xref: /openbmc/linux/kernel/seccomp.c (revision 93f5715e)
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2 /*
3  * linux/kernel/seccomp.c
4  *
5  * Copyright 2004-2005  Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
6  *
7  * Copyright (C) 2012 Google, Inc.
8  * Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
9  *
10  * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing facility.
11  *
12  * Mode 1 uses a fixed list of allowed system calls.
13  * Mode 2 allows user-defined system call filters in the form
14  *        of Berkeley Packet Filters/Linux Socket Filters.
15  */
16 
17 #include <linux/refcount.h>
18 #include <linux/audit.h>
19 #include <linux/compat.h>
20 #include <linux/coredump.h>
21 #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
22 #include <linux/nospec.h>
23 #include <linux/prctl.h>
24 #include <linux/sched.h>
25 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
26 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
27 #include <linux/slab.h>
28 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
29 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
30 
31 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
32 #include <asm/syscall.h>
33 #endif
34 
35 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
36 #include <linux/filter.h>
37 #include <linux/pid.h>
38 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
39 #include <linux/security.h>
40 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
41 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
42 
43 /**
44  * struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs
45  *
46  * @usage: reference count to manage the object lifetime.
47  *         get/put helpers should be used when accessing an instance
48  *         outside of a lifetime-guarded section.  In general, this
49  *         is only needed for handling filters shared across tasks.
50  * @log: true if all actions except for SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW should be logged
51  * @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter
52  * @prog: the BPF program to evaluate
53  *
54  * seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev
55  * pointer.  For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting
56  * with current->seccomp.filter, the most recently attached or inherited filter.
57  * However, multiple filters may share a @prev node, by way of fork(), which
58  * results in a unidirectional tree existing in memory.  This is similar to
59  * how namespaces work.
60  *
61  * seccomp_filter objects should never be modified after being attached
62  * to a task_struct (other than @usage).
63  */
64 struct seccomp_filter {
65 	refcount_t usage;
66 	bool log;
67 	struct seccomp_filter *prev;
68 	struct bpf_prog *prog;
69 };
70 
71 /* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
72 #define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter))
73 
74 /*
75  * Endianness is explicitly ignored and left for BPF program authors to manage
76  * as per the specific architecture.
77  */
78 static void populate_seccomp_data(struct seccomp_data *sd)
79 {
80 	struct task_struct *task = current;
81 	struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(task);
82 	unsigned long args[6];
83 
84 	sd->nr = syscall_get_nr(task, regs);
85 	sd->arch = syscall_get_arch();
86 	syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 0, 6, args);
87 	sd->args[0] = args[0];
88 	sd->args[1] = args[1];
89 	sd->args[2] = args[2];
90 	sd->args[3] = args[3];
91 	sd->args[4] = args[4];
92 	sd->args[5] = args[5];
93 	sd->instruction_pointer = KSTK_EIP(task);
94 }
95 
96 /**
97  *	seccomp_check_filter - verify seccomp filter code
98  *	@filter: filter to verify
99  *	@flen: length of filter
100  *
101  * Takes a previously checked filter (by bpf_check_classic) and
102  * redirects all filter code that loads struct sk_buff data
103  * and related data through seccomp_bpf_load.  It also
104  * enforces length and alignment checking of those loads.
105  *
106  * Returns 0 if the rule set is legal or -EINVAL if not.
107  */
108 static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
109 {
110 	int pc;
111 	for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) {
112 		struct sock_filter *ftest = &filter[pc];
113 		u16 code = ftest->code;
114 		u32 k = ftest->k;
115 
116 		switch (code) {
117 		case BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS:
118 			ftest->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_W | BPF_ABS;
119 			/* 32-bit aligned and not out of bounds. */
120 			if (k >= sizeof(struct seccomp_data) || k & 3)
121 				return -EINVAL;
122 			continue;
123 		case BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_LEN:
124 			ftest->code = BPF_LD | BPF_IMM;
125 			ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data);
126 			continue;
127 		case BPF_LDX | BPF_W | BPF_LEN:
128 			ftest->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_IMM;
129 			ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data);
130 			continue;
131 		/* Explicitly include allowed calls. */
132 		case BPF_RET | BPF_K:
133 		case BPF_RET | BPF_A:
134 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_ADD | BPF_K:
135 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_ADD | BPF_X:
136 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_SUB | BPF_K:
137 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_SUB | BPF_X:
138 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_MUL | BPF_K:
139 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_MUL | BPF_X:
140 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_K:
141 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X:
142 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_K:
143 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_X:
144 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_OR | BPF_K:
145 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_OR | BPF_X:
146 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_K:
147 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_X:
148 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_LSH | BPF_K:
149 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_LSH | BPF_X:
150 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_RSH | BPF_K:
151 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_RSH | BPF_X:
152 		case BPF_ALU | BPF_NEG:
153 		case BPF_LD | BPF_IMM:
154 		case BPF_LDX | BPF_IMM:
155 		case BPF_MISC | BPF_TAX:
156 		case BPF_MISC | BPF_TXA:
157 		case BPF_LD | BPF_MEM:
158 		case BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM:
159 		case BPF_ST:
160 		case BPF_STX:
161 		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JA:
162 		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K:
163 		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_X:
164 		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K:
165 		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_X:
166 		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K:
167 		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_X:
168 		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K:
169 		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_X:
170 			continue;
171 		default:
172 			return -EINVAL;
173 		}
174 	}
175 	return 0;
176 }
177 
178 /**
179  * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd
180  * @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters
181  * @match: stores struct seccomp_filter that resulted in the return value,
182  *         unless filter returned SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, in which case it will
183  *         be unchanged.
184  *
185  * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
186  */
187 #define ACTION_ONLY(ret) ((s32)((ret) & (SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL)))
188 static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
189 			       struct seccomp_filter **match)
190 {
191 	struct seccomp_data sd_local;
192 	u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
193 	/* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
194 	struct seccomp_filter *f =
195 			READ_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter);
196 
197 	/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
198 	if (unlikely(WARN_ON(f == NULL)))
199 		return SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS;
200 
201 	if (!sd) {
202 		populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
203 		sd = &sd_local;
204 	}
205 
206 	/*
207 	 * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
208 	 * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
209 	 */
210 	for (; f; f = f->prev) {
211 		u32 cur_ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(f->prog, sd);
212 
213 		if (ACTION_ONLY(cur_ret) < ACTION_ONLY(ret)) {
214 			ret = cur_ret;
215 			*match = f;
216 		}
217 	}
218 	return ret;
219 }
220 #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
221 
222 static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
223 {
224 	assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);
225 
226 	if (current->seccomp.mode && current->seccomp.mode != seccomp_mode)
227 		return false;
228 
229 	return true;
230 }
231 
232 void __weak arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task) { }
233 
234 static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
235 				       unsigned long seccomp_mode,
236 				       unsigned long flags)
237 {
238 	assert_spin_locked(&task->sighand->siglock);
239 
240 	task->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
241 	/*
242 	 * Make sure TIF_SECCOMP cannot be set before the mode (and
243 	 * filter) is set.
244 	 */
245 	smp_mb__before_atomic();
246 	/* Assume default seccomp processes want spec flaw mitigation. */
247 	if ((flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW) == 0)
248 		arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(task);
249 	set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP);
250 }
251 
252 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
253 /* Returns 1 if the parent is an ancestor of the child. */
254 static int is_ancestor(struct seccomp_filter *parent,
255 		       struct seccomp_filter *child)
256 {
257 	/* NULL is the root ancestor. */
258 	if (parent == NULL)
259 		return 1;
260 	for (; child; child = child->prev)
261 		if (child == parent)
262 			return 1;
263 	return 0;
264 }
265 
266 /**
267  * seccomp_can_sync_threads: checks if all threads can be synchronized
268  *
269  * Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held.
270  *
271  * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error, or the pid of a thread which was
272  * either not in the correct seccomp mode or it did not have an ancestral
273  * seccomp filter.
274  */
275 static inline pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void)
276 {
277 	struct task_struct *thread, *caller;
278 
279 	BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex));
280 	assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);
281 
282 	/* Validate all threads being eligible for synchronization. */
283 	caller = current;
284 	for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
285 		pid_t failed;
286 
287 		/* Skip current, since it is initiating the sync. */
288 		if (thread == caller)
289 			continue;
290 
291 		if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED ||
292 		    (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER &&
293 		     is_ancestor(thread->seccomp.filter,
294 				 caller->seccomp.filter)))
295 			continue;
296 
297 		/* Return the first thread that cannot be synchronized. */
298 		failed = task_pid_vnr(thread);
299 		/* If the pid cannot be resolved, then return -ESRCH */
300 		if (unlikely(WARN_ON(failed == 0)))
301 			failed = -ESRCH;
302 		return failed;
303 	}
304 
305 	return 0;
306 }
307 
308 /**
309  * seccomp_sync_threads: sets all threads to use current's filter
310  *
311  * Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held, and for
312  * seccomp_can_sync_threads() to have returned success already
313  * without dropping the locks.
314  *
315  */
316 static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(unsigned long flags)
317 {
318 	struct task_struct *thread, *caller;
319 
320 	BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex));
321 	assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);
322 
323 	/* Synchronize all threads. */
324 	caller = current;
325 	for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
326 		/* Skip current, since it needs no changes. */
327 		if (thread == caller)
328 			continue;
329 
330 		/* Get a task reference for the new leaf node. */
331 		get_seccomp_filter(caller);
332 		/*
333 		 * Drop the task reference to the shared ancestor since
334 		 * current's path will hold a reference.  (This also
335 		 * allows a put before the assignment.)
336 		 */
337 		put_seccomp_filter(thread);
338 		smp_store_release(&thread->seccomp.filter,
339 				  caller->seccomp.filter);
340 
341 		/*
342 		 * Don't let an unprivileged task work around
343 		 * the no_new_privs restriction by creating
344 		 * a thread that sets it up, enters seccomp,
345 		 * then dies.
346 		 */
347 		if (task_no_new_privs(caller))
348 			task_set_no_new_privs(thread);
349 
350 		/*
351 		 * Opt the other thread into seccomp if needed.
352 		 * As threads are considered to be trust-realm
353 		 * equivalent (see ptrace_may_access), it is safe to
354 		 * allow one thread to transition the other.
355 		 */
356 		if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED)
357 			seccomp_assign_mode(thread, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER,
358 					    flags);
359 	}
360 }
361 
362 /**
363  * seccomp_prepare_filter: Prepares a seccomp filter for use.
364  * @fprog: BPF program to install
365  *
366  * Returns filter on success or an ERR_PTR on failure.
367  */
368 static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
369 {
370 	struct seccomp_filter *sfilter;
371 	int ret;
372 	const bool save_orig = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE);
373 
374 	if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS)
375 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
376 
377 	BUG_ON(INT_MAX / fprog->len < sizeof(struct sock_filter));
378 
379 	/*
380 	 * Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task has
381 	 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs.
382 	 * This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the
383 	 * behavior of privileged children.
384 	 */
385 	if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
386 	    security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
387 				     CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
388 		return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
389 
390 	/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
391 	sfilter = kzalloc(sizeof(*sfilter), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
392 	if (!sfilter)
393 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
394 
395 	ret = bpf_prog_create_from_user(&sfilter->prog, fprog,
396 					seccomp_check_filter, save_orig);
397 	if (ret < 0) {
398 		kfree(sfilter);
399 		return ERR_PTR(ret);
400 	}
401 
402 	refcount_set(&sfilter->usage, 1);
403 
404 	return sfilter;
405 }
406 
407 /**
408  * seccomp_prepare_user_filter - prepares a user-supplied sock_fprog
409  * @user_filter: pointer to the user data containing a sock_fprog.
410  *
411  * Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise.
412  */
413 static struct seccomp_filter *
414 seccomp_prepare_user_filter(const char __user *user_filter)
415 {
416 	struct sock_fprog fprog;
417 	struct seccomp_filter *filter = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
418 
419 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
420 	if (in_compat_syscall()) {
421 		struct compat_sock_fprog fprog32;
422 		if (copy_from_user(&fprog32, user_filter, sizeof(fprog32)))
423 			goto out;
424 		fprog.len = fprog32.len;
425 		fprog.filter = compat_ptr(fprog32.filter);
426 	} else /* falls through to the if below. */
427 #endif
428 	if (copy_from_user(&fprog, user_filter, sizeof(fprog)))
429 		goto out;
430 	filter = seccomp_prepare_filter(&fprog);
431 out:
432 	return filter;
433 }
434 
435 /**
436  * seccomp_attach_filter: validate and attach filter
437  * @flags:  flags to change filter behavior
438  * @filter: seccomp filter to add to the current process
439  *
440  * Caller must be holding current->sighand->siglock lock.
441  *
442  * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
443  */
444 static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags,
445 				  struct seccomp_filter *filter)
446 {
447 	unsigned long total_insns;
448 	struct seccomp_filter *walker;
449 
450 	assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);
451 
452 	/* Validate resulting filter length. */
453 	total_insns = filter->prog->len;
454 	for (walker = current->seccomp.filter; walker; walker = walker->prev)
455 		total_insns += walker->prog->len + 4;  /* 4 instr penalty */
456 	if (total_insns > MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH)
457 		return -ENOMEM;
458 
459 	/* If thread sync has been requested, check that it is possible. */
460 	if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) {
461 		int ret;
462 
463 		ret = seccomp_can_sync_threads();
464 		if (ret)
465 			return ret;
466 	}
467 
468 	/* Set log flag, if present. */
469 	if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG)
470 		filter->log = true;
471 
472 	/*
473 	 * If there is an existing filter, make it the prev and don't drop its
474 	 * task reference.
475 	 */
476 	filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter;
477 	current->seccomp.filter = filter;
478 
479 	/* Now that the new filter is in place, synchronize to all threads. */
480 	if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
481 		seccomp_sync_threads(flags);
482 
483 	return 0;
484 }
485 
486 static void __get_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
487 {
488 	/* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */
489 	refcount_inc(&filter->usage);
490 }
491 
492 /* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of the filter on @tsk */
493 void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
494 {
495 	struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
496 	if (!orig)
497 		return;
498 	__get_seccomp_filter(orig);
499 }
500 
501 static inline void seccomp_filter_free(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
502 {
503 	if (filter) {
504 		bpf_prog_destroy(filter->prog);
505 		kfree(filter);
506 	}
507 }
508 
509 static void __put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *orig)
510 {
511 	/* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
512 	while (orig && refcount_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
513 		struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
514 		orig = orig->prev;
515 		seccomp_filter_free(freeme);
516 	}
517 }
518 
519 /* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of tsk->seccomp.filter */
520 void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
521 {
522 	__put_seccomp_filter(tsk->seccomp.filter);
523 }
524 
525 static void seccomp_init_siginfo(siginfo_t *info, int syscall, int reason)
526 {
527 	clear_siginfo(info);
528 	info->si_signo = SIGSYS;
529 	info->si_code = SYS_SECCOMP;
530 	info->si_call_addr = (void __user *)KSTK_EIP(current);
531 	info->si_errno = reason;
532 	info->si_arch = syscall_get_arch();
533 	info->si_syscall = syscall;
534 }
535 
536 /**
537  * seccomp_send_sigsys - signals the task to allow in-process syscall emulation
538  * @syscall: syscall number to send to userland
539  * @reason: filter-supplied reason code to send to userland (via si_errno)
540  *
541  * Forces a SIGSYS with a code of SYS_SECCOMP and related sigsys info.
542  */
543 static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
544 {
545 	struct siginfo info;
546 	seccomp_init_siginfo(&info, syscall, reason);
547 	force_sig_info(SIGSYS, &info, current);
548 }
549 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
550 
551 /* For use with seccomp_actions_logged */
552 #define SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS	(1 << 0)
553 #define SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD		(1 << 1)
554 #define SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP		(1 << 2)
555 #define SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO		(1 << 3)
556 #define SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE		(1 << 4)
557 #define SECCOMP_LOG_LOG			(1 << 5)
558 #define SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW		(1 << 6)
559 
560 static u32 seccomp_actions_logged = SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS |
561 				    SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD  |
562 				    SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP  |
563 				    SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO |
564 				    SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE |
565 				    SECCOMP_LOG_LOG;
566 
567 static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall, long signr, u32 action,
568 			       bool requested)
569 {
570 	bool log = false;
571 
572 	switch (action) {
573 	case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
574 		break;
575 	case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
576 		log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP;
577 		break;
578 	case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
579 		log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO;
580 		break;
581 	case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
582 		log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE;
583 		break;
584 	case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
585 		log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_LOG;
586 		break;
587 	case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD:
588 		log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD;
589 		break;
590 	case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS:
591 	default:
592 		log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS;
593 	}
594 
595 	/*
596 	 * Emit an audit message when the action is RET_KILL_*, RET_LOG, or the
597 	 * FILTER_FLAG_LOG bit was set. The admin has the ability to silence
598 	 * any action from being logged by removing the action name from the
599 	 * seccomp_actions_logged sysctl.
600 	 */
601 	if (!log)
602 		return;
603 
604 	audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action);
605 }
606 
607 /*
608  * Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn.
609  * To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit
610  * to limit the stack allocations too.
611  */
612 static const int mode1_syscalls[] = {
613 	__NR_seccomp_read, __NR_seccomp_write, __NR_seccomp_exit, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn,
614 	0, /* null terminated */
615 };
616 
617 static void __secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
618 {
619 	const int *syscall_whitelist = mode1_syscalls;
620 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
621 	if (in_compat_syscall())
622 		syscall_whitelist = get_compat_mode1_syscalls();
623 #endif
624 	do {
625 		if (*syscall_whitelist == this_syscall)
626 			return;
627 	} while (*++syscall_whitelist);
628 
629 #ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
630 	dump_stack();
631 #endif
632 	seccomp_log(this_syscall, SIGKILL, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD, true);
633 	do_exit(SIGKILL);
634 }
635 
636 #ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
637 void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
638 {
639 	int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
640 
641 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
642 	    unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
643 		return;
644 
645 	if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED)
646 		return;
647 	else if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT)
648 		__secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);
649 	else
650 		BUG();
651 }
652 #else
653 
654 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
655 static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
656 			    const bool recheck_after_trace)
657 {
658 	u32 filter_ret, action;
659 	struct seccomp_filter *match = NULL;
660 	int data;
661 
662 	/*
663 	 * Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have
664 	 * been seen after TIF_SECCOMP was seen.
665 	 */
666 	rmb();
667 
668 	filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd, &match);
669 	data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
670 	action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL;
671 
672 	switch (action) {
673 	case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
674 		/* Set low-order bits as an errno, capped at MAX_ERRNO. */
675 		if (data > MAX_ERRNO)
676 			data = MAX_ERRNO;
677 		syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current),
678 					 -data, 0);
679 		goto skip;
680 
681 	case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
682 		/* Show the handler the original registers. */
683 		syscall_rollback(current, task_pt_regs(current));
684 		/* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */
685 		seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall, data);
686 		goto skip;
687 
688 	case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
689 		/* We've been put in this state by the ptracer already. */
690 		if (recheck_after_trace)
691 			return 0;
692 
693 		/* ENOSYS these calls if there is no tracer attached. */
694 		if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) {
695 			syscall_set_return_value(current,
696 						 task_pt_regs(current),
697 						 -ENOSYS, 0);
698 			goto skip;
699 		}
700 
701 		/* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */
702 		ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data);
703 		/*
704 		 * The delivery of a fatal signal during event
705 		 * notification may silently skip tracer notification,
706 		 * which could leave us with a potentially unmodified
707 		 * syscall that the tracer would have liked to have
708 		 * changed. Since the process is about to die, we just
709 		 * force the syscall to be skipped and let the signal
710 		 * kill the process and correctly handle any tracer exit
711 		 * notifications.
712 		 */
713 		if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
714 			goto skip;
715 		/* Check if the tracer forced the syscall to be skipped. */
716 		this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current));
717 		if (this_syscall < 0)
718 			goto skip;
719 
720 		/*
721 		 * Recheck the syscall, since it may have changed. This
722 		 * intentionally uses a NULL struct seccomp_data to force
723 		 * a reload of all registers. This does not goto skip since
724 		 * a skip would have already been reported.
725 		 */
726 		if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, true))
727 			return -1;
728 
729 		return 0;
730 
731 	case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
732 		seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, true);
733 		return 0;
734 
735 	case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
736 		/*
737 		 * Note that the "match" filter will always be NULL for
738 		 * this action since SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW is the starting
739 		 * state in seccomp_run_filters().
740 		 */
741 		return 0;
742 
743 	case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD:
744 	case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS:
745 	default:
746 		seccomp_log(this_syscall, SIGSYS, action, true);
747 		/* Dump core only if this is the last remaining thread. */
748 		if (action == SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS ||
749 		    get_nr_threads(current) == 1) {
750 			siginfo_t info;
751 
752 			/* Show the original registers in the dump. */
753 			syscall_rollback(current, task_pt_regs(current));
754 			/* Trigger a manual coredump since do_exit skips it. */
755 			seccomp_init_siginfo(&info, this_syscall, data);
756 			do_coredump(&info);
757 		}
758 		if (action == SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS)
759 			do_group_exit(SIGSYS);
760 		else
761 			do_exit(SIGSYS);
762 	}
763 
764 	unreachable();
765 
766 skip:
767 	seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, match ? match->log : false);
768 	return -1;
769 }
770 #else
771 static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
772 			    const bool recheck_after_trace)
773 {
774 	BUG();
775 }
776 #endif
777 
778 int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
779 {
780 	int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
781 	int this_syscall;
782 
783 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
784 	    unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
785 		return 0;
786 
787 	this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr :
788 		syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current));
789 
790 	switch (mode) {
791 	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
792 		__secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);  /* may call do_exit */
793 		return 0;
794 	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
795 		return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, sd, false);
796 	default:
797 		BUG();
798 	}
799 }
800 #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER */
801 
802 long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
803 {
804 	return current->seccomp.mode;
805 }
806 
807 /**
808  * seccomp_set_mode_strict: internal function for setting strict seccomp
809  *
810  * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
811  *
812  * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
813  */
814 static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
815 {
816 	const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT;
817 	long ret = -EINVAL;
818 
819 	spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
820 
821 	if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
822 		goto out;
823 
824 #ifdef TIF_NOTSC
825 	disable_TSC();
826 #endif
827 	seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode, 0);
828 	ret = 0;
829 
830 out:
831 	spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
832 
833 	return ret;
834 }
835 
836 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
837 /**
838  * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter
839  * @flags:  flags to change filter behavior
840  * @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter
841  *
842  * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters.
843  * Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order)
844  * for each system call the task makes.
845  *
846  * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
847  *
848  * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
849  */
850 static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
851 				    const char __user *filter)
852 {
853 	const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
854 	struct seccomp_filter *prepared = NULL;
855 	long ret = -EINVAL;
856 
857 	/* Validate flags. */
858 	if (flags & ~SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK)
859 		return -EINVAL;
860 
861 	/* Prepare the new filter before holding any locks. */
862 	prepared = seccomp_prepare_user_filter(filter);
863 	if (IS_ERR(prepared))
864 		return PTR_ERR(prepared);
865 
866 	/*
867 	 * Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC
868 	 * while another thread is in the middle of calling exec.
869 	 */
870 	if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC &&
871 	    mutex_lock_killable(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
872 		goto out_free;
873 
874 	spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
875 
876 	if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
877 		goto out;
878 
879 	ret = seccomp_attach_filter(flags, prepared);
880 	if (ret)
881 		goto out;
882 	/* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */
883 	prepared = NULL;
884 
885 	seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode, flags);
886 out:
887 	spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
888 	if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
889 		mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
890 out_free:
891 	seccomp_filter_free(prepared);
892 	return ret;
893 }
894 #else
895 static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
896 					   const char __user *filter)
897 {
898 	return -EINVAL;
899 }
900 #endif
901 
902 static long seccomp_get_action_avail(const char __user *uaction)
903 {
904 	u32 action;
905 
906 	if (copy_from_user(&action, uaction, sizeof(action)))
907 		return -EFAULT;
908 
909 	switch (action) {
910 	case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS:
911 	case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD:
912 	case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
913 	case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
914 	case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
915 	case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
916 	case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
917 		break;
918 	default:
919 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
920 	}
921 
922 	return 0;
923 }
924 
925 /* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */
926 static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
927 		       const char __user *uargs)
928 {
929 	switch (op) {
930 	case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT:
931 		if (flags != 0 || uargs != NULL)
932 			return -EINVAL;
933 		return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
934 	case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER:
935 		return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags, uargs);
936 	case SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL:
937 		if (flags != 0)
938 			return -EINVAL;
939 
940 		return seccomp_get_action_avail(uargs);
941 	default:
942 		return -EINVAL;
943 	}
944 }
945 
946 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(seccomp, unsigned int, op, unsigned int, flags,
947 			 const char __user *, uargs)
948 {
949 	return do_seccomp(op, flags, uargs);
950 }
951 
952 /**
953  * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
954  * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
955  * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
956  *
957  * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
958  */
959 long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
960 {
961 	unsigned int op;
962 	char __user *uargs;
963 
964 	switch (seccomp_mode) {
965 	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
966 		op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT;
967 		/*
968 		 * Setting strict mode through prctl always ignored filter,
969 		 * so make sure it is always NULL here to pass the internal
970 		 * check in do_seccomp().
971 		 */
972 		uargs = NULL;
973 		break;
974 	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
975 		op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER;
976 		uargs = filter;
977 		break;
978 	default:
979 		return -EINVAL;
980 	}
981 
982 	/* prctl interface doesn't have flags, so they are always zero. */
983 	return do_seccomp(op, 0, uargs);
984 }
985 
986 #if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)
987 static struct seccomp_filter *get_nth_filter(struct task_struct *task,
988 					     unsigned long filter_off)
989 {
990 	struct seccomp_filter *orig, *filter;
991 	unsigned long count;
992 
993 	/*
994 	 * Note: this is only correct because the caller should be the (ptrace)
995 	 * tracer of the task, otherwise lock_task_sighand is needed.
996 	 */
997 	spin_lock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
998 
999 	if (task->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER) {
1000 		spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
1001 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1002 	}
1003 
1004 	orig = task->seccomp.filter;
1005 	__get_seccomp_filter(orig);
1006 	spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
1007 
1008 	count = 0;
1009 	for (filter = orig; filter; filter = filter->prev)
1010 		count++;
1011 
1012 	if (filter_off >= count) {
1013 		filter = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
1014 		goto out;
1015 	}
1016 
1017 	count -= filter_off;
1018 	for (filter = orig; filter && count > 1; filter = filter->prev)
1019 		count--;
1020 
1021 	if (WARN_ON(count != 1 || !filter)) {
1022 		filter = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
1023 		goto out;
1024 	}
1025 
1026 	__get_seccomp_filter(filter);
1027 
1028 out:
1029 	__put_seccomp_filter(orig);
1030 	return filter;
1031 }
1032 
1033 long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long filter_off,
1034 			void __user *data)
1035 {
1036 	struct seccomp_filter *filter;
1037 	struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog;
1038 	long ret;
1039 
1040 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
1041 	    current->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) {
1042 		return -EACCES;
1043 	}
1044 
1045 	filter = get_nth_filter(task, filter_off);
1046 	if (IS_ERR(filter))
1047 		return PTR_ERR(filter);
1048 
1049 	fprog = filter->prog->orig_prog;
1050 	if (!fprog) {
1051 		/* This must be a new non-cBPF filter, since we save
1052 		 * every cBPF filter's orig_prog above when
1053 		 * CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is enabled.
1054 		 */
1055 		ret = -EMEDIUMTYPE;
1056 		goto out;
1057 	}
1058 
1059 	ret = fprog->len;
1060 	if (!data)
1061 		goto out;
1062 
1063 	if (copy_to_user(data, fprog->filter, bpf_classic_proglen(fprog)))
1064 		ret = -EFAULT;
1065 
1066 out:
1067 	__put_seccomp_filter(filter);
1068 	return ret;
1069 }
1070 
1071 long seccomp_get_metadata(struct task_struct *task,
1072 			  unsigned long size, void __user *data)
1073 {
1074 	long ret;
1075 	struct seccomp_filter *filter;
1076 	struct seccomp_metadata kmd = {};
1077 
1078 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
1079 	    current->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) {
1080 		return -EACCES;
1081 	}
1082 
1083 	size = min_t(unsigned long, size, sizeof(kmd));
1084 
1085 	if (size < sizeof(kmd.filter_off))
1086 		return -EINVAL;
1087 
1088 	if (copy_from_user(&kmd.filter_off, data, sizeof(kmd.filter_off)))
1089 		return -EFAULT;
1090 
1091 	filter = get_nth_filter(task, kmd.filter_off);
1092 	if (IS_ERR(filter))
1093 		return PTR_ERR(filter);
1094 
1095 	if (filter->log)
1096 		kmd.flags |= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG;
1097 
1098 	ret = size;
1099 	if (copy_to_user(data, &kmd, size))
1100 		ret = -EFAULT;
1101 
1102 	__put_seccomp_filter(filter);
1103 	return ret;
1104 }
1105 #endif
1106 
1107 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
1108 
1109 /* Human readable action names for friendly sysctl interaction */
1110 #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME	"kill_process"
1111 #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME	"kill_thread"
1112 #define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME		"trap"
1113 #define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME		"errno"
1114 #define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME		"trace"
1115 #define SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME		"log"
1116 #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME		"allow"
1117 
1118 static const char seccomp_actions_avail[] =
1119 				SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME	" "
1120 				SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME	" "
1121 				SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME		" "
1122 				SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME		" "
1123 				SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME		" "
1124 				SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME		" "
1125 				SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME;
1126 
1127 struct seccomp_log_name {
1128 	u32		log;
1129 	const char	*name;
1130 };
1131 
1132 static const struct seccomp_log_name seccomp_log_names[] = {
1133 	{ SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME },
1134 	{ SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME },
1135 	{ SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME },
1136 	{ SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME },
1137 	{ SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME },
1138 	{ SECCOMP_LOG_LOG, SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME },
1139 	{ SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME },
1140 	{ }
1141 };
1142 
1143 static bool seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(char *names, size_t size,
1144 					      u32 actions_logged,
1145 					      const char *sep)
1146 {
1147 	const struct seccomp_log_name *cur;
1148 	bool append_sep = false;
1149 
1150 	for (cur = seccomp_log_names; cur->name && size; cur++) {
1151 		ssize_t ret;
1152 
1153 		if (!(actions_logged & cur->log))
1154 			continue;
1155 
1156 		if (append_sep) {
1157 			ret = strscpy(names, sep, size);
1158 			if (ret < 0)
1159 				return false;
1160 
1161 			names += ret;
1162 			size -= ret;
1163 		} else
1164 			append_sep = true;
1165 
1166 		ret = strscpy(names, cur->name, size);
1167 		if (ret < 0)
1168 			return false;
1169 
1170 		names += ret;
1171 		size -= ret;
1172 	}
1173 
1174 	return true;
1175 }
1176 
1177 static bool seccomp_action_logged_from_name(u32 *action_logged,
1178 					    const char *name)
1179 {
1180 	const struct seccomp_log_name *cur;
1181 
1182 	for (cur = seccomp_log_names; cur->name; cur++) {
1183 		if (!strcmp(cur->name, name)) {
1184 			*action_logged = cur->log;
1185 			return true;
1186 		}
1187 	}
1188 
1189 	return false;
1190 }
1191 
1192 static bool seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(u32 *actions_logged, char *names)
1193 {
1194 	char *name;
1195 
1196 	*actions_logged = 0;
1197 	while ((name = strsep(&names, " ")) && *name) {
1198 		u32 action_logged = 0;
1199 
1200 		if (!seccomp_action_logged_from_name(&action_logged, name))
1201 			return false;
1202 
1203 		*actions_logged |= action_logged;
1204 	}
1205 
1206 	return true;
1207 }
1208 
1209 static int read_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user *buffer,
1210 			       size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
1211 {
1212 	char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)];
1213 	struct ctl_table table;
1214 
1215 	memset(names, 0, sizeof(names));
1216 
1217 	if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names, sizeof(names),
1218 					       seccomp_actions_logged, " "))
1219 		return -EINVAL;
1220 
1221 	table = *ro_table;
1222 	table.data = names;
1223 	table.maxlen = sizeof(names);
1224 	return proc_dostring(&table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos);
1225 }
1226 
1227 static int write_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user *buffer,
1228 				size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos, u32 *actions_logged)
1229 {
1230 	char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)];
1231 	struct ctl_table table;
1232 	int ret;
1233 
1234 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
1235 		return -EPERM;
1236 
1237 	memset(names, 0, sizeof(names));
1238 
1239 	table = *ro_table;
1240 	table.data = names;
1241 	table.maxlen = sizeof(names);
1242 	ret = proc_dostring(&table, 1, buffer, lenp, ppos);
1243 	if (ret)
1244 		return ret;
1245 
1246 	if (!seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(actions_logged, table.data))
1247 		return -EINVAL;
1248 
1249 	if (*actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW)
1250 		return -EINVAL;
1251 
1252 	seccomp_actions_logged = *actions_logged;
1253 	return 0;
1254 }
1255 
1256 static void audit_actions_logged(u32 actions_logged, u32 old_actions_logged,
1257 				 int ret)
1258 {
1259 	char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)];
1260 	char old_names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)];
1261 	const char *new = names;
1262 	const char *old = old_names;
1263 
1264 	if (!audit_enabled)
1265 		return;
1266 
1267 	memset(names, 0, sizeof(names));
1268 	memset(old_names, 0, sizeof(old_names));
1269 
1270 	if (ret)
1271 		new = "?";
1272 	else if (!actions_logged)
1273 		new = "(none)";
1274 	else if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names, sizeof(names),
1275 						    actions_logged, ","))
1276 		new = "?";
1277 
1278 	if (!old_actions_logged)
1279 		old = "(none)";
1280 	else if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(old_names,
1281 						    sizeof(old_names),
1282 						    old_actions_logged, ","))
1283 		old = "?";
1284 
1285 	return audit_seccomp_actions_logged(new, old, !ret);
1286 }
1287 
1288 static int seccomp_actions_logged_handler(struct ctl_table *ro_table, int write,
1289 					  void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
1290 					  loff_t *ppos)
1291 {
1292 	int ret;
1293 
1294 	if (write) {
1295 		u32 actions_logged = 0;
1296 		u32 old_actions_logged = seccomp_actions_logged;
1297 
1298 		ret = write_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos,
1299 					   &actions_logged);
1300 		audit_actions_logged(actions_logged, old_actions_logged, ret);
1301 	} else
1302 		ret = read_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos);
1303 
1304 	return ret;
1305 }
1306 
1307 static struct ctl_path seccomp_sysctl_path[] = {
1308 	{ .procname = "kernel", },
1309 	{ .procname = "seccomp", },
1310 	{ }
1311 };
1312 
1313 static struct ctl_table seccomp_sysctl_table[] = {
1314 	{
1315 		.procname	= "actions_avail",
1316 		.data		= (void *) &seccomp_actions_avail,
1317 		.maxlen		= sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail),
1318 		.mode		= 0444,
1319 		.proc_handler	= proc_dostring,
1320 	},
1321 	{
1322 		.procname	= "actions_logged",
1323 		.mode		= 0644,
1324 		.proc_handler	= seccomp_actions_logged_handler,
1325 	},
1326 	{ }
1327 };
1328 
1329 static int __init seccomp_sysctl_init(void)
1330 {
1331 	struct ctl_table_header *hdr;
1332 
1333 	hdr = register_sysctl_paths(seccomp_sysctl_path, seccomp_sysctl_table);
1334 	if (!hdr)
1335 		pr_warn("seccomp: sysctl registration failed\n");
1336 	else
1337 		kmemleak_not_leak(hdr);
1338 
1339 	return 0;
1340 }
1341 
1342 device_initcall(seccomp_sysctl_init)
1343 
1344 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
1345