1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later 2 /* 3 * Security plug functions 4 * 5 * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com> 6 * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> 7 * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com> 8 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies 9 * Copyright (C) 2023 Microsoft Corporation <paul@paul-moore.com> 10 */ 11 12 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt 13 14 #include <linux/bpf.h> 15 #include <linux/capability.h> 16 #include <linux/dcache.h> 17 #include <linux/export.h> 18 #include <linux/init.h> 19 #include <linux/kernel.h> 20 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> 21 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> 22 #include <linux/integrity.h> 23 #include <linux/ima.h> 24 #include <linux/evm.h> 25 #include <linux/fsnotify.h> 26 #include <linux/mman.h> 27 #include <linux/mount.h> 28 #include <linux/personality.h> 29 #include <linux/backing-dev.h> 30 #include <linux/string.h> 31 #include <linux/msg.h> 32 #include <net/flow.h> 33 34 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 35 36 /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ 37 #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) 38 39 /* 40 * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the 41 * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows 42 * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing 43 * purposes. 44 */ 45 const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX + 1] = { 46 [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", 47 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", 48 [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", 49 [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access", 50 [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", 51 [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", 52 [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", 53 [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", 54 [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", 55 [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", 56 [LOCKDOWN_DEVICE_TREE] = "modifying device tree contents", 57 [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage", 58 [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO", 59 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters", 60 [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio", 61 [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access", 62 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access", 63 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM", 64 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM", 65 [LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection", 66 [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", 67 [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", 68 [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", 69 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", 70 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM", 71 [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", 72 [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", 73 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access", 74 [LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret", 75 [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", 76 }; 77 78 struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init; 79 static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain); 80 81 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; 82 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; 83 84 char *lsm_names; 85 static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init; 86 87 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ 88 static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; 89 static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm; 90 91 static __initconst const char *const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM; 92 93 /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ 94 static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms; 95 static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive; 96 97 static __initdata bool debug; 98 #define init_debug(...) \ 99 do { \ 100 if (debug) \ 101 pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \ 102 } while (0) 103 104 static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm) 105 { 106 if (!lsm->enabled) 107 return false; 108 109 return *lsm->enabled; 110 } 111 112 /* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */ 113 static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1; 114 static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0; 115 static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled) 116 { 117 /* 118 * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use 119 * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state. 120 */ 121 if (!lsm->enabled) { 122 if (enabled) 123 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 124 else 125 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 126 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) { 127 if (!enabled) 128 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 129 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) { 130 if (enabled) 131 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 132 } else { 133 *lsm->enabled = enabled; 134 } 135 } 136 137 /* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */ 138 static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 139 { 140 struct lsm_info **check; 141 142 for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++) 143 if (*check == lsm) 144 return true; 145 146 return false; 147 } 148 149 /* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */ 150 static int last_lsm __initdata; 151 static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from) 152 { 153 /* Ignore duplicate selections. */ 154 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 155 return; 156 157 if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from)) 158 return; 159 160 /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */ 161 if (!lsm->enabled) 162 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 163 ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm; 164 165 init_debug("%s ordered: %s (%s)\n", from, lsm->name, 166 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 167 } 168 169 /* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */ 170 static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm) 171 { 172 /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */ 173 if (!is_enabled(lsm)) 174 return false; 175 176 /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */ 177 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) { 178 init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name); 179 return false; 180 } 181 182 return true; 183 } 184 185 static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs) 186 { 187 int offset; 188 189 if (*need <= 0) 190 return; 191 192 offset = ALIGN(*lbs, sizeof(void *)); 193 *lbs = offset + *need; 194 *need = offset; 195 } 196 197 static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) 198 { 199 if (!needed) 200 return; 201 202 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 203 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file); 204 /* 205 * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to 206 * what the modules might need. 207 */ 208 if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0) 209 blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head); 210 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 211 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 212 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 213 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 214 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); 215 } 216 217 /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ 218 static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 219 { 220 int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm); 221 222 /* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */ 223 set_enabled(lsm, enabled); 224 225 /* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */ 226 if (enabled) { 227 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) { 228 exclusive = lsm; 229 init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name); 230 } 231 232 lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs); 233 } 234 } 235 236 /* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */ 237 static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 238 { 239 if (is_enabled(lsm)) { 240 int ret; 241 242 init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name); 243 ret = lsm->init(); 244 WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret); 245 } 246 } 247 248 /* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */ 249 static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) 250 { 251 struct lsm_info *lsm; 252 char *sep, *name, *next; 253 254 /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */ 255 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 256 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST) 257 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " first"); 258 } 259 260 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 261 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 262 struct lsm_info *major; 263 264 /* 265 * To match the original "security=" behavior, this 266 * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major 267 * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable 268 * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs. 269 */ 270 for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info; 271 major++) { 272 if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) && 273 strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) { 274 set_enabled(major, false); 275 init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s (only one legacy major LSM)\n", 276 chosen_major_lsm, major->name); 277 } 278 } 279 } 280 281 sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL); 282 next = sep; 283 /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */ 284 while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) { 285 bool found = false; 286 287 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 288 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE && 289 strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) { 290 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin); 291 found = true; 292 } 293 } 294 295 if (!found) 296 init_debug("%s ignored: %s (not built into kernel)\n", 297 origin, name); 298 } 299 300 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 301 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 302 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 303 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 304 continue; 305 if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0) 306 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security="); 307 } 308 } 309 310 /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */ 311 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 312 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 313 continue; 314 set_enabled(lsm, false); 315 init_debug("%s skipped: %s (not in requested order)\n", 316 origin, lsm->name); 317 } 318 319 kfree(sep); 320 } 321 322 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred); 323 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task); 324 325 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result); 326 327 static void __init report_lsm_order(void) 328 { 329 struct lsm_info **lsm, *early; 330 int first = 0; 331 332 pr_info("initializing lsm="); 333 334 /* Report each enabled LSM name, comma separated. */ 335 for (early = __start_early_lsm_info; 336 early < __end_early_lsm_info; early++) 337 if (is_enabled(early)) 338 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", early->name); 339 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 340 if (is_enabled(*lsm)) 341 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", (*lsm)->name); 342 343 pr_cont("\n"); 344 } 345 346 static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) 347 { 348 struct lsm_info **lsm; 349 350 ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms), 351 GFP_KERNEL); 352 353 if (chosen_lsm_order) { 354 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 355 pr_warn("security=%s is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=%s\n", 356 chosen_major_lsm, chosen_lsm_order); 357 chosen_major_lsm = NULL; 358 } 359 ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline"); 360 } else 361 ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin"); 362 363 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 364 prepare_lsm(*lsm); 365 366 report_lsm_order(); 367 368 init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 369 init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file); 370 init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 371 init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 372 init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 373 init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 374 init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); 375 376 /* 377 * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs 378 */ 379 if (blob_sizes.lbs_file) 380 lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache", 381 blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0, 382 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 383 if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode) 384 lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache", 385 blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0, 386 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 387 388 lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred); 389 lsm_early_task(current); 390 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 391 initialize_lsm(*lsm); 392 393 kfree(ordered_lsms); 394 } 395 396 int __init early_security_init(void) 397 { 398 struct lsm_info *lsm; 399 400 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 401 INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&security_hook_heads.NAME); 402 #include "linux/lsm_hook_defs.h" 403 #undef LSM_HOOK 404 405 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 406 if (!lsm->enabled) 407 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 408 prepare_lsm(lsm); 409 initialize_lsm(lsm); 410 } 411 412 return 0; 413 } 414 415 /** 416 * security_init - initializes the security framework 417 * 418 * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence. 419 */ 420 int __init security_init(void) 421 { 422 struct lsm_info *lsm; 423 424 init_debug("legacy security=%s\n", chosen_major_lsm ? : " *unspecified*"); 425 init_debug(" CONFIG_LSM=%s\n", builtin_lsm_order); 426 init_debug("boot arg lsm=%s\n", chosen_lsm_order ? : " *unspecified*"); 427 428 /* 429 * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is 430 * available 431 */ 432 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 433 init_debug(" early started: %s (%s)\n", lsm->name, 434 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 435 if (lsm->enabled) 436 lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names); 437 } 438 439 /* Load LSMs in specified order. */ 440 ordered_lsm_init(); 441 442 return 0; 443 } 444 445 /* Save user chosen LSM */ 446 static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str) 447 { 448 chosen_major_lsm = str; 449 return 1; 450 } 451 __setup("security=", choose_major_lsm); 452 453 /* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */ 454 static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str) 455 { 456 chosen_lsm_order = str; 457 return 1; 458 } 459 __setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order); 460 461 /* Enable LSM order debugging. */ 462 static int __init enable_debug(char *str) 463 { 464 debug = true; 465 return 1; 466 } 467 __setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug); 468 469 static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm) 470 { 471 const char *last; 472 473 if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm)) 474 return false; 475 last = strrchr(list, ','); 476 if (last) 477 /* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */ 478 last++; 479 else 480 last = list; 481 return !strcmp(last, lsm); 482 } 483 484 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) 485 { 486 char *cp; 487 488 if (*result == NULL) { 489 *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL); 490 if (*result == NULL) 491 return -ENOMEM; 492 } else { 493 /* Check if it is the last registered name */ 494 if (match_last_lsm(*result, new)) 495 return 0; 496 cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new); 497 if (cp == NULL) 498 return -ENOMEM; 499 kfree(*result); 500 *result = cp; 501 } 502 return 0; 503 } 504 505 /** 506 * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. 507 * @hooks: the hooks to add 508 * @count: the number of hooks to add 509 * @lsm: the name of the security module 510 * 511 * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. 512 */ 513 void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, 514 const char *lsm) 515 { 516 int i; 517 518 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { 519 hooks[i].lsm = lsm; 520 hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); 521 } 522 523 /* 524 * Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back 525 * and fix this up afterwards. 526 */ 527 if (slab_is_available()) { 528 if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0) 529 panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__); 530 } 531 } 532 533 int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) 534 { 535 return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 536 event, data); 537 } 538 EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier); 539 540 int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 541 { 542 return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 543 nb); 544 } 545 EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier); 546 547 int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 548 { 549 return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 550 nb); 551 } 552 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier); 553 554 /** 555 * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob 556 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 557 * @gfp: allocation type 558 * 559 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 560 * 561 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 562 */ 563 static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 564 { 565 if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) { 566 cred->security = NULL; 567 return 0; 568 } 569 570 cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp); 571 if (cred->security == NULL) 572 return -ENOMEM; 573 return 0; 574 } 575 576 /** 577 * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob 578 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 579 * 580 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 581 */ 582 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred) 583 { 584 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL); 585 586 if (rc) 587 panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__); 588 } 589 590 /** 591 * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob 592 * @file: the file that needs a blob 593 * 594 * Allocate the file blob for all the modules 595 * 596 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 597 */ 598 static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file) 599 { 600 if (!lsm_file_cache) { 601 file->f_security = NULL; 602 return 0; 603 } 604 605 file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL); 606 if (file->f_security == NULL) 607 return -ENOMEM; 608 return 0; 609 } 610 611 /** 612 * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob 613 * @inode: the inode that needs a blob 614 * 615 * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules 616 * 617 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 618 */ 619 int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 620 { 621 if (!lsm_inode_cache) { 622 inode->i_security = NULL; 623 return 0; 624 } 625 626 inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); 627 if (inode->i_security == NULL) 628 return -ENOMEM; 629 return 0; 630 } 631 632 /** 633 * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob 634 * @task: the task that needs a blob 635 * 636 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 637 * 638 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 639 */ 640 static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) 641 { 642 if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) { 643 task->security = NULL; 644 return 0; 645 } 646 647 task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL); 648 if (task->security == NULL) 649 return -ENOMEM; 650 return 0; 651 } 652 653 /** 654 * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob 655 * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob 656 * 657 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 658 * 659 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 660 */ 661 static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip) 662 { 663 if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) { 664 kip->security = NULL; 665 return 0; 666 } 667 668 kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL); 669 if (kip->security == NULL) 670 return -ENOMEM; 671 return 0; 672 } 673 674 /** 675 * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob 676 * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob 677 * 678 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 679 * 680 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 681 */ 682 static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp) 683 { 684 if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) { 685 mp->security = NULL; 686 return 0; 687 } 688 689 mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL); 690 if (mp->security == NULL) 691 return -ENOMEM; 692 return 0; 693 } 694 695 /** 696 * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob 697 * @task: the task that needs a blob 698 * 699 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 700 */ 701 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) 702 { 703 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 704 705 if (rc) 706 panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__); 707 } 708 709 /** 710 * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob 711 * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob 712 * 713 * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules 714 * 715 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 716 */ 717 static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 718 { 719 if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) { 720 sb->s_security = NULL; 721 return 0; 722 } 723 724 sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL); 725 if (sb->s_security == NULL) 726 return -ENOMEM; 727 return 0; 728 } 729 730 /* 731 * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and 732 * can be accessed with: 733 * 734 * LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) 735 * 736 * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each 737 * LSM hook. 738 */ 739 #define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default) 740 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME) 741 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \ 742 static const int __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT); 743 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 744 DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME) 745 746 #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h> 747 #undef LSM_HOOK 748 749 /* 750 * Hook list operation macros. 751 * 752 * call_void_hook: 753 * This is a hook that does not return a value. 754 * 755 * call_int_hook: 756 * This is a hook that returns a value. 757 */ 758 759 #define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \ 760 do { \ 761 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 762 \ 763 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \ 764 P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 765 } while (0) 766 767 #define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \ 768 int RC = IRC; \ 769 do { \ 770 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 771 \ 772 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ 773 RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 774 if (RC != 0) \ 775 break; \ 776 } \ 777 } while (0); \ 778 RC; \ 779 }) 780 781 /* Security operations */ 782 783 /** 784 * security_binder_set_context_mgr() - Check if becoming binder ctx mgr is ok 785 * @mgr: task credentials of current binder process 786 * 787 * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager. 788 * 789 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 790 */ 791 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr) 792 { 793 return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr); 794 } 795 796 /** 797 * security_binder_transaction() - Check if a binder transaction is allowed 798 * @from: sending process 799 * @to: receiving process 800 * 801 * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call to @to. 802 * 803 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 804 */ 805 int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from, 806 const struct cred *to) 807 { 808 return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to); 809 } 810 811 /** 812 * security_binder_transfer_binder() - Check if a binder transfer is allowed 813 * @from: sending process 814 * @to: receiving process 815 * 816 * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to. 817 * 818 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 819 */ 820 int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, 821 const struct cred *to) 822 { 823 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to); 824 } 825 826 /** 827 * security_binder_transfer_file() - Check if a binder file xfer is allowed 828 * @from: sending process 829 * @to: receiving process 830 * @file: file being transferred 831 * 832 * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to. 833 * 834 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 835 */ 836 int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, 837 const struct cred *to, struct file *file) 838 { 839 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file); 840 } 841 842 /** 843 * security_ptrace_access_check() - Check if tracing is allowed 844 * @child: target process 845 * @mode: PTRACE_MODE flags 846 * 847 * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the @child 848 * process. Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check 849 * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of tracing check 850 * during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of binprm_security_ops if the 851 * process is being traced and its security attributes would be changed by the 852 * execve. 853 * 854 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 855 */ 856 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) 857 { 858 return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode); 859 } 860 861 /** 862 * security_ptrace_traceme() - Check if tracing is allowed 863 * @parent: tracing process 864 * 865 * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the 866 * current process before allowing the current process to present itself to the 867 * @parent process for tracing. 868 * 869 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 870 */ 871 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) 872 { 873 return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent); 874 } 875 876 /** 877 * security_capget() - Get the capability sets for a process 878 * @target: target process 879 * @effective: effective capability set 880 * @inheritable: inheritable capability set 881 * @permitted: permitted capability set 882 * 883 * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the 884 * @target process. The hook may also perform permission checking to determine 885 * if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets of the @target 886 * process. 887 * 888 * Return: Returns 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained. 889 */ 890 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, 891 kernel_cap_t *effective, 892 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 893 kernel_cap_t *permitted) 894 { 895 return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target, 896 effective, inheritable, permitted); 897 } 898 899 /** 900 * security_capset() - Set the capability sets for a process 901 * @new: new credentials for the target process 902 * @old: current credentials of the target process 903 * @effective: effective capability set 904 * @inheritable: inheritable capability set 905 * @permitted: permitted capability set 906 * 907 * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the 908 * current process. 909 * 910 * Return: Returns 0 and update @new if permission is granted. 911 */ 912 int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 913 const kernel_cap_t *effective, 914 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 915 const kernel_cap_t *permitted) 916 { 917 return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old, 918 effective, inheritable, permitted); 919 } 920 921 /** 922 * security_capable() - Check if a process has the necessary capability 923 * @cred: credentials to examine 924 * @ns: user namespace 925 * @cap: capability requested 926 * @opts: capability check options 927 * 928 * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated 929 * credentials. @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. 930 * @opts contains options for the capable check <include/linux/security.h>. 931 * 932 * Return: Returns 0 if the capability is granted. 933 */ 934 int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, 935 struct user_namespace *ns, 936 int cap, 937 unsigned int opts) 938 { 939 return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); 940 } 941 942 /** 943 * security_quotactl() - Check if a quotactl() syscall is allowed for this fs 944 * @cmds: commands 945 * @type: type 946 * @id: id 947 * @sb: filesystem 948 * 949 * Check whether the quotactl syscall is allowed for this @sb. 950 * 951 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 952 */ 953 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) 954 { 955 return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb); 956 } 957 958 /** 959 * security_quota_on() - Check if QUOTAON is allowed for a dentry 960 * @dentry: dentry 961 * 962 * Check whether QUOTAON is allowed for @dentry. 963 * 964 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 965 */ 966 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) 967 { 968 return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry); 969 } 970 971 /** 972 * security_syslog() - Check if accessing the kernel message ring is allowed 973 * @type: SYSLOG_ACTION_* type 974 * 975 * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing 976 * logging to the console. See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of 977 * the @type values. 978 * 979 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 980 */ 981 int security_syslog(int type) 982 { 983 return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type); 984 } 985 986 /** 987 * security_settime64() - Check if changing the system time is allowed 988 * @ts: new time 989 * @tz: timezone 990 * 991 * Check permission to change the system time, struct timespec64 is defined in 992 * <include/linux/time64.h> and timezone is defined in <include/linux/time.h>. 993 * 994 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 995 */ 996 int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz) 997 { 998 return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz); 999 } 1000 1001 /** 1002 * security_vm_enough_memory_mm() - Check if allocating a new mem map is allowed 1003 * @mm: mm struct 1004 * @pages: number of pages 1005 * 1006 * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping. If all LSMs return 1007 * a positive value, __vm_enough_memory() will be called with cap_sys_admin 1008 * set. If at least one LSM returns 0 or negative, __vm_enough_memory() will be 1009 * called with cap_sys_admin cleared. 1010 * 1011 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted by the LSM infrastructure to the 1012 * caller. 1013 */ 1014 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) 1015 { 1016 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1017 int cap_sys_admin = 1; 1018 int rc; 1019 1020 /* 1021 * The module will respond with a positive value if 1022 * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be 1023 * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules 1024 * agree that it should be set it will. If any module 1025 * thinks it should not be set it won't. 1026 */ 1027 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) { 1028 rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); 1029 if (rc <= 0) { 1030 cap_sys_admin = 0; 1031 break; 1032 } 1033 } 1034 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); 1035 } 1036 1037 /** 1038 * security_bprm_creds_for_exec() - Prepare the credentials for exec() 1039 * @bprm: binary program information 1040 * 1041 * If the setup in prepare_exec_creds did not setup @bprm->cred->security 1042 * properly for executing @bprm->file, update the LSM's portion of 1043 * @bprm->cred->security to be what commit_creds needs to install for the new 1044 * program. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 1045 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 1046 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. @bprm 1047 * contains the linux_binprm structure. 1048 * 1049 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1050 */ 1051 int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1052 { 1053 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm); 1054 } 1055 1056 /** 1057 * security_bprm_creds_from_file() - Update linux_binprm creds based on file 1058 * @bprm: binary program information 1059 * @file: associated file 1060 * 1061 * If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change privilege upon 1062 * exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change. This is called after 1063 * finding the binary that will be executed without an interpreter. This 1064 * ensures that the credentials will not be derived from a script that the 1065 * binary will need to reopen, which when reopend may end up being a completely 1066 * different file. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 1067 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 1068 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. The 1069 * hook must add to @bprm->per_clear any personality flags that should be 1070 * cleared from current->personality. @bprm contains the linux_binprm 1071 * structure. 1072 * 1073 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1074 */ 1075 int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) 1076 { 1077 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file); 1078 } 1079 1080 /** 1081 * security_bprm_check() - Mediate binary handler search 1082 * @bprm: binary program information 1083 * 1084 * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will begin. 1085 * It allows a check against the @bprm->cred->security value which was set in 1086 * the preceding creds_for_exec call. The argv list and envp list are reliably 1087 * available in @bprm. This hook may be called multiple times during a single 1088 * execve. @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. 1089 * 1090 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 1091 */ 1092 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1093 { 1094 int ret; 1095 1096 ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); 1097 if (ret) 1098 return ret; 1099 return ima_bprm_check(bprm); 1100 } 1101 1102 /** 1103 * security_bprm_committing_creds() - Install creds for a process during exec() 1104 * @bprm: binary program information 1105 * 1106 * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being 1107 * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials pointed to 1108 * by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by the 1109 * bprm_creds_for_exec hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure. This 1110 * hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such as closing 1111 * open file descriptors to which access will no longer be granted when the 1112 * attributes are changed. This is called immediately before commit_creds(). 1113 */ 1114 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1115 { 1116 call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm); 1117 } 1118 1119 /** 1120 * security_bprm_committed_creds() - Tidy up after cred install during exec() 1121 * @bprm: binary program information 1122 * 1123 * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a process 1124 * being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials have, by this 1125 * point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the linux_binprm 1126 * structure. This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the 1127 * process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal state. This is called 1128 * immediately after commit_creds(). 1129 */ 1130 void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1131 { 1132 call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm); 1133 } 1134 1135 /** 1136 * security_fs_context_dup() - Duplicate a fs_context LSM blob 1137 * @fc: destination filesystem context 1138 * @src_fc: source filesystem context 1139 * 1140 * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer is 1141 * initialised to NULL by the caller. @fc indicates the new filesystem context. 1142 * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context. 1143 * 1144 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure. 1145 */ 1146 int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) 1147 { 1148 return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc); 1149 } 1150 1151 /** 1152 * security_fs_context_parse_param() - Configure a filesystem context 1153 * @fc: filesystem context 1154 * @param: filesystem parameter 1155 * 1156 * Userspace provided a parameter to configure a superblock. The LSM can 1157 * consume the parameter or return it to the caller for use elsewhere. 1158 * 1159 * Return: If the parameter is used by the LSM it should return 0, if it is 1160 * returned to the caller -ENOPARAM is returned, otherwise a negative 1161 * error code is returned. 1162 */ 1163 int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, 1164 struct fs_parameter *param) 1165 { 1166 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1167 int trc; 1168 int rc = -ENOPARAM; 1169 1170 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.fs_context_parse_param, 1171 list) { 1172 trc = hp->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param); 1173 if (trc == 0) 1174 rc = 0; 1175 else if (trc != -ENOPARAM) 1176 return trc; 1177 } 1178 return rc; 1179 } 1180 1181 /** 1182 * security_sb_alloc() - Allocate a super_block LSM blob 1183 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1184 * 1185 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field. The 1186 * s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is allocated. 1187 * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. 1188 * 1189 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. 1190 */ 1191 int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 1192 { 1193 int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb); 1194 1195 if (unlikely(rc)) 1196 return rc; 1197 rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb); 1198 if (unlikely(rc)) 1199 security_sb_free(sb); 1200 return rc; 1201 } 1202 1203 /** 1204 * security_sb_delete() - Release super_block LSM associated objects 1205 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1206 * 1207 * Release objects tied to a superblock (e.g. inodes). @sb contains the 1208 * super_block structure being released. 1209 */ 1210 void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb) 1211 { 1212 call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb); 1213 } 1214 1215 /** 1216 * security_sb_free() - Free a super_block LSM blob 1217 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1218 * 1219 * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field. @sb contains the super_block 1220 * structure to be modified. 1221 */ 1222 void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) 1223 { 1224 call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb); 1225 kfree(sb->s_security); 1226 sb->s_security = NULL; 1227 } 1228 1229 /** 1230 * security_free_mnt_opts() - Free memory associated with mount options 1231 * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options 1232 * 1233 * Free memory associated with @mnt_ops. 1234 */ 1235 void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts) 1236 { 1237 if (!*mnt_opts) 1238 return; 1239 call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts); 1240 *mnt_opts = NULL; 1241 } 1242 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts); 1243 1244 /** 1245 * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() - Consume LSM mount options 1246 * @options: mount options 1247 * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options 1248 * 1249 * Eat (scan @options) and save them in @mnt_opts. 1250 * 1251 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1252 */ 1253 int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) 1254 { 1255 return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts); 1256 } 1257 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts); 1258 1259 /** 1260 * security_sb_mnt_opts_compat() - Check if new mount options are allowed 1261 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1262 * @mnt_opts: new mount options 1263 * 1264 * Determine if the new mount options in @mnt_opts are allowed given the 1265 * existing mounted filesystem at @sb. @sb superblock being compared. 1266 * 1267 * Return: Returns 0 if options are compatible. 1268 */ 1269 int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, 1270 void *mnt_opts) 1271 { 1272 return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1273 } 1274 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat); 1275 1276 /** 1277 * security_sb_remount() - Verify no incompatible mount changes during remount 1278 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1279 * @mnt_opts: (re)mount options 1280 * 1281 * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes are 1282 * being made to those options. 1283 * 1284 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1285 */ 1286 int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, 1287 void *mnt_opts) 1288 { 1289 return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1290 } 1291 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount); 1292 1293 /** 1294 * security_sb_kern_mount() - Check if a kernel mount is allowed 1295 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1296 * 1297 * Mount this @sb if allowed by permissions. 1298 * 1299 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1300 */ 1301 int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb) 1302 { 1303 return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb); 1304 } 1305 1306 /** 1307 * security_sb_show_options() - Output the mount options for a superblock 1308 * @m: output file 1309 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1310 * 1311 * Show (print on @m) mount options for this @sb. 1312 * 1313 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1314 */ 1315 int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) 1316 { 1317 return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb); 1318 } 1319 1320 /** 1321 * security_sb_statfs() - Check if accessing fs stats is allowed 1322 * @dentry: superblock handle 1323 * 1324 * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt 1325 * mountpoint. @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem. 1326 * 1327 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1328 */ 1329 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) 1330 { 1331 return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry); 1332 } 1333 1334 /** 1335 * security_sb_mount() - Check permission for mounting a filesystem 1336 * @dev_name: filesystem backing device 1337 * @path: mount point 1338 * @type: filesystem type 1339 * @flags: mount flags 1340 * @data: filesystem specific data 1341 * 1342 * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on the 1343 * mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name identifies a 1344 * device if the file system type requires a device. For a remount 1345 * (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a loopback/bind mount 1346 * (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the pathname of the object being 1347 * mounted. 1348 * 1349 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1350 */ 1351 int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, 1352 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) 1353 { 1354 return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data); 1355 } 1356 1357 /** 1358 * security_sb_umount() - Check permission for unmounting a filesystem 1359 * @mnt: mounted filesystem 1360 * @flags: unmount flags 1361 * 1362 * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted. 1363 * 1364 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1365 */ 1366 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) 1367 { 1368 return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags); 1369 } 1370 1371 /** 1372 * security_sb_pivotroot() - Check permissions for pivoting the rootfs 1373 * @old_path: new location for current rootfs 1374 * @new_path: location of the new rootfs 1375 * 1376 * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem. 1377 * 1378 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1379 */ 1380 int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, 1381 const struct path *new_path) 1382 { 1383 return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path); 1384 } 1385 1386 /** 1387 * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() - Set the mount options for a filesystem 1388 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1389 * @mnt_opts: binary mount options 1390 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1391 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1392 * 1393 * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock. 1394 * 1395 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1396 */ 1397 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, 1398 void *mnt_opts, 1399 unsigned long kern_flags, 1400 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1401 { 1402 return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts, 1403 mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb, 1404 mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1405 } 1406 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts); 1407 1408 /** 1409 * security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() - Duplicate superblock mount options 1410 * @oldsb: source superblock 1411 * @newsb: destination superblock 1412 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1413 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1414 * 1415 * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another. 1416 * 1417 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1418 */ 1419 int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, 1420 struct super_block *newsb, 1421 unsigned long kern_flags, 1422 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1423 { 1424 return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb, 1425 kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1426 } 1427 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts); 1428 1429 /** 1430 * security_move_mount() - Check permissions for moving a mount 1431 * @from_path: source mount point 1432 * @to_path: destination mount point 1433 * 1434 * Check permission before a mount is moved. 1435 * 1436 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1437 */ 1438 int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, 1439 const struct path *to_path) 1440 { 1441 return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path); 1442 } 1443 1444 /** 1445 * security_path_notify() - Check if setting a watch is allowed 1446 * @path: file path 1447 * @mask: event mask 1448 * @obj_type: file path type 1449 * 1450 * Check permissions before setting a watch on events as defined by @mask, on 1451 * an object at @path, whose type is defined by @obj_type. 1452 * 1453 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1454 */ 1455 int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, 1456 unsigned int obj_type) 1457 { 1458 return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type); 1459 } 1460 1461 /** 1462 * security_inode_alloc() - Allocate an inode LSM blob 1463 * @inode: the inode 1464 * 1465 * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The 1466 * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is 1467 * allocated. 1468 * 1469 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 1470 */ 1471 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 1472 { 1473 int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode); 1474 1475 if (unlikely(rc)) 1476 return rc; 1477 rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode); 1478 if (unlikely(rc)) 1479 security_inode_free(inode); 1480 return rc; 1481 } 1482 1483 static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) 1484 { 1485 /* 1486 * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob 1487 */ 1488 kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head); 1489 } 1490 1491 /** 1492 * security_inode_free() - Free an inode's LSM blob 1493 * @inode: the inode 1494 * 1495 * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to NULL. 1496 */ 1497 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) 1498 { 1499 integrity_inode_free(inode); 1500 call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode); 1501 /* 1502 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and 1503 * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made 1504 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS 1505 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder 1506 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and 1507 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact. 1508 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too. 1509 */ 1510 if (inode->i_security) 1511 call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security, 1512 inode_free_by_rcu); 1513 } 1514 1515 /** 1516 * security_dentry_init_security() - Perform dentry initialization 1517 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1518 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1519 * @name: name of the last path component 1520 * @xattr_name: name of the security/LSM xattr 1521 * @ctx: pointer to the resulting LSM context 1522 * @ctxlen: length of @ctx 1523 * 1524 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available since NFSv4 1525 * has no label backed by an EA anyway. It is important to note that 1526 * @xattr_name does not need to be free'd by the caller, it is a static string. 1527 * 1528 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1529 */ 1530 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1531 const struct qstr *name, 1532 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx, 1533 u32 *ctxlen) 1534 { 1535 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1536 int rc; 1537 1538 /* 1539 * Only one module will provide a security context. 1540 */ 1541 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security, 1542 list) { 1543 rc = hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name, 1544 xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen); 1545 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security)) 1546 return rc; 1547 } 1548 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security); 1549 } 1550 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security); 1551 1552 /** 1553 * security_dentry_create_files_as() - Perform dentry initialization 1554 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1555 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1556 * @name: name of the last path component 1557 * @old: creds to use for LSM context calculations 1558 * @new: creds to modify 1559 * 1560 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available and set 1561 * that context in passed in creds so that new files are created using that 1562 * context. Context is calculated using the passed in creds and not the creds 1563 * of the caller. 1564 * 1565 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1566 */ 1567 int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1568 struct qstr *name, 1569 const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) 1570 { 1571 return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode, 1572 name, old, new); 1573 } 1574 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as); 1575 1576 /** 1577 * security_inode_init_security() - Initialize an inode's LSM context 1578 * @inode: the inode 1579 * @dir: parent directory 1580 * @qstr: last component of the pathname 1581 * @initxattrs: callback function to write xattrs 1582 * @fs_data: filesystem specific data 1583 * 1584 * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly 1585 * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode. This 1586 * hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation transaction and 1587 * provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike the post_create/mkdir/... 1588 * hooks called by the VFS. The hook function is expected to allocate the name 1589 * and value via kmalloc, with the caller being responsible for calling kfree 1590 * after using them. If the security module does not use security attributes 1591 * or does not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode, then 1592 * it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. 1593 * 1594 * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is 1595 * needed, or -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure. 1596 */ 1597 int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1598 const struct qstr *qstr, 1599 const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) 1600 { 1601 struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1]; 1602 struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr; 1603 int ret; 1604 1605 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1606 return 0; 1607 1608 if (!initxattrs) 1609 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, 1610 dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL); 1611 memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs)); 1612 lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; 1613 ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, 1614 &lsm_xattr->name, 1615 &lsm_xattr->value, 1616 &lsm_xattr->value_len); 1617 if (ret) 1618 goto out; 1619 1620 evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1; 1621 ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr); 1622 if (ret) 1623 goto out; 1624 ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); 1625 out: 1626 for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) 1627 kfree(xattr->value); 1628 return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret; 1629 } 1630 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); 1631 1632 /** 1633 * security_inode_init_security_anon() - Initialize an anonymous inode 1634 * @inode: the inode 1635 * @name: the anonymous inode class 1636 * @context_inode: an optional related inode 1637 * 1638 * Set up the incore security field for the new anonymous inode and return 1639 * whether the inode creation is permitted by the security module or not. 1640 * 1641 * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EACCES if the security module denies the 1642 * creation of this inode, or another -errno upon other errors. 1643 */ 1644 int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, 1645 const struct qstr *name, 1646 const struct inode *context_inode) 1647 { 1648 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, name, 1649 context_inode); 1650 } 1651 1652 int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1653 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, 1654 void **value, size_t *len) 1655 { 1656 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1657 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 1658 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, 1659 qstr, name, value, len); 1660 } 1661 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security); 1662 1663 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH 1664 /** 1665 * security_path_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 1666 * @dir: parent directory 1667 * @dentry: new file 1668 * @mode: new file mode 1669 * @dev: device number 1670 * 1671 * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called even 1672 * if mknod operation is being done for a regular file. 1673 * 1674 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1675 */ 1676 int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1677 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) 1678 { 1679 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1680 return 0; 1681 return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1682 } 1683 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod); 1684 1685 /** 1686 * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed 1687 * @dir: parent directory 1688 * @dentry: new directory 1689 * @mode: new directory mode 1690 * 1691 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory. 1692 * 1693 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1694 */ 1695 int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1696 umode_t mode) 1697 { 1698 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1699 return 0; 1700 return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1701 } 1702 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir); 1703 1704 /** 1705 * security_path_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 1706 * @dir: parent directory 1707 * @dentry: directory to remove 1708 * 1709 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 1710 * 1711 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1712 */ 1713 int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1714 { 1715 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1716 return 0; 1717 return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1718 } 1719 1720 /** 1721 * security_path_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 1722 * @dir: parent directory 1723 * @dentry: file 1724 * 1725 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 1726 * 1727 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1728 */ 1729 int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1730 { 1731 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1732 return 0; 1733 return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1734 } 1735 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink); 1736 1737 /** 1738 * security_path_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 1739 * @dir: parent directory 1740 * @dentry: symbolic link 1741 * @old_name: file pathname 1742 * 1743 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 1744 * 1745 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1746 */ 1747 int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1748 const char *old_name) 1749 { 1750 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1751 return 0; 1752 return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1753 } 1754 1755 /** 1756 * security_path_link - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 1757 * @old_dentry: existing file 1758 * @new_dir: new parent directory 1759 * @new_dentry: new link 1760 * 1761 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 1762 * 1763 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1764 */ 1765 int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, 1766 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1767 { 1768 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1769 return 0; 1770 return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); 1771 } 1772 1773 /** 1774 * security_path_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 1775 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 1776 * @old_dentry: the old file 1777 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 1778 * @new_dentry: the new file 1779 * @flags: flags 1780 * 1781 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 1782 * 1783 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1784 */ 1785 int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 1786 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 1787 unsigned int flags) 1788 { 1789 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 1790 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && 1791 IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 1792 return 0; 1793 1794 return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, 1795 new_dentry, flags); 1796 } 1797 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename); 1798 1799 /** 1800 * security_path_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 1801 * @path: file 1802 * 1803 * Check permission before truncating the file indicated by path. Note that 1804 * truncation permissions may also be checked based on already opened files, 1805 * using the security_file_truncate() hook. 1806 * 1807 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1808 */ 1809 int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path) 1810 { 1811 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1812 return 0; 1813 return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path); 1814 } 1815 1816 /** 1817 * security_path_chmod() - Check if changing the file's mode is allowed 1818 * @path: file 1819 * @mode: new mode 1820 * 1821 * Check for permission to change a mode of the file @path. The new mode is 1822 * specified in @mode which is a bitmask of constants from 1823 * <include/uapi/linux/stat.h>. 1824 * 1825 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1826 */ 1827 int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) 1828 { 1829 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1830 return 0; 1831 return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode); 1832 } 1833 1834 /** 1835 * security_path_chown() - Check if changing the file's owner/group is allowed 1836 * @path: file 1837 * @uid: file owner 1838 * @gid: file group 1839 * 1840 * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory. 1841 * 1842 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1843 */ 1844 int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) 1845 { 1846 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1847 return 0; 1848 return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid); 1849 } 1850 1851 /** 1852 * security_path_chroot() - Check if changing the root directory is allowed 1853 * @path: directory 1854 * 1855 * Check for permission to change root directory. 1856 * 1857 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1858 */ 1859 int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path) 1860 { 1861 return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path); 1862 } 1863 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */ 1864 1865 /** 1866 * security_inode_create() - Check if creating a file is allowed 1867 * @dir: the parent directory 1868 * @dentry: the file being created 1869 * @mode: requested file mode 1870 * 1871 * Check permission to create a regular file. 1872 * 1873 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1874 */ 1875 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1876 umode_t mode) 1877 { 1878 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1879 return 0; 1880 return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1881 } 1882 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create); 1883 1884 /** 1885 * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 1886 * @old_dentry: existing file 1887 * @dir: new parent directory 1888 * @new_dentry: new link 1889 * 1890 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 1891 * 1892 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1893 */ 1894 int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, 1895 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1896 { 1897 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1898 return 0; 1899 return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); 1900 } 1901 1902 /** 1903 * security_inode_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 1904 * @dir: parent directory 1905 * @dentry: file 1906 * 1907 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 1908 * 1909 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1910 */ 1911 int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1912 { 1913 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1914 return 0; 1915 return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1916 } 1917 1918 /** 1919 * security_inode_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 1920 * @dir: parent directory 1921 * @dentry: symbolic link 1922 * @old_name: existing filename 1923 * 1924 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 1925 * 1926 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1927 */ 1928 int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1929 const char *old_name) 1930 { 1931 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1932 return 0; 1933 return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1934 } 1935 1936 /** 1937 * security_inode_mkdir() - Check if creation a new director is allowed 1938 * @dir: parent directory 1939 * @dentry: new directory 1940 * @mode: new directory mode 1941 * 1942 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory 1943 * associated with inode structure @dir. 1944 * 1945 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1946 */ 1947 int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1948 { 1949 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1950 return 0; 1951 return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1952 } 1953 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir); 1954 1955 /** 1956 * security_inode_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 1957 * @dir: parent directory 1958 * @dentry: directory to be removed 1959 * 1960 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 1961 * 1962 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1963 */ 1964 int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1965 { 1966 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1967 return 0; 1968 return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1969 } 1970 1971 /** 1972 * security_inode_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 1973 * @dir: parent directory 1974 * @dentry: new file 1975 * @mode: new file mode 1976 * @dev: device number 1977 * 1978 * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo file 1979 * created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation is being 1980 * done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called and not this 1981 * hook. 1982 * 1983 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1984 */ 1985 int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1986 umode_t mode, dev_t dev) 1987 { 1988 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1989 return 0; 1990 return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1991 } 1992 1993 /** 1994 * security_inode_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 1995 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 1996 * @old_dentry: the old file 1997 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 1998 * @new_dentry: the new file 1999 * @flags: flags 2000 * 2001 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 2002 * 2003 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2004 */ 2005 int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 2006 struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 2007 unsigned int flags) 2008 { 2009 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 2010 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && 2011 IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 2012 return 0; 2013 2014 if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { 2015 int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry, 2016 old_dir, old_dentry); 2017 if (err) 2018 return err; 2019 } 2020 2021 return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, 2022 new_dir, new_dentry); 2023 } 2024 2025 /** 2026 * security_inode_readlink() - Check if reading a symbolic link is allowed 2027 * @dentry: link 2028 * 2029 * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. 2030 * 2031 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2032 */ 2033 int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) 2034 { 2035 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2036 return 0; 2037 return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry); 2038 } 2039 2040 /** 2041 * security_inode_follow_link() - Check if following a symbolic link is allowed 2042 * @dentry: link dentry 2043 * @inode: link inode 2044 * @rcu: true if in RCU-walk mode 2045 * 2046 * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname. If 2047 * @rcu is true, @inode is not stable. 2048 * 2049 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2050 */ 2051 int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, 2052 bool rcu) 2053 { 2054 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2055 return 0; 2056 return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu); 2057 } 2058 2059 /** 2060 * security_inode_permission() - Check if accessing an inode is allowed 2061 * @inode: inode 2062 * @mask: access mask 2063 * 2064 * Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the 2065 * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to 2066 * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks. Notice 2067 * that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many other 2068 * operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is called when 2069 * the actual read/write operations are performed. 2070 * 2071 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2072 */ 2073 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) 2074 { 2075 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2076 return 0; 2077 return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask); 2078 } 2079 2080 /** 2081 * security_inode_setattr() - Check if setting file attributes is allowed 2082 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2083 * @dentry: file 2084 * @attr: new attributes 2085 * 2086 * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel call 2087 * to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever file 2088 * attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod operations, 2089 * transferring disk quotas, etc). 2090 * 2091 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2092 */ 2093 int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2094 struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 2095 { 2096 int ret; 2097 2098 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2099 return 0; 2100 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr); 2101 if (ret) 2102 return ret; 2103 return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); 2104 } 2105 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); 2106 2107 /** 2108 * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed 2109 * @path: file 2110 * 2111 * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. 2112 * 2113 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2114 */ 2115 int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) 2116 { 2117 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 2118 return 0; 2119 return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path); 2120 } 2121 2122 /** 2123 * security_inode_setxattr() - Check if setting file xattrs is allowed 2124 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2125 * @dentry: file 2126 * @name: xattr name 2127 * @value: xattr value 2128 * @size: size of xattr value 2129 * @flags: flags 2130 * 2131 * Check permission before setting the extended attributes. 2132 * 2133 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2134 */ 2135 int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2136 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 2137 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2138 { 2139 int ret; 2140 2141 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2142 return 0; 2143 /* 2144 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 2145 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 2146 */ 2147 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name, value, 2148 size, flags); 2149 2150 if (ret == 1) 2151 ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); 2152 if (ret) 2153 return ret; 2154 ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 2155 if (ret) 2156 return ret; 2157 return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size); 2158 } 2159 2160 /** 2161 * security_inode_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed 2162 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2163 * @dentry: file 2164 * @acl_name: acl name 2165 * @kacl: acl struct 2166 * 2167 * Check permission before setting posix acls, the posix acls in @kacl are 2168 * identified by @acl_name. 2169 * 2170 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2171 */ 2172 int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2173 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, 2174 struct posix_acl *kacl) 2175 { 2176 int ret; 2177 2178 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2179 return 0; 2180 ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, 2181 kacl); 2182 if (ret) 2183 return ret; 2184 ret = ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2185 if (ret) 2186 return ret; 2187 return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2188 } 2189 2190 /** 2191 * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed 2192 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2193 * @dentry: file 2194 * @acl_name: acl name 2195 * 2196 * Check permission before getting osix acls, the posix acls are identified by 2197 * @acl_name. 2198 * 2199 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2200 */ 2201 int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2202 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2203 { 2204 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2205 return 0; 2206 return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2207 } 2208 2209 /** 2210 * security_inode_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed 2211 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2212 * @dentry: file 2213 * @acl_name: acl name 2214 * 2215 * Check permission before removing posix acls, the posix acls are identified 2216 * by @acl_name. 2217 * 2218 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2219 */ 2220 int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2221 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2222 { 2223 int ret; 2224 2225 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2226 return 0; 2227 ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2228 if (ret) 2229 return ret; 2230 ret = ima_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2231 if (ret) 2232 return ret; 2233 return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2234 } 2235 2236 /** 2237 * security_inode_post_setxattr() - Update the inode after a setxattr operation 2238 * @dentry: file 2239 * @name: xattr name 2240 * @value: xattr value 2241 * @size: xattr value size 2242 * @flags: flags 2243 * 2244 * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation. 2245 */ 2246 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 2247 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2248 { 2249 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2250 return; 2251 call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); 2252 evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 2253 } 2254 2255 /** 2256 * security_inode_getxattr() - Check if xattr access is allowed 2257 * @dentry: file 2258 * @name: xattr name 2259 * 2260 * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes identified by 2261 * @name for @dentry. 2262 * 2263 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2264 */ 2265 int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2266 { 2267 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2268 return 0; 2269 return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name); 2270 } 2271 2272 /** 2273 * security_inode_listxattr() - Check if listing xattrs is allowed 2274 * @dentry: file 2275 * 2276 * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute names for 2277 * @dentry. 2278 * 2279 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2280 */ 2281 int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) 2282 { 2283 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2284 return 0; 2285 return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry); 2286 } 2287 2288 /** 2289 * security_inode_removexattr() - Check if removing an xattr is allowed 2290 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2291 * @dentry: file 2292 * @name: xattr name 2293 * 2294 * Check permission before removing the extended attribute identified by @name 2295 * for @dentry. 2296 * 2297 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2298 */ 2299 int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2300 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2301 { 2302 int ret; 2303 2304 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2305 return 0; 2306 /* 2307 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 2308 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 2309 */ 2310 ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); 2311 if (ret == 1) 2312 ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 2313 if (ret) 2314 return ret; 2315 ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); 2316 if (ret) 2317 return ret; 2318 return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 2319 } 2320 2321 /** 2322 * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required 2323 * @dentry: associated dentry 2324 * 2325 * Called when an inode has been changed to determine if 2326 * security_inode_killpriv() should be called. 2327 * 2328 * Return: Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation, return 0 if 2329 * security_inode_killpriv() does not need to be called, return >0 if 2330 * security_inode_killpriv() does need to be called. 2331 */ 2332 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) 2333 { 2334 return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry); 2335 } 2336 2337 /** 2338 * security_inode_killpriv() - The setuid bit is removed, update LSM state 2339 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2340 * @dentry: associated dentry 2341 * 2342 * The @dentry's setuid bit is being removed. Remove similar security labels. 2343 * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held. 2344 * 2345 * Return: Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation 2346 * causing setuid bit removal is failed. 2347 */ 2348 int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2349 struct dentry *dentry) 2350 { 2351 return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, idmap, dentry); 2352 } 2353 2354 /** 2355 * security_inode_getsecurity() - Get the xattr security label of an inode 2356 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2357 * @inode: inode 2358 * @name: xattr name 2359 * @buffer: security label buffer 2360 * @alloc: allocation flag 2361 * 2362 * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the security 2363 * label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that @name is the 2364 * remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix has been removed. 2365 * @alloc is used to specify if the call should return a value via the buffer 2366 * or just the value length. 2367 * 2368 * Return: Returns size of buffer on success. 2369 */ 2370 int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2371 struct inode *inode, const char *name, 2372 void **buffer, bool alloc) 2373 { 2374 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2375 int rc; 2376 2377 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2378 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 2379 /* 2380 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 2381 */ 2382 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) { 2383 rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name, buffer, 2384 alloc); 2385 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity)) 2386 return rc; 2387 } 2388 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 2389 } 2390 2391 /** 2392 * security_inode_setsecurity() - Set the xattr security label of an inode 2393 * @inode: inode 2394 * @name: xattr name 2395 * @value: security label 2396 * @size: length of security label 2397 * @flags: flags 2398 * 2399 * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the extended 2400 * attribute value @value. @size indicates the size of the @value in bytes. 2401 * @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0. Note that @name is the 2402 * remainder of the attribute name after the security. prefix has been removed. 2403 * 2404 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2405 */ 2406 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, 2407 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2408 { 2409 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2410 int rc; 2411 2412 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2413 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 2414 /* 2415 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 2416 */ 2417 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) { 2418 rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, 2419 flags); 2420 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity)) 2421 return rc; 2422 } 2423 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 2424 } 2425 2426 /** 2427 * security_inode_listsecurity() - List the xattr security label names 2428 * @inode: inode 2429 * @buffer: buffer 2430 * @buffer_size: size of buffer 2431 * 2432 * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels associated with 2433 * @inode into @buffer. The maximum size of @buffer is specified by 2434 * @buffer_size. @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer 2435 * required. 2436 * 2437 * Return: Returns number of bytes used/required on success. 2438 */ 2439 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, 2440 char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) 2441 { 2442 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2443 return 0; 2444 return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size); 2445 } 2446 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity); 2447 2448 /** 2449 * security_inode_getsecid() - Get an inode's secid 2450 * @inode: inode 2451 * @secid: secid to return 2452 * 2453 * Get the secid associated with the node. In case of failure, @secid will be 2454 * set to zero. 2455 */ 2456 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) 2457 { 2458 call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid); 2459 } 2460 2461 /** 2462 * security_inode_copy_up() - Create new creds for an overlayfs copy-up op 2463 * @src: union dentry of copy-up file 2464 * @new: newly created creds 2465 * 2466 * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of overlay 2467 * filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds and modify as 2468 * need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to new creds temporarily to 2469 * create new file and release newly allocated creds. 2470 * 2471 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error. 2472 */ 2473 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) 2474 { 2475 return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new); 2476 } 2477 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up); 2478 2479 /** 2480 * security_inode_copy_up_xattr() - Filter xattrs in an overlayfs copy-up op 2481 * @name: xattr name 2482 * 2483 * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied up from a 2484 * lower layer to the union/overlay layer. The caller is responsible for 2485 * reading and writing the xattrs, this hook is merely a filter. 2486 * 2487 * Return: Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP 2488 * if the security module does not know about attribute, or a negative 2489 * error code to abort the copy up. 2490 */ 2491 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) 2492 { 2493 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2494 int rc; 2495 2496 /* 2497 * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the 2498 * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or 2499 * any other error code incase of an error. 2500 */ 2501 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, 2502 &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) { 2503 rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name); 2504 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr)) 2505 return rc; 2506 } 2507 2508 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr); 2509 } 2510 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr); 2511 2512 /** 2513 * security_kernfs_init_security() - Init LSM context for a kernfs node 2514 * @kn_dir: parent kernfs node 2515 * @kn: the kernfs node to initialize 2516 * 2517 * Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based on its 2518 * own and its parent's attributes. 2519 * 2520 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2521 */ 2522 int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, 2523 struct kernfs_node *kn) 2524 { 2525 return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn); 2526 } 2527 2528 /** 2529 * security_file_permission() - Check file permissions 2530 * @file: file 2531 * @mask: requested permissions 2532 * 2533 * Check file permissions before accessing an open file. This hook is called 2534 * by various operations that read or write files. A security module can use 2535 * this hook to perform additional checking on these operations, e.g. to 2536 * revalidate permissions on use to support privilege bracketing or policy 2537 * changes. Notice that this hook is used when the actual read/write 2538 * operations are performed, whereas the inode_security_ops hook is called when 2539 * a file is opened (as well as many other operations). Although this hook can 2540 * be used to revalidate permissions for various system call operations that 2541 * read or write files, it does not address the revalidation of permissions for 2542 * memory-mapped files. Security modules must handle this separately if they 2543 * need such revalidation. 2544 * 2545 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2546 */ 2547 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) 2548 { 2549 int ret; 2550 2551 ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask); 2552 if (ret) 2553 return ret; 2554 2555 return fsnotify_perm(file, mask); 2556 } 2557 2558 /** 2559 * security_file_alloc() - Allocate and init a file's LSM blob 2560 * @file: the file 2561 * 2562 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field. The 2563 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 2564 * 2565 * Return: Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 2566 */ 2567 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) 2568 { 2569 int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file); 2570 2571 if (rc) 2572 return rc; 2573 rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file); 2574 if (unlikely(rc)) 2575 security_file_free(file); 2576 return rc; 2577 } 2578 2579 /** 2580 * security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob 2581 * @file: the file 2582 * 2583 * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security. 2584 */ 2585 void security_file_free(struct file *file) 2586 { 2587 void *blob; 2588 2589 call_void_hook(file_free_security, file); 2590 2591 blob = file->f_security; 2592 if (blob) { 2593 file->f_security = NULL; 2594 kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob); 2595 } 2596 } 2597 2598 /** 2599 * security_file_ioctl() - Check if an ioctl is allowed 2600 * @file: associated file 2601 * @cmd: ioctl cmd 2602 * @arg: ioctl arguments 2603 * 2604 * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file. Note that @arg sometimes 2605 * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer 2606 * value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used 2607 * by the security module. 2608 * 2609 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2610 */ 2611 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2612 { 2613 return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 2614 } 2615 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl); 2616 2617 static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) 2618 { 2619 /* 2620 * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect 2621 * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about... 2622 */ 2623 if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ) 2624 return prot; 2625 if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) 2626 return prot; 2627 /* 2628 * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it. 2629 */ 2630 if (!file) 2631 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2632 /* 2633 * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need 2634 * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case 2635 */ 2636 if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) { 2637 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU 2638 if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) { 2639 unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file); 2640 if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC)) 2641 return prot; 2642 } 2643 #endif 2644 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2645 } 2646 /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */ 2647 return prot; 2648 } 2649 2650 /** 2651 * security_mmap_file() - Check if mmap'ing a file is allowed 2652 * @file: file 2653 * @prot: protection applied by the kernel 2654 * @flags: flags 2655 * 2656 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. if 2657 * mapping anonymous memory. 2658 * 2659 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2660 */ 2661 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, 2662 unsigned long flags) 2663 { 2664 unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot); 2665 int ret; 2666 2667 ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 2668 if (ret) 2669 return ret; 2670 return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 2671 } 2672 2673 /** 2674 * security_mmap_addr() - Check if mmap'ing an address is allowed 2675 * @addr: address 2676 * 2677 * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr. 2678 * 2679 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2680 */ 2681 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) 2682 { 2683 return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr); 2684 } 2685 2686 /** 2687 * security_file_mprotect() - Check if changing memory protections is allowed 2688 * @vma: memory region 2689 * @reqprot: application requested protection 2690 * @prot: protection applied by the kernel 2691 * 2692 * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions. 2693 * 2694 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2695 */ 2696 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, 2697 unsigned long prot) 2698 { 2699 int ret; 2700 2701 ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); 2702 if (ret) 2703 return ret; 2704 return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot); 2705 } 2706 2707 /** 2708 * security_file_lock() - Check if a file lock is allowed 2709 * @file: file 2710 * @cmd: lock operation (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK) 2711 * 2712 * Check permission before performing file locking operations. Note the hook 2713 * mediates both flock and fcntl style locks. 2714 * 2715 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2716 */ 2717 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) 2718 { 2719 return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd); 2720 } 2721 2722 /** 2723 * security_file_fcntl() - Check if fcntl() op is allowed 2724 * @file: file 2725 * @cmd: fnctl command 2726 * @arg: command argument 2727 * 2728 * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd from 2729 * being performed on the file @file. Note that @arg sometimes represents a 2730 * user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer value. When 2731 * @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used by the 2732 * security module. 2733 * 2734 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2735 */ 2736 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2737 { 2738 return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 2739 } 2740 2741 /** 2742 * security_file_set_fowner() - Set the file owner info in the LSM blob 2743 * @file: the file 2744 * 2745 * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in 2746 * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook. 2747 * 2748 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2749 */ 2750 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) 2751 { 2752 call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file); 2753 } 2754 2755 /** 2756 * security_file_send_sigiotask() - Check if sending SIGIO/SIGURG is allowed 2757 * @tsk: target task 2758 * @fown: signal sender 2759 * @sig: signal to be sent, SIGIO is sent if 0 2760 * 2761 * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the 2762 * process @tsk. Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt. Note 2763 * that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a struct file, 2764 * so the file structure (and associated security information) can always be 2765 * obtained: container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner). 2766 * 2767 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2768 */ 2769 int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, 2770 struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) 2771 { 2772 return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig); 2773 } 2774 2775 /** 2776 * security_file_receive() - Check is receiving a file via IPC is allowed 2777 * @file: file being received 2778 * 2779 * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process to 2780 * receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC. 2781 * 2782 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2783 */ 2784 int security_file_receive(struct file *file) 2785 { 2786 return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file); 2787 } 2788 2789 /** 2790 * security_file_open() - Save open() time state for late use by the LSM 2791 * @file: 2792 * 2793 * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon file_permission, 2794 * and recheck access if anything has changed since inode_permission. 2795 * 2796 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2797 */ 2798 int security_file_open(struct file *file) 2799 { 2800 int ret; 2801 2802 ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file); 2803 if (ret) 2804 return ret; 2805 2806 return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN); 2807 } 2808 2809 /** 2810 * security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 2811 * @file: file 2812 * 2813 * Check permission before truncating a file, i.e. using ftruncate. Note that 2814 * truncation permission may also be checked based on the path, using the 2815 * @path_truncate hook. 2816 * 2817 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2818 */ 2819 int security_file_truncate(struct file *file) 2820 { 2821 return call_int_hook(file_truncate, 0, file); 2822 } 2823 2824 /** 2825 * security_task_alloc() - Allocate a task's LSM blob 2826 * @task: the task 2827 * @clone_flags: flags indicating what is being shared 2828 * 2829 * Handle allocation of task-related resources. 2830 * 2831 * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. 2832 */ 2833 int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) 2834 { 2835 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 2836 2837 if (rc) 2838 return rc; 2839 rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags); 2840 if (unlikely(rc)) 2841 security_task_free(task); 2842 return rc; 2843 } 2844 2845 /** 2846 * security_task_free() - Free a task's LSM blob and related resources 2847 * @task: task 2848 * 2849 * Handle release of task-related resources. Note that this can be called from 2850 * interrupt context. 2851 */ 2852 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) 2853 { 2854 call_void_hook(task_free, task); 2855 2856 kfree(task->security); 2857 task->security = NULL; 2858 } 2859 2860 /** 2861 * security_cred_alloc_blank() - Allocate the min memory to allow cred_transfer 2862 * @cred: credentials 2863 * @gfp: gfp flags 2864 * 2865 * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that 2866 * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM. 2867 * 2868 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 2869 */ 2870 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 2871 { 2872 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp); 2873 2874 if (rc) 2875 return rc; 2876 2877 rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp); 2878 if (unlikely(rc)) 2879 security_cred_free(cred); 2880 return rc; 2881 } 2882 2883 /** 2884 * security_cred_free() - Free the cred's LSM blob and associated resources 2885 * @cred: credentials 2886 * 2887 * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials. 2888 */ 2889 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) 2890 { 2891 /* 2892 * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that 2893 * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL. 2894 */ 2895 if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL)) 2896 return; 2897 2898 call_void_hook(cred_free, cred); 2899 2900 kfree(cred->security); 2901 cred->security = NULL; 2902 } 2903 2904 /** 2905 * security_prepare_creds() - Prepare a new set of credentials 2906 * @new: new credentials 2907 * @old: original credentials 2908 * @gfp: gfp flags 2909 * 2910 * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set. 2911 * 2912 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 2913 */ 2914 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) 2915 { 2916 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp); 2917 2918 if (rc) 2919 return rc; 2920 2921 rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp); 2922 if (unlikely(rc)) 2923 security_cred_free(new); 2924 return rc; 2925 } 2926 2927 /** 2928 * security_transfer_creds() - Transfer creds 2929 * @new: target credentials 2930 * @old: original credentials 2931 * 2932 * Transfer data from original creds to new creds. 2933 */ 2934 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 2935 { 2936 call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); 2937 } 2938 2939 /** 2940 * security_cred_getsecid() - Get the secid from a set of credentials 2941 * @c: credentials 2942 * @secid: secid value 2943 * 2944 * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c. In case of 2945 * failure, @secid will be set to zero. 2946 */ 2947 void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) 2948 { 2949 *secid = 0; 2950 call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); 2951 } 2952 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); 2953 2954 /** 2955 * security_kernel_act_as() - Set the kernel credentials to act as secid 2956 * @new: credentials 2957 * @secid: secid 2958 * 2959 * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). 2960 * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid. 2961 * 2962 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2963 */ 2964 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) 2965 { 2966 return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); 2967 } 2968 2969 /** 2970 * security_kernel_create_files_as() - Set file creation context using an inode 2971 * @new: target credentials 2972 * @inode: reference inode 2973 * 2974 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as the 2975 * objective context of the specified inode. The current task must be the one 2976 * that nominated @inode. 2977 * 2978 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2979 */ 2980 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) 2981 { 2982 return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode); 2983 } 2984 2985 /** 2986 * security_kernel_module_request() - Check is loading a module is allowed 2987 * @kmod_name: module name 2988 * 2989 * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for 2990 * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. 2991 * 2992 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2993 */ 2994 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) 2995 { 2996 int ret; 2997 2998 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); 2999 if (ret) 3000 return ret; 3001 return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); 3002 } 3003 3004 /** 3005 * security_kernel_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 3006 * @file: file 3007 * @id: file identifier 3008 * @contents: trust if security_kernel_post_read_file() will be called 3009 * 3010 * Read a file specified by userspace. 3011 * 3012 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3013 */ 3014 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, 3015 bool contents) 3016 { 3017 int ret; 3018 3019 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); 3020 if (ret) 3021 return ret; 3022 return ima_read_file(file, id, contents); 3023 } 3024 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); 3025 3026 /** 3027 * security_kernel_post_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 3028 * @file: file 3029 * @buf: file contents 3030 * @size: size of file contents 3031 * @id: file identifier 3032 * 3033 * Read a file specified by userspace. This must be paired with a prior call 3034 * to security_kernel_read_file() call that indicated this hook would also be 3035 * called, see security_kernel_read_file() for more information. 3036 * 3037 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3038 */ 3039 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, 3040 enum kernel_read_file_id id) 3041 { 3042 int ret; 3043 3044 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id); 3045 if (ret) 3046 return ret; 3047 return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id); 3048 } 3049 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); 3050 3051 /** 3052 * security_kernel_load_data() - Load data provided by userspace 3053 * @id: data identifier 3054 * @contents: true if security_kernel_post_load_data() will be called 3055 * 3056 * Load data provided by userspace. 3057 * 3058 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3059 */ 3060 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) 3061 { 3062 int ret; 3063 3064 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents); 3065 if (ret) 3066 return ret; 3067 return ima_load_data(id, contents); 3068 } 3069 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); 3070 3071 /** 3072 * security_kernel_post_load_data() - Load userspace data from a non-file source 3073 * @buf: data 3074 * @size: size of data 3075 * @id: data identifier 3076 * @description: text description of data, specific to the id value 3077 * 3078 * Load data provided by a non-file source (usually userspace buffer). This 3079 * must be paired with a prior security_kernel_load_data() call that indicated 3080 * this hook would also be called, see security_kernel_load_data() for more 3081 * information. 3082 * 3083 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3084 */ 3085 int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, 3086 enum kernel_load_data_id id, 3087 char *description) 3088 { 3089 int ret; 3090 3091 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id, 3092 description); 3093 if (ret) 3094 return ret; 3095 return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description); 3096 } 3097 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data); 3098 3099 /** 3100 * security_task_fix_setuid() - Update LSM with new user id attributes 3101 * @new: updated credentials 3102 * @old: credentials being replaced 3103 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag values 3104 * 3105 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user identity 3106 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 3107 * the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If @new is the set of 3108 * credentials that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this 3109 * rather than to @current->cred. 3110 * 3111 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3112 */ 3113 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 3114 int flags) 3115 { 3116 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags); 3117 } 3118 3119 /** 3120 * security_task_fix_setgid() - Update LSM with new group id attributes 3121 * @new: updated credentials 3122 * @old: credentials being replaced 3123 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag value 3124 * 3125 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the group identity 3126 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 3127 * the set*gid system calls invoked this hook. @new is the set of credentials 3128 * that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 3129 * @current->cred. 3130 * 3131 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3132 */ 3133 int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 3134 int flags) 3135 { 3136 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags); 3137 } 3138 3139 /** 3140 * security_task_fix_setgroups() - Update LSM with new supplementary groups 3141 * @new: updated credentials 3142 * @old: credentials being replaced 3143 * 3144 * Update the module's state after setting the supplementary group identity 3145 * attributes of the current process. @new is the set of credentials that will 3146 * be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 3147 * @current->cred. 3148 * 3149 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3150 */ 3151 int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 3152 { 3153 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, 0, new, old); 3154 } 3155 3156 /** 3157 * security_task_setpgid() - Check if setting the pgid is allowed 3158 * @p: task being modified 3159 * @pgid: new pgid 3160 * 3161 * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the process 3162 * @p to @pgid. 3163 * 3164 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3165 */ 3166 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) 3167 { 3168 return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid); 3169 } 3170 3171 /** 3172 * security_task_getpgid() - Check if getting the pgid is allowed 3173 * @p: task 3174 * 3175 * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the process 3176 * @p. 3177 * 3178 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3179 */ 3180 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) 3181 { 3182 return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p); 3183 } 3184 3185 /** 3186 * security_task_getsid() - Check if getting the session id is allowed 3187 * @p: task 3188 * 3189 * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process @p. 3190 * 3191 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3192 */ 3193 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) 3194 { 3195 return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); 3196 } 3197 3198 /** 3199 * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid 3200 * @secid: secid value 3201 * 3202 * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return 3203 * it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3204 */ 3205 void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) 3206 { 3207 *secid = 0; 3208 call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid); 3209 } 3210 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj); 3211 3212 /** 3213 * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid 3214 * @p: target task 3215 * @secid: secid value 3216 * 3217 * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and 3218 * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3219 */ 3220 void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) 3221 { 3222 *secid = 0; 3223 call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); 3224 } 3225 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj); 3226 3227 /** 3228 * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed 3229 * @p: target task 3230 * @nice: nice value 3231 * 3232 * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice. 3233 * 3234 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3235 */ 3236 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) 3237 { 3238 return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice); 3239 } 3240 3241 /** 3242 * security_task_setioprio() - Check if setting a task's ioprio is allowed 3243 * @p: target task 3244 * @ioprio: ioprio value 3245 * 3246 * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio. 3247 * 3248 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3249 */ 3250 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) 3251 { 3252 return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio); 3253 } 3254 3255 /** 3256 * security_task_getioprio() - Check if getting a task's ioprio is allowed 3257 * @p: task 3258 * 3259 * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p. 3260 * 3261 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3262 */ 3263 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) 3264 { 3265 return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p); 3266 } 3267 3268 /** 3269 * security_task_prlimit() - Check if get/setting resources limits is allowed 3270 * @cred: current task credentials 3271 * @tcred: target task credentials 3272 * @flags: LSM_PRLIMIT_* flag bits indicating a get/set/both 3273 * 3274 * Check permission before getting and/or setting the resource limits of 3275 * another task. 3276 * 3277 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3278 */ 3279 int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, 3280 unsigned int flags) 3281 { 3282 return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags); 3283 } 3284 3285 /** 3286 * security_task_setrlimit() - Check if setting a new rlimit value is allowed 3287 * @p: target task's group leader 3288 * @resource: resource whose limit is being set 3289 * @new_rlim: new resource limit 3290 * 3291 * Check permission before setting the resource limits of process @p for 3292 * @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can be examined by 3293 * dereferencing (p->signal->rlim + resource). 3294 * 3295 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3296 */ 3297 int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, 3298 struct rlimit *new_rlim) 3299 { 3300 return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim); 3301 } 3302 3303 /** 3304 * security_task_setscheduler() - Check if setting sched policy/param is allowed 3305 * @p: target task 3306 * 3307 * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of 3308 * process @p. 3309 * 3310 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3311 */ 3312 int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3313 { 3314 return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p); 3315 } 3316 3317 /** 3318 * security_task_getscheduler() - Check if getting scheduling info is allowed 3319 * @p: target task 3320 * 3321 * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process @p. 3322 * 3323 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3324 */ 3325 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3326 { 3327 return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p); 3328 } 3329 3330 /** 3331 * security_task_movememory() - Check if moving memory is allowed 3332 * @p: task 3333 * 3334 * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p. 3335 * 3336 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3337 */ 3338 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) 3339 { 3340 return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p); 3341 } 3342 3343 /** 3344 * security_task_kill() - Check if sending a signal is allowed 3345 * @p: target process 3346 * @info: signal information 3347 * @sig: signal value 3348 * @cred: credentials of the signal sender, NULL if @current 3349 * 3350 * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p. @info can be NULL, the 3351 * constant 1, or a pointer to a kernel_siginfo structure. If @info is 1 or 3352 * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming from 3353 * the kernel and should typically be permitted. SIGIO signals are handled 3354 * separately by the send_sigiotask hook in file_security_ops. 3355 * 3356 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3357 */ 3358 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, 3359 int sig, const struct cred *cred) 3360 { 3361 return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred); 3362 } 3363 3364 /** 3365 * security_task_prctl() - Check if a prctl op is allowed 3366 * @option: operation 3367 * @arg2: argument 3368 * @arg3: argument 3369 * @arg4: argument 3370 * @arg5: argument 3371 * 3372 * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the 3373 * current process. 3374 * 3375 * Return: Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value 3376 * to cause prctl() to return immediately with that value. 3377 */ 3378 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, 3379 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) 3380 { 3381 int thisrc; 3382 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl); 3383 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3384 3385 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) { 3386 thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); 3387 if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) { 3388 rc = thisrc; 3389 if (thisrc != 0) 3390 break; 3391 } 3392 } 3393 return rc; 3394 } 3395 3396 /** 3397 * security_task_to_inode() - Set the security attributes of a task's inode 3398 * @p: task 3399 * @inode: inode 3400 * 3401 * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's 3402 * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes. 3403 */ 3404 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) 3405 { 3406 call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode); 3407 } 3408 3409 /** 3410 * security_create_user_ns() - Check if creating a new userns is allowed 3411 * @cred: prepared creds 3412 * 3413 * Check permission prior to creating a new user namespace. 3414 * 3415 * Return: Returns 0 if successful, otherwise < 0 error code. 3416 */ 3417 int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred) 3418 { 3419 return call_int_hook(userns_create, 0, cred); 3420 } 3421 3422 /** 3423 * security_ipc_permission() - Check if sysv ipc access is allowed 3424 * @ipcp: ipc permission structure 3425 * @flag: requested permissions 3426 * 3427 * Check permissions for access to IPC. 3428 * 3429 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3430 */ 3431 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) 3432 { 3433 return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag); 3434 } 3435 3436 /** 3437 * security_ipc_getsecid() - Get the sysv ipc object's secid 3438 * @ipcp: ipc permission structure 3439 * @secid: secid pointer 3440 * 3441 * Get the secid associated with the ipc object. In case of failure, @secid 3442 * will be set to zero. 3443 */ 3444 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) 3445 { 3446 *secid = 0; 3447 call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); 3448 } 3449 3450 /** 3451 * security_msg_msg_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc message LSM blob 3452 * @msg: message structure 3453 * 3454 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field. The 3455 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3456 * 3457 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3458 */ 3459 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) 3460 { 3461 int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg); 3462 3463 if (unlikely(rc)) 3464 return rc; 3465 rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg); 3466 if (unlikely(rc)) 3467 security_msg_msg_free(msg); 3468 return rc; 3469 } 3470 3471 /** 3472 * security_msg_msg_free() - Free a sysv ipc message LSM blob 3473 * @msg: message structure 3474 * 3475 * Deallocate the security structure for this message. 3476 */ 3477 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg) 3478 { 3479 call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg); 3480 kfree(msg->security); 3481 msg->security = NULL; 3482 } 3483 3484 /** 3485 * security_msg_queue_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob 3486 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3487 * 3488 * Allocate and attach a security structure to @msg. The security field is 3489 * initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3490 * 3491 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3492 */ 3493 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3494 { 3495 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq); 3496 3497 if (unlikely(rc)) 3498 return rc; 3499 rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq); 3500 if (unlikely(rc)) 3501 security_msg_queue_free(msq); 3502 return rc; 3503 } 3504 3505 /** 3506 * security_msg_queue_free() - Free a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob 3507 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3508 * 3509 * Deallocate security field @perm->security for the message queue. 3510 */ 3511 void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3512 { 3513 call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq); 3514 kfree(msq->security); 3515 msq->security = NULL; 3516 } 3517 3518 /** 3519 * security_msg_queue_associate() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed 3520 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3521 * @msqflg: operation flags 3522 * 3523 * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the msgget system 3524 * call. This hook is only called when returning the message queue identifier 3525 * for an existing message queue, not when a new message queue is created. 3526 * 3527 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 3528 */ 3529 int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) 3530 { 3531 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg); 3532 } 3533 3534 /** 3535 * security_msg_queue_msgctl() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed 3536 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3537 * @cmd: operation 3538 * 3539 * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd is to be 3540 * performed on the message queue with permissions. 3541 * 3542 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3543 */ 3544 int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) 3545 { 3546 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd); 3547 } 3548 3549 /** 3550 * security_msg_queue_msgsnd() - Check if sending a sysv ipc message is allowed 3551 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3552 * @msg: message 3553 * @msqflg: operation flags 3554 * 3555 * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message queue 3556 * with permissions specified in @msq. 3557 * 3558 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3559 */ 3560 int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, 3561 struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) 3562 { 3563 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg); 3564 } 3565 3566 /** 3567 * security_msg_queue_msgrcv() - Check if receiving a sysv ipc msg is allowed 3568 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3569 * @msg: message 3570 * @target: target task 3571 * @type: type of message requested 3572 * @mode: operation flags 3573 * 3574 * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message queue. 3575 * The @target task structure contains a pointer to the process that will be 3576 * receiving the message (not equal to the current process when inline receives 3577 * are being performed). 3578 * 3579 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3580 */ 3581 int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, 3582 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) 3583 { 3584 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode); 3585 } 3586 3587 /** 3588 * security_shm_alloc() - Allocate a sysv shm LSM blob 3589 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3590 * 3591 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @shp security field. The 3592 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3593 * 3594 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3595 */ 3596 int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3597 { 3598 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp); 3599 3600 if (unlikely(rc)) 3601 return rc; 3602 rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp); 3603 if (unlikely(rc)) 3604 security_shm_free(shp); 3605 return rc; 3606 } 3607 3608 /** 3609 * security_shm_free() - Free a sysv shm LSM blob 3610 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3611 * 3612 * Deallocate the security structure @perm->security for the memory segment. 3613 */ 3614 void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3615 { 3616 call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp); 3617 kfree(shp->security); 3618 shp->security = NULL; 3619 } 3620 3621 /** 3622 * security_shm_associate() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed 3623 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3624 * @shmflg: operation flags 3625 * 3626 * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the shmget 3627 * system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared memory 3628 * region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared memory 3629 * region is created. 3630 * 3631 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3632 */ 3633 int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) 3634 { 3635 return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg); 3636 } 3637 3638 /** 3639 * security_shm_shmctl() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed 3640 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3641 * @cmd: operation 3642 * 3643 * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by @cmd is 3644 * to be performed on the shared memory region with permissions in @shp. 3645 * 3646 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 3647 */ 3648 int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) 3649 { 3650 return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd); 3651 } 3652 3653 /** 3654 * security_shm_shmat() - Check if a sysv shm attach operation is allowed 3655 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3656 * @shmaddr: address of memory region to attach 3657 * @shmflg: operation flags 3658 * 3659 * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the 3660 * shared memory segment with permissions @shp to the data segment of the 3661 * calling process. The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr. 3662 * 3663 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3664 */ 3665 int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, 3666 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) 3667 { 3668 return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg); 3669 } 3670 3671 /** 3672 * security_sem_alloc() - Allocate a sysv semaphore LSM blob 3673 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3674 * 3675 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @sma security field. The 3676 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3677 * 3678 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3679 */ 3680 int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3681 { 3682 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma); 3683 3684 if (unlikely(rc)) 3685 return rc; 3686 rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma); 3687 if (unlikely(rc)) 3688 security_sem_free(sma); 3689 return rc; 3690 } 3691 3692 /** 3693 * security_sem_free() - Free a sysv semaphore LSM blob 3694 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3695 * 3696 * Deallocate security structure @sma->security for the semaphore. 3697 */ 3698 void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3699 { 3700 call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma); 3701 kfree(sma->security); 3702 sma->security = NULL; 3703 } 3704 3705 /** 3706 * security_sem_associate() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3707 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3708 * @semflg: operation flags 3709 * 3710 * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget system 3711 * call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore identifier for 3712 * an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be created. 3713 * 3714 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3715 */ 3716 int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) 3717 { 3718 return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg); 3719 } 3720 3721 /** 3722 * security_sem_semctl() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3723 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3724 * @cmd: operation 3725 * 3726 * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be 3727 * performed on the semaphore. 3728 * 3729 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3730 */ 3731 int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) 3732 { 3733 return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd); 3734 } 3735 3736 /** 3737 * security_sem_semop() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3738 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3739 * @sops: operations to perform 3740 * @nsops: number of operations 3741 * @alter: flag indicating changes will be made 3742 * 3743 * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the semaphore 3744 * set. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set may be modified. 3745 * 3746 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3747 */ 3748 int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, 3749 unsigned nsops, int alter) 3750 { 3751 return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter); 3752 } 3753 3754 /** 3755 * security_d_instantiate() - Populate an inode's LSM state based on a dentry 3756 * @dentry: dentry 3757 * @inode: inode 3758 * 3759 * Fill in @inode security information for a @dentry if allowed. 3760 */ 3761 void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) 3762 { 3763 if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 3764 return; 3765 call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode); 3766 } 3767 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); 3768 3769 /** 3770 * security_getprocattr() - Read an attribute for a task 3771 * @p: the task 3772 * @lsm: LSM name 3773 * @name: attribute name 3774 * @value: attribute value 3775 * 3776 * Read attribute @name for task @p and store it into @value if allowed. 3777 * 3778 * Return: Returns the length of @value on success, a negative value otherwise. 3779 */ 3780 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, 3781 const char *name, char **value) 3782 { 3783 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3784 3785 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { 3786 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 3787 continue; 3788 return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); 3789 } 3790 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr); 3791 } 3792 3793 /** 3794 * security_setprocattr() - Set an attribute for a task 3795 * @lsm: LSM name 3796 * @name: attribute name 3797 * @value: attribute value 3798 * @size: attribute value size 3799 * 3800 * Write (set) the current task's attribute @name to @value, size @size if 3801 * allowed. 3802 * 3803 * Return: Returns bytes written on success, a negative value otherwise. 3804 */ 3805 int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, 3806 size_t size) 3807 { 3808 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3809 3810 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { 3811 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 3812 continue; 3813 return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); 3814 } 3815 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr); 3816 } 3817 3818 /** 3819 * security_netlink_send() - Save info and check if netlink sending is allowed 3820 * @sk: sending socket 3821 * @skb: netlink message 3822 * 3823 * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission checking 3824 * can be performed when the message is processed. The security information 3825 * can be saved using the eff_cap field of the netlink_skb_parms structure. 3826 * Also may be used to provide fine grained control over message transmission. 3827 * 3828 * Return: Returns 0 if the information was successfully saved and message is 3829 * allowed to be transmitted. 3830 */ 3831 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 3832 { 3833 return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb); 3834 } 3835 3836 /** 3837 * security_ismaclabel() - Check is the named attribute is a MAC label 3838 * @name: full extended attribute name 3839 * 3840 * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name represents a MAC label. 3841 * 3842 * Return: Returns 1 if name is a MAC attribute otherwise returns 0. 3843 */ 3844 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) 3845 { 3846 return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name); 3847 } 3848 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); 3849 3850 /** 3851 * security_secid_to_secctx() - Convert a secid to a secctx 3852 * @secid: secid 3853 * @secdata: secctx 3854 * @seclen: secctx length 3855 * 3856 * Convert secid to security context. If @secdata is NULL the length of the 3857 * result will be returned in @seclen, but no @secdata will be returned. This 3858 * does mean that the length could change between calls to check the length and 3859 * the next call which actually allocates and returns the @secdata. 3860 * 3861 * Return: Return 0 on success, error on failure. 3862 */ 3863 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) 3864 { 3865 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3866 int rc; 3867 3868 /* 3869 * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this 3870 * LSM hook is not "stackable"). 3871 */ 3872 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { 3873 rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); 3874 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx)) 3875 return rc; 3876 } 3877 3878 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx); 3879 } 3880 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); 3881 3882 /** 3883 * security_secctx_to_secid() - Convert a secctx to a secid 3884 * @secdata: secctx 3885 * @seclen: length of secctx 3886 * @secid: secid 3887 * 3888 * Convert security context to secid. 3889 * 3890 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3891 */ 3892 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) 3893 { 3894 *secid = 0; 3895 return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid); 3896 } 3897 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); 3898 3899 /** 3900 * security_release_secctx() - Free a secctx buffer 3901 * @secdata: secctx 3902 * @seclen: length of secctx 3903 * 3904 * Release the security context. 3905 */ 3906 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) 3907 { 3908 call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); 3909 } 3910 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); 3911 3912 /** 3913 * security_inode_invalidate_secctx() - Invalidate an inode's security label 3914 * @inode: inode 3915 * 3916 * Notify the security module that it must revalidate the security context of 3917 * an inode. 3918 */ 3919 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) 3920 { 3921 call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode); 3922 } 3923 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx); 3924 3925 /** 3926 * security_inode_notifysecctx() - Nofify the LSM of an inode's security label 3927 * @inode: inode 3928 * @ctx: secctx 3929 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 3930 * 3931 * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should 3932 * be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module 3933 * for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize 3934 * the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server 3935 * for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. 3936 * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked. 3937 * 3938 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3939 */ 3940 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 3941 { 3942 return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 3943 } 3944 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx); 3945 3946 /** 3947 * security_inode_setsecctx() - Change the security label of an inode 3948 * @dentry: inode 3949 * @ctx: secctx 3950 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 3951 * 3952 * Change the security context of an inode. Updates the incore security 3953 * context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed 3954 * (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the 3955 * context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security 3956 * context in its incore inode and on the backing filesystem to a value 3957 * provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. Must be called with 3958 * inode->i_mutex locked. 3959 * 3960 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3961 */ 3962 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 3963 { 3964 return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen); 3965 } 3966 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx); 3967 3968 /** 3969 * security_inode_getsecctx() - Get the security label of an inode 3970 * @inode: inode 3971 * @ctx: secctx 3972 * @ctxlen: length of secctx 3973 * 3974 * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security 3975 * context for the given @inode. 3976 * 3977 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 3978 */ 3979 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) 3980 { 3981 return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 3982 } 3983 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx); 3984 3985 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE 3986 /** 3987 * security_post_notification() - Check if a watch notification can be posted 3988 * @w_cred: credentials of the task that set the watch 3989 * @cred: credentials of the task which triggered the watch 3990 * @n: the notification 3991 * 3992 * Check to see if a watch notification can be posted to a particular queue. 3993 * 3994 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3995 */ 3996 int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, 3997 const struct cred *cred, 3998 struct watch_notification *n) 3999 { 4000 return call_int_hook(post_notification, 0, w_cred, cred, n); 4001 } 4002 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */ 4003 4004 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS 4005 /** 4006 * security_watch_key() - Check if a task is allowed to watch for key events 4007 * @key: the key to watch 4008 * 4009 * Check to see if a process is allowed to watch for event notifications from 4010 * a key or keyring. 4011 * 4012 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4013 */ 4014 int security_watch_key(struct key *key) 4015 { 4016 return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key); 4017 } 4018 #endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */ 4019 4020 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK 4021 /** 4022 * security_unix_stream_connect() - Check if a AF_UNIX stream is allowed 4023 * @sock: originating sock 4024 * @other: peer sock 4025 * @newsk: new sock 4026 * 4027 * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection 4028 * between @sock and @other. 4029 * 4030 * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because 4031 * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix 4032 * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name 4033 * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod 4034 * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to 4035 * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient 4036 * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible 4037 * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target 4038 * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. 4039 * 4040 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4041 */ 4042 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, 4043 struct sock *newsk) 4044 { 4045 return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk); 4046 } 4047 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect); 4048 4049 /** 4050 * security_unix_may_send() - Check if AF_UNIX socket can send datagrams 4051 * @sock: originating sock 4052 * @other: peer sock 4053 * 4054 * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to 4055 * @other. 4056 * 4057 * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because 4058 * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix 4059 * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name 4060 * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod 4061 * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to 4062 * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient 4063 * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible 4064 * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target 4065 * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. 4066 * 4067 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4068 */ 4069 int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) 4070 { 4071 return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other); 4072 } 4073 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send); 4074 4075 /** 4076 * security_socket_create() - Check if creating a new socket is allowed 4077 * @family: protocol family 4078 * @type: communications type 4079 * @protocol: requested protocol 4080 * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested 4081 * 4082 * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket. 4083 * 4084 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4085 */ 4086 int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) 4087 { 4088 return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern); 4089 } 4090 4091 /** 4092 * security_socket_post_create() - Initialize a newly created socket 4093 * @sock: socket 4094 * @family: protocol family 4095 * @type: communications type 4096 * @protocol: requested protocol 4097 * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested 4098 * 4099 * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security 4100 * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the socket 4101 * structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored in the 4102 * associated inode. Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will allocate 4103 * and attach security information to SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security. This hook 4104 * may be used to update the SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security field with additional 4105 * information that wasn't available when the inode was allocated. 4106 * 4107 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4108 */ 4109 int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, 4110 int type, int protocol, int kern) 4111 { 4112 return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type, 4113 protocol, kern); 4114 } 4115 4116 /** 4117 * security_socket_socketpair() - Check if creating a socketpair is allowed 4118 * @socka: first socket 4119 * @sockb: second socket 4120 * 4121 * Check permissions before creating a fresh pair of sockets. 4122 * 4123 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted and the connection was 4124 * established. 4125 */ 4126 int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) 4127 { 4128 return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb); 4129 } 4130 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair); 4131 4132 /** 4133 * security_socket_bind() - Check if a socket bind operation is allowed 4134 * @sock: socket 4135 * @address: requested bind address 4136 * @addrlen: length of address 4137 * 4138 * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is performed 4139 * and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the @address 4140 * parameter. 4141 * 4142 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4143 */ 4144 int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, 4145 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4146 { 4147 return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 4148 } 4149 4150 /** 4151 * security_socket_connect() - Check if a socket connect operation is allowed 4152 * @sock: socket 4153 * @address: address of remote connection point 4154 * @addrlen: length of address 4155 * 4156 * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation attempts to 4157 * connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address. 4158 * 4159 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4160 */ 4161 int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, 4162 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4163 { 4164 return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 4165 } 4166 4167 /** 4168 * security_socket_listen() - Check if a socket is allowed to listen 4169 * @sock: socket 4170 * @backlog: connection queue size 4171 * 4172 * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation. 4173 * 4174 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4175 */ 4176 int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) 4177 { 4178 return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog); 4179 } 4180 4181 /** 4182 * security_socket_accept() - Check if a socket is allowed to accept connections 4183 * @sock: listening socket 4184 * @newsock: newly creation connection socket 4185 * 4186 * Check permission before accepting a new connection. Note that the new 4187 * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it, but 4188 * the accept operation has not actually been performed. 4189 * 4190 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4191 */ 4192 int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) 4193 { 4194 return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock); 4195 } 4196 4197 /** 4198 * security_socket_sendmsg() - Check is sending a message is allowed 4199 * @sock: sending socket 4200 * @msg: message to send 4201 * @size: size of message 4202 * 4203 * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket. 4204 * 4205 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4206 */ 4207 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) 4208 { 4209 return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size); 4210 } 4211 4212 /** 4213 * security_socket_recvmsg() - Check if receiving a message is allowed 4214 * @sock: receiving socket 4215 * @msg: message to receive 4216 * @size: size of message 4217 * @flags: operational flags 4218 * 4219 * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket. 4220 * 4221 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4222 */ 4223 int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, 4224 int size, int flags) 4225 { 4226 return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags); 4227 } 4228 4229 /** 4230 * security_socket_getsockname() - Check if reading the socket addr is allowed 4231 * @sock: socket 4232 * 4233 * Check permission before reading the local address (name) of the socket 4234 * object. 4235 * 4236 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4237 */ 4238 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) 4239 { 4240 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock); 4241 } 4242 4243 /** 4244 * security_socket_getpeername() - Check if reading the peer's addr is allowed 4245 * @sock: socket 4246 * 4247 * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object. 4248 * 4249 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4250 */ 4251 int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) 4252 { 4253 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock); 4254 } 4255 4256 /** 4257 * security_socket_getsockopt() - Check if reading a socket option is allowed 4258 * @sock: socket 4259 * @level: option's protocol level 4260 * @optname: option name 4261 * 4262 * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket 4263 * @sock. 4264 * 4265 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4266 */ 4267 int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 4268 { 4269 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 4270 } 4271 4272 /** 4273 * security_socket_setsockopt() - Check if setting a socket option is allowed 4274 * @sock: socket 4275 * @level: option's protocol level 4276 * @optname: option name 4277 * 4278 * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket @sock. 4279 * 4280 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4281 */ 4282 int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 4283 { 4284 return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 4285 } 4286 4287 /** 4288 * security_socket_shutdown() - Checks if shutting down the socket is allowed 4289 * @sock: socket 4290 * @how: flag indicating how sends and receives are handled 4291 * 4292 * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket @sock is 4293 * shut down. 4294 * 4295 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4296 */ 4297 int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) 4298 { 4299 return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how); 4300 } 4301 4302 /** 4303 * security_sock_rcv_skb() - Check if an incoming network packet is allowed 4304 * @sk: destination sock 4305 * @skb: incoming packet 4306 * 4307 * Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct from 4308 * Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the incoming 4309 * sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk. Must not 4310 * sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks. 4311 * 4312 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4313 */ 4314 int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 4315 { 4316 return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb); 4317 } 4318 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); 4319 4320 /** 4321 * security_socket_getpeersec_stream() - Get the remote peer label 4322 * @sock: socket 4323 * @optval: destination buffer 4324 * @optlen: size of peer label copied into the buffer 4325 * @len: maximum size of the destination buffer 4326 * 4327 * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state 4328 * for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC. 4329 * For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the socket is associated with an 4330 * ipsec SA. 4331 * 4332 * Return: Returns 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return 4333 * values. 4334 */ 4335 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval, 4336 sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len) 4337 { 4338 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 4339 optval, optlen, len); 4340 } 4341 4342 /** 4343 * security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() - Get the remote peer label 4344 * @sock: socket 4345 * @skb: datagram packet 4346 * @secid: remote peer label secid 4347 * 4348 * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state 4349 * for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via getsockopt 4350 * SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated the IP_PASSSEC 4351 * option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the security state returned by 4352 * this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY ancillary message type. 4353 * 4354 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4355 */ 4356 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, 4357 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 4358 { 4359 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 4360 skb, secid); 4361 } 4362 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram); 4363 4364 /** 4365 * security_sk_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a sock's LSM blob 4366 * @sk: sock 4367 * @family: protocol family 4368 * @priority: gfp flags 4369 * 4370 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field, which 4371 * is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets. 4372 * 4373 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4374 */ 4375 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) 4376 { 4377 return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority); 4378 } 4379 4380 /** 4381 * security_sk_free() - Free the sock's LSM blob 4382 * @sk: sock 4383 * 4384 * Deallocate security structure. 4385 */ 4386 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk) 4387 { 4388 call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk); 4389 } 4390 4391 /** 4392 * security_sk_clone() - Clone a sock's LSM state 4393 * @sk: original sock 4394 * @newsk: target sock 4395 * 4396 * Clone/copy security structure. 4397 */ 4398 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) 4399 { 4400 call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk); 4401 } 4402 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone); 4403 4404 void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic) 4405 { 4406 call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid); 4407 } 4408 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow); 4409 4410 /** 4411 * security_req_classify_flow() - Set a flow's secid based on request_sock 4412 * @req: request_sock 4413 * @flic: target flow 4414 * 4415 * Sets @flic's secid to @req's secid. 4416 */ 4417 void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, 4418 struct flowi_common *flic) 4419 { 4420 call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic); 4421 } 4422 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow); 4423 4424 /** 4425 * security_sock_graft() - Reconcile LSM state when grafting a sock on a socket 4426 * @sk: sock being grafted 4427 * @parent: target parent socket 4428 * 4429 * Sets @parent's inode secid to @sk's secid and update @sk with any necessary 4430 * LSM state from @parent. 4431 */ 4432 void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) 4433 { 4434 call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent); 4435 } 4436 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft); 4437 4438 /** 4439 * security_inet_conn_request() - Set request_sock state using incoming connect 4440 * @sk: parent listening sock 4441 * @skb: incoming connection 4442 * @req: new request_sock 4443 * 4444 * Initialize the @req LSM state based on @sk and the incoming connect in @skb. 4445 * 4446 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4447 */ 4448 int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, 4449 struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) 4450 { 4451 return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req); 4452 } 4453 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request); 4454 4455 /** 4456 * security_inet_csk_clone() - Set new sock LSM state based on request_sock 4457 * @newsk: new sock 4458 * @req: connection request_sock 4459 * 4460 * Set that LSM state of @sock using the LSM state from @req. 4461 */ 4462 void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, 4463 const struct request_sock *req) 4464 { 4465 call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req); 4466 } 4467 4468 /** 4469 * security_inet_conn_established() - Update sock's LSM state with connection 4470 * @sk: sock 4471 * @skb: connection packet 4472 * 4473 * Update @sock's LSM state to represent a new connection from @skb. 4474 */ 4475 void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, 4476 struct sk_buff *skb) 4477 { 4478 call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb); 4479 } 4480 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established); 4481 4482 /** 4483 * security_secmark_relabel_packet() - Check if setting a secmark is allowed 4484 * @secid: new secmark value 4485 * 4486 * Check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to @secid. 4487 * 4488 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4489 */ 4490 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid) 4491 { 4492 return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid); 4493 } 4494 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet); 4495 4496 /** 4497 * security_secmark_refcount_inc() - Increment the secmark labeling rule count 4498 * 4499 * Tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. 4500 */ 4501 void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void) 4502 { 4503 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc); 4504 } 4505 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc); 4506 4507 /** 4508 * security_secmark_refcount_dec() - Decrement the secmark labeling rule count 4509 * 4510 * Tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. 4511 */ 4512 void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void) 4513 { 4514 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec); 4515 } 4516 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec); 4517 4518 /** 4519 * security_tun_dev_alloc_security() - Allocate a LSM blob for a TUN device 4520 * @security: pointer to the LSM blob 4521 * 4522 * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN device, 4523 * returning the pointer in @security. 4524 * 4525 * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. 4526 */ 4527 int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) 4528 { 4529 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security); 4530 } 4531 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security); 4532 4533 /** 4534 * security_tun_dev_free_security() - Free a TUN device LSM blob 4535 * @security: LSM blob 4536 * 4537 * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN device. 4538 */ 4539 void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) 4540 { 4541 call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security); 4542 } 4543 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security); 4544 4545 /** 4546 * security_tun_dev_create() - Check if creating a TUN device is allowed 4547 * 4548 * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device. 4549 * 4550 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4551 */ 4552 int security_tun_dev_create(void) 4553 { 4554 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0); 4555 } 4556 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create); 4557 4558 /** 4559 * security_tun_dev_attach_queue() - Check if attaching a TUN queue is allowed 4560 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4561 * 4562 * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue. 4563 * 4564 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4565 */ 4566 int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) 4567 { 4568 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security); 4569 } 4570 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue); 4571 4572 /** 4573 * security_tun_dev_attach() - Update TUN device LSM state on attach 4574 * @sk: associated sock 4575 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4576 * 4577 * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated 4578 * with the TUN device's sock structure. 4579 * 4580 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4581 */ 4582 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) 4583 { 4584 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security); 4585 } 4586 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach); 4587 4588 /** 4589 * security_tun_dev_open() - Update TUN device LSM state on open 4590 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4591 * 4592 * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated 4593 * with the TUN device's security structure. 4594 * 4595 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4596 */ 4597 int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) 4598 { 4599 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security); 4600 } 4601 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open); 4602 4603 /** 4604 * security_sctp_assoc_request() - Update the LSM on a SCTP association req 4605 * @asoc: SCTP association 4606 * @skb: packet requesting the association 4607 * 4608 * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association INIT packet to the LSM. 4609 * 4610 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4611 */ 4612 int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, 4613 struct sk_buff *skb) 4614 { 4615 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, asoc, skb); 4616 } 4617 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request); 4618 4619 /** 4620 * security_sctp_bind_connect() - Validate a list of addrs for a SCTP option 4621 * @sk: socket 4622 * @optname: SCTP option to validate 4623 * @address: list of IP addresses to validate 4624 * @addrlen: length of the address list 4625 * 4626 * Validiate permissions required for each address associated with sock @sk. 4627 * Depending on @optname, the addresses will be treated as either a connect or 4628 * bind service. The @addrlen is calculated on each IPv4 and IPv6 address using 4629 * sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6). 4630 * 4631 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4632 */ 4633 int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, 4634 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4635 { 4636 return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname, 4637 address, addrlen); 4638 } 4639 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect); 4640 4641 /** 4642 * security_sctp_sk_clone() - Clone a SCTP sock's LSM state 4643 * @asoc: SCTP association 4644 * @sk: original sock 4645 * @newsk: target sock 4646 * 4647 * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) (i.e. a TCP style 4648 * socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls 4649 * sctp_peeloff(3). 4650 */ 4651 void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk, 4652 struct sock *newsk) 4653 { 4654 call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, asoc, sk, newsk); 4655 } 4656 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone); 4657 4658 /** 4659 * security_sctp_assoc_established() - Update LSM state when assoc established 4660 * @asoc: SCTP association 4661 * @skb: packet establishing the association 4662 * 4663 * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association COOKIE_ACK packet to the 4664 * security module. 4665 * 4666 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4667 */ 4668 int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc, 4669 struct sk_buff *skb) 4670 { 4671 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, 0, asoc, skb); 4672 } 4673 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established); 4674 4675 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ 4676 4677 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND 4678 /** 4679 * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed 4680 * @sec: LSM blob 4681 * @subnet_prefix: subnet prefix of the port 4682 * @pkey: IB pkey 4683 * 4684 * Check permission to access a pkey when modifing a QP. 4685 * 4686 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4687 */ 4688 int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey) 4689 { 4690 return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey); 4691 } 4692 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access); 4693 4694 /** 4695 * security_ib_endport_manage_subnet() - Check if SMPs traffic is allowed 4696 * @sec: LSM blob 4697 * @dev_name: IB device name 4698 * @port_num: port number 4699 * 4700 * Check permissions to send and receive SMPs on a end port. 4701 * 4702 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4703 */ 4704 int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, 4705 const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) 4706 { 4707 return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec, 4708 dev_name, port_num); 4709 } 4710 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet); 4711 4712 /** 4713 * security_ib_alloc_security() - Allocate an Infiniband LSM blob 4714 * @sec: LSM blob 4715 * 4716 * Allocate a security structure for Infiniband objects. 4717 * 4718 * Return: Returns 0 on success, non-zero on failure. 4719 */ 4720 int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec) 4721 { 4722 return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec); 4723 } 4724 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security); 4725 4726 /** 4727 * security_ib_free_security() - Free an Infiniband LSM blob 4728 * @sec: LSM blob 4729 * 4730 * Deallocate an Infiniband security structure. 4731 */ 4732 void security_ib_free_security(void *sec) 4733 { 4734 call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec); 4735 } 4736 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security); 4737 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ 4738 4739 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM 4740 /** 4741 * security_xfrm_policy_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm policy LSM blob 4742 * @ctxp: xfrm security context being added to the SPD 4743 * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace 4744 * @gfp: gfp flags 4745 * 4746 * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security field 4747 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated. 4748 * 4749 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4750 */ 4751 int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, 4752 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, 4753 gfp_t gfp) 4754 { 4755 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp); 4756 } 4757 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc); 4758 4759 /** 4760 * security_xfrm_policy_clone() - Clone xfrm policy LSM state 4761 * @old_ctx: xfrm security context 4762 * @new_ctxp: target xfrm security context 4763 * 4764 * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the information from 4765 * the old_ctx structure. 4766 * 4767 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4768 */ 4769 int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, 4770 struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) 4771 { 4772 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp); 4773 } 4774 4775 /** 4776 * security_xfrm_policy_free() - Free a xfrm security context 4777 * @ctx: xfrm security context 4778 * 4779 * Free LSM resources associated with @ctx. 4780 */ 4781 void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 4782 { 4783 call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx); 4784 } 4785 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free); 4786 4787 /** 4788 * security_xfrm_policy_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm policy is allowed 4789 * @ctx: xfrm security context 4790 * 4791 * Authorize deletion of a SPD entry. 4792 * 4793 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4794 */ 4795 int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 4796 { 4797 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx); 4798 } 4799 4800 /** 4801 * security_xfrm_state_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob 4802 * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD 4803 * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace 4804 * 4805 * Allocate a security structure to the @x->security field; the security field 4806 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to 4807 * correspond to @sec_ctx. 4808 * 4809 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4810 */ 4811 int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, 4812 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) 4813 { 4814 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx); 4815 } 4816 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc); 4817 4818 /** 4819 * security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob 4820 * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD 4821 * @polsec: associated policy's security context 4822 * @secid: secid from the flow 4823 * 4824 * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security field 4825 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to 4826 * correspond to secid. 4827 * 4828 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. 4829 */ 4830 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, 4831 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) 4832 { 4833 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid); 4834 } 4835 4836 /** 4837 * security_xfrm_state_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm state is allowed 4838 * @x: xfrm state 4839 * 4840 * Authorize deletion of x->security. 4841 * 4842 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4843 */ 4844 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) 4845 { 4846 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x); 4847 } 4848 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete); 4849 4850 /** 4851 * security_xfrm_state_free() - Free a xfrm state 4852 * @x: xfrm state 4853 * 4854 * Deallocate x->security. 4855 */ 4856 void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) 4857 { 4858 call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x); 4859 } 4860 4861 /** 4862 * security_xfrm_policy_lookup() - Check if using a xfrm policy is allowed 4863 * @ctx: target xfrm security context 4864 * @fl_secid: flow secid used to authorize access 4865 * 4866 * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing XFRMs on a 4867 * packet. The hook is called when selecting either a per-socket policy or a 4868 * generic xfrm policy. 4869 * 4870 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno on 4871 * other errors. 4872 */ 4873 int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid) 4874 { 4875 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid); 4876 } 4877 4878 /** 4879 * security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() - Check for a xfrm match 4880 * @x: xfrm state to match 4881 * @xp: xfrm policy to check for a match 4882 * @flic: flow to check for a match. 4883 * 4884 * Check @xp and @flic for a match with @x. 4885 * 4886 * Return: Returns 1 if there is a match. 4887 */ 4888 int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, 4889 struct xfrm_policy *xp, 4890 const struct flowi_common *flic) 4891 { 4892 struct security_hook_list *hp; 4893 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); 4894 4895 /* 4896 * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment 4897 * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately, 4898 * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux 4899 * supplies this call. 4900 * 4901 * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than 4902 * using the macro 4903 */ 4904 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, 4905 list) { 4906 rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic); 4907 break; 4908 } 4909 return rc; 4910 } 4911 4912 /** 4913 * security_xfrm_decode_session() - Determine the xfrm secid for a packet 4914 * @skb: xfrm packet 4915 * @secid: secid 4916 * 4917 * Decode the packet in @skb and return the security label in @secid. 4918 * 4919 * Return: Return 0 if all xfrms used have the same secid. 4920 */ 4921 int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 4922 { 4923 return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1); 4924 } 4925 4926 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic) 4927 { 4928 int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid, 4929 0); 4930 4931 BUG_ON(rc); 4932 } 4933 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow); 4934 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ 4935 4936 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS 4937 /** 4938 * security_key_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a kernel key LSM blob 4939 * @key: key 4940 * @cred: credentials 4941 * @flags: allocation flags 4942 * 4943 * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does not 4944 * have a serial number assigned at this point. 4945 * 4946 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. 4947 */ 4948 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, 4949 unsigned long flags) 4950 { 4951 return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags); 4952 } 4953 4954 /** 4955 * security_key_free() - Free a kernel key LSM blob 4956 * @key: key 4957 * 4958 * Notification of destruction; free security data. 4959 */ 4960 void security_key_free(struct key *key) 4961 { 4962 call_void_hook(key_free, key); 4963 } 4964 4965 /** 4966 * security_key_permission() - Check if a kernel key operation is allowed 4967 * @key_ref: key reference 4968 * @cred: credentials of actor requesting access 4969 * @need_perm: requested permissions 4970 * 4971 * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a key. 4972 * 4973 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. 4974 */ 4975 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, 4976 enum key_need_perm need_perm) 4977 { 4978 return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm); 4979 } 4980 4981 /** 4982 * security_key_getsecurity() - Get the key's security label 4983 * @key: key 4984 * @_buffer: security label buffer 4985 * 4986 * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key for 4987 * the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function allocates the 4988 * storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller should free it. 4989 * 4990 * Return: Returns the length of @_buffer (including terminating NUL) or -ve if 4991 * an error occurs. May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if 4992 * there is no security label assigned to the key. 4993 */ 4994 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) 4995 { 4996 *_buffer = NULL; 4997 return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer); 4998 } 4999 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ 5000 5001 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT 5002 /** 5003 * security_audit_rule_init() - Allocate and init an LSM audit rule struct 5004 * @field: audit action 5005 * @op: rule operator 5006 * @rulestr: rule context 5007 * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct 5008 * 5009 * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. 5010 * 5011 * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of 5012 * an invalid rule. 5013 */ 5014 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) 5015 { 5016 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); 5017 } 5018 5019 /** 5020 * security_audit_rule_known() - Check if an audit rule contains LSM fields 5021 * @krule: audit rule 5022 * 5023 * Specifies whether given @krule contains any fields related to the current 5024 * LSM. 5025 * 5026 * Return: Returns 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise. 5027 */ 5028 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) 5029 { 5030 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule); 5031 } 5032 5033 /** 5034 * security_audit_rule_free() - Free an LSM audit rule struct 5035 * @lsmrule: audit rule struct 5036 * 5037 * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by 5038 * audit_rule_init(). 5039 */ 5040 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) 5041 { 5042 call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); 5043 } 5044 5045 /** 5046 * security_audit_rule_match() - Check if a label matches an audit rule 5047 * @secid: security label 5048 * @field: LSM audit field 5049 * @op: matching operator 5050 * @lsmrule: audit rule 5051 * 5052 * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved by 5053 * security_audit_rule_known(). 5054 * 5055 * Return: Returns 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on 5056 * failure. 5057 */ 5058 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) 5059 { 5060 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule); 5061 } 5062 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ 5063 5064 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL 5065 /** 5066 * security_bpf() - Check if the bpf syscall operation is allowed 5067 * @cmd: command 5068 * @attr: bpf attribute 5069 * @size: size 5070 * 5071 * Do a initial check for all bpf syscalls after the attribute is copied into 5072 * the kernel. The actual security module can implement their own rules to 5073 * check the specific cmd they need. 5074 * 5075 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5076 */ 5077 int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) 5078 { 5079 return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size); 5080 } 5081 5082 /** 5083 * security_bpf_map() - Check if access to a bpf map is allowed 5084 * @map: bpf map 5085 * @fmode: mode 5086 * 5087 * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF 5088 * maps. 5089 * 5090 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5091 */ 5092 int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) 5093 { 5094 return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode); 5095 } 5096 5097 /** 5098 * security_bpf_prog() - Check if access to a bpf program is allowed 5099 * @prog: bpf program 5100 * 5101 * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF 5102 * programs. 5103 * 5104 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5105 */ 5106 int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) 5107 { 5108 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog); 5109 } 5110 5111 /** 5112 * security_bpf_map_alloc() - Allocate a bpf map LSM blob 5113 * @map: bpf map 5114 * 5115 * Initialize the security field inside bpf map. 5116 * 5117 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5118 */ 5119 int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) 5120 { 5121 return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map); 5122 } 5123 5124 /** 5125 * security_bpf_prog_alloc() - Allocate a bpf program LSM blob 5126 * @aux: bpf program aux info struct 5127 * 5128 * Initialize the security field inside bpf program. 5129 * 5130 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5131 */ 5132 int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 5133 { 5134 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux); 5135 } 5136 5137 /** 5138 * security_bpf_map_free() - Free a bpf map's LSM blob 5139 * @map: bpf map 5140 * 5141 * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf map. 5142 */ 5143 void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) 5144 { 5145 call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map); 5146 } 5147 5148 /** 5149 * security_bpf_prog_free() - Free a bpf program's LSM blob 5150 * @aux: bpf program aux info struct 5151 * 5152 * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog. 5153 */ 5154 void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 5155 { 5156 call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); 5157 } 5158 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ 5159 5160 /** 5161 * security_locked_down() - Check if a kernel feature is allowed 5162 * @what: requested kernel feature 5163 * 5164 * Determine whether a kernel feature that potentially enables arbitrary code 5165 * execution in kernel space should be permitted. 5166 * 5167 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5168 */ 5169 int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) 5170 { 5171 return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what); 5172 } 5173 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down); 5174 5175 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 5176 /** 5177 * security_perf_event_open() - Check if a perf event open is allowed 5178 * @attr: perf event attribute 5179 * @type: type of event 5180 * 5181 * Check whether the @type of perf_event_open syscall is allowed. 5182 * 5183 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5184 */ 5185 int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) 5186 { 5187 return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type); 5188 } 5189 5190 /** 5191 * security_perf_event_alloc() - Allocate a perf event LSM blob 5192 * @event: perf event 5193 * 5194 * Allocate and save perf_event security info. 5195 * 5196 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 5197 */ 5198 int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) 5199 { 5200 return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event); 5201 } 5202 5203 /** 5204 * security_perf_event_free() - Free a perf event LSM blob 5205 * @event: perf event 5206 * 5207 * Release (free) perf_event security info. 5208 */ 5209 void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) 5210 { 5211 call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event); 5212 } 5213 5214 /** 5215 * security_perf_event_read() - Check if reading a perf event label is allowed 5216 * @event: perf event 5217 * 5218 * Read perf_event security info if allowed. 5219 * 5220 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5221 */ 5222 int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) 5223 { 5224 return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event); 5225 } 5226 5227 /** 5228 * security_perf_event_write() - Check if writing a perf event label is allowed 5229 * @event: perf event 5230 * 5231 * Write perf_event security info if allowed. 5232 * 5233 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5234 */ 5235 int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) 5236 { 5237 return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event); 5238 } 5239 #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */ 5240 5241 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING 5242 /** 5243 * security_uring_override_creds() - Check if overriding creds is allowed 5244 * @new: new credentials 5245 * 5246 * Check if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to 5247 * override it's credentials with @new. 5248 * 5249 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5250 */ 5251 int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) 5252 { 5253 return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, 0, new); 5254 } 5255 5256 /** 5257 * security_uring_sqpoll() - Check if IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL is allowed 5258 * 5259 * Check whether the current task is allowed to spawn a io_uring polling thread 5260 * (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). 5261 * 5262 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5263 */ 5264 int security_uring_sqpoll(void) 5265 { 5266 return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0); 5267 } 5268 5269 /** 5270 * security_uring_cmd() - Check if a io_uring passthrough command is allowed 5271 * @ioucmd: command 5272 * 5273 * Check whether the file_operations uring_cmd is allowed to run. 5274 * 5275 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5276 */ 5277 int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) 5278 { 5279 return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd); 5280 } 5281 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ 5282