1 /* 2 * AppArmor security module 3 * 4 * This file contains AppArmor policy attachment and domain transitions 5 * 6 * Copyright (C) 2002-2008 Novell/SUSE 7 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. 8 * 9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as 11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the 12 * License. 13 */ 14 15 #include <linux/errno.h> 16 #include <linux/fdtable.h> 17 #include <linux/file.h> 18 #include <linux/mount.h> 19 #include <linux/syscalls.h> 20 #include <linux/tracehook.h> 21 #include <linux/personality.h> 22 23 #include "include/audit.h" 24 #include "include/apparmorfs.h" 25 #include "include/context.h" 26 #include "include/domain.h" 27 #include "include/file.h" 28 #include "include/ipc.h" 29 #include "include/match.h" 30 #include "include/path.h" 31 #include "include/policy.h" 32 33 /** 34 * aa_free_domain_entries - free entries in a domain table 35 * @domain: the domain table to free (MAYBE NULL) 36 */ 37 void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain) 38 { 39 int i; 40 if (domain) { 41 if (!domain->table) 42 return; 43 44 for (i = 0; i < domain->size; i++) 45 kzfree(domain->table[i]); 46 kzfree(domain->table); 47 domain->table = NULL; 48 } 49 } 50 51 /** 52 * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task 53 * @task: task we want to change profile of (NOT NULL) 54 * @to_profile: profile to change to (NOT NULL) 55 * 56 * Check if the task is ptraced and if so if the tracing task is allowed 57 * to trace the new domain 58 * 59 * Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed 60 */ 61 static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task, 62 struct aa_profile *to_profile) 63 { 64 struct task_struct *tracer; 65 const struct cred *cred = NULL; 66 struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL; 67 int error = 0; 68 69 rcu_read_lock(); 70 tracer = ptrace_parent(task); 71 if (tracer) { 72 /* released below */ 73 cred = get_task_cred(tracer); 74 tracerp = aa_cred_profile(cred); 75 } 76 77 /* not ptraced */ 78 if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerp)) 79 goto out; 80 81 error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracerp, to_profile, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); 82 83 out: 84 rcu_read_unlock(); 85 if (cred) 86 put_cred(cred); 87 88 return error; 89 } 90 91 /** 92 * change_profile_perms - find permissions for change_profile 93 * @profile: the current profile (NOT NULL) 94 * @ns: the namespace being switched to (NOT NULL) 95 * @name: the name of the profile to change to (NOT NULL) 96 * @request: requested perms 97 * @start: state to start matching in 98 * 99 * Returns: permission set 100 */ 101 static struct file_perms change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, 102 struct aa_namespace *ns, 103 const char *name, u32 request, 104 unsigned int start) 105 { 106 struct file_perms perms; 107 struct path_cond cond = { }; 108 unsigned int state; 109 110 if (unconfined(profile)) { 111 perms.allow = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE | AA_MAY_ONEXEC; 112 perms.audit = perms.quiet = perms.kill = 0; 113 return perms; 114 } else if (!profile->file.dfa) { 115 return nullperms; 116 } else if ((ns == profile->ns)) { 117 /* try matching against rules with out namespace prepended */ 118 aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, start, name, &cond, &perms); 119 if (COMBINED_PERM_MASK(perms) & request) 120 return perms; 121 } 122 123 /* try matching with namespace name and then profile */ 124 state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, start, ns->base.name); 125 state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->file.dfa, state, ":", 1); 126 aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms); 127 128 return perms; 129 } 130 131 /** 132 * __attach_match_ - find an attachment match 133 * @name - to match against (NOT NULL) 134 * @head - profile list to walk (NOT NULL) 135 * 136 * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list. There is a matching 137 * preference where an exact match is preferred over a name which uses 138 * expressions to match, and matching expressions with the greatest 139 * xmatch_len are preferred. 140 * 141 * Requires: @head not be shared or have appropriate locks held 142 * 143 * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found 144 */ 145 static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name, 146 struct list_head *head) 147 { 148 int len = 0; 149 struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL; 150 151 list_for_each_entry(profile, head, base.list) { 152 if (profile->flags & PFLAG_NULL) 153 continue; 154 if (profile->xmatch && profile->xmatch_len > len) { 155 unsigned int state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch, 156 DFA_START, name); 157 u32 perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state); 158 /* any accepting state means a valid match. */ 159 if (perm & MAY_EXEC) { 160 candidate = profile; 161 len = profile->xmatch_len; 162 } 163 } else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name)) 164 /* exact non-re match, no more searching required */ 165 return profile; 166 } 167 168 return candidate; 169 } 170 171 /** 172 * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes 173 * @ns: the current namespace (NOT NULL) 174 * @list: list to search (NOT NULL) 175 * @name: the executable name to match against (NOT NULL) 176 * 177 * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found 178 */ 179 static struct aa_profile *find_attach(struct aa_namespace *ns, 180 struct list_head *list, const char *name) 181 { 182 struct aa_profile *profile; 183 184 read_lock(&ns->lock); 185 profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list)); 186 read_unlock(&ns->lock); 187 188 return profile; 189 } 190 191 /** 192 * separate_fqname - separate the namespace and profile names 193 * @fqname: the fqname name to split (NOT NULL) 194 * @ns_name: the namespace name if it exists (NOT NULL) 195 * 196 * This is the xtable equivalent routine of aa_split_fqname. It finds the 197 * split in an xtable fqname which contains an embedded \0 instead of a : 198 * if a namespace is specified. This is done so the xtable is constant and 199 * isn't re-split on every lookup. 200 * 201 * Either the profile or namespace name may be optional but if the namespace 202 * is specified the profile name termination must be present. This results 203 * in the following possible encodings: 204 * profile_name\0 205 * :ns_name\0profile_name\0 206 * :ns_name\0\0 207 * 208 * NOTE: the xtable fqname is pre-validated at load time in unpack_trans_table 209 * 210 * Returns: profile name if it is specified else NULL 211 */ 212 static const char *separate_fqname(const char *fqname, const char **ns_name) 213 { 214 const char *name; 215 216 if (fqname[0] == ':') { 217 /* In this case there is guaranteed to be two \0 terminators 218 * in the string. They are verified at load time by 219 * by unpack_trans_table 220 */ 221 *ns_name = fqname + 1; /* skip : */ 222 name = *ns_name + strlen(*ns_name) + 1; 223 if (!*name) 224 name = NULL; 225 } else { 226 *ns_name = NULL; 227 name = fqname; 228 } 229 230 return name; 231 } 232 233 static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name) 234 { 235 return NULL; 236 } 237 238 /** 239 * x_table_lookup - lookup an x transition name via transition table 240 * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL) 241 * @xindex: index into x transition table 242 * 243 * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL) 244 */ 245 static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex) 246 { 247 struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL; 248 struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns; 249 u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK; 250 int index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK; 251 const char *name; 252 253 /* index is guaranteed to be in range, validated at load time */ 254 for (name = profile->file.trans.table[index]; !new_profile && name; 255 name = next_name(xtype, name)) { 256 struct aa_namespace *new_ns; 257 const char *xname = NULL; 258 259 new_ns = NULL; 260 if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) { 261 /* release by caller */ 262 new_profile = aa_find_child(profile, name); 263 continue; 264 } else if (*name == ':') { 265 /* switching namespace */ 266 const char *ns_name; 267 xname = name = separate_fqname(name, &ns_name); 268 if (!xname) 269 /* no name so use profile name */ 270 xname = profile->base.hname; 271 if (*ns_name == '@') { 272 /* TODO: variable support */ 273 ; 274 } 275 /* released below */ 276 new_ns = aa_find_namespace(ns, ns_name); 277 if (!new_ns) 278 continue; 279 } else if (*name == '@') { 280 /* TODO: variable support */ 281 continue; 282 } else { 283 /* basic namespace lookup */ 284 xname = name; 285 } 286 287 /* released by caller */ 288 new_profile = aa_lookup_profile(new_ns ? new_ns : ns, xname); 289 aa_put_namespace(new_ns); 290 } 291 292 /* released by caller */ 293 return new_profile; 294 } 295 296 /** 297 * x_to_profile - get target profile for a given xindex 298 * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL) 299 * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL) 300 * @xindex: index into x transition table 301 * 302 * find profile for a transition index 303 * 304 * Returns: refcounted profile or NULL if not found available 305 */ 306 static struct aa_profile *x_to_profile(struct aa_profile *profile, 307 const char *name, u32 xindex) 308 { 309 struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL; 310 struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns; 311 u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK; 312 313 switch (xtype) { 314 case AA_X_NONE: 315 /* fail exec unless ix || ux fallback - handled by caller */ 316 return NULL; 317 case AA_X_NAME: 318 if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) 319 /* released by caller */ 320 new_profile = find_attach(ns, &profile->base.profiles, 321 name); 322 else 323 /* released by caller */ 324 new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, 325 name); 326 break; 327 case AA_X_TABLE: 328 /* released by caller */ 329 new_profile = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex); 330 break; 331 } 332 333 /* released by caller */ 334 return new_profile; 335 } 336 337 /** 338 * apparmor_bprm_set_creds - set the new creds on the bprm struct 339 * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) 340 * 341 * Returns: %0 or error on failure 342 */ 343 int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 344 { 345 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; 346 struct aa_profile *profile, *new_profile = NULL; 347 struct aa_namespace *ns; 348 char *buffer = NULL; 349 unsigned int state; 350 struct file_perms perms = {}; 351 struct path_cond cond = { 352 file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid, 353 file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode 354 }; 355 const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL; 356 int error = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); 357 if (error) 358 return error; 359 360 if (bprm->cred_prepared) 361 return 0; 362 363 cxt = bprm->cred->security; 364 BUG_ON(!cxt); 365 366 profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile)); 367 /* 368 * get the namespace from the replacement profile as replacement 369 * can change the namespace 370 */ 371 ns = profile->ns; 372 state = profile->file.start; 373 374 /* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */ 375 error = aa_path_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, &buffer, 376 &name, &info); 377 if (error) { 378 if (profile->flags & 379 (PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR | PFLAG_UNCONFINED)) 380 error = 0; 381 name = bprm->filename; 382 goto audit; 383 } 384 385 /* Test for onexec first as onexec directives override other 386 * x transitions. 387 */ 388 if (unconfined(profile)) { 389 /* unconfined task */ 390 if (cxt->onexec) 391 /* change_profile on exec already been granted */ 392 new_profile = aa_get_profile(cxt->onexec); 393 else 394 new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, name); 395 if (!new_profile) 396 goto cleanup; 397 /* 398 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed 399 * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results 400 * in a further reduction of permissions. 401 */ 402 goto apply; 403 } 404 405 /* find exec permissions for name */ 406 state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms); 407 if (cxt->onexec) { 408 struct file_perms cp; 409 info = "change_profile onexec"; 410 if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) 411 goto audit; 412 413 /* test if this exec can be paired with change_profile onexec. 414 * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing 415 * exec\0change_profile 416 */ 417 state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state); 418 cp = change_profile_perms(profile, cxt->onexec->ns, 419 cxt->onexec->base.name, 420 AA_MAY_ONEXEC, state); 421 422 if (!(cp.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) 423 goto audit; 424 new_profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(cxt->onexec)); 425 goto apply; 426 } 427 428 if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) { 429 /* exec permission determine how to transition */ 430 new_profile = x_to_profile(profile, name, perms.xindex); 431 if (!new_profile) { 432 if (perms.xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) { 433 /* (p|c|n)ix - don't change profile but do 434 * use the newest version, which was picked 435 * up above when getting profile 436 */ 437 info = "ix fallback"; 438 new_profile = aa_get_profile(profile); 439 goto x_clear; 440 } else if (perms.xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) { 441 new_profile = aa_get_profile(ns->unconfined); 442 info = "ux fallback"; 443 } else { 444 error = -ENOENT; 445 info = "profile not found"; 446 } 447 } 448 } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) { 449 /* no exec permission - are we in learning mode */ 450 new_profile = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0); 451 if (!new_profile) { 452 error = -ENOMEM; 453 info = "could not create null profile"; 454 } else { 455 error = -EACCES; 456 target = new_profile->base.hname; 457 } 458 perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE; 459 } else 460 /* fail exec */ 461 error = -EACCES; 462 463 /* 464 * Policy has specified a domain transition, if no_new_privs then 465 * fail the exec. 466 */ 467 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) { 468 aa_put_profile(new_profile); 469 error = -EPERM; 470 goto cleanup; 471 } 472 473 if (!new_profile) 474 goto audit; 475 476 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { 477 /* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */ 478 ; 479 } 480 481 if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) { 482 error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, new_profile); 483 if (error) { 484 aa_put_profile(new_profile); 485 goto audit; 486 } 487 } 488 489 /* Determine if secure exec is needed. 490 * Can be at this point for the following reasons: 491 * 1. unconfined switching to confined 492 * 2. confined switching to different confinement 493 * 3. confined switching to unconfined 494 * 495 * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec 496 * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec") 497 * 498 * bprm->unsafe is used to cache the AA_X_UNSAFE permission 499 * to avoid having to recompute in secureexec 500 */ 501 if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) { 502 AA_DEBUG("scrubbing environment variables for %s profile=%s\n", 503 name, new_profile->base.hname); 504 bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED; 505 } 506 apply: 507 target = new_profile->base.hname; 508 /* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */ 509 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; 510 511 x_clear: 512 aa_put_profile(cxt->profile); 513 /* transfer new profile reference will be released when cxt is freed */ 514 cxt->profile = new_profile; 515 516 /* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */ 517 aa_put_profile(cxt->previous); 518 aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec); 519 cxt->previous = NULL; 520 cxt->onexec = NULL; 521 cxt->token = 0; 522 523 audit: 524 error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, 525 name, target, cond.uid, info, error); 526 527 cleanup: 528 aa_put_profile(profile); 529 kfree(buffer); 530 531 return error; 532 } 533 534 /** 535 * apparmor_bprm_secureexec - determine if secureexec is needed 536 * @bprm: binprm for exec (NOT NULL) 537 * 538 * Returns: %1 if secureexec is needed else %0 539 */ 540 int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 541 { 542 int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm); 543 544 /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds 545 * and stored in bprm->unsafe. 546 */ 547 if (!ret && (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED)) 548 ret = 1; 549 550 return ret; 551 } 552 553 /** 554 * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds 555 * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) 556 */ 557 void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 558 { 559 struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile(); 560 struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = bprm->cred->security; 561 562 /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */ 563 if ((new_cxt->profile == profile) || 564 (unconfined(new_cxt->profile))) 565 return; 566 567 current->pdeath_signal = 0; 568 569 /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new profile */ 570 __aa_transition_rlimits(profile, new_cxt->profile); 571 } 572 573 /** 574 * apparmor_bprm_commited_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed 575 * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) 576 */ 577 void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 578 { 579 /* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */ 580 return; 581 } 582 583 /* 584 * Functions for self directed profile change 585 */ 586 587 /** 588 * new_compound_name - create an hname with @n2 appended to @n1 589 * @n1: base of hname (NOT NULL) 590 * @n2: name to append (NOT NULL) 591 * 592 * Returns: new name or NULL on error 593 */ 594 static char *new_compound_name(const char *n1, const char *n2) 595 { 596 char *name = kmalloc(strlen(n1) + strlen(n2) + 3, GFP_KERNEL); 597 if (name) 598 sprintf(name, "%s//%s", n1, n2); 599 return name; 600 } 601 602 /** 603 * aa_change_hat - change hat to/from subprofile 604 * @hats: vector of hat names to try changing into (MAYBE NULL if @count == 0) 605 * @count: number of hat names in @hats 606 * @token: magic value to validate the hat change 607 * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test 608 * 609 * Change to the first profile specified in @hats that exists, and store 610 * the @hat_magic in the current task context. If the count == 0 and the 611 * @token matches that stored in the current task context, return to the 612 * top level profile. 613 * 614 * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise. 615 */ 616 int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest) 617 { 618 const struct cred *cred; 619 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; 620 struct aa_profile *profile, *previous_profile, *hat = NULL; 621 char *name = NULL; 622 int i; 623 struct file_perms perms = {}; 624 const char *target = NULL, *info = NULL; 625 int error = 0; 626 627 /* 628 * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs. 629 * There is no exception for unconfined as change_hat is not 630 * available. 631 */ 632 if (current->no_new_privs) 633 return -EPERM; 634 635 /* released below */ 636 cred = get_current_cred(); 637 cxt = cred->security; 638 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); 639 previous_profile = cxt->previous; 640 641 if (unconfined(profile)) { 642 info = "unconfined"; 643 error = -EPERM; 644 goto audit; 645 } 646 647 if (count) { 648 /* attempting to change into a new hat or switch to a sibling */ 649 struct aa_profile *root; 650 root = PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile) ? profile->parent : profile; 651 652 /* find first matching hat */ 653 for (i = 0; i < count && !hat; i++) 654 /* released below */ 655 hat = aa_find_child(root, hats[i]); 656 if (!hat) { 657 if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(root) || permtest) { 658 if (list_empty(&root->base.profiles)) 659 error = -ECHILD; 660 else 661 error = -ENOENT; 662 goto out; 663 } 664 665 /* 666 * In complain mode and failed to match any hats. 667 * Audit the failure is based off of the first hat 668 * supplied. This is done due how userspace 669 * interacts with change_hat. 670 * 671 * TODO: Add logging of all failed hats 672 */ 673 674 /* freed below */ 675 name = new_compound_name(root->base.hname, hats[0]); 676 target = name; 677 /* released below */ 678 hat = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 1); 679 if (!hat) { 680 info = "failed null profile create"; 681 error = -ENOMEM; 682 goto audit; 683 } 684 } else { 685 target = hat->base.hname; 686 if (!PROFILE_IS_HAT(hat)) { 687 info = "target not hat"; 688 error = -EPERM; 689 goto audit; 690 } 691 } 692 693 error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, hat); 694 if (error) { 695 info = "ptraced"; 696 error = -EPERM; 697 goto audit; 698 } 699 700 if (!permtest) { 701 error = aa_set_current_hat(hat, token); 702 if (error == -EACCES) 703 /* kill task in case of brute force attacks */ 704 perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT; 705 else if (name && !error) 706 /* reset error for learning of new hats */ 707 error = -ENOENT; 708 } 709 } else if (previous_profile) { 710 /* Return to saved profile. Kill task if restore fails 711 * to avoid brute force attacks 712 */ 713 target = previous_profile->base.hname; 714 error = aa_restore_previous_profile(token); 715 perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT; 716 } else 717 /* ignore restores when there is no saved profile */ 718 goto out; 719 720 audit: 721 if (!permtest) 722 error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, 723 OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL, 724 target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error); 725 726 out: 727 aa_put_profile(hat); 728 kfree(name); 729 put_cred(cred); 730 731 return error; 732 } 733 734 /** 735 * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition 736 * @ns_name: name of the profile namespace to change to (MAYBE NULL) 737 * @hname: name of profile to change to (MAYBE NULL) 738 * @onexec: whether this transition is to take place immediately or at exec 739 * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test 740 * 741 * Change to new profile @name. Unlike with hats, there is no way 742 * to change back. If @name isn't specified the current profile name is 743 * used. 744 * If @onexec then the transition is delayed until 745 * the next exec. 746 * 747 * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise. 748 */ 749 int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec, 750 bool permtest) 751 { 752 const struct cred *cred; 753 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; 754 struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL; 755 struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL; 756 struct file_perms perms = {}; 757 const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL; 758 int op, error = 0; 759 u32 request; 760 761 if (!hname && !ns_name) 762 return -EINVAL; 763 764 if (onexec) { 765 request = AA_MAY_ONEXEC; 766 op = OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC; 767 } else { 768 request = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE; 769 op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE; 770 } 771 772 cred = get_current_cred(); 773 cxt = cred->security; 774 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); 775 776 /* 777 * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs 778 * and not unconfined. 779 * Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed even when 780 * no_new_privs is set because this aways results in a reduction 781 * of permissions. 782 */ 783 if (current->no_new_privs && !unconfined(profile)) { 784 put_cred(cred); 785 return -EPERM; 786 } 787 788 if (ns_name) { 789 /* released below */ 790 ns = aa_find_namespace(profile->ns, ns_name); 791 if (!ns) { 792 /* we don't create new namespace in complain mode */ 793 name = ns_name; 794 info = "namespace not found"; 795 error = -ENOENT; 796 goto audit; 797 } 798 } else 799 /* released below */ 800 ns = aa_get_namespace(profile->ns); 801 802 /* if the name was not specified, use the name of the current profile */ 803 if (!hname) { 804 if (unconfined(profile)) 805 hname = ns->unconfined->base.hname; 806 else 807 hname = profile->base.hname; 808 } 809 810 perms = change_profile_perms(profile, ns, hname, request, 811 profile->file.start); 812 if (!(perms.allow & request)) { 813 error = -EACCES; 814 goto audit; 815 } 816 817 /* released below */ 818 target = aa_lookup_profile(ns, hname); 819 if (!target) { 820 info = "profile not found"; 821 error = -ENOENT; 822 if (permtest || !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) 823 goto audit; 824 /* released below */ 825 target = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0); 826 if (!target) { 827 info = "failed null profile create"; 828 error = -ENOMEM; 829 goto audit; 830 } 831 } 832 833 /* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */ 834 error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, target); 835 if (error) { 836 info = "ptrace prevents transition"; 837 goto audit; 838 } 839 840 if (permtest) 841 goto audit; 842 843 if (onexec) 844 error = aa_set_current_onexec(target); 845 else 846 error = aa_replace_current_profile(target); 847 848 audit: 849 if (!permtest) 850 error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request, 851 name, hname, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error); 852 853 aa_put_namespace(ns); 854 aa_put_profile(target); 855 put_cred(cred); 856 857 return error; 858 } 859