xref: /openbmc/linux/kernel/stackleak.c (revision f9834f18)
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2 /*
3  * This code fills the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value
4  * before returning to userspace. It's part of the STACKLEAK feature
5  * ported from grsecurity/PaX.
6  *
7  * Author: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
8  *
9  * STACKLEAK reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can
10  * reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
11  */
12 
13 #include <linux/stackleak.h>
14 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
15 
16 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
17 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
18 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
19 
20 static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(stack_erasing_bypass);
21 
22 int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
23 			void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
24 {
25 	int ret = 0;
26 	int state = !static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass);
27 	int prev_state = state;
28 
29 	table->data = &state;
30 	table->maxlen = sizeof(int);
31 	ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
32 	state = !!state;
33 	if (ret || !write || state == prev_state)
34 		return ret;
35 
36 	if (state)
37 		static_branch_disable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
38 	else
39 		static_branch_enable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
40 
41 	pr_warn("stackleak: kernel stack erasing is %s\n",
42 					state ? "enabled" : "disabled");
43 	return ret;
44 }
45 
46 #define skip_erasing()	static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass)
47 #else
48 #define skip_erasing()	false
49 #endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */
50 
51 asmlinkage void notrace stackleak_erase(void)
52 {
53 	/* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */
54 	unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack;
55 	unsigned long boundary = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current);
56 	unsigned int poison_count = 0;
57 	const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
58 
59 	if (skip_erasing())
60 		return;
61 
62 	/* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */
63 	if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE))
64 		kstack_ptr = boundary;
65 
66 	/* Search for the poison value in the kernel stack */
67 	while (kstack_ptr > boundary && poison_count <= depth) {
68 		if (*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr == STACKLEAK_POISON)
69 			poison_count++;
70 		else
71 			poison_count = 0;
72 
73 		kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long);
74 	}
75 
76 	/*
77 	 * One 'long int' at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and
78 	 * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y).
79 	 */
80 	if (kstack_ptr == boundary)
81 		kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
82 
83 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
84 	current->prev_lowest_stack = kstack_ptr;
85 #endif
86 
87 	/*
88 	 * Now write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from
89 	 * 'kstack_ptr' and move up till the new 'boundary'. We assume that
90 	 * the stack pointer doesn't change when we write poison.
91 	 */
92 	if (on_thread_stack())
93 		boundary = current_stack_pointer;
94 	else
95 		boundary = current_top_of_stack();
96 
97 	while (kstack_ptr < boundary) {
98 		*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr = STACKLEAK_POISON;
99 		kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
100 	}
101 
102 	/* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */
103 	current->lowest_stack = current_top_of_stack() - THREAD_SIZE/64;
104 }
105 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(stackleak_erase);
106 
107 void __used notrace stackleak_track_stack(void)
108 {
109 	/*
110 	 * N.B. stackleak_erase() fills the kernel stack with the poison value,
111 	 * which has the register width. That code assumes that the value
112 	 * of 'lowest_stack' is aligned on the register width boundary.
113 	 *
114 	 * That is true for x86 and x86_64 because of the kernel stack
115 	 * alignment on these platforms (for details, see 'cc_stack_align' in
116 	 * arch/x86/Makefile). Take care of that when you port STACKLEAK to
117 	 * new platforms.
118 	 */
119 	unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
120 
121 	/*
122 	 * Having CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than
123 	 * STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in
124 	 * stackleak_erase() unreliable. Let's prevent that.
125 	 */
126 	BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH);
127 
128 	if (sp < current->lowest_stack &&
129 	    sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) +
130 						sizeof(unsigned long)) {
131 		current->lowest_stack = sp;
132 	}
133 }
134 EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_track_stack);
135