xref: /openbmc/linux/security/apparmor/ipc.c (revision 3dc4b6fb)
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /*
3  * AppArmor security module
4  *
5  * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
6  *
7  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
8  * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
9  */
10 
11 #include <linux/gfp.h>
12 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
13 
14 #include "include/audit.h"
15 #include "include/capability.h"
16 #include "include/cred.h"
17 #include "include/policy.h"
18 #include "include/ipc.h"
19 #include "include/sig_names.h"
20 
21 /**
22  * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
23  * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
24  * @mask: permission mask to convert
25  */
26 static void audit_ptrace_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
27 {
28 	switch (mask) {
29 	case MAY_READ:
30 		audit_log_string(ab, "read");
31 		break;
32 	case MAY_WRITE:
33 		audit_log_string(ab, "trace");
34 		break;
35 	case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
36 		audit_log_string(ab, "readby");
37 		break;
38 	case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
39 		audit_log_string(ab, "tracedby");
40 		break;
41 	}
42 }
43 
44 /* call back to audit ptrace fields */
45 static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
46 {
47 	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
48 
49 	if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
50 		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
51 		audit_ptrace_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request);
52 
53 		if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
54 			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
55 			audit_ptrace_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied);
56 		}
57 	}
58 	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
59 	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
60 			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
61 }
62 
63 /* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
64 /* TODO: conditionals */
65 static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
66 			     struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
67 			     struct common_audit_data *sa)
68 {
69 	struct aa_perms perms = { };
70 
71 	aad(sa)->peer = peer;
72 	aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
73 			       &perms);
74 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
75 	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
76 }
77 
78 static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
79 			       struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
80 			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
81 {
82 	if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
83 	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
84 		return 0;
85 
86 	return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
87 }
88 
89 static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
90 			       struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
91 			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
92 {
93 	if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
94 		return 0;
95 
96 	if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
97 		return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
98 
99 	/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
100 	if (&tracer->label == tracee)
101 		return 0;
102 
103 	aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
104 	aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
105 	aad(sa)->request = 0;
106 	aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
107 				    CAP_OPT_NONE);
108 
109 	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
110 }
111 
112 /**
113  * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
114  * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
115  * @tracee: task label to be traced
116  * @request: permission request
117  *
118  * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
119  */
120 int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
121 		  u32 request)
122 {
123 	struct aa_profile *profile;
124 	u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
125 	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
126 
127 	return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
128 			profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
129 			profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
130 }
131 
132 
133 static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
134 {
135 	if (sig > SIGRTMAX)
136 		return SIGUNKNOWN;
137 	else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN)
138 		return sig - SIGRTMIN + SIGRT_BASE;
139 	else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
140 		return sig_map[sig];
141 	return SIGUNKNOWN;
142 }
143 
144 /**
145  * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string
146  * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
147  * @mask: permission mask to convert
148  */
149 static void audit_signal_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
150 {
151 	if (mask & MAY_READ)
152 		audit_log_string(ab, "receive");
153 	if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
154 		audit_log_string(ab, "send");
155 }
156 
157 /**
158  * audit_cb - call back for signal specific audit fields
159  * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
160  * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
161  */
162 static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
163 {
164 	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
165 
166 	if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
167 		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
168 		audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request);
169 		if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
170 			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
171 			audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied);
172 		}
173 	}
174 	if (aad(sa)->signal == SIGUNKNOWN)
175 		audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)",
176 				 aad(sa)->unmappedsig);
177 	else if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
178 		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]);
179 	else
180 		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
181 				 aad(sa)->signal - SIGRT_BASE);
182 	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
183 	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
184 			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
185 }
186 
187 static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
188 			       struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
189 			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
190 {
191 	struct aa_perms perms;
192 	unsigned int state;
193 
194 	if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
195 	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
196 		return 0;
197 
198 	aad(sa)->peer = peer;
199 	/* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
200 	state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
201 			    profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
202 			    aad(sa)->signal);
203 	aa_label_match(profile, peer, state, false, request, &perms);
204 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
205 	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb);
206 }
207 
208 int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
209 {
210 	struct aa_profile *profile;
211 	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL);
212 
213 	aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig);
214 	aad(&sa)->unmappedsig = sig;
215 	return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile,
216 			profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &sa),
217 			profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &sa));
218 }
219