1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only 2 /* 3 * Integrity Measurement Architecture 4 * 5 * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation 6 * 7 * Authors: 8 * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com> 9 * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> 10 * Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com> 11 * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> 12 * 13 * File: ima_main.c 14 * implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap, 15 * and ima_file_check. 16 */ 17 18 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt 19 20 #include <linux/module.h> 21 #include <linux/file.h> 22 #include <linux/binfmts.h> 23 #include <linux/mount.h> 24 #include <linux/mman.h> 25 #include <linux/slab.h> 26 #include <linux/xattr.h> 27 #include <linux/ima.h> 28 #include <linux/iversion.h> 29 #include <linux/fs.h> 30 31 #include "ima.h" 32 33 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE 34 int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; 35 #else 36 int ima_appraise; 37 #endif 38 39 int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; 40 static int hash_setup_done; 41 42 static struct notifier_block ima_lsm_policy_notifier = { 43 .notifier_call = ima_lsm_policy_change, 44 }; 45 46 static int __init hash_setup(char *str) 47 { 48 struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); 49 int i; 50 51 if (hash_setup_done) 52 return 1; 53 54 if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) { 55 if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0) 56 ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; 57 else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) 58 ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5; 59 else 60 return 1; 61 goto out; 62 } 63 64 i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, str); 65 if (i < 0) 66 return 1; 67 68 ima_hash_algo = i; 69 out: 70 hash_setup_done = 1; 71 return 1; 72 } 73 __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup); 74 75 /* Prevent mmap'ing a file execute that is already mmap'ed write */ 76 static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file, 77 char **pathbuf, const char **pathname, 78 char *filename) 79 { 80 struct inode *inode; 81 int rc = 0; 82 83 if ((func == MMAP_CHECK) && mapping_writably_mapped(file->f_mapping)) { 84 rc = -ETXTBSY; 85 inode = file_inode(file); 86 87 if (!*pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */ 88 *pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, 89 filename); 90 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, *pathname, 91 "mmap_file", "mmapped_writers", rc, 0); 92 } 93 return rc; 94 } 95 96 /* 97 * ima_rdwr_violation_check 98 * 99 * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files: 100 * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, 101 * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. 102 * - Opening a file for read when already open for write, 103 * could result in a file measurement error. 104 * 105 */ 106 static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, 107 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, 108 int must_measure, 109 char **pathbuf, 110 const char **pathname, 111 char *filename) 112 { 113 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); 114 fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; 115 bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false; 116 117 if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) { 118 if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) { 119 if (!iint) 120 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); 121 /* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */ 122 if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, 123 &iint->atomic_flags)) 124 send_tomtou = true; 125 } 126 } else { 127 if (must_measure) 128 set_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags); 129 if (inode_is_open_for_write(inode) && must_measure) 130 send_writers = true; 131 } 132 133 if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers) 134 return; 135 136 *pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, filename); 137 138 if (send_tomtou) 139 ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint, 140 "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU"); 141 if (send_writers) 142 ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint, 143 "invalid_pcr", "open_writers"); 144 } 145 146 static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, 147 struct inode *inode, struct file *file) 148 { 149 fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; 150 bool update; 151 152 if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE)) 153 return; 154 155 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); 156 if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) { 157 update = test_and_clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, 158 &iint->atomic_flags); 159 if (!IS_I_VERSION(inode) || 160 !inode_eq_iversion(inode, iint->version) || 161 (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) { 162 iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE); 163 iint->measured_pcrs = 0; 164 if (update) 165 ima_update_xattr(iint, file); 166 } 167 } 168 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); 169 } 170 171 /** 172 * ima_file_free - called on __fput() 173 * @file: pointer to file structure being freed 174 * 175 * Flag files that changed, based on i_version 176 */ 177 void ima_file_free(struct file *file) 178 { 179 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); 180 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; 181 182 if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) 183 return; 184 185 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); 186 if (!iint) 187 return; 188 189 ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file); 190 } 191 192 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, 193 u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, 194 enum ima_hooks func) 195 { 196 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); 197 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; 198 struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL; 199 char *pathbuf = NULL; 200 char filename[NAME_MAX]; 201 const char *pathname = NULL; 202 int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0; 203 int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; 204 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL; 205 struct modsig *modsig = NULL; 206 int xattr_len = 0; 207 bool violation_check; 208 enum hash_algo hash_algo; 209 210 if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) 211 return 0; 212 213 /* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action 214 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. 215 * Included is the appraise submask. 216 */ 217 action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr, 218 &template_desc); 219 violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) && 220 (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE)); 221 if (!action && !violation_check) 222 return 0; 223 224 must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE; 225 226 /* Is the appraise rule hook specific? */ 227 if (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE) 228 func = FILE_CHECK; 229 230 inode_lock(inode); 231 232 if (action) { 233 iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); 234 if (!iint) 235 rc = -ENOMEM; 236 } 237 238 if (!rc && violation_check) 239 ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE, 240 &pathbuf, &pathname, filename); 241 242 inode_unlock(inode); 243 244 if (rc) 245 goto out; 246 if (!action) 247 goto out; 248 249 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); 250 251 if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags)) 252 /* reset appraisal flags if ima_inode_post_setattr was called */ 253 iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED | 254 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK | 255 IMA_ACTION_FLAGS); 256 257 /* 258 * Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the 259 * kernel has no way of detecting file change on the filesystem. 260 * (Limited to privileged mounted filesystems.) 261 */ 262 if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags) || 263 ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) && 264 !(inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER) && 265 !(action & IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS))) { 266 iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; 267 iint->measured_pcrs = 0; 268 } 269 270 /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask 271 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED, 272 * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED) 273 */ 274 iint->flags |= action; 275 action &= IMA_DO_MASK; 276 action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1); 277 278 /* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */ 279 if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))) 280 action ^= IMA_MEASURE; 281 282 /* HASH sets the digital signature and update flags, nothing else */ 283 if ((action & IMA_HASH) && 284 !(test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags))) { 285 xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value); 286 if ((xattr_value && xattr_len > 2) && 287 (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) 288 set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); 289 iint->flags |= IMA_HASHED; 290 action ^= IMA_HASH; 291 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); 292 } 293 294 /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */ 295 if (!action) { 296 if (must_appraise) { 297 rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf, 298 &pathname, filename); 299 if (!rc) 300 rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, func); 301 } 302 goto out_locked; 303 } 304 305 if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) || 306 strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) { 307 /* read 'security.ima' */ 308 xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value); 309 310 /* 311 * Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy, and allow 312 * an additional measurement list entry, if needed, based on the 313 * template format and whether the file was already measured. 314 */ 315 if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) { 316 rc = ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig); 317 318 if (!rc && ima_template_has_modsig(template_desc) && 319 iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED) 320 action |= IMA_MEASURE; 321 } 322 } 323 324 hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len); 325 326 rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig); 327 if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL) 328 goto out_locked; 329 330 if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */ 331 pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename); 332 333 if (action & IMA_MEASURE) 334 ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, 335 xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr, 336 template_desc); 337 if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) { 338 inode_lock(inode); 339 rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname, 340 xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig); 341 inode_unlock(inode); 342 if (!rc) 343 rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf, 344 &pathname, filename); 345 } 346 if (action & IMA_AUDIT) 347 ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname); 348 349 if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)) 350 rc = 0; 351 out_locked: 352 if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags) && 353 !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) 354 rc = -EACCES; 355 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); 356 kfree(xattr_value); 357 ima_free_modsig(modsig); 358 out: 359 if (pathbuf) 360 __putname(pathbuf); 361 if (must_appraise) { 362 if (rc && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) 363 return -EACCES; 364 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) 365 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); 366 } 367 return 0; 368 } 369 370 /** 371 * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement. 372 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL) 373 * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. 374 * 375 * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure() 376 * policy decision. 377 * 378 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file 379 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. 380 */ 381 int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) 382 { 383 u32 secid; 384 385 if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { 386 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); 387 return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 388 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); 389 } 390 391 return 0; 392 } 393 394 /** 395 * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. 396 * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure 397 * 398 * The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write, 399 * from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file, 400 * already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access(). 401 * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually 402 * what is being executed. 403 * 404 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file 405 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. 406 */ 407 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 408 { 409 int ret; 410 u32 secid; 411 412 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); 413 ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, 414 MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); 415 if (ret) 416 return ret; 417 418 security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid); 419 return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0, 420 MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); 421 } 422 423 /** 424 * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. 425 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured 426 * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC or MAY_APPEND 427 * 428 * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision. 429 * 430 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file 431 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. 432 */ 433 int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) 434 { 435 u32 secid; 436 437 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); 438 return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, 439 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | 440 MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); 441 } 442 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); 443 444 /** 445 * ima_post_create_tmpfile - mark newly created tmpfile as new 446 * @file : newly created tmpfile 447 * 448 * No measuring, appraising or auditing of newly created tmpfiles is needed. 449 * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created 450 * tmpfiles are in policy. 451 */ 452 void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode) 453 { 454 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; 455 int must_appraise; 456 457 must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK); 458 if (!must_appraise) 459 return; 460 461 /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */ 462 iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); 463 if (!iint) 464 return; 465 466 /* needed for writing the security xattrs */ 467 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); 468 iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; 469 } 470 471 /** 472 * ima_post_path_mknod - mark as a new inode 473 * @dentry: newly created dentry 474 * 475 * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the 476 * file data can be written later. 477 */ 478 void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) 479 { 480 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; 481 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; 482 int must_appraise; 483 484 must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK); 485 if (!must_appraise) 486 return; 487 488 /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */ 489 iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); 490 if (!iint) 491 return; 492 493 /* needed for re-opening empty files */ 494 iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE; 495 } 496 497 /** 498 * ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy 499 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit 500 * @read_id: caller identifier 501 * 502 * Permit reading a file based on policy. The policy rules are written 503 * in terms of the policy identifier. Appraising the integrity of 504 * a file requires a file descriptor. 505 * 506 * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. 507 */ 508 int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) 509 { 510 /* 511 * READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER 512 * 513 * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the 514 * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion 515 * of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two 516 * buffers? 517 */ 518 return 0; 519 } 520 521 const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { 522 [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, 523 [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, 524 [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK, 525 [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, 526 [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, 527 [READING_POLICY] = POLICY_CHECK 528 }; 529 530 /** 531 * ima_post_read_file - in memory collect/appraise/audit measurement 532 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit 533 * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents 534 * @size: size of in memory file contents 535 * @read_id: caller identifier 536 * 537 * Measure/appraise/audit in memory file based on policy. Policy rules 538 * are written in terms of a policy identifier. 539 * 540 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file 541 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. 542 */ 543 int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, 544 enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) 545 { 546 enum ima_hooks func; 547 u32 secid; 548 549 if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) { 550 if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && 551 (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { 552 pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n"); 553 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ 554 } 555 return 0; 556 } 557 558 /* permit signed certs */ 559 if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) 560 return 0; 561 562 if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */ 563 if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) 564 return -EACCES; 565 return 0; 566 } 567 568 func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; 569 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); 570 return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, 571 MAY_READ, func); 572 } 573 574 /** 575 * ima_load_data - appraise decision based on policy 576 * @id: kernel load data caller identifier 577 * 578 * Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the 579 * data provided by userspace. Enforce policy rules requring a file 580 * signature (eg. kexec'ed kernel image). 581 * 582 * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. 583 */ 584 int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) 585 { 586 bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce; 587 588 ima_enforce = 589 (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) == IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; 590 591 switch (id) { 592 case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE: 593 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG) 594 && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) { 595 pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n"); 596 return -EACCES; 597 } 598 599 if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC)) { 600 pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n"); 601 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ 602 } 603 break; 604 case LOADING_FIRMWARE: 605 if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE)) { 606 pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n"); 607 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ 608 } 609 break; 610 case LOADING_MODULE: 611 sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); 612 613 if (ima_enforce && (!sig_enforce 614 && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES))) { 615 pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); 616 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ 617 } 618 default: 619 break; 620 } 621 return 0; 622 } 623 624 /* 625 * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log. 626 * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. 627 * @size: size of buffer(in bytes). 628 * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry. 629 * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation. 630 * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated. 631 * 632 * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. 633 */ 634 static void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, 635 const char *eventname, 636 const struct cred *cred, u32 secid) 637 { 638 int ret = 0; 639 struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL; 640 struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {}; 641 struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint, 642 .filename = eventname, 643 .buf = buf, 644 .buf_len = size}; 645 struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL; 646 struct { 647 struct ima_digest_data hdr; 648 char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; 649 } hash = {}; 650 int violation = 0; 651 int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; 652 int action = 0; 653 654 action = ima_get_action(NULL, cred, secid, 0, KEXEC_CMDLINE, &pcr, 655 &template_desc); 656 if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE)) 657 return; 658 659 iint.ima_hash = &hash.hdr; 660 iint.ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo; 661 iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; 662 663 ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint.ima_hash); 664 if (ret < 0) 665 goto out; 666 667 ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc); 668 if (ret < 0) 669 goto out; 670 671 ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr); 672 673 if (ret < 0) 674 ima_free_template_entry(entry); 675 676 out: 677 return; 678 } 679 680 /** 681 * ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args 682 * @buf: pointer to buffer 683 * @size: size of buffer 684 * 685 * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised. 686 */ 687 void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) 688 { 689 u32 secid; 690 691 if (buf && size != 0) { 692 security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); 693 process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", 694 current_cred(), secid); 695 } 696 } 697 698 static int __init init_ima(void) 699 { 700 int error; 701 702 ima_init_template_list(); 703 hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH); 704 error = ima_init(); 705 706 if (error && strcmp(hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], 707 CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH) != 0) { 708 pr_info("Allocating %s failed, going to use default hash algorithm %s\n", 709 hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH); 710 hash_setup_done = 0; 711 hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH); 712 error = ima_init(); 713 } 714 715 error = register_blocking_lsm_notifier(&ima_lsm_policy_notifier); 716 if (error) 717 pr_warn("Couldn't register LSM notifier, error %d\n", error); 718 719 if (!error) 720 ima_update_policy_flag(); 721 722 return error; 723 } 724 725 late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */ 726