971 /** 4972 * security_key_permission() - Check if a kernel key operation is allowed 4973 * @key_ref: key reference 4974 * @cred: credentials of actor requesting access 4975 * @need_perm: requested permissions 4976 * 4977 * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a key. 4978 * 4979 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. 4980 */ 4981 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, 4982 enum key_need_perm need_perm) 4983 { 4984 return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm); 4985 } 4986 4987 /** 4988 * security_key_getsecurity() - Get the key's security label 4989 * @key: key 4990 * @buffer: security label buffer 4991 * 4992 * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key for 4993 * the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function allocates the 4994 * storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller should free it. 4995 * 4996 * Return: Returns the length of @buffer (including terminating NUL) or -ve if 4997 * an error occurs. May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if 4998 * there is no security label assigned to the key. 4999 */ 5000 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer) 5001 { 5002 *buffer = NULL; 5003 return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, buffer); 5004 } 5005 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ 5006 5007 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT 5008 /** 5009 * security_audit_rule_init() - Allocate and init an LSM audit rule struct 5010 * @field: audit action 5011 * @op: rule operator 5012 * @rulestr: rule context 5013 * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct 5014 * 5015 * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. 5016 * 5017 * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of 5018 * an invalid rule. 5019 */ 5020 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) 5021 { 5022 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); 5023 } 5024 5025 /** 5026 * security_audit_rule_known() - Check if an audit rule contains LSM fields 5027 * @krule: audit rule 5028 * 5029 * Specifies whether given @krule contains any fields related to the current 5030 * LSM. 5031 * 5032 * Return: Returns 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise. 5033 */ 5034 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) 5035 { 5036 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule); 5037 } 5038 5039 /** 5040 * security_audit_rule_free() - Free an LSM audit rule struct 5041 * @lsmrule: audit rule struct 5042 * 5043 * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by 5044 * audit_rule_init(). 5045 */ 5046 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) 5047 { 5048 call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); 5049 } 5050 5051 /** 5052 * security_audit_rule_match() - Check if a label matches an audit rule 5053 * @secid: security label 5054 * @field: LSM audit field 5055 * @op: matching operator 5056 * @lsmrule: audit rule 5057 * 5058 * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved by 5059 * security_audit_rule_known(). 5060 * 5061 * Return: Returns 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on 5062 * failure. 5063 */ 5064 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) 5065 { 5066 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule); 5067 } 5068 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ 5069 5070 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL 5071 /** 5072 * security_bpf() - Check if the bpf syscall operation is allowed 5073 * @cmd: command 5074 * @attr: bpf attribute 5075 * @size: size 5076 * 5077 * Do a initial check for all bpf syscalls after the attribute is copied into 5078 * the kernel. The actual security module can implement their own rules to 5079 * check the specific cmd they need. 5080 * 5081 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5082 */ 5083 int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) 5084 { 5085 return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size); 5086 } 5087 5088 /** 5089 * security_bpf_map() - Check if access to a bpf map is allowed 5090 * @map: bpf map 5091 * @fmode: mode 5092 * 5093 * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF 5094 * maps. 5095 * 5096 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5097 */ 5098 int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) 5099 { 5100 return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode); 5101 } 5102 5103 /** 5104 * security_bpf_prog() - Check if access to a bpf program is allowed 5105 * @prog: bpf program 5106 * 5107 * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF 5108 * programs. 5109 * 5110 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5111 */ 5112 int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) 5113 { 5114 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog); 5115 } 5116 5117 /** 5118 * security_bpf_map_alloc() - Allocate a bpf map LSM blob 5119 * @map: bpf map 5120 * 5121 * Initialize the security field inside bpf map. 5122 * 5123 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5124 */ 5125 int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) 5126 { 5127 return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map); 5128 } 5129 5130 /** 5131 * security_bpf_prog_alloc() - Allocate a bpf program LSM blob 5132 * @aux: bpf program aux info struct 5133 * 5134 * Initialize the security field inside bpf program. 5135 * 5136 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5137 */ 5138 int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 5139 { 5140 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux); 5141 } 5142 5143 /** 5144 * security_bpf_map_free() - Free a bpf map's LSM blob 5145 * @map: bpf map 5146 * 5147 * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf map. 5148 */ 5149 void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) 5150 { 5151 call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map); 5152 } 5153 5154 /** 5155 * security_bpf_prog_free() - Free a bpf program's LSM blob 5156 * @aux: bpf program aux info struct 5157 * 5158 * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog. 5159 */ 5160 void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 5161 { 5162 call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); 5163 } 5164 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ 5165 5166 /** 5167 * security_locked_down() - Check if a kernel feature is allowed 5168 * @what: requested kernel feature 5169 * 5170 * Determine whether a kernel feature that potentially enables arbitrary code 5171 * execution in kernel space should be permitted. 5172 * 5173 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5174 */ 5175 int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) 5176 { 5177 return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what); 5178 } 5179 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down); 5180 5181 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 5182 /** 5183 * security_perf_event_open() - Check if a perf event open is allowed 5184 * @attr: perf event attribute 5185 * @type: type of event 5186 * 5187 * Check whether the @type of perf_event_open syscall is allowed. 5188 * 5189 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5190 */ 5191 int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) 5192 { 5193 return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type); 5194 } 5195 5196 /** 5197 * security_perf_event_alloc() - Allocate a perf event LSM blob 5198 * @event: perf event 5199 * 5200 * Allocate and save perf_event security info. 5201 * 5202 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5203 */ 5204 int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) 5205 { 5206 return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event); 5207 } 5208 5209 /** 5210 * security_perf_event_free() - Free a perf event LSM blob 5211 * @event: perf event 5212 * 5213 * Release (free) perf_event security info. 5214 */ 5215 void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) 5216 { 5217 call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event); 5218 } 5219 5220 /** 5221 * security_perf_event_read() - Check if reading a perf event label is allowed 5222 * @event: perf event 5223 * 5224 * Read perf_event security info if allowed. 5225 * 5226 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5227 */ 5228 int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) 5229 { 5230 return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event); 5231 } 5232 5233 /** 5234 * security_perf_event_write() - Check if writing a perf event label is allowed 5235 * @event: perf event 5236 * 5237 * Write perf_event security info if allowed. 5238 * 5239 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5240 */ 5241 int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) 5242 { 5243 return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event); 5244 } 5245 #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */ 5246 5247 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING 5248 /** 5249 * security_uring_override_creds() - Check if overriding creds is allowed 5250 * @new: new credentials 5251 * 5252 * Check if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to 5253 * override it's credentials with @new. 5254 * 5255 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5256 */ 5257 int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) 5258 { 5259 return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, 0, new); 5260 } 5261 5262 /** 5263 * security_uring_sqpoll() - Check if IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL is allowed 5264 * 5265 * Check whether the current task is allowed to spawn a io_uring polling thread 5266 * (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). 5267 * 5268 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5269 */ 5270 int security_uring_sqpoll(void) 5271 { 5272 return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0); 5273 } 5274 5275 /** 5276 * security_uring_cmd() - Check if a io_uring passthrough command is allowed 5277 * @ioucmd: command 5278 * 5279 * Check whether the file_operations uring_cmd is allowed to run. 5280 * 5281 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5282 */ 5283 int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) 5284 { 5285 return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd); 5286 } 5287 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ 5288