1 /* 2 BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux 3 Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies). 4 5 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 6 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as 7 published by the Free Software Foundation; 8 9 THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS 10 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, 11 FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS. 12 IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY 13 CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES 14 WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN 15 ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF 16 OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. 17 18 ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS, 19 COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS 20 SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED. 21 */ 22 23 #include <linux/debugfs.h> 24 #include <linux/scatterlist.h> 25 #include <linux/crypto.h> 26 #include <crypto/b128ops.h> 27 #include <crypto/hash.h> 28 29 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h> 30 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h> 31 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h> 32 #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h> 33 34 #include "ecc.h" 35 #include "smp.h" 36 37 #define SMP_DEV(hdev) \ 38 ((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data) 39 40 /* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want 41 * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys 42 * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions. 43 */ 44 #ifdef DEBUG 45 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \ 46 ##__VA_ARGS__) 47 #else 48 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \ 49 ##__VA_ARGS__) 50 #endif 51 52 #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd) 53 54 /* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */ 55 #define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY); 56 57 #define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000) 58 59 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \ 60 0x1f : 0x07) 61 #define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07 62 63 /* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */ 64 #define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80 65 66 enum { 67 SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, 68 SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, 69 SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, 70 SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, 71 SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, 72 SMP_FLAG_SC, 73 SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, 74 SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, 75 SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, 76 SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, 77 SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, 78 SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, 79 }; 80 81 struct smp_dev { 82 /* Secure Connections OOB data */ 83 u8 local_pk[64]; 84 u8 local_sk[32]; 85 u8 local_rand[16]; 86 bool debug_key; 87 88 u8 min_key_size; 89 u8 max_key_size; 90 91 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes; 92 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; 93 }; 94 95 struct smp_chan { 96 struct l2cap_conn *conn; 97 struct delayed_work security_timer; 98 unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */ 99 100 u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */ 101 u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */ 102 u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */ 103 u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */ 104 u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */ 105 u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */ 106 u8 rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */ 107 u8 lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */ 108 u8 enc_key_size; 109 u8 remote_key_dist; 110 bdaddr_t id_addr; 111 u8 id_addr_type; 112 u8 irk[16]; 113 struct smp_csrk *csrk; 114 struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk; 115 struct smp_ltk *ltk; 116 struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk; 117 struct smp_irk *remote_irk; 118 u8 *link_key; 119 unsigned long flags; 120 u8 method; 121 u8 passkey_round; 122 123 /* Secure Connections variables */ 124 u8 local_pk[64]; 125 u8 local_sk[32]; 126 u8 remote_pk[64]; 127 u8 dhkey[32]; 128 u8 mackey[16]; 129 130 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes; 131 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; 132 }; 133 134 /* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core 135 * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the 136 * private debug key. 137 */ 138 static const u8 debug_pk[64] = { 139 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc, 140 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef, 141 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e, 142 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20, 143 144 0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74, 145 0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76, 146 0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63, 147 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc, 148 }; 149 150 static const u8 debug_sk[32] = { 151 0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58, 152 0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a, 153 0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74, 154 0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f, 155 }; 156 157 static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len) 158 { 159 size_t i; 160 161 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 162 dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i]; 163 } 164 165 /* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions 166 * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6. 167 */ 168 169 static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m, 170 size_t len, u8 mac[16]) 171 { 172 uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX]; 173 SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm); 174 int err; 175 176 if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX) 177 return -EFBIG; 178 179 if (!tfm) { 180 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm); 181 return -EINVAL; 182 } 183 184 desc->tfm = tfm; 185 desc->flags = 0; 186 187 /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */ 188 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16); 189 swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len); 190 191 SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m); 192 SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k); 193 194 err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16); 195 if (err) { 196 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err); 197 return err; 198 } 199 200 err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, msg_msb, len, mac_msb); 201 shash_desc_zero(desc); 202 if (err) { 203 BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err); 204 return err; 205 } 206 207 swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16); 208 209 SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac); 210 211 return 0; 212 } 213 214 static int smp_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], 215 const u8 v[32], const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16]) 216 { 217 u8 m[65]; 218 int err; 219 220 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u); 221 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v); 222 SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z); 223 224 m[0] = z; 225 memcpy(m + 1, v, 32); 226 memcpy(m + 33, u, 32); 227 228 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res); 229 if (err) 230 return err; 231 232 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res); 233 234 return err; 235 } 236 237 static int smp_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32], 238 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7], 239 const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16]) 240 { 241 /* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in 242 * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII 243 * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a 244 * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little 245 * endian format. 246 */ 247 const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 }; 248 const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60, 249 0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c }; 250 const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 }; 251 u8 m[53], t[16]; 252 int err; 253 254 SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w); 255 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2); 256 SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2); 257 258 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t); 259 if (err) 260 return err; 261 262 SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t); 263 264 memcpy(m, length, 2); 265 memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7); 266 memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7); 267 memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16); 268 memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16); 269 memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4); 270 271 m[52] = 0; /* Counter */ 272 273 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey); 274 if (err) 275 return err; 276 277 SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey); 278 279 m[52] = 1; /* Counter */ 280 281 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk); 282 if (err) 283 return err; 284 285 SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk); 286 287 return 0; 288 } 289 290 static int smp_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16], 291 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16], 292 const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7], 293 u8 res[16]) 294 { 295 u8 m[65]; 296 int err; 297 298 SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w); 299 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2); 300 SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2); 301 302 memcpy(m, a2, 7); 303 memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7); 304 memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3); 305 memcpy(m + 17, r, 16); 306 memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16); 307 memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16); 308 309 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res); 310 if (err) 311 return err; 312 313 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res); 314 315 return err; 316 } 317 318 static int smp_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32], 319 const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val) 320 { 321 u8 m[80], tmp[16]; 322 int err; 323 324 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u); 325 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v); 326 SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y); 327 328 memcpy(m, y, 16); 329 memcpy(m + 16, v, 32); 330 memcpy(m + 48, u, 32); 331 332 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp); 333 if (err) 334 return err; 335 336 *val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp); 337 *val %= 1000000; 338 339 SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val); 340 341 return 0; 342 } 343 344 static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16], 345 const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16]) 346 { 347 int err; 348 349 SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id); 350 351 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res); 352 if (err) 353 return err; 354 355 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res); 356 357 return err; 358 } 359 360 /* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1, 361 * s1 and ah. 362 */ 363 364 static int smp_e(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r) 365 { 366 uint8_t tmp[16], data[16]; 367 int err; 368 369 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r); 370 371 if (!tfm) { 372 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm); 373 return -EINVAL; 374 } 375 376 /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */ 377 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16); 378 379 err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16); 380 if (err) { 381 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err); 382 return err; 383 } 384 385 /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */ 386 swap_buf(r, data, 16); 387 388 crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, data, data); 389 390 /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */ 391 swap_buf(data, r, 16); 392 393 SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r); 394 395 return err; 396 } 397 398 static int smp_c1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16], 399 const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, 400 const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16]) 401 { 402 u8 p1[16], p2[16]; 403 int err; 404 405 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r); 406 SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra); 407 SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres); 408 409 memset(p1, 0, 16); 410 411 /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */ 412 p1[0] = _iat; 413 p1[1] = _rat; 414 memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7); 415 memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7); 416 417 SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1); 418 419 /* res = r XOR p1 */ 420 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1); 421 422 /* res = e(k, res) */ 423 err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res); 424 if (err) { 425 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); 426 return err; 427 } 428 429 /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */ 430 memcpy(p2, ra, 6); 431 memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6); 432 memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4); 433 434 SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2); 435 436 /* res = res XOR p2 */ 437 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2); 438 439 /* res = e(k, res) */ 440 err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res); 441 if (err) 442 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); 443 444 return err; 445 } 446 447 static int smp_s1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16], 448 const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16]) 449 { 450 int err; 451 452 /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */ 453 memcpy(_r, r2, 8); 454 memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8); 455 456 err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, _r); 457 if (err) 458 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); 459 460 return err; 461 } 462 463 static int smp_ah(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 irk[16], 464 const u8 r[3], u8 res[3]) 465 { 466 u8 _res[16]; 467 int err; 468 469 /* r' = padding || r */ 470 memcpy(_res, r, 3); 471 memset(_res + 3, 0, 13); 472 473 err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res); 474 if (err) { 475 BT_ERR("Encrypt error"); 476 return err; 477 } 478 479 /* The output of the random address function ah is: 480 * ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24 481 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits 482 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the 483 * result of ah. 484 */ 485 memcpy(res, _res, 3); 486 487 return 0; 488 } 489 490 bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], 491 const bdaddr_t *bdaddr) 492 { 493 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; 494 struct smp_dev *smp; 495 u8 hash[3]; 496 int err; 497 498 if (!chan || !chan->data) 499 return false; 500 501 smp = chan->data; 502 503 BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk); 504 505 err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash); 506 if (err) 507 return false; 508 509 return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3); 510 } 511 512 int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa) 513 { 514 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; 515 struct smp_dev *smp; 516 int err; 517 518 if (!chan || !chan->data) 519 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 520 521 smp = chan->data; 522 523 get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3); 524 525 rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */ 526 rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */ 527 528 err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b); 529 if (err < 0) 530 return err; 531 532 BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa); 533 534 return 0; 535 } 536 537 int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16]) 538 { 539 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; 540 struct smp_dev *smp; 541 int err; 542 543 if (!chan || !chan->data) 544 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 545 546 smp = chan->data; 547 548 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) { 549 BT_DBG("Using debug keys"); 550 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64); 551 memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32); 552 smp->debug_key = true; 553 } else { 554 while (true) { 555 /* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */ 556 if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk)) 557 return -EIO; 558 559 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that 560 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key. 561 */ 562 if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32)) 563 break; 564 } 565 smp->debug_key = false; 566 } 567 568 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk); 569 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32); 570 SMP_DBG("OOB Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk); 571 572 get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16); 573 574 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk, 575 smp->local_rand, 0, hash); 576 if (err < 0) 577 return err; 578 579 memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16); 580 581 return 0; 582 } 583 584 static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data) 585 { 586 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 587 struct smp_chan *smp; 588 struct kvec iv[2]; 589 struct msghdr msg; 590 591 if (!chan) 592 return; 593 594 BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code); 595 596 iv[0].iov_base = &code; 597 iv[0].iov_len = 1; 598 599 iv[1].iov_base = data; 600 iv[1].iov_len = len; 601 602 memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); 603 604 iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, iv, 2, 1 + len); 605 606 l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len); 607 608 if (!chan->data) 609 return; 610 611 smp = chan->data; 612 613 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); 614 schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT); 615 } 616 617 static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq) 618 { 619 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) { 620 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC) 621 return BT_SECURITY_FIPS; 622 else 623 return BT_SECURITY_HIGH; 624 } else { 625 return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; 626 } 627 } 628 629 static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level) 630 { 631 switch (sec_level) { 632 case BT_SECURITY_FIPS: 633 case BT_SECURITY_HIGH: 634 return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING; 635 case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM: 636 return SMP_AUTH_BONDING; 637 default: 638 return SMP_AUTH_NONE; 639 } 640 } 641 642 static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, 643 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, 644 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq) 645 { 646 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 647 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 648 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 649 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 650 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT; 651 652 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) { 653 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; 654 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; 655 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING; 656 } else { 657 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING; 658 } 659 660 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING)) 661 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; 662 663 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY)) 664 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; 665 666 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) && 667 (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) { 668 struct oob_data *oob_data; 669 u8 bdaddr_type; 670 671 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) { 672 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY; 673 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY; 674 } 675 676 if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC) 677 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC; 678 else 679 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM; 680 681 oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst, 682 bdaddr_type); 683 if (oob_data && oob_data->present) { 684 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags); 685 oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT; 686 memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16); 687 memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16); 688 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf); 689 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr); 690 } 691 692 } else { 693 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC; 694 } 695 696 if (rsp == NULL) { 697 req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; 698 req->oob_flag = oob_flag; 699 req->max_key_size = SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size; 700 req->init_key_dist = local_dist; 701 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist; 702 req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev)); 703 704 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist; 705 return; 706 } 707 708 rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; 709 rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag; 710 rsp->max_key_size = SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size; 711 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist; 712 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist; 713 rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev)); 714 715 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist; 716 } 717 718 static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size) 719 { 720 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 721 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; 722 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 723 724 if (max_key_size > SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size || 725 max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE) 726 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; 727 728 smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size; 729 730 return 0; 731 } 732 733 static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn) 734 { 735 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 736 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 737 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 738 bool complete; 739 740 BUG_ON(!smp); 741 742 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); 743 744 complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); 745 mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete); 746 747 kzfree(smp->csrk); 748 kzfree(smp->slave_csrk); 749 kzfree(smp->link_key); 750 751 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes); 752 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); 753 754 /* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key 755 * support hasn't been explicitly enabled. 756 */ 757 if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG && 758 !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) { 759 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list); 760 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu); 761 smp->ltk = NULL; 762 } 763 764 /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */ 765 if (!complete) { 766 if (smp->ltk) { 767 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list); 768 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu); 769 } 770 771 if (smp->slave_ltk) { 772 list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list); 773 kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu); 774 } 775 776 if (smp->remote_irk) { 777 list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list); 778 kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu); 779 } 780 } 781 782 chan->data = NULL; 783 kzfree(smp); 784 hci_conn_drop(hcon); 785 } 786 787 static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason) 788 { 789 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 790 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 791 792 if (reason) 793 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason), 794 &reason); 795 796 mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); 797 798 if (chan->data) 799 smp_chan_destroy(conn); 800 } 801 802 #define JUST_WORKS 0x00 803 #define JUST_CFM 0x01 804 #define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02 805 #define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03 806 #define REQ_OOB 0x04 807 #define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05 808 #define OVERLAP 0xFF 809 810 static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = { 811 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, 812 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, 813 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, 814 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM }, 815 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP }, 816 }; 817 818 static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = { 819 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, 820 { JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, 821 { DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY }, 822 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM }, 823 { DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, 824 }; 825 826 static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) 827 { 828 /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets 829 * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators. 830 */ 831 if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY || 832 remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY) 833 return JUST_CFM; 834 835 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) 836 return sc_method[remote_io][local_io]; 837 838 return gen_method[remote_io][local_io]; 839 } 840 841 static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, 842 u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) 843 { 844 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 845 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 846 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 847 u32 passkey = 0; 848 int ret = 0; 849 850 /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */ 851 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); 852 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); 853 854 BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io); 855 856 /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming 857 * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM 858 * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this 859 * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the 860 * table. 861 */ 862 if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM)) 863 smp->method = JUST_CFM; 864 else 865 smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io); 866 867 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */ 868 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, 869 &smp->flags)) 870 smp->method = JUST_WORKS; 871 872 /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */ 873 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && 874 hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) 875 smp->method = JUST_WORKS; 876 877 /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */ 878 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) { 879 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); 880 return 0; 881 } 882 883 /* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we 884 * can only recover the just-works case. 885 */ 886 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) 887 return -EINVAL; 888 889 /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */ 890 if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) { 891 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags); 892 if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH) 893 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; 894 } 895 896 /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master 897 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey. 898 */ 899 if (smp->method == OVERLAP) { 900 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) 901 smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY; 902 else 903 smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY; 904 } 905 906 /* Generate random passkey. */ 907 if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) { 908 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); 909 get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey)); 910 passkey %= 1000000; 911 put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk); 912 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey); 913 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); 914 } 915 916 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) 917 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, 918 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type); 919 else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM) 920 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, 921 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, 922 passkey, 1); 923 else 924 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, 925 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, 926 passkey, 0); 927 928 return ret; 929 } 930 931 static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) 932 { 933 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 934 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp; 935 int ret; 936 937 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); 938 939 ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, 940 conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr, 941 conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr, 942 cp.confirm_val); 943 if (ret) 944 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 945 946 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); 947 948 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp); 949 950 if (conn->hcon->out) 951 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 952 else 953 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); 954 955 return 0; 956 } 957 958 static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) 959 { 960 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 961 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 962 u8 confirm[16]; 963 int ret; 964 965 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(smp->tfm_aes)) 966 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 967 968 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); 969 970 ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, 971 hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr, 972 hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm); 973 if (ret) 974 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 975 976 if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf)) != 0) { 977 BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)"); 978 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; 979 } 980 981 if (hcon->out) { 982 u8 stk[16]; 983 __le64 rand = 0; 984 __le16 ediv = 0; 985 986 smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk); 987 988 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) 989 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 990 991 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size); 992 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size; 993 set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); 994 } else { 995 u8 stk[16], auth; 996 __le64 rand = 0; 997 __le16 ediv = 0; 998 999 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), 1000 smp->prnd); 1001 1002 smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk); 1003 1004 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH) 1005 auth = 1; 1006 else 1007 auth = 0; 1008 1009 /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the 1010 * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master 1011 * STK never needs to be stored). 1012 */ 1013 hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, 1014 SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); 1015 } 1016 1017 return 0; 1018 } 1019 1020 static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) 1021 { 1022 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 1023 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 1024 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 1025 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 1026 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; 1027 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; 1028 bool persistent; 1029 1030 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { 1031 if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) 1032 persistent = false; 1033 else 1034 persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY, 1035 &hcon->flags); 1036 } else { 1037 /* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if 1038 * both sides had the bonding bit set in their 1039 * authentication requests. 1040 */ 1041 persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & 1042 SMP_AUTH_BONDING); 1043 } 1044 1045 if (smp->remote_irk) { 1046 mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent); 1047 1048 /* Now that user space can be considered to know the 1049 * identity address track the connection based on it 1050 * from now on (assuming this is an LE link). 1051 */ 1052 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) { 1053 bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr); 1054 hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type; 1055 queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work); 1056 } 1057 } 1058 1059 if (smp->csrk) { 1060 smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; 1061 bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); 1062 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent); 1063 } 1064 1065 if (smp->slave_csrk) { 1066 smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; 1067 bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); 1068 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent); 1069 } 1070 1071 if (smp->ltk) { 1072 smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; 1073 bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); 1074 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent); 1075 } 1076 1077 if (smp->slave_ltk) { 1078 smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; 1079 bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); 1080 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent); 1081 } 1082 1083 if (smp->link_key) { 1084 struct link_key *key; 1085 u8 type; 1086 1087 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags)) 1088 type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION; 1089 else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) 1090 type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256; 1091 else 1092 type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256; 1093 1094 key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst, 1095 smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent); 1096 if (key) { 1097 mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent); 1098 1099 /* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant 1100 * flag is not set. 1101 */ 1102 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) && 1103 key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) { 1104 list_del_rcu(&key->list); 1105 kfree_rcu(key, rcu); 1106 } 1107 } 1108 } 1109 } 1110 1111 static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp) 1112 { 1113 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; 1114 u8 key_type, auth; 1115 1116 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags)) 1117 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG; 1118 else 1119 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256; 1120 1121 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) 1122 auth = 1; 1123 else 1124 auth = 0; 1125 1126 smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, 1127 key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size, 1128 0, 0); 1129 } 1130 1131 static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp) 1132 { 1133 /* These constants are as specified in the core specification. 1134 * In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp1' and 'lebr'. 1135 */ 1136 const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 }; 1137 const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c }; 1138 1139 smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL); 1140 if (!smp->link_key) 1141 return; 1142 1143 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) { 1144 kzfree(smp->link_key); 1145 smp->link_key = NULL; 1146 return; 1147 } 1148 1149 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) { 1150 kzfree(smp->link_key); 1151 smp->link_key = NULL; 1152 return; 1153 } 1154 } 1155 1156 static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp) 1157 { 1158 /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs 1159 * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive 1160 * them in the correct order. 1161 */ 1162 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) 1163 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO); 1164 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) 1165 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO); 1166 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) 1167 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); 1168 } 1169 1170 static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp) 1171 { 1172 /* These constants are as specified in the core specification. 1173 * In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp2' and 'brle'. 1174 */ 1175 const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 }; 1176 const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 }; 1177 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; 1178 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 1179 struct link_key *key; 1180 1181 key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst); 1182 if (!key) { 1183 BT_ERR("%s No Link Key found to generate LTK", hdev->name); 1184 return; 1185 } 1186 1187 if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) 1188 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); 1189 1190 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk)) 1191 return; 1192 1193 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk)) 1194 return; 1195 1196 sc_add_ltk(smp); 1197 } 1198 1199 static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp) 1200 { 1201 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; 1202 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 1203 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 1204 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 1205 __u8 *keydist; 1206 1207 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); 1208 1209 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; 1210 1211 /* The responder sends its keys first */ 1212 if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) { 1213 smp_allow_key_dist(smp); 1214 return; 1215 } 1216 1217 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; 1218 1219 if (hcon->out) { 1220 keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist; 1221 *keydist &= req->init_key_dist; 1222 } else { 1223 keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist; 1224 *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist; 1225 } 1226 1227 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { 1228 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY)) 1229 sc_generate_link_key(smp); 1230 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)) 1231 sc_generate_ltk(smp); 1232 1233 /* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */ 1234 *keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; 1235 } 1236 1237 BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist); 1238 1239 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { 1240 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; 1241 struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident; 1242 struct smp_ltk *ltk; 1243 u8 authenticated; 1244 __le16 ediv; 1245 __le64 rand; 1246 1247 /* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of 1248 * bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest 1249 * of the value to zeroes. 1250 */ 1251 get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size); 1252 memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0, 1253 sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size); 1254 1255 get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv)); 1256 get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand)); 1257 1258 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc); 1259 1260 authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH; 1261 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, 1262 SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk, 1263 smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); 1264 smp->slave_ltk = ltk; 1265 1266 ident.ediv = ediv; 1267 ident.rand = rand; 1268 1269 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident); 1270 1271 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; 1272 } 1273 1274 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) { 1275 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo; 1276 struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo; 1277 1278 memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk)); 1279 1280 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo); 1281 1282 /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address 1283 * after the connection has been established. 1284 * 1285 * This is true even when the connection has been 1286 * established using a resolvable random address. 1287 */ 1288 bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src); 1289 addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type; 1290 1291 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo), 1292 &addrinfo); 1293 1294 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; 1295 } 1296 1297 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) { 1298 struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign; 1299 struct smp_csrk *csrk; 1300 1301 /* Generate a new random key */ 1302 get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk)); 1303 1304 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); 1305 if (csrk) { 1306 if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) 1307 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED; 1308 else 1309 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED; 1310 memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); 1311 } 1312 smp->slave_csrk = csrk; 1313 1314 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign); 1315 1316 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; 1317 } 1318 1319 /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */ 1320 if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) { 1321 smp_allow_key_dist(smp); 1322 return; 1323 } 1324 1325 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); 1326 smp_notify_keys(conn); 1327 1328 smp_chan_destroy(conn); 1329 } 1330 1331 static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work) 1332 { 1333 struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, 1334 security_timer.work); 1335 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 1336 1337 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); 1338 1339 hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM); 1340 } 1341 1342 static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn) 1343 { 1344 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 1345 struct smp_chan *smp; 1346 1347 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC); 1348 if (!smp) 1349 return NULL; 1350 1351 smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); 1352 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) { 1353 BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context"); 1354 kzfree(smp); 1355 return NULL; 1356 } 1357 1358 smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); 1359 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) { 1360 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); 1361 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes); 1362 kzfree(smp); 1363 return NULL; 1364 } 1365 1366 smp->conn = conn; 1367 chan->data = smp; 1368 1369 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL); 1370 1371 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout); 1372 1373 hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon); 1374 1375 return smp; 1376 } 1377 1378 static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16]) 1379 { 1380 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; 1381 u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7]; 1382 1383 if (hcon->out) { 1384 na = smp->prnd; 1385 nb = smp->rrnd; 1386 } else { 1387 na = smp->rrnd; 1388 nb = smp->prnd; 1389 } 1390 1391 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6); 1392 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6); 1393 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type; 1394 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type; 1395 1396 return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk); 1397 } 1398 1399 static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp) 1400 { 1401 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; 1402 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check; 1403 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr; 1404 u8 io_cap[3], r[16]; 1405 1406 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6); 1407 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6); 1408 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type; 1409 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type; 1410 1411 if (hcon->out) { 1412 local_addr = a; 1413 remote_addr = b; 1414 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3); 1415 } else { 1416 local_addr = b; 1417 remote_addr = a; 1418 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3); 1419 } 1420 1421 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r)); 1422 1423 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) 1424 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r); 1425 1426 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) 1427 memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16); 1428 1429 smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap, 1430 local_addr, remote_addr, check.e); 1431 1432 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check); 1433 } 1434 1435 static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) 1436 { 1437 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 1438 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 1439 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm; 1440 u8 r; 1441 1442 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01); 1443 r |= 0x80; 1444 1445 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); 1446 1447 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r, 1448 cfm.confirm_val)) 1449 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1450 1451 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm); 1452 1453 return 0; 1454 } 1455 1456 static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op) 1457 { 1458 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 1459 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 1460 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 1461 u8 cfm[16], r; 1462 1463 /* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */ 1464 if (smp->passkey_round >= 20) 1465 return 0; 1466 1467 switch (smp_op) { 1468 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM: 1469 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01); 1470 r |= 0x80; 1471 1472 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk, 1473 smp->rrnd, r, cfm)) 1474 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1475 1476 if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16)) 1477 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; 1478 1479 smp->passkey_round++; 1480 1481 if (smp->passkey_round == 20) { 1482 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */ 1483 if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk)) 1484 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1485 } 1486 1487 /* The round is only complete when the initiator 1488 * receives pairing random. 1489 */ 1490 if (!hcon->out) { 1491 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, 1492 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); 1493 if (smp->passkey_round == 20) 1494 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); 1495 else 1496 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 1497 return 0; 1498 } 1499 1500 /* Start the next round */ 1501 if (smp->passkey_round != 20) 1502 return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0); 1503 1504 /* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */ 1505 sc_dhkey_check(smp); 1506 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); 1507 1508 break; 1509 1510 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM: 1511 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) { 1512 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); 1513 return 0; 1514 } 1515 1516 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); 1517 1518 if (hcon->out) { 1519 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, 1520 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); 1521 return 0; 1522 } 1523 1524 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp); 1525 1526 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY: 1527 default: 1528 /* Initiating device starts the round */ 1529 if (!hcon->out) 1530 return 0; 1531 1532 BT_DBG("%s Starting passkey round %u", hdev->name, 1533 smp->passkey_round + 1); 1534 1535 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 1536 1537 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp); 1538 } 1539 1540 return 0; 1541 } 1542 1543 static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) 1544 { 1545 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 1546 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 1547 u8 smp_op; 1548 1549 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags); 1550 1551 switch (mgmt_op) { 1552 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY: 1553 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); 1554 return 0; 1555 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY: 1556 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED); 1557 return 0; 1558 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY: 1559 hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey); 1560 smp->passkey_round = 0; 1561 1562 if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) 1563 smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM; 1564 else 1565 smp_op = 0; 1566 1567 if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op)) 1568 return -EIO; 1569 1570 return 0; 1571 } 1572 1573 /* Initiator sends DHKey check first */ 1574 if (hcon->out) { 1575 sc_dhkey_check(smp); 1576 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); 1577 } else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) { 1578 sc_dhkey_check(smp); 1579 sc_add_ltk(smp); 1580 } 1581 1582 return 0; 1583 } 1584 1585 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) 1586 { 1587 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; 1588 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 1589 struct smp_chan *smp; 1590 u32 value; 1591 int err; 1592 1593 BT_DBG(""); 1594 1595 if (!conn) 1596 return -ENOTCONN; 1597 1598 chan = conn->smp; 1599 if (!chan) 1600 return -ENOTCONN; 1601 1602 l2cap_chan_lock(chan); 1603 if (!chan->data) { 1604 err = -ENOTCONN; 1605 goto unlock; 1606 } 1607 1608 smp = chan->data; 1609 1610 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { 1611 err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey); 1612 goto unlock; 1613 } 1614 1615 switch (mgmt_op) { 1616 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY: 1617 value = le32_to_cpu(passkey); 1618 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); 1619 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value); 1620 put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk); 1621 /* Fall Through */ 1622 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY: 1623 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); 1624 break; 1625 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY: 1626 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY: 1627 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); 1628 err = 0; 1629 goto unlock; 1630 default: 1631 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); 1632 err = -EOPNOTSUPP; 1633 goto unlock; 1634 } 1635 1636 err = 0; 1637 1638 /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */ 1639 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) { 1640 u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp); 1641 if (rsp) 1642 smp_failure(conn, rsp); 1643 } 1644 1645 unlock: 1646 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); 1647 return err; 1648 } 1649 1650 static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp, 1651 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, 1652 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp) 1653 { 1654 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 1655 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; 1656 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0; 1657 1658 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) { 1659 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; 1660 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; 1661 } 1662 1663 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING)) 1664 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; 1665 1666 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY)) 1667 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; 1668 1669 if (!rsp) { 1670 memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req)); 1671 1672 req->init_key_dist = local_dist; 1673 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist; 1674 req->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size; 1675 1676 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist; 1677 1678 return; 1679 } 1680 1681 memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp)); 1682 1683 rsp->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size; 1684 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist; 1685 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist; 1686 1687 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist; 1688 } 1689 1690 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 1691 { 1692 struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data; 1693 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 1694 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; 1695 struct smp_chan *smp; 1696 u8 key_size, auth, sec_level; 1697 int ret; 1698 1699 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); 1700 1701 if (skb->len < sizeof(*req)) 1702 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 1703 1704 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) 1705 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; 1706 1707 if (!chan->data) 1708 smp = smp_chan_create(conn); 1709 else 1710 smp = chan->data; 1711 1712 if (!smp) 1713 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1714 1715 /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */ 1716 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); 1717 1718 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) && 1719 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) 1720 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; 1721 1722 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) 1723 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; 1724 1725 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; 1726 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req)); 1727 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req)); 1728 1729 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has 1730 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the 1731 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use. 1732 */ 1733 if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT) 1734 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags); 1735 1736 /* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */ 1737 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { 1738 /* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */ 1739 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) && 1740 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) 1741 return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED; 1742 1743 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); 1744 1745 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp); 1746 1747 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size); 1748 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) 1749 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; 1750 1751 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ 1752 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; 1753 1754 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; 1755 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp)); 1756 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp); 1757 1758 smp_distribute_keys(smp); 1759 return 0; 1760 } 1761 1762 build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth); 1763 1764 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) 1765 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); 1766 1767 if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) 1768 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; 1769 else 1770 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); 1771 1772 if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level) 1773 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; 1774 1775 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */ 1776 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { 1777 u8 method; 1778 1779 method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability, 1780 req->io_capability); 1781 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) 1782 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; 1783 } 1784 1785 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size); 1786 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) 1787 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; 1788 1789 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); 1790 1791 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; 1792 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp)); 1793 1794 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp); 1795 1796 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); 1797 1798 /* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the 1799 * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth 1800 * req bits from our security request, which may create a false 1801 * positive SC enablement. 1802 */ 1803 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 1804 1805 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { 1806 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); 1807 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ 1808 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; 1809 /* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */ 1810 return 0; 1811 } 1812 1813 /* Request setup of TK */ 1814 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability); 1815 if (ret) 1816 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1817 1818 return 0; 1819 } 1820 1821 static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp) 1822 { 1823 struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev; 1824 1825 BT_DBG(""); 1826 1827 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) { 1828 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; 1829 struct smp_dev *smp_dev; 1830 1831 if (!chan || !chan->data) 1832 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1833 1834 smp_dev = chan->data; 1835 1836 memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64); 1837 memcpy(smp->local_sk, smp_dev->local_sk, 32); 1838 memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16); 1839 1840 if (smp_dev->debug_key) 1841 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); 1842 1843 goto done; 1844 } 1845 1846 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) { 1847 BT_DBG("Using debug keys"); 1848 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64); 1849 memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32); 1850 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); 1851 } else { 1852 while (true) { 1853 /* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */ 1854 if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk)) 1855 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1856 1857 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that 1858 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key. 1859 */ 1860 if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32)) 1861 break; 1862 } 1863 } 1864 1865 done: 1866 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk); 1867 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32); 1868 SMP_DBG("Local Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk); 1869 1870 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk); 1871 1872 return 0; 1873 } 1874 1875 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 1876 { 1877 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data; 1878 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 1879 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 1880 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; 1881 u8 key_size, auth; 1882 int ret; 1883 1884 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); 1885 1886 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp)) 1887 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 1888 1889 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) 1890 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; 1891 1892 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp)); 1893 1894 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; 1895 1896 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size); 1897 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) 1898 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; 1899 1900 auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); 1901 1902 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) 1903 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; 1904 1905 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has 1906 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the 1907 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use. 1908 */ 1909 if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT) 1910 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags); 1911 1912 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; 1913 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp)); 1914 1915 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared 1916 * some bits that we had enabled in our request. 1917 */ 1918 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist; 1919 1920 /* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */ 1921 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { 1922 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ 1923 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; 1924 smp_distribute_keys(smp); 1925 return 0; 1926 } 1927 1928 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) 1929 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); 1930 else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH) 1931 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; 1932 1933 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */ 1934 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { 1935 u8 method; 1936 1937 method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability, 1938 rsp->io_capability); 1939 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) 1940 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; 1941 } 1942 1943 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); 1944 1945 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared 1946 * some bits that we had enabled in our request. 1947 */ 1948 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist; 1949 1950 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { 1951 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ 1952 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; 1953 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); 1954 return sc_send_public_key(smp); 1955 } 1956 1957 auth |= req->auth_req; 1958 1959 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability); 1960 if (ret) 1961 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1962 1963 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); 1964 1965 /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */ 1966 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags)) 1967 return smp_confirm(smp); 1968 1969 return 0; 1970 } 1971 1972 static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) 1973 { 1974 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 1975 1976 BT_DBG(""); 1977 1978 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) 1979 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 1980 1981 if (conn->hcon->out) { 1982 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), 1983 smp->prnd); 1984 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); 1985 } 1986 1987 return 0; 1988 } 1989 1990 /* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits 1991 * from our security request and thereby create the impression that 1992 * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it. 1993 */ 1994 static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp) 1995 { 1996 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 1997 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 1998 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 1999 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; 2000 u8 auth; 2001 2002 /* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */ 2003 if (hcon->out) 2004 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2005 2006 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) { 2007 BT_ERR("Refusing SMP SC -> legacy fallback in SC-only mode"); 2008 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2009 } 2010 2011 BT_ERR("Trying to fall back to legacy SMP"); 2012 2013 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; 2014 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; 2015 2016 /* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */ 2017 smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist); 2018 2019 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); 2020 2021 if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) { 2022 BT_ERR("Failed to fall back to legacy SMP"); 2023 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2024 } 2025 2026 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); 2027 2028 return 0; 2029 } 2030 2031 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2032 { 2033 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2034 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2035 2036 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); 2037 2038 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf)) 2039 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2040 2041 memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); 2042 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); 2043 2044 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { 2045 int ret; 2046 2047 /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */ 2048 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags)) 2049 return sc_check_confirm(smp); 2050 2051 BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm"); 2052 2053 ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp); 2054 if (ret) 2055 return ret; 2056 } 2057 2058 if (conn->hcon->out) { 2059 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), 2060 smp->prnd); 2061 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); 2062 return 0; 2063 } 2064 2065 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags)) 2066 return smp_confirm(smp); 2067 2068 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); 2069 2070 return 0; 2071 } 2072 2073 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2074 { 2075 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2076 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2077 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2078 u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb; 2079 u32 passkey; 2080 int err; 2081 2082 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); 2083 2084 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd)) 2085 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2086 2087 memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); 2088 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); 2089 2090 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) 2091 return smp_random(smp); 2092 2093 if (hcon->out) { 2094 pkax = smp->local_pk; 2095 pkbx = smp->remote_pk; 2096 na = smp->prnd; 2097 nb = smp->rrnd; 2098 } else { 2099 pkax = smp->remote_pk; 2100 pkbx = smp->local_pk; 2101 na = smp->rrnd; 2102 nb = smp->prnd; 2103 } 2104 2105 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) { 2106 if (!hcon->out) 2107 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, 2108 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); 2109 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); 2110 goto mackey_and_ltk; 2111 } 2112 2113 /* Passkey entry has special treatment */ 2114 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) 2115 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); 2116 2117 if (hcon->out) { 2118 u8 cfm[16]; 2119 2120 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk, 2121 smp->rrnd, 0, cfm); 2122 if (err) 2123 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2124 2125 if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16)) 2126 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; 2127 } else { 2128 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), 2129 smp->prnd); 2130 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); 2131 } 2132 2133 mackey_and_ltk: 2134 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */ 2135 err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk); 2136 if (err) 2137 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2138 2139 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == REQ_OOB) { 2140 if (hcon->out) { 2141 sc_dhkey_check(smp); 2142 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); 2143 } 2144 return 0; 2145 } 2146 2147 err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey); 2148 if (err) 2149 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2150 2151 err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, 2152 hcon->dst_type, passkey, 0); 2153 if (err) 2154 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2155 2156 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags); 2157 2158 return 0; 2159 } 2160 2161 static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level) 2162 { 2163 struct smp_ltk *key; 2164 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2165 2166 key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role); 2167 if (!key) 2168 return false; 2169 2170 if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level) 2171 return false; 2172 2173 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) 2174 return true; 2175 2176 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size); 2177 hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size; 2178 2179 /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */ 2180 clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); 2181 2182 return true; 2183 } 2184 2185 bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level, 2186 enum smp_key_pref key_pref) 2187 { 2188 if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW) 2189 return true; 2190 2191 /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using 2192 * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the 2193 * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK 2194 * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we 2195 * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits). 2196 */ 2197 if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK && 2198 test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) && 2199 hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role)) 2200 return false; 2201 2202 if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level) 2203 return true; 2204 2205 return false; 2206 } 2207 2208 static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2209 { 2210 struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data; 2211 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; 2212 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2213 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 2214 struct smp_chan *smp; 2215 u8 sec_level, auth; 2216 2217 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); 2218 2219 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) 2220 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2221 2222 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) 2223 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; 2224 2225 auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); 2226 2227 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) 2228 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; 2229 2230 if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) 2231 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; 2232 else 2233 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); 2234 2235 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) 2236 return 0; 2237 2238 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) 2239 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; 2240 2241 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) 2242 return 0; 2243 2244 smp = smp_chan_create(conn); 2245 if (!smp) 2246 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2247 2248 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) && 2249 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) 2250 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; 2251 2252 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); 2253 2254 memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp)); 2255 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth); 2256 2257 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; 2258 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); 2259 2260 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); 2261 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); 2262 2263 return 0; 2264 } 2265 2266 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) 2267 { 2268 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; 2269 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 2270 struct smp_chan *smp; 2271 __u8 authreq; 2272 int ret; 2273 2274 BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level); 2275 2276 /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */ 2277 if (!conn) 2278 return 1; 2279 2280 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) 2281 return 1; 2282 2283 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) 2284 return 1; 2285 2286 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) 2287 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; 2288 2289 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) 2290 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) 2291 return 0; 2292 2293 chan = conn->smp; 2294 if (!chan) { 2295 BT_ERR("SMP security requested but not available"); 2296 return 1; 2297 } 2298 2299 l2cap_chan_lock(chan); 2300 2301 /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */ 2302 if (chan->data) { 2303 ret = 0; 2304 goto unlock; 2305 } 2306 2307 smp = smp_chan_create(conn); 2308 if (!smp) { 2309 ret = 1; 2310 goto unlock; 2311 } 2312 2313 authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level); 2314 2315 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) 2316 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC; 2317 2318 /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level 2319 * requires it. 2320 */ 2321 if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT || 2322 hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) 2323 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM; 2324 2325 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) { 2326 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; 2327 2328 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq); 2329 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; 2330 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); 2331 2332 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); 2333 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); 2334 } else { 2335 struct smp_cmd_security_req cp; 2336 cp.auth_req = authreq; 2337 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); 2338 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ); 2339 } 2340 2341 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); 2342 ret = 0; 2343 2344 unlock: 2345 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); 2346 return ret; 2347 } 2348 2349 void smp_cancel_pairing(struct hci_conn *hcon) 2350 { 2351 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; 2352 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 2353 struct smp_chan *smp; 2354 2355 if (!conn) 2356 return; 2357 2358 chan = conn->smp; 2359 if (!chan) 2360 return; 2361 2362 l2cap_chan_lock(chan); 2363 2364 smp = chan->data; 2365 if (smp) { 2366 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags)) 2367 smp_failure(conn, 0); 2368 else 2369 smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED); 2370 } 2371 2372 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); 2373 } 2374 2375 static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2376 { 2377 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; 2378 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2379 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2380 2381 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); 2382 2383 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) 2384 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2385 2386 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT); 2387 2388 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); 2389 2390 memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk)); 2391 2392 return 0; 2393 } 2394 2395 static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2396 { 2397 struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data; 2398 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2399 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2400 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; 2401 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2402 struct smp_ltk *ltk; 2403 u8 authenticated; 2404 2405 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); 2406 2407 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) 2408 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2409 2410 /* Mark the information as received */ 2411 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; 2412 2413 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) 2414 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO); 2415 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) 2416 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); 2417 2418 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); 2419 2420 authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH); 2421 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK, 2422 authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size, 2423 rp->ediv, rp->rand); 2424 smp->ltk = ltk; 2425 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) 2426 smp_distribute_keys(smp); 2427 2428 return 0; 2429 } 2430 2431 static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2432 { 2433 struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data; 2434 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2435 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2436 2437 BT_DBG(""); 2438 2439 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) 2440 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2441 2442 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO); 2443 2444 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); 2445 2446 memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16); 2447 2448 return 0; 2449 } 2450 2451 static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, 2452 struct sk_buff *skb) 2453 { 2454 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data; 2455 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2456 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2457 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2458 bdaddr_t rpa; 2459 2460 BT_DBG(""); 2461 2462 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) 2463 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2464 2465 /* Mark the information as received */ 2466 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; 2467 2468 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) 2469 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); 2470 2471 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); 2472 2473 /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending 2474 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK 2475 * as "identity information". However, since such 2476 * implementations are not known of and in order to not over 2477 * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never 2478 * received an IRK for such a device. 2479 * 2480 * The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public 2481 * Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for. 2482 */ 2483 if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) || 2484 !hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) { 2485 BT_ERR("Ignoring IRK with no identity address"); 2486 goto distribute; 2487 } 2488 2489 bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr); 2490 smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type; 2491 2492 if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type)) 2493 bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst); 2494 else 2495 bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY); 2496 2497 smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr, 2498 smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa); 2499 2500 distribute: 2501 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) 2502 smp_distribute_keys(smp); 2503 2504 return 0; 2505 } 2506 2507 static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2508 { 2509 struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; 2510 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2511 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2512 struct smp_csrk *csrk; 2513 2514 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); 2515 2516 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) 2517 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2518 2519 /* Mark the information as received */ 2520 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; 2521 2522 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); 2523 2524 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); 2525 if (csrk) { 2526 if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) 2527 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED; 2528 else 2529 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED; 2530 memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); 2531 } 2532 smp->csrk = csrk; 2533 smp_distribute_keys(smp); 2534 2535 return 0; 2536 } 2537 2538 static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp) 2539 { 2540 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 2541 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2542 struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote; 2543 u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method; 2544 2545 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) || 2546 test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) 2547 return REQ_OOB; 2548 2549 /* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs 2550 * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get 2551 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the 2552 * first byte which contains the opcode. 2553 */ 2554 if (hcon->out) { 2555 local = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; 2556 remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; 2557 } else { 2558 local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; 2559 remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; 2560 } 2561 2562 local_io = local->io_capability; 2563 remote_io = remote->io_capability; 2564 2565 local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM); 2566 remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM); 2567 2568 /* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table, 2569 * otherwise use JUST WORKS. 2570 */ 2571 if (local_mitm || remote_mitm) 2572 method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io); 2573 else 2574 method = JUST_WORKS; 2575 2576 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */ 2577 if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) 2578 method = JUST_WORKS; 2579 2580 return method; 2581 } 2582 2583 static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2584 { 2585 struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data; 2586 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2587 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2588 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2589 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 2590 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm; 2591 int err; 2592 2593 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); 2594 2595 if (skb->len < sizeof(*key)) 2596 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2597 2598 memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64); 2599 2600 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) { 2601 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk, 2602 smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val); 2603 if (err) 2604 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2605 2606 if (memcmp(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16)) 2607 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; 2608 } 2609 2610 /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving 2611 * the key from the initiating device. 2612 */ 2613 if (!hcon->out) { 2614 err = sc_send_public_key(smp); 2615 if (err) 2616 return err; 2617 } 2618 2619 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk); 2620 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32); 2621 2622 if (!ecdh_shared_secret(smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk, smp->dhkey)) 2623 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2624 2625 SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey); 2626 2627 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags); 2628 2629 smp->method = sc_select_method(smp); 2630 2631 BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method); 2632 2633 /* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */ 2634 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM) 2635 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; 2636 else 2637 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS; 2638 2639 if (!memcmp(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64)) 2640 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); 2641 2642 if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) { 2643 get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify, 2644 sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify)); 2645 hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000; 2646 hcon->passkey_entered = 0; 2647 smp->passkey_round = 0; 2648 if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, 2649 hcon->dst_type, 2650 hcon->passkey_notify, 2651 hcon->passkey_entered)) 2652 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2653 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 2654 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); 2655 } 2656 2657 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) { 2658 if (hcon->out) 2659 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, 2660 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); 2661 2662 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); 2663 2664 return 0; 2665 } 2666 2667 if (hcon->out) 2668 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 2669 2670 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) { 2671 if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, 2672 hcon->dst_type)) 2673 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2674 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 2675 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags); 2676 return 0; 2677 } 2678 2679 /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to 2680 * send the confirm value. 2681 */ 2682 if (conn->hcon->out) 2683 return 0; 2684 2685 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, 2686 0, cfm.confirm_val); 2687 if (err) 2688 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2689 2690 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm); 2691 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); 2692 2693 return 0; 2694 } 2695 2696 static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2697 { 2698 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data; 2699 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2700 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2701 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2702 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr; 2703 u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16]; 2704 int err; 2705 2706 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); 2707 2708 if (skb->len < sizeof(*check)) 2709 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2710 2711 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6); 2712 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6); 2713 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type; 2714 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type; 2715 2716 if (hcon->out) { 2717 local_addr = a; 2718 remote_addr = b; 2719 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3); 2720 } else { 2721 local_addr = b; 2722 remote_addr = a; 2723 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3); 2724 } 2725 2726 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r)); 2727 2728 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) 2729 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r); 2730 else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) 2731 memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16); 2732 2733 err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r, 2734 io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e); 2735 if (err) 2736 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2737 2738 if (memcmp(check->e, e, 16)) 2739 return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED; 2740 2741 if (!hcon->out) { 2742 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) { 2743 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags); 2744 return 0; 2745 } 2746 2747 /* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */ 2748 sc_dhkey_check(smp); 2749 } 2750 2751 sc_add_ltk(smp); 2752 2753 if (hcon->out) { 2754 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size); 2755 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size; 2756 } 2757 2758 return 0; 2759 } 2760 2761 static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn, 2762 struct sk_buff *skb) 2763 { 2764 struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data; 2765 2766 BT_DBG("value 0x%02x", kp->value); 2767 2768 return 0; 2769 } 2770 2771 static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) 2772 { 2773 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; 2774 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2775 struct smp_chan *smp; 2776 __u8 code, reason; 2777 int err = 0; 2778 2779 if (skb->len < 1) 2780 return -EILSEQ; 2781 2782 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) { 2783 reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; 2784 goto done; 2785 } 2786 2787 code = skb->data[0]; 2788 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code)); 2789 2790 smp = chan->data; 2791 2792 if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX) 2793 goto drop; 2794 2795 if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)) 2796 goto drop; 2797 2798 /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are 2799 * pairing request and security request. 2800 */ 2801 if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ) 2802 goto drop; 2803 2804 switch (code) { 2805 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ: 2806 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb); 2807 break; 2808 2809 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL: 2810 smp_failure(conn, 0); 2811 err = -EPERM; 2812 break; 2813 2814 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP: 2815 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb); 2816 break; 2817 2818 case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ: 2819 reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb); 2820 break; 2821 2822 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM: 2823 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb); 2824 break; 2825 2826 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM: 2827 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb); 2828 break; 2829 2830 case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO: 2831 reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb); 2832 break; 2833 2834 case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT: 2835 reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb); 2836 break; 2837 2838 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: 2839 reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb); 2840 break; 2841 2842 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO: 2843 reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb); 2844 break; 2845 2846 case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO: 2847 reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb); 2848 break; 2849 2850 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY: 2851 reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb); 2852 break; 2853 2854 case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK: 2855 reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb); 2856 break; 2857 2858 case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY: 2859 reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb); 2860 break; 2861 2862 default: 2863 BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code); 2864 reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; 2865 goto done; 2866 } 2867 2868 done: 2869 if (!err) { 2870 if (reason) 2871 smp_failure(conn, reason); 2872 kfree_skb(skb); 2873 } 2874 2875 return err; 2876 2877 drop: 2878 BT_ERR("%s unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR", hcon->hdev->name, 2879 code, &hcon->dst); 2880 kfree_skb(skb); 2881 return 0; 2882 } 2883 2884 static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err) 2885 { 2886 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; 2887 2888 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); 2889 2890 if (chan->data) 2891 smp_chan_destroy(conn); 2892 2893 conn->smp = NULL; 2894 l2cap_chan_put(chan); 2895 } 2896 2897 static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan) 2898 { 2899 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; 2900 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2901 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 2902 struct smp_cmd_pairing req; 2903 struct smp_chan *smp; 2904 2905 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); 2906 2907 /* Only new pairings are interesting */ 2908 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags)) 2909 return; 2910 2911 /* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */ 2912 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) 2913 return; 2914 2915 /* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */ 2916 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) 2917 return; 2918 2919 /* Secure Connections support must be enabled */ 2920 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) 2921 return; 2922 2923 /* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */ 2924 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) && 2925 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) 2926 return; 2927 2928 /* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */ 2929 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) 2930 return; 2931 2932 /* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */ 2933 if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon)) 2934 return; 2935 2936 /* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */ 2937 if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR)) 2938 return; 2939 2940 /* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */ 2941 if (chan->data) 2942 return; 2943 2944 smp = smp_chan_create(conn); 2945 if (!smp) { 2946 BT_ERR("%s unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR", 2947 hdev->name); 2948 return; 2949 } 2950 2951 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); 2952 2953 BT_DBG("%s starting SMP over BR/EDR", hdev->name); 2954 2955 /* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */ 2956 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL); 2957 2958 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; 2959 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req)); 2960 2961 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req); 2962 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); 2963 } 2964 2965 static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) 2966 { 2967 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2968 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; 2969 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2970 2971 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); 2972 2973 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { 2974 bredr_pairing(chan); 2975 return; 2976 } 2977 2978 if (!smp) 2979 return; 2980 2981 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) 2982 return; 2983 2984 cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer); 2985 2986 smp_distribute_keys(smp); 2987 } 2988 2989 static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) 2990 { 2991 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; 2992 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2993 2994 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); 2995 2996 /* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own 2997 * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the 2998 * first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in 2999 * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function wont 3000 * get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called. 3001 */ 3002 conn->smp = chan; 3003 3004 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) 3005 bredr_pairing(chan); 3006 } 3007 3008 static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) 3009 { 3010 int err; 3011 3012 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); 3013 3014 err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb); 3015 if (err) { 3016 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 3017 3018 if (smp) 3019 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); 3020 3021 hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); 3022 } 3023 3024 return err; 3025 } 3026 3027 static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, 3028 unsigned long hdr_len, 3029 unsigned long len, int nb) 3030 { 3031 struct sk_buff *skb; 3032 3033 skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL); 3034 if (!skb) 3035 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 3036 3037 skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX; 3038 bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan; 3039 3040 return skb; 3041 } 3042 3043 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = { 3044 .name = "Security Manager", 3045 .ready = smp_ready_cb, 3046 .recv = smp_recv_cb, 3047 .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb, 3048 .teardown = smp_teardown_cb, 3049 .resume = smp_resume_cb, 3050 3051 .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection, 3052 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change, 3053 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close, 3054 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer, 3055 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend, 3056 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown, 3057 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, 3058 }; 3059 3060 static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan) 3061 { 3062 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 3063 3064 BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan); 3065 3066 chan = l2cap_chan_create(); 3067 if (!chan) 3068 return NULL; 3069 3070 chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type; 3071 chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops; 3072 chan->scid = pchan->scid; 3073 chan->dcid = chan->scid; 3074 chan->imtu = pchan->imtu; 3075 chan->omtu = pchan->omtu; 3076 chan->mode = pchan->mode; 3077 3078 /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to 3079 * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel 3080 * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep 3081 * warnings. 3082 */ 3083 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP); 3084 3085 BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan); 3086 3087 return chan; 3088 } 3089 3090 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = { 3091 .name = "Security Manager Root", 3092 .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb, 3093 3094 /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */ 3095 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close, 3096 .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb, 3097 .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv, 3098 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change, 3099 .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown, 3100 .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready, 3101 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer, 3102 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend, 3103 .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume, 3104 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown, 3105 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, 3106 }; 3107 3108 static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid) 3109 { 3110 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 3111 struct smp_dev *smp; 3112 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes; 3113 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; 3114 3115 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) { 3116 smp = NULL; 3117 goto create_chan; 3118 } 3119 3120 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL); 3121 if (!smp) 3122 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 3123 3124 tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); 3125 if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) { 3126 BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context"); 3127 kzfree(smp); 3128 return ERR_CAST(tfm_aes); 3129 } 3130 3131 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); 3132 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) { 3133 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); 3134 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes); 3135 kzfree(smp); 3136 return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac); 3137 } 3138 3139 smp->tfm_aes = tfm_aes; 3140 smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac; 3141 smp->min_key_size = SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE; 3142 smp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE; 3143 3144 create_chan: 3145 chan = l2cap_chan_create(); 3146 if (!chan) { 3147 if (smp) { 3148 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes); 3149 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); 3150 kzfree(smp); 3151 } 3152 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 3153 } 3154 3155 chan->data = smp; 3156 3157 l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid); 3158 3159 l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan); 3160 3161 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) { 3162 u8 bdaddr_type; 3163 3164 hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type); 3165 3166 if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC) 3167 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC; 3168 else 3169 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM; 3170 } else { 3171 bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr); 3172 chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR; 3173 } 3174 3175 chan->state = BT_LISTEN; 3176 chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC; 3177 chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU; 3178 chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops; 3179 3180 /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */ 3181 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT); 3182 3183 return chan; 3184 } 3185 3186 static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan) 3187 { 3188 struct smp_dev *smp; 3189 3190 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); 3191 3192 smp = chan->data; 3193 if (smp) { 3194 chan->data = NULL; 3195 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes); 3196 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); 3197 kzfree(smp); 3198 } 3199 3200 l2cap_chan_put(chan); 3201 } 3202 3203 static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_read(struct file *file, 3204 char __user *user_buf, 3205 size_t count, loff_t *ppos) 3206 { 3207 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data; 3208 char buf[3]; 3209 3210 buf[0] = hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP) ? 'Y': 'N'; 3211 buf[1] = '\n'; 3212 buf[2] = '\0'; 3213 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2); 3214 } 3215 3216 static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file, 3217 const char __user *user_buf, 3218 size_t count, loff_t *ppos) 3219 { 3220 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data; 3221 char buf[32]; 3222 size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf)-1)); 3223 bool enable; 3224 3225 if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size)) 3226 return -EFAULT; 3227 3228 buf[buf_size] = '\0'; 3229 if (strtobool(buf, &enable)) 3230 return -EINVAL; 3231 3232 if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) 3233 return -EALREADY; 3234 3235 if (enable) { 3236 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 3237 3238 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR); 3239 if (IS_ERR(chan)) 3240 return PTR_ERR(chan); 3241 3242 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan; 3243 } else { 3244 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 3245 3246 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data; 3247 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL; 3248 smp_del_chan(chan); 3249 } 3250 3251 hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP); 3252 3253 return count; 3254 } 3255 3256 static const struct file_operations force_bredr_smp_fops = { 3257 .open = simple_open, 3258 .read = force_bredr_smp_read, 3259 .write = force_bredr_smp_write, 3260 .llseek = default_llseek, 3261 }; 3262 3263 static ssize_t le_min_key_size_read(struct file *file, 3264 char __user *user_buf, 3265 size_t count, loff_t *ppos) 3266 { 3267 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data; 3268 char buf[4]; 3269 3270 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size); 3271 3272 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf)); 3273 } 3274 3275 static ssize_t le_min_key_size_write(struct file *file, 3276 const char __user *user_buf, 3277 size_t count, loff_t *ppos) 3278 { 3279 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data; 3280 char buf[32]; 3281 size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1)); 3282 u8 key_size; 3283 3284 if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size)) 3285 return -EFAULT; 3286 3287 buf[buf_size] = '\0'; 3288 3289 sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size); 3290 3291 if (key_size > SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size || 3292 key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE) 3293 return -EINVAL; 3294 3295 SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size = key_size; 3296 3297 return count; 3298 } 3299 3300 static const struct file_operations le_min_key_size_fops = { 3301 .open = simple_open, 3302 .read = le_min_key_size_read, 3303 .write = le_min_key_size_write, 3304 .llseek = default_llseek, 3305 }; 3306 3307 static ssize_t le_max_key_size_read(struct file *file, 3308 char __user *user_buf, 3309 size_t count, loff_t *ppos) 3310 { 3311 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data; 3312 char buf[4]; 3313 3314 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size); 3315 3316 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf)); 3317 } 3318 3319 static ssize_t le_max_key_size_write(struct file *file, 3320 const char __user *user_buf, 3321 size_t count, loff_t *ppos) 3322 { 3323 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data; 3324 char buf[32]; 3325 size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1)); 3326 u8 key_size; 3327 3328 if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size)) 3329 return -EFAULT; 3330 3331 buf[buf_size] = '\0'; 3332 3333 sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size); 3334 3335 if (key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE || 3336 key_size < SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size) 3337 return -EINVAL; 3338 3339 SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size = key_size; 3340 3341 return count; 3342 } 3343 3344 static const struct file_operations le_max_key_size_fops = { 3345 .open = simple_open, 3346 .read = le_max_key_size_read, 3347 .write = le_max_key_size_write, 3348 .llseek = default_llseek, 3349 }; 3350 3351 int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev) 3352 { 3353 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 3354 3355 BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); 3356 3357 /* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then 3358 * there is also no need to register any SMP channel. 3359 */ 3360 if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev)) 3361 return 0; 3362 3363 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) { 3364 chan = hdev->smp_data; 3365 hdev->smp_data = NULL; 3366 smp_del_chan(chan); 3367 } 3368 3369 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP); 3370 if (IS_ERR(chan)) 3371 return PTR_ERR(chan); 3372 3373 hdev->smp_data = chan; 3374 3375 debugfs_create_file("le_min_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev, 3376 &le_min_key_size_fops); 3377 debugfs_create_file("le_max_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev, 3378 &le_max_key_size_fops); 3379 3380 /* If the controller does not support BR/EDR Secure Connections 3381 * feature, then the BR/EDR SMP channel shall not be present. 3382 * 3383 * To test this with Bluetooth 4.0 controllers, create a debugfs 3384 * switch that allows forcing BR/EDR SMP support and accepting 3385 * cross-transport pairing on non-AES encrypted connections. 3386 */ 3387 if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) { 3388 debugfs_create_file("force_bredr_smp", 0644, hdev->debugfs, 3389 hdev, &force_bredr_smp_fops); 3390 3391 /* Flag can be already set here (due to power toggle) */ 3392 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) 3393 return 0; 3394 } 3395 3396 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) { 3397 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data; 3398 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL; 3399 smp_del_chan(chan); 3400 } 3401 3402 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR); 3403 if (IS_ERR(chan)) { 3404 int err = PTR_ERR(chan); 3405 chan = hdev->smp_data; 3406 hdev->smp_data = NULL; 3407 smp_del_chan(chan); 3408 return err; 3409 } 3410 3411 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan; 3412 3413 return 0; 3414 } 3415 3416 void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev) 3417 { 3418 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 3419 3420 if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) { 3421 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data; 3422 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL; 3423 smp_del_chan(chan); 3424 } 3425 3426 if (hdev->smp_data) { 3427 chan = hdev->smp_data; 3428 hdev->smp_data = NULL; 3429 smp_del_chan(chan); 3430 } 3431 } 3432 3433 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP) 3434 3435 static int __init test_ah(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes) 3436 { 3437 const u8 irk[16] = { 3438 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34, 3439 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec }; 3440 const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 }; 3441 const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d }; 3442 u8 res[3]; 3443 int err; 3444 3445 err = smp_ah(tfm_aes, irk, r, res); 3446 if (err) 3447 return err; 3448 3449 if (memcmp(res, exp, 3)) 3450 return -EINVAL; 3451 3452 return 0; 3453 } 3454 3455 static int __init test_c1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes) 3456 { 3457 const u8 k[16] = { 3458 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 3459 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; 3460 const u8 r[16] = { 3461 0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63, 3462 0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 }; 3463 const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 }; 3464 const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 }; 3465 const u8 _iat = 0x01; 3466 const u8 _rat = 0x00; 3467 const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } }; 3468 const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } }; 3469 const u8 exp[16] = { 3470 0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2, 3471 0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e }; 3472 u8 res[16]; 3473 int err; 3474 3475 err = smp_c1(tfm_aes, k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res); 3476 if (err) 3477 return err; 3478 3479 if (memcmp(res, exp, 16)) 3480 return -EINVAL; 3481 3482 return 0; 3483 } 3484 3485 static int __init test_s1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes) 3486 { 3487 const u8 k[16] = { 3488 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 3489 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; 3490 const u8 r1[16] = { 3491 0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 }; 3492 const u8 r2[16] = { 3493 0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 }; 3494 const u8 exp[16] = { 3495 0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b, 3496 0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a }; 3497 u8 res[16]; 3498 int err; 3499 3500 err = smp_s1(tfm_aes, k, r1, r2, res); 3501 if (err) 3502 return err; 3503 3504 if (memcmp(res, exp, 16)) 3505 return -EINVAL; 3506 3507 return 0; 3508 } 3509 3510 static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) 3511 { 3512 const u8 u[32] = { 3513 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc, 3514 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef, 3515 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e, 3516 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 }; 3517 const u8 v[32] = { 3518 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b, 3519 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59, 3520 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90, 3521 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 }; 3522 const u8 x[16] = { 3523 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, 3524 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; 3525 const u8 z = 0x00; 3526 const u8 exp[16] = { 3527 0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1, 3528 0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 }; 3529 u8 res[16]; 3530 int err; 3531 3532 err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res); 3533 if (err) 3534 return err; 3535 3536 if (memcmp(res, exp, 16)) 3537 return -EINVAL; 3538 3539 return 0; 3540 } 3541 3542 static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) 3543 { 3544 const u8 w[32] = { 3545 0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86, 3546 0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99, 3547 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34, 3548 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec }; 3549 const u8 n1[16] = { 3550 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, 3551 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; 3552 const u8 n2[16] = { 3553 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21, 3554 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 }; 3555 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 }; 3556 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 }; 3557 const u8 exp_ltk[16] = { 3558 0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98, 3559 0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 }; 3560 const u8 exp_mackey[16] = { 3561 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd, 3562 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 }; 3563 u8 mackey[16], ltk[16]; 3564 int err; 3565 3566 err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk); 3567 if (err) 3568 return err; 3569 3570 if (memcmp(mackey, exp_mackey, 16)) 3571 return -EINVAL; 3572 3573 if (memcmp(ltk, exp_ltk, 16)) 3574 return -EINVAL; 3575 3576 return 0; 3577 } 3578 3579 static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) 3580 { 3581 const u8 w[16] = { 3582 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd, 3583 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 }; 3584 const u8 n1[16] = { 3585 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, 3586 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; 3587 const u8 n2[16] = { 3588 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21, 3589 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 }; 3590 const u8 r[16] = { 3591 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08, 3592 0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 }; 3593 const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 }; 3594 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 }; 3595 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 }; 3596 const u8 exp[16] = { 3597 0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2, 3598 0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 }; 3599 u8 res[16]; 3600 int err; 3601 3602 err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res); 3603 if (err) 3604 return err; 3605 3606 if (memcmp(res, exp, 16)) 3607 return -EINVAL; 3608 3609 return 0; 3610 } 3611 3612 static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) 3613 { 3614 const u8 u[32] = { 3615 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc, 3616 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef, 3617 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e, 3618 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 }; 3619 const u8 v[32] = { 3620 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b, 3621 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59, 3622 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90, 3623 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 }; 3624 const u8 x[16] = { 3625 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, 3626 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; 3627 const u8 y[16] = { 3628 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21, 3629 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 }; 3630 const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000; 3631 u32 val; 3632 int err; 3633 3634 err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val); 3635 if (err) 3636 return err; 3637 3638 if (val != exp_val) 3639 return -EINVAL; 3640 3641 return 0; 3642 } 3643 3644 static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) 3645 { 3646 const u8 w[16] = { 3647 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34, 3648 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec }; 3649 const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c }; 3650 const u8 exp[16] = { 3651 0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8, 3652 0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d }; 3653 u8 res[16]; 3654 int err; 3655 3656 err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res); 3657 if (err) 3658 return err; 3659 3660 if (memcmp(res, exp, 16)) 3661 return -EINVAL; 3662 3663 return 0; 3664 } 3665 3666 static char test_smp_buffer[32]; 3667 3668 static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf, 3669 size_t count, loff_t *ppos) 3670 { 3671 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer, 3672 strlen(test_smp_buffer)); 3673 } 3674 3675 static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = { 3676 .open = simple_open, 3677 .read = test_smp_read, 3678 .llseek = default_llseek, 3679 }; 3680 3681 static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes, 3682 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) 3683 { 3684 ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime; 3685 unsigned long long duration; 3686 int err; 3687 3688 calltime = ktime_get(); 3689 3690 err = test_ah(tfm_aes); 3691 if (err) { 3692 BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed"); 3693 goto done; 3694 } 3695 3696 err = test_c1(tfm_aes); 3697 if (err) { 3698 BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed"); 3699 goto done; 3700 } 3701 3702 err = test_s1(tfm_aes); 3703 if (err) { 3704 BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed"); 3705 goto done; 3706 } 3707 3708 err = test_f4(tfm_cmac); 3709 if (err) { 3710 BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed"); 3711 goto done; 3712 } 3713 3714 err = test_f5(tfm_cmac); 3715 if (err) { 3716 BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed"); 3717 goto done; 3718 } 3719 3720 err = test_f6(tfm_cmac); 3721 if (err) { 3722 BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed"); 3723 goto done; 3724 } 3725 3726 err = test_g2(tfm_cmac); 3727 if (err) { 3728 BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed"); 3729 goto done; 3730 } 3731 3732 err = test_h6(tfm_cmac); 3733 if (err) { 3734 BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed"); 3735 goto done; 3736 } 3737 3738 rettime = ktime_get(); 3739 delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime); 3740 duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10; 3741 3742 BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration); 3743 3744 done: 3745 if (!err) 3746 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), 3747 "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration); 3748 else 3749 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n"); 3750 3751 debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL, 3752 &test_smp_fops); 3753 3754 return err; 3755 } 3756 3757 int __init bt_selftest_smp(void) 3758 { 3759 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes; 3760 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; 3761 int err; 3762 3763 tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); 3764 if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) { 3765 BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context"); 3766 return PTR_ERR(tfm_aes); 3767 } 3768 3769 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); 3770 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) { 3771 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); 3772 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes); 3773 return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac); 3774 } 3775 3776 err = run_selftests(tfm_aes, tfm_cmac); 3777 3778 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac); 3779 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes); 3780 3781 return err; 3782 } 3783 3784 #endif 3785