xref: /openbmc/linux/security/Kconfig.hardening (revision 151f4e2b)
1menu "Kernel hardening options"
2
3config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
4	bool
5	help
6	  While the kernel is built with warnings enabled for any missed
7	  stack variable initializations, this warning is silenced for
8	  anything passed by reference to another function, under the
9	  occasionally misguided assumption that the function will do
10	  the initialization. As this regularly leads to exploitable
11	  flaws, this plugin is available to identify and zero-initialize
12	  such variables, depending on the chosen level of coverage.
13
14	  This plugin was originally ported from grsecurity/PaX. More
15	  information at:
16	   * https://grsecurity.net/
17	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
18
19menu "Memory initialization"
20
21config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
22	def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern)
23
24choice
25	prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
26	default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
27	default INIT_STACK_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
28	default INIT_STACK_NONE
29	help
30	  This option enables initialization of stack variables at
31	  function entry time. This has the possibility to have the
32	  greatest coverage (since all functions can have their
33	  variables initialized), but the performance impact depends
34	  on the function calling complexity of a given workload's
35	  syscalls.
36
37	  This chooses the level of coverage over classes of potentially
38	  uninitialized variables. The selected class will be
39	  initialized before use in a function.
40
41	config INIT_STACK_NONE
42		bool "no automatic initialization (weakest)"
43		help
44		  Disable automatic stack variable initialization.
45		  This leaves the kernel vulnerable to the standard
46		  classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits
47		  and information exposures.
48
49	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER
50		bool "zero-init structs marked for userspace (weak)"
51		depends on GCC_PLUGINS
52		select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
53		help
54		  Zero-initialize any structures on the stack containing
55		  a __user attribute. This can prevent some classes of
56		  uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
57		  exposures, like CVE-2013-2141:
58		  https://git.kernel.org/linus/b9e146d8eb3b9eca
59
60	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
61		bool "zero-init structs passed by reference (strong)"
62		depends on GCC_PLUGINS
63		select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
64		help
65		  Zero-initialize any structures on the stack that may
66		  be passed by reference and had not already been
67		  explicitly initialized. This can prevent most classes
68		  of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
69		  exposures, like CVE-2017-1000410:
70		  https://git.kernel.org/linus/06e7e776ca4d3654
71
72	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
73		bool "zero-init anything passed by reference (very strong)"
74		depends on GCC_PLUGINS
75		select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
76		help
77		  Zero-initialize any stack variables that may be passed
78		  by reference and had not already been explicitly
79		  initialized. This is intended to eliminate all classes
80		  of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
81		  exposures.
82
83	config INIT_STACK_ALL
84		bool "0xAA-init everything on the stack (strongest)"
85		depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
86		help
87		  Initializes everything on the stack with a 0xAA
88		  pattern. This is intended to eliminate all classes
89		  of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
90		  exposures, even variables that were warned to have been
91		  left uninitialized.
92
93endchoice
94
95config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
96	bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
97	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
98	depends on !COMPILE_TEST	# too noisy
99	help
100	  This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
101	  structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be
102	  initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
103	  by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.
104
105config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
106	bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
107	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
108	depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
109	help
110	  This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
111	  returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving
112	  the stack initialized to the poison value, which both reduces
113	  the lifetime of any sensitive stack contents and reduces
114	  potential for uninitialized stack variable exploits or information
115	  exposures (it does not cover functions reaching the same stack
116	  depth as prior functions during the same syscall). This blocks
117	  most uninitialized stack variable attacks, with the performance
118	  impact being driven by the depth of the stack usage, rather than
119	  the function calling complexity.
120
121	  The performance impact on a single CPU system kernel compilation
122	  sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you
123	  are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before
124	  deploying it.
125
126	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
127	   * https://grsecurity.net/
128	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
129
130config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
131	int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK"
132	default 100
133	range 0 4096
134	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
135	help
136	  The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking
137	  the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes).
138	  It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with
139	  a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
140	  If unsure, leave the default value 100.
141
142config STACKLEAK_METRICS
143	bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system"
144	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
145	depends on PROC_FS
146	help
147	  If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in
148	  the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
149	  shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and
150	  previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it
151	  can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for
152	  your workloads.
153
154config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
155	bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
156	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
157	help
158	  This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
159	  runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
160	  CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
161
162endmenu
163
164endmenu
165