xref: /openbmc/linux/samples/seccomp/user-trap.c (revision 02147266)
1 #include <signal.h>
2 #include <stdio.h>
3 #include <stdlib.h>
4 #include <unistd.h>
5 #include <errno.h>
6 #include <fcntl.h>
7 #include <string.h>
8 #include <stddef.h>
9 #include <sys/sysmacros.h>
10 #include <sys/types.h>
11 #include <sys/wait.h>
12 #include <sys/socket.h>
13 #include <sys/stat.h>
14 #include <sys/mman.h>
15 #include <sys/syscall.h>
16 #include <sys/user.h>
17 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
18 #include <sys/ptrace.h>
19 #include <sys/mount.h>
20 #include <linux/limits.h>
21 #include <linux/filter.h>
22 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
23 
24 #define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
25 
26 static int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args)
27 {
28 	errno = 0;
29 	return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args);
30 }
31 
32 static int send_fd(int sock, int fd)
33 {
34 	struct msghdr msg = {};
35 	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
36 	char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {0}, c = 'c';
37 	struct iovec io = {
38 		.iov_base = &c,
39 		.iov_len = 1,
40 	};
41 
42 	msg.msg_iov = &io;
43 	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
44 	msg.msg_control = buf;
45 	msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(buf);
46 	cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
47 	cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
48 	cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
49 	cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
50 	*((int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg)) = fd;
51 	msg.msg_controllen = cmsg->cmsg_len;
52 
53 	if (sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) {
54 		perror("sendmsg");
55 		return -1;
56 	}
57 
58 	return 0;
59 }
60 
61 static int recv_fd(int sock)
62 {
63 	struct msghdr msg = {};
64 	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
65 	char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {0}, c = 'c';
66 	struct iovec io = {
67 		.iov_base = &c,
68 		.iov_len = 1,
69 	};
70 
71 	msg.msg_iov = &io;
72 	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
73 	msg.msg_control = buf;
74 	msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(buf);
75 
76 	if (recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) {
77 		perror("recvmsg");
78 		return -1;
79 	}
80 
81 	cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
82 
83 	return *((int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg));
84 }
85 
86 static int user_trap_syscall(int nr, unsigned int flags)
87 {
88 	struct sock_filter filter[] = {
89 		BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
90 			offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
91 		BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, nr, 0, 1),
92 		BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF),
93 		BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
94 	};
95 
96 	struct sock_fprog prog = {
97 		.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
98 		.filter = filter,
99 	};
100 
101 	return seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flags, &prog);
102 }
103 
104 static int handle_req(struct seccomp_notif *req,
105 		      struct seccomp_notif_resp *resp, int listener)
106 {
107 	char path[PATH_MAX], source[PATH_MAX], target[PATH_MAX];
108 	int ret = -1, mem;
109 
110 	resp->id = req->id;
111 	resp->error = -EPERM;
112 	resp->val = 0;
113 
114 	if (req->data.nr != __NR_mount) {
115 		fprintf(stderr, "huh? trapped something besides mount? %d\n", req->data.nr);
116 		return -1;
117 	}
118 
119 	/* Only allow bind mounts. */
120 	if (!(req->data.args[3] & MS_BIND))
121 		return 0;
122 
123 	/*
124 	 * Ok, let's read the task's memory to see where they wanted their
125 	 * mount to go.
126 	 */
127 	snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%d/mem", req->pid);
128 	mem = open(path, O_RDONLY);
129 	if (mem < 0) {
130 		perror("open mem");
131 		return -1;
132 	}
133 
134 	/*
135 	 * Now we avoid a TOCTOU: we referred to a pid by its pid, but since
136 	 * the pid that made the syscall may have died, we need to confirm that
137 	 * the pid is still valid after we open its /proc/pid/mem file. We can
138 	 * ask the listener fd this as follows.
139 	 *
140 	 * Note that this check should occur *after* any task-specific
141 	 * resources are opened, to make sure that the task has not died and
142 	 * we're not wrongly reading someone else's state in order to make
143 	 * decisions.
144 	 */
145 	if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID, &req->id) < 0) {
146 		fprintf(stderr, "task died before we could map its memory\n");
147 		goto out;
148 	}
149 
150 	/*
151 	 * Phew, we've got the right /proc/pid/mem. Now we can read it. Note
152 	 * that to avoid another TOCTOU, we should read all of the pointer args
153 	 * before we decide to allow the syscall.
154 	 */
155 	if (lseek(mem, req->data.args[0], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
156 		perror("seek");
157 		goto out;
158 	}
159 
160 	ret = read(mem, source, sizeof(source));
161 	if (ret < 0) {
162 		perror("read");
163 		goto out;
164 	}
165 
166 	if (lseek(mem, req->data.args[1], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
167 		perror("seek");
168 		goto out;
169 	}
170 
171 	ret = read(mem, target, sizeof(target));
172 	if (ret < 0) {
173 		perror("read");
174 		goto out;
175 	}
176 
177 	/*
178 	 * Our policy is to only allow bind mounts inside /tmp. This isn't very
179 	 * interesting, because we could do unprivlieged bind mounts with user
180 	 * namespaces already, but you get the idea.
181 	 */
182 	if (!strncmp(source, "/tmp/", 5) && !strncmp(target, "/tmp/", 5)) {
183 		if (mount(source, target, NULL, req->data.args[3], NULL) < 0) {
184 			ret = -1;
185 			perror("actual mount");
186 			goto out;
187 		}
188 		resp->error = 0;
189 	}
190 
191 	/* Even if we didn't allow it because of policy, generating the
192 	 * response was be a success, because we want to tell the worker EPERM.
193 	 */
194 	ret = 0;
195 
196 out:
197 	close(mem);
198 	return ret;
199 }
200 
201 int main(void)
202 {
203 	int sk_pair[2], ret = 1, status, listener;
204 	pid_t worker = 0 , tracer = 0;
205 
206 	if (socketpair(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, sk_pair) < 0) {
207 		perror("socketpair");
208 		return 1;
209 	}
210 
211 	worker = fork();
212 	if (worker < 0) {
213 		perror("fork");
214 		goto close_pair;
215 	}
216 
217 	if (worker == 0) {
218 		listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_mount,
219 					     SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
220 		if (listener < 0) {
221 			perror("seccomp");
222 			exit(1);
223 		}
224 
225 		/*
226 		 * Drop privileges. We definitely can't mount as uid 1000.
227 		 */
228 		if (setuid(1000) < 0) {
229 			perror("setuid");
230 			exit(1);
231 		}
232 
233 		/*
234 		 * Send the listener to the parent; also serves as
235 		 * synchronization.
236 		 */
237 		if (send_fd(sk_pair[1], listener) < 0)
238 			exit(1);
239 		close(listener);
240 
241 		if (mkdir("/tmp/foo", 0755) < 0) {
242 			perror("mkdir");
243 			exit(1);
244 		}
245 
246 		/*
247 		 * Try a bad mount just for grins.
248 		 */
249 		if (mount("/dev/sda", "/tmp/foo", NULL, 0, NULL) != -1) {
250 			fprintf(stderr, "huh? mounted /dev/sda?\n");
251 			exit(1);
252 		}
253 
254 		if (errno != EPERM) {
255 			perror("bad error from mount");
256 			exit(1);
257 		}
258 
259 		/*
260 		 * Ok, we expect this one to succeed.
261 		 */
262 		if (mount("/tmp/foo", "/tmp/foo", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
263 			perror("mount");
264 			exit(1);
265 		}
266 
267 		exit(0);
268 	}
269 
270 	/*
271 	 * Get the listener from the child.
272 	 */
273 	listener = recv_fd(sk_pair[0]);
274 	if (listener < 0)
275 		goto out_kill;
276 
277 	/*
278 	 * Fork a task to handle the requests. This isn't strictly necessary,
279 	 * but it makes the particular writing of this sample easier, since we
280 	 * can just wait ofr the tracee to exit and kill the tracer.
281 	 */
282 	tracer = fork();
283 	if (tracer < 0) {
284 		perror("fork");
285 		goto out_kill;
286 	}
287 
288 	if (tracer == 0) {
289 		struct seccomp_notif *req;
290 		struct seccomp_notif_resp *resp;
291 		struct seccomp_notif_sizes sizes;
292 
293 		if (seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES, 0, &sizes) < 0) {
294 			perror("seccomp(GET_NOTIF_SIZES)");
295 			goto out_close;
296 		}
297 
298 		req = malloc(sizes.seccomp_notif);
299 		if (!req)
300 			goto out_close;
301 
302 		resp = malloc(sizes.seccomp_notif_resp);
303 		if (!resp)
304 			goto out_req;
305 		memset(resp, 0, sizes.seccomp_notif_resp);
306 
307 		while (1) {
308 			memset(req, 0, sizes.seccomp_notif);
309 			if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, req)) {
310 				perror("ioctl recv");
311 				goto out_resp;
312 			}
313 
314 			if (handle_req(req, resp, listener) < 0)
315 				goto out_resp;
316 
317 			/*
318 			 * ENOENT here means that the task may have gotten a
319 			 * signal and restarted the syscall. It's up to the
320 			 * handler to decide what to do in this case, but for
321 			 * the sample code, we just ignore it. Probably
322 			 * something better should happen, like undoing the
323 			 * mount, or keeping track of the args to make sure we
324 			 * don't do it again.
325 			 */
326 			if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, resp) < 0 &&
327 			    errno != ENOENT) {
328 				perror("ioctl send");
329 				goto out_resp;
330 			}
331 		}
332 out_resp:
333 		free(resp);
334 out_req:
335 		free(req);
336 out_close:
337 		close(listener);
338 		exit(1);
339 	}
340 
341 	close(listener);
342 
343 	if (waitpid(worker, &status, 0) != worker) {
344 		perror("waitpid");
345 		goto out_kill;
346 	}
347 
348 	if (umount2("/tmp/foo", MNT_DETACH) < 0 && errno != EINVAL) {
349 		perror("umount2");
350 		goto out_kill;
351 	}
352 
353 	if (remove("/tmp/foo") < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
354 		perror("remove");
355 		exit(1);
356 	}
357 
358 	if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
359 		fprintf(stderr, "worker exited nonzero\n");
360 		goto out_kill;
361 	}
362 
363 	ret = 0;
364 
365 out_kill:
366 	if (tracer > 0)
367 		kill(tracer, SIGKILL);
368 	if (worker > 0)
369 		kill(worker, SIGKILL);
370 
371 close_pair:
372 	close(sk_pair[0]);
373 	close(sk_pair[1]);
374 	return ret;
375 }
376