1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later 2 /* 3 * Security plug functions 4 * 5 * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com> 6 * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> 7 * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com> 8 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies 9 * Copyright (C) 2023 Microsoft Corporation <paul@paul-moore.com> 10 */ 11 12 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt 13 14 #include <linux/bpf.h> 15 #include <linux/capability.h> 16 #include <linux/dcache.h> 17 #include <linux/export.h> 18 #include <linux/init.h> 19 #include <linux/kernel.h> 20 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> 21 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> 22 #include <linux/integrity.h> 23 #include <linux/ima.h> 24 #include <linux/evm.h> 25 #include <linux/fsnotify.h> 26 #include <linux/mman.h> 27 #include <linux/mount.h> 28 #include <linux/personality.h> 29 #include <linux/backing-dev.h> 30 #include <linux/string.h> 31 #include <linux/msg.h> 32 #include <net/flow.h> 33 34 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 35 36 /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ 37 #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) 38 39 /* 40 * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the 41 * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows 42 * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing 43 * purposes. 44 */ 45 const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { 46 [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", 47 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", 48 [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", 49 [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access", 50 [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", 51 [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", 52 [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", 53 [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", 54 [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", 55 [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", 56 [LOCKDOWN_DEVICE_TREE] = "modifying device tree contents", 57 [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage", 58 [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO", 59 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters", 60 [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio", 61 [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access", 62 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access", 63 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM", 64 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM", 65 [LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection", 66 [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", 67 [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", 68 [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", 69 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", 70 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM", 71 [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", 72 [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", 73 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access", 74 [LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret", 75 [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", 76 }; 77 78 struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init; 79 static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain); 80 81 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; 82 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; 83 84 char *lsm_names; 85 static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init; 86 87 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ 88 static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; 89 static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm; 90 91 static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM; 92 93 /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ 94 static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms; 95 static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive; 96 97 static __initdata bool debug; 98 #define init_debug(...) \ 99 do { \ 100 if (debug) \ 101 pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \ 102 } while (0) 103 104 static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm) 105 { 106 if (!lsm->enabled) 107 return false; 108 109 return *lsm->enabled; 110 } 111 112 /* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */ 113 static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1; 114 static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0; 115 static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled) 116 { 117 /* 118 * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use 119 * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state. 120 */ 121 if (!lsm->enabled) { 122 if (enabled) 123 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 124 else 125 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 126 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) { 127 if (!enabled) 128 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 129 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) { 130 if (enabled) 131 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 132 } else { 133 *lsm->enabled = enabled; 134 } 135 } 136 137 /* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */ 138 static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 139 { 140 struct lsm_info **check; 141 142 for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++) 143 if (*check == lsm) 144 return true; 145 146 return false; 147 } 148 149 /* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */ 150 static int last_lsm __initdata; 151 static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from) 152 { 153 /* Ignore duplicate selections. */ 154 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 155 return; 156 157 if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from)) 158 return; 159 160 /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */ 161 if (!lsm->enabled) 162 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 163 ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm; 164 165 init_debug("%s ordered: %s (%s)\n", from, lsm->name, 166 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 167 } 168 169 /* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */ 170 static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm) 171 { 172 /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */ 173 if (!is_enabled(lsm)) 174 return false; 175 176 /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */ 177 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) { 178 init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name); 179 return false; 180 } 181 182 return true; 183 } 184 185 static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs) 186 { 187 int offset; 188 189 if (*need <= 0) 190 return; 191 192 offset = ALIGN(*lbs, sizeof(void *)); 193 *lbs = offset + *need; 194 *need = offset; 195 } 196 197 static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) 198 { 199 if (!needed) 200 return; 201 202 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 203 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file); 204 /* 205 * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to 206 * what the modules might need. 207 */ 208 if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0) 209 blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head); 210 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 211 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 212 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 213 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 214 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); 215 } 216 217 /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ 218 static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 219 { 220 int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm); 221 222 /* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */ 223 set_enabled(lsm, enabled); 224 225 /* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */ 226 if (enabled) { 227 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) { 228 exclusive = lsm; 229 init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name); 230 } 231 232 lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs); 233 } 234 } 235 236 /* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */ 237 static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 238 { 239 if (is_enabled(lsm)) { 240 int ret; 241 242 init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name); 243 ret = lsm->init(); 244 WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret); 245 } 246 } 247 248 /* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */ 249 static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) 250 { 251 struct lsm_info *lsm; 252 char *sep, *name, *next; 253 254 /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */ 255 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 256 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST) 257 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " first"); 258 } 259 260 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 261 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 262 struct lsm_info *major; 263 264 /* 265 * To match the original "security=" behavior, this 266 * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major 267 * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable 268 * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs. 269 */ 270 for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info; 271 major++) { 272 if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) && 273 strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) { 274 set_enabled(major, false); 275 init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s (only one legacy major LSM)\n", 276 chosen_major_lsm, major->name); 277 } 278 } 279 } 280 281 sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL); 282 next = sep; 283 /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */ 284 while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) { 285 bool found = false; 286 287 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 288 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE && 289 strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) { 290 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin); 291 found = true; 292 } 293 } 294 295 if (!found) 296 init_debug("%s ignored: %s (not built into kernel)\n", 297 origin, name); 298 } 299 300 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 301 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 302 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 303 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 304 continue; 305 if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0) 306 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security="); 307 } 308 } 309 310 /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */ 311 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 312 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 313 continue; 314 set_enabled(lsm, false); 315 init_debug("%s skipped: %s (not in requested order)\n", 316 origin, lsm->name); 317 } 318 319 kfree(sep); 320 } 321 322 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred); 323 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task); 324 325 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result); 326 327 static void __init report_lsm_order(void) 328 { 329 struct lsm_info **lsm, *early; 330 int first = 0; 331 332 pr_info("initializing lsm="); 333 334 /* Report each enabled LSM name, comma separated. */ 335 for (early = __start_early_lsm_info; early < __end_early_lsm_info; early++) 336 if (is_enabled(early)) 337 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", early->name); 338 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 339 if (is_enabled(*lsm)) 340 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", (*lsm)->name); 341 342 pr_cont("\n"); 343 } 344 345 static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) 346 { 347 struct lsm_info **lsm; 348 349 ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms), 350 GFP_KERNEL); 351 352 if (chosen_lsm_order) { 353 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 354 pr_warn("security=%s is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=%s\n", 355 chosen_major_lsm, chosen_lsm_order); 356 chosen_major_lsm = NULL; 357 } 358 ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline"); 359 } else 360 ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin"); 361 362 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 363 prepare_lsm(*lsm); 364 365 report_lsm_order(); 366 367 init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 368 init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file); 369 init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 370 init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 371 init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 372 init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 373 init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); 374 375 /* 376 * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs 377 */ 378 if (blob_sizes.lbs_file) 379 lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache", 380 blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0, 381 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 382 if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode) 383 lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache", 384 blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0, 385 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 386 387 lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred); 388 lsm_early_task(current); 389 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 390 initialize_lsm(*lsm); 391 392 kfree(ordered_lsms); 393 } 394 395 int __init early_security_init(void) 396 { 397 struct lsm_info *lsm; 398 399 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 400 INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&security_hook_heads.NAME); 401 #include "linux/lsm_hook_defs.h" 402 #undef LSM_HOOK 403 404 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 405 if (!lsm->enabled) 406 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 407 prepare_lsm(lsm); 408 initialize_lsm(lsm); 409 } 410 411 return 0; 412 } 413 414 /** 415 * security_init - initializes the security framework 416 * 417 * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence. 418 */ 419 int __init security_init(void) 420 { 421 struct lsm_info *lsm; 422 423 init_debug("legacy security=%s\n", chosen_major_lsm ?: " *unspecified*"); 424 init_debug(" CONFIG_LSM=%s\n", builtin_lsm_order); 425 init_debug("boot arg lsm=%s\n", chosen_lsm_order ?: " *unspecified*"); 426 427 /* 428 * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is 429 * available 430 */ 431 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 432 init_debug(" early started: %s (%s)\n", lsm->name, 433 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 434 if (lsm->enabled) 435 lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names); 436 } 437 438 /* Load LSMs in specified order. */ 439 ordered_lsm_init(); 440 441 return 0; 442 } 443 444 /* Save user chosen LSM */ 445 static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str) 446 { 447 chosen_major_lsm = str; 448 return 1; 449 } 450 __setup("security=", choose_major_lsm); 451 452 /* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */ 453 static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str) 454 { 455 chosen_lsm_order = str; 456 return 1; 457 } 458 __setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order); 459 460 /* Enable LSM order debugging. */ 461 static int __init enable_debug(char *str) 462 { 463 debug = true; 464 return 1; 465 } 466 __setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug); 467 468 static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm) 469 { 470 const char *last; 471 472 if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm)) 473 return false; 474 last = strrchr(list, ','); 475 if (last) 476 /* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */ 477 last++; 478 else 479 last = list; 480 return !strcmp(last, lsm); 481 } 482 483 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) 484 { 485 char *cp; 486 487 if (*result == NULL) { 488 *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL); 489 if (*result == NULL) 490 return -ENOMEM; 491 } else { 492 /* Check if it is the last registered name */ 493 if (match_last_lsm(*result, new)) 494 return 0; 495 cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new); 496 if (cp == NULL) 497 return -ENOMEM; 498 kfree(*result); 499 *result = cp; 500 } 501 return 0; 502 } 503 504 /** 505 * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. 506 * @hooks: the hooks to add 507 * @count: the number of hooks to add 508 * @lsm: the name of the security module 509 * 510 * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. 511 */ 512 void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, 513 const char *lsm) 514 { 515 int i; 516 517 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { 518 hooks[i].lsm = lsm; 519 hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); 520 } 521 522 /* 523 * Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back 524 * and fix this up afterwards. 525 */ 526 if (slab_is_available()) { 527 if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0) 528 panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__); 529 } 530 } 531 532 int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) 533 { 534 return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 535 event, data); 536 } 537 EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier); 538 539 int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 540 { 541 return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 542 nb); 543 } 544 EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier); 545 546 int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 547 { 548 return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 549 nb); 550 } 551 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier); 552 553 /** 554 * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob 555 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 556 * @gfp: allocation type 557 * 558 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 559 * 560 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 561 */ 562 static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 563 { 564 if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) { 565 cred->security = NULL; 566 return 0; 567 } 568 569 cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp); 570 if (cred->security == NULL) 571 return -ENOMEM; 572 return 0; 573 } 574 575 /** 576 * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob 577 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 578 * 579 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 580 */ 581 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred) 582 { 583 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL); 584 585 if (rc) 586 panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__); 587 } 588 589 /** 590 * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob 591 * @file: the file that needs a blob 592 * 593 * Allocate the file blob for all the modules 594 * 595 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 596 */ 597 static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file) 598 { 599 if (!lsm_file_cache) { 600 file->f_security = NULL; 601 return 0; 602 } 603 604 file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL); 605 if (file->f_security == NULL) 606 return -ENOMEM; 607 return 0; 608 } 609 610 /** 611 * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob 612 * @inode: the inode that needs a blob 613 * 614 * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules 615 * 616 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 617 */ 618 int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 619 { 620 if (!lsm_inode_cache) { 621 inode->i_security = NULL; 622 return 0; 623 } 624 625 inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); 626 if (inode->i_security == NULL) 627 return -ENOMEM; 628 return 0; 629 } 630 631 /** 632 * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob 633 * @task: the task that needs a blob 634 * 635 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 636 * 637 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 638 */ 639 static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) 640 { 641 if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) { 642 task->security = NULL; 643 return 0; 644 } 645 646 task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL); 647 if (task->security == NULL) 648 return -ENOMEM; 649 return 0; 650 } 651 652 /** 653 * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob 654 * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob 655 * 656 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 657 * 658 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 659 */ 660 static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip) 661 { 662 if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) { 663 kip->security = NULL; 664 return 0; 665 } 666 667 kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL); 668 if (kip->security == NULL) 669 return -ENOMEM; 670 return 0; 671 } 672 673 /** 674 * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob 675 * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob 676 * 677 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 678 * 679 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 680 */ 681 static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp) 682 { 683 if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) { 684 mp->security = NULL; 685 return 0; 686 } 687 688 mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL); 689 if (mp->security == NULL) 690 return -ENOMEM; 691 return 0; 692 } 693 694 /** 695 * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob 696 * @task: the task that needs a blob 697 * 698 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 699 */ 700 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) 701 { 702 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 703 704 if (rc) 705 panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__); 706 } 707 708 /** 709 * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob 710 * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob 711 * 712 * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules 713 * 714 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 715 */ 716 static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 717 { 718 if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) { 719 sb->s_security = NULL; 720 return 0; 721 } 722 723 sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL); 724 if (sb->s_security == NULL) 725 return -ENOMEM; 726 return 0; 727 } 728 729 /* 730 * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and 731 * can be accessed with: 732 * 733 * LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) 734 * 735 * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each 736 * LSM hook. 737 */ 738 #define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default) 739 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME) 740 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \ 741 static const int __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT); 742 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 743 DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME) 744 745 #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h> 746 #undef LSM_HOOK 747 748 /* 749 * Hook list operation macros. 750 * 751 * call_void_hook: 752 * This is a hook that does not return a value. 753 * 754 * call_int_hook: 755 * This is a hook that returns a value. 756 */ 757 758 #define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \ 759 do { \ 760 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 761 \ 762 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \ 763 P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 764 } while (0) 765 766 #define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \ 767 int RC = IRC; \ 768 do { \ 769 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 770 \ 771 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ 772 RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 773 if (RC != 0) \ 774 break; \ 775 } \ 776 } while (0); \ 777 RC; \ 778 }) 779 780 /* Security operations */ 781 782 /** 783 * security_binder_set_context_mgr() - Check if becoming binder ctx mgr is ok 784 * @mgr: task credentials of current binder process 785 * 786 * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager. 787 * 788 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 789 */ 790 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr) 791 { 792 return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr); 793 } 794 795 /** 796 * security_binder_transaction() - Check if a binder transaction is allowed 797 * @from: sending process 798 * @to: receiving process 799 * 800 * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call to @to. 801 * 802 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 803 */ 804 int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from, 805 const struct cred *to) 806 { 807 return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to); 808 } 809 810 /** 811 * security_binder_transfer_binder() - Check if a binder transfer is allowed 812 * @from: sending process 813 * @to: receiving process 814 * 815 * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to. 816 * 817 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 818 */ 819 int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, 820 const struct cred *to) 821 { 822 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to); 823 } 824 825 /** 826 * security_binder_transfer_file() - Check if a binder file xfer is allowed 827 * @from: sending process 828 * @to: receiving process 829 * @file: file being transferred 830 * 831 * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to. 832 * 833 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 834 */ 835 int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, 836 const struct cred *to, struct file *file) 837 { 838 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file); 839 } 840 841 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) 842 { 843 return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode); 844 } 845 846 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) 847 { 848 return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent); 849 } 850 851 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, 852 kernel_cap_t *effective, 853 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 854 kernel_cap_t *permitted) 855 { 856 return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target, 857 effective, inheritable, permitted); 858 } 859 860 int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 861 const kernel_cap_t *effective, 862 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 863 const kernel_cap_t *permitted) 864 { 865 return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old, 866 effective, inheritable, permitted); 867 } 868 869 int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, 870 struct user_namespace *ns, 871 int cap, 872 unsigned int opts) 873 { 874 return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); 875 } 876 877 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) 878 { 879 return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb); 880 } 881 882 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) 883 { 884 return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry); 885 } 886 887 int security_syslog(int type) 888 { 889 return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type); 890 } 891 892 int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz) 893 { 894 return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz); 895 } 896 897 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) 898 { 899 struct security_hook_list *hp; 900 int cap_sys_admin = 1; 901 int rc; 902 903 /* 904 * The module will respond with a positive value if 905 * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be 906 * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules 907 * agree that it should be set it will. If any module 908 * thinks it should not be set it won't. 909 */ 910 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) { 911 rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); 912 if (rc <= 0) { 913 cap_sys_admin = 0; 914 break; 915 } 916 } 917 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); 918 } 919 920 /** 921 * security_bprm_creds_for_exec() - Prepare the credentials for exec() 922 * @bprm: binary program information 923 * 924 * If the setup in prepare_exec_creds did not setup @bprm->cred->security 925 * properly for executing @bprm->file, update the LSM's portion of 926 * @bprm->cred->security to be what commit_creds needs to install for the new 927 * program. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 928 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 929 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. @bprm 930 * contains the linux_binprm structure. 931 * 932 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 933 */ 934 int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 935 { 936 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm); 937 } 938 939 /** 940 * security_bprm_creds_from_file() - Update linux_binprm creds based on file 941 * @bprm: binary program information 942 * @file: associated file 943 * 944 * If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change privilege upon 945 * exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change. This is called after 946 * finding the binary that will be executed without an interpreter. This 947 * ensures that the credentials will not be derived from a script that the 948 * binary will need to reopen, which when reopend may end up being a completely 949 * different file. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 950 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 951 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. The 952 * hook must add to @bprm->per_clear any personality flags that should be 953 * cleared from current->personality. @bprm contains the linux_binprm 954 * structure. 955 * 956 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 957 */ 958 int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) 959 { 960 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file); 961 } 962 963 /** 964 * security_bprm_check() - Mediate binary handler search 965 * @bprm: binary program information 966 * 967 * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will begin. 968 * It allows a check against the @bprm->cred->security value which was set in 969 * the preceding creds_for_exec call. The argv list and envp list are reliably 970 * available in @bprm. This hook may be called multiple times during a single 971 * execve. @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. 972 * 973 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 974 */ 975 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 976 { 977 int ret; 978 979 ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); 980 if (ret) 981 return ret; 982 return ima_bprm_check(bprm); 983 } 984 985 /** 986 * security_bprm_committing_creds() - Install creds for a process during exec() 987 * @bprm: binary program information 988 * 989 * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being 990 * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials pointed to 991 * by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by the 992 * bprm_creds_for_exec hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure. This 993 * hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such as closing 994 * open file descriptors to which access will no longer be granted when the 995 * attributes are changed. This is called immediately before commit_creds(). 996 */ 997 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 998 { 999 call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm); 1000 } 1001 1002 /** 1003 * security_bprm_committed_creds() - Tidy up after cred install during exec() 1004 * @bprm: binary program information 1005 * 1006 * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a process 1007 * being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials have, by this 1008 * point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the linux_binprm 1009 * structure. This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the 1010 * process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal state. This is called 1011 * immediately after commit_creds(). 1012 */ 1013 void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 1014 { 1015 call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm); 1016 } 1017 1018 /** 1019 * security_fs_context_dup() - Duplicate a fs_context LSM blob 1020 * @fc: destination filesystem context 1021 * @src_fc: source filesystem context 1022 * 1023 * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer is 1024 * initialised to NULL by the caller. @fc indicates the new filesystem context. 1025 * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context. 1026 * 1027 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure. 1028 */ 1029 int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) 1030 { 1031 return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc); 1032 } 1033 1034 /** 1035 * security_fs_context_parse_param() - Configure a filesystem context 1036 * @fc: filesystem context 1037 * @param: filesystem parameter 1038 * 1039 * Userspace provided a parameter to configure a superblock. The LSM can 1040 * consume the parameter or return it to the caller for use elsewhere. 1041 * 1042 * Return: If the parameter is used by the LSM it should return 0, if it is 1043 * returned to the caller -ENOPARAM is returned, otherwise a negative 1044 * error code is returned. 1045 */ 1046 int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, 1047 struct fs_parameter *param) 1048 { 1049 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1050 int trc; 1051 int rc = -ENOPARAM; 1052 1053 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.fs_context_parse_param, 1054 list) { 1055 trc = hp->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param); 1056 if (trc == 0) 1057 rc = 0; 1058 else if (trc != -ENOPARAM) 1059 return trc; 1060 } 1061 return rc; 1062 } 1063 1064 /** 1065 * security_sb_alloc() - Allocate a super_block LSM blob 1066 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1067 * 1068 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field. The 1069 * s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is allocated. 1070 * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. 1071 * 1072 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. 1073 */ 1074 int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 1075 { 1076 int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb); 1077 1078 if (unlikely(rc)) 1079 return rc; 1080 rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb); 1081 if (unlikely(rc)) 1082 security_sb_free(sb); 1083 return rc; 1084 } 1085 1086 /** 1087 * security_sb_delete() - Release super_block LSM associated objects 1088 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1089 * 1090 * Release objects tied to a superblock (e.g. inodes). @sb contains the 1091 * super_block structure being released. 1092 */ 1093 void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb) 1094 { 1095 call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb); 1096 } 1097 1098 /** 1099 * security_sb_free() - Free a super_block LSM blob 1100 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1101 * 1102 * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field. @sb contains the super_block 1103 * structure to be modified. 1104 */ 1105 void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) 1106 { 1107 call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb); 1108 kfree(sb->s_security); 1109 sb->s_security = NULL; 1110 } 1111 1112 /** 1113 * security_free_mnt_opts() - Free memory associated with mount options 1114 * @mnt_ops: LSM processed mount options 1115 * 1116 * Free memory associated with @mnt_ops. 1117 */ 1118 void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts) 1119 { 1120 if (!*mnt_opts) 1121 return; 1122 call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts); 1123 *mnt_opts = NULL; 1124 } 1125 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts); 1126 1127 /** 1128 * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() - Consume LSM mount options 1129 * @options: mount options 1130 * @mnt_ops: LSM processed mount options 1131 * 1132 * Eat (scan @options) and save them in @mnt_opts. 1133 * 1134 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1135 */ 1136 int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) 1137 { 1138 return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts); 1139 } 1140 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts); 1141 1142 /** 1143 * security_sb_mnt_opts_compat() - Check if new mount options are allowed 1144 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1145 * @mnt_opts: new mount options 1146 * 1147 * Determine if the new mount options in @mnt_opts are allowed given the 1148 * existing mounted filesystem at @sb. @sb superblock being compared. 1149 * 1150 * Return: Returns 0 if options are compatible. 1151 */ 1152 int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, 1153 void *mnt_opts) 1154 { 1155 return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1156 } 1157 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat); 1158 1159 /** 1160 * security_sb_remount() - Verify no incompatible mount changes during remount 1161 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1162 * @mnt_opts: (re)mount options 1163 * 1164 * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes are 1165 * being made to those options. 1166 * 1167 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1168 */ 1169 int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, 1170 void *mnt_opts) 1171 { 1172 return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1173 } 1174 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount); 1175 1176 /** 1177 * security_sb_kern_mount() - Check if a kernel mount is allowed 1178 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1179 * 1180 * Mount this @sb if allowed by permissions. 1181 * 1182 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1183 */ 1184 int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb) 1185 { 1186 return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb); 1187 } 1188 1189 /** 1190 * security_sb_show_options() - Output the mount options for a superblock 1191 * @m: output file 1192 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1193 * 1194 * Show (print on @m) mount options for this @sb. 1195 * 1196 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1197 */ 1198 int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) 1199 { 1200 return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb); 1201 } 1202 1203 /** 1204 * security_sb_statfs() - Check if accessing fs stats is allowed 1205 * @dentry: superblock handle 1206 * 1207 * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt 1208 * mountpoint. @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem. 1209 * 1210 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1211 */ 1212 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) 1213 { 1214 return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry); 1215 } 1216 1217 /** 1218 * security_sb_mount() - Check permission for mounting a filesystem 1219 * @dev_name: filesystem backing device 1220 * @path: mount point 1221 * @type: filesystem type 1222 * @flags: mount flags 1223 * @data: filesystem specific data 1224 * 1225 * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on the 1226 * mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name identifies a 1227 * device if the file system type requires a device. For a remount 1228 * (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a loopback/bind mount 1229 * (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the pathname of the object being 1230 * mounted. 1231 * 1232 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1233 */ 1234 int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, 1235 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) 1236 { 1237 return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data); 1238 } 1239 1240 /** 1241 * security_sb_umount() - Check permission for unmounting a filesystem 1242 * @mnt: mounted filesystem 1243 * @flags: unmount flags 1244 * 1245 * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted. 1246 * 1247 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1248 */ 1249 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) 1250 { 1251 return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags); 1252 } 1253 1254 /** 1255 * security_sb_pivotroot() - Check permissions for pivoting the rootfs 1256 * @old_path: new location for current rootfs 1257 * @new_path: location of the new rootfs 1258 * 1259 * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem. 1260 * 1261 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1262 */ 1263 int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path) 1264 { 1265 return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path); 1266 } 1267 1268 /** 1269 * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() - Set the mount options for a filesystem 1270 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1271 * @mnt_opts: binary mount options 1272 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1273 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1274 * 1275 * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock. 1276 * 1277 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1278 */ 1279 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, 1280 void *mnt_opts, 1281 unsigned long kern_flags, 1282 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1283 { 1284 return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts, 1285 mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb, 1286 mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1287 } 1288 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts); 1289 1290 /** 1291 * security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() - Duplicate superblock mount options 1292 * @olddb: source superblock 1293 * @newdb: destination superblock 1294 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1295 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1296 * 1297 * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another. 1298 * 1299 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1300 */ 1301 int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, 1302 struct super_block *newsb, 1303 unsigned long kern_flags, 1304 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1305 { 1306 return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb, 1307 kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1308 } 1309 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts); 1310 1311 /** 1312 * security_move_mount() - Check permissions for moving a mount 1313 * @from_path: source mount point 1314 * @to_path: destination mount point 1315 * 1316 * Check permission before a mount is moved. 1317 * 1318 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1319 */ 1320 int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path) 1321 { 1322 return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path); 1323 } 1324 1325 /** 1326 * security_path_notify() - Check if setting a watch is allowed 1327 * @path: file path 1328 * @mask: event mask 1329 * @obj_type: file path type 1330 * 1331 * Check permissions before setting a watch on events as defined by @mask, on 1332 * an object at @path, whose type is defined by @obj_type. 1333 * 1334 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1335 */ 1336 int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, 1337 unsigned int obj_type) 1338 { 1339 return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type); 1340 } 1341 1342 /** 1343 * security_inode_alloc() - Allocate an inode LSM blob 1344 * @inode: the inode 1345 * 1346 * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The 1347 * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is 1348 * allocated. 1349 * 1350 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 1351 */ 1352 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 1353 { 1354 int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode); 1355 1356 if (unlikely(rc)) 1357 return rc; 1358 rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode); 1359 if (unlikely(rc)) 1360 security_inode_free(inode); 1361 return rc; 1362 } 1363 1364 static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) 1365 { 1366 /* 1367 * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob 1368 */ 1369 kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head); 1370 } 1371 1372 /** 1373 * security_inode_free() - Free an inode's LSM blob 1374 * @inode: the inode 1375 * 1376 * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to NULL. 1377 */ 1378 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) 1379 { 1380 integrity_inode_free(inode); 1381 call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode); 1382 /* 1383 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and 1384 * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made 1385 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS 1386 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder 1387 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and 1388 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact. 1389 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too. 1390 */ 1391 if (inode->i_security) 1392 call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security, 1393 inode_free_by_rcu); 1394 } 1395 1396 /** 1397 * security_dentry_init_security() - Perform dentry initialization 1398 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1399 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1400 * @name: name of the last path component 1401 * @xattr_name: name of the security/LSM xattr 1402 * @ctx: pointer to the resulting LSM context 1403 * @ctxlen: length of @ctx 1404 * 1405 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available since NFSv4 1406 * has no label backed by an EA anyway. It is important to note that 1407 * @xattr_name does not need to be free'd by the caller, it is a static string. 1408 * 1409 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1410 */ 1411 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1412 const struct qstr *name, 1413 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx, 1414 u32 *ctxlen) 1415 { 1416 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1417 int rc; 1418 1419 /* 1420 * Only one module will provide a security context. 1421 */ 1422 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security, list) { 1423 rc = hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name, 1424 xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen); 1425 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security)) 1426 return rc; 1427 } 1428 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security); 1429 } 1430 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security); 1431 1432 /** 1433 * security_dentry_create_files_as() - Perform dentry initialization 1434 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1435 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1436 * @name: name of the last path component 1437 * @old: creds to use for LSM context calculations 1438 * @new: creds to modify 1439 * 1440 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available and set 1441 * that context in passed in creds so that new files are created using that 1442 * context. Context is calculated using the passed in creds and not the creds 1443 * of the caller. 1444 * 1445 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1446 */ 1447 int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1448 struct qstr *name, 1449 const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) 1450 { 1451 return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode, 1452 name, old, new); 1453 } 1454 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as); 1455 1456 /** 1457 * security_inode_init_security() - Initialize an inode's LSM context 1458 * @inode: the inode 1459 * @dir: parent directory 1460 * @qstr: last component of the pathname 1461 * @initxattrs: callback function to write xattrs 1462 * @fs_data: filesystem specific data 1463 * 1464 * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly 1465 * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode. This 1466 * hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation transaction and 1467 * provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike the post_create/mkdir/... 1468 * hooks called by the VFS. The hook function is expected to allocate the name 1469 * and value via kmalloc, with the caller being responsible for calling kfree 1470 * after using them. If the security module does not use security attributes 1471 * or does not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode, then 1472 * it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. 1473 * 1474 * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is 1475 * needed, or -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure. 1476 */ 1477 int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1478 const struct qstr *qstr, 1479 const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) 1480 { 1481 struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1]; 1482 struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr; 1483 int ret; 1484 1485 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1486 return 0; 1487 1488 if (!initxattrs) 1489 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, 1490 dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL); 1491 memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs)); 1492 lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; 1493 ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, 1494 &lsm_xattr->name, 1495 &lsm_xattr->value, 1496 &lsm_xattr->value_len); 1497 if (ret) 1498 goto out; 1499 1500 evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1; 1501 ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr); 1502 if (ret) 1503 goto out; 1504 ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); 1505 out: 1506 for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) 1507 kfree(xattr->value); 1508 return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret; 1509 } 1510 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); 1511 1512 /** 1513 * security_inode_init_security_anon() - Initialize an anonymous inode 1514 * @inode: the inode 1515 * @name: the anonymous inode class 1516 * @context_inode: an optional related inode 1517 * 1518 * Set up the incore security field for the new anonymous inode and return 1519 * whether the inode creation is permitted by the security module or not. 1520 * 1521 * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EACCES if the security module denies the 1522 * creation of this inode, or another -errno upon other errors. 1523 */ 1524 int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, 1525 const struct qstr *name, 1526 const struct inode *context_inode) 1527 { 1528 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, name, 1529 context_inode); 1530 } 1531 1532 int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1533 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, 1534 void **value, size_t *len) 1535 { 1536 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1537 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 1538 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, 1539 qstr, name, value, len); 1540 } 1541 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security); 1542 1543 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH 1544 /** 1545 * security_path_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 1546 * @dir: parent directory 1547 * @dentry: new file 1548 * @mode: new file mode 1549 * @dev: device number 1550 * 1551 * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called even 1552 * if mknod operation is being done for a regular file. 1553 * 1554 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1555 */ 1556 int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, 1557 unsigned int dev) 1558 { 1559 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1560 return 0; 1561 return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1562 } 1563 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod); 1564 1565 /** 1566 * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed 1567 * @dir: parent directory 1568 * @dentry: new directory 1569 * @mode: new directory mode 1570 * 1571 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory. 1572 * 1573 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1574 */ 1575 int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1576 { 1577 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1578 return 0; 1579 return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1580 } 1581 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir); 1582 1583 /** 1584 * security_path_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 1585 * @dir: parent directory 1586 * @dentry: directory to remove 1587 * 1588 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 1589 * 1590 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1591 */ 1592 int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1593 { 1594 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1595 return 0; 1596 return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1597 } 1598 1599 /** 1600 * security_path_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 1601 * @dir: parent directory 1602 * @dentry: file 1603 * 1604 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 1605 * 1606 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1607 */ 1608 int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1609 { 1610 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1611 return 0; 1612 return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1613 } 1614 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink); 1615 1616 /** 1617 * security_path_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 1618 * @dir: parent directory 1619 * @dentry: symbolic link 1620 * @old_name: file pathname 1621 * 1622 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 1623 * 1624 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1625 */ 1626 int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1627 const char *old_name) 1628 { 1629 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1630 return 0; 1631 return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1632 } 1633 1634 /** 1635 * security_path_link - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 1636 * @old_dentry: existing file 1637 * @new_dir: new parent directory 1638 * @new_dentry: new link 1639 * 1640 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 1641 * 1642 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1643 */ 1644 int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, 1645 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1646 { 1647 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1648 return 0; 1649 return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); 1650 } 1651 1652 /** 1653 * security_path_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 1654 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 1655 * @old_dentry: the old file 1656 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 1657 * @new_dentry: the new file 1658 * @flags: flags 1659 * 1660 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 1661 * 1662 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1663 */ 1664 int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 1665 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 1666 unsigned int flags) 1667 { 1668 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 1669 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 1670 return 0; 1671 1672 return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, 1673 new_dentry, flags); 1674 } 1675 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename); 1676 1677 /** 1678 * security_path_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 1679 * @path: file 1680 * 1681 * Check permission before truncating the file indicated by path. Note that 1682 * truncation permissions may also be checked based on already opened files, 1683 * using the security_file_truncate() hook. 1684 * 1685 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1686 */ 1687 int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path) 1688 { 1689 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1690 return 0; 1691 return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path); 1692 } 1693 1694 /** 1695 * security_path_chmod() - Check if changing the file's mode is allowed 1696 * @path: file 1697 * @mode: new mode 1698 * 1699 * Check for permission to change a mode of the file @path. The new mode is 1700 * specified in @mode which is a bitmask of constants from 1701 * <include/uapi/linux/stat.h>. 1702 * 1703 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1704 */ 1705 int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) 1706 { 1707 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1708 return 0; 1709 return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode); 1710 } 1711 1712 /** 1713 * security_path_chown() - Check if changing the file's owner/group is allowed 1714 * @path: file 1715 * @uid: file owner 1716 * @gid: file group 1717 * 1718 * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory. 1719 * 1720 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1721 */ 1722 int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) 1723 { 1724 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1725 return 0; 1726 return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid); 1727 } 1728 1729 /** 1730 * security_path_chroot() - Check if changing the root directory is allowed 1731 * @path: directory 1732 * 1733 * Check for permission to change root directory. 1734 * 1735 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1736 */ 1737 int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path) 1738 { 1739 return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path); 1740 } 1741 #endif 1742 1743 /** 1744 * security_inode_create() - Check if creating a file is allowed 1745 * @dir: the parent directory 1746 * @dentry: the file being created 1747 * @mode: requested file mode 1748 * 1749 * Check permission to create a regular file. 1750 * 1751 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1752 */ 1753 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1754 { 1755 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1756 return 0; 1757 return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1758 } 1759 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create); 1760 1761 /** 1762 * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 1763 * @old_dentry: existing file 1764 * @dir: new parent directory 1765 * @new_dentry: new link 1766 * 1767 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 1768 * 1769 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1770 */ 1771 int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, 1772 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1773 { 1774 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1775 return 0; 1776 return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); 1777 } 1778 1779 /** 1780 * security_inode_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 1781 * @dir: parent directory 1782 * @dentry: file 1783 * 1784 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 1785 * 1786 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1787 */ 1788 int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1789 { 1790 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1791 return 0; 1792 return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1793 } 1794 1795 /** 1796 * security_inode_symlink() Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 1797 * @dir: parent directory 1798 * @dentry: symbolic link 1799 * @old_name: existing filename 1800 * 1801 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 1802 * 1803 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1804 */ 1805 int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1806 const char *old_name) 1807 { 1808 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1809 return 0; 1810 return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1811 } 1812 1813 /** 1814 * security_inode_mkdir() - Check if creation a new director is allowed 1815 * @dir: parent directory 1816 * @dentry: new directory 1817 * @mode: new directory mode 1818 * 1819 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory 1820 * associated with inode structure @dir. 1821 * 1822 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1823 */ 1824 int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1825 { 1826 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1827 return 0; 1828 return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1829 } 1830 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir); 1831 1832 /** 1833 * security_inode_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 1834 * @dir: parent directory 1835 * @dentry: directory to be removed 1836 * 1837 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 1838 * 1839 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1840 */ 1841 int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1842 { 1843 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1844 return 0; 1845 return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1846 } 1847 1848 /** 1849 * security_inode_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 1850 * @dir: parent directory 1851 * @dentry: new file 1852 * @mode: new file mode 1853 * @dev: device number 1854 * 1855 * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo file 1856 * created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation is being 1857 * done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called and not this 1858 * hook. 1859 * 1860 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1861 */ 1862 int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev) 1863 { 1864 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1865 return 0; 1866 return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1867 } 1868 1869 /** 1870 * security_inode_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 1871 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 1872 * @old_dentry: the old file 1873 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 1874 * @new_dentry: the new file 1875 * @flags: flags 1876 * 1877 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 1878 * 1879 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1880 */ 1881 int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 1882 struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 1883 unsigned int flags) 1884 { 1885 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 1886 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 1887 return 0; 1888 1889 if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { 1890 int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry, 1891 old_dir, old_dentry); 1892 if (err) 1893 return err; 1894 } 1895 1896 return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, 1897 new_dir, new_dentry); 1898 } 1899 1900 /** 1901 * security_inode_readlink() - Check if reading a symbolic link is allowed 1902 * @dentry: link 1903 * 1904 * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. 1905 * 1906 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1907 */ 1908 int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) 1909 { 1910 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1911 return 0; 1912 return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry); 1913 } 1914 1915 /** 1916 * security_inode_follow_link() - Check if following a symbolic link is allowed 1917 * @dentry: link dentry 1918 * @inode: link inode 1919 * @rcu: true if in RCU-walk mode 1920 * 1921 * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname. If 1922 * @rcu is true, @inode is not stable. 1923 * 1924 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1925 */ 1926 int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, 1927 bool rcu) 1928 { 1929 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1930 return 0; 1931 return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu); 1932 } 1933 1934 /** 1935 * security_inode_permission() - Check if accessing an inode is allowed 1936 * @inode: inode 1937 * @mask: access mask 1938 * 1939 * Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the 1940 * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to 1941 * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks. Notice 1942 * that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many other 1943 * operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is called when 1944 * the actual read/write operations are performed. 1945 * 1946 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1947 */ 1948 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) 1949 { 1950 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1951 return 0; 1952 return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask); 1953 } 1954 1955 /** 1956 * security_inode_setattr() - Check if setting file attributes is allowed 1957 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 1958 * @dentry: file 1959 * @attr: new attributes 1960 * 1961 * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel call 1962 * to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever file 1963 * attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod operations, 1964 * transferring disk quotas, etc). 1965 * 1966 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1967 */ 1968 int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 1969 struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 1970 { 1971 int ret; 1972 1973 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1974 return 0; 1975 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr); 1976 if (ret) 1977 return ret; 1978 return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); 1979 } 1980 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); 1981 1982 /** 1983 * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed 1984 * @path: file 1985 * 1986 * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. 1987 * 1988 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1989 */ 1990 int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) 1991 { 1992 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1993 return 0; 1994 return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path); 1995 } 1996 1997 /** 1998 * security_inode_setxattr() - Check if setting file xattrs is allowed 1999 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2000 * @dentry: file 2001 * @name: xattr name 2002 * @value: xattr value 2003 * @flags: flags 2004 * 2005 * Check permission before setting the extended attributes. 2006 * 2007 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2008 */ 2009 int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2010 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 2011 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2012 { 2013 int ret; 2014 2015 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2016 return 0; 2017 /* 2018 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 2019 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 2020 */ 2021 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name, value, 2022 size, flags); 2023 2024 if (ret == 1) 2025 ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); 2026 if (ret) 2027 return ret; 2028 ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 2029 if (ret) 2030 return ret; 2031 return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size); 2032 } 2033 2034 /** 2035 * security_inode_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed 2036 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2037 * @dentry: file 2038 * @acl_name: acl name 2039 * @kacl: acl struct 2040 * 2041 * Check permission before setting posix acls, the posix acls in @kacl are 2042 * identified by @acl_name. 2043 * 2044 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2045 */ 2046 int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2047 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, 2048 struct posix_acl *kacl) 2049 { 2050 int ret; 2051 2052 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2053 return 0; 2054 ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, 2055 kacl); 2056 if (ret) 2057 return ret; 2058 ret = ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2059 if (ret) 2060 return ret; 2061 return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2062 } 2063 2064 /** 2065 * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed 2066 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2067 * @dentry: file 2068 * @acl_name: acl name 2069 * 2070 * Check permission before getting osix acls, the posix acls are identified by 2071 * @acl_name. 2072 * 2073 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2074 */ 2075 int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2076 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2077 { 2078 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2079 return 0; 2080 return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2081 } 2082 2083 /** 2084 * security_inode_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed 2085 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2086 * @dentry: file 2087 * @acl_name: acl name 2088 * 2089 * Check permission before removing posix acls, the posix acls are identified 2090 * by @acl_name. 2091 * 2092 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2093 */ 2094 int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2095 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2096 { 2097 int ret; 2098 2099 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2100 return 0; 2101 ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2102 if (ret) 2103 return ret; 2104 ret = ima_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2105 if (ret) 2106 return ret; 2107 return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2108 } 2109 2110 /** 2111 * security_inode_post_setxattr() - Update the inode after a setxattr operation 2112 * @dentry: file 2113 * @name: xattr name 2114 * @value: xattr value 2115 * @size: xattr value size 2116 * @flags: flags 2117 * 2118 * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation. 2119 */ 2120 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 2121 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2122 { 2123 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2124 return; 2125 call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); 2126 evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 2127 } 2128 2129 /** 2130 * security_inode_getxattr() - Check if xattr access is allowed 2131 * @dentry: file 2132 * @name: xattr name 2133 * 2134 * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes identified by 2135 * @name for @dentry. 2136 * 2137 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2138 */ 2139 int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2140 { 2141 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2142 return 0; 2143 return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name); 2144 } 2145 2146 /** 2147 * security_inode_listxattr() - Check if listing xattrs is allowed 2148 * @dentry: file 2149 * 2150 * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute names for 2151 * @dentry. 2152 * 2153 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2154 */ 2155 int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) 2156 { 2157 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2158 return 0; 2159 return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry); 2160 } 2161 2162 /** 2163 * security_inode_removexattr() - Check if removing an xattr is allowed 2164 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2165 * @dentry: file 2166 * @name: xattr name 2167 * 2168 * Check permission before removing the extended attribute identified by @name 2169 * for @dentry. 2170 * 2171 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2172 */ 2173 int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2174 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2175 { 2176 int ret; 2177 2178 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2179 return 0; 2180 /* 2181 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 2182 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 2183 */ 2184 ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); 2185 if (ret == 1) 2186 ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 2187 if (ret) 2188 return ret; 2189 ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); 2190 if (ret) 2191 return ret; 2192 return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 2193 } 2194 2195 /** 2196 * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required 2197 * @dentry: associated dentry 2198 * 2199 * Called when an inode has been changed to determine if 2200 * security_inode_killpriv() should be called. 2201 * 2202 * Return: Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation, return 0 if 2203 * security_inode_killpriv() does not need to be called, return >0 if 2204 * security_inode_killpriv() does need to be called. 2205 */ 2206 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) 2207 { 2208 return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry); 2209 } 2210 2211 /** 2212 * security_inode_killpriv() - The setuid bit is removed, update LSM state 2213 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2214 * @dentry: associated dentry 2215 * 2216 * The @dentry's setuid bit is being removed. Remove similar security labels. 2217 * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held. 2218 * 2219 * Return: Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation 2220 * causing setuid bit removal is failed. 2221 */ 2222 int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2223 struct dentry *dentry) 2224 { 2225 return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, idmap, dentry); 2226 } 2227 2228 /** 2229 * security_inode_getsecurity() - Get the xattr security label of an inode 2230 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2231 * @inode: inode 2232 * @name: xattr name 2233 * @buffer: security label buffer 2234 * @alloc: allocation flag 2235 * 2236 * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the security 2237 * label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that @name is the 2238 * remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix has been removed. 2239 * @alloc is used to specify if the call should return a value via the buffer 2240 * or just the value length. 2241 * 2242 * Return: Returns size of buffer on success. 2243 */ 2244 int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2245 struct inode *inode, const char *name, 2246 void **buffer, bool alloc) 2247 { 2248 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2249 int rc; 2250 2251 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2252 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 2253 /* 2254 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 2255 */ 2256 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) { 2257 rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name, buffer, alloc); 2258 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity)) 2259 return rc; 2260 } 2261 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 2262 } 2263 2264 /** 2265 * security_inode_setsecurity() - Set the xattr security label of an inode 2266 * @inode: inode 2267 * @name: xattr name 2268 * @value: security label 2269 * @size: length of security label 2270 * @flags: flags 2271 * 2272 * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the extended 2273 * attribute value @value. @size indicates the size of the @value in bytes. 2274 * @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0. Note that @name is the 2275 * remainder of the attribute name after the security. prefix has been removed. 2276 * 2277 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2278 */ 2279 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2280 { 2281 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2282 int rc; 2283 2284 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2285 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 2286 /* 2287 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 2288 */ 2289 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) { 2290 rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, 2291 flags); 2292 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity)) 2293 return rc; 2294 } 2295 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 2296 } 2297 2298 /** 2299 * security_inode_listsecurity() - List the xattr security label names 2300 * @inode: inode 2301 * @buffer: buffer 2302 * @buffer_size: size of buffer 2303 * 2304 * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels associated with 2305 * @inode into @buffer. The maximum size of @buffer is specified by 2306 * @buffer_size. @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer 2307 * required. 2308 * 2309 * Return: Returns number of bytes used/required on success. 2310 */ 2311 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) 2312 { 2313 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2314 return 0; 2315 return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size); 2316 } 2317 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity); 2318 2319 /** 2320 * security_inode_getsecid() - Get an inode's secid 2321 * @inode: inode 2322 * @secid: secid to return 2323 * 2324 * Get the secid associated with the node. In case of failure, @secid will be 2325 * set to zero. 2326 */ 2327 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) 2328 { 2329 call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid); 2330 } 2331 2332 /** 2333 * security_inode_copy_up() - Create new creds for an overlayfs copy-up op 2334 * @src: union dentry of copy-up file 2335 * @new: newly created creds 2336 * 2337 * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of overlay 2338 * filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds and modify as 2339 * need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to new creds temporarily to 2340 * create new file and release newly allocated creds. 2341 * 2342 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error. 2343 */ 2344 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) 2345 { 2346 return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new); 2347 } 2348 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up); 2349 2350 /** 2351 * security_inode_copy_up_xattr() - Filter xattrs in an overlayfs copy-up op 2352 * @name: xattr name 2353 * 2354 * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied up from a 2355 * lower layer to the union/overlay layer. The caller is responsible for 2356 * reading and writing the xattrs, this hook is merely a filter. 2357 * 2358 * Return: Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP 2359 * if the security module does not know about attribute, or a negative 2360 * error code to abort the copy up. 2361 */ 2362 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) 2363 { 2364 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2365 int rc; 2366 2367 /* 2368 * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the 2369 * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or 2370 * any other error code incase of an error. 2371 */ 2372 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, 2373 &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) { 2374 rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name); 2375 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr)) 2376 return rc; 2377 } 2378 2379 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr); 2380 } 2381 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr); 2382 2383 /** 2384 * security_kernfs_init_security() - Init LSM context for a kernfs node 2385 * @kn_dir: parent kernfs node 2386 * @kn: the kernfs node to initialize 2387 * 2388 * Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based on its 2389 * own and its parent's attributes. 2390 * 2391 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2392 */ 2393 int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, 2394 struct kernfs_node *kn) 2395 { 2396 return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn); 2397 } 2398 2399 /** 2400 * security_file_permission() - Check file permissions 2401 * @file: file 2402 * @mask: requested permissions 2403 * 2404 * Check file permissions before accessing an open file. This hook is called 2405 * by various operations that read or write files. A security module can use 2406 * this hook to perform additional checking on these operations, e.g. to 2407 * revalidate permissions on use to support privilege bracketing or policy 2408 * changes. Notice that this hook is used when the actual read/write 2409 * operations are performed, whereas the inode_security_ops hook is called when 2410 * a file is opened (as well as many other operations). Although this hook can 2411 * be used to revalidate permissions for various system call operations that 2412 * read or write files, it does not address the revalidation of permissions for 2413 * memory-mapped files. Security modules must handle this separately if they 2414 * need such revalidation. 2415 * 2416 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2417 */ 2418 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) 2419 { 2420 int ret; 2421 2422 ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask); 2423 if (ret) 2424 return ret; 2425 2426 return fsnotify_perm(file, mask); 2427 } 2428 2429 /** 2430 * security_file_alloc() - Allocate and init a file's LSM blob 2431 * @file: the file 2432 * 2433 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field. The 2434 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 2435 * 2436 * Return: Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 2437 */ 2438 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) 2439 { 2440 int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file); 2441 2442 if (rc) 2443 return rc; 2444 rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file); 2445 if (unlikely(rc)) 2446 security_file_free(file); 2447 return rc; 2448 } 2449 2450 /** 2451 * security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob 2452 * @file: the file 2453 * 2454 * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security. 2455 */ 2456 void security_file_free(struct file *file) 2457 { 2458 void *blob; 2459 2460 call_void_hook(file_free_security, file); 2461 2462 blob = file->f_security; 2463 if (blob) { 2464 file->f_security = NULL; 2465 kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob); 2466 } 2467 } 2468 2469 /** 2470 * security_file_ioctl() - Check if an ioctl is allowed 2471 * @file: associated file 2472 * @cmd: ioctl cmd 2473 * @arg: ioctl arguments 2474 * 2475 * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file. Note that @arg sometimes 2476 * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer 2477 * value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used 2478 * by the security module. 2479 * 2480 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2481 */ 2482 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2483 { 2484 return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 2485 } 2486 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl); 2487 2488 static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) 2489 { 2490 /* 2491 * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect 2492 * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about... 2493 */ 2494 if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ) 2495 return prot; 2496 if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) 2497 return prot; 2498 /* 2499 * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it. 2500 */ 2501 if (!file) 2502 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2503 /* 2504 * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need 2505 * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case 2506 */ 2507 if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) { 2508 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU 2509 if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) { 2510 unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file); 2511 if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC)) 2512 return prot; 2513 } 2514 #endif 2515 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2516 } 2517 /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */ 2518 return prot; 2519 } 2520 2521 /** 2522 * security_mmap_file() - Check if mmap'ing a file is allowed 2523 * @file: file 2524 * @prot: protection applied by the kernel 2525 * @flags: flags 2526 * 2527 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. if 2528 * mapping anonymous memory. 2529 * 2530 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2531 */ 2532 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, 2533 unsigned long flags) 2534 { 2535 unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot); 2536 int ret; 2537 2538 ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 2539 if (ret) 2540 return ret; 2541 return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 2542 } 2543 2544 /** 2545 * security_mmap_addr() - Check if mmap'ing an address is allowed 2546 * @addr: address 2547 * 2548 * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr. 2549 * 2550 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2551 */ 2552 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) 2553 { 2554 return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr); 2555 } 2556 2557 /** 2558 * security_file_mprotect() - Check if changing memory protections is allowed 2559 * @vma: memory region 2560 * @reqprot: application requested protection 2561 * @prog: protection applied by the kernel 2562 * 2563 * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions. 2564 * 2565 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2566 */ 2567 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, 2568 unsigned long prot) 2569 { 2570 int ret; 2571 2572 ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); 2573 if (ret) 2574 return ret; 2575 return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot); 2576 } 2577 2578 /** 2579 * security_file_lock() - Check if a file lock is allowed 2580 * @file: file 2581 * @cmd: lock operation (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK) 2582 * 2583 * Check permission before performing file locking operations. Note the hook 2584 * mediates both flock and fcntl style locks. 2585 * 2586 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2587 */ 2588 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) 2589 { 2590 return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd); 2591 } 2592 2593 /** 2594 * security_file_fcntl() - Check if fcntl() op is allowed 2595 * @file: file 2596 * @cmd: fnctl command 2597 * @arg: command argument 2598 * 2599 * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd from 2600 * being performed on the file @file. Note that @arg sometimes represents a 2601 * user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer value. When 2602 * @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used by the 2603 * security module. 2604 * 2605 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2606 */ 2607 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2608 { 2609 return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 2610 } 2611 2612 /** 2613 * security_file_set_fowner() - Set the file owner info in the LSM blob 2614 * @file: the file 2615 * 2616 * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in 2617 * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook. 2618 * 2619 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2620 */ 2621 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) 2622 { 2623 call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file); 2624 } 2625 2626 /** 2627 * security_file_send_sigiotask() - Check if sending SIGIO/SIGURG is allowed 2628 * @tsk: target task 2629 * @fown: signal sender 2630 * @sig: signal to be sent, SIGIO is sent if 0 2631 * 2632 * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the 2633 * process @tsk. Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt. Note 2634 * that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a struct file, 2635 * so the file structure (and associated security information) can always be 2636 * obtained: container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner). 2637 * 2638 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2639 */ 2640 int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, 2641 struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) 2642 { 2643 return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig); 2644 } 2645 2646 /** 2647 * security_file_receive() - Check is receiving a file via IPC is allowed 2648 * @file: file being received 2649 * 2650 * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process to 2651 * receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC. 2652 * 2653 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2654 */ 2655 int security_file_receive(struct file *file) 2656 { 2657 return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file); 2658 } 2659 2660 /** 2661 * security_file_open() - Save open() time state for late use by the LSM 2662 * @file: 2663 * 2664 * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon file_permission, 2665 * and recheck access if anything has changed since inode_permission. 2666 * 2667 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2668 */ 2669 int security_file_open(struct file *file) 2670 { 2671 int ret; 2672 2673 ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file); 2674 if (ret) 2675 return ret; 2676 2677 return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN); 2678 } 2679 2680 /** 2681 * security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 2682 * @file: file 2683 * 2684 * Check permission before truncating a file, i.e. using ftruncate. Note that 2685 * truncation permission may also be checked based on the path, using the 2686 * @path_truncate hook. 2687 * 2688 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2689 */ 2690 int security_file_truncate(struct file *file) 2691 { 2692 return call_int_hook(file_truncate, 0, file); 2693 } 2694 2695 /** 2696 * security_task_alloc() - Allocate a task's LSM blob 2697 * @task: the task 2698 * @clone_flags: flags indicating what is being shared 2699 * 2700 * Handle allocation of task-related resources. 2701 * 2702 * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. 2703 */ 2704 int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) 2705 { 2706 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 2707 2708 if (rc) 2709 return rc; 2710 rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags); 2711 if (unlikely(rc)) 2712 security_task_free(task); 2713 return rc; 2714 } 2715 2716 /** 2717 * security_task_free() - Free a task's LSM blob and related resources 2718 * @task: task 2719 * 2720 * Handle release of task-related resources. Note that this can be called from 2721 * interrupt context. 2722 */ 2723 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) 2724 { 2725 call_void_hook(task_free, task); 2726 2727 kfree(task->security); 2728 task->security = NULL; 2729 } 2730 2731 /** 2732 * security_cred_alloc_blank() - Allocate the min memory to allow cred_transfer 2733 * @cred: credentials 2734 * @gfp: gfp flags 2735 * 2736 * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that 2737 * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM. 2738 * 2739 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 2740 */ 2741 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 2742 { 2743 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp); 2744 2745 if (rc) 2746 return rc; 2747 2748 rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp); 2749 if (unlikely(rc)) 2750 security_cred_free(cred); 2751 return rc; 2752 } 2753 2754 /** 2755 * security_cred_free() - Free the cred's LSM blob and associated resources 2756 * @cred: credentials 2757 * 2758 * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials. 2759 */ 2760 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) 2761 { 2762 /* 2763 * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that 2764 * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL. 2765 */ 2766 if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL)) 2767 return; 2768 2769 call_void_hook(cred_free, cred); 2770 2771 kfree(cred->security); 2772 cred->security = NULL; 2773 } 2774 2775 /** 2776 * security_prepare_creds() - Prepare a new set of credentials 2777 * @new: new credentials 2778 * @old: original credentials 2779 * @gfp: gfp flags 2780 * 2781 * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set. 2782 * 2783 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 2784 */ 2785 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) 2786 { 2787 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp); 2788 2789 if (rc) 2790 return rc; 2791 2792 rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp); 2793 if (unlikely(rc)) 2794 security_cred_free(new); 2795 return rc; 2796 } 2797 2798 /** 2799 * security_transfer_creds() - Transfer creds 2800 * @new: target credentials 2801 * @old: original credentials 2802 * 2803 * Transfer data from original creds to new creds. 2804 */ 2805 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 2806 { 2807 call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); 2808 } 2809 2810 /** 2811 * security_cred_getsecid() - Get the secid from a set of credentials 2812 * @c: credentials 2813 * @secid: secid value 2814 * 2815 * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c. In case of 2816 * failure, @secid will be set to zero. 2817 */ 2818 void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) 2819 { 2820 *secid = 0; 2821 call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); 2822 } 2823 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); 2824 2825 /** 2826 * security_kernel_act_as() - Set the kernel credentials to act as secid 2827 * @new: credentials 2828 * @secid: secid 2829 * 2830 * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). 2831 * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid. 2832 * 2833 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2834 */ 2835 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) 2836 { 2837 return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); 2838 } 2839 2840 /** 2841 * security_kernel_create_files_as() - Set file creation context using an inode 2842 * @new: target credentials 2843 * @inode: reference inode 2844 * 2845 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as the 2846 * objective context of the specified inode. The current task must be the one 2847 * that nominated @inode. 2848 * 2849 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2850 */ 2851 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) 2852 { 2853 return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode); 2854 } 2855 2856 /** 2857 * security_kernel_module_request() - Check is loading a module is allowed 2858 * @kmod_name: module name 2859 * 2860 * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for 2861 * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. 2862 * 2863 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2864 */ 2865 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) 2866 { 2867 int ret; 2868 2869 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); 2870 if (ret) 2871 return ret; 2872 return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); 2873 } 2874 2875 /** 2876 * security_kernel_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 2877 * @file: file 2878 * @id: file identifier 2879 * @contents: trust if security_kernel_post_read_file() will be called 2880 * 2881 * Read a file specified by userspace. 2882 * 2883 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2884 */ 2885 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, 2886 bool contents) 2887 { 2888 int ret; 2889 2890 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); 2891 if (ret) 2892 return ret; 2893 return ima_read_file(file, id, contents); 2894 } 2895 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); 2896 2897 /** 2898 * security_kernel_post_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 2899 * @file: file 2900 * @buf: file contents 2901 * @size: size of file contents 2902 * @id: file identifier 2903 * 2904 * Read a file specified by userspace. This must be paired with a prior call 2905 * to security_kernel_read_file() call that indicated this hook would also be 2906 * called, see security_kernel_read_file() for more information. 2907 * 2908 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2909 */ 2910 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, 2911 enum kernel_read_file_id id) 2912 { 2913 int ret; 2914 2915 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id); 2916 if (ret) 2917 return ret; 2918 return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id); 2919 } 2920 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); 2921 2922 /** 2923 * security_kernel_load_data() - Load data provided by userspace 2924 * @id: data identifier 2925 * @contents: true if security_kernel_post_load_data() will be called 2926 * 2927 * Load data provided by userspace. 2928 * 2929 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2930 */ 2931 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) 2932 { 2933 int ret; 2934 2935 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents); 2936 if (ret) 2937 return ret; 2938 return ima_load_data(id, contents); 2939 } 2940 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); 2941 2942 /** 2943 * security_kernel_post_load_data() - Load userspace data from a non-file source 2944 * @buf: data 2945 * @size: size of data 2946 * @id: data identifier 2947 * @description: text description of data, specific to the id value 2948 * 2949 * Load data provided by a non-file source (usually userspace buffer). This 2950 * must be paired with a prior security_kernel_load_data() call that indicated 2951 * this hook would also be called, see security_kernel_load_data() for more 2952 * information. 2953 * 2954 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2955 */ 2956 int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, 2957 enum kernel_load_data_id id, 2958 char *description) 2959 { 2960 int ret; 2961 2962 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id, 2963 description); 2964 if (ret) 2965 return ret; 2966 return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description); 2967 } 2968 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data); 2969 2970 /** 2971 * security_task_fix_setuid() - Update LSM with new user id attributes 2972 * @new: updated credentials 2973 * @old: credentials being replaced 2974 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag values 2975 * 2976 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user identity 2977 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 2978 * the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If @new is the set of 2979 * credentials that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this 2980 * rather than to @current->cred. 2981 * 2982 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2983 */ 2984 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 2985 int flags) 2986 { 2987 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags); 2988 } 2989 2990 /** 2991 * security_task_fix_setgid() - Update LSM with new group id attributes 2992 * @new: updated credentials 2993 * @old: credentials being replaced 2994 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag value 2995 * 2996 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the group identity 2997 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 2998 * the set*gid system calls invoked this hook. @new is the set of credentials 2999 * that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 3000 * @current->cred. 3001 * 3002 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3003 */ 3004 int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 3005 int flags) 3006 { 3007 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags); 3008 } 3009 3010 /** 3011 * security_task_fix_setgroups() - Update LSM with new supplementary groups 3012 * @new: updated credentials 3013 * @old: credentials being replaced 3014 * 3015 * Update the module's state after setting the supplementary group identity 3016 * attributes of the current process. @new is the set of credentials that will 3017 * be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 3018 * @current->cred. 3019 * 3020 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 3021 */ 3022 int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 3023 { 3024 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, 0, new, old); 3025 } 3026 3027 /** 3028 * security_task_setpgid() - Check if setting the pgid is allowed 3029 * @p: task being modified 3030 * @pgid: new pgid 3031 * 3032 * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the process 3033 * @p to @pgid. 3034 * 3035 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3036 */ 3037 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) 3038 { 3039 return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid); 3040 } 3041 3042 /** 3043 * security_task_getpgid() - Check if getting the pgid is allowed 3044 * @p: task 3045 * 3046 * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the process 3047 * @p. 3048 * 3049 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3050 */ 3051 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) 3052 { 3053 return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p); 3054 } 3055 3056 /** 3057 * security_task_getsid() - Check if getting the session id is allowed 3058 * @p: task 3059 * 3060 * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process @p. 3061 * 3062 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3063 */ 3064 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) 3065 { 3066 return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); 3067 } 3068 3069 /** 3070 * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid 3071 * @secid: secid value 3072 * 3073 * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return 3074 * it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3075 */ 3076 void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) 3077 { 3078 *secid = 0; 3079 call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid); 3080 } 3081 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj); 3082 3083 /** 3084 * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid 3085 * @p: target task 3086 * @secid: secid value 3087 * 3088 * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and 3089 * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3090 */ 3091 void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) 3092 { 3093 *secid = 0; 3094 call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); 3095 } 3096 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj); 3097 3098 /** 3099 * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed 3100 * @p: target task 3101 * @nice: nice value 3102 * 3103 * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice. 3104 * 3105 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3106 */ 3107 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) 3108 { 3109 return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice); 3110 } 3111 3112 /** 3113 * security_task_setioprio() - Check if setting a task's ioprio is allowed 3114 * @p: target task 3115 * @ioprio: ioprio value 3116 * 3117 * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio. 3118 * 3119 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3120 */ 3121 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) 3122 { 3123 return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio); 3124 } 3125 3126 /** 3127 * security_task_getioprio() - Check if getting a task's ioprio is allowed 3128 * @p: task 3129 * 3130 * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p. 3131 * 3132 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3133 */ 3134 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) 3135 { 3136 return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p); 3137 } 3138 3139 /** 3140 * security_task_prlimit() - Check if get/setting resources limits is allowed 3141 * @cred: current task credentials 3142 * @tcred: target task credentials 3143 * @flags: LSM_PRLIMIT_* flag bits indicating a get/set/both 3144 * 3145 * Check permission before getting and/or setting the resource limits of 3146 * another task. 3147 * 3148 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3149 */ 3150 int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, 3151 unsigned int flags) 3152 { 3153 return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags); 3154 } 3155 3156 /** 3157 * security_task_setrlimit() - Check if setting a new rlimit value is allowed 3158 * @p: target task's group leader 3159 * @resource: resource whose limit is being set 3160 * @new_rlim: new resource limit 3161 * 3162 * Check permission before setting the resource limits of process @p for 3163 * @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can be examined by 3164 * dereferencing (p->signal->rlim + resource). 3165 * 3166 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3167 */ 3168 int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, 3169 struct rlimit *new_rlim) 3170 { 3171 return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim); 3172 } 3173 3174 /** 3175 * security_task_setscheduler() - Check if setting sched policy/param is allowed 3176 * @p: target task 3177 * 3178 * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of 3179 * process @p. 3180 * 3181 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3182 */ 3183 int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3184 { 3185 return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p); 3186 } 3187 3188 /** 3189 * security_task_getscheduler() - Check if getting scheduling info is allowed 3190 * @p: target task 3191 * 3192 * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process @p. 3193 * 3194 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3195 */ 3196 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3197 { 3198 return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p); 3199 } 3200 3201 /** 3202 * security_task_movememory() - Check if moving memory is allowed 3203 * @p: task 3204 * 3205 * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p. 3206 * 3207 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3208 */ 3209 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) 3210 { 3211 return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p); 3212 } 3213 3214 /** 3215 * security_task_kill() - Check if sending a signal is allowed 3216 * @p: target process 3217 * @info: signal information 3218 * @sig: signal value 3219 * @cred: credentials of the signal sender, NULL if @current 3220 * 3221 * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p. @info can be NULL, the 3222 * constant 1, or a pointer to a kernel_siginfo structure. If @info is 1 or 3223 * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming from 3224 * the kernel and should typically be permitted. SIGIO signals are handled 3225 * separately by the send_sigiotask hook in file_security_ops. 3226 * 3227 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3228 */ 3229 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, 3230 int sig, const struct cred *cred) 3231 { 3232 return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred); 3233 } 3234 3235 /** 3236 * security_task_prctl() - Check if a prctl op is allowed 3237 * @option: operation 3238 * @arg2: argument 3239 * @arg3: argument 3240 * @arg4: argument 3241 * @arg5: argument 3242 * 3243 * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the 3244 * current process. 3245 * 3246 * Return: Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value 3247 * to cause prctl() to return immediately with that value. 3248 */ 3249 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, 3250 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) 3251 { 3252 int thisrc; 3253 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl); 3254 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3255 3256 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) { 3257 thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); 3258 if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) { 3259 rc = thisrc; 3260 if (thisrc != 0) 3261 break; 3262 } 3263 } 3264 return rc; 3265 } 3266 3267 /** 3268 * security_task_to_inode() - Set the security attributes of a task's inode 3269 * @p: task 3270 * @inode: inode 3271 * 3272 * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's 3273 * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes. 3274 */ 3275 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) 3276 { 3277 call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode); 3278 } 3279 3280 /** 3281 * security_create_user_ns() - Check if creating a new userns is allowed 3282 * @cred: prepared creds 3283 * 3284 * Check permission prior to creating a new user namespace. 3285 * 3286 * Return: Returns 0 if successful, otherwise < 0 error code. 3287 */ 3288 int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred) 3289 { 3290 return call_int_hook(userns_create, 0, cred); 3291 } 3292 3293 /** 3294 * security_ipc_permission() - Check if sysv ipc access is allowed 3295 * @ipcp: ipc permission structure 3296 * @flags: requested permissions 3297 * 3298 * Check permissions for access to IPC. 3299 * 3300 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3301 */ 3302 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) 3303 { 3304 return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag); 3305 } 3306 3307 /** 3308 * security_ipc_getsecid() - Get the sysv ipc object's secid 3309 * @ipcp: ipc permission structure 3310 * @secid: secid pointer 3311 * 3312 * Get the secid associated with the ipc object. In case of failure, @secid 3313 * will be set to zero. 3314 */ 3315 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) 3316 { 3317 *secid = 0; 3318 call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); 3319 } 3320 3321 /** 3322 * security_msg_msg_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc message LSM blob 3323 * @msg: message structure 3324 * 3325 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field. The 3326 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3327 * 3328 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3329 */ 3330 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) 3331 { 3332 int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg); 3333 3334 if (unlikely(rc)) 3335 return rc; 3336 rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg); 3337 if (unlikely(rc)) 3338 security_msg_msg_free(msg); 3339 return rc; 3340 } 3341 3342 /** 3343 * security_msg_msg_free() - Free a sysv ipc message LSM blob 3344 * @msg: message structure 3345 * 3346 * Deallocate the security structure for this message. 3347 */ 3348 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg) 3349 { 3350 call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg); 3351 kfree(msg->security); 3352 msg->security = NULL; 3353 } 3354 3355 /** 3356 * security_msg_queue_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob 3357 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3358 * 3359 * Allocate and attach a security structure to @msg. The security field is 3360 * initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3361 * 3362 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3363 */ 3364 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3365 { 3366 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq); 3367 3368 if (unlikely(rc)) 3369 return rc; 3370 rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq); 3371 if (unlikely(rc)) 3372 security_msg_queue_free(msq); 3373 return rc; 3374 } 3375 3376 /** 3377 * security_msg_queue_free() - Free a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob 3378 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3379 * 3380 * Deallocate security field @perm->security for the message queue. 3381 */ 3382 void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3383 { 3384 call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq); 3385 kfree(msq->security); 3386 msq->security = NULL; 3387 } 3388 3389 /** 3390 * security_msg_queue_associate() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed 3391 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3392 * @msqflg: operation flags 3393 * 3394 * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the msgget system 3395 * call. This hook is only called when returning the message queue identifier 3396 * for an existing message queue, not when a new message queue is created. 3397 * 3398 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 3399 */ 3400 int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) 3401 { 3402 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg); 3403 } 3404 3405 /** 3406 * security_msg_queue_msgctl() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed 3407 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3408 * @cmd: operation 3409 * 3410 * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd is to be 3411 * performed on the message queue with permissions. 3412 * 3413 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3414 */ 3415 int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) 3416 { 3417 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd); 3418 } 3419 3420 /** 3421 * security_msg_queue_msgsnd() - Check if sending a sysv ipc message is allowed 3422 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3423 * @msg: message 3424 * @msqflg: operation flags 3425 * 3426 * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message queue 3427 * with permissions specified in @msq. 3428 * 3429 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3430 */ 3431 int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, 3432 struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) 3433 { 3434 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg); 3435 } 3436 3437 /** 3438 * security_msg_queue_msgrcv() - Check if receiving a sysv ipc msg is allowed 3439 * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure 3440 * @msg: message 3441 * @target: target task 3442 * @type: type of message requested 3443 * @mode: operation flags 3444 * 3445 * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message queue. 3446 * The @target task structure contains a pointer to the process that will be 3447 * receiving the message (not equal to the current process when inline receives 3448 * are being performed). 3449 * 3450 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3451 */ 3452 int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, 3453 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) 3454 { 3455 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode); 3456 } 3457 3458 /** 3459 * security_shm_alloc() - Allocate a sysv shm LSM blob 3460 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3461 * 3462 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @shp security field. The 3463 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3464 * 3465 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3466 */ 3467 int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3468 { 3469 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp); 3470 3471 if (unlikely(rc)) 3472 return rc; 3473 rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp); 3474 if (unlikely(rc)) 3475 security_shm_free(shp); 3476 return rc; 3477 } 3478 3479 /** 3480 * security_shm_free() - Free a sysv shm LSM blob 3481 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3482 * 3483 * Deallocate the security structure @perm->security for the memory segment. 3484 */ 3485 void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3486 { 3487 call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp); 3488 kfree(shp->security); 3489 shp->security = NULL; 3490 } 3491 3492 /** 3493 * security_shm_associate() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed 3494 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3495 * @shmflg: operation flags 3496 * 3497 * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the shmget 3498 * system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared memory 3499 * region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared memory 3500 * region is created. 3501 * 3502 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3503 */ 3504 int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) 3505 { 3506 return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg); 3507 } 3508 3509 /** 3510 * security_shm_shmctl() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed 3511 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3512 * @cmd: operation 3513 * 3514 * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by @cmd is 3515 * to be performed on the shared memory region with permissions in @shp. 3516 * 3517 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. 3518 */ 3519 int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) 3520 { 3521 return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd); 3522 } 3523 3524 /** 3525 * security_shm_shmat() - Check if a sysv shm attach operation is allowed 3526 * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure 3527 * @shmaddr: address of memory region to attach 3528 * @shmflg: operation flags 3529 * 3530 * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the 3531 * shared memory segment with permissions @shp to the data segment of the 3532 * calling process. The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr. 3533 * 3534 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3535 */ 3536 int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) 3537 { 3538 return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg); 3539 } 3540 3541 /** 3542 * security_sem_alloc() - Allocate a sysv semaphore LSM blob 3543 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3544 * 3545 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @sma security field. The 3546 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 3547 * 3548 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. 3549 */ 3550 int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3551 { 3552 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma); 3553 3554 if (unlikely(rc)) 3555 return rc; 3556 rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma); 3557 if (unlikely(rc)) 3558 security_sem_free(sma); 3559 return rc; 3560 } 3561 3562 /** 3563 * security_sem_free() - Free a sysv semaphore LSM blob 3564 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3565 * 3566 * Deallocate security structure @sma->security for the semaphore. 3567 */ 3568 void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3569 { 3570 call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma); 3571 kfree(sma->security); 3572 sma->security = NULL; 3573 } 3574 3575 /** 3576 * security_sem_associate() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3577 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3578 * @semflg: operation flags 3579 * 3580 * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget system 3581 * call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore identifier for 3582 * an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be created. 3583 * 3584 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3585 */ 3586 int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) 3587 { 3588 return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg); 3589 } 3590 3591 /** 3592 * security_sem_ctl() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3593 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3594 * @cmd: operation 3595 * 3596 * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be 3597 * performed on the semaphore. 3598 * 3599 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3600 */ 3601 int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) 3602 { 3603 return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd); 3604 } 3605 3606 /** 3607 * security_sem_semop() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed 3608 * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure 3609 * @sops: operations to perform 3610 * @nsops: number of operations 3611 * @alter: flag indicating changes will be made 3612 * 3613 * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the semaphore 3614 * set. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set may be modified. 3615 * 3616 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3617 */ 3618 int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, 3619 unsigned nsops, int alter) 3620 { 3621 return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter); 3622 } 3623 3624 /** 3625 * security_d_instantiate() - Populate an inode's LSM state based on a dentry 3626 * @dentry: dentry 3627 * @inode: inode 3628 * 3629 * Fill in @inode security information for a @dentry if allowed. 3630 */ 3631 void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) 3632 { 3633 if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 3634 return; 3635 call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode); 3636 } 3637 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); 3638 3639 /** 3640 * security_getprocattr() - Read an attribute for a task 3641 * @p: the task 3642 * @lsm: LSM name 3643 * @name: attribute name 3644 * @value: attribute value 3645 * 3646 * Read attribute @name for task @p and store it into @value if allowed. 3647 * 3648 * Return: Returns the length of @value on success, a negative value otherwise. 3649 */ 3650 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, 3651 const char *name, char **value) 3652 { 3653 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3654 3655 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { 3656 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 3657 continue; 3658 return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); 3659 } 3660 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr); 3661 } 3662 3663 /** 3664 * security_setprocattr() - Set an attribute for a task 3665 * @lsm: LSM name 3666 * @name: attribute name 3667 * @value: attribute value 3668 * @size: attribute value size 3669 * 3670 * Write (set) the current task's attribute @name to @value, size @size if 3671 * allowed. 3672 * 3673 * Return: Returns bytes written on success, a negative value otherwise. 3674 */ 3675 int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, 3676 size_t size) 3677 { 3678 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3679 3680 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { 3681 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 3682 continue; 3683 return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); 3684 } 3685 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr); 3686 } 3687 3688 /** 3689 * security_netlink_send() - Save info and check if netlink sending is allowed 3690 * @sk: sending socket 3691 * @skb: netlink message 3692 * 3693 * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission checking 3694 * can be performed when the message is processed. The security information 3695 * can be saved using the eff_cap field of the netlink_skb_parms structure. 3696 * Also may be used to provide fine grained control over message transmission. 3697 * 3698 * Return: Returns 0 if the information was successfully saved and message is 3699 * allowed to be transmitted. 3700 */ 3701 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 3702 { 3703 return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb); 3704 } 3705 3706 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) 3707 { 3708 return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name); 3709 } 3710 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); 3711 3712 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) 3713 { 3714 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3715 int rc; 3716 3717 /* 3718 * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this 3719 * LSM hook is not "stackable"). 3720 */ 3721 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { 3722 rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); 3723 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx)) 3724 return rc; 3725 } 3726 3727 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx); 3728 } 3729 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); 3730 3731 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) 3732 { 3733 *secid = 0; 3734 return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid); 3735 } 3736 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); 3737 3738 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) 3739 { 3740 call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); 3741 } 3742 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); 3743 3744 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) 3745 { 3746 call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode); 3747 } 3748 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx); 3749 3750 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 3751 { 3752 return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 3753 } 3754 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx); 3755 3756 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 3757 { 3758 return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen); 3759 } 3760 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx); 3761 3762 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) 3763 { 3764 return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 3765 } 3766 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx); 3767 3768 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE 3769 int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, 3770 const struct cred *cred, 3771 struct watch_notification *n) 3772 { 3773 return call_int_hook(post_notification, 0, w_cred, cred, n); 3774 } 3775 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */ 3776 3777 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS 3778 int security_watch_key(struct key *key) 3779 { 3780 return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key); 3781 } 3782 #endif 3783 3784 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK 3785 /** 3786 * security_unix_stream_connect() - Check if a AF_UNIX stream is allowed 3787 * @sock: originating sock 3788 * @other: peer sock 3789 * @newsk: new sock 3790 * 3791 * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection 3792 * between @sock and @other. 3793 * 3794 * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because 3795 * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix 3796 * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name 3797 * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod 3798 * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to 3799 * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient 3800 * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible 3801 * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target 3802 * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. 3803 * 3804 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3805 */ 3806 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) 3807 { 3808 return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk); 3809 } 3810 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect); 3811 3812 /** 3813 * security_unix_may_send() - Check if AF_UNIX socket can send datagrams 3814 * @sock: originating sock 3815 * @other: peer sock 3816 * 3817 * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to 3818 * @other. 3819 * 3820 * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because 3821 * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix 3822 * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name 3823 * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod 3824 * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to 3825 * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient 3826 * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible 3827 * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target 3828 * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. 3829 * 3830 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3831 */ 3832 int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) 3833 { 3834 return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other); 3835 } 3836 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send); 3837 3838 /** 3839 * security_socket_create() - Check if creating a new socket is allowed 3840 * @family: protocol family 3841 * @type: communications type 3842 * @protocol: requested protocol 3843 * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested 3844 * 3845 * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket. 3846 * 3847 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3848 */ 3849 int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) 3850 { 3851 return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern); 3852 } 3853 3854 /** 3855 * security_socket_create() - Initialize a newly created socket 3856 * @sock: socket 3857 * @family: protocol family 3858 * @type: communications type 3859 * @protocol: requested protocol 3860 * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested 3861 * 3862 * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security 3863 * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the socket 3864 * structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored in the 3865 * associated inode. Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will allocate 3866 * and attach security information to SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security. This hook 3867 * may be used to update the SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security field with additional 3868 * information that wasn't available when the inode was allocated. 3869 * 3870 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3871 */ 3872 int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, 3873 int type, int protocol, int kern) 3874 { 3875 return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type, 3876 protocol, kern); 3877 } 3878 3879 /** 3880 * security_socket_socketpair() - Check if creating a socketpair is allowed 3881 * @socka: first socket 3882 * @sockb: second socket 3883 * 3884 * Check permissions before creating a fresh pair of sockets. 3885 * 3886 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted and the connection was 3887 * established. 3888 */ 3889 int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) 3890 { 3891 return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb); 3892 } 3893 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair); 3894 3895 /** 3896 * security_socket_bind() - Check if a socket bind operation is allowed 3897 * @sock: socket 3898 * @address: requested bind address 3899 * @addrlen: length of address 3900 * 3901 * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is performed 3902 * and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the @address 3903 * parameter. 3904 * 3905 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3906 */ 3907 int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 3908 { 3909 return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 3910 } 3911 3912 /** 3913 * security_socket_connect() - Check if a socket connect operation is allowed 3914 * @sock: socket 3915 * @address: address of remote connection point 3916 * @addrlen: length of address 3917 * 3918 * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation attempts to 3919 * connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address. 3920 * 3921 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3922 */ 3923 int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 3924 { 3925 return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 3926 } 3927 3928 /** 3929 * security_socket_listen() - Check if a socket is allowed to listen 3930 * @sock: socket 3931 * @backlog: connection queue size 3932 * 3933 * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation. 3934 * 3935 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3936 */ 3937 int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) 3938 { 3939 return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog); 3940 } 3941 3942 /** 3943 * security_socket_accept() - Check if a socket is allowed to accept connections 3944 * @sock: listening socket 3945 * @newsock: newly creation connection socket 3946 * 3947 * Check permission before accepting a new connection. Note that the new 3948 * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it, but 3949 * the accept operation has not actually been performed. 3950 * 3951 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3952 */ 3953 int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) 3954 { 3955 return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock); 3956 } 3957 3958 /** 3959 * security_socket_sendmsg() - Check is sending a message is allowed 3960 * @sock: sending socket 3961 * @msg: message to send 3962 * @size: size of message 3963 * 3964 * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket. 3965 * 3966 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3967 */ 3968 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) 3969 { 3970 return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size); 3971 } 3972 3973 /** 3974 * security_socket_recvmsg() - Check if receiving a message is allowed 3975 * @sock: receiving socket 3976 * @msg: message to receive 3977 * @size: size of message 3978 * @flags: operational flags 3979 * 3980 * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket. 3981 * 3982 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3983 */ 3984 int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, 3985 int size, int flags) 3986 { 3987 return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags); 3988 } 3989 3990 /** 3991 * security_socket_getsockname() - Check if reading the socket addr is allowed 3992 * @sock: socket 3993 * 3994 * Check permission before reading the local address (name) of the socket 3995 * object. 3996 * 3997 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3998 */ 3999 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) 4000 { 4001 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock); 4002 } 4003 4004 /** 4005 * security_socket_getpeername() - Check if reading the peer's addr is allowed 4006 * @sock: socket 4007 * 4008 * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object. 4009 * 4010 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4011 */ 4012 int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) 4013 { 4014 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock); 4015 } 4016 4017 /** 4018 * security_socket_getsockopt() - Check if reading a socket option is allowed 4019 * @sock: socket 4020 * @level: option's protocol level 4021 * @optname: option name 4022 * 4023 * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket 4024 * @sock. 4025 * 4026 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4027 */ 4028 int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 4029 { 4030 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 4031 } 4032 4033 /** 4034 * security_socket_setsockopt() - Check if setting a socket option is allowed 4035 * @sock: socket 4036 * @level: option's protocol level 4037 * @optname: option name 4038 * 4039 * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket @sock. 4040 * 4041 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4042 */ 4043 int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 4044 { 4045 return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 4046 } 4047 4048 /** 4049 * security_socket_shutdown() - Checks if shutting down the socket is allowed 4050 * @sock: socket 4051 * @how: flag indicating how sends and receives are handled 4052 * 4053 * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket @sock is 4054 * shut down. 4055 * 4056 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4057 */ 4058 int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) 4059 { 4060 return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how); 4061 } 4062 4063 /** 4064 * security_sock_rcv_skb() - Check if an incoming network packet is allowed 4065 * @sk: destination sock 4066 * @skb: incoming packet 4067 * 4068 * Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct from 4069 * Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the incoming 4070 * sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk. Must not 4071 * sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks. 4072 * 4073 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4074 */ 4075 int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 4076 { 4077 return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb); 4078 } 4079 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); 4080 4081 /** 4082 * security_socket_getpeersec_stream() - Get the remote peer label 4083 * @sock: socket 4084 * @optval: destination buffer 4085 * @optlen: size of peer label copied into the buffer 4086 * @len: maximum size of the destination buffer 4087 * 4088 * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state 4089 * for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC. 4090 * For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the socket is associated with an 4091 * ipsec SA. 4092 * 4093 * Return: Returns 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return 4094 * values. 4095 */ 4096 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval, 4097 sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len) 4098 { 4099 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 4100 optval, optlen, len); 4101 } 4102 4103 /** 4104 * security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() - Get the remote peer label 4105 * @sock: socket 4106 * @skb: datagram packet 4107 * @secid: remote peer label secid 4108 * 4109 * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state 4110 * for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via getsockopt 4111 * SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated the IP_PASSSEC 4112 * option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the security state returned by 4113 * this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY ancillary message type. 4114 * 4115 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4116 */ 4117 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 4118 { 4119 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 4120 skb, secid); 4121 } 4122 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram); 4123 4124 /** 4125 * security_sk_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a sock's LSM blob 4126 * @sk: sock 4127 * @family: protocol family 4128 * @priotity: gfp flags 4129 * 4130 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field, which 4131 * is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets. 4132 * 4133 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4134 */ 4135 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) 4136 { 4137 return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority); 4138 } 4139 4140 /** 4141 * security_sk_free() - Free the sock's LSM blob 4142 * @sk: sock 4143 * 4144 * Deallocate security structure. 4145 */ 4146 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk) 4147 { 4148 call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk); 4149 } 4150 4151 /** 4152 * security_sk_clone() - Clone a sock's LSM state 4153 * @sk: original sock 4154 * @newsk: target sock 4155 * 4156 * Clone/copy security structure. 4157 */ 4158 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) 4159 { 4160 call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk); 4161 } 4162 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone); 4163 4164 void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic) 4165 { 4166 call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid); 4167 } 4168 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow); 4169 4170 /** 4171 * security_req_classify_flow() - Set a flow's secid based on request_sock 4172 * @req: request_sock 4173 * @flic: target flow 4174 * 4175 * Sets @flic's secid to @req's secid. 4176 */ 4177 void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, 4178 struct flowi_common *flic) 4179 { 4180 call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic); 4181 } 4182 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow); 4183 4184 /** 4185 * security_sock_graft() - Reconcile LSM state when grafting a sock on a socket 4186 * @sk: sock being grafted 4187 * @sock: target socket 4188 * 4189 * Sets @sock's inode secid to @sk's secid and update @sk with any necessary 4190 * LSM state from @sock. 4191 */ 4192 void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) 4193 { 4194 call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent); 4195 } 4196 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft); 4197 4198 /** 4199 * security_inet_conn_request() - Set request_sock state using incoming connect 4200 * @sk: parent listening sock 4201 * @skb: incoming connection 4202 * @req: new request_sock 4203 * 4204 * Initialize the @req LSM state based on @sk and the incoming connect in @skb. 4205 * 4206 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4207 */ 4208 int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, 4209 struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) 4210 { 4211 return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req); 4212 } 4213 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request); 4214 4215 /** 4216 * security_inet_csk_clone() - Set new sock LSM state based on request_sock 4217 * @newsk: new sock 4218 * @req: connection request_sock 4219 * 4220 * Set that LSM state of @sock using the LSM state from @req. 4221 */ 4222 void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, 4223 const struct request_sock *req) 4224 { 4225 call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req); 4226 } 4227 4228 /** 4229 * security_inet_conn_established() - Update sock's LSM state with connection 4230 * @sk: sock 4231 * @skb: connection packet 4232 * 4233 * Update @sock's LSM state to represent a new connection from @skb. 4234 */ 4235 void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, 4236 struct sk_buff *skb) 4237 { 4238 call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb); 4239 } 4240 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established); 4241 4242 /** 4243 * security_secmark_relabel_packet() - Check if setting a secmark is allowed 4244 * @secid: new secmark value 4245 * 4246 * Check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to @secid. 4247 * 4248 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4249 */ 4250 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid) 4251 { 4252 return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid); 4253 } 4254 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet); 4255 4256 /** 4257 * security_secmark_refcount_inc() - Increment the secmark labeling rule count 4258 * 4259 * Tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. 4260 */ 4261 void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void) 4262 { 4263 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc); 4264 } 4265 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc); 4266 4267 /** 4268 * security_secmark_refcount_dec() - Decrement the secmark labeling rule count 4269 * 4270 * Tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. 4271 */ 4272 void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void) 4273 { 4274 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec); 4275 } 4276 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec); 4277 4278 /** 4279 * security_tun_dev_alloc_security() - Allocate a LSM blob for a TUN device 4280 * @security: pointer to the LSM blob 4281 * 4282 * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN device, 4283 * returning the pointer in @security. 4284 * 4285 * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. 4286 */ 4287 int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) 4288 { 4289 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security); 4290 } 4291 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security); 4292 4293 /** 4294 * security_tun_dev_free_security() - Free a TUN device LSM blob 4295 * @security: LSM blob 4296 * 4297 * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN device. 4298 */ 4299 void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) 4300 { 4301 call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security); 4302 } 4303 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security); 4304 4305 /** 4306 * security_tun_dev_create() - Check if creating a TUN device is allowed 4307 * 4308 * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device. 4309 * 4310 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4311 */ 4312 int security_tun_dev_create(void) 4313 { 4314 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0); 4315 } 4316 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create); 4317 4318 /** 4319 * security_tun_dev_attach_queue() - Check if attaching a TUN queue is allowed 4320 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4321 * 4322 * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue. 4323 * 4324 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4325 */ 4326 int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) 4327 { 4328 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security); 4329 } 4330 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue); 4331 4332 /** 4333 * security_tun_dev_attach() - Update TUN device LSM state on attach 4334 * @sk: associated sock 4335 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4336 * 4337 * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated 4338 * with the TUN device's sock structure. 4339 * 4340 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4341 */ 4342 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) 4343 { 4344 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security); 4345 } 4346 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach); 4347 4348 /** 4349 * security_tun_dev_open() - Update TUN device LSM state on open 4350 * @security: TUN device LSM blob 4351 * 4352 * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated 4353 * with the TUN device's security structure. 4354 * 4355 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4356 */ 4357 int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) 4358 { 4359 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security); 4360 } 4361 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open); 4362 4363 /** 4364 * security_sctp_assoc_request() - Update the LSM on a SCTP association req 4365 * @asoc: SCTP association 4366 * @skb: packet requesting the association 4367 * 4368 * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association INIT packet to the LSM. 4369 * 4370 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4371 */ 4372 int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sk_buff *skb) 4373 { 4374 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, asoc, skb); 4375 } 4376 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request); 4377 4378 /** 4379 * security_sctp_bind_connect() - Validate a list of addrs for a SCTP option 4380 * @sk: socket 4381 * @optname: SCTP option to validate 4382 * @address: list of IP addresses to validate 4383 * @addrlen: length of the address list 4384 * 4385 * Validiate permissions required for each address associated with sock @sk. 4386 * Depending on @optname, the addresses will be treated as either a connect or 4387 * bind service. The @addrlen is calculated on each IPv4 and IPv6 address using 4388 * sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6). 4389 * 4390 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4391 */ 4392 int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, 4393 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 4394 { 4395 return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname, 4396 address, addrlen); 4397 } 4398 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect); 4399 4400 /** 4401 * security_sctp_sk_clone() - Clone a SCTP sock's LSM state 4402 * @asoc: SCTP association 4403 * @sk: original sock 4404 * @newsk: target sock 4405 * 4406 * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) (i.e. a TCP style 4407 * socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls 4408 * sctp_peeloff(3). 4409 */ 4410 void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk, 4411 struct sock *newsk) 4412 { 4413 call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, asoc, sk, newsk); 4414 } 4415 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone); 4416 4417 /** 4418 * security_sctp_assoc_established() - Update LSM state when assoc established 4419 * @asoc: SCTP association 4420 * @skb: packet establishing the association 4421 * 4422 * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association COOKIE_ACK packet to the 4423 * security module. 4424 * 4425 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4426 */ 4427 int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc, 4428 struct sk_buff *skb) 4429 { 4430 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, 0, asoc, skb); 4431 } 4432 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established); 4433 4434 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ 4435 4436 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND 4437 4438 /** 4439 * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed 4440 * @sec: LSM blob 4441 * @subnet_prefix: subnet prefix of the port 4442 * @pkey: IB pkey 4443 * 4444 * Check permission to access a pkey when modifing a QP. 4445 * 4446 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4447 */ 4448 int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey) 4449 { 4450 return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey); 4451 } 4452 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access); 4453 4454 /** 4455 * security_ib_endport_manage_subnet() - Check if SMPs traffic is allowed 4456 * @sec: LSM blob 4457 * @dev_name: IB device name 4458 * @port_num: port number 4459 * 4460 * Check permissions to send and receive SMPs on a end port. 4461 * 4462 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4463 */ 4464 int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) 4465 { 4466 return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec, dev_name, port_num); 4467 } 4468 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet); 4469 4470 /** 4471 * security_ib_alloc_security() - Allocate an Infiniband LSM blob 4472 * @sec: LSM blob 4473 * 4474 * Allocate a security structure for Infiniband objects. 4475 * 4476 * Return: Returns 0 on success, non-zero on failure. 4477 */ 4478 int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec) 4479 { 4480 return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec); 4481 } 4482 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security); 4483 4484 /** 4485 * security_ib_free_security() - Free an Infiniband LSM blob 4486 * @sec: LSM blob 4487 * 4488 * Deallocate an Infiniband security structure. 4489 */ 4490 void security_ib_free_security(void *sec) 4491 { 4492 call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec); 4493 } 4494 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security); 4495 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ 4496 4497 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM 4498 4499 /** 4500 * security_xfrm_policy_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm policy LSM blob 4501 * @ctxp: xfrm security context being added to the SPD 4502 * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace 4503 * @gfp: gfp flags 4504 * 4505 * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security field 4506 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated. 4507 * 4508 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4509 */ 4510 int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, 4511 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, 4512 gfp_t gfp) 4513 { 4514 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp); 4515 } 4516 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc); 4517 4518 /** 4519 * security_xfrm_policy_clone() - Clone xfrm policy LSM state 4520 * @old_ctx: xfrm security context 4521 * @new_ctxp: target xfrm security context 4522 * 4523 * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the information from 4524 * the old_ctx structure. 4525 * 4526 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4527 */ 4528 int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, 4529 struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) 4530 { 4531 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp); 4532 } 4533 4534 /** 4535 * security_xfrm_policy_free() - Free a xfrm security context 4536 * @ctx: xfrm security context 4537 * 4538 * Free LSM resources associated with @ctx. 4539 */ 4540 void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 4541 { 4542 call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx); 4543 } 4544 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free); 4545 4546 /** 4547 * security_xfrm_policy_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm policy is allowed 4548 * @ctx: xfrm security context 4549 * 4550 * Authorize deletion of a SPD entry. 4551 * 4552 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4553 */ 4554 int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 4555 { 4556 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx); 4557 } 4558 4559 /** 4560 * security_xfrm_state_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob 4561 * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD 4562 * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace 4563 * 4564 * Allocate a security structure to the @x->security field; the security field 4565 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to 4566 * correspond to @sec_ctx. 4567 * 4568 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 4569 */ 4570 int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, 4571 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) 4572 { 4573 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx); 4574 } 4575 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc); 4576 4577 /** 4578 * security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob 4579 * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD 4580 * @polsec: associated policy's security context 4581 * @secid: secid from the flow 4582 * 4583 * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security field 4584 * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to 4585 * correspond to secid. 4586 * 4587 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. 4588 */ 4589 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, 4590 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) 4591 { 4592 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid); 4593 } 4594 4595 /** 4596 * security_xfrm_state_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm state is allowed 4597 * @x: xfrm state 4598 * 4599 * Authorize deletion of x->security. 4600 * 4601 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4602 */ 4603 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) 4604 { 4605 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x); 4606 } 4607 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete); 4608 4609 /** 4610 * security_xfrm_state_free() - Free a xfrm state 4611 * @x: xfrm state 4612 * 4613 * Deallocate x->security. 4614 */ 4615 void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) 4616 { 4617 call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x); 4618 } 4619 4620 /** 4621 * security_xfrm_policy_lookup() - Check if using a xfrm policy is allowed 4622 * @ctx: target xfrm security context 4623 * @fl_secid: flow secid used to authorize access 4624 * 4625 * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing XFRMs on a 4626 * packet. The hook is called when selecting either a per-socket policy or a 4627 * generic xfrm policy. 4628 * 4629 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno on 4630 * other errors. 4631 */ 4632 int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid) 4633 { 4634 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid); 4635 } 4636 4637 /** 4638 * security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() - Check for a xfrm match 4639 * @x: xfrm state to match 4640 * @xp xfrm policy to check for a match 4641 * @flic: flow to check for a match. 4642 * 4643 * Check @xp and @flic for a match with @x. 4644 * 4645 * Return: Returns 1 if there is a match. 4646 */ 4647 int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, 4648 struct xfrm_policy *xp, 4649 const struct flowi_common *flic) 4650 { 4651 struct security_hook_list *hp; 4652 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); 4653 4654 /* 4655 * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment 4656 * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately, 4657 * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux 4658 * supplies this call. 4659 * 4660 * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than 4661 * using the macro 4662 */ 4663 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, 4664 list) { 4665 rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic); 4666 break; 4667 } 4668 return rc; 4669 } 4670 4671 /** 4672 * security_xfrm_decode_session() - Determine the xfrm secid for a packet 4673 * @skb: xfrm packet 4674 * @secid: secid 4675 * 4676 * Decode the packet in @skb and return the security label in @secid. 4677 * 4678 * Return: Return 0 if all xfrms used have the same secid. 4679 */ 4680 int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 4681 { 4682 return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1); 4683 } 4684 4685 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic) 4686 { 4687 int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid, 4688 0); 4689 4690 BUG_ON(rc); 4691 } 4692 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow); 4693 4694 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ 4695 4696 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS 4697 4698 /** 4699 * security_key_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a kernel key LSM blob 4700 * @key: key 4701 * @cred: credentials 4702 * @flags: allocation flags 4703 * 4704 * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does not 4705 * have a serial number assigned at this point. 4706 * 4707 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. 4708 */ 4709 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, 4710 unsigned long flags) 4711 { 4712 return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags); 4713 } 4714 4715 /** 4716 * security_key_free() - Free a kernel key LSM blob 4717 * @key: key 4718 * 4719 * Notification of destruction; free security data. 4720 */ 4721 void security_key_free(struct key *key) 4722 { 4723 call_void_hook(key_free, key); 4724 } 4725 4726 /** 4727 * security_key_permission() - Check if a kernel key operation is allowed 4728 * @key_ref: key reference 4729 * @cred: credentials of actor requesting access 4730 * @need_perm: requested permissions 4731 * 4732 * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a key. 4733 * 4734 * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. 4735 */ 4736 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, 4737 enum key_need_perm need_perm) 4738 { 4739 return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm); 4740 } 4741 4742 /** 4743 * security_key_getsecurity() - Get the key's security label 4744 * @key: key 4745 * @buffer: security label buffer 4746 * 4747 * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key for 4748 * the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function allocates the 4749 * storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller should free it. 4750 * 4751 * Return: Returns the length of @buffer (including terminating NUL) or -ve if 4752 * an error occurs. May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if 4753 * there is no security label assigned to the key. 4754 */ 4755 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) 4756 { 4757 *_buffer = NULL; 4758 return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer); 4759 } 4760 4761 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ 4762 4763 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT 4764 4765 /** 4766 * security_audit_rule_init() - Allocate and init an LSM audit rule struct 4767 * @field: audit action 4768 * @op: rule operator 4769 * @rulestr: rule context 4770 * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct 4771 * 4772 * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. 4773 * 4774 * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of 4775 * an invalid rule. 4776 */ 4777 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) 4778 { 4779 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); 4780 } 4781 4782 /** 4783 * security_audit_rule_known() - Check if an audit rule contains LSM fields 4784 * @krule: audit rule 4785 * 4786 * Specifies whether given @krule contains any fields related to the current 4787 * LSM. 4788 * 4789 * Return: Returns 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise. 4790 */ 4791 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) 4792 { 4793 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule); 4794 } 4795 4796 /** 4797 * security_audit_rule_free() - Free an LSM audit rule struct 4798 * @lsmrule: audit rule struct 4799 * 4800 * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by 4801 * audit_rule_init(). 4802 */ 4803 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) 4804 { 4805 call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); 4806 } 4807 4808 /** 4809 * security_audit_rule_match() - Check if a label matches an audit rule 4810 * @secid: security label 4811 * @field: LSM audit field 4812 * @op: matching operator 4813 * @lsmrule: audit rule 4814 * 4815 * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved by 4816 * security_audit_rule_known(). 4817 * 4818 * Return: Returns 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on 4819 * failure. 4820 */ 4821 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) 4822 { 4823 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule); 4824 } 4825 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ 4826 4827 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL 4828 /** 4829 * security_bpf() - Check if the bpf syscall operation is allowed 4830 * @cmd: command 4831 * @attr: bpf attribute 4832 * @size: size 4833 * 4834 * Do a initial check for all bpf syscalls after the attribute is copied into 4835 * the kernel. The actual security module can implement their own rules to 4836 * check the specific cmd they need. 4837 * 4838 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4839 */ 4840 int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) 4841 { 4842 return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size); 4843 } 4844 4845 /** 4846 * security_bpf_map() - Check if access to a bpf map is allowed 4847 * @map: bpf map 4848 * @fmode: mode 4849 * 4850 * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF 4851 * maps. 4852 * 4853 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4854 */ 4855 int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) 4856 { 4857 return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode); 4858 } 4859 4860 /** 4861 * security_bpf_prog() - Check if access to a bpf program is allowed 4862 * @prog: bpf program 4863 * 4864 * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF 4865 * programs. 4866 * 4867 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4868 */ 4869 int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) 4870 { 4871 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog); 4872 } 4873 4874 /** 4875 * security_bpf_map_alloc() - Allocate a bpf map LSM blob 4876 * @map: bpf map 4877 * 4878 * Initialize the security field inside bpf map. 4879 * 4880 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4881 */ 4882 int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) 4883 { 4884 return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map); 4885 } 4886 4887 /** 4888 * security_bpf_prog_alloc() - Allocate a bpf program LSM blob 4889 * @aux: bpf program aux info struct 4890 * 4891 * Initialize the security field inside bpf program. 4892 * 4893 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4894 */ 4895 int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 4896 { 4897 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux); 4898 } 4899 4900 /** 4901 * security_bpf_map_free() - Free a bpf map's LSM blob 4902 * @map: bpf map 4903 * 4904 * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf map. 4905 */ 4906 void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) 4907 { 4908 call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map); 4909 } 4910 4911 /** 4912 * security_bpf_prog_free() - Free a bpf program's LSM blob 4913 * @aux: bpf program aux info struct 4914 * 4915 * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog. 4916 */ 4917 void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 4918 { 4919 call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); 4920 } 4921 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ 4922 4923 int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) 4924 { 4925 return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what); 4926 } 4927 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down); 4928 4929 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 4930 /** 4931 * security_perf_event_open() - Check if a perf event open is allowed 4932 * @attr: perf event attribute 4933 * @type: type of event 4934 * 4935 * Check whether the @type of perf_event_open syscall is allowed. 4936 * 4937 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4938 */ 4939 int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) 4940 { 4941 return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type); 4942 } 4943 4944 /** 4945 * security_perf_event_alloc() - Allocate a perf event LSM blob 4946 * @event: perf event 4947 * 4948 * Allocate and save perf_event security info. 4949 * 4950 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 4951 */ 4952 int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) 4953 { 4954 return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event); 4955 } 4956 4957 /** 4958 * security_perf_event_free() - Free a perf event LSM blob 4959 * @event: perf event 4960 * 4961 * Release (free) perf_event security info. 4962 */ 4963 void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) 4964 { 4965 call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event); 4966 } 4967 4968 /** 4969 * security_perf_event_read() - Check if reading a perf event label is allowed 4970 * @event: perf event 4971 * 4972 * Read perf_event security info if allowed. 4973 * 4974 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4975 */ 4976 int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) 4977 { 4978 return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event); 4979 } 4980 4981 /** 4982 * security_perf_event_write() - Check if writing a perf event label is allowed 4983 * @event: perf event 4984 * 4985 * Write perf_event security info if allowed. 4986 * 4987 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 4988 */ 4989 int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) 4990 { 4991 return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event); 4992 } 4993 #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */ 4994 4995 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING 4996 /** 4997 * security_uring_override_creds() - Check if overriding creds is allowed 4998 * @new: new credentials 4999 * 5000 * Check if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to 5001 * override it's credentials with @new. 5002 * 5003 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5004 */ 5005 int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) 5006 { 5007 return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, 0, new); 5008 } 5009 5010 /** 5011 * security_uring_sqpoll() - Check if IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL is allowed 5012 * 5013 * Check whether the current task is allowed to spawn a io_uring polling thread 5014 * (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). 5015 * 5016 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5017 */ 5018 int security_uring_sqpoll(void) 5019 { 5020 return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0); 5021 } 5022 5023 /** 5024 * security_uring_cmd() - Check if a io_uring passthrough command is allowed 5025 * @ioucmd: command 5026 * 5027 * Check whether the file_operations uring_cmd is allowed to run. 5028 * 5029 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 5030 */ 5031 int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) 5032 { 5033 return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd); 5034 } 5035 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ 5036