xref: /openbmc/linux/kernel/stackleak.c (revision 0b003749)
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2 /*
3  * This code fills the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value
4  * before returning to userspace. It's part of the STACKLEAK feature
5  * ported from grsecurity/PaX.
6  *
7  * Author: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
8  *
9  * STACKLEAK reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can
10  * reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
11  */
12 
13 #include <linux/stackleak.h>
14 
15 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
16 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
17 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
18 
19 static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(stack_erasing_bypass);
20 
21 int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
22 			void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
23 {
24 	int ret = 0;
25 	int state = !static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass);
26 	int prev_state = state;
27 
28 	table->data = &state;
29 	table->maxlen = sizeof(int);
30 	ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
31 	state = !!state;
32 	if (ret || !write || state == prev_state)
33 		return ret;
34 
35 	if (state)
36 		static_branch_disable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
37 	else
38 		static_branch_enable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
39 
40 	pr_warn("stackleak: kernel stack erasing is %s\n",
41 					state ? "enabled" : "disabled");
42 	return ret;
43 }
44 
45 #define skip_erasing()	static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass)
46 #else
47 #define skip_erasing()	false
48 #endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */
49 
50 asmlinkage void stackleak_erase(void)
51 {
52 	/* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */
53 	unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack;
54 	unsigned long boundary = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current);
55 	unsigned int poison_count = 0;
56 	const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
57 
58 	if (skip_erasing())
59 		return;
60 
61 	/* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */
62 	if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE))
63 		kstack_ptr = boundary;
64 
65 	/* Search for the poison value in the kernel stack */
66 	while (kstack_ptr > boundary && poison_count <= depth) {
67 		if (*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr == STACKLEAK_POISON)
68 			poison_count++;
69 		else
70 			poison_count = 0;
71 
72 		kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long);
73 	}
74 
75 	/*
76 	 * One 'long int' at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and
77 	 * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y).
78 	 */
79 	if (kstack_ptr == boundary)
80 		kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
81 
82 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
83 	current->prev_lowest_stack = kstack_ptr;
84 #endif
85 
86 	/*
87 	 * Now write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from
88 	 * 'kstack_ptr' and move up till the new 'boundary'. We assume that
89 	 * the stack pointer doesn't change when we write poison.
90 	 */
91 	if (on_thread_stack())
92 		boundary = current_stack_pointer;
93 	else
94 		boundary = current_top_of_stack();
95 
96 	while (kstack_ptr < boundary) {
97 		*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr = STACKLEAK_POISON;
98 		kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
99 	}
100 
101 	/* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */
102 	current->lowest_stack = current_top_of_stack() - THREAD_SIZE/64;
103 }
104 
105 void __used stackleak_track_stack(void)
106 {
107 	/*
108 	 * N.B. stackleak_erase() fills the kernel stack with the poison value,
109 	 * which has the register width. That code assumes that the value
110 	 * of 'lowest_stack' is aligned on the register width boundary.
111 	 *
112 	 * That is true for x86 and x86_64 because of the kernel stack
113 	 * alignment on these platforms (for details, see 'cc_stack_align' in
114 	 * arch/x86/Makefile). Take care of that when you port STACKLEAK to
115 	 * new platforms.
116 	 */
117 	unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
118 
119 	/*
120 	 * Having CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than
121 	 * STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in
122 	 * stackleak_erase() unreliable. Let's prevent that.
123 	 */
124 	BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH);
125 
126 	if (sp < current->lowest_stack &&
127 	    sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) +
128 						sizeof(unsigned long)) {
129 		current->lowest_stack = sp;
130 	}
131 }
132 EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_track_stack);
133