1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later 2 /* 3 * Security plug functions 4 * 5 * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com> 6 * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> 7 * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com> 8 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies 9 * Copyright (C) 2023 Microsoft Corporation <paul@paul-moore.com> 10 */ 11 12 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt 13 14 #include <linux/bpf.h> 15 #include <linux/capability.h> 16 #include <linux/dcache.h> 17 #include <linux/export.h> 18 #include <linux/init.h> 19 #include <linux/kernel.h> 20 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> 21 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> 22 #include <linux/integrity.h> 23 #include <linux/ima.h> 24 #include <linux/evm.h> 25 #include <linux/fsnotify.h> 26 #include <linux/mman.h> 27 #include <linux/mount.h> 28 #include <linux/personality.h> 29 #include <linux/backing-dev.h> 30 #include <linux/string.h> 31 #include <linux/msg.h> 32 #include <net/flow.h> 33 34 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 35 36 /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ 37 #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) 38 39 /* 40 * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the 41 * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows 42 * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing 43 * purposes. 44 */ 45 const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { 46 [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", 47 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", 48 [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", 49 [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access", 50 [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", 51 [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", 52 [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", 53 [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", 54 [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", 55 [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", 56 [LOCKDOWN_DEVICE_TREE] = "modifying device tree contents", 57 [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage", 58 [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO", 59 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters", 60 [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio", 61 [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access", 62 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access", 63 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM", 64 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM", 65 [LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection", 66 [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", 67 [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", 68 [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", 69 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", 70 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM", 71 [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", 72 [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", 73 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access", 74 [LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret", 75 [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", 76 }; 77 78 struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init; 79 static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain); 80 81 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; 82 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; 83 84 char *lsm_names; 85 static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init; 86 87 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ 88 static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; 89 static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm; 90 91 static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM; 92 93 /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ 94 static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms; 95 static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive; 96 97 static __initdata bool debug; 98 #define init_debug(...) \ 99 do { \ 100 if (debug) \ 101 pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \ 102 } while (0) 103 104 static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm) 105 { 106 if (!lsm->enabled) 107 return false; 108 109 return *lsm->enabled; 110 } 111 112 /* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */ 113 static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1; 114 static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0; 115 static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled) 116 { 117 /* 118 * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use 119 * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state. 120 */ 121 if (!lsm->enabled) { 122 if (enabled) 123 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 124 else 125 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 126 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) { 127 if (!enabled) 128 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 129 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) { 130 if (enabled) 131 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 132 } else { 133 *lsm->enabled = enabled; 134 } 135 } 136 137 /* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */ 138 static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 139 { 140 struct lsm_info **check; 141 142 for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++) 143 if (*check == lsm) 144 return true; 145 146 return false; 147 } 148 149 /* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */ 150 static int last_lsm __initdata; 151 static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from) 152 { 153 /* Ignore duplicate selections. */ 154 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 155 return; 156 157 if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from)) 158 return; 159 160 /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */ 161 if (!lsm->enabled) 162 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 163 ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm; 164 165 init_debug("%s ordered: %s (%s)\n", from, lsm->name, 166 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 167 } 168 169 /* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */ 170 static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm) 171 { 172 /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */ 173 if (!is_enabled(lsm)) 174 return false; 175 176 /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */ 177 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) { 178 init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name); 179 return false; 180 } 181 182 return true; 183 } 184 185 static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs) 186 { 187 int offset; 188 189 if (*need <= 0) 190 return; 191 192 offset = ALIGN(*lbs, sizeof(void *)); 193 *lbs = offset + *need; 194 *need = offset; 195 } 196 197 static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) 198 { 199 if (!needed) 200 return; 201 202 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 203 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file); 204 /* 205 * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to 206 * what the modules might need. 207 */ 208 if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0) 209 blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head); 210 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 211 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 212 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 213 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 214 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); 215 } 216 217 /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ 218 static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 219 { 220 int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm); 221 222 /* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */ 223 set_enabled(lsm, enabled); 224 225 /* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */ 226 if (enabled) { 227 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) { 228 exclusive = lsm; 229 init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name); 230 } 231 232 lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs); 233 } 234 } 235 236 /* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */ 237 static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 238 { 239 if (is_enabled(lsm)) { 240 int ret; 241 242 init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name); 243 ret = lsm->init(); 244 WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret); 245 } 246 } 247 248 /* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */ 249 static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) 250 { 251 struct lsm_info *lsm; 252 char *sep, *name, *next; 253 254 /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */ 255 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 256 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST) 257 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " first"); 258 } 259 260 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 261 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 262 struct lsm_info *major; 263 264 /* 265 * To match the original "security=" behavior, this 266 * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major 267 * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable 268 * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs. 269 */ 270 for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info; 271 major++) { 272 if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) && 273 strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) { 274 set_enabled(major, false); 275 init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s (only one legacy major LSM)\n", 276 chosen_major_lsm, major->name); 277 } 278 } 279 } 280 281 sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL); 282 next = sep; 283 /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */ 284 while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) { 285 bool found = false; 286 287 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 288 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE && 289 strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) { 290 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin); 291 found = true; 292 } 293 } 294 295 if (!found) 296 init_debug("%s ignored: %s (not built into kernel)\n", 297 origin, name); 298 } 299 300 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 301 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 302 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 303 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 304 continue; 305 if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0) 306 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security="); 307 } 308 } 309 310 /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */ 311 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 312 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 313 continue; 314 set_enabled(lsm, false); 315 init_debug("%s skipped: %s (not in requested order)\n", 316 origin, lsm->name); 317 } 318 319 kfree(sep); 320 } 321 322 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred); 323 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task); 324 325 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result); 326 327 static void __init report_lsm_order(void) 328 { 329 struct lsm_info **lsm, *early; 330 int first = 0; 331 332 pr_info("initializing lsm="); 333 334 /* Report each enabled LSM name, comma separated. */ 335 for (early = __start_early_lsm_info; early < __end_early_lsm_info; early++) 336 if (is_enabled(early)) 337 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", early->name); 338 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 339 if (is_enabled(*lsm)) 340 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", (*lsm)->name); 341 342 pr_cont("\n"); 343 } 344 345 static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) 346 { 347 struct lsm_info **lsm; 348 349 ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms), 350 GFP_KERNEL); 351 352 if (chosen_lsm_order) { 353 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 354 pr_warn("security=%s is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=%s\n", 355 chosen_major_lsm, chosen_lsm_order); 356 chosen_major_lsm = NULL; 357 } 358 ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline"); 359 } else 360 ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin"); 361 362 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 363 prepare_lsm(*lsm); 364 365 report_lsm_order(); 366 367 init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 368 init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file); 369 init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 370 init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 371 init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 372 init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 373 init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); 374 375 /* 376 * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs 377 */ 378 if (blob_sizes.lbs_file) 379 lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache", 380 blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0, 381 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 382 if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode) 383 lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache", 384 blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0, 385 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 386 387 lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred); 388 lsm_early_task(current); 389 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 390 initialize_lsm(*lsm); 391 392 kfree(ordered_lsms); 393 } 394 395 int __init early_security_init(void) 396 { 397 struct lsm_info *lsm; 398 399 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 400 INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&security_hook_heads.NAME); 401 #include "linux/lsm_hook_defs.h" 402 #undef LSM_HOOK 403 404 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 405 if (!lsm->enabled) 406 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 407 prepare_lsm(lsm); 408 initialize_lsm(lsm); 409 } 410 411 return 0; 412 } 413 414 /** 415 * security_init - initializes the security framework 416 * 417 * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence. 418 */ 419 int __init security_init(void) 420 { 421 struct lsm_info *lsm; 422 423 init_debug("legacy security=%s\n", chosen_major_lsm ?: " *unspecified*"); 424 init_debug(" CONFIG_LSM=%s\n", builtin_lsm_order); 425 init_debug("boot arg lsm=%s\n", chosen_lsm_order ?: " *unspecified*"); 426 427 /* 428 * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is 429 * available 430 */ 431 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 432 init_debug(" early started: %s (%s)\n", lsm->name, 433 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 434 if (lsm->enabled) 435 lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names); 436 } 437 438 /* Load LSMs in specified order. */ 439 ordered_lsm_init(); 440 441 return 0; 442 } 443 444 /* Save user chosen LSM */ 445 static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str) 446 { 447 chosen_major_lsm = str; 448 return 1; 449 } 450 __setup("security=", choose_major_lsm); 451 452 /* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */ 453 static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str) 454 { 455 chosen_lsm_order = str; 456 return 1; 457 } 458 __setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order); 459 460 /* Enable LSM order debugging. */ 461 static int __init enable_debug(char *str) 462 { 463 debug = true; 464 return 1; 465 } 466 __setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug); 467 468 static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm) 469 { 470 const char *last; 471 472 if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm)) 473 return false; 474 last = strrchr(list, ','); 475 if (last) 476 /* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */ 477 last++; 478 else 479 last = list; 480 return !strcmp(last, lsm); 481 } 482 483 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) 484 { 485 char *cp; 486 487 if (*result == NULL) { 488 *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL); 489 if (*result == NULL) 490 return -ENOMEM; 491 } else { 492 /* Check if it is the last registered name */ 493 if (match_last_lsm(*result, new)) 494 return 0; 495 cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new); 496 if (cp == NULL) 497 return -ENOMEM; 498 kfree(*result); 499 *result = cp; 500 } 501 return 0; 502 } 503 504 /** 505 * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. 506 * @hooks: the hooks to add 507 * @count: the number of hooks to add 508 * @lsm: the name of the security module 509 * 510 * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. 511 */ 512 void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, 513 const char *lsm) 514 { 515 int i; 516 517 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { 518 hooks[i].lsm = lsm; 519 hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); 520 } 521 522 /* 523 * Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back 524 * and fix this up afterwards. 525 */ 526 if (slab_is_available()) { 527 if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0) 528 panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__); 529 } 530 } 531 532 int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) 533 { 534 return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 535 event, data); 536 } 537 EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier); 538 539 int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 540 { 541 return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 542 nb); 543 } 544 EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier); 545 546 int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 547 { 548 return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 549 nb); 550 } 551 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier); 552 553 /** 554 * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob 555 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 556 * @gfp: allocation type 557 * 558 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 559 * 560 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 561 */ 562 static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 563 { 564 if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) { 565 cred->security = NULL; 566 return 0; 567 } 568 569 cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp); 570 if (cred->security == NULL) 571 return -ENOMEM; 572 return 0; 573 } 574 575 /** 576 * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob 577 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 578 * 579 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 580 */ 581 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred) 582 { 583 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL); 584 585 if (rc) 586 panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__); 587 } 588 589 /** 590 * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob 591 * @file: the file that needs a blob 592 * 593 * Allocate the file blob for all the modules 594 * 595 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 596 */ 597 static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file) 598 { 599 if (!lsm_file_cache) { 600 file->f_security = NULL; 601 return 0; 602 } 603 604 file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL); 605 if (file->f_security == NULL) 606 return -ENOMEM; 607 return 0; 608 } 609 610 /** 611 * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob 612 * @inode: the inode that needs a blob 613 * 614 * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules 615 * 616 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 617 */ 618 int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 619 { 620 if (!lsm_inode_cache) { 621 inode->i_security = NULL; 622 return 0; 623 } 624 625 inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); 626 if (inode->i_security == NULL) 627 return -ENOMEM; 628 return 0; 629 } 630 631 /** 632 * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob 633 * @task: the task that needs a blob 634 * 635 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 636 * 637 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 638 */ 639 static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) 640 { 641 if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) { 642 task->security = NULL; 643 return 0; 644 } 645 646 task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL); 647 if (task->security == NULL) 648 return -ENOMEM; 649 return 0; 650 } 651 652 /** 653 * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob 654 * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob 655 * 656 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 657 * 658 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 659 */ 660 static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip) 661 { 662 if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) { 663 kip->security = NULL; 664 return 0; 665 } 666 667 kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL); 668 if (kip->security == NULL) 669 return -ENOMEM; 670 return 0; 671 } 672 673 /** 674 * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob 675 * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob 676 * 677 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 678 * 679 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 680 */ 681 static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp) 682 { 683 if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) { 684 mp->security = NULL; 685 return 0; 686 } 687 688 mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL); 689 if (mp->security == NULL) 690 return -ENOMEM; 691 return 0; 692 } 693 694 /** 695 * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob 696 * @task: the task that needs a blob 697 * 698 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 699 */ 700 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) 701 { 702 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 703 704 if (rc) 705 panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__); 706 } 707 708 /** 709 * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob 710 * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob 711 * 712 * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules 713 * 714 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 715 */ 716 static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 717 { 718 if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) { 719 sb->s_security = NULL; 720 return 0; 721 } 722 723 sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL); 724 if (sb->s_security == NULL) 725 return -ENOMEM; 726 return 0; 727 } 728 729 /* 730 * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and 731 * can be accessed with: 732 * 733 * LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) 734 * 735 * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each 736 * LSM hook. 737 */ 738 #define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default) 739 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME) 740 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \ 741 static const int __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT); 742 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 743 DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME) 744 745 #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h> 746 #undef LSM_HOOK 747 748 /* 749 * Hook list operation macros. 750 * 751 * call_void_hook: 752 * This is a hook that does not return a value. 753 * 754 * call_int_hook: 755 * This is a hook that returns a value. 756 */ 757 758 #define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \ 759 do { \ 760 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 761 \ 762 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \ 763 P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 764 } while (0) 765 766 #define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \ 767 int RC = IRC; \ 768 do { \ 769 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 770 \ 771 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ 772 RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 773 if (RC != 0) \ 774 break; \ 775 } \ 776 } while (0); \ 777 RC; \ 778 }) 779 780 /* Security operations */ 781 782 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr) 783 { 784 return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr); 785 } 786 787 int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from, 788 const struct cred *to) 789 { 790 return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to); 791 } 792 793 int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, 794 const struct cred *to) 795 { 796 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to); 797 } 798 799 int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, 800 const struct cred *to, struct file *file) 801 { 802 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file); 803 } 804 805 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) 806 { 807 return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode); 808 } 809 810 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) 811 { 812 return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent); 813 } 814 815 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, 816 kernel_cap_t *effective, 817 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 818 kernel_cap_t *permitted) 819 { 820 return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target, 821 effective, inheritable, permitted); 822 } 823 824 int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 825 const kernel_cap_t *effective, 826 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 827 const kernel_cap_t *permitted) 828 { 829 return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old, 830 effective, inheritable, permitted); 831 } 832 833 int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, 834 struct user_namespace *ns, 835 int cap, 836 unsigned int opts) 837 { 838 return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); 839 } 840 841 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) 842 { 843 return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb); 844 } 845 846 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) 847 { 848 return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry); 849 } 850 851 int security_syslog(int type) 852 { 853 return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type); 854 } 855 856 int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz) 857 { 858 return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz); 859 } 860 861 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) 862 { 863 struct security_hook_list *hp; 864 int cap_sys_admin = 1; 865 int rc; 866 867 /* 868 * The module will respond with a positive value if 869 * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be 870 * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules 871 * agree that it should be set it will. If any module 872 * thinks it should not be set it won't. 873 */ 874 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) { 875 rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); 876 if (rc <= 0) { 877 cap_sys_admin = 0; 878 break; 879 } 880 } 881 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); 882 } 883 884 /** 885 * security_bprm_creds_for_exec() - Prepare the credentials for exec() 886 * @bprm: binary program information 887 * 888 * If the setup in prepare_exec_creds did not setup @bprm->cred->security 889 * properly for executing @bprm->file, update the LSM's portion of 890 * @bprm->cred->security to be what commit_creds needs to install for the new 891 * program. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 892 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 893 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. @bprm 894 * contains the linux_binprm structure. 895 * 896 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 897 */ 898 int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 899 { 900 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm); 901 } 902 903 /** 904 * security_bprm_creds_from_file() - Update linux_binprm creds based on file 905 * @bprm: binary program information 906 * @file: associated file 907 * 908 * If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change privilege upon 909 * exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change. This is called after 910 * finding the binary that will be executed without an interpreter. This 911 * ensures that the credentials will not be derived from a script that the 912 * binary will need to reopen, which when reopend may end up being a completely 913 * different file. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 914 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 915 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. The 916 * hook must add to @bprm->per_clear any personality flags that should be 917 * cleared from current->personality. @bprm contains the linux_binprm 918 * structure. 919 * 920 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 921 */ 922 int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) 923 { 924 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file); 925 } 926 927 /** 928 * security_bprm_check() - Mediate binary handler search 929 * @bprm: binary program information 930 * 931 * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will begin. 932 * It allows a check against the @bprm->cred->security value which was set in 933 * the preceding creds_for_exec call. The argv list and envp list are reliably 934 * available in @bprm. This hook may be called multiple times during a single 935 * execve. @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. 936 * 937 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 938 */ 939 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 940 { 941 int ret; 942 943 ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); 944 if (ret) 945 return ret; 946 return ima_bprm_check(bprm); 947 } 948 949 /** 950 * security_bprm_committing_creds() - Install creds for a process during exec() 951 * @bprm: binary program information 952 * 953 * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being 954 * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials pointed to 955 * by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by the 956 * bprm_creds_for_exec hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure. This 957 * hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such as closing 958 * open file descriptors to which access will no longer be granted when the 959 * attributes are changed. This is called immediately before commit_creds(). 960 */ 961 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 962 { 963 call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm); 964 } 965 966 /** 967 * security_bprm_committed_creds() - Tidy up after cred install during exec() 968 * @bprm: binary program information 969 * 970 * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a process 971 * being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials have, by this 972 * point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the linux_binprm 973 * structure. This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the 974 * process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal state. This is called 975 * immediately after commit_creds(). 976 */ 977 void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 978 { 979 call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm); 980 } 981 982 /** 983 * security_fs_context_dup() - Duplicate a fs_context LSM blob 984 * @fc: destination filesystem context 985 * @src_fc: source filesystem context 986 * 987 * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer is 988 * initialised to NULL by the caller. @fc indicates the new filesystem context. 989 * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context. 990 * 991 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure. 992 */ 993 int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) 994 { 995 return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc); 996 } 997 998 /** 999 * security_fs_context_parse_param() - Configure a filesystem context 1000 * @fc: filesystem context 1001 * @param: filesystem parameter 1002 * 1003 * Userspace provided a parameter to configure a superblock. The LSM can 1004 * consume the parameter or return it to the caller for use elsewhere. 1005 * 1006 * Return: If the parameter is used by the LSM it should return 0, if it is 1007 * returned to the caller -ENOPARAM is returned, otherwise a negative 1008 * error code is returned. 1009 */ 1010 int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, 1011 struct fs_parameter *param) 1012 { 1013 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1014 int trc; 1015 int rc = -ENOPARAM; 1016 1017 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.fs_context_parse_param, 1018 list) { 1019 trc = hp->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param); 1020 if (trc == 0) 1021 rc = 0; 1022 else if (trc != -ENOPARAM) 1023 return trc; 1024 } 1025 return rc; 1026 } 1027 1028 int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 1029 { 1030 int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb); 1031 1032 if (unlikely(rc)) 1033 return rc; 1034 rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb); 1035 if (unlikely(rc)) 1036 security_sb_free(sb); 1037 return rc; 1038 } 1039 1040 void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb) 1041 { 1042 call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb); 1043 } 1044 1045 void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) 1046 { 1047 call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb); 1048 kfree(sb->s_security); 1049 sb->s_security = NULL; 1050 } 1051 1052 void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts) 1053 { 1054 if (!*mnt_opts) 1055 return; 1056 call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts); 1057 *mnt_opts = NULL; 1058 } 1059 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts); 1060 1061 int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) 1062 { 1063 return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts); 1064 } 1065 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts); 1066 1067 int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, 1068 void *mnt_opts) 1069 { 1070 return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1071 } 1072 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat); 1073 1074 int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, 1075 void *mnt_opts) 1076 { 1077 return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1078 } 1079 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount); 1080 1081 int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb) 1082 { 1083 return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb); 1084 } 1085 1086 int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) 1087 { 1088 return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb); 1089 } 1090 1091 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) 1092 { 1093 return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry); 1094 } 1095 1096 int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, 1097 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) 1098 { 1099 return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data); 1100 } 1101 1102 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) 1103 { 1104 return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags); 1105 } 1106 1107 int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path) 1108 { 1109 return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path); 1110 } 1111 1112 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, 1113 void *mnt_opts, 1114 unsigned long kern_flags, 1115 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1116 { 1117 return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts, 1118 mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb, 1119 mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1120 } 1121 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts); 1122 1123 int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, 1124 struct super_block *newsb, 1125 unsigned long kern_flags, 1126 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1127 { 1128 return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb, 1129 kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1130 } 1131 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts); 1132 1133 int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path) 1134 { 1135 return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path); 1136 } 1137 1138 int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, 1139 unsigned int obj_type) 1140 { 1141 return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type); 1142 } 1143 1144 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 1145 { 1146 int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode); 1147 1148 if (unlikely(rc)) 1149 return rc; 1150 rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode); 1151 if (unlikely(rc)) 1152 security_inode_free(inode); 1153 return rc; 1154 } 1155 1156 static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) 1157 { 1158 /* 1159 * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob 1160 */ 1161 kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head); 1162 } 1163 1164 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) 1165 { 1166 integrity_inode_free(inode); 1167 call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode); 1168 /* 1169 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and 1170 * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made 1171 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS 1172 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder 1173 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and 1174 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact. 1175 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too. 1176 */ 1177 if (inode->i_security) 1178 call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security, 1179 inode_free_by_rcu); 1180 } 1181 1182 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1183 const struct qstr *name, 1184 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx, 1185 u32 *ctxlen) 1186 { 1187 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1188 int rc; 1189 1190 /* 1191 * Only one module will provide a security context. 1192 */ 1193 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security, list) { 1194 rc = hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name, 1195 xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen); 1196 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security)) 1197 return rc; 1198 } 1199 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security); 1200 } 1201 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security); 1202 1203 int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1204 struct qstr *name, 1205 const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) 1206 { 1207 return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode, 1208 name, old, new); 1209 } 1210 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as); 1211 1212 int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1213 const struct qstr *qstr, 1214 const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) 1215 { 1216 struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1]; 1217 struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr; 1218 int ret; 1219 1220 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1221 return 0; 1222 1223 if (!initxattrs) 1224 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, 1225 dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL); 1226 memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs)); 1227 lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; 1228 ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, 1229 &lsm_xattr->name, 1230 &lsm_xattr->value, 1231 &lsm_xattr->value_len); 1232 if (ret) 1233 goto out; 1234 1235 evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1; 1236 ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr); 1237 if (ret) 1238 goto out; 1239 ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); 1240 out: 1241 for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) 1242 kfree(xattr->value); 1243 return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret; 1244 } 1245 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); 1246 1247 int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, 1248 const struct qstr *name, 1249 const struct inode *context_inode) 1250 { 1251 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, name, 1252 context_inode); 1253 } 1254 1255 int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1256 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, 1257 void **value, size_t *len) 1258 { 1259 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1260 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 1261 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, 1262 qstr, name, value, len); 1263 } 1264 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security); 1265 1266 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH 1267 int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, 1268 unsigned int dev) 1269 { 1270 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1271 return 0; 1272 return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1273 } 1274 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod); 1275 1276 int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1277 { 1278 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1279 return 0; 1280 return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1281 } 1282 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir); 1283 1284 int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1285 { 1286 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1287 return 0; 1288 return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1289 } 1290 1291 int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1292 { 1293 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1294 return 0; 1295 return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1296 } 1297 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink); 1298 1299 int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1300 const char *old_name) 1301 { 1302 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1303 return 0; 1304 return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1305 } 1306 1307 int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, 1308 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1309 { 1310 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1311 return 0; 1312 return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); 1313 } 1314 1315 int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 1316 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 1317 unsigned int flags) 1318 { 1319 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 1320 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 1321 return 0; 1322 1323 return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, 1324 new_dentry, flags); 1325 } 1326 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename); 1327 1328 int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path) 1329 { 1330 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1331 return 0; 1332 return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path); 1333 } 1334 1335 int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) 1336 { 1337 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1338 return 0; 1339 return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode); 1340 } 1341 1342 int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) 1343 { 1344 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1345 return 0; 1346 return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid); 1347 } 1348 1349 int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path) 1350 { 1351 return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path); 1352 } 1353 #endif 1354 1355 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1356 { 1357 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1358 return 0; 1359 return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1360 } 1361 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create); 1362 1363 int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, 1364 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1365 { 1366 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1367 return 0; 1368 return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); 1369 } 1370 1371 int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1372 { 1373 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1374 return 0; 1375 return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1376 } 1377 1378 int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1379 const char *old_name) 1380 { 1381 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1382 return 0; 1383 return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1384 } 1385 1386 int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1387 { 1388 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1389 return 0; 1390 return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1391 } 1392 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir); 1393 1394 int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1395 { 1396 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1397 return 0; 1398 return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1399 } 1400 1401 int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev) 1402 { 1403 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1404 return 0; 1405 return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1406 } 1407 1408 int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 1409 struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 1410 unsigned int flags) 1411 { 1412 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 1413 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 1414 return 0; 1415 1416 if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { 1417 int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry, 1418 old_dir, old_dentry); 1419 if (err) 1420 return err; 1421 } 1422 1423 return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, 1424 new_dir, new_dentry); 1425 } 1426 1427 int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) 1428 { 1429 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1430 return 0; 1431 return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry); 1432 } 1433 1434 int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, 1435 bool rcu) 1436 { 1437 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1438 return 0; 1439 return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu); 1440 } 1441 1442 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) 1443 { 1444 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1445 return 0; 1446 return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask); 1447 } 1448 1449 int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 1450 struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 1451 { 1452 int ret; 1453 1454 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1455 return 0; 1456 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr); 1457 if (ret) 1458 return ret; 1459 return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); 1460 } 1461 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); 1462 1463 int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) 1464 { 1465 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1466 return 0; 1467 return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path); 1468 } 1469 1470 int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 1471 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 1472 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 1473 { 1474 int ret; 1475 1476 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1477 return 0; 1478 /* 1479 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 1480 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 1481 */ 1482 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name, value, 1483 size, flags); 1484 1485 if (ret == 1) 1486 ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); 1487 if (ret) 1488 return ret; 1489 ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 1490 if (ret) 1491 return ret; 1492 return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size); 1493 } 1494 1495 int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 1496 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, 1497 struct posix_acl *kacl) 1498 { 1499 int ret; 1500 1501 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1502 return 0; 1503 ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, 1504 kacl); 1505 if (ret) 1506 return ret; 1507 ret = ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 1508 if (ret) 1509 return ret; 1510 return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 1511 } 1512 1513 int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 1514 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 1515 { 1516 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1517 return 0; 1518 return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 1519 } 1520 1521 int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 1522 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 1523 { 1524 int ret; 1525 1526 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1527 return 0; 1528 ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 1529 if (ret) 1530 return ret; 1531 ret = ima_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 1532 if (ret) 1533 return ret; 1534 return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 1535 } 1536 1537 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 1538 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 1539 { 1540 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1541 return; 1542 call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); 1543 evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 1544 } 1545 1546 int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 1547 { 1548 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1549 return 0; 1550 return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name); 1551 } 1552 1553 int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) 1554 { 1555 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1556 return 0; 1557 return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry); 1558 } 1559 1560 int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 1561 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 1562 { 1563 int ret; 1564 1565 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1566 return 0; 1567 /* 1568 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 1569 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 1570 */ 1571 ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); 1572 if (ret == 1) 1573 ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 1574 if (ret) 1575 return ret; 1576 ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); 1577 if (ret) 1578 return ret; 1579 return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 1580 } 1581 1582 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) 1583 { 1584 return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry); 1585 } 1586 1587 int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 1588 struct dentry *dentry) 1589 { 1590 return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, idmap, dentry); 1591 } 1592 1593 int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 1594 struct inode *inode, const char *name, 1595 void **buffer, bool alloc) 1596 { 1597 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1598 int rc; 1599 1600 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1601 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 1602 /* 1603 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 1604 */ 1605 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) { 1606 rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name, buffer, alloc); 1607 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity)) 1608 return rc; 1609 } 1610 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 1611 } 1612 1613 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 1614 { 1615 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1616 int rc; 1617 1618 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1619 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 1620 /* 1621 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 1622 */ 1623 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) { 1624 rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, 1625 flags); 1626 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity)) 1627 return rc; 1628 } 1629 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 1630 } 1631 1632 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) 1633 { 1634 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1635 return 0; 1636 return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size); 1637 } 1638 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity); 1639 1640 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) 1641 { 1642 call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid); 1643 } 1644 1645 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) 1646 { 1647 return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new); 1648 } 1649 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up); 1650 1651 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) 1652 { 1653 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1654 int rc; 1655 1656 /* 1657 * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the 1658 * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or 1659 * any other error code incase of an error. 1660 */ 1661 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, 1662 &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) { 1663 rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name); 1664 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr)) 1665 return rc; 1666 } 1667 1668 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr); 1669 } 1670 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr); 1671 1672 int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, 1673 struct kernfs_node *kn) 1674 { 1675 return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn); 1676 } 1677 1678 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) 1679 { 1680 int ret; 1681 1682 ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask); 1683 if (ret) 1684 return ret; 1685 1686 return fsnotify_perm(file, mask); 1687 } 1688 1689 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) 1690 { 1691 int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file); 1692 1693 if (rc) 1694 return rc; 1695 rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file); 1696 if (unlikely(rc)) 1697 security_file_free(file); 1698 return rc; 1699 } 1700 1701 void security_file_free(struct file *file) 1702 { 1703 void *blob; 1704 1705 call_void_hook(file_free_security, file); 1706 1707 blob = file->f_security; 1708 if (blob) { 1709 file->f_security = NULL; 1710 kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob); 1711 } 1712 } 1713 1714 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 1715 { 1716 return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 1717 } 1718 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl); 1719 1720 static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) 1721 { 1722 /* 1723 * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect 1724 * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about... 1725 */ 1726 if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ) 1727 return prot; 1728 if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) 1729 return prot; 1730 /* 1731 * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it. 1732 */ 1733 if (!file) 1734 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 1735 /* 1736 * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need 1737 * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case 1738 */ 1739 if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) { 1740 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU 1741 if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) { 1742 unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file); 1743 if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC)) 1744 return prot; 1745 } 1746 #endif 1747 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 1748 } 1749 /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */ 1750 return prot; 1751 } 1752 1753 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, 1754 unsigned long flags) 1755 { 1756 unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot); 1757 int ret; 1758 1759 ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 1760 if (ret) 1761 return ret; 1762 return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 1763 } 1764 1765 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) 1766 { 1767 return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr); 1768 } 1769 1770 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, 1771 unsigned long prot) 1772 { 1773 int ret; 1774 1775 ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); 1776 if (ret) 1777 return ret; 1778 return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot); 1779 } 1780 1781 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) 1782 { 1783 return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd); 1784 } 1785 1786 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 1787 { 1788 return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 1789 } 1790 1791 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) 1792 { 1793 call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file); 1794 } 1795 1796 int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, 1797 struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) 1798 { 1799 return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig); 1800 } 1801 1802 int security_file_receive(struct file *file) 1803 { 1804 return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file); 1805 } 1806 1807 int security_file_open(struct file *file) 1808 { 1809 int ret; 1810 1811 ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file); 1812 if (ret) 1813 return ret; 1814 1815 return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN); 1816 } 1817 1818 int security_file_truncate(struct file *file) 1819 { 1820 return call_int_hook(file_truncate, 0, file); 1821 } 1822 1823 int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) 1824 { 1825 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 1826 1827 if (rc) 1828 return rc; 1829 rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags); 1830 if (unlikely(rc)) 1831 security_task_free(task); 1832 return rc; 1833 } 1834 1835 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) 1836 { 1837 call_void_hook(task_free, task); 1838 1839 kfree(task->security); 1840 task->security = NULL; 1841 } 1842 1843 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 1844 { 1845 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp); 1846 1847 if (rc) 1848 return rc; 1849 1850 rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp); 1851 if (unlikely(rc)) 1852 security_cred_free(cred); 1853 return rc; 1854 } 1855 1856 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) 1857 { 1858 /* 1859 * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that 1860 * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL. 1861 */ 1862 if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL)) 1863 return; 1864 1865 call_void_hook(cred_free, cred); 1866 1867 kfree(cred->security); 1868 cred->security = NULL; 1869 } 1870 1871 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) 1872 { 1873 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp); 1874 1875 if (rc) 1876 return rc; 1877 1878 rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp); 1879 if (unlikely(rc)) 1880 security_cred_free(new); 1881 return rc; 1882 } 1883 1884 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 1885 { 1886 call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); 1887 } 1888 1889 void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) 1890 { 1891 *secid = 0; 1892 call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); 1893 } 1894 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); 1895 1896 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) 1897 { 1898 return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); 1899 } 1900 1901 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) 1902 { 1903 return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode); 1904 } 1905 1906 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) 1907 { 1908 int ret; 1909 1910 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); 1911 if (ret) 1912 return ret; 1913 return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); 1914 } 1915 1916 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, 1917 bool contents) 1918 { 1919 int ret; 1920 1921 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); 1922 if (ret) 1923 return ret; 1924 return ima_read_file(file, id, contents); 1925 } 1926 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); 1927 1928 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, 1929 enum kernel_read_file_id id) 1930 { 1931 int ret; 1932 1933 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id); 1934 if (ret) 1935 return ret; 1936 return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id); 1937 } 1938 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); 1939 1940 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) 1941 { 1942 int ret; 1943 1944 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents); 1945 if (ret) 1946 return ret; 1947 return ima_load_data(id, contents); 1948 } 1949 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); 1950 1951 int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, 1952 enum kernel_load_data_id id, 1953 char *description) 1954 { 1955 int ret; 1956 1957 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id, 1958 description); 1959 if (ret) 1960 return ret; 1961 return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description); 1962 } 1963 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data); 1964 1965 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 1966 int flags) 1967 { 1968 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags); 1969 } 1970 1971 int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 1972 int flags) 1973 { 1974 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags); 1975 } 1976 1977 int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 1978 { 1979 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, 0, new, old); 1980 } 1981 1982 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) 1983 { 1984 return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid); 1985 } 1986 1987 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) 1988 { 1989 return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p); 1990 } 1991 1992 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) 1993 { 1994 return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); 1995 } 1996 1997 void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) 1998 { 1999 *secid = 0; 2000 call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid); 2001 } 2002 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj); 2003 2004 void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) 2005 { 2006 *secid = 0; 2007 call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); 2008 } 2009 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj); 2010 2011 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) 2012 { 2013 return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice); 2014 } 2015 2016 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) 2017 { 2018 return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio); 2019 } 2020 2021 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) 2022 { 2023 return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p); 2024 } 2025 2026 int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, 2027 unsigned int flags) 2028 { 2029 return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags); 2030 } 2031 2032 int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, 2033 struct rlimit *new_rlim) 2034 { 2035 return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim); 2036 } 2037 2038 int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 2039 { 2040 return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p); 2041 } 2042 2043 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 2044 { 2045 return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p); 2046 } 2047 2048 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) 2049 { 2050 return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p); 2051 } 2052 2053 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, 2054 int sig, const struct cred *cred) 2055 { 2056 return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred); 2057 } 2058 2059 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, 2060 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) 2061 { 2062 int thisrc; 2063 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl); 2064 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2065 2066 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) { 2067 thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); 2068 if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) { 2069 rc = thisrc; 2070 if (thisrc != 0) 2071 break; 2072 } 2073 } 2074 return rc; 2075 } 2076 2077 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) 2078 { 2079 call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode); 2080 } 2081 2082 int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred) 2083 { 2084 return call_int_hook(userns_create, 0, cred); 2085 } 2086 2087 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) 2088 { 2089 return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag); 2090 } 2091 2092 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) 2093 { 2094 *secid = 0; 2095 call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); 2096 } 2097 2098 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) 2099 { 2100 int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg); 2101 2102 if (unlikely(rc)) 2103 return rc; 2104 rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg); 2105 if (unlikely(rc)) 2106 security_msg_msg_free(msg); 2107 return rc; 2108 } 2109 2110 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg) 2111 { 2112 call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg); 2113 kfree(msg->security); 2114 msg->security = NULL; 2115 } 2116 2117 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 2118 { 2119 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq); 2120 2121 if (unlikely(rc)) 2122 return rc; 2123 rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq); 2124 if (unlikely(rc)) 2125 security_msg_queue_free(msq); 2126 return rc; 2127 } 2128 2129 void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 2130 { 2131 call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq); 2132 kfree(msq->security); 2133 msq->security = NULL; 2134 } 2135 2136 int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) 2137 { 2138 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg); 2139 } 2140 2141 int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) 2142 { 2143 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd); 2144 } 2145 2146 int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, 2147 struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) 2148 { 2149 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg); 2150 } 2151 2152 int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, 2153 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) 2154 { 2155 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode); 2156 } 2157 2158 int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 2159 { 2160 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp); 2161 2162 if (unlikely(rc)) 2163 return rc; 2164 rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp); 2165 if (unlikely(rc)) 2166 security_shm_free(shp); 2167 return rc; 2168 } 2169 2170 void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 2171 { 2172 call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp); 2173 kfree(shp->security); 2174 shp->security = NULL; 2175 } 2176 2177 int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) 2178 { 2179 return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg); 2180 } 2181 2182 int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) 2183 { 2184 return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd); 2185 } 2186 2187 int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) 2188 { 2189 return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg); 2190 } 2191 2192 int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 2193 { 2194 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma); 2195 2196 if (unlikely(rc)) 2197 return rc; 2198 rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma); 2199 if (unlikely(rc)) 2200 security_sem_free(sma); 2201 return rc; 2202 } 2203 2204 void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 2205 { 2206 call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma); 2207 kfree(sma->security); 2208 sma->security = NULL; 2209 } 2210 2211 int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) 2212 { 2213 return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg); 2214 } 2215 2216 int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) 2217 { 2218 return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd); 2219 } 2220 2221 int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, 2222 unsigned nsops, int alter) 2223 { 2224 return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter); 2225 } 2226 2227 void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) 2228 { 2229 if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2230 return; 2231 call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode); 2232 } 2233 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); 2234 2235 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, 2236 const char *name, char **value) 2237 { 2238 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2239 2240 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { 2241 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 2242 continue; 2243 return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); 2244 } 2245 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr); 2246 } 2247 2248 int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, 2249 size_t size) 2250 { 2251 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2252 2253 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { 2254 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 2255 continue; 2256 return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); 2257 } 2258 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr); 2259 } 2260 2261 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 2262 { 2263 return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb); 2264 } 2265 2266 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) 2267 { 2268 return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name); 2269 } 2270 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); 2271 2272 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) 2273 { 2274 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2275 int rc; 2276 2277 /* 2278 * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this 2279 * LSM hook is not "stackable"). 2280 */ 2281 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { 2282 rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); 2283 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx)) 2284 return rc; 2285 } 2286 2287 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx); 2288 } 2289 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); 2290 2291 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) 2292 { 2293 *secid = 0; 2294 return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid); 2295 } 2296 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); 2297 2298 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) 2299 { 2300 call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); 2301 } 2302 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); 2303 2304 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) 2305 { 2306 call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode); 2307 } 2308 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx); 2309 2310 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 2311 { 2312 return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 2313 } 2314 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx); 2315 2316 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 2317 { 2318 return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen); 2319 } 2320 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx); 2321 2322 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) 2323 { 2324 return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 2325 } 2326 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx); 2327 2328 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE 2329 int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, 2330 const struct cred *cred, 2331 struct watch_notification *n) 2332 { 2333 return call_int_hook(post_notification, 0, w_cred, cred, n); 2334 } 2335 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */ 2336 2337 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS 2338 int security_watch_key(struct key *key) 2339 { 2340 return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key); 2341 } 2342 #endif 2343 2344 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK 2345 2346 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) 2347 { 2348 return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk); 2349 } 2350 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect); 2351 2352 int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) 2353 { 2354 return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other); 2355 } 2356 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send); 2357 2358 int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) 2359 { 2360 return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern); 2361 } 2362 2363 int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, 2364 int type, int protocol, int kern) 2365 { 2366 return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type, 2367 protocol, kern); 2368 } 2369 2370 int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) 2371 { 2372 return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb); 2373 } 2374 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair); 2375 2376 int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 2377 { 2378 return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 2379 } 2380 2381 int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 2382 { 2383 return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 2384 } 2385 2386 int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) 2387 { 2388 return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog); 2389 } 2390 2391 int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) 2392 { 2393 return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock); 2394 } 2395 2396 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) 2397 { 2398 return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size); 2399 } 2400 2401 int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, 2402 int size, int flags) 2403 { 2404 return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags); 2405 } 2406 2407 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) 2408 { 2409 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock); 2410 } 2411 2412 int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) 2413 { 2414 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock); 2415 } 2416 2417 int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 2418 { 2419 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 2420 } 2421 2422 int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 2423 { 2424 return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 2425 } 2426 2427 int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) 2428 { 2429 return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how); 2430 } 2431 2432 int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 2433 { 2434 return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb); 2435 } 2436 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); 2437 2438 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval, 2439 sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len) 2440 { 2441 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 2442 optval, optlen, len); 2443 } 2444 2445 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 2446 { 2447 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 2448 skb, secid); 2449 } 2450 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram); 2451 2452 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) 2453 { 2454 return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority); 2455 } 2456 2457 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk) 2458 { 2459 call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk); 2460 } 2461 2462 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) 2463 { 2464 call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk); 2465 } 2466 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone); 2467 2468 void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic) 2469 { 2470 call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid); 2471 } 2472 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow); 2473 2474 void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, 2475 struct flowi_common *flic) 2476 { 2477 call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic); 2478 } 2479 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow); 2480 2481 void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) 2482 { 2483 call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent); 2484 } 2485 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft); 2486 2487 int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, 2488 struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) 2489 { 2490 return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req); 2491 } 2492 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request); 2493 2494 void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, 2495 const struct request_sock *req) 2496 { 2497 call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req); 2498 } 2499 2500 void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, 2501 struct sk_buff *skb) 2502 { 2503 call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb); 2504 } 2505 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established); 2506 2507 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid) 2508 { 2509 return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid); 2510 } 2511 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet); 2512 2513 void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void) 2514 { 2515 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc); 2516 } 2517 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc); 2518 2519 void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void) 2520 { 2521 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec); 2522 } 2523 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec); 2524 2525 int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) 2526 { 2527 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security); 2528 } 2529 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security); 2530 2531 void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) 2532 { 2533 call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security); 2534 } 2535 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security); 2536 2537 int security_tun_dev_create(void) 2538 { 2539 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0); 2540 } 2541 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create); 2542 2543 int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) 2544 { 2545 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security); 2546 } 2547 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue); 2548 2549 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) 2550 { 2551 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security); 2552 } 2553 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach); 2554 2555 int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) 2556 { 2557 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security); 2558 } 2559 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open); 2560 2561 int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sk_buff *skb) 2562 { 2563 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, asoc, skb); 2564 } 2565 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request); 2566 2567 int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, 2568 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 2569 { 2570 return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname, 2571 address, addrlen); 2572 } 2573 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect); 2574 2575 void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk, 2576 struct sock *newsk) 2577 { 2578 call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, asoc, sk, newsk); 2579 } 2580 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone); 2581 2582 int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc, 2583 struct sk_buff *skb) 2584 { 2585 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, 0, asoc, skb); 2586 } 2587 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established); 2588 2589 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ 2590 2591 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND 2592 2593 int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey) 2594 { 2595 return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey); 2596 } 2597 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access); 2598 2599 int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) 2600 { 2601 return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec, dev_name, port_num); 2602 } 2603 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet); 2604 2605 int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec) 2606 { 2607 return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec); 2608 } 2609 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security); 2610 2611 void security_ib_free_security(void *sec) 2612 { 2613 call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec); 2614 } 2615 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security); 2616 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ 2617 2618 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM 2619 2620 int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, 2621 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, 2622 gfp_t gfp) 2623 { 2624 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp); 2625 } 2626 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc); 2627 2628 int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, 2629 struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) 2630 { 2631 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp); 2632 } 2633 2634 void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 2635 { 2636 call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx); 2637 } 2638 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free); 2639 2640 int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 2641 { 2642 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx); 2643 } 2644 2645 int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, 2646 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) 2647 { 2648 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx); 2649 } 2650 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc); 2651 2652 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, 2653 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) 2654 { 2655 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid); 2656 } 2657 2658 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) 2659 { 2660 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x); 2661 } 2662 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete); 2663 2664 void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) 2665 { 2666 call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x); 2667 } 2668 2669 int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid) 2670 { 2671 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid); 2672 } 2673 2674 int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, 2675 struct xfrm_policy *xp, 2676 const struct flowi_common *flic) 2677 { 2678 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2679 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); 2680 2681 /* 2682 * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment 2683 * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately, 2684 * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux 2685 * supplies this call. 2686 * 2687 * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than 2688 * using the macro 2689 */ 2690 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, 2691 list) { 2692 rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic); 2693 break; 2694 } 2695 return rc; 2696 } 2697 2698 int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 2699 { 2700 return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1); 2701 } 2702 2703 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic) 2704 { 2705 int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid, 2706 0); 2707 2708 BUG_ON(rc); 2709 } 2710 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow); 2711 2712 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ 2713 2714 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS 2715 2716 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, 2717 unsigned long flags) 2718 { 2719 return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags); 2720 } 2721 2722 void security_key_free(struct key *key) 2723 { 2724 call_void_hook(key_free, key); 2725 } 2726 2727 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, 2728 enum key_need_perm need_perm) 2729 { 2730 return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm); 2731 } 2732 2733 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) 2734 { 2735 *_buffer = NULL; 2736 return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer); 2737 } 2738 2739 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ 2740 2741 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT 2742 2743 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) 2744 { 2745 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); 2746 } 2747 2748 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) 2749 { 2750 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule); 2751 } 2752 2753 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) 2754 { 2755 call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); 2756 } 2757 2758 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) 2759 { 2760 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule); 2761 } 2762 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ 2763 2764 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL 2765 int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) 2766 { 2767 return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size); 2768 } 2769 int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) 2770 { 2771 return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode); 2772 } 2773 int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) 2774 { 2775 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog); 2776 } 2777 int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) 2778 { 2779 return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map); 2780 } 2781 int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 2782 { 2783 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux); 2784 } 2785 void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) 2786 { 2787 call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map); 2788 } 2789 void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 2790 { 2791 call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); 2792 } 2793 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ 2794 2795 int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) 2796 { 2797 return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what); 2798 } 2799 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down); 2800 2801 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 2802 int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) 2803 { 2804 return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type); 2805 } 2806 2807 int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) 2808 { 2809 return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event); 2810 } 2811 2812 void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) 2813 { 2814 call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event); 2815 } 2816 2817 int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) 2818 { 2819 return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event); 2820 } 2821 2822 int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) 2823 { 2824 return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event); 2825 } 2826 #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */ 2827 2828 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING 2829 int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) 2830 { 2831 return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, 0, new); 2832 } 2833 2834 int security_uring_sqpoll(void) 2835 { 2836 return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0); 2837 } 2838 int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) 2839 { 2840 return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd); 2841 } 2842 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ 2843