1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later 2 /* 3 * Security plug functions 4 * 5 * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com> 6 * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> 7 * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com> 8 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies 9 * Copyright (C) 2023 Microsoft Corporation <paul@paul-moore.com> 10 */ 11 12 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt 13 14 #include <linux/bpf.h> 15 #include <linux/capability.h> 16 #include <linux/dcache.h> 17 #include <linux/export.h> 18 #include <linux/init.h> 19 #include <linux/kernel.h> 20 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> 21 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> 22 #include <linux/integrity.h> 23 #include <linux/ima.h> 24 #include <linux/evm.h> 25 #include <linux/fsnotify.h> 26 #include <linux/mman.h> 27 #include <linux/mount.h> 28 #include <linux/personality.h> 29 #include <linux/backing-dev.h> 30 #include <linux/string.h> 31 #include <linux/msg.h> 32 #include <net/flow.h> 33 34 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 35 36 /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ 37 #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) 38 39 /* 40 * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the 41 * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows 42 * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing 43 * purposes. 44 */ 45 const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { 46 [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", 47 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", 48 [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", 49 [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access", 50 [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", 51 [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", 52 [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", 53 [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", 54 [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", 55 [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", 56 [LOCKDOWN_DEVICE_TREE] = "modifying device tree contents", 57 [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage", 58 [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO", 59 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters", 60 [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio", 61 [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access", 62 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access", 63 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM", 64 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM", 65 [LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection", 66 [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", 67 [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", 68 [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", 69 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", 70 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM", 71 [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", 72 [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", 73 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access", 74 [LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret", 75 [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", 76 }; 77 78 struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init; 79 static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain); 80 81 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; 82 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; 83 84 char *lsm_names; 85 static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init; 86 87 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ 88 static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; 89 static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm; 90 91 static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM; 92 93 /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ 94 static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms; 95 static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive; 96 97 static __initdata bool debug; 98 #define init_debug(...) \ 99 do { \ 100 if (debug) \ 101 pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \ 102 } while (0) 103 104 static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm) 105 { 106 if (!lsm->enabled) 107 return false; 108 109 return *lsm->enabled; 110 } 111 112 /* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */ 113 static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1; 114 static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0; 115 static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled) 116 { 117 /* 118 * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use 119 * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state. 120 */ 121 if (!lsm->enabled) { 122 if (enabled) 123 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 124 else 125 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 126 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) { 127 if (!enabled) 128 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; 129 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) { 130 if (enabled) 131 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 132 } else { 133 *lsm->enabled = enabled; 134 } 135 } 136 137 /* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */ 138 static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 139 { 140 struct lsm_info **check; 141 142 for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++) 143 if (*check == lsm) 144 return true; 145 146 return false; 147 } 148 149 /* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */ 150 static int last_lsm __initdata; 151 static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from) 152 { 153 /* Ignore duplicate selections. */ 154 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 155 return; 156 157 if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from)) 158 return; 159 160 /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */ 161 if (!lsm->enabled) 162 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 163 ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm; 164 165 init_debug("%s ordered: %s (%s)\n", from, lsm->name, 166 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 167 } 168 169 /* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */ 170 static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm) 171 { 172 /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */ 173 if (!is_enabled(lsm)) 174 return false; 175 176 /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */ 177 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) { 178 init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name); 179 return false; 180 } 181 182 return true; 183 } 184 185 static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs) 186 { 187 int offset; 188 189 if (*need <= 0) 190 return; 191 192 offset = ALIGN(*lbs, sizeof(void *)); 193 *lbs = offset + *need; 194 *need = offset; 195 } 196 197 static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) 198 { 199 if (!needed) 200 return; 201 202 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 203 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file); 204 /* 205 * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to 206 * what the modules might need. 207 */ 208 if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0) 209 blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head); 210 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 211 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 212 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 213 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 214 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); 215 } 216 217 /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ 218 static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 219 { 220 int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm); 221 222 /* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */ 223 set_enabled(lsm, enabled); 224 225 /* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */ 226 if (enabled) { 227 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) { 228 exclusive = lsm; 229 init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name); 230 } 231 232 lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs); 233 } 234 } 235 236 /* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */ 237 static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) 238 { 239 if (is_enabled(lsm)) { 240 int ret; 241 242 init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name); 243 ret = lsm->init(); 244 WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret); 245 } 246 } 247 248 /* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */ 249 static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) 250 { 251 struct lsm_info *lsm; 252 char *sep, *name, *next; 253 254 /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */ 255 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 256 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST) 257 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " first"); 258 } 259 260 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 261 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 262 struct lsm_info *major; 263 264 /* 265 * To match the original "security=" behavior, this 266 * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major 267 * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable 268 * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs. 269 */ 270 for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info; 271 major++) { 272 if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) && 273 strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) { 274 set_enabled(major, false); 275 init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s (only one legacy major LSM)\n", 276 chosen_major_lsm, major->name); 277 } 278 } 279 } 280 281 sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL); 282 next = sep; 283 /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */ 284 while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) { 285 bool found = false; 286 287 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 288 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE && 289 strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) { 290 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin); 291 found = true; 292 } 293 } 294 295 if (!found) 296 init_debug("%s ignored: %s (not built into kernel)\n", 297 origin, name); 298 } 299 300 /* Process "security=", if given. */ 301 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 302 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 303 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 304 continue; 305 if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0) 306 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security="); 307 } 308 } 309 310 /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */ 311 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { 312 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) 313 continue; 314 set_enabled(lsm, false); 315 init_debug("%s skipped: %s (not in requested order)\n", 316 origin, lsm->name); 317 } 318 319 kfree(sep); 320 } 321 322 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred); 323 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task); 324 325 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result); 326 327 static void __init report_lsm_order(void) 328 { 329 struct lsm_info **lsm, *early; 330 int first = 0; 331 332 pr_info("initializing lsm="); 333 334 /* Report each enabled LSM name, comma separated. */ 335 for (early = __start_early_lsm_info; early < __end_early_lsm_info; early++) 336 if (is_enabled(early)) 337 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", early->name); 338 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 339 if (is_enabled(*lsm)) 340 pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", (*lsm)->name); 341 342 pr_cont("\n"); 343 } 344 345 static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) 346 { 347 struct lsm_info **lsm; 348 349 ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms), 350 GFP_KERNEL); 351 352 if (chosen_lsm_order) { 353 if (chosen_major_lsm) { 354 pr_warn("security=%s is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=%s\n", 355 chosen_major_lsm, chosen_lsm_order); 356 chosen_major_lsm = NULL; 357 } 358 ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline"); 359 } else 360 ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin"); 361 362 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 363 prepare_lsm(*lsm); 364 365 report_lsm_order(); 366 367 init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred); 368 init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file); 369 init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode); 370 init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); 371 init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); 372 init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); 373 init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); 374 375 /* 376 * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs 377 */ 378 if (blob_sizes.lbs_file) 379 lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache", 380 blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0, 381 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 382 if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode) 383 lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache", 384 blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0, 385 SLAB_PANIC, NULL); 386 387 lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred); 388 lsm_early_task(current); 389 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) 390 initialize_lsm(*lsm); 391 392 kfree(ordered_lsms); 393 } 394 395 int __init early_security_init(void) 396 { 397 struct lsm_info *lsm; 398 399 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 400 INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&security_hook_heads.NAME); 401 #include "linux/lsm_hook_defs.h" 402 #undef LSM_HOOK 403 404 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 405 if (!lsm->enabled) 406 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; 407 prepare_lsm(lsm); 408 initialize_lsm(lsm); 409 } 410 411 return 0; 412 } 413 414 /** 415 * security_init - initializes the security framework 416 * 417 * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence. 418 */ 419 int __init security_init(void) 420 { 421 struct lsm_info *lsm; 422 423 init_debug("legacy security=%s\n", chosen_major_lsm ?: " *unspecified*"); 424 init_debug(" CONFIG_LSM=%s\n", builtin_lsm_order); 425 init_debug("boot arg lsm=%s\n", chosen_lsm_order ?: " *unspecified*"); 426 427 /* 428 * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is 429 * available 430 */ 431 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { 432 init_debug(" early started: %s (%s)\n", lsm->name, 433 is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); 434 if (lsm->enabled) 435 lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names); 436 } 437 438 /* Load LSMs in specified order. */ 439 ordered_lsm_init(); 440 441 return 0; 442 } 443 444 /* Save user chosen LSM */ 445 static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str) 446 { 447 chosen_major_lsm = str; 448 return 1; 449 } 450 __setup("security=", choose_major_lsm); 451 452 /* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */ 453 static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str) 454 { 455 chosen_lsm_order = str; 456 return 1; 457 } 458 __setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order); 459 460 /* Enable LSM order debugging. */ 461 static int __init enable_debug(char *str) 462 { 463 debug = true; 464 return 1; 465 } 466 __setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug); 467 468 static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm) 469 { 470 const char *last; 471 472 if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm)) 473 return false; 474 last = strrchr(list, ','); 475 if (last) 476 /* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */ 477 last++; 478 else 479 last = list; 480 return !strcmp(last, lsm); 481 } 482 483 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) 484 { 485 char *cp; 486 487 if (*result == NULL) { 488 *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL); 489 if (*result == NULL) 490 return -ENOMEM; 491 } else { 492 /* Check if it is the last registered name */ 493 if (match_last_lsm(*result, new)) 494 return 0; 495 cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new); 496 if (cp == NULL) 497 return -ENOMEM; 498 kfree(*result); 499 *result = cp; 500 } 501 return 0; 502 } 503 504 /** 505 * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. 506 * @hooks: the hooks to add 507 * @count: the number of hooks to add 508 * @lsm: the name of the security module 509 * 510 * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. 511 */ 512 void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, 513 const char *lsm) 514 { 515 int i; 516 517 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { 518 hooks[i].lsm = lsm; 519 hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); 520 } 521 522 /* 523 * Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back 524 * and fix this up afterwards. 525 */ 526 if (slab_is_available()) { 527 if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0) 528 panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__); 529 } 530 } 531 532 int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) 533 { 534 return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 535 event, data); 536 } 537 EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier); 538 539 int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 540 { 541 return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 542 nb); 543 } 544 EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier); 545 546 int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) 547 { 548 return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, 549 nb); 550 } 551 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier); 552 553 /** 554 * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob 555 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 556 * @gfp: allocation type 557 * 558 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 559 * 560 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 561 */ 562 static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 563 { 564 if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) { 565 cred->security = NULL; 566 return 0; 567 } 568 569 cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp); 570 if (cred->security == NULL) 571 return -ENOMEM; 572 return 0; 573 } 574 575 /** 576 * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob 577 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob 578 * 579 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules 580 */ 581 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred) 582 { 583 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL); 584 585 if (rc) 586 panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__); 587 } 588 589 /** 590 * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob 591 * @file: the file that needs a blob 592 * 593 * Allocate the file blob for all the modules 594 * 595 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 596 */ 597 static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file) 598 { 599 if (!lsm_file_cache) { 600 file->f_security = NULL; 601 return 0; 602 } 603 604 file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL); 605 if (file->f_security == NULL) 606 return -ENOMEM; 607 return 0; 608 } 609 610 /** 611 * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob 612 * @inode: the inode that needs a blob 613 * 614 * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules 615 * 616 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 617 */ 618 int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 619 { 620 if (!lsm_inode_cache) { 621 inode->i_security = NULL; 622 return 0; 623 } 624 625 inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); 626 if (inode->i_security == NULL) 627 return -ENOMEM; 628 return 0; 629 } 630 631 /** 632 * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob 633 * @task: the task that needs a blob 634 * 635 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 636 * 637 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 638 */ 639 static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) 640 { 641 if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) { 642 task->security = NULL; 643 return 0; 644 } 645 646 task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL); 647 if (task->security == NULL) 648 return -ENOMEM; 649 return 0; 650 } 651 652 /** 653 * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob 654 * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob 655 * 656 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 657 * 658 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 659 */ 660 static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip) 661 { 662 if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) { 663 kip->security = NULL; 664 return 0; 665 } 666 667 kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL); 668 if (kip->security == NULL) 669 return -ENOMEM; 670 return 0; 671 } 672 673 /** 674 * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob 675 * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob 676 * 677 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules 678 * 679 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 680 */ 681 static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp) 682 { 683 if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) { 684 mp->security = NULL; 685 return 0; 686 } 687 688 mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL); 689 if (mp->security == NULL) 690 return -ENOMEM; 691 return 0; 692 } 693 694 /** 695 * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob 696 * @task: the task that needs a blob 697 * 698 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules 699 */ 700 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) 701 { 702 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 703 704 if (rc) 705 panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__); 706 } 707 708 /** 709 * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob 710 * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob 711 * 712 * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules 713 * 714 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. 715 */ 716 static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 717 { 718 if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) { 719 sb->s_security = NULL; 720 return 0; 721 } 722 723 sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL); 724 if (sb->s_security == NULL) 725 return -ENOMEM; 726 return 0; 727 } 728 729 /* 730 * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and 731 * can be accessed with: 732 * 733 * LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) 734 * 735 * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each 736 * LSM hook. 737 */ 738 #define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default) 739 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME) 740 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \ 741 static const int __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT); 742 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ 743 DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME) 744 745 #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h> 746 #undef LSM_HOOK 747 748 /* 749 * Hook list operation macros. 750 * 751 * call_void_hook: 752 * This is a hook that does not return a value. 753 * 754 * call_int_hook: 755 * This is a hook that returns a value. 756 */ 757 758 #define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \ 759 do { \ 760 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 761 \ 762 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \ 763 P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 764 } while (0) 765 766 #define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \ 767 int RC = IRC; \ 768 do { \ 769 struct security_hook_list *P; \ 770 \ 771 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ 772 RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ 773 if (RC != 0) \ 774 break; \ 775 } \ 776 } while (0); \ 777 RC; \ 778 }) 779 780 /* Security operations */ 781 782 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr) 783 { 784 return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr); 785 } 786 787 int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from, 788 const struct cred *to) 789 { 790 return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to); 791 } 792 793 int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, 794 const struct cred *to) 795 { 796 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to); 797 } 798 799 int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, 800 const struct cred *to, struct file *file) 801 { 802 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file); 803 } 804 805 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) 806 { 807 return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode); 808 } 809 810 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) 811 { 812 return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent); 813 } 814 815 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, 816 kernel_cap_t *effective, 817 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 818 kernel_cap_t *permitted) 819 { 820 return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target, 821 effective, inheritable, permitted); 822 } 823 824 int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 825 const kernel_cap_t *effective, 826 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 827 const kernel_cap_t *permitted) 828 { 829 return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old, 830 effective, inheritable, permitted); 831 } 832 833 int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, 834 struct user_namespace *ns, 835 int cap, 836 unsigned int opts) 837 { 838 return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); 839 } 840 841 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) 842 { 843 return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb); 844 } 845 846 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) 847 { 848 return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry); 849 } 850 851 int security_syslog(int type) 852 { 853 return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type); 854 } 855 856 int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz) 857 { 858 return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz); 859 } 860 861 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) 862 { 863 struct security_hook_list *hp; 864 int cap_sys_admin = 1; 865 int rc; 866 867 /* 868 * The module will respond with a positive value if 869 * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be 870 * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules 871 * agree that it should be set it will. If any module 872 * thinks it should not be set it won't. 873 */ 874 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) { 875 rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); 876 if (rc <= 0) { 877 cap_sys_admin = 0; 878 break; 879 } 880 } 881 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); 882 } 883 884 /** 885 * security_bprm_creds_for_exec() - Prepare the credentials for exec() 886 * @bprm: binary program information 887 * 888 * If the setup in prepare_exec_creds did not setup @bprm->cred->security 889 * properly for executing @bprm->file, update the LSM's portion of 890 * @bprm->cred->security to be what commit_creds needs to install for the new 891 * program. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 892 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 893 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. @bprm 894 * contains the linux_binprm structure. 895 * 896 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 897 */ 898 int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 899 { 900 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm); 901 } 902 903 /** 904 * security_bprm_creds_from_file() - Update linux_binprm creds based on file 905 * @bprm: binary program information 906 * @file: associated file 907 * 908 * If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change privilege upon 909 * exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change. This is called after 910 * finding the binary that will be executed without an interpreter. This 911 * ensures that the credentials will not be derived from a script that the 912 * binary will need to reopen, which when reopend may end up being a completely 913 * different file. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for 914 * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec 915 * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. The 916 * hook must add to @bprm->per_clear any personality flags that should be 917 * cleared from current->personality. @bprm contains the linux_binprm 918 * structure. 919 * 920 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 921 */ 922 int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) 923 { 924 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file); 925 } 926 927 /** 928 * security_bprm_check() - Mediate binary handler search 929 * @bprm: binary program information 930 * 931 * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will begin. 932 * It allows a check against the @bprm->cred->security value which was set in 933 * the preceding creds_for_exec call. The argv list and envp list are reliably 934 * available in @bprm. This hook may be called multiple times during a single 935 * execve. @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. 936 * 937 * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 938 */ 939 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 940 { 941 int ret; 942 943 ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); 944 if (ret) 945 return ret; 946 return ima_bprm_check(bprm); 947 } 948 949 /** 950 * security_bprm_committing_creds() - Install creds for a process during exec() 951 * @bprm: binary program information 952 * 953 * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being 954 * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials pointed to 955 * by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by the 956 * bprm_creds_for_exec hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure. This 957 * hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such as closing 958 * open file descriptors to which access will no longer be granted when the 959 * attributes are changed. This is called immediately before commit_creds(). 960 */ 961 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 962 { 963 call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm); 964 } 965 966 /** 967 * security_bprm_committed_creds() - Tidy up after cred install during exec() 968 * @bprm: binary program information 969 * 970 * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a process 971 * being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials have, by this 972 * point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the linux_binprm 973 * structure. This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the 974 * process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal state. This is called 975 * immediately after commit_creds(). 976 */ 977 void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 978 { 979 call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm); 980 } 981 982 /** 983 * security_fs_context_dup() - Duplicate a fs_context LSM blob 984 * @fc: destination filesystem context 985 * @src_fc: source filesystem context 986 * 987 * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer is 988 * initialised to NULL by the caller. @fc indicates the new filesystem context. 989 * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context. 990 * 991 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure. 992 */ 993 int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) 994 { 995 return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc); 996 } 997 998 /** 999 * security_fs_context_parse_param() - Configure a filesystem context 1000 * @fc: filesystem context 1001 * @param: filesystem parameter 1002 * 1003 * Userspace provided a parameter to configure a superblock. The LSM can 1004 * consume the parameter or return it to the caller for use elsewhere. 1005 * 1006 * Return: If the parameter is used by the LSM it should return 0, if it is 1007 * returned to the caller -ENOPARAM is returned, otherwise a negative 1008 * error code is returned. 1009 */ 1010 int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, 1011 struct fs_parameter *param) 1012 { 1013 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1014 int trc; 1015 int rc = -ENOPARAM; 1016 1017 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.fs_context_parse_param, 1018 list) { 1019 trc = hp->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param); 1020 if (trc == 0) 1021 rc = 0; 1022 else if (trc != -ENOPARAM) 1023 return trc; 1024 } 1025 return rc; 1026 } 1027 1028 /** 1029 * security_sb_alloc() - Allocate a super_block LSM blob 1030 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1031 * 1032 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field. The 1033 * s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is allocated. 1034 * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. 1035 * 1036 * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. 1037 */ 1038 int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) 1039 { 1040 int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb); 1041 1042 if (unlikely(rc)) 1043 return rc; 1044 rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb); 1045 if (unlikely(rc)) 1046 security_sb_free(sb); 1047 return rc; 1048 } 1049 1050 /** 1051 * security_sb_delete() - Release super_block LSM associated objects 1052 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1053 * 1054 * Release objects tied to a superblock (e.g. inodes). @sb contains the 1055 * super_block structure being released. 1056 */ 1057 void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb) 1058 { 1059 call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb); 1060 } 1061 1062 /** 1063 * security_sb_free() - Free a super_block LSM blob 1064 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1065 * 1066 * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field. @sb contains the super_block 1067 * structure to be modified. 1068 */ 1069 void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) 1070 { 1071 call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb); 1072 kfree(sb->s_security); 1073 sb->s_security = NULL; 1074 } 1075 1076 /** 1077 * security_free_mnt_opts() - Free memory associated with mount options 1078 * @mnt_ops: LSM processed mount options 1079 * 1080 * Free memory associated with @mnt_ops. 1081 */ 1082 void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts) 1083 { 1084 if (!*mnt_opts) 1085 return; 1086 call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts); 1087 *mnt_opts = NULL; 1088 } 1089 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts); 1090 1091 /** 1092 * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() - Consume LSM mount options 1093 * @options: mount options 1094 * @mnt_ops: LSM processed mount options 1095 * 1096 * Eat (scan @options) and save them in @mnt_opts. 1097 * 1098 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1099 */ 1100 int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) 1101 { 1102 return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts); 1103 } 1104 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts); 1105 1106 /** 1107 * security_sb_mnt_opts_compat() - Check if new mount options are allowed 1108 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1109 * @mnt_opts: new mount options 1110 * 1111 * Determine if the new mount options in @mnt_opts are allowed given the 1112 * existing mounted filesystem at @sb. @sb superblock being compared. 1113 * 1114 * Return: Returns 0 if options are compatible. 1115 */ 1116 int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, 1117 void *mnt_opts) 1118 { 1119 return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1120 } 1121 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat); 1122 1123 /** 1124 * security_sb_remount() - Verify no incompatible mount changes during remount 1125 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1126 * @mnt_opts: (re)mount options 1127 * 1128 * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes are 1129 * being made to those options. 1130 * 1131 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1132 */ 1133 int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, 1134 void *mnt_opts) 1135 { 1136 return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, mnt_opts); 1137 } 1138 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount); 1139 1140 /** 1141 * security_sb_kern_mount() - Check if a kernel mount is allowed 1142 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1143 * 1144 * Mount this @sb if allowed by permissions. 1145 * 1146 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1147 */ 1148 int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb) 1149 { 1150 return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb); 1151 } 1152 1153 /** 1154 * security_sb_show_options() - Output the mount options for a superblock 1155 * @m: output file 1156 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1157 * 1158 * Show (print on @m) mount options for this @sb. 1159 * 1160 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1161 */ 1162 int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) 1163 { 1164 return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb); 1165 } 1166 1167 /** 1168 * security_sb_statfs() - Check if accessing fs stats is allowed 1169 * @dentry: superblock handle 1170 * 1171 * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt 1172 * mountpoint. @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem. 1173 * 1174 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1175 */ 1176 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) 1177 { 1178 return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry); 1179 } 1180 1181 /** 1182 * security_sb_mount() - Check permission for mounting a filesystem 1183 * @dev_name: filesystem backing device 1184 * @path: mount point 1185 * @type: filesystem type 1186 * @flags: mount flags 1187 * @data: filesystem specific data 1188 * 1189 * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on the 1190 * mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name identifies a 1191 * device if the file system type requires a device. For a remount 1192 * (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a loopback/bind mount 1193 * (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the pathname of the object being 1194 * mounted. 1195 * 1196 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1197 */ 1198 int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, 1199 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) 1200 { 1201 return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data); 1202 } 1203 1204 /** 1205 * security_sb_umount() - Check permission for unmounting a filesystem 1206 * @mnt: mounted filesystem 1207 * @flags: unmount flags 1208 * 1209 * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted. 1210 * 1211 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1212 */ 1213 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) 1214 { 1215 return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags); 1216 } 1217 1218 /** 1219 * security_sb_pivotroot() - Check permissions for pivoting the rootfs 1220 * @old_path: new location for current rootfs 1221 * @new_path: location of the new rootfs 1222 * 1223 * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem. 1224 * 1225 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1226 */ 1227 int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path) 1228 { 1229 return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path); 1230 } 1231 1232 /** 1233 * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() - Set the mount options for a filesystem 1234 * @sb: filesystem superblock 1235 * @mnt_opts: binary mount options 1236 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1237 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1238 * 1239 * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock. 1240 * 1241 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1242 */ 1243 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, 1244 void *mnt_opts, 1245 unsigned long kern_flags, 1246 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1247 { 1248 return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts, 1249 mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb, 1250 mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1251 } 1252 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts); 1253 1254 /** 1255 * security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() - Duplicate superblock mount options 1256 * @olddb: source superblock 1257 * @newdb: destination superblock 1258 * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) 1259 * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) 1260 * 1261 * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another. 1262 * 1263 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1264 */ 1265 int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, 1266 struct super_block *newsb, 1267 unsigned long kern_flags, 1268 unsigned long *set_kern_flags) 1269 { 1270 return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb, 1271 kern_flags, set_kern_flags); 1272 } 1273 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts); 1274 1275 /** 1276 * security_move_mount() - Check permissions for moving a mount 1277 * @from_path: source mount point 1278 * @to_path: destination mount point 1279 * 1280 * Check permission before a mount is moved. 1281 * 1282 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1283 */ 1284 int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path) 1285 { 1286 return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path); 1287 } 1288 1289 /** 1290 * security_path_notify() - Check if setting a watch is allowed 1291 * @path: file path 1292 * @mask: event mask 1293 * @obj_type: file path type 1294 * 1295 * Check permissions before setting a watch on events as defined by @mask, on 1296 * an object at @path, whose type is defined by @obj_type. 1297 * 1298 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1299 */ 1300 int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, 1301 unsigned int obj_type) 1302 { 1303 return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type); 1304 } 1305 1306 /** 1307 * security_inode_alloc() - Allocate an inode LSM blob 1308 * @inode: the inode 1309 * 1310 * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The 1311 * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is 1312 * allocated. 1313 * 1314 * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. 1315 */ 1316 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) 1317 { 1318 int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode); 1319 1320 if (unlikely(rc)) 1321 return rc; 1322 rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode); 1323 if (unlikely(rc)) 1324 security_inode_free(inode); 1325 return rc; 1326 } 1327 1328 static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) 1329 { 1330 /* 1331 * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob 1332 */ 1333 kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head); 1334 } 1335 1336 /** 1337 * security_inode_free() - Free an inode's LSM blob 1338 * @inode: the inode 1339 * 1340 * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to NULL. 1341 */ 1342 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) 1343 { 1344 integrity_inode_free(inode); 1345 call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode); 1346 /* 1347 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and 1348 * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made 1349 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS 1350 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder 1351 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and 1352 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact. 1353 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too. 1354 */ 1355 if (inode->i_security) 1356 call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security, 1357 inode_free_by_rcu); 1358 } 1359 1360 /** 1361 * security_dentry_init_security() - Perform dentry initialization 1362 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1363 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1364 * @name: name of the last path component 1365 * @xattr_name: name of the security/LSM xattr 1366 * @ctx: pointer to the resulting LSM context 1367 * @ctxlen: length of @ctx 1368 * 1369 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available since NFSv4 1370 * has no label backed by an EA anyway. It is important to note that 1371 * @xattr_name does not need to be free'd by the caller, it is a static string. 1372 * 1373 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 1374 */ 1375 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1376 const struct qstr *name, 1377 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx, 1378 u32 *ctxlen) 1379 { 1380 struct security_hook_list *hp; 1381 int rc; 1382 1383 /* 1384 * Only one module will provide a security context. 1385 */ 1386 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security, list) { 1387 rc = hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name, 1388 xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen); 1389 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security)) 1390 return rc; 1391 } 1392 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security); 1393 } 1394 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security); 1395 1396 /** 1397 * security_dentry_create_files_as() - Perform dentry initialization 1398 * @dentry: the dentry to initialize 1399 * @mode: mode used to determine resource type 1400 * @name: name of the last path component 1401 * @old: creds to use for LSM context calculations 1402 * @new: creds to modify 1403 * 1404 * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available and set 1405 * that context in passed in creds so that new files are created using that 1406 * context. Context is calculated using the passed in creds and not the creds 1407 * of the caller. 1408 * 1409 * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. 1410 */ 1411 int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, 1412 struct qstr *name, 1413 const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) 1414 { 1415 return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode, 1416 name, old, new); 1417 } 1418 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as); 1419 1420 /** 1421 * security_inode_init_security() - Initialize an inode's LSM context 1422 * @inode: the inode 1423 * @dir: parent directory 1424 * @qstr: last component of the pathname 1425 * @initxattrs: callback function to write xattrs 1426 * @fs_data: filesystem specific data 1427 * 1428 * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly 1429 * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode. This 1430 * hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation transaction and 1431 * provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike the post_create/mkdir/... 1432 * hooks called by the VFS. The hook function is expected to allocate the name 1433 * and value via kmalloc, with the caller being responsible for calling kfree 1434 * after using them. If the security module does not use security attributes 1435 * or does not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode, then 1436 * it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. 1437 * 1438 * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is 1439 * needed, or -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure. 1440 */ 1441 int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1442 const struct qstr *qstr, 1443 const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) 1444 { 1445 struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1]; 1446 struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr; 1447 int ret; 1448 1449 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1450 return 0; 1451 1452 if (!initxattrs) 1453 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, 1454 dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL); 1455 memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs)); 1456 lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; 1457 ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, 1458 &lsm_xattr->name, 1459 &lsm_xattr->value, 1460 &lsm_xattr->value_len); 1461 if (ret) 1462 goto out; 1463 1464 evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1; 1465 ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr); 1466 if (ret) 1467 goto out; 1468 ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); 1469 out: 1470 for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) 1471 kfree(xattr->value); 1472 return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret; 1473 } 1474 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); 1475 1476 /** 1477 * security_inode_init_security_anon() - Initialize an anonymous inode 1478 * @inode: the inode 1479 * @name: the anonymous inode class 1480 * @context_inode: an optional related inode 1481 * 1482 * Set up the incore security field for the new anonymous inode and return 1483 * whether the inode creation is permitted by the security module or not. 1484 * 1485 * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EACCES if the security module denies the 1486 * creation of this inode, or another -errno upon other errors. 1487 */ 1488 int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, 1489 const struct qstr *name, 1490 const struct inode *context_inode) 1491 { 1492 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, name, 1493 context_inode); 1494 } 1495 1496 int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, 1497 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, 1498 void **value, size_t *len) 1499 { 1500 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1501 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 1502 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, 1503 qstr, name, value, len); 1504 } 1505 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security); 1506 1507 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH 1508 /** 1509 * security_path_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 1510 * @dir: parent directory 1511 * @dentry: new file 1512 * @mode: new file mode 1513 * @dev: device number 1514 * 1515 * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called even 1516 * if mknod operation is being done for a regular file. 1517 * 1518 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1519 */ 1520 int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, 1521 unsigned int dev) 1522 { 1523 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1524 return 0; 1525 return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1526 } 1527 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod); 1528 1529 /** 1530 * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed 1531 * @dir: parent directory 1532 * @dentry: new directory 1533 * @mode: new directory mode 1534 * 1535 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory. 1536 * 1537 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1538 */ 1539 int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1540 { 1541 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1542 return 0; 1543 return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1544 } 1545 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir); 1546 1547 /** 1548 * security_path_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 1549 * @dir: parent directory 1550 * @dentry: directory to remove 1551 * 1552 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 1553 * 1554 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1555 */ 1556 int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1557 { 1558 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1559 return 0; 1560 return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1561 } 1562 1563 /** 1564 * security_path_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 1565 * @dir: parent directory 1566 * @dentry: file 1567 * 1568 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 1569 * 1570 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1571 */ 1572 int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1573 { 1574 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1575 return 0; 1576 return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1577 } 1578 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink); 1579 1580 /** 1581 * security_path_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 1582 * @dir: parent directory 1583 * @dentry: symbolic link 1584 * @old_name: file pathname 1585 * 1586 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 1587 * 1588 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1589 */ 1590 int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1591 const char *old_name) 1592 { 1593 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) 1594 return 0; 1595 return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1596 } 1597 1598 /** 1599 * security_path_link - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 1600 * @old_dentry: existing file 1601 * @new_dir: new parent directory 1602 * @new_dentry: new link 1603 * 1604 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 1605 * 1606 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1607 */ 1608 int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, 1609 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1610 { 1611 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1612 return 0; 1613 return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); 1614 } 1615 1616 /** 1617 * security_path_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 1618 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 1619 * @old_dentry: the old file 1620 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 1621 * @new_dentry: the new file 1622 * @flags: flags 1623 * 1624 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 1625 * 1626 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1627 */ 1628 int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 1629 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 1630 unsigned int flags) 1631 { 1632 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 1633 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 1634 return 0; 1635 1636 return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, 1637 new_dentry, flags); 1638 } 1639 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename); 1640 1641 /** 1642 * security_path_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 1643 * @path: file 1644 * 1645 * Check permission before truncating the file indicated by path. Note that 1646 * truncation permissions may also be checked based on already opened files, 1647 * using the security_file_truncate() hook. 1648 * 1649 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1650 */ 1651 int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path) 1652 { 1653 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1654 return 0; 1655 return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path); 1656 } 1657 1658 /** 1659 * security_path_chmod() - Check if changing the file's mode is allowed 1660 * @path: file 1661 * @mode: new mode 1662 * 1663 * Check for permission to change a mode of the file @path. The new mode is 1664 * specified in @mode which is a bitmask of constants from 1665 * <include/uapi/linux/stat.h>. 1666 * 1667 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1668 */ 1669 int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) 1670 { 1671 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1672 return 0; 1673 return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode); 1674 } 1675 1676 /** 1677 * security_path_chown() - Check if changing the file's owner/group is allowed 1678 * @path: file 1679 * @uid: file owner 1680 * @gid: file group 1681 * 1682 * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory. 1683 * 1684 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1685 */ 1686 int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) 1687 { 1688 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1689 return 0; 1690 return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid); 1691 } 1692 1693 /** 1694 * security_path_chroot() - Check if changing the root directory is allowed 1695 * @path: directory 1696 * 1697 * Check for permission to change root directory. 1698 * 1699 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1700 */ 1701 int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path) 1702 { 1703 return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path); 1704 } 1705 #endif 1706 1707 /** 1708 * security_inode_create() - Check if creating a file is allowed 1709 * @dir: the parent directory 1710 * @dentry: the file being created 1711 * @mode: requested file mode 1712 * 1713 * Check permission to create a regular file. 1714 * 1715 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1716 */ 1717 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1718 { 1719 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1720 return 0; 1721 return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1722 } 1723 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create); 1724 1725 /** 1726 * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed 1727 * @old_dentry: existing file 1728 * @dir: new parent directory 1729 * @new_dentry: new link 1730 * 1731 * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. 1732 * 1733 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1734 */ 1735 int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, 1736 struct dentry *new_dentry) 1737 { 1738 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) 1739 return 0; 1740 return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); 1741 } 1742 1743 /** 1744 * security_inode_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed 1745 * @dir: parent directory 1746 * @dentry: file 1747 * 1748 * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 1749 * 1750 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1751 */ 1752 int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1753 { 1754 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1755 return 0; 1756 return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); 1757 } 1758 1759 /** 1760 * security_inode_symlink() Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed 1761 * @dir: parent directory 1762 * @dentry: symbolic link 1763 * @old_name: existing filename 1764 * 1765 * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. 1766 * 1767 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1768 */ 1769 int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 1770 const char *old_name) 1771 { 1772 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1773 return 0; 1774 return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); 1775 } 1776 1777 /** 1778 * security_inode_mkdir() - Check if creation a new director is allowed 1779 * @dir: parent directory 1780 * @dentry: new directory 1781 * @mode: new directory mode 1782 * 1783 * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory 1784 * associated with inode structure @dir. 1785 * 1786 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1787 */ 1788 int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) 1789 { 1790 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1791 return 0; 1792 return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); 1793 } 1794 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir); 1795 1796 /** 1797 * security_inode_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed 1798 * @dir: parent directory 1799 * @dentry: directory to be removed 1800 * 1801 * Check the permission to remove a directory. 1802 * 1803 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1804 */ 1805 int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 1806 { 1807 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1808 return 0; 1809 return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); 1810 } 1811 1812 /** 1813 * security_inode_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed 1814 * @dir: parent directory 1815 * @dentry: new file 1816 * @mode: new file mode 1817 * @dev: device number 1818 * 1819 * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo file 1820 * created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation is being 1821 * done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called and not this 1822 * hook. 1823 * 1824 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1825 */ 1826 int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev) 1827 { 1828 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) 1829 return 0; 1830 return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); 1831 } 1832 1833 /** 1834 * security_inode_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed 1835 * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file 1836 * @old_dentry: the old file 1837 * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file 1838 * @new_dentry: the new file 1839 * @flags: flags 1840 * 1841 * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. 1842 * 1843 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1844 */ 1845 int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 1846 struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 1847 unsigned int flags) 1848 { 1849 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || 1850 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) 1851 return 0; 1852 1853 if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { 1854 int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry, 1855 old_dir, old_dentry); 1856 if (err) 1857 return err; 1858 } 1859 1860 return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, 1861 new_dir, new_dentry); 1862 } 1863 1864 /** 1865 * security_inode_readlink() - Check if reading a symbolic link is allowed 1866 * @dentry: link 1867 * 1868 * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. 1869 * 1870 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1871 */ 1872 int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) 1873 { 1874 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1875 return 0; 1876 return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry); 1877 } 1878 1879 /** 1880 * security_inode_follow_link() - Check if following a symbolic link is allowed 1881 * @dentry: link dentry 1882 * @inode: link inode 1883 * @rcu: true if in RCU-walk mode 1884 * 1885 * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname. If 1886 * @rcu is true, @inode is not stable. 1887 * 1888 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1889 */ 1890 int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, 1891 bool rcu) 1892 { 1893 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1894 return 0; 1895 return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu); 1896 } 1897 1898 /** 1899 * security_inode_permission() - Check if accessing an inode is allowed 1900 * @inode: inode 1901 * @mask: access mask 1902 * 1903 * Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the 1904 * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to 1905 * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks. Notice 1906 * that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many other 1907 * operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is called when 1908 * the actual read/write operations are performed. 1909 * 1910 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1911 */ 1912 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) 1913 { 1914 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 1915 return 0; 1916 return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask); 1917 } 1918 1919 /** 1920 * security_inode_setattr() - Check if setting file attributes is allowed 1921 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 1922 * @dentry: file 1923 * @attr: new attributes 1924 * 1925 * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel call 1926 * to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever file 1927 * attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod operations, 1928 * transferring disk quotas, etc). 1929 * 1930 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1931 */ 1932 int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 1933 struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 1934 { 1935 int ret; 1936 1937 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1938 return 0; 1939 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr); 1940 if (ret) 1941 return ret; 1942 return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); 1943 } 1944 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); 1945 1946 /** 1947 * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed 1948 * @path: file 1949 * 1950 * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. 1951 * 1952 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1953 */ 1954 int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) 1955 { 1956 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) 1957 return 0; 1958 return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path); 1959 } 1960 1961 /** 1962 * security_inode_setxattr() - Check if setting file xattrs is allowed 1963 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 1964 * @dentry: file 1965 * @name: xattr name 1966 * @value: xattr value 1967 * @flags: flags 1968 * 1969 * Check permission before setting the extended attributes. 1970 * 1971 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 1972 */ 1973 int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 1974 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 1975 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 1976 { 1977 int ret; 1978 1979 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 1980 return 0; 1981 /* 1982 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 1983 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 1984 */ 1985 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name, value, 1986 size, flags); 1987 1988 if (ret == 1) 1989 ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); 1990 if (ret) 1991 return ret; 1992 ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 1993 if (ret) 1994 return ret; 1995 return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size); 1996 } 1997 1998 /** 1999 * security_inode_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed 2000 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2001 * @dentry: file 2002 * @acl_name: acl name 2003 * @kacl: acl struct 2004 * 2005 * Check permission before setting posix acls, the posix acls in @kacl are 2006 * identified by @acl_name. 2007 * 2008 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2009 */ 2010 int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2011 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, 2012 struct posix_acl *kacl) 2013 { 2014 int ret; 2015 2016 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2017 return 0; 2018 ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, 2019 kacl); 2020 if (ret) 2021 return ret; 2022 ret = ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2023 if (ret) 2024 return ret; 2025 return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); 2026 } 2027 2028 /** 2029 * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed 2030 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2031 * @dentry: file 2032 * @acl_name: acl name 2033 * 2034 * Check permission before getting osix acls, the posix acls are identified by 2035 * @acl_name. 2036 * 2037 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2038 */ 2039 int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2040 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2041 { 2042 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2043 return 0; 2044 return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2045 } 2046 2047 /** 2048 * security_inode_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed 2049 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2050 * @dentry: file 2051 * @acl_name: acl name 2052 * 2053 * Check permission before removing posix acls, the posix acls are identified 2054 * by @acl_name. 2055 * 2056 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2057 */ 2058 int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2059 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) 2060 { 2061 int ret; 2062 2063 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2064 return 0; 2065 ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2066 if (ret) 2067 return ret; 2068 ret = ima_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2069 if (ret) 2070 return ret; 2071 return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); 2072 } 2073 2074 /** 2075 * security_inode_post_setxattr() - Update the inode after a setxattr operation 2076 * @dentry: file 2077 * @name: xattr name 2078 * @value: xattr value 2079 * @size: xattr value size 2080 * @flags: flags 2081 * 2082 * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation. 2083 */ 2084 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 2085 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2086 { 2087 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2088 return; 2089 call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); 2090 evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); 2091 } 2092 2093 /** 2094 * security_inode_getxattr() - Check if xattr access is allowed 2095 * @dentry: file 2096 * @name: xattr name 2097 * 2098 * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes identified by 2099 * @name for @dentry. 2100 * 2101 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2102 */ 2103 int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2104 { 2105 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2106 return 0; 2107 return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name); 2108 } 2109 2110 /** 2111 * security_inode_listxattr() - Check if listing xattrs is allowed 2112 * @dentry: file 2113 * 2114 * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute names for 2115 * @dentry. 2116 * 2117 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2118 */ 2119 int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) 2120 { 2121 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2122 return 0; 2123 return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry); 2124 } 2125 2126 /** 2127 * security_inode_removexattr() - Check if removing an xattr is allowed 2128 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2129 * @dentry: file 2130 * @name: xattr name 2131 * 2132 * Check permission before removing the extended attribute identified by @name 2133 * for @dentry. 2134 * 2135 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2136 */ 2137 int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2138 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 2139 { 2140 int ret; 2141 2142 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) 2143 return 0; 2144 /* 2145 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, 2146 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. 2147 */ 2148 ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); 2149 if (ret == 1) 2150 ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 2151 if (ret) 2152 return ret; 2153 ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); 2154 if (ret) 2155 return ret; 2156 return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); 2157 } 2158 2159 /** 2160 * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required 2161 * @dentry: associated dentry 2162 * 2163 * Called when an inode has been changed to determine if 2164 * security_inode_killpriv() should be called. 2165 * 2166 * Return: Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation, return 0 if 2167 * security_inode_killpriv() does not need to be called, return >0 if 2168 * security_inode_killpriv() does need to be called. 2169 */ 2170 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) 2171 { 2172 return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry); 2173 } 2174 2175 /** 2176 * security_inode_killpriv() - The setuid bit is removed, update LSM state 2177 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2178 * @dentry: associated dentry 2179 * 2180 * The @dentry's setuid bit is being removed. Remove similar security labels. 2181 * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held. 2182 * 2183 * Return: Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation 2184 * causing setuid bit removal is failed. 2185 */ 2186 int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2187 struct dentry *dentry) 2188 { 2189 return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, idmap, dentry); 2190 } 2191 2192 /** 2193 * security_inode_getsecurity() - Get the xattr security label of an inode 2194 * @idmap: idmap of the mount 2195 * @inode: inode 2196 * @name: xattr name 2197 * @buffer: security label buffer 2198 * @alloc: allocation flag 2199 * 2200 * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the security 2201 * label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that @name is the 2202 * remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix has been removed. 2203 * @alloc is used to specify if the call should return a value via the buffer 2204 * or just the value length. 2205 * 2206 * Return: Returns size of buffer on success. 2207 */ 2208 int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 2209 struct inode *inode, const char *name, 2210 void **buffer, bool alloc) 2211 { 2212 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2213 int rc; 2214 2215 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2216 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 2217 /* 2218 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 2219 */ 2220 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) { 2221 rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name, buffer, alloc); 2222 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity)) 2223 return rc; 2224 } 2225 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); 2226 } 2227 2228 /** 2229 * security_inode_setsecurity() - Set the xattr security label of an inode 2230 * @inode: inode 2231 * @name: xattr name 2232 * @value: security label 2233 * @size: length of security label 2234 * @flags: flags 2235 * 2236 * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the extended 2237 * attribute value @value. @size indicates the size of the @value in bytes. 2238 * @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0. Note that @name is the 2239 * remainder of the attribute name after the security. prefix has been removed. 2240 * 2241 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2242 */ 2243 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 2244 { 2245 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2246 int rc; 2247 2248 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2249 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 2250 /* 2251 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. 2252 */ 2253 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) { 2254 rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, 2255 flags); 2256 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity)) 2257 return rc; 2258 } 2259 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); 2260 } 2261 2262 /** 2263 * security_inode_listsecurity() - List the xattr security label names 2264 * @inode: inode 2265 * @buffer: buffer 2266 * @buffer_size: size of buffer 2267 * 2268 * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels associated with 2269 * @inode into @buffer. The maximum size of @buffer is specified by 2270 * @buffer_size. @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer 2271 * required. 2272 * 2273 * Return: Returns number of bytes used/required on success. 2274 */ 2275 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) 2276 { 2277 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 2278 return 0; 2279 return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size); 2280 } 2281 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity); 2282 2283 /** 2284 * security_inode_getsecid() - Get an inode's secid 2285 * @inode: inode 2286 * @secid: secid to return 2287 * 2288 * Get the secid associated with the node. In case of failure, @secid will be 2289 * set to zero. 2290 */ 2291 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) 2292 { 2293 call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid); 2294 } 2295 2296 /** 2297 * security_inode_copy_up() - Create new creds for an overlayfs copy-up op 2298 * @src: union dentry of copy-up file 2299 * @new: newly created creds 2300 * 2301 * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of overlay 2302 * filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds and modify as 2303 * need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to new creds temporarily to 2304 * create new file and release newly allocated creds. 2305 * 2306 * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error. 2307 */ 2308 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) 2309 { 2310 return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new); 2311 } 2312 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up); 2313 2314 /** 2315 * security_inode_copy_up_xattr() - Filter xattrs in an overlayfs copy-up op 2316 * @name: xattr name 2317 * 2318 * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied up from a 2319 * lower layer to the union/overlay layer. The caller is responsible for 2320 * reading and writing the xattrs, this hook is merely a filter. 2321 * 2322 * Return: Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP 2323 * if the security module does not know about attribute, or a negative 2324 * error code to abort the copy up. 2325 */ 2326 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) 2327 { 2328 struct security_hook_list *hp; 2329 int rc; 2330 2331 /* 2332 * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the 2333 * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or 2334 * any other error code incase of an error. 2335 */ 2336 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, 2337 &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) { 2338 rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name); 2339 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr)) 2340 return rc; 2341 } 2342 2343 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr); 2344 } 2345 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr); 2346 2347 /** 2348 * security_kernfs_init_security() - Init LSM context for a kernfs node 2349 * @kn_dir: parent kernfs node 2350 * @kn: the kernfs node to initialize 2351 * 2352 * Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based on its 2353 * own and its parent's attributes. 2354 * 2355 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2356 */ 2357 int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, 2358 struct kernfs_node *kn) 2359 { 2360 return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn); 2361 } 2362 2363 /** 2364 * security_file_permission() - Check file permissions 2365 * @file: file 2366 * @mask: requested permissions 2367 * 2368 * Check file permissions before accessing an open file. This hook is called 2369 * by various operations that read or write files. A security module can use 2370 * this hook to perform additional checking on these operations, e.g. to 2371 * revalidate permissions on use to support privilege bracketing or policy 2372 * changes. Notice that this hook is used when the actual read/write 2373 * operations are performed, whereas the inode_security_ops hook is called when 2374 * a file is opened (as well as many other operations). Although this hook can 2375 * be used to revalidate permissions for various system call operations that 2376 * read or write files, it does not address the revalidation of permissions for 2377 * memory-mapped files. Security modules must handle this separately if they 2378 * need such revalidation. 2379 * 2380 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2381 */ 2382 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) 2383 { 2384 int ret; 2385 2386 ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask); 2387 if (ret) 2388 return ret; 2389 2390 return fsnotify_perm(file, mask); 2391 } 2392 2393 /** 2394 * security_file_alloc() - Allocate and init a file's LSM blob 2395 * @file: the file 2396 * 2397 * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field. The 2398 * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. 2399 * 2400 * Return: Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. 2401 */ 2402 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) 2403 { 2404 int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file); 2405 2406 if (rc) 2407 return rc; 2408 rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file); 2409 if (unlikely(rc)) 2410 security_file_free(file); 2411 return rc; 2412 } 2413 2414 /** 2415 * security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob 2416 * @file: the file 2417 * 2418 * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security. 2419 */ 2420 void security_file_free(struct file *file) 2421 { 2422 void *blob; 2423 2424 call_void_hook(file_free_security, file); 2425 2426 blob = file->f_security; 2427 if (blob) { 2428 file->f_security = NULL; 2429 kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob); 2430 } 2431 } 2432 2433 /** 2434 * security_file_ioctl() - Check if an ioctl is allowed 2435 * @file: associated file 2436 * @cmd: ioctl cmd 2437 * @arg: ioctl arguments 2438 * 2439 * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file. Note that @arg sometimes 2440 * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer 2441 * value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used 2442 * by the security module. 2443 * 2444 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2445 */ 2446 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2447 { 2448 return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 2449 } 2450 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl); 2451 2452 static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) 2453 { 2454 /* 2455 * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect 2456 * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about... 2457 */ 2458 if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ) 2459 return prot; 2460 if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) 2461 return prot; 2462 /* 2463 * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it. 2464 */ 2465 if (!file) 2466 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2467 /* 2468 * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need 2469 * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case 2470 */ 2471 if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) { 2472 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU 2473 if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) { 2474 unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file); 2475 if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC)) 2476 return prot; 2477 } 2478 #endif 2479 return prot | PROT_EXEC; 2480 } 2481 /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */ 2482 return prot; 2483 } 2484 2485 /** 2486 * security_mmap_file() - Check if mmap'ing a file is allowed 2487 * @file: file 2488 * @prot: protection applied by the kernel 2489 * @flags: flags 2490 * 2491 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. if 2492 * mapping anonymous memory. 2493 * 2494 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2495 */ 2496 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, 2497 unsigned long flags) 2498 { 2499 unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot); 2500 int ret; 2501 2502 ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 2503 if (ret) 2504 return ret; 2505 return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags); 2506 } 2507 2508 /** 2509 * security_mmap_addr() - Check if mmap'ing an address is allowed 2510 * @addr: address 2511 * 2512 * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr. 2513 * 2514 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2515 */ 2516 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) 2517 { 2518 return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr); 2519 } 2520 2521 /** 2522 * security_file_mprotect() - Check if changing memory protections is allowed 2523 * @vma: memory region 2524 * @reqprot: application requested protection 2525 * @prog: protection applied by the kernel 2526 * 2527 * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions. 2528 * 2529 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2530 */ 2531 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, 2532 unsigned long prot) 2533 { 2534 int ret; 2535 2536 ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); 2537 if (ret) 2538 return ret; 2539 return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot); 2540 } 2541 2542 /** 2543 * security_file_lock() - Check if a file lock is allowed 2544 * @file: file 2545 * @cmd: lock operation (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK) 2546 * 2547 * Check permission before performing file locking operations. Note the hook 2548 * mediates both flock and fcntl style locks. 2549 * 2550 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2551 */ 2552 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) 2553 { 2554 return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd); 2555 } 2556 2557 /** 2558 * security_file_fcntl() - Check if fcntl() op is allowed 2559 * @file: file 2560 * @cmd: fnctl command 2561 * @arg: command argument 2562 * 2563 * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd from 2564 * being performed on the file @file. Note that @arg sometimes represents a 2565 * user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer value. When 2566 * @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used by the 2567 * security module. 2568 * 2569 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2570 */ 2571 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) 2572 { 2573 return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg); 2574 } 2575 2576 /** 2577 * security_file_set_fowner() - Set the file owner info in the LSM blob 2578 * @file: the file 2579 * 2580 * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in 2581 * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook. 2582 * 2583 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2584 */ 2585 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) 2586 { 2587 call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file); 2588 } 2589 2590 /** 2591 * security_file_send_sigiotask() - Check if sending SIGIO/SIGURG is allowed 2592 * @tsk: target task 2593 * @fown: signal sender 2594 * @sig: signal to be sent, SIGIO is sent if 0 2595 * 2596 * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the 2597 * process @tsk. Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt. Note 2598 * that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a struct file, 2599 * so the file structure (and associated security information) can always be 2600 * obtained: container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner). 2601 * 2602 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2603 */ 2604 int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, 2605 struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) 2606 { 2607 return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig); 2608 } 2609 2610 /** 2611 * security_file_receive() - Check is receiving a file via IPC is allowed 2612 * @file: file being received 2613 * 2614 * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process to 2615 * receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC. 2616 * 2617 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2618 */ 2619 int security_file_receive(struct file *file) 2620 { 2621 return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file); 2622 } 2623 2624 /** 2625 * security_file_open() - Save open() time state for late use by the LSM 2626 * @file: 2627 * 2628 * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon file_permission, 2629 * and recheck access if anything has changed since inode_permission. 2630 * 2631 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2632 */ 2633 int security_file_open(struct file *file) 2634 { 2635 int ret; 2636 2637 ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file); 2638 if (ret) 2639 return ret; 2640 2641 return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN); 2642 } 2643 2644 /** 2645 * security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed 2646 * @file: file 2647 * 2648 * Check permission before truncating a file, i.e. using ftruncate. Note that 2649 * truncation permission may also be checked based on the path, using the 2650 * @path_truncate hook. 2651 * 2652 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2653 */ 2654 int security_file_truncate(struct file *file) 2655 { 2656 return call_int_hook(file_truncate, 0, file); 2657 } 2658 2659 /** 2660 * security_task_alloc() - Allocate a task's LSM blob 2661 * @task: the task 2662 * @clone_flags: flags indicating what is being shared 2663 * 2664 * Handle allocation of task-related resources. 2665 * 2666 * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. 2667 */ 2668 int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) 2669 { 2670 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); 2671 2672 if (rc) 2673 return rc; 2674 rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags); 2675 if (unlikely(rc)) 2676 security_task_free(task); 2677 return rc; 2678 } 2679 2680 /** 2681 * security_task_free() - Free a task's LSM blob and related resources 2682 * @task: task 2683 * 2684 * Handle release of task-related resources. Note that this can be called from 2685 * interrupt context. 2686 */ 2687 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) 2688 { 2689 call_void_hook(task_free, task); 2690 2691 kfree(task->security); 2692 task->security = NULL; 2693 } 2694 2695 /** 2696 * security_cred_alloc_blank() - Allocate the min memory to allow cred_transfer 2697 * @cred: credentials 2698 * @gfp: gfp flags 2699 * 2700 * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that 2701 * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM. 2702 * 2703 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 2704 */ 2705 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 2706 { 2707 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp); 2708 2709 if (rc) 2710 return rc; 2711 2712 rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp); 2713 if (unlikely(rc)) 2714 security_cred_free(cred); 2715 return rc; 2716 } 2717 2718 /** 2719 * security_cred_free() - Free the cred's LSM blob and associated resources 2720 * @cred: credentials 2721 * 2722 * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials. 2723 */ 2724 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) 2725 { 2726 /* 2727 * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that 2728 * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL. 2729 */ 2730 if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL)) 2731 return; 2732 2733 call_void_hook(cred_free, cred); 2734 2735 kfree(cred->security); 2736 cred->security = NULL; 2737 } 2738 2739 /** 2740 * security_prepare_creds() - Prepare a new set of credentials 2741 * @new: new credentials 2742 * @old: original credentials 2743 * @gfp: gfp flags 2744 * 2745 * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set. 2746 * 2747 * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. 2748 */ 2749 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) 2750 { 2751 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp); 2752 2753 if (rc) 2754 return rc; 2755 2756 rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp); 2757 if (unlikely(rc)) 2758 security_cred_free(new); 2759 return rc; 2760 } 2761 2762 /** 2763 * security_transfer_creds() - Transfer creds 2764 * @new: target credentials 2765 * @old: original credentials 2766 * 2767 * Transfer data from original creds to new creds. 2768 */ 2769 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 2770 { 2771 call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); 2772 } 2773 2774 /** 2775 * security_cred_getsecid() - Get the secid from a set of credentials 2776 * @c: credentials 2777 * @secid: secid value 2778 * 2779 * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c. In case of 2780 * failure, @secid will be set to zero. 2781 */ 2782 void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) 2783 { 2784 *secid = 0; 2785 call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); 2786 } 2787 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); 2788 2789 /** 2790 * security_kernel_act_as() - Set the kernel credentials to act as secid 2791 * @new: credentials 2792 * @secid: secid 2793 * 2794 * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). 2795 * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid. 2796 * 2797 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2798 */ 2799 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) 2800 { 2801 return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); 2802 } 2803 2804 /** 2805 * security_kernel_create_files_as() - Set file creation context using an inode 2806 * @new: target credentials 2807 * @inode: reference inode 2808 * 2809 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as the 2810 * objective context of the specified inode. The current task must be the one 2811 * that nominated @inode. 2812 * 2813 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2814 */ 2815 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) 2816 { 2817 return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode); 2818 } 2819 2820 /** 2821 * security_kernel_module_request() - Check is loading a module is allowed 2822 * @kmod_name: module name 2823 * 2824 * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for 2825 * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. 2826 * 2827 * Return: Returns 0 if successful. 2828 */ 2829 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) 2830 { 2831 int ret; 2832 2833 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); 2834 if (ret) 2835 return ret; 2836 return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); 2837 } 2838 2839 /** 2840 * security_kernel_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 2841 * @file: file 2842 * @id: file identifier 2843 * @contents: trust if security_kernel_post_read_file() will be called 2844 * 2845 * Read a file specified by userspace. 2846 * 2847 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2848 */ 2849 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, 2850 bool contents) 2851 { 2852 int ret; 2853 2854 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); 2855 if (ret) 2856 return ret; 2857 return ima_read_file(file, id, contents); 2858 } 2859 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); 2860 2861 /** 2862 * security_kernel_post_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace 2863 * @file: file 2864 * @buf: file contents 2865 * @size: size of file contents 2866 * @id: file identifier 2867 * 2868 * Read a file specified by userspace. This must be paired with a prior call 2869 * to security_kernel_read_file() call that indicated this hook would also be 2870 * called, see security_kernel_read_file() for more information. 2871 * 2872 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2873 */ 2874 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, 2875 enum kernel_read_file_id id) 2876 { 2877 int ret; 2878 2879 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id); 2880 if (ret) 2881 return ret; 2882 return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id); 2883 } 2884 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); 2885 2886 /** 2887 * security_kernel_load_data() - Load data provided by userspace 2888 * @id: data identifier 2889 * @contents: true if security_kernel_post_load_data() will be called 2890 * 2891 * Load data provided by userspace. 2892 * 2893 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2894 */ 2895 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) 2896 { 2897 int ret; 2898 2899 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents); 2900 if (ret) 2901 return ret; 2902 return ima_load_data(id, contents); 2903 } 2904 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); 2905 2906 /** 2907 * security_kernel_post_load_data() - Load userspace data from a non-file source 2908 * @buf: data 2909 * @size: size of data 2910 * @id: data identifier 2911 * @description: text description of data, specific to the id value 2912 * 2913 * Load data provided by a non-file source (usually userspace buffer). This 2914 * must be paired with a prior security_kernel_load_data() call that indicated 2915 * this hook would also be called, see security_kernel_load_data() for more 2916 * information. 2917 * 2918 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 2919 */ 2920 int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, 2921 enum kernel_load_data_id id, 2922 char *description) 2923 { 2924 int ret; 2925 2926 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id, 2927 description); 2928 if (ret) 2929 return ret; 2930 return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description); 2931 } 2932 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data); 2933 2934 /** 2935 * security_task_fix_setuid() - Update LSM with new user id attributes 2936 * @new: updated credentials 2937 * @old: credentials being replaced 2938 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag values 2939 * 2940 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user identity 2941 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 2942 * the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If @new is the set of 2943 * credentials that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this 2944 * rather than to @current->cred. 2945 * 2946 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2947 */ 2948 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 2949 int flags) 2950 { 2951 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags); 2952 } 2953 2954 /** 2955 * security_task_fix_setgid() - Update LSM with new group id attributes 2956 * @new: updated credentials 2957 * @old: credentials being replaced 2958 * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag value 2959 * 2960 * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the group identity 2961 * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of 2962 * the set*gid system calls invoked this hook. @new is the set of credentials 2963 * that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 2964 * @current->cred. 2965 * 2966 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2967 */ 2968 int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 2969 int flags) 2970 { 2971 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags); 2972 } 2973 2974 /** 2975 * security_task_fix_setgroups() - Update LSM with new supplementary groups 2976 * @new: updated credentials 2977 * @old: credentials being replaced 2978 * 2979 * Update the module's state after setting the supplementary group identity 2980 * attributes of the current process. @new is the set of credentials that will 2981 * be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to 2982 * @current->cred. 2983 * 2984 * Return: Returns 0 on success. 2985 */ 2986 int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 2987 { 2988 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, 0, new, old); 2989 } 2990 2991 /** 2992 * security_task_setpgid() - Check if setting the pgid is allowed 2993 * @p: task being modified 2994 * @pgid: new pgid 2995 * 2996 * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the process 2997 * @p to @pgid. 2998 * 2999 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3000 */ 3001 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) 3002 { 3003 return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid); 3004 } 3005 3006 /** 3007 * security_task_getpgid() - Check if getting the pgid is allowed 3008 * @p: task 3009 * 3010 * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the process 3011 * @p. 3012 * 3013 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3014 */ 3015 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) 3016 { 3017 return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p); 3018 } 3019 3020 /** 3021 * security_task_getsid() - Check if getting the session id is allowed 3022 * @p: task 3023 * 3024 * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process @p. 3025 * 3026 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3027 */ 3028 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) 3029 { 3030 return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); 3031 } 3032 3033 /** 3034 * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid 3035 * @secid: secid value 3036 * 3037 * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return 3038 * it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3039 */ 3040 void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) 3041 { 3042 *secid = 0; 3043 call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid); 3044 } 3045 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj); 3046 3047 /** 3048 * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid 3049 * @p: target task 3050 * @secid: secid value 3051 * 3052 * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and 3053 * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. 3054 */ 3055 void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) 3056 { 3057 *secid = 0; 3058 call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); 3059 } 3060 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj); 3061 3062 /** 3063 * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed 3064 * @p: target task 3065 * @nice: nice value 3066 * 3067 * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice. 3068 * 3069 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3070 */ 3071 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) 3072 { 3073 return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice); 3074 } 3075 3076 /** 3077 * security_task_setioprio() - Check if setting a task's ioprio is allowed 3078 * @p: target task 3079 * @ioprio: ioprio value 3080 * 3081 * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio. 3082 * 3083 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3084 */ 3085 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) 3086 { 3087 return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio); 3088 } 3089 3090 /** 3091 * security_task_getioprio() - Check if getting a task's ioprio is allowed 3092 * @p: task 3093 * 3094 * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p. 3095 * 3096 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3097 */ 3098 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) 3099 { 3100 return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p); 3101 } 3102 3103 /** 3104 * security_task_prlimit() - Check if get/setting resources limits is allowed 3105 * @cred: current task credentials 3106 * @tcred: target task credentials 3107 * @flags: LSM_PRLIMIT_* flag bits indicating a get/set/both 3108 * 3109 * Check permission before getting and/or setting the resource limits of 3110 * another task. 3111 * 3112 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3113 */ 3114 int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, 3115 unsigned int flags) 3116 { 3117 return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags); 3118 } 3119 3120 /** 3121 * security_task_setrlimit() - Check if setting a new rlimit value is allowed 3122 * @p: target task's group leader 3123 * @resource: resource whose limit is being set 3124 * @new_rlim: new resource limit 3125 * 3126 * Check permission before setting the resource limits of process @p for 3127 * @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can be examined by 3128 * dereferencing (p->signal->rlim + resource). 3129 * 3130 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3131 */ 3132 int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, 3133 struct rlimit *new_rlim) 3134 { 3135 return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim); 3136 } 3137 3138 /** 3139 * security_task_setscheduler() - Check if setting sched policy/param is allowed 3140 * @p: target task 3141 * 3142 * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of 3143 * process @p. 3144 * 3145 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3146 */ 3147 int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3148 { 3149 return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p); 3150 } 3151 3152 /** 3153 * security_task_getscheduler() - Check if getting scheduling info is allowed 3154 * @p: target task 3155 * 3156 * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process @p. 3157 * 3158 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3159 */ 3160 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) 3161 { 3162 return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p); 3163 } 3164 3165 /** 3166 * security_task_movememory() - Check if moving memory is allowed 3167 * @p: task 3168 * 3169 * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p. 3170 * 3171 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3172 */ 3173 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) 3174 { 3175 return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p); 3176 } 3177 3178 /** 3179 * security_task_kill() - Check if sending a signal is allowed 3180 * @p: target process 3181 * @info: signal information 3182 * @sig: signal value 3183 * @cred: credentials of the signal sender, NULL if @current 3184 * 3185 * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p. @info can be NULL, the 3186 * constant 1, or a pointer to a kernel_siginfo structure. If @info is 1 or 3187 * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming from 3188 * the kernel and should typically be permitted. SIGIO signals are handled 3189 * separately by the send_sigiotask hook in file_security_ops. 3190 * 3191 * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. 3192 */ 3193 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, 3194 int sig, const struct cred *cred) 3195 { 3196 return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred); 3197 } 3198 3199 /** 3200 * security_task_prctl() - Check if a prctl op is allowed 3201 * @option: operation 3202 * @arg2: argument 3203 * @arg3: argument 3204 * @arg4: argument 3205 * @arg5: argument 3206 * 3207 * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the 3208 * current process. 3209 * 3210 * Return: Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value 3211 * to cause prctl() to return immediately with that value. 3212 */ 3213 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, 3214 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) 3215 { 3216 int thisrc; 3217 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl); 3218 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3219 3220 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) { 3221 thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); 3222 if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) { 3223 rc = thisrc; 3224 if (thisrc != 0) 3225 break; 3226 } 3227 } 3228 return rc; 3229 } 3230 3231 /** 3232 * security_task_to_inode() - Set the security attributes of a task's inode 3233 * @p: task 3234 * @inode: inode 3235 * 3236 * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's 3237 * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes. 3238 */ 3239 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) 3240 { 3241 call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode); 3242 } 3243 3244 /** 3245 * security_create_user_ns() - Check if creating a new userns is allowed 3246 * @cred: prepared creds 3247 * 3248 * Check permission prior to creating a new user namespace. 3249 * 3250 * Return: Returns 0 if successful, otherwise < 0 error code. 3251 */ 3252 int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred) 3253 { 3254 return call_int_hook(userns_create, 0, cred); 3255 } 3256 3257 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) 3258 { 3259 return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag); 3260 } 3261 3262 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) 3263 { 3264 *secid = 0; 3265 call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); 3266 } 3267 3268 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) 3269 { 3270 int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg); 3271 3272 if (unlikely(rc)) 3273 return rc; 3274 rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg); 3275 if (unlikely(rc)) 3276 security_msg_msg_free(msg); 3277 return rc; 3278 } 3279 3280 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg) 3281 { 3282 call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg); 3283 kfree(msg->security); 3284 msg->security = NULL; 3285 } 3286 3287 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3288 { 3289 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq); 3290 3291 if (unlikely(rc)) 3292 return rc; 3293 rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq); 3294 if (unlikely(rc)) 3295 security_msg_queue_free(msq); 3296 return rc; 3297 } 3298 3299 void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) 3300 { 3301 call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq); 3302 kfree(msq->security); 3303 msq->security = NULL; 3304 } 3305 3306 int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) 3307 { 3308 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg); 3309 } 3310 3311 int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) 3312 { 3313 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd); 3314 } 3315 3316 int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, 3317 struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) 3318 { 3319 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg); 3320 } 3321 3322 int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, 3323 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) 3324 { 3325 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode); 3326 } 3327 3328 int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3329 { 3330 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp); 3331 3332 if (unlikely(rc)) 3333 return rc; 3334 rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp); 3335 if (unlikely(rc)) 3336 security_shm_free(shp); 3337 return rc; 3338 } 3339 3340 void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) 3341 { 3342 call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp); 3343 kfree(shp->security); 3344 shp->security = NULL; 3345 } 3346 3347 int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) 3348 { 3349 return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg); 3350 } 3351 3352 int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) 3353 { 3354 return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd); 3355 } 3356 3357 int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) 3358 { 3359 return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg); 3360 } 3361 3362 int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3363 { 3364 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma); 3365 3366 if (unlikely(rc)) 3367 return rc; 3368 rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma); 3369 if (unlikely(rc)) 3370 security_sem_free(sma); 3371 return rc; 3372 } 3373 3374 void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) 3375 { 3376 call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma); 3377 kfree(sma->security); 3378 sma->security = NULL; 3379 } 3380 3381 int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) 3382 { 3383 return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg); 3384 } 3385 3386 int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) 3387 { 3388 return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd); 3389 } 3390 3391 int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, 3392 unsigned nsops, int alter) 3393 { 3394 return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter); 3395 } 3396 3397 /** 3398 * security_d_instantiate() - Populate an inode's LSM state based on a dentry 3399 * @dentry: dentry 3400 * @inode: inode 3401 * 3402 * Fill in @inode security information for a @dentry if allowed. 3403 */ 3404 void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) 3405 { 3406 if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode))) 3407 return; 3408 call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode); 3409 } 3410 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); 3411 3412 /** 3413 * security_getprocattr() - Read an attribute for a task 3414 * @p: the task 3415 * @lsm: LSM name 3416 * @name: attribute name 3417 * @value: attribute value 3418 * 3419 * Read attribute @name for task @p and store it into @value if allowed. 3420 * 3421 * Return: Returns the length of @value on success, a negative value otherwise. 3422 */ 3423 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, 3424 const char *name, char **value) 3425 { 3426 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3427 3428 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { 3429 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 3430 continue; 3431 return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); 3432 } 3433 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr); 3434 } 3435 3436 /** 3437 * security_setprocattr() - Set an attribute for a task 3438 * @lsm: LSM name 3439 * @name: attribute name 3440 * @value: attribute value 3441 * @size: attribute value size 3442 * 3443 * Write (set) the current task's attribute @name to @value, size @size if 3444 * allowed. 3445 * 3446 * Return: Returns bytes written on success, a negative value otherwise. 3447 */ 3448 int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, 3449 size_t size) 3450 { 3451 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3452 3453 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { 3454 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) 3455 continue; 3456 return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); 3457 } 3458 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr); 3459 } 3460 3461 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 3462 { 3463 return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb); 3464 } 3465 3466 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) 3467 { 3468 return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name); 3469 } 3470 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); 3471 3472 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) 3473 { 3474 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3475 int rc; 3476 3477 /* 3478 * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this 3479 * LSM hook is not "stackable"). 3480 */ 3481 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { 3482 rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); 3483 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx)) 3484 return rc; 3485 } 3486 3487 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx); 3488 } 3489 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); 3490 3491 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) 3492 { 3493 *secid = 0; 3494 return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid); 3495 } 3496 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); 3497 3498 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) 3499 { 3500 call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); 3501 } 3502 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); 3503 3504 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) 3505 { 3506 call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode); 3507 } 3508 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx); 3509 3510 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 3511 { 3512 return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 3513 } 3514 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx); 3515 3516 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) 3517 { 3518 return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen); 3519 } 3520 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx); 3521 3522 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) 3523 { 3524 return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen); 3525 } 3526 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx); 3527 3528 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE 3529 int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, 3530 const struct cred *cred, 3531 struct watch_notification *n) 3532 { 3533 return call_int_hook(post_notification, 0, w_cred, cred, n); 3534 } 3535 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */ 3536 3537 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS 3538 int security_watch_key(struct key *key) 3539 { 3540 return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key); 3541 } 3542 #endif 3543 3544 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK 3545 3546 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) 3547 { 3548 return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk); 3549 } 3550 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect); 3551 3552 int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) 3553 { 3554 return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other); 3555 } 3556 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send); 3557 3558 int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) 3559 { 3560 return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern); 3561 } 3562 3563 int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, 3564 int type, int protocol, int kern) 3565 { 3566 return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type, 3567 protocol, kern); 3568 } 3569 3570 int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) 3571 { 3572 return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb); 3573 } 3574 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair); 3575 3576 int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 3577 { 3578 return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 3579 } 3580 3581 int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 3582 { 3583 return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen); 3584 } 3585 3586 int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) 3587 { 3588 return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog); 3589 } 3590 3591 int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) 3592 { 3593 return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock); 3594 } 3595 3596 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) 3597 { 3598 return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size); 3599 } 3600 3601 int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, 3602 int size, int flags) 3603 { 3604 return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags); 3605 } 3606 3607 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) 3608 { 3609 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock); 3610 } 3611 3612 int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) 3613 { 3614 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock); 3615 } 3616 3617 int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 3618 { 3619 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 3620 } 3621 3622 int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) 3623 { 3624 return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); 3625 } 3626 3627 int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) 3628 { 3629 return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how); 3630 } 3631 3632 int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 3633 { 3634 return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb); 3635 } 3636 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); 3637 3638 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval, 3639 sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len) 3640 { 3641 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 3642 optval, optlen, len); 3643 } 3644 3645 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 3646 { 3647 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, 3648 skb, secid); 3649 } 3650 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram); 3651 3652 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) 3653 { 3654 return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority); 3655 } 3656 3657 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk) 3658 { 3659 call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk); 3660 } 3661 3662 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) 3663 { 3664 call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk); 3665 } 3666 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone); 3667 3668 void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic) 3669 { 3670 call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid); 3671 } 3672 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow); 3673 3674 void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, 3675 struct flowi_common *flic) 3676 { 3677 call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic); 3678 } 3679 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow); 3680 3681 void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) 3682 { 3683 call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent); 3684 } 3685 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft); 3686 3687 int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, 3688 struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) 3689 { 3690 return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req); 3691 } 3692 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request); 3693 3694 void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, 3695 const struct request_sock *req) 3696 { 3697 call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req); 3698 } 3699 3700 void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, 3701 struct sk_buff *skb) 3702 { 3703 call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb); 3704 } 3705 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established); 3706 3707 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid) 3708 { 3709 return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid); 3710 } 3711 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet); 3712 3713 void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void) 3714 { 3715 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc); 3716 } 3717 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc); 3718 3719 void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void) 3720 { 3721 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec); 3722 } 3723 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec); 3724 3725 int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) 3726 { 3727 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security); 3728 } 3729 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security); 3730 3731 void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) 3732 { 3733 call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security); 3734 } 3735 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security); 3736 3737 int security_tun_dev_create(void) 3738 { 3739 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0); 3740 } 3741 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create); 3742 3743 int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) 3744 { 3745 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security); 3746 } 3747 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue); 3748 3749 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) 3750 { 3751 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security); 3752 } 3753 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach); 3754 3755 int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) 3756 { 3757 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security); 3758 } 3759 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open); 3760 3761 int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sk_buff *skb) 3762 { 3763 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, asoc, skb); 3764 } 3765 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request); 3766 3767 int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, 3768 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 3769 { 3770 return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname, 3771 address, addrlen); 3772 } 3773 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect); 3774 3775 void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk, 3776 struct sock *newsk) 3777 { 3778 call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, asoc, sk, newsk); 3779 } 3780 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone); 3781 3782 int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc, 3783 struct sk_buff *skb) 3784 { 3785 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, 0, asoc, skb); 3786 } 3787 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established); 3788 3789 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ 3790 3791 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND 3792 3793 int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey) 3794 { 3795 return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey); 3796 } 3797 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access); 3798 3799 int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) 3800 { 3801 return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec, dev_name, port_num); 3802 } 3803 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet); 3804 3805 int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec) 3806 { 3807 return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec); 3808 } 3809 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security); 3810 3811 void security_ib_free_security(void *sec) 3812 { 3813 call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec); 3814 } 3815 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security); 3816 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ 3817 3818 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM 3819 3820 int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, 3821 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, 3822 gfp_t gfp) 3823 { 3824 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp); 3825 } 3826 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc); 3827 3828 int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, 3829 struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) 3830 { 3831 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp); 3832 } 3833 3834 void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 3835 { 3836 call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx); 3837 } 3838 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free); 3839 3840 int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) 3841 { 3842 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx); 3843 } 3844 3845 int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, 3846 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) 3847 { 3848 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx); 3849 } 3850 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc); 3851 3852 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, 3853 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) 3854 { 3855 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid); 3856 } 3857 3858 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) 3859 { 3860 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x); 3861 } 3862 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete); 3863 3864 void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) 3865 { 3866 call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x); 3867 } 3868 3869 int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid) 3870 { 3871 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid); 3872 } 3873 3874 int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, 3875 struct xfrm_policy *xp, 3876 const struct flowi_common *flic) 3877 { 3878 struct security_hook_list *hp; 3879 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); 3880 3881 /* 3882 * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment 3883 * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately, 3884 * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux 3885 * supplies this call. 3886 * 3887 * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than 3888 * using the macro 3889 */ 3890 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, 3891 list) { 3892 rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic); 3893 break; 3894 } 3895 return rc; 3896 } 3897 3898 int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 3899 { 3900 return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1); 3901 } 3902 3903 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic) 3904 { 3905 int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid, 3906 0); 3907 3908 BUG_ON(rc); 3909 } 3910 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow); 3911 3912 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ 3913 3914 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS 3915 3916 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, 3917 unsigned long flags) 3918 { 3919 return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags); 3920 } 3921 3922 void security_key_free(struct key *key) 3923 { 3924 call_void_hook(key_free, key); 3925 } 3926 3927 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, 3928 enum key_need_perm need_perm) 3929 { 3930 return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm); 3931 } 3932 3933 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) 3934 { 3935 *_buffer = NULL; 3936 return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer); 3937 } 3938 3939 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ 3940 3941 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT 3942 3943 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) 3944 { 3945 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); 3946 } 3947 3948 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) 3949 { 3950 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule); 3951 } 3952 3953 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) 3954 { 3955 call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); 3956 } 3957 3958 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) 3959 { 3960 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule); 3961 } 3962 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ 3963 3964 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL 3965 int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) 3966 { 3967 return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size); 3968 } 3969 int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) 3970 { 3971 return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode); 3972 } 3973 int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) 3974 { 3975 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog); 3976 } 3977 int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) 3978 { 3979 return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map); 3980 } 3981 int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 3982 { 3983 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux); 3984 } 3985 void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) 3986 { 3987 call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map); 3988 } 3989 void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) 3990 { 3991 call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); 3992 } 3993 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ 3994 3995 int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) 3996 { 3997 return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what); 3998 } 3999 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down); 4000 4001 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 4002 int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) 4003 { 4004 return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type); 4005 } 4006 4007 int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) 4008 { 4009 return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event); 4010 } 4011 4012 void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) 4013 { 4014 call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event); 4015 } 4016 4017 int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) 4018 { 4019 return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event); 4020 } 4021 4022 int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) 4023 { 4024 return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event); 4025 } 4026 #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */ 4027 4028 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING 4029 int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) 4030 { 4031 return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, 0, new); 4032 } 4033 4034 int security_uring_sqpoll(void) 4035 { 4036 return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0); 4037 } 4038 int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) 4039 { 4040 return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd); 4041 } 4042 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ 4043