1 /* 2 * COPYRIGHT (c) 2008 3 * The Regents of the University of Michigan 4 * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 5 * 6 * Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works 7 * and redistribute this software and such derivative works 8 * for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of 9 * Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity 10 * pertaining to the use of distribution of this software 11 * without specific, written prior authorization. If the 12 * above copyright notice or any other identification of the 13 * University of Michigan is included in any copy of any 14 * portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must 15 * also be included. 16 * 17 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION 18 * FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY 19 * PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF 20 * MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING 21 * WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF 22 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE 23 * REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE 24 * FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR 25 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING 26 * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN 27 * IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 28 * SUCH DAMAGES. 29 */ 30 31 #include <crypto/skcipher.h> 32 #include <linux/types.h> 33 #include <linux/jiffies.h> 34 #include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h> 35 #include <linux/random.h> 36 #include <linux/pagemap.h> 37 38 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG) 39 # define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH 40 #endif 41 42 static inline int 43 gss_krb5_padding(int blocksize, int length) 44 { 45 return blocksize - (length % blocksize); 46 } 47 48 static inline void 49 gss_krb5_add_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int offset, int blocksize) 50 { 51 int padding = gss_krb5_padding(blocksize, buf->len - offset); 52 char *p; 53 struct kvec *iov; 54 55 if (buf->page_len || buf->tail[0].iov_len) 56 iov = &buf->tail[0]; 57 else 58 iov = &buf->head[0]; 59 p = iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len; 60 iov->iov_len += padding; 61 buf->len += padding; 62 memset(p, padding, padding); 63 } 64 65 static inline int 66 gss_krb5_remove_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int blocksize) 67 { 68 u8 *ptr; 69 u8 pad; 70 size_t len = buf->len; 71 72 if (len <= buf->head[0].iov_len) { 73 pad = *(u8 *)(buf->head[0].iov_base + len - 1); 74 if (pad > buf->head[0].iov_len) 75 return -EINVAL; 76 buf->head[0].iov_len -= pad; 77 goto out; 78 } else 79 len -= buf->head[0].iov_len; 80 if (len <= buf->page_len) { 81 unsigned int last = (buf->page_base + len - 1) 82 >>PAGE_SHIFT; 83 unsigned int offset = (buf->page_base + len - 1) 84 & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); 85 ptr = kmap_atomic(buf->pages[last]); 86 pad = *(ptr + offset); 87 kunmap_atomic(ptr); 88 goto out; 89 } else 90 len -= buf->page_len; 91 BUG_ON(len > buf->tail[0].iov_len); 92 pad = *(u8 *)(buf->tail[0].iov_base + len - 1); 93 out: 94 /* XXX: NOTE: we do not adjust the page lengths--they represent 95 * a range of data in the real filesystem page cache, and we need 96 * to know that range so the xdr code can properly place read data. 97 * However adjusting the head length, as we do above, is harmless. 98 * In the case of a request that fits into a single page, the server 99 * also uses length and head length together to determine the original 100 * start of the request to copy the request for deferal; so it's 101 * easier on the server if we adjust head and tail length in tandem. 102 * It's not really a problem that we don't fool with the page and 103 * tail lengths, though--at worst badly formed xdr might lead the 104 * server to attempt to parse the padding. 105 * XXX: Document all these weird requirements for gss mechanism 106 * wrap/unwrap functions. */ 107 if (pad > blocksize) 108 return -EINVAL; 109 if (buf->len > pad) 110 buf->len -= pad; 111 else 112 return -EINVAL; 113 return 0; 114 } 115 116 void 117 gss_krb5_make_confounder(char *p, u32 conflen) 118 { 119 static u64 i = 0; 120 u64 *q = (u64 *)p; 121 122 /* rfc1964 claims this should be "random". But all that's really 123 * necessary is that it be unique. And not even that is necessary in 124 * our case since our "gssapi" implementation exists only to support 125 * rpcsec_gss, so we know that the only buffers we will ever encrypt 126 * already begin with a unique sequence number. Just to hedge my bets 127 * I'll make a half-hearted attempt at something unique, but ensuring 128 * uniqueness would mean worrying about atomicity and rollover, and I 129 * don't care enough. */ 130 131 /* initialize to random value */ 132 if (i == 0) { 133 i = prandom_u32(); 134 i = (i << 32) | prandom_u32(); 135 } 136 137 switch (conflen) { 138 case 16: 139 *q++ = i++; 140 /* fall through */ 141 case 8: 142 *q++ = i++; 143 break; 144 default: 145 BUG(); 146 } 147 } 148 149 /* Assumptions: the head and tail of inbuf are ours to play with. 150 * The pages, however, may be real pages in the page cache and we replace 151 * them with scratch pages from **pages before writing to them. */ 152 /* XXX: obviously the above should be documentation of wrap interface, 153 * and shouldn't be in this kerberos-specific file. */ 154 155 /* XXX factor out common code with seal/unseal. */ 156 157 static u32 158 gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, 159 struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) 160 { 161 char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; 162 struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata), 163 .data = cksumdata}; 164 int blocksize = 0, plainlen; 165 unsigned char *ptr, *msg_start; 166 time64_t now; 167 int headlen; 168 struct page **tmp_pages; 169 u32 seq_send; 170 u8 *cksumkey; 171 u32 conflen = kctx->gk5e->conflen; 172 173 dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); 174 175 now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); 176 177 blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc); 178 gss_krb5_add_padding(buf, offset, blocksize); 179 BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % blocksize); 180 plainlen = conflen + buf->len - offset; 181 182 headlen = g_token_size(&kctx->mech_used, 183 GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength + plainlen) - 184 (buf->len - offset); 185 186 ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; 187 /* shift data to make room for header. */ 188 xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, headlen); 189 190 /* XXX Would be cleverer to encrypt while copying. */ 191 BUG_ON((buf->len - offset - headlen) % blocksize); 192 193 g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, 194 GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 195 kctx->gk5e->cksumlength + plainlen, &ptr); 196 197 198 /* ptr now at header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */ 199 ptr[0] = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff); 200 ptr[1] = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff); 201 202 msg_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; 203 204 /* 205 * signalg and sealalg are stored as if they were converted from LE 206 * to host endian, even though they're opaque pairs of bytes according 207 * to the RFC. 208 */ 209 *(__le16 *)(ptr + 2) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->signalg); 210 *(__le16 *)(ptr + 4) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->sealalg); 211 ptr[6] = 0xff; 212 ptr[7] = 0xff; 213 214 gss_krb5_make_confounder(msg_start, conflen); 215 216 if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum) 217 cksumkey = kctx->cksum; 218 else 219 cksumkey = NULL; 220 221 /* XXXJBF: UGH!: */ 222 tmp_pages = buf->pages; 223 buf->pages = pages; 224 if (make_checksum(kctx, ptr, 8, buf, offset + headlen - conflen, 225 cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SEAL, &md5cksum)) 226 return GSS_S_FAILURE; 227 buf->pages = tmp_pages; 228 229 memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len); 230 231 seq_send = atomic_fetch_inc(&kctx->seq_send); 232 233 /* XXX would probably be more efficient to compute checksum 234 * and encrypt at the same time: */ 235 if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx, kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff, 236 seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8))) 237 return GSS_S_FAILURE; 238 239 if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { 240 struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher; 241 int err; 242 cipher = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 243 0, 0); 244 if (IS_ERR(cipher)) 245 return GSS_S_FAILURE; 246 247 krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(kctx, cipher, seq_send); 248 249 err = gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(cipher, buf, 250 offset + headlen - conflen, pages); 251 crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cipher); 252 if (err) 253 return GSS_S_FAILURE; 254 } else { 255 if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, 256 offset + headlen - conflen, pages)) 257 return GSS_S_FAILURE; 258 } 259 260 return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE; 261 } 262 263 static u32 264 gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, 265 struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack, 266 unsigned int *align) 267 { 268 int signalg; 269 int sealalg; 270 char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; 271 struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata), 272 .data = cksumdata}; 273 time64_t now; 274 int direction; 275 s32 seqnum; 276 unsigned char *ptr; 277 int bodysize; 278 void *data_start, *orig_start; 279 int data_len; 280 int blocksize; 281 u32 conflen = kctx->gk5e->conflen; 282 int crypt_offset; 283 u8 *cksumkey; 284 unsigned int saved_len = buf->len; 285 286 dprintk("RPC: gss_unwrap_kerberos\n"); 287 288 ptr = (u8 *)buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; 289 if (g_verify_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr, 290 len - offset)) 291 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; 292 293 if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) || 294 (ptr[1] != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff))) 295 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; 296 297 /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */ 298 299 /* get the sign and seal algorithms */ 300 301 signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8); 302 if (signalg != kctx->gk5e->signalg) 303 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; 304 305 sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8); 306 if (sealalg != kctx->gk5e->sealalg) 307 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; 308 309 if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff)) 310 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; 311 312 /* 313 * Data starts after token header and checksum. ptr points 314 * to the beginning of the token header 315 */ 316 crypt_offset = ptr + (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) - 317 (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base; 318 319 /* 320 * Need plaintext seqnum to derive encryption key for arcfour-hmac 321 */ 322 if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, 323 ptr + 8, &direction, &seqnum)) 324 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; 325 326 if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) || 327 (!kctx->initiate && direction != 0)) 328 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; 329 330 buf->len = len; 331 if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { 332 struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher; 333 int err; 334 335 cipher = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 336 0, 0); 337 if (IS_ERR(cipher)) 338 return GSS_S_FAILURE; 339 340 krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(kctx, cipher, seqnum); 341 342 err = gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(cipher, buf, crypt_offset); 343 crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cipher); 344 if (err) 345 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; 346 } else { 347 if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, crypt_offset)) 348 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; 349 } 350 351 if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum) 352 cksumkey = kctx->cksum; 353 else 354 cksumkey = NULL; 355 356 if (make_checksum(kctx, ptr, 8, buf, crypt_offset, 357 cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SEAL, &md5cksum)) 358 return GSS_S_FAILURE; 359 360 if (memcmp(md5cksum.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, 361 kctx->gk5e->cksumlength)) 362 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; 363 364 /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */ 365 366 now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); 367 368 if (now > kctx->endtime) 369 return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED; 370 371 /* do sequencing checks */ 372 373 /* Copy the data back to the right position. XXX: Would probably be 374 * better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */ 375 376 blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc); 377 data_start = ptr + (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) + 378 conflen; 379 orig_start = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; 380 data_len = (buf->head[0].iov_base + buf->head[0].iov_len) - data_start; 381 memmove(orig_start, data_start, data_len); 382 buf->head[0].iov_len -= (data_start - orig_start); 383 buf->len = len - (data_start - orig_start); 384 385 if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf, blocksize)) 386 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; 387 388 /* slack must include room for krb5 padding */ 389 *slack = XDR_QUADLEN(saved_len - buf->len); 390 /* The GSS blob always precedes the RPC message payload */ 391 *align = *slack; 392 return GSS_S_COMPLETE; 393 } 394 395 /* 396 * We can shift data by up to LOCAL_BUF_LEN bytes in a pass. If we need 397 * to do more than that, we shift repeatedly. Kevin Coffman reports 398 * seeing 28 bytes as the value used by Microsoft clients and servers 399 * with AES, so this constant is chosen to allow handling 28 in one pass 400 * without using too much stack space. 401 * 402 * If that proves to a problem perhaps we could use a more clever 403 * algorithm. 404 */ 405 #define LOCAL_BUF_LEN 32u 406 407 static void rotate_buf_a_little(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift) 408 { 409 char head[LOCAL_BUF_LEN]; 410 char tmp[LOCAL_BUF_LEN]; 411 unsigned int this_len, i; 412 413 BUG_ON(shift > LOCAL_BUF_LEN); 414 415 read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, 0, head, shift); 416 for (i = 0; i + shift < buf->len; i += LOCAL_BUF_LEN) { 417 this_len = min(LOCAL_BUF_LEN, buf->len - (i + shift)); 418 read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, i+shift, tmp, this_len); 419 write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, i, tmp, this_len); 420 } 421 write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, buf->len - shift, head, shift); 422 } 423 424 static void _rotate_left(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift) 425 { 426 int shifted = 0; 427 int this_shift; 428 429 shift %= buf->len; 430 while (shifted < shift) { 431 this_shift = min(shift - shifted, LOCAL_BUF_LEN); 432 rotate_buf_a_little(buf, this_shift); 433 shifted += this_shift; 434 } 435 } 436 437 static void rotate_left(u32 base, struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift) 438 { 439 struct xdr_buf subbuf; 440 441 xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, base, buf->len - base); 442 _rotate_left(&subbuf, shift); 443 } 444 445 static u32 446 gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, 447 struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) 448 { 449 u8 *ptr, *plainhdr; 450 time64_t now; 451 u8 flags = 0x00; 452 __be16 *be16ptr; 453 __be64 *be64ptr; 454 u32 err; 455 456 dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); 457 458 if (kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2 == NULL) 459 return GSS_S_FAILURE; 460 461 /* make room for gss token header */ 462 if (xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)) 463 return GSS_S_FAILURE; 464 465 /* construct gss token header */ 466 ptr = plainhdr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; 467 *ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG2_TOK_WRAP>>8) & 0xff); 468 *ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG2_TOK_WRAP & 0xff); 469 470 if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR) == 0) 471 flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR; 472 if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY) != 0) 473 flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_ACCEPTORSUBKEY; 474 /* We always do confidentiality in wrap tokens */ 475 flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED; 476 477 *ptr++ = flags; 478 *ptr++ = 0xff; 479 be16ptr = (__be16 *)ptr; 480 481 *be16ptr++ = 0; 482 /* "inner" token header always uses 0 for RRC */ 483 *be16ptr++ = 0; 484 485 be64ptr = (__be64 *)be16ptr; 486 *be64ptr = cpu_to_be64(atomic64_fetch_inc(&kctx->seq_send64)); 487 488 err = (*kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, buf, pages); 489 if (err) 490 return err; 491 492 now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); 493 return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE; 494 } 495 496 static u32 497 gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, 498 struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack, 499 unsigned int *align) 500 { 501 time64_t now; 502 u8 *ptr; 503 u8 flags = 0x00; 504 u16 ec, rrc; 505 int err; 506 u32 headskip, tailskip; 507 u8 decrypted_hdr[GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN]; 508 unsigned int movelen; 509 510 511 dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); 512 513 if (kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2 == NULL) 514 return GSS_S_FAILURE; 515 516 ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; 517 518 if (be16_to_cpu(*((__be16 *)ptr)) != KG2_TOK_WRAP) 519 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; 520 521 flags = ptr[2]; 522 if ((!kctx->initiate && (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)) || 523 (kctx->initiate && !(flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR))) 524 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; 525 526 if ((flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED) == 0) { 527 dprintk("%s: token missing expected sealed flag\n", __func__); 528 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; 529 } 530 531 if (ptr[3] != 0xff) 532 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; 533 534 ec = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 4)); 535 rrc = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 6)); 536 537 /* 538 * NOTE: the sequence number at ptr + 8 is skipped, rpcsec_gss 539 * doesn't want it checked; see page 6 of rfc 2203. 540 */ 541 542 if (rrc != 0) 543 rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc); 544 545 err = (*kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, len, buf, 546 &headskip, &tailskip); 547 if (err) 548 return GSS_S_FAILURE; 549 550 /* 551 * Retrieve the decrypted gss token header and verify 552 * it against the original 553 */ 554 err = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, 555 len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - tailskip, 556 decrypted_hdr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN); 557 if (err) { 558 dprintk("%s: error %u getting decrypted_hdr\n", __func__, err); 559 return GSS_S_FAILURE; 560 } 561 if (memcmp(ptr, decrypted_hdr, 6) 562 || memcmp(ptr + 8, decrypted_hdr + 8, 8)) { 563 dprintk("%s: token hdr, plaintext hdr mismatch!\n", __func__); 564 return GSS_S_FAILURE; 565 } 566 567 /* do sequencing checks */ 568 569 /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */ 570 now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); 571 if (now > kctx->endtime) 572 return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED; 573 574 /* 575 * Move the head data back to the right position in xdr_buf. 576 * We ignore any "ec" data since it might be in the head or 577 * the tail, and we really don't need to deal with it. 578 * Note that buf->head[0].iov_len may indicate the available 579 * head buffer space rather than that actually occupied. 580 */ 581 movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, len); 582 movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; 583 BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen > 584 buf->head[0].iov_len); 585 memmove(ptr, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip, movelen); 586 buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; 587 buf->len = len - (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip); 588 589 /* Trim off the trailing "extra count" and checksum blob */ 590 xdr_buf_trim(buf, ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); 591 592 *align = XDR_QUADLEN(GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip); 593 *slack = *align + XDR_QUADLEN(ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); 594 return GSS_S_COMPLETE; 595 } 596 597 u32 598 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, 599 struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) 600 { 601 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; 602 603 switch (kctx->enctype) { 604 default: 605 BUG(); 606 case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW: 607 case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: 608 case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC: 609 return gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, buf, pages); 610 case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: 611 case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: 612 return gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, buf, pages); 613 } 614 } 615 616 u32 617 gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, 618 int len, struct xdr_buf *buf) 619 { 620 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; 621 622 switch (kctx->enctype) { 623 default: 624 BUG(); 625 case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW: 626 case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: 627 case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC: 628 return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, len, buf, 629 &gctx->slack, &gctx->align); 630 case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: 631 case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: 632 return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, len, buf, 633 &gctx->slack, &gctx->align); 634 } 635 } 636