1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only 2 /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com 3 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook 4 * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io 5 */ 6 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h> 7 #include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h> 8 #include <linux/kernel.h> 9 #include <linux/types.h> 10 #include <linux/slab.h> 11 #include <linux/bpf.h> 12 #include <linux/btf.h> 13 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> 14 #include <linux/filter.h> 15 #include <net/netlink.h> 16 #include <linux/file.h> 17 #include <linux/vmalloc.h> 18 #include <linux/stringify.h> 19 #include <linux/bsearch.h> 20 #include <linux/sort.h> 21 #include <linux/perf_event.h> 22 #include <linux/ctype.h> 23 #include <linux/error-injection.h> 24 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> 25 #include <linux/btf_ids.h> 26 #include <linux/poison.h> 27 #include <linux/module.h> 28 #include <linux/cpumask.h> 29 #include <net/xdp.h> 30 31 #include "disasm.h" 32 33 static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = { 34 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \ 35 [_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops, 36 #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) 37 #define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name) 38 #include <linux/bpf_types.h> 39 #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE 40 #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE 41 #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE 42 }; 43 44 /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program 45 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state. 46 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn. 47 * 48 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG. 49 * It rejects the following programs: 50 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns 51 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge) 52 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function) 53 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps 54 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn. 55 * Since it's analyzing all paths through the program, the length of the 56 * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of 57 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs. 58 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k 59 * 60 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction 61 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics. 62 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is 63 * copied to R1. 64 * 65 * All registers are 64-bit. 66 * R0 - return register 67 * R1-R5 argument passing registers 68 * R6-R9 callee saved registers 69 * R10 - frame pointer read-only 70 * 71 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context 72 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX. 73 * 74 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case: 75 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), 76 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20), 77 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1 78 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize 79 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack. 80 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK 81 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking). 82 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant. 83 * 84 * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which 85 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer. 86 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type) 87 * 88 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register 89 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are 90 * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function. 91 * 92 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value' 93 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible. 94 * 95 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against 96 * function argument constraints. 97 * 98 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints. 99 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be 100 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as 101 * 'pointer to map element key' 102 * 103 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem(): 104 * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, 105 * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, 106 * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 107 * 108 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null' 109 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and 110 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside 111 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key. 112 * 113 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like: 114 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) 115 * { 116 * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; 117 * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; 118 * void *value; 119 * 120 * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that 121 * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on 122 * the stack of eBPF program. 123 * } 124 * 125 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like: 126 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR 127 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK 128 * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP 129 * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), 130 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees: 131 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok, 132 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes 133 * 134 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far, 135 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits 136 * and were initialized prior to this call. 137 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at 138 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets 139 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function 140 * returns either pointer to map value or NULL. 141 * 142 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off' 143 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to 144 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false 145 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op(). 146 * 147 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5 148 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable. 149 * 150 * The following reference types represent a potential reference to a kernel 151 * resource which, after first being allocated, must be checked and freed by 152 * the BPF program: 153 * - PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, PTR_TO_SOCKET 154 * 155 * When the verifier sees a helper call return a reference type, it allocates a 156 * pointer id for the reference and stores it in the current function state. 157 * Similar to the way that PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL is converted into 158 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL becomes PTR_TO_SOCKET when the type 159 * passes through a NULL-check conditional. For the branch wherein the state is 160 * changed to CONST_IMM, the verifier releases the reference. 161 * 162 * For each helper function that allocates a reference, such as 163 * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), there is a corresponding release function, such as 164 * bpf_sk_release(). When a reference type passes into the release function, 165 * the verifier also releases the reference. If any unchecked or unreleased 166 * reference remains at the end of the program, the verifier rejects it. 167 */ 168 169 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */ 170 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem { 171 /* verifer state is 'st' 172 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx' 173 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx' 174 */ 175 struct bpf_verifier_state st; 176 int insn_idx; 177 int prev_insn_idx; 178 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next; 179 /* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */ 180 u32 log_pos; 181 }; 182 183 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ 8192 184 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64 185 186 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON (1ULL << 63) 187 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN (1ULL << 62) 188 189 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV 1UL 190 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) + \ 191 POISON_POINTER_DELTA)) 192 #define BPF_MAP_PTR(X) ((struct bpf_map *)((X) & ~BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV)) 193 194 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx); 195 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ref_obj_id); 196 static void invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 197 static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 198 static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 199 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 200 static void specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 201 u32 func_id, u16 offset, unsigned long *addr); 202 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 203 204 static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 205 { 206 return BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON; 207 } 208 209 static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 210 { 211 return aux->map_ptr_state & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV; 212 } 213 214 static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 215 const struct bpf_map *map, bool unpriv) 216 { 217 BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV); 218 unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux); 219 aux->map_ptr_state = (unsigned long)map | 220 (unpriv ? BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV : 0UL); 221 } 222 223 static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 224 { 225 return aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON; 226 } 227 228 static bool bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 229 { 230 return !(aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN); 231 } 232 233 static u64 bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 234 { 235 return aux->map_key_state & ~(BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 236 } 237 238 static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state) 239 { 240 bool poisoned = bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux); 241 242 aux->map_key_state = state | BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | 243 (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL); 244 } 245 246 static bool bpf_helper_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 247 { 248 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 249 insn->src_reg == 0; 250 } 251 252 static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 253 { 254 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 255 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL; 256 } 257 258 static bool bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 259 { 260 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 261 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL; 262 } 263 264 struct bpf_call_arg_meta { 265 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 266 bool raw_mode; 267 bool pkt_access; 268 u8 release_regno; 269 int regno; 270 int access_size; 271 int mem_size; 272 u64 msize_max_value; 273 int ref_obj_id; 274 int dynptr_id; 275 int map_uid; 276 int func_id; 277 struct btf *btf; 278 u32 btf_id; 279 struct btf *ret_btf; 280 u32 ret_btf_id; 281 u32 subprogno; 282 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 283 }; 284 285 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta { 286 /* In parameters */ 287 struct btf *btf; 288 u32 func_id; 289 u32 kfunc_flags; 290 const struct btf_type *func_proto; 291 const char *func_name; 292 /* Out parameters */ 293 u32 ref_obj_id; 294 u8 release_regno; 295 bool r0_rdonly; 296 u32 ret_btf_id; 297 u64 r0_size; 298 u32 subprogno; 299 struct { 300 u64 value; 301 bool found; 302 } arg_constant; 303 304 /* arg_{btf,btf_id,owning_ref} are used by kfunc-specific handling, 305 * generally to pass info about user-defined local kptr types to later 306 * verification logic 307 * bpf_obj_drop 308 * Record the local kptr type to be drop'd 309 * bpf_refcount_acquire (via KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR arg type) 310 * Record the local kptr type to be refcount_incr'd and use 311 * arg_owning_ref to determine whether refcount_acquire should be 312 * fallible 313 */ 314 struct btf *arg_btf; 315 u32 arg_btf_id; 316 bool arg_owning_ref; 317 318 struct { 319 struct btf_field *field; 320 } arg_list_head; 321 struct { 322 struct btf_field *field; 323 } arg_rbtree_root; 324 struct { 325 enum bpf_dynptr_type type; 326 u32 id; 327 u32 ref_obj_id; 328 } initialized_dynptr; 329 struct { 330 u8 spi; 331 u8 frameno; 332 } iter; 333 u64 mem_size; 334 }; 335 336 struct btf *btf_vmlinux; 337 338 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); 339 340 static const struct bpf_line_info * 341 find_linfo(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_off) 342 { 343 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 344 const struct bpf_prog *prog; 345 u32 i, nr_linfo; 346 347 prog = env->prog; 348 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 349 350 if (!nr_linfo || insn_off >= prog->len) 351 return NULL; 352 353 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 354 for (i = 1; i < nr_linfo; i++) 355 if (insn_off < linfo[i].insn_off) 356 break; 357 358 return &linfo[i - 1]; 359 } 360 361 __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...) 362 { 363 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data; 364 va_list args; 365 366 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 367 return; 368 369 va_start(args, fmt); 370 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); 371 va_end(args); 372 } 373 374 static const char *ltrim(const char *s) 375 { 376 while (isspace(*s)) 377 s++; 378 379 return s; 380 } 381 382 __printf(3, 4) static void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 383 u32 insn_off, 384 const char *prefix_fmt, ...) 385 { 386 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 387 388 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 389 return; 390 391 linfo = find_linfo(env, insn_off); 392 if (!linfo || linfo == env->prev_linfo) 393 return; 394 395 if (prefix_fmt) { 396 va_list args; 397 398 va_start(args, prefix_fmt); 399 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, prefix_fmt, args); 400 va_end(args); 401 } 402 403 verbose(env, "%s\n", 404 ltrim(btf_name_by_offset(env->prog->aux->btf, 405 linfo->line_off))); 406 407 env->prev_linfo = linfo; 408 } 409 410 static void verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 411 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 412 struct tnum *range, const char *ctx, 413 const char *reg_name) 414 { 415 char tn_buf[48]; 416 417 verbose(env, "At %s the register %s ", ctx, reg_name); 418 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 419 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 420 verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf); 421 } else { 422 verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value"); 423 } 424 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), *range); 425 verbose(env, " should have been in %s\n", tn_buf); 426 } 427 428 static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 429 { 430 type = base_type(type); 431 return type == PTR_TO_PACKET || 432 type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META; 433 } 434 435 static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 436 { 437 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 438 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || 439 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 440 type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 441 } 442 443 static bool type_may_be_null(u32 type) 444 { 445 return type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 446 } 447 448 static bool reg_not_null(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 449 { 450 enum bpf_reg_type type; 451 452 type = reg->type; 453 if (type_may_be_null(type)) 454 return false; 455 456 type = base_type(type); 457 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 458 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 459 type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 460 type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 461 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || 462 (type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && is_trusted_reg(reg)) || 463 type == PTR_TO_MEM; 464 } 465 466 static bool type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(u32 type) 467 { 468 return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && type_flag(type) & MEM_ALLOC; 469 } 470 471 static bool type_is_non_owning_ref(u32 type) 472 { 473 return type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(type) && type_flag(type) & NON_OWN_REF; 474 } 475 476 static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 477 { 478 struct btf_record *rec = NULL; 479 struct btf_struct_meta *meta; 480 481 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 482 rec = reg->map_ptr->record; 483 } else if (type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 484 meta = btf_find_struct_meta(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 485 if (meta) 486 rec = meta->record; 487 } 488 return rec; 489 } 490 491 static bool subprog_is_global(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 492 { 493 struct bpf_func_info_aux *aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux; 494 495 return aux && aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL; 496 } 497 498 static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 499 { 500 return btf_record_has_field(reg_btf_record(reg), BPF_SPIN_LOCK); 501 } 502 503 static bool type_is_rdonly_mem(u32 type) 504 { 505 return type & MEM_RDONLY; 506 } 507 508 static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 509 const struct bpf_map *map) 510 { 511 enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC; 512 513 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || 514 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || 515 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp || 516 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve || 517 func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 518 return true; 519 520 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 521 (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 522 map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)) 523 return true; 524 525 return false; 526 } 527 528 static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 529 { 530 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock || 531 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock || 532 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_sock || 533 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp6_sock || 534 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_udp6_sock || 535 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_mptcp_sock || 536 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock || 537 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_request_sock; 538 } 539 540 static bool is_dynptr_ref_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 541 { 542 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data; 543 } 544 545 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 546 547 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 548 { 549 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 550 func_id == BPF_FUNC_find_vma || 551 func_id == BPF_FUNC_loop || 552 func_id == BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain; 553 } 554 555 static bool is_async_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 556 { 557 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback; 558 } 559 560 static bool is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 561 { 562 return is_sync_callback_calling_function(func_id) || 563 is_async_callback_calling_function(func_id); 564 } 565 566 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn) 567 { 568 return (bpf_helper_call(insn) && is_sync_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) || 569 (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)); 570 } 571 572 static bool is_storage_get_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 573 { 574 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get || 575 func_id == BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get || 576 func_id == BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get || 577 func_id == BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get; 578 } 579 580 static bool helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 581 const struct bpf_map *map) 582 { 583 int ref_obj_uses = 0; 584 585 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) 586 ref_obj_uses++; 587 if (is_acquire_function(func_id, map)) 588 ref_obj_uses++; 589 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) 590 ref_obj_uses++; 591 592 return ref_obj_uses > 1; 593 } 594 595 static bool is_cmpxchg_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 596 { 597 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && 598 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 599 insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG; 600 } 601 602 /* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' 603 * 604 * Note that reg_type_str() can not appear more than once in a single verbose() 605 * statement. 606 */ 607 static const char *reg_type_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 608 enum bpf_reg_type type) 609 { 610 char postfix[16] = {0}, prefix[64] = {0}; 611 static const char * const str[] = { 612 [NOT_INIT] = "?", 613 [SCALAR_VALUE] = "scalar", 614 [PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx", 615 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr", 616 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value", 617 [PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp", 618 [PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt", 619 [PTR_TO_PACKET_META] = "pkt_meta", 620 [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end", 621 [PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS] = "flow_keys", 622 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = "sock", 623 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = "sock_common", 624 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = "tcp_sock", 625 [PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER] = "tp_buffer", 626 [PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK] = "xdp_sock", 627 [PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = "ptr_", 628 [PTR_TO_MEM] = "mem", 629 [PTR_TO_BUF] = "buf", 630 [PTR_TO_FUNC] = "func", 631 [PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = "map_key", 632 [CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = "dynptr_ptr", 633 }; 634 635 if (type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { 636 if (base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 637 strncpy(postfix, "or_null_", 16); 638 else 639 strncpy(postfix, "_or_null", 16); 640 } 641 642 snprintf(prefix, sizeof(prefix), "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s", 643 type & MEM_RDONLY ? "rdonly_" : "", 644 type & MEM_RINGBUF ? "ringbuf_" : "", 645 type & MEM_USER ? "user_" : "", 646 type & MEM_PERCPU ? "percpu_" : "", 647 type & MEM_RCU ? "rcu_" : "", 648 type & PTR_UNTRUSTED ? "untrusted_" : "", 649 type & PTR_TRUSTED ? "trusted_" : "" 650 ); 651 652 snprintf(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, "%s%s%s", 653 prefix, str[base_type(type)], postfix); 654 return env->tmp_str_buf; 655 } 656 657 static char slot_type_char[] = { 658 [STACK_INVALID] = '?', 659 [STACK_SPILL] = 'r', 660 [STACK_MISC] = 'm', 661 [STACK_ZERO] = '0', 662 [STACK_DYNPTR] = 'd', 663 [STACK_ITER] = 'i', 664 }; 665 666 static void print_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 667 enum bpf_reg_liveness live) 668 { 669 if (live & (REG_LIVE_READ | REG_LIVE_WRITTEN | REG_LIVE_DONE)) 670 verbose(env, "_"); 671 if (live & REG_LIVE_READ) 672 verbose(env, "r"); 673 if (live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 674 verbose(env, "w"); 675 if (live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 676 verbose(env, "D"); 677 } 678 679 static int __get_spi(s32 off) 680 { 681 return (-off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 682 } 683 684 static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 685 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 686 { 687 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 688 689 return cur->frame[reg->frameno]; 690 } 691 692 static bool is_spi_bounds_valid(struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi, int nr_slots) 693 { 694 int allocated_slots = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 695 696 /* We need to check that slots between [spi - nr_slots + 1, spi] are 697 * within [0, allocated_stack). 698 * 699 * Please note that the spi grows downwards. For example, a dynptr 700 * takes the size of two stack slots; the first slot will be at 701 * spi and the second slot will be at spi - 1. 702 */ 703 return spi - nr_slots + 1 >= 0 && spi < allocated_slots; 704 } 705 706 static int stack_slot_obj_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 707 const char *obj_kind, int nr_slots) 708 { 709 int off, spi; 710 711 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 712 verbose(env, "%s has to be at a constant offset\n", obj_kind); 713 return -EINVAL; 714 } 715 716 off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 717 if (off % BPF_REG_SIZE) { 718 verbose(env, "cannot pass in %s at an offset=%d\n", obj_kind, off); 719 return -EINVAL; 720 } 721 722 spi = __get_spi(off); 723 if (spi + 1 < nr_slots) { 724 verbose(env, "cannot pass in %s at an offset=%d\n", obj_kind, off); 725 return -EINVAL; 726 } 727 728 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(func(env, reg), spi, nr_slots)) 729 return -ERANGE; 730 return spi; 731 } 732 733 static int dynptr_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 734 { 735 return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "dynptr", BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS); 736 } 737 738 static int iter_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) 739 { 740 return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "iter", nr_slots); 741 } 742 743 static const char *btf_type_name(const struct btf *btf, u32 id) 744 { 745 return btf_name_by_offset(btf, btf_type_by_id(btf, id)->name_off); 746 } 747 748 static const char *dynptr_type_str(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 749 { 750 switch (type) { 751 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 752 return "local"; 753 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 754 return "ringbuf"; 755 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB: 756 return "skb"; 757 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP: 758 return "xdp"; 759 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID: 760 return "<invalid>"; 761 default: 762 WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown dynptr type %d\n", type); 763 return "<unknown>"; 764 } 765 } 766 767 static const char *iter_type_str(const struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id) 768 { 769 if (!btf || btf_id == 0) 770 return "<invalid>"; 771 772 /* we already validated that type is valid and has conforming name */ 773 return btf_type_name(btf, btf_id) + sizeof(ITER_PREFIX) - 1; 774 } 775 776 static const char *iter_state_str(enum bpf_iter_state state) 777 { 778 switch (state) { 779 case BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE: 780 return "active"; 781 case BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED: 782 return "drained"; 783 case BPF_ITER_STATE_INVALID: 784 return "<invalid>"; 785 default: 786 WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown iter state %d\n", state); 787 return "<unknown>"; 788 } 789 } 790 791 static void mark_reg_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno) 792 { 793 env->scratched_regs |= 1U << regno; 794 } 795 796 static void mark_stack_slot_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 spi) 797 { 798 env->scratched_stack_slots |= 1ULL << spi; 799 } 800 801 static bool reg_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno) 802 { 803 return (env->scratched_regs >> regno) & 1; 804 } 805 806 static bool stack_slot_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u64 regno) 807 { 808 return (env->scratched_stack_slots >> regno) & 1; 809 } 810 811 static bool verifier_state_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 812 { 813 return env->scratched_regs || env->scratched_stack_slots; 814 } 815 816 static void mark_verifier_state_clean(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 817 { 818 env->scratched_regs = 0U; 819 env->scratched_stack_slots = 0ULL; 820 } 821 822 /* Used for printing the entire verifier state. */ 823 static void mark_verifier_state_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 824 { 825 env->scratched_regs = ~0U; 826 env->scratched_stack_slots = ~0ULL; 827 } 828 829 static enum bpf_dynptr_type arg_to_dynptr_type(enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 830 { 831 switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) { 832 case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 833 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL; 834 case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 835 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 836 case DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB: 837 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB; 838 case DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP: 839 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP; 840 default: 841 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID; 842 } 843 } 844 845 static enum bpf_type_flag get_dynptr_type_flag(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 846 { 847 switch (type) { 848 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 849 return DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL; 850 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 851 return DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 852 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB: 853 return DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB; 854 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP: 855 return DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP; 856 default: 857 return 0; 858 } 859 } 860 861 static bool dynptr_type_refcounted(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 862 { 863 return type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 864 } 865 866 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 867 enum bpf_dynptr_type type, 868 bool first_slot, int dynptr_id); 869 870 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 871 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 872 873 static void mark_dynptr_stack_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 874 struct bpf_reg_state *sreg1, 875 struct bpf_reg_state *sreg2, 876 enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 877 { 878 int id = ++env->id_gen; 879 880 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg1, type, true, id); 881 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg2, type, false, id); 882 } 883 884 static void mark_dynptr_cb_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 885 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 886 enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 887 { 888 __mark_dynptr_reg(reg, type, true, ++env->id_gen); 889 } 890 891 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 892 struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi); 893 894 static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 895 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int insn_idx, int clone_ref_obj_id) 896 { 897 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 898 enum bpf_dynptr_type type; 899 int spi, i, err; 900 901 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 902 if (spi < 0) 903 return spi; 904 905 /* We cannot assume both spi and spi - 1 belong to the same dynptr, 906 * hence we need to call destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot twice for both, 907 * to ensure that for the following example: 908 * [d1][d1][d2][d2] 909 * spi 3 2 1 0 910 * So marking spi = 2 should lead to destruction of both d1 and d2. In 911 * case they do belong to same dynptr, second call won't see slot_type 912 * as STACK_DYNPTR and will simply skip destruction. 913 */ 914 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 915 if (err) 916 return err; 917 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi - 1); 918 if (err) 919 return err; 920 921 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 922 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 923 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 924 } 925 926 type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 927 if (type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) 928 return -EINVAL; 929 930 mark_dynptr_stack_regs(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 931 &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr, type); 932 933 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(type)) { 934 /* The id is used to track proper releasing */ 935 int id; 936 937 if (clone_ref_obj_id) 938 id = clone_ref_obj_id; 939 else 940 id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 941 942 if (id < 0) 943 return id; 944 945 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id; 946 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id; 947 } 948 949 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 950 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 951 952 return 0; 953 } 954 955 static void invalidate_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi) 956 { 957 int i; 958 959 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 960 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 961 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 962 } 963 964 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 965 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr); 966 967 /* Why do we need to set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN for STACK_INVALID slot? 968 * 969 * While we don't allow reading STACK_INVALID, it is still possible to 970 * do <8 byte writes marking some but not all slots as STACK_MISC. Then, 971 * helpers or insns can do partial read of that part without failing, 972 * but check_stack_range_initialized, check_stack_read_var_off, and 973 * check_stack_read_fixed_off will do mark_reg_read for all 8-bytes of 974 * the slot conservatively. Hence we need to prevent those liveness 975 * marking walks. 976 * 977 * This was not a problem before because STACK_INVALID is only set by 978 * default (where the default reg state has its reg->parent as NULL), or 979 * in clean_live_states after REG_LIVE_DONE (at which point 980 * mark_reg_read won't walk reg->parent chain), but not randomly during 981 * verifier state exploration (like we did above). Hence, for our case 982 * parentage chain will still be live (i.e. reg->parent may be 983 * non-NULL), while earlier reg->parent was NULL, so we need 984 * REG_LIVE_WRITTEN to screen off read marker propagation when it is 985 * done later on reads or by mark_dynptr_read as well to unnecessary 986 * mark registers in verifier state. 987 */ 988 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 989 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 990 } 991 992 static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 993 { 994 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 995 int spi, ref_obj_id, i; 996 997 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 998 if (spi < 0) 999 return spi; 1000 1001 if (!dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) { 1002 invalidate_dynptr(env, state, spi); 1003 return 0; 1004 } 1005 1006 ref_obj_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 1007 1008 /* If the dynptr has a ref_obj_id, then we need to invalidate 1009 * two things: 1010 * 1011 * 1) Any dynptrs with a matching ref_obj_id (clones) 1012 * 2) Any slices derived from this dynptr. 1013 */ 1014 1015 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */ 1016 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, ref_obj_id)); 1017 1018 /* Invalidate any dynptr clones */ 1019 for (i = 1; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 1020 if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id != ref_obj_id) 1021 continue; 1022 1023 /* it should always be the case that if the ref obj id 1024 * matches then the stack slot also belongs to a 1025 * dynptr 1026 */ 1027 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR) { 1028 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: misconfigured ref_obj_id\n"); 1029 return -EFAULT; 1030 } 1031 if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 1032 invalidate_dynptr(env, state, i); 1033 } 1034 1035 return 0; 1036 } 1037 1038 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1039 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 1040 1041 static void mark_reg_invalid(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1042 { 1043 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 1044 __mark_reg_not_init(env, reg); 1045 else 1046 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 1047 } 1048 1049 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1050 struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi) 1051 { 1052 struct bpf_func_state *fstate; 1053 struct bpf_reg_state *dreg; 1054 int i, dynptr_id; 1055 1056 /* We always ensure that STACK_DYNPTR is never set partially, 1057 * hence just checking for slot_type[0] is enough. This is 1058 * different for STACK_SPILL, where it may be only set for 1059 * 1 byte, so code has to use is_spilled_reg. 1060 */ 1061 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR) 1062 return 0; 1063 1064 /* Reposition spi to first slot */ 1065 if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 1066 spi = spi + 1; 1067 1068 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) { 1069 verbose(env, "cannot overwrite referenced dynptr\n"); 1070 return -EINVAL; 1071 } 1072 1073 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 1074 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - 1); 1075 1076 /* Writing partially to one dynptr stack slot destroys both. */ 1077 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 1078 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 1079 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 1080 } 1081 1082 dynptr_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id; 1083 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */ 1084 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, fstate, dreg, ({ 1085 /* Dynptr slices are only PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL and PTR_TO_MEM */ 1086 if (dreg->type != (PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_MAYBE_NULL) && dreg->type != PTR_TO_MEM) 1087 continue; 1088 if (dreg->dynptr_id == dynptr_id) 1089 mark_reg_invalid(env, dreg); 1090 })); 1091 1092 /* Do not release reference state, we are destroying dynptr on stack, 1093 * not using some helper to release it. Just reset register. 1094 */ 1095 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 1096 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr); 1097 1098 /* Same reason as unmark_stack_slots_dynptr above */ 1099 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 1100 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 1101 1102 return 0; 1103 } 1104 1105 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1106 { 1107 int spi; 1108 1109 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 1110 return false; 1111 1112 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 1113 1114 /* -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots) isn't an 1115 * error because this just means the stack state hasn't been updated yet. 1116 * We will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later. 1117 */ 1118 if (spi < 0 && spi != -ERANGE) 1119 return false; 1120 1121 /* We don't need to check if the stack slots are marked by previous 1122 * dynptr initializations because we allow overwriting existing unreferenced 1123 * STACK_DYNPTR slots, see mark_stack_slots_dynptr which calls 1124 * destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot to ensure dynptr objects at the slots we are 1125 * touching are completely destructed before we reinitialize them for a new 1126 * one. For referenced ones, destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot returns an error early 1127 * instead of delaying it until the end where the user will get "Unreleased 1128 * reference" error. 1129 */ 1130 return true; 1131 } 1132 1133 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1134 { 1135 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1136 int i, spi; 1137 1138 /* This already represents first slot of initialized bpf_dynptr. 1139 * 1140 * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR already has fixed and var_off as 0 due to 1141 * check_func_arg_reg_off's logic, so we don't need to check its 1142 * offset and alignment. 1143 */ 1144 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 1145 return true; 1146 1147 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 1148 if (spi < 0) 1149 return false; 1150 if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 1151 return false; 1152 1153 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 1154 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR || 1155 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR) 1156 return false; 1157 } 1158 1159 return true; 1160 } 1161 1162 static bool is_dynptr_type_expected(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1163 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 1164 { 1165 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1166 enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type; 1167 int spi; 1168 1169 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR takes any type of dynptr */ 1170 if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 1171 return true; 1172 1173 dynptr_type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 1174 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 1175 return reg->dynptr.type == dynptr_type; 1176 } else { 1177 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 1178 if (spi < 0) 1179 return false; 1180 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type == dynptr_type; 1181 } 1182 } 1183 1184 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 1185 1186 static int mark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1187 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int insn_idx, 1188 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots) 1189 { 1190 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1191 int spi, i, j, id; 1192 1193 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1194 if (spi < 0) 1195 return spi; 1196 1197 id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 1198 if (id < 0) 1199 return id; 1200 1201 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1202 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1203 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1204 1205 __mark_reg_known_zero(st); 1206 st->type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* we don't have dedicated reg type */ 1207 st->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 1208 st->ref_obj_id = i == 0 ? id : 0; 1209 st->iter.btf = btf; 1210 st->iter.btf_id = btf_id; 1211 st->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE; 1212 st->iter.depth = 0; 1213 1214 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1215 slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_ITER; 1216 1217 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i); 1218 } 1219 1220 return 0; 1221 } 1222 1223 static int unmark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1224 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) 1225 { 1226 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1227 int spi, i, j; 1228 1229 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1230 if (spi < 0) 1231 return spi; 1232 1233 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1234 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1235 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1236 1237 if (i == 0) 1238 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, st->ref_obj_id)); 1239 1240 __mark_reg_not_init(env, st); 1241 1242 /* see unmark_stack_slots_dynptr() for why we need to set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN */ 1243 st->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 1244 1245 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1246 slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; 1247 1248 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i); 1249 } 1250 1251 return 0; 1252 } 1253 1254 static bool is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1255 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) 1256 { 1257 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1258 int spi, i, j; 1259 1260 /* For -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots), we 1261 * will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later, so 1262 * return true for that case. 1263 */ 1264 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1265 if (spi == -ERANGE) 1266 return true; 1267 if (spi < 0) 1268 return false; 1269 1270 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1271 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1272 1273 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1274 if (slot->slot_type[j] == STACK_ITER) 1275 return false; 1276 } 1277 1278 return true; 1279 } 1280 1281 static bool is_iter_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1282 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots) 1283 { 1284 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1285 int spi, i, j; 1286 1287 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1288 if (spi < 0) 1289 return false; 1290 1291 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1292 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1293 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1294 1295 /* only main (first) slot has ref_obj_id set */ 1296 if (i == 0 && !st->ref_obj_id) 1297 return false; 1298 if (i != 0 && st->ref_obj_id) 1299 return false; 1300 if (st->iter.btf != btf || st->iter.btf_id != btf_id) 1301 return false; 1302 1303 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1304 if (slot->slot_type[j] != STACK_ITER) 1305 return false; 1306 } 1307 1308 return true; 1309 } 1310 1311 /* Check if given stack slot is "special": 1312 * - spilled register state (STACK_SPILL); 1313 * - dynptr state (STACK_DYNPTR); 1314 * - iter state (STACK_ITER). 1315 */ 1316 static bool is_stack_slot_special(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1317 { 1318 enum bpf_stack_slot_type type = stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]; 1319 1320 switch (type) { 1321 case STACK_SPILL: 1322 case STACK_DYNPTR: 1323 case STACK_ITER: 1324 return true; 1325 case STACK_INVALID: 1326 case STACK_MISC: 1327 case STACK_ZERO: 1328 return false; 1329 default: 1330 WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown stack slot type %d\n", type); 1331 return true; 1332 } 1333 } 1334 1335 /* The reg state of a pointer or a bounded scalar was saved when 1336 * it was spilled to the stack. 1337 */ 1338 static bool is_spilled_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1339 { 1340 return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL; 1341 } 1342 1343 static bool is_spilled_scalar_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1344 { 1345 return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL && 1346 stack->spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE; 1347 } 1348 1349 static void scrub_spilled_slot(u8 *stype) 1350 { 1351 if (*stype != STACK_INVALID) 1352 *stype = STACK_MISC; 1353 } 1354 1355 static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1356 const struct bpf_func_state *state, 1357 bool print_all) 1358 { 1359 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 1360 enum bpf_reg_type t; 1361 int i; 1362 1363 if (state->frameno) 1364 verbose(env, " frame%d:", state->frameno); 1365 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 1366 reg = &state->regs[i]; 1367 t = reg->type; 1368 if (t == NOT_INIT) 1369 continue; 1370 if (!print_all && !reg_scratched(env, i)) 1371 continue; 1372 verbose(env, " R%d", i); 1373 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1374 verbose(env, "="); 1375 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 1376 verbose(env, "P"); 1377 if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) && 1378 tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 1379 /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */ 1380 verbose(env, "%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t)); 1381 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 1382 } else { 1383 const char *sep = ""; 1384 1385 verbose(env, "%s", reg_type_str(env, t)); 1386 if (base_type(t) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 1387 verbose(env, "%s", btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id)); 1388 verbose(env, "("); 1389 /* 1390 * _a stands for append, was shortened to avoid multiline statements below. 1391 * This macro is used to output a comma separated list of attributes. 1392 */ 1393 #define verbose_a(fmt, ...) ({ verbose(env, "%s" fmt, sep, __VA_ARGS__); sep = ","; }) 1394 1395 if (reg->id) 1396 verbose_a("id=%d", reg->id); 1397 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 1398 verbose_a("ref_obj_id=%d", reg->ref_obj_id); 1399 if (type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) 1400 verbose_a("%s", "non_own_ref"); 1401 if (t != SCALAR_VALUE) 1402 verbose_a("off=%d", reg->off); 1403 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t)) 1404 verbose_a("r=%d", reg->range); 1405 else if (base_type(t) == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || 1406 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 1407 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) 1408 verbose_a("ks=%d,vs=%d", 1409 reg->map_ptr->key_size, 1410 reg->map_ptr->value_size); 1411 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 1412 /* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but 1413 * could be a pointer whose offset is too big 1414 * for reg->off 1415 */ 1416 verbose_a("imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value); 1417 } else { 1418 if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value && 1419 reg->smin_value != S64_MIN) 1420 verbose_a("smin=%lld", (long long)reg->smin_value); 1421 if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value && 1422 reg->smax_value != S64_MAX) 1423 verbose_a("smax=%lld", (long long)reg->smax_value); 1424 if (reg->umin_value != 0) 1425 verbose_a("umin=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value); 1426 if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX) 1427 verbose_a("umax=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value); 1428 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 1429 char tn_buf[48]; 1430 1431 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 1432 verbose_a("var_off=%s", tn_buf); 1433 } 1434 if (reg->s32_min_value != reg->smin_value && 1435 reg->s32_min_value != S32_MIN) 1436 verbose_a("s32_min=%d", (int)(reg->s32_min_value)); 1437 if (reg->s32_max_value != reg->smax_value && 1438 reg->s32_max_value != S32_MAX) 1439 verbose_a("s32_max=%d", (int)(reg->s32_max_value)); 1440 if (reg->u32_min_value != reg->umin_value && 1441 reg->u32_min_value != U32_MIN) 1442 verbose_a("u32_min=%d", (int)(reg->u32_min_value)); 1443 if (reg->u32_max_value != reg->umax_value && 1444 reg->u32_max_value != U32_MAX) 1445 verbose_a("u32_max=%d", (int)(reg->u32_max_value)); 1446 } 1447 #undef verbose_a 1448 1449 verbose(env, ")"); 1450 } 1451 } 1452 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 1453 char types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE + 1]; 1454 bool valid = false; 1455 int j; 1456 1457 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 1458 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[j] != STACK_INVALID) 1459 valid = true; 1460 types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[state->stack[i].slot_type[j]]; 1461 } 1462 types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0; 1463 if (!valid) 1464 continue; 1465 if (!print_all && !stack_slot_scratched(env, i)) 1466 continue; 1467 switch (state->stack[i].slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]) { 1468 case STACK_SPILL: 1469 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 1470 t = reg->type; 1471 1472 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 1473 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1474 verbose(env, "=%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t)); 1475 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 1476 verbose(env, "P"); 1477 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 1478 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 1479 break; 1480 case STACK_DYNPTR: 1481 i += BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS - 1; 1482 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 1483 1484 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 1485 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1486 verbose(env, "=dynptr_%s", dynptr_type_str(reg->dynptr.type)); 1487 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 1488 verbose(env, "(ref_id=%d)", reg->ref_obj_id); 1489 break; 1490 case STACK_ITER: 1491 /* only main slot has ref_obj_id set; skip others */ 1492 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 1493 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) 1494 continue; 1495 1496 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 1497 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1498 verbose(env, "=iter_%s(ref_id=%d,state=%s,depth=%u)", 1499 iter_type_str(reg->iter.btf, reg->iter.btf_id), 1500 reg->ref_obj_id, iter_state_str(reg->iter.state), 1501 reg->iter.depth); 1502 break; 1503 case STACK_MISC: 1504 case STACK_ZERO: 1505 default: 1506 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 1507 1508 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1509 types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[state->stack[i].slot_type[j]]; 1510 types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0; 1511 1512 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 1513 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1514 verbose(env, "=%s", types_buf); 1515 break; 1516 } 1517 } 1518 if (state->acquired_refs && state->refs[0].id) { 1519 verbose(env, " refs=%d", state->refs[0].id); 1520 for (i = 1; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) 1521 if (state->refs[i].id) 1522 verbose(env, ",%d", state->refs[i].id); 1523 } 1524 if (state->in_callback_fn) 1525 verbose(env, " cb"); 1526 if (state->in_async_callback_fn) 1527 verbose(env, " async_cb"); 1528 verbose(env, "\n"); 1529 if (!print_all) 1530 mark_verifier_state_clean(env); 1531 } 1532 1533 static inline u32 vlog_alignment(u32 pos) 1534 { 1535 return round_up(max(pos + BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT / 2, BPF_LOG_ALIGNMENT), 1536 BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT) - pos - 1; 1537 } 1538 1539 static void print_insn_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1540 const struct bpf_func_state *state) 1541 { 1542 if (env->prev_log_pos && env->prev_log_pos == env->log.end_pos) { 1543 /* remove new line character */ 1544 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, env->prev_log_pos - 1); 1545 verbose(env, "%*c;", vlog_alignment(env->prev_insn_print_pos), ' '); 1546 } else { 1547 verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx); 1548 } 1549 print_verifier_state(env, state, false); 1550 } 1551 1552 /* copy array src of length n * size bytes to dst. dst is reallocated if it's too 1553 * small to hold src. This is different from krealloc since we don't want to preserve 1554 * the contents of dst. 1555 * 1556 * Leaves dst untouched if src is NULL or length is zero. Returns NULL if memory could 1557 * not be allocated. 1558 */ 1559 static void *copy_array(void *dst, const void *src, size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags) 1560 { 1561 size_t alloc_bytes; 1562 void *orig = dst; 1563 size_t bytes; 1564 1565 if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(src)) 1566 goto out; 1567 1568 if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(n, size, &bytes))) 1569 return NULL; 1570 1571 alloc_bytes = max(ksize(orig), kmalloc_size_roundup(bytes)); 1572 dst = krealloc(orig, alloc_bytes, flags); 1573 if (!dst) { 1574 kfree(orig); 1575 return NULL; 1576 } 1577 1578 memcpy(dst, src, bytes); 1579 out: 1580 return dst ? dst : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1581 } 1582 1583 /* resize an array from old_n items to new_n items. the array is reallocated if it's too 1584 * small to hold new_n items. new items are zeroed out if the array grows. 1585 * 1586 * Contrary to krealloc_array, does not free arr if new_n is zero. 1587 */ 1588 static void *realloc_array(void *arr, size_t old_n, size_t new_n, size_t size) 1589 { 1590 size_t alloc_size; 1591 void *new_arr; 1592 1593 if (!new_n || old_n == new_n) 1594 goto out; 1595 1596 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(new_n, size)); 1597 new_arr = krealloc(arr, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL); 1598 if (!new_arr) { 1599 kfree(arr); 1600 return NULL; 1601 } 1602 arr = new_arr; 1603 1604 if (new_n > old_n) 1605 memset(arr + old_n * size, 0, (new_n - old_n) * size); 1606 1607 out: 1608 return arr ? arr : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1609 } 1610 1611 static int copy_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1612 { 1613 dst->refs = copy_array(dst->refs, src->refs, src->acquired_refs, 1614 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state), GFP_KERNEL); 1615 if (!dst->refs) 1616 return -ENOMEM; 1617 1618 dst->acquired_refs = src->acquired_refs; 1619 return 0; 1620 } 1621 1622 static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1623 { 1624 size_t n = src->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1625 1626 dst->stack = copy_array(dst->stack, src->stack, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state), 1627 GFP_KERNEL); 1628 if (!dst->stack) 1629 return -ENOMEM; 1630 1631 dst->allocated_stack = src->allocated_stack; 1632 return 0; 1633 } 1634 1635 static int resize_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, size_t n) 1636 { 1637 state->refs = realloc_array(state->refs, state->acquired_refs, n, 1638 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state)); 1639 if (!state->refs) 1640 return -ENOMEM; 1641 1642 state->acquired_refs = n; 1643 return 0; 1644 } 1645 1646 /* Possibly update state->allocated_stack to be at least size bytes. Also 1647 * possibly update the function's high-water mark in its bpf_subprog_info. 1648 */ 1649 static int grow_stack_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *state, int size) 1650 { 1651 size_t old_n = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, n = size / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1652 1653 if (old_n >= n) 1654 return 0; 1655 1656 state->stack = realloc_array(state->stack, old_n, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state)); 1657 if (!state->stack) 1658 return -ENOMEM; 1659 1660 state->allocated_stack = size; 1661 1662 /* update known max for given subprogram */ 1663 if (env->subprog_info[state->subprogno].stack_depth < size) 1664 env->subprog_info[state->subprogno].stack_depth = size; 1665 1666 return 0; 1667 } 1668 1669 /* Acquire a pointer id from the env and update the state->refs to include 1670 * this new pointer reference. 1671 * On success, returns a valid pointer id to associate with the register 1672 * On failure, returns a negative errno. 1673 */ 1674 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 1675 { 1676 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 1677 int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs; 1678 int id, err; 1679 1680 err = resize_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1); 1681 if (err) 1682 return err; 1683 id = ++env->id_gen; 1684 state->refs[new_ofs].id = id; 1685 state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx; 1686 state->refs[new_ofs].callback_ref = state->in_callback_fn ? state->frameno : 0; 1687 1688 return id; 1689 } 1690 1691 /* release function corresponding to acquire_reference_state(). Idempotent. */ 1692 static int release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id) 1693 { 1694 int i, last_idx; 1695 1696 last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1; 1697 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 1698 if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) { 1699 /* Cannot release caller references in callbacks */ 1700 if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno) 1701 return -EINVAL; 1702 if (last_idx && i != last_idx) 1703 memcpy(&state->refs[i], &state->refs[last_idx], 1704 sizeof(*state->refs)); 1705 memset(&state->refs[last_idx], 0, sizeof(*state->refs)); 1706 state->acquired_refs--; 1707 return 0; 1708 } 1709 } 1710 return -EINVAL; 1711 } 1712 1713 static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state) 1714 { 1715 if (!state) 1716 return; 1717 kfree(state->refs); 1718 kfree(state->stack); 1719 kfree(state); 1720 } 1721 1722 static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) 1723 { 1724 kfree(state->jmp_history); 1725 state->jmp_history = NULL; 1726 state->jmp_history_cnt = 0; 1727 } 1728 1729 static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, 1730 bool free_self) 1731 { 1732 int i; 1733 1734 for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) { 1735 free_func_state(state->frame[i]); 1736 state->frame[i] = NULL; 1737 } 1738 clear_jmp_history(state); 1739 if (free_self) 1740 kfree(state); 1741 } 1742 1743 /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space 1744 * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack 1745 */ 1746 static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, 1747 const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1748 { 1749 int err; 1750 1751 memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, acquired_refs)); 1752 err = copy_reference_state(dst, src); 1753 if (err) 1754 return err; 1755 return copy_stack_state(dst, src); 1756 } 1757 1758 static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, 1759 const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) 1760 { 1761 struct bpf_func_state *dst; 1762 int i, err; 1763 1764 dst_state->jmp_history = copy_array(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history, 1765 src->jmp_history_cnt, sizeof(struct bpf_idx_pair), 1766 GFP_USER); 1767 if (!dst_state->jmp_history) 1768 return -ENOMEM; 1769 dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt; 1770 1771 /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */ 1772 for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) { 1773 free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]); 1774 dst_state->frame[i] = NULL; 1775 } 1776 dst_state->speculative = src->speculative; 1777 dst_state->active_rcu_lock = src->active_rcu_lock; 1778 dst_state->curframe = src->curframe; 1779 dst_state->active_lock.ptr = src->active_lock.ptr; 1780 dst_state->active_lock.id = src->active_lock.id; 1781 dst_state->branches = src->branches; 1782 dst_state->parent = src->parent; 1783 dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx; 1784 dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx; 1785 dst_state->dfs_depth = src->dfs_depth; 1786 dst_state->callback_unroll_depth = src->callback_unroll_depth; 1787 dst_state->used_as_loop_entry = src->used_as_loop_entry; 1788 for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { 1789 dst = dst_state->frame[i]; 1790 if (!dst) { 1791 dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL); 1792 if (!dst) 1793 return -ENOMEM; 1794 dst_state->frame[i] = dst; 1795 } 1796 err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]); 1797 if (err) 1798 return err; 1799 } 1800 return 0; 1801 } 1802 1803 static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 1804 { 1805 return env->prog->len; 1806 } 1807 1808 static struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 1809 { 1810 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 1811 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; 1812 1813 return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)]; 1814 } 1815 1816 static bool same_callsites(struct bpf_verifier_state *a, struct bpf_verifier_state *b) 1817 { 1818 int fr; 1819 1820 if (a->curframe != b->curframe) 1821 return false; 1822 1823 for (fr = a->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) 1824 if (a->frame[fr]->callsite != b->frame[fr]->callsite) 1825 return false; 1826 1827 return true; 1828 } 1829 1830 /* Open coded iterators allow back-edges in the state graph in order to 1831 * check unbounded loops that iterators. 1832 * 1833 * In is_state_visited() it is necessary to know if explored states are 1834 * part of some loops in order to decide whether non-exact states 1835 * comparison could be used: 1836 * - non-exact states comparison establishes sub-state relation and uses 1837 * read and precision marks to do so, these marks are propagated from 1838 * children states and thus are not guaranteed to be final in a loop; 1839 * - exact states comparison just checks if current and explored states 1840 * are identical (and thus form a back-edge). 1841 * 1842 * Paper "A New Algorithm for Identifying Loops in Decompilation" 1843 * by Tao Wei, Jian Mao, Wei Zou and Yu Chen [1] presents a convenient 1844 * algorithm for loop structure detection and gives an overview of 1845 * relevant terminology. It also has helpful illustrations. 1846 * 1847 * [1] https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:15784067 1848 * 1849 * We use a similar algorithm but because loop nested structure is 1850 * irrelevant for verifier ours is significantly simpler and resembles 1851 * strongly connected components algorithm from Sedgewick's textbook. 1852 * 1853 * Define topmost loop entry as a first node of the loop traversed in a 1854 * depth first search starting from initial state. The goal of the loop 1855 * tracking algorithm is to associate topmost loop entries with states 1856 * derived from these entries. 1857 * 1858 * For each step in the DFS states traversal algorithm needs to identify 1859 * the following situations: 1860 * 1861 * initial initial initial 1862 * | | | 1863 * V V V 1864 * ... ... .---------> hdr 1865 * | | | | 1866 * V V | V 1867 * cur .-> succ | .------... 1868 * | | | | | | 1869 * V | V | V V 1870 * succ '-- cur | ... ... 1871 * | | | 1872 * | V V 1873 * | succ <- cur 1874 * | | 1875 * | V 1876 * | ... 1877 * | | 1878 * '----' 1879 * 1880 * (A) successor state of cur (B) successor state of cur or it's entry 1881 * not yet traversed are in current DFS path, thus cur and succ 1882 * are members of the same outermost loop 1883 * 1884 * initial initial 1885 * | | 1886 * V V 1887 * ... ... 1888 * | | 1889 * V V 1890 * .------... .------... 1891 * | | | | 1892 * V V V V 1893 * .-> hdr ... ... ... 1894 * | | | | | 1895 * | V V V V 1896 * | succ <- cur succ <- cur 1897 * | | | 1898 * | V V 1899 * | ... ... 1900 * | | | 1901 * '----' exit 1902 * 1903 * (C) successor state of cur is a part of some loop but this loop 1904 * does not include cur or successor state is not in a loop at all. 1905 * 1906 * Algorithm could be described as the following python code: 1907 * 1908 * traversed = set() # Set of traversed nodes 1909 * entries = {} # Mapping from node to loop entry 1910 * depths = {} # Depth level assigned to graph node 1911 * path = set() # Current DFS path 1912 * 1913 * # Find outermost loop entry known for n 1914 * def get_loop_entry(n): 1915 * h = entries.get(n, None) 1916 * while h in entries and entries[h] != h: 1917 * h = entries[h] 1918 * return h 1919 * 1920 * # Update n's loop entry if h's outermost entry comes 1921 * # before n's outermost entry in current DFS path. 1922 * def update_loop_entry(n, h): 1923 * n1 = get_loop_entry(n) or n 1924 * h1 = get_loop_entry(h) or h 1925 * if h1 in path and depths[h1] <= depths[n1]: 1926 * entries[n] = h1 1927 * 1928 * def dfs(n, depth): 1929 * traversed.add(n) 1930 * path.add(n) 1931 * depths[n] = depth 1932 * for succ in G.successors(n): 1933 * if succ not in traversed: 1934 * # Case A: explore succ and update cur's loop entry 1935 * # only if succ's entry is in current DFS path. 1936 * dfs(succ, depth + 1) 1937 * h = get_loop_entry(succ) 1938 * update_loop_entry(n, h) 1939 * else: 1940 * # Case B or C depending on `h1 in path` check in update_loop_entry(). 1941 * update_loop_entry(n, succ) 1942 * path.remove(n) 1943 * 1944 * To adapt this algorithm for use with verifier: 1945 * - use st->branch == 0 as a signal that DFS of succ had been finished 1946 * and cur's loop entry has to be updated (case A), handle this in 1947 * update_branch_counts(); 1948 * - use st->branch > 0 as a signal that st is in the current DFS path; 1949 * - handle cases B and C in is_state_visited(); 1950 * - update topmost loop entry for intermediate states in get_loop_entry(). 1951 */ 1952 static struct bpf_verifier_state *get_loop_entry(struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 1953 { 1954 struct bpf_verifier_state *topmost = st->loop_entry, *old; 1955 1956 while (topmost && topmost->loop_entry && topmost != topmost->loop_entry) 1957 topmost = topmost->loop_entry; 1958 /* Update loop entries for intermediate states to avoid this 1959 * traversal in future get_loop_entry() calls. 1960 */ 1961 while (st && st->loop_entry != topmost) { 1962 old = st->loop_entry; 1963 st->loop_entry = topmost; 1964 st = old; 1965 } 1966 return topmost; 1967 } 1968 1969 static void update_loop_entry(struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, struct bpf_verifier_state *hdr) 1970 { 1971 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur1, *hdr1; 1972 1973 cur1 = get_loop_entry(cur) ?: cur; 1974 hdr1 = get_loop_entry(hdr) ?: hdr; 1975 /* The head1->branches check decides between cases B and C in 1976 * comment for get_loop_entry(). If hdr1->branches == 0 then 1977 * head's topmost loop entry is not in current DFS path, 1978 * hence 'cur' and 'hdr' are not in the same loop and there is 1979 * no need to update cur->loop_entry. 1980 */ 1981 if (hdr1->branches && hdr1->dfs_depth <= cur1->dfs_depth) { 1982 cur->loop_entry = hdr; 1983 hdr->used_as_loop_entry = true; 1984 } 1985 } 1986 1987 static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 1988 { 1989 while (st) { 1990 u32 br = --st->branches; 1991 1992 /* br == 0 signals that DFS exploration for 'st' is finished, 1993 * thus it is necessary to update parent's loop entry if it 1994 * turned out that st is a part of some loop. 1995 * This is a part of 'case A' in get_loop_entry() comment. 1996 */ 1997 if (br == 0 && st->parent && st->loop_entry) 1998 update_loop_entry(st->parent, st->loop_entry); 1999 2000 /* WARN_ON(br > 1) technically makes sense here, 2001 * but see comment in push_stack(), hence: 2002 */ 2003 WARN_ONCE((int)br < 0, 2004 "BUG update_branch_counts:branches_to_explore=%d\n", 2005 br); 2006 if (br) 2007 break; 2008 st = st->parent; 2009 } 2010 } 2011 2012 static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, 2013 int *insn_idx, bool pop_log) 2014 { 2015 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 2016 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head; 2017 int err; 2018 2019 if (env->head == NULL) 2020 return -ENOENT; 2021 2022 if (cur) { 2023 err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st); 2024 if (err) 2025 return err; 2026 } 2027 if (pop_log) 2028 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos); 2029 if (insn_idx) 2030 *insn_idx = head->insn_idx; 2031 if (prev_insn_idx) 2032 *prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx; 2033 elem = head->next; 2034 free_verifier_state(&head->st, false); 2035 kfree(head); 2036 env->head = elem; 2037 env->stack_size--; 2038 return 0; 2039 } 2040 2041 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2042 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 2043 bool speculative) 2044 { 2045 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 2046 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 2047 int err; 2048 2049 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); 2050 if (!elem) 2051 goto err; 2052 2053 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 2054 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 2055 elem->next = env->head; 2056 elem->log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 2057 env->head = elem; 2058 env->stack_size++; 2059 err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur); 2060 if (err) 2061 goto err; 2062 elem->st.speculative |= speculative; 2063 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 2064 verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n", 2065 env->stack_size); 2066 goto err; 2067 } 2068 if (elem->st.parent) { 2069 ++elem->st.parent->branches; 2070 /* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here, 2071 * but 2072 * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch 2073 * instructions 2074 * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create 2075 * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current 2076 * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state 2077 * which might have large 'branches' count. 2078 */ 2079 } 2080 return &elem->st; 2081 err: 2082 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 2083 env->cur_state = NULL; 2084 /* pop all elements and return */ 2085 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 2086 return NULL; 2087 } 2088 2089 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6 2090 static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = { 2091 BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5 2092 }; 2093 2094 /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */ 2095 static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 2096 { 2097 reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm); 2098 reg->smin_value = (s64)imm; 2099 reg->smax_value = (s64)imm; 2100 reg->umin_value = imm; 2101 reg->umax_value = imm; 2102 2103 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 2104 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 2105 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 2106 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 2107 } 2108 2109 /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as 2110 * known to have the value @imm. 2111 */ 2112 static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 2113 { 2114 /* Clear off and union(map_ptr, range) */ 2115 memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0, 2116 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type)); 2117 reg->id = 0; 2118 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 2119 ___mark_reg_known(reg, imm); 2120 } 2121 2122 static void __mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 2123 { 2124 reg->var_off = tnum_const_subreg(reg->var_off, imm); 2125 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 2126 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 2127 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 2128 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 2129 } 2130 2131 /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be 2132 * used only on registers holding a pointer type. 2133 */ 2134 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2135 { 2136 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 2137 } 2138 2139 static void __mark_reg_const_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2140 { 2141 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 2142 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 2143 } 2144 2145 static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2146 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 2147 { 2148 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 2149 verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno); 2150 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ 2151 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) 2152 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2153 return; 2154 } 2155 __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno); 2156 } 2157 2158 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum bpf_dynptr_type type, 2159 bool first_slot, int dynptr_id) 2160 { 2161 /* reg->type has no meaning for STACK_DYNPTR, but when we set reg for 2162 * callback arguments, it does need to be CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, so simply 2163 * set it unconditionally as it is ignored for STACK_DYNPTR anyway. 2164 */ 2165 __mark_reg_known_zero(reg); 2166 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 2167 /* Give each dynptr a unique id to uniquely associate slices to it. */ 2168 reg->id = dynptr_id; 2169 reg->dynptr.type = type; 2170 reg->dynptr.first_slot = first_slot; 2171 } 2172 2173 static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2174 { 2175 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 2176 const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 2177 2178 if (map->inner_map_meta) { 2179 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 2180 reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta; 2181 /* transfer reg's id which is unique for every map_lookup_elem 2182 * as UID of the inner map. 2183 */ 2184 if (btf_record_has_field(map->inner_map_meta->record, BPF_TIMER)) 2185 reg->map_uid = reg->id; 2186 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) { 2187 reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 2188 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 2189 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) { 2190 reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; 2191 } else { 2192 reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 2193 } 2194 return; 2195 } 2196 2197 reg->type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 2198 } 2199 2200 static void mark_reg_graph_node(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 2201 struct btf_field_graph_root *ds_head) 2202 { 2203 __mark_reg_known_zero(®s[regno]); 2204 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 2205 regs[regno].btf = ds_head->btf; 2206 regs[regno].btf_id = ds_head->value_btf_id; 2207 regs[regno].off = ds_head->node_offset; 2208 } 2209 2210 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2211 { 2212 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 2213 } 2214 2215 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2216 { 2217 return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) || 2218 reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END; 2219 } 2220 2221 static bool reg_is_dynptr_slice_pkt(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2222 { 2223 return base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM && 2224 (reg->type & DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB || reg->type & DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP); 2225 } 2226 2227 /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */ 2228 static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 2229 enum bpf_reg_type which) 2230 { 2231 /* The register can already have a range from prior markings. 2232 * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its 2233 * origin. 2234 */ 2235 return reg->type == which && 2236 reg->id == 0 && 2237 reg->off == 0 && 2238 tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 2239 } 2240 2241 /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */ 2242 static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2243 { 2244 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2245 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2246 reg->umin_value = 0; 2247 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 2248 2249 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 2250 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 2251 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 2252 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 2253 } 2254 2255 static void __mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2256 { 2257 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2258 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2259 reg->umin_value = 0; 2260 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 2261 } 2262 2263 static void __mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2264 { 2265 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 2266 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 2267 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 2268 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 2269 } 2270 2271 static void __update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2272 { 2273 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 2274 2275 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 2276 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, 2277 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MIN)); 2278 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 2279 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, 2280 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MAX)); 2281 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)var32_off.value); 2282 reg->u32_max_value = min(reg->u32_max_value, 2283 (u32)(var32_off.value | var32_off.mask)); 2284 } 2285 2286 static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2287 { 2288 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 2289 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, 2290 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN)); 2291 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 2292 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, 2293 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX)); 2294 reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value); 2295 reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value, 2296 reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask); 2297 } 2298 2299 static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2300 { 2301 __update_reg32_bounds(reg); 2302 __update_reg64_bounds(reg); 2303 } 2304 2305 /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */ 2306 static void __reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2307 { 2308 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 2309 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 2310 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 2311 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 2312 */ 2313 if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 || reg->s32_max_value < 0) { 2314 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 2315 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 2316 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 2317 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 2318 return; 2319 } 2320 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 2321 * boundary, so we must be careful. 2322 */ 2323 if ((s32)reg->u32_max_value >= 0) { 2324 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 2325 * is positive, hence safe. 2326 */ 2327 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value; 2328 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 2329 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 2330 } else if ((s32)reg->u32_min_value < 0) { 2331 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 2332 * is negative, hence safe. 2333 */ 2334 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 2335 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 2336 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value; 2337 } 2338 } 2339 2340 static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2341 { 2342 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 2343 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 2344 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 2345 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 2346 */ 2347 if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) { 2348 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 2349 reg->umin_value); 2350 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 2351 reg->umax_value); 2352 return; 2353 } 2354 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 2355 * boundary, so we must be careful. 2356 */ 2357 if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) { 2358 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 2359 * is positive, hence safe. 2360 */ 2361 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 2362 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 2363 reg->umax_value); 2364 } else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) { 2365 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 2366 * is negative, hence safe. 2367 */ 2368 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 2369 reg->umin_value); 2370 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 2371 } 2372 } 2373 2374 static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2375 { 2376 __reg32_deduce_bounds(reg); 2377 __reg64_deduce_bounds(reg); 2378 } 2379 2380 /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */ 2381 static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2382 { 2383 struct tnum var64_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off, 2384 tnum_range(reg->umin_value, 2385 reg->umax_value)); 2386 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(var64_off), 2387 tnum_range(reg->u32_min_value, 2388 reg->u32_max_value)); 2389 2390 reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off); 2391 } 2392 2393 static void reg_bounds_sync(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2394 { 2395 /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */ 2396 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 2397 /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */ 2398 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 2399 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ 2400 __reg_bound_offset(reg); 2401 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 2402 * slightly, e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 2403 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 2404 */ 2405 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 2406 } 2407 2408 static bool __reg32_bound_s64(s32 a) 2409 { 2410 return a >= 0 && a <= S32_MAX; 2411 } 2412 2413 static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2414 { 2415 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value; 2416 reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value; 2417 2418 /* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds but must 2419 * be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds and refine later 2420 * from tnum. 2421 */ 2422 if (__reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_min_value) && 2423 __reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_max_value)) { 2424 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value; 2425 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value; 2426 } else { 2427 reg->smin_value = 0; 2428 reg->smax_value = U32_MAX; 2429 } 2430 } 2431 2432 static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2433 { 2434 /* special case when 64-bit register has upper 32-bit register 2435 * zeroed. Typically happens after zext or <<32, >>32 sequence 2436 * allowing us to use 32-bit bounds directly, 2437 */ 2438 if (tnum_equals_const(tnum_clear_subreg(reg->var_off), 0)) { 2439 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 2440 } else { 2441 /* Otherwise the best we can do is push lower 32bit known and 2442 * unknown bits into register (var_off set from jmp logic) 2443 * then learn as much as possible from the 64-bit tnum 2444 * known and unknown bits. The previous smin/smax bounds are 2445 * invalid here because of jmp32 compare so mark them unknown 2446 * so they do not impact tnum bounds calculation. 2447 */ 2448 __mark_reg64_unbounded(reg); 2449 } 2450 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 2451 } 2452 2453 static bool __reg64_bound_s32(s64 a) 2454 { 2455 return a >= S32_MIN && a <= S32_MAX; 2456 } 2457 2458 static bool __reg64_bound_u32(u64 a) 2459 { 2460 return a >= U32_MIN && a <= U32_MAX; 2461 } 2462 2463 static void __reg_combine_64_into_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2464 { 2465 __mark_reg32_unbounded(reg); 2466 if (__reg64_bound_s32(reg->smin_value) && __reg64_bound_s32(reg->smax_value)) { 2467 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)reg->smin_value; 2468 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)reg->smax_value; 2469 } 2470 if (__reg64_bound_u32(reg->umin_value) && __reg64_bound_u32(reg->umax_value)) { 2471 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)reg->umin_value; 2472 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)reg->umax_value; 2473 } 2474 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 2475 } 2476 2477 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */ 2478 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2479 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2480 { 2481 /* 2482 * Clear type, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and 2483 * padding between 'type' and union 2484 */ 2485 memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)); 2486 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 2487 reg->id = 0; 2488 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 2489 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; 2490 reg->frameno = 0; 2491 reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable; 2492 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); 2493 } 2494 2495 static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2496 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 2497 { 2498 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 2499 verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno); 2500 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 2501 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 2502 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2503 return; 2504 } 2505 __mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno); 2506 } 2507 2508 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2509 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2510 { 2511 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 2512 reg->type = NOT_INIT; 2513 } 2514 2515 static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2516 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 2517 { 2518 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 2519 verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno); 2520 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 2521 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 2522 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2523 return; 2524 } 2525 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2526 } 2527 2528 static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2529 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 2530 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type, 2531 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, 2532 enum bpf_type_flag flag) 2533 { 2534 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 2535 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 2536 return; 2537 } 2538 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); 2539 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag; 2540 regs[regno].btf = btf; 2541 regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id; 2542 if (type_may_be_null(flag)) 2543 regs[regno].id = ++env->id_gen; 2544 } 2545 2546 #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0) 2547 static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2548 struct bpf_func_state *state) 2549 { 2550 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 2551 int i; 2552 2553 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 2554 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i); 2555 regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 2556 regs[i].parent = NULL; 2557 regs[i].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 2558 } 2559 2560 /* frame pointer */ 2561 regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK; 2562 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP); 2563 regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno; 2564 } 2565 2566 #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1) 2567 static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2568 struct bpf_func_state *state, 2569 int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno) 2570 { 2571 state->callsite = callsite; 2572 state->frameno = frameno; 2573 state->subprogno = subprogno; 2574 state->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 0); 2575 init_reg_state(env, state); 2576 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 2577 } 2578 2579 /* Similar to push_stack(), but for async callbacks */ 2580 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_async_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2581 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 2582 int subprog) 2583 { 2584 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 2585 struct bpf_func_state *frame; 2586 2587 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); 2588 if (!elem) 2589 goto err; 2590 2591 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 2592 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 2593 elem->next = env->head; 2594 elem->log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 2595 env->head = elem; 2596 env->stack_size++; 2597 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 2598 verbose(env, 2599 "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex for async cb.\n", 2600 env->stack_size); 2601 goto err; 2602 } 2603 /* Unlike push_stack() do not copy_verifier_state(). 2604 * The caller state doesn't matter. 2605 * This is async callback. It starts in a fresh stack. 2606 * Initialize it similar to do_check_common(). 2607 */ 2608 elem->st.branches = 1; 2609 frame = kzalloc(sizeof(*frame), GFP_KERNEL); 2610 if (!frame) 2611 goto err; 2612 init_func_state(env, frame, 2613 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 2614 0 /* frameno within this callchain */, 2615 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 2616 elem->st.frame[0] = frame; 2617 return &elem->st; 2618 err: 2619 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 2620 env->cur_state = NULL; 2621 /* pop all elements and return */ 2622 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 2623 return NULL; 2624 } 2625 2626 2627 enum reg_arg_type { 2628 SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */ 2629 DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */ 2630 DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */ 2631 }; 2632 2633 static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b) 2634 { 2635 return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start - 2636 ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start; 2637 } 2638 2639 static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 2640 { 2641 struct bpf_subprog_info *p; 2642 2643 p = bsearch(&off, env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 2644 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs); 2645 if (!p) 2646 return -ENOENT; 2647 return p - env->subprog_info; 2648 2649 } 2650 2651 static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 2652 { 2653 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 2654 int ret; 2655 2656 if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) { 2657 verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n"); 2658 return -EINVAL; 2659 } 2660 ret = find_subprog(env, off); 2661 if (ret >= 0) 2662 return ret; 2663 if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) { 2664 verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n"); 2665 return -E2BIG; 2666 } 2667 /* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */ 2668 env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off; 2669 sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 2670 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL); 2671 return env->subprog_cnt - 1; 2672 } 2673 2674 #define MAX_KFUNC_DESCS 256 2675 #define MAX_KFUNC_BTFS 256 2676 2677 struct bpf_kfunc_desc { 2678 struct btf_func_model func_model; 2679 u32 func_id; 2680 s32 imm; 2681 u16 offset; 2682 unsigned long addr; 2683 }; 2684 2685 struct bpf_kfunc_btf { 2686 struct btf *btf; 2687 struct module *module; 2688 u16 offset; 2689 }; 2690 2691 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab { 2692 /* Sorted by func_id (BTF ID) and offset (fd_array offset) during 2693 * verification. JITs do lookups by bpf_insn, where func_id may not be 2694 * available, therefore at the end of verification do_misc_fixups() 2695 * sorts this by imm and offset. 2696 */ 2697 struct bpf_kfunc_desc descs[MAX_KFUNC_DESCS]; 2698 u32 nr_descs; 2699 }; 2700 2701 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab { 2702 struct bpf_kfunc_btf descs[MAX_KFUNC_BTFS]; 2703 u32 nr_descs; 2704 }; 2705 2706 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off(const void *a, const void *b) 2707 { 2708 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 2709 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 2710 2711 /* func_id is not greater than BTF_MAX_TYPE */ 2712 return d0->func_id - d1->func_id ?: d0->offset - d1->offset; 2713 } 2714 2715 static int kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off(const void *a, const void *b) 2716 { 2717 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d0 = a; 2718 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d1 = b; 2719 2720 return d0->offset - d1->offset; 2721 } 2722 2723 static const struct bpf_kfunc_desc * 2724 find_kfunc_desc(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, u16 offset) 2725 { 2726 struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 2727 .func_id = func_id, 2728 .offset = offset, 2729 }; 2730 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2731 2732 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2733 return bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 2734 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off); 2735 } 2736 2737 int bpf_get_kfunc_addr(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, 2738 u16 btf_fd_idx, u8 **func_addr) 2739 { 2740 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 2741 2742 desc = find_kfunc_desc(prog, func_id, btf_fd_idx); 2743 if (!desc) 2744 return -EFAULT; 2745 2746 *func_addr = (u8 *)desc->addr; 2747 return 0; 2748 } 2749 2750 static struct btf *__find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2751 s16 offset) 2752 { 2753 struct bpf_kfunc_btf kf_btf = { .offset = offset }; 2754 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab; 2755 struct bpf_kfunc_btf *b; 2756 struct module *mod; 2757 struct btf *btf; 2758 int btf_fd; 2759 2760 tab = env->prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 2761 b = bsearch(&kf_btf, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 2762 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off); 2763 if (!b) { 2764 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_BTFS) { 2765 verbose(env, "too many different module BTFs\n"); 2766 return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); 2767 } 2768 2769 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 2770 verbose(env, "kfunc offset > 0 without fd_array is invalid\n"); 2771 return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO); 2772 } 2773 2774 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&btf_fd, env->fd_array, 2775 offset * sizeof(btf_fd), 2776 sizeof(btf_fd))) 2777 return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); 2778 2779 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); 2780 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 2781 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF fd specified\n"); 2782 return btf; 2783 } 2784 2785 if (!btf_is_module(btf)) { 2786 verbose(env, "BTF fd for kfunc is not a module BTF\n"); 2787 btf_put(btf); 2788 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 2789 } 2790 2791 mod = btf_try_get_module(btf); 2792 if (!mod) { 2793 btf_put(btf); 2794 return ERR_PTR(-ENXIO); 2795 } 2796 2797 b = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 2798 b->btf = btf; 2799 b->module = mod; 2800 b->offset = offset; 2801 2802 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2803 kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off, NULL); 2804 } 2805 return b->btf; 2806 } 2807 2808 void bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab) 2809 { 2810 if (!tab) 2811 return; 2812 2813 while (tab->nr_descs--) { 2814 module_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].module); 2815 btf_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].btf); 2816 } 2817 kfree(tab); 2818 } 2819 2820 static struct btf *find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, s16 offset) 2821 { 2822 if (offset) { 2823 if (offset < 0) { 2824 /* In the future, this can be allowed to increase limit 2825 * of fd index into fd_array, interpreted as u16. 2826 */ 2827 verbose(env, "negative offset disallowed for kernel module function call\n"); 2828 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 2829 } 2830 2831 return __find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 2832 } 2833 return btf_vmlinux ?: ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); 2834 } 2835 2836 static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id, s16 offset) 2837 { 2838 const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto; 2839 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *btf_tab; 2840 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2841 struct bpf_prog_aux *prog_aux; 2842 struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 2843 const char *func_name; 2844 struct btf *desc_btf; 2845 unsigned long call_imm; 2846 unsigned long addr; 2847 int err; 2848 2849 prog_aux = env->prog->aux; 2850 tab = prog_aux->kfunc_tab; 2851 btf_tab = prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 2852 if (!tab) { 2853 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 2854 verbose(env, "calling kernel function is not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 2855 return -ENOTSUPP; 2856 } 2857 2858 if (!env->prog->jit_requested) { 2859 verbose(env, "JIT is required for calling kernel function\n"); 2860 return -ENOTSUPP; 2861 } 2862 2863 if (!bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call()) { 2864 verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kernel function\n"); 2865 return -ENOTSUPP; 2866 } 2867 2868 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible) { 2869 verbose(env, "cannot call kernel function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 2870 return -EINVAL; 2871 } 2872 2873 tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*tab), GFP_KERNEL); 2874 if (!tab) 2875 return -ENOMEM; 2876 prog_aux->kfunc_tab = tab; 2877 } 2878 2879 /* func_id == 0 is always invalid, but instead of returning an error, be 2880 * conservative and wait until the code elimination pass before returning 2881 * error, so that invalid calls that get pruned out can be in BPF programs 2882 * loaded from userspace. It is also required that offset be untouched 2883 * for such calls. 2884 */ 2885 if (!func_id && !offset) 2886 return 0; 2887 2888 if (!btf_tab && offset) { 2889 btf_tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*btf_tab), GFP_KERNEL); 2890 if (!btf_tab) 2891 return -ENOMEM; 2892 prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab = btf_tab; 2893 } 2894 2895 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 2896 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) { 2897 verbose(env, "failed to find BTF for kernel function\n"); 2898 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 2899 } 2900 2901 if (find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, func_id, offset)) 2902 return 0; 2903 2904 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_DESCS) { 2905 verbose(env, "too many different kernel function calls\n"); 2906 return -E2BIG; 2907 } 2908 2909 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 2910 if (!func || !btf_type_is_func(func)) { 2911 verbose(env, "kernel btf_id %u is not a function\n", 2912 func_id); 2913 return -EINVAL; 2914 } 2915 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 2916 if (!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)) { 2917 verbose(env, "kernel function btf_id %u does not have a valid func_proto\n", 2918 func_id); 2919 return -EINVAL; 2920 } 2921 2922 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 2923 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(func_name); 2924 if (!addr) { 2925 verbose(env, "cannot find address for kernel function %s\n", 2926 func_name); 2927 return -EINVAL; 2928 } 2929 specialize_kfunc(env, func_id, offset, &addr); 2930 2931 if (bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()) { 2932 call_imm = func_id; 2933 } else { 2934 call_imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(addr); 2935 /* Check whether the relative offset overflows desc->imm */ 2936 if ((unsigned long)(s32)call_imm != call_imm) { 2937 verbose(env, "address of kernel function %s is out of range\n", 2938 func_name); 2939 return -EINVAL; 2940 } 2941 } 2942 2943 if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(func_id)) { 2944 err = bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_check(&env->log, prog_aux); 2945 if (err) 2946 return err; 2947 } 2948 2949 desc = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 2950 desc->func_id = func_id; 2951 desc->imm = call_imm; 2952 desc->offset = offset; 2953 desc->addr = addr; 2954 err = btf_distill_func_proto(&env->log, desc_btf, 2955 func_proto, func_name, 2956 &desc->func_model); 2957 if (!err) 2958 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2959 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off, NULL); 2960 return err; 2961 } 2962 2963 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off(const void *a, const void *b) 2964 { 2965 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 2966 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 2967 2968 if (d0->imm != d1->imm) 2969 return d0->imm < d1->imm ? -1 : 1; 2970 if (d0->offset != d1->offset) 2971 return d0->offset < d1->offset ? -1 : 1; 2972 return 0; 2973 } 2974 2975 static void sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm_off(struct bpf_prog *prog) 2976 { 2977 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2978 2979 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2980 if (!tab) 2981 return; 2982 2983 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2984 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off, NULL); 2985 } 2986 2987 bool bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_prog *prog) 2988 { 2989 return !!prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2990 } 2991 2992 const struct btf_func_model * 2993 bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog *prog, 2994 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 2995 { 2996 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 2997 .imm = insn->imm, 2998 .offset = insn->off, 2999 }; 3000 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *res; 3001 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 3002 3003 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 3004 res = bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 3005 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off); 3006 3007 return res ? &res->func_model : NULL; 3008 } 3009 3010 static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3011 { 3012 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 3013 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 3014 int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 3015 3016 /* Add entry function. */ 3017 ret = add_subprog(env, 0); 3018 if (ret) 3019 return ret; 3020 3021 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 3022 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn) && 3023 !bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) 3024 continue; 3025 3026 if (!env->bpf_capable) { 3027 verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"); 3028 return -EPERM; 3029 } 3030 3031 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn) || bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 3032 ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 3033 else 3034 ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm, insn->off); 3035 3036 if (ret < 0) 3037 return ret; 3038 } 3039 3040 /* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration 3041 * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased. 3042 */ 3043 subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt; 3044 3045 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 3046 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 3047 verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start); 3048 3049 return 0; 3050 } 3051 3052 static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3053 { 3054 int i, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0; 3055 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 3056 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 3057 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 3058 3059 /* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */ 3060 subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start; 3061 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 3062 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 3063 u8 code = insn[i].code; 3064 3065 if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 3066 insn[i].src_reg == 0 && 3067 insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 3068 subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true; 3069 subprog[cur_subprog].tail_call_reachable = true; 3070 } 3071 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_LD && 3072 (BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IND)) 3073 subprog[cur_subprog].has_ld_abs = true; 3074 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) 3075 goto next; 3076 if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL) 3077 goto next; 3078 if (code == (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA)) 3079 off = i + insn[i].imm + 1; 3080 else 3081 off = i + insn[i].off + 1; 3082 if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) { 3083 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off); 3084 return -EINVAL; 3085 } 3086 next: 3087 if (i == subprog_end - 1) { 3088 /* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another 3089 * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit 3090 * or unconditional jump back 3091 */ 3092 if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) && 3093 code != (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA) && 3094 code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { 3095 verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n"); 3096 return -EINVAL; 3097 } 3098 subprog_start = subprog_end; 3099 cur_subprog++; 3100 if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt) 3101 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 3102 } 3103 } 3104 return 0; 3105 } 3106 3107 /* Parentage chain of this register (or stack slot) should take care of all 3108 * issues like callee-saved registers, stack slot allocation time, etc. 3109 */ 3110 static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3111 const struct bpf_reg_state *state, 3112 struct bpf_reg_state *parent, u8 flag) 3113 { 3114 bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */ 3115 int cnt = 0; 3116 3117 while (parent) { 3118 /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ 3119 if (writes && state->live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 3120 break; 3121 if (parent->live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { 3122 verbose(env, "verifier BUG type %s var_off %lld off %d\n", 3123 reg_type_str(env, parent->type), 3124 parent->var_off.value, parent->off); 3125 return -EFAULT; 3126 } 3127 /* The first condition is more likely to be true than the 3128 * second, checked it first. 3129 */ 3130 if ((parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ) == flag || 3131 parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ64) 3132 /* The parentage chain never changes and 3133 * this parent was already marked as LIVE_READ. 3134 * There is no need to keep walking the chain again and 3135 * keep re-marking all parents as LIVE_READ. 3136 * This case happens when the same register is read 3137 * multiple times without writes into it in-between. 3138 * Also, if parent has the stronger REG_LIVE_READ64 set, 3139 * then no need to set the weak REG_LIVE_READ32. 3140 */ 3141 break; 3142 /* ... then we depend on parent's value */ 3143 parent->live |= flag; 3144 /* REG_LIVE_READ64 overrides REG_LIVE_READ32. */ 3145 if (flag == REG_LIVE_READ64) 3146 parent->live &= ~REG_LIVE_READ32; 3147 state = parent; 3148 parent = state->parent; 3149 writes = true; 3150 cnt++; 3151 } 3152 3153 if (env->longest_mark_read_walk < cnt) 3154 env->longest_mark_read_walk = cnt; 3155 return 0; 3156 } 3157 3158 static int mark_dynptr_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3159 { 3160 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 3161 int spi, ret; 3162 3163 /* For CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, it must have already been done by 3164 * check_reg_arg in check_helper_call and mark_btf_func_reg_size in 3165 * check_kfunc_call. 3166 */ 3167 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 3168 return 0; 3169 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 3170 if (spi < 0) 3171 return spi; 3172 /* Caller ensures dynptr is valid and initialized, which means spi is in 3173 * bounds and spi is the first dynptr slot. Simply mark stack slot as 3174 * read. 3175 */ 3176 ret = mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 3177 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 3178 if (ret) 3179 return ret; 3180 return mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr, 3181 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 3182 } 3183 3184 static int mark_iter_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3185 int spi, int nr_slots) 3186 { 3187 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 3188 int err, i; 3189 3190 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 3191 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &state->stack[spi - i].spilled_ptr; 3192 3193 err = mark_reg_read(env, st, st->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 3194 if (err) 3195 return err; 3196 3197 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i); 3198 } 3199 3200 return 0; 3201 } 3202 3203 /* This function is supposed to be used by the following 32-bit optimization 3204 * code only. It returns TRUE if the source or destination register operates 3205 * on 64-bit, otherwise return FALSE. 3206 */ 3207 static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 3208 u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum reg_arg_type t) 3209 { 3210 u8 code, class, op; 3211 3212 code = insn->code; 3213 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 3214 op = BPF_OP(code); 3215 if (class == BPF_JMP) { 3216 /* BPF_EXIT for "main" will reach here. Return TRUE 3217 * conservatively. 3218 */ 3219 if (op == BPF_EXIT) 3220 return true; 3221 if (op == BPF_CALL) { 3222 /* BPF to BPF call will reach here because of marking 3223 * caller saved clobber with DST_OP_NO_MARK for which we 3224 * don't care the register def because they are anyway 3225 * marked as NOT_INIT already. 3226 */ 3227 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 3228 return false; 3229 /* Helper call will reach here because of arg type 3230 * check, conservatively return TRUE. 3231 */ 3232 if (t == SRC_OP) 3233 return true; 3234 3235 return false; 3236 } 3237 } 3238 3239 if (class == BPF_ALU64 && op == BPF_END && (insn->imm == 16 || insn->imm == 32)) 3240 return false; 3241 3242 if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP || 3243 (class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64)) 3244 return true; 3245 3246 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_JMP32) 3247 return false; 3248 3249 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 3250 if (t != SRC_OP) 3251 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 3252 /* LDX source must be ptr. */ 3253 return true; 3254 } 3255 3256 if (class == BPF_STX) { 3257 /* BPF_STX (including atomic variants) has multiple source 3258 * operands, one of which is a ptr. Check whether the caller is 3259 * asking about it. 3260 */ 3261 if (t == SRC_OP && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 3262 return true; 3263 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 3264 } 3265 3266 if (class == BPF_LD) { 3267 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(code); 3268 3269 /* LD_IMM64 */ 3270 if (mode == BPF_IMM) 3271 return true; 3272 3273 /* Both LD_IND and LD_ABS return 32-bit data. */ 3274 if (t != SRC_OP) 3275 return false; 3276 3277 /* Implicit ctx ptr. */ 3278 if (regno == BPF_REG_6) 3279 return true; 3280 3281 /* Explicit source could be any width. */ 3282 return true; 3283 } 3284 3285 if (class == BPF_ST) 3286 /* The only source register for BPF_ST is a ptr. */ 3287 return true; 3288 3289 /* Conservatively return true at default. */ 3290 return true; 3291 } 3292 3293 /* Return the regno defined by the insn, or -1. */ 3294 static int insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 3295 { 3296 switch (BPF_CLASS(insn->code)) { 3297 case BPF_JMP: 3298 case BPF_JMP32: 3299 case BPF_ST: 3300 return -1; 3301 case BPF_STX: 3302 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 3303 (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH)) { 3304 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 3305 return BPF_REG_0; 3306 else 3307 return insn->src_reg; 3308 } else { 3309 return -1; 3310 } 3311 default: 3312 return insn->dst_reg; 3313 } 3314 } 3315 3316 /* Return TRUE if INSN has defined any 32-bit value explicitly. */ 3317 static bool insn_has_def32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 3318 { 3319 int dst_reg = insn_def_regno(insn); 3320 3321 if (dst_reg == -1) 3322 return false; 3323 3324 return !is_reg64(env, insn, dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP); 3325 } 3326 3327 static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3328 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3329 { 3330 s32 def_idx = reg->subreg_def; 3331 3332 if (def_idx == DEF_NOT_SUBREG) 3333 return; 3334 3335 env->insn_aux_data[def_idx - 1].zext_dst = true; 3336 /* The dst will be zero extended, so won't be sub-register anymore. */ 3337 reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 3338 } 3339 3340 static int __check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 3341 enum reg_arg_type t) 3342 { 3343 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx; 3344 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3345 bool rw64; 3346 3347 if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) { 3348 verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno); 3349 return -EINVAL; 3350 } 3351 3352 mark_reg_scratched(env, regno); 3353 3354 reg = ®s[regno]; 3355 rw64 = is_reg64(env, insn, regno, reg, t); 3356 if (t == SRC_OP) { 3357 /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */ 3358 if (reg->type == NOT_INIT) { 3359 verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno); 3360 return -EACCES; 3361 } 3362 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ 3363 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) 3364 return 0; 3365 3366 if (rw64) 3367 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 3368 3369 return mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, 3370 rw64 ? REG_LIVE_READ64 : REG_LIVE_READ32); 3371 } else { 3372 /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */ 3373 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) { 3374 verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n"); 3375 return -EACCES; 3376 } 3377 reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3378 reg->subreg_def = rw64 ? DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 3379 if (t == DST_OP) 3380 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 3381 } 3382 return 0; 3383 } 3384 3385 static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3386 enum reg_arg_type t) 3387 { 3388 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3389 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3390 3391 return __check_reg_arg(env, state->regs, regno, t); 3392 } 3393 3394 static void mark_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 3395 { 3396 env->insn_aux_data[idx].jmp_point = true; 3397 } 3398 3399 static bool is_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 3400 { 3401 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].jmp_point; 3402 } 3403 3404 /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */ 3405 static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3406 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 3407 { 3408 u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt; 3409 struct bpf_idx_pair *p; 3410 size_t alloc_size; 3411 3412 if (!is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) 3413 return 0; 3414 3415 cnt++; 3416 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(cnt, sizeof(*p))); 3417 p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, alloc_size, GFP_USER); 3418 if (!p) 3419 return -ENOMEM; 3420 p[cnt - 1].idx = env->insn_idx; 3421 p[cnt - 1].prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 3422 cur->jmp_history = p; 3423 cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt; 3424 return 0; 3425 } 3426 3427 /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded 3428 * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution. 3429 * Return -ENOENT if we exhausted all instructions within given state. 3430 * 3431 * It's legal to have a bit of a looping with the same starting and ending 3432 * insn index within the same state, e.g.: 3->4->5->3, so just because current 3433 * instruction index is the same as state's first_idx doesn't mean we are 3434 * done. If there is still some jump history left, we should keep going. We 3435 * need to take into account that we might have a jump history between given 3436 * state's parent and itself, due to checkpointing. In this case, we'll have 3437 * history entry recording a jump from last instruction of parent state and 3438 * first instruction of given state. 3439 */ 3440 static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i, 3441 u32 *history) 3442 { 3443 u32 cnt = *history; 3444 3445 if (i == st->first_insn_idx) { 3446 if (cnt == 0) 3447 return -ENOENT; 3448 if (cnt == 1 && st->jmp_history[0].idx == i) 3449 return -ENOENT; 3450 } 3451 3452 if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) { 3453 i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx; 3454 (*history)--; 3455 } else { 3456 i--; 3457 } 3458 return i; 3459 } 3460 3461 static const char *disasm_kfunc_name(void *data, const struct bpf_insn *insn) 3462 { 3463 const struct btf_type *func; 3464 struct btf *desc_btf; 3465 3466 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 3467 return NULL; 3468 3469 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(data, insn->off); 3470 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 3471 return "<error>"; 3472 3473 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, insn->imm); 3474 return btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 3475 } 3476 3477 static inline void bt_init(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame) 3478 { 3479 bt->frame = frame; 3480 } 3481 3482 static inline void bt_reset(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3483 { 3484 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = bt->env; 3485 3486 memset(bt, 0, sizeof(*bt)); 3487 bt->env = env; 3488 } 3489 3490 static inline u32 bt_empty(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3491 { 3492 u64 mask = 0; 3493 int i; 3494 3495 for (i = 0; i <= bt->frame; i++) 3496 mask |= bt->reg_masks[i] | bt->stack_masks[i]; 3497 3498 return mask == 0; 3499 } 3500 3501 static inline int bt_subprog_enter(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3502 { 3503 if (bt->frame == MAX_CALL_FRAMES - 1) { 3504 verbose(bt->env, "BUG subprog enter from frame %d\n", bt->frame); 3505 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3506 return -EFAULT; 3507 } 3508 bt->frame++; 3509 return 0; 3510 } 3511 3512 static inline int bt_subprog_exit(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3513 { 3514 if (bt->frame == 0) { 3515 verbose(bt->env, "BUG subprog exit from frame 0\n"); 3516 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3517 return -EFAULT; 3518 } 3519 bt->frame--; 3520 return 0; 3521 } 3522 3523 static inline void bt_set_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg) 3524 { 3525 bt->reg_masks[frame] |= 1 << reg; 3526 } 3527 3528 static inline void bt_clear_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg) 3529 { 3530 bt->reg_masks[frame] &= ~(1 << reg); 3531 } 3532 3533 static inline void bt_set_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) 3534 { 3535 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame, reg); 3536 } 3537 3538 static inline void bt_clear_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) 3539 { 3540 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame, reg); 3541 } 3542 3543 static inline void bt_set_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot) 3544 { 3545 bt->stack_masks[frame] |= 1ull << slot; 3546 } 3547 3548 static inline void bt_clear_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot) 3549 { 3550 bt->stack_masks[frame] &= ~(1ull << slot); 3551 } 3552 3553 static inline void bt_set_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 slot) 3554 { 3555 bt_set_frame_slot(bt, bt->frame, slot); 3556 } 3557 3558 static inline void bt_clear_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 slot) 3559 { 3560 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, bt->frame, slot); 3561 } 3562 3563 static inline u32 bt_frame_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame) 3564 { 3565 return bt->reg_masks[frame]; 3566 } 3567 3568 static inline u32 bt_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3569 { 3570 return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame]; 3571 } 3572 3573 static inline u64 bt_frame_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame) 3574 { 3575 return bt->stack_masks[frame]; 3576 } 3577 3578 static inline u64 bt_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3579 { 3580 return bt->stack_masks[bt->frame]; 3581 } 3582 3583 static inline bool bt_is_reg_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) 3584 { 3585 return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame] & (1 << reg); 3586 } 3587 3588 static inline bool bt_is_slot_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 slot) 3589 { 3590 return bt->stack_masks[bt->frame] & (1ull << slot); 3591 } 3592 3593 /* format registers bitmask, e.g., "r0,r2,r4" for 0x15 mask */ 3594 static void fmt_reg_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u32 reg_mask) 3595 { 3596 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 3597 bool first = true; 3598 int i, n; 3599 3600 buf[0] = '\0'; 3601 3602 bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); 3603 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 3604 n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%sr%d", first ? "" : ",", i); 3605 first = false; 3606 buf += n; 3607 buf_sz -= n; 3608 if (buf_sz < 0) 3609 break; 3610 } 3611 } 3612 /* format stack slots bitmask, e.g., "-8,-24,-40" for 0x15 mask */ 3613 static void fmt_stack_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u64 stack_mask) 3614 { 3615 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 3616 bool first = true; 3617 int i, n; 3618 3619 buf[0] = '\0'; 3620 3621 bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask); 3622 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 3623 n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%s%d", first ? "" : ",", -(i + 1) * 8); 3624 first = false; 3625 buf += n; 3626 buf_sz -= n; 3627 if (buf_sz < 0) 3628 break; 3629 } 3630 } 3631 3632 static bool calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx); 3633 3634 /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to 3635 * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and 3636 * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state. 3637 * 3638 * @idx is an index of the instruction we are currently processing; 3639 * @subseq_idx is an index of the subsequent instruction that: 3640 * - *would be* executed next, if jump history is viewed in forward order; 3641 * - *was* processed previously during backtracking. 3642 */ 3643 static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, 3644 struct backtrack_state *bt) 3645 { 3646 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 3647 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 3648 .cb_print = verbose, 3649 .private_data = env, 3650 }; 3651 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx; 3652 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 3653 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 3654 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 3655 u32 dreg = insn->dst_reg; 3656 u32 sreg = insn->src_reg; 3657 u32 spi, i; 3658 3659 if (insn->code == 0) 3660 return 0; 3661 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 3662 fmt_reg_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3663 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: regs=%s ", 3664 bt->frame, env->tmp_str_buf); 3665 fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, bt_stack_mask(bt)); 3666 verbose(env, "stack=%s before ", env->tmp_str_buf); 3667 verbose(env, "%d: ", idx); 3668 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 3669 } 3670 3671 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 3672 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 3673 return 0; 3674 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { 3675 /* sreg is reserved and unused 3676 * dreg still need precision before this insn 3677 */ 3678 return 0; 3679 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 3680 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 3681 /* dreg = sreg or dreg = (s8, s16, s32)sreg 3682 * dreg needs precision after this insn 3683 * sreg needs precision before this insn 3684 */ 3685 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 3686 if (sreg != BPF_REG_FP) 3687 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 3688 } else { 3689 /* dreg = K 3690 * dreg needs precision after this insn. 3691 * Corresponding register is already marked 3692 * as precise=true in this verifier state. 3693 * No further markings in parent are necessary 3694 */ 3695 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 3696 } 3697 } else { 3698 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 3699 /* dreg += sreg 3700 * both dreg and sreg need precision 3701 * before this insn 3702 */ 3703 if (sreg != BPF_REG_FP) 3704 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 3705 } /* else dreg += K 3706 * dreg still needs precision before this insn 3707 */ 3708 } 3709 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 3710 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 3711 return 0; 3712 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 3713 3714 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision. 3715 * Load from any other memory can be zero extended. 3716 * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated 3717 * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state. 3718 * No further tracking necessary. 3719 */ 3720 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 3721 return 0; 3722 3723 /* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack. 3724 * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be 3725 * tracked with precision 3726 */ 3727 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3728 if (spi >= 64) { 3729 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 3730 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3731 return -EFAULT; 3732 } 3733 bt_set_slot(bt, spi); 3734 } else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) { 3735 if (bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 3736 /* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg 3737 * to access memory. It means backtracking 3738 * encountered a case of pointer subtraction. 3739 */ 3740 return -ENOTSUPP; 3741 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack */ 3742 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 3743 return 0; 3744 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3745 if (spi >= 64) { 3746 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 3747 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3748 return -EFAULT; 3749 } 3750 if (!bt_is_slot_set(bt, spi)) 3751 return 0; 3752 bt_clear_slot(bt, spi); 3753 if (class == BPF_STX) 3754 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 3755 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 3756 if (bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) { 3757 int subprog_insn_idx, subprog; 3758 3759 subprog_insn_idx = idx + insn->imm + 1; 3760 subprog = find_subprog(env, subprog_insn_idx); 3761 if (subprog < 0) 3762 return -EFAULT; 3763 3764 if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) { 3765 /* check that jump history doesn't have any 3766 * extra instructions from subprog; the next 3767 * instruction after call to global subprog 3768 * should be literally next instruction in 3769 * caller program 3770 */ 3771 WARN_ONCE(idx + 1 != subseq_idx, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3772 /* r1-r5 are invalidated after subprog call, 3773 * so for global func call it shouldn't be set 3774 * anymore 3775 */ 3776 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 3777 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3778 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3779 return -EFAULT; 3780 } 3781 /* global subprog always sets R0 */ 3782 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 3783 return 0; 3784 } else { 3785 /* static subprog call instruction, which 3786 * means that we are exiting current subprog, 3787 * so only r1-r5 could be still requested as 3788 * precise, r0 and r6-r10 or any stack slot in 3789 * the current frame should be zero by now 3790 */ 3791 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 3792 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3793 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3794 return -EFAULT; 3795 } 3796 /* we don't track register spills perfectly, 3797 * so fallback to force-precise instead of failing */ 3798 if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) 3799 return -ENOTSUPP; 3800 /* propagate r1-r5 to the caller */ 3801 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) { 3802 if (bt_is_reg_set(bt, i)) { 3803 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 3804 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame - 1, i); 3805 } 3806 } 3807 if (bt_subprog_exit(bt)) 3808 return -EFAULT; 3809 return 0; 3810 } 3811 } else if (is_sync_callback_calling_insn(insn) && idx != subseq_idx - 1) { 3812 /* exit from callback subprog to callback-calling helper or 3813 * kfunc call. Use idx/subseq_idx check to discern it from 3814 * straight line code backtracking. 3815 * Unlike the subprog call handling above, we shouldn't 3816 * propagate precision of r1-r5 (if any requested), as they are 3817 * not actually arguments passed directly to callback subprogs 3818 */ 3819 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 3820 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3821 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3822 return -EFAULT; 3823 } 3824 if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) 3825 return -ENOTSUPP; 3826 /* clear r1-r5 in callback subprog's mask */ 3827 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 3828 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 3829 if (bt_subprog_exit(bt)) 3830 return -EFAULT; 3831 return 0; 3832 } else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 3833 /* kfunc with imm==0 is invalid and fixup_kfunc_call will 3834 * catch this error later. Make backtracking conservative 3835 * with ENOTSUPP. 3836 */ 3837 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && insn->imm == 0) 3838 return -ENOTSUPP; 3839 /* regular helper call sets R0 */ 3840 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 3841 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 3842 /* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5 3843 * they should have been found already. 3844 */ 3845 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3846 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3847 return -EFAULT; 3848 } 3849 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 3850 bool r0_precise; 3851 3852 /* Backtracking to a nested function call, 'idx' is a part of 3853 * the inner frame 'subseq_idx' is a part of the outer frame. 3854 * In case of a regular function call, instructions giving 3855 * precision to registers R1-R5 should have been found already. 3856 * In case of a callback, it is ok to have R1-R5 marked for 3857 * backtracking, as these registers are set by the function 3858 * invoking callback. 3859 */ 3860 if (subseq_idx >= 0 && calls_callback(env, subseq_idx)) 3861 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 3862 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 3863 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 3864 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3865 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3866 return -EFAULT; 3867 } 3868 3869 /* BPF_EXIT in subprog or callback always returns 3870 * right after the call instruction, so by checking 3871 * whether the instruction at subseq_idx-1 is subprog 3872 * call or not we can distinguish actual exit from 3873 * *subprog* from exit from *callback*. In the former 3874 * case, we need to propagate r0 precision, if 3875 * necessary. In the former we never do that. 3876 */ 3877 r0_precise = subseq_idx - 1 >= 0 && 3878 bpf_pseudo_call(&env->prog->insnsi[subseq_idx - 1]) && 3879 bt_is_reg_set(bt, BPF_REG_0); 3880 3881 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 3882 if (bt_subprog_enter(bt)) 3883 return -EFAULT; 3884 3885 if (r0_precise) 3886 bt_set_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 3887 /* r6-r9 and stack slots will stay set in caller frame 3888 * bitmasks until we return back from callee(s) 3889 */ 3890 return 0; 3891 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 3892 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg) && !bt_is_reg_set(bt, sreg)) 3893 return 0; 3894 /* dreg <cond> sreg 3895 * Both dreg and sreg need precision before 3896 * this insn. If only sreg was marked precise 3897 * before it would be equally necessary to 3898 * propagate it to dreg. 3899 */ 3900 bt_set_reg(bt, dreg); 3901 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 3902 /* else dreg <cond> K 3903 * Only dreg still needs precision before 3904 * this insn, so for the K-based conditional 3905 * there is nothing new to be marked. 3906 */ 3907 } 3908 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 3909 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 3910 return 0; 3911 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 3912 /* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind. 3913 * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision 3914 * into parent is necessary 3915 */ 3916 if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS) 3917 /* to be analyzed */ 3918 return -ENOTSUPP; 3919 } 3920 return 0; 3921 } 3922 3923 /* the scalar precision tracking algorithm: 3924 * . at the start all registers have precise=false. 3925 * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns. 3926 * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in: 3927 * . ptr + scalar alu 3928 * . if (scalar cond K|scalar) 3929 * . helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected 3930 * backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and 3931 * stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar regisers 3932 * should be precise. 3933 * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots) 3934 * are equivalent if both are not precise. 3935 * 3936 * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain, 3937 * since many different registers and stack slots could have been 3938 * used to compute single precise scalar. 3939 * 3940 * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then 3941 * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects 3942 * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper 3943 * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe. 3944 * 3945 * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states. 3946 * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn. 3947 * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later. 3948 * 3949 * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like: 3950 * R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) 3951 * r9 -= r8 3952 * r5 = r9 3953 * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7 3954 * R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff)) 3955 * r5 += 1 3956 * ... 3957 * call bpf_perf_event_output#25 3958 * where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO 3959 * 3960 * and this case: 3961 * r6 = 1 3962 * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0 3963 * r0 += r6 3964 * if r0 == 0 goto 3965 * 3966 * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame. 3967 * 3968 * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started, 3969 * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees 3970 * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to 3971 * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences") 3972 * 3973 * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking. 3974 */ 3975 static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3976 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 3977 { 3978 struct bpf_func_state *func; 3979 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3980 int i, j; 3981 3982 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 3983 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: falling back to forcing all scalars precise\n", 3984 st->curframe); 3985 } 3986 3987 /* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path. 3988 * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars. 3989 * We also skip current state and go straight to first parent state, 3990 * because precision markings in current non-checkpointed state are 3991 * not needed. See why in the comment in __mark_chain_precision below. 3992 */ 3993 for (st = st->parent; st; st = st->parent) { 3994 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 3995 func = st->frame[i]; 3996 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 3997 reg = &func->regs[j]; 3998 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg->precise) 3999 continue; 4000 reg->precise = true; 4001 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4002 verbose(env, "force_precise: frame%d: forcing r%d to be precise\n", 4003 i, j); 4004 } 4005 } 4006 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 4007 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 4008 continue; 4009 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 4010 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg->precise) 4011 continue; 4012 reg->precise = true; 4013 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4014 verbose(env, "force_precise: frame%d: forcing fp%d to be precise\n", 4015 i, -(j + 1) * 8); 4016 } 4017 } 4018 } 4019 } 4020 } 4021 4022 static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 4023 { 4024 struct bpf_func_state *func; 4025 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4026 int i, j; 4027 4028 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 4029 func = st->frame[i]; 4030 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 4031 reg = &func->regs[j]; 4032 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 4033 continue; 4034 reg->precise = false; 4035 } 4036 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 4037 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 4038 continue; 4039 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 4040 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 4041 continue; 4042 reg->precise = false; 4043 } 4044 } 4045 } 4046 4047 static bool idset_contains(struct bpf_idset *s, u32 id) 4048 { 4049 u32 i; 4050 4051 for (i = 0; i < s->count; ++i) 4052 if (s->ids[i] == id) 4053 return true; 4054 4055 return false; 4056 } 4057 4058 static int idset_push(struct bpf_idset *s, u32 id) 4059 { 4060 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(s->count >= ARRAY_SIZE(s->ids))) 4061 return -EFAULT; 4062 s->ids[s->count++] = id; 4063 return 0; 4064 } 4065 4066 static void idset_reset(struct bpf_idset *s) 4067 { 4068 s->count = 0; 4069 } 4070 4071 /* Collect a set of IDs for all registers currently marked as precise in env->bt. 4072 * Mark all registers with these IDs as precise. 4073 */ 4074 static int mark_precise_scalar_ids(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 4075 { 4076 struct bpf_idset *precise_ids = &env->idset_scratch; 4077 struct backtrack_state *bt = &env->bt; 4078 struct bpf_func_state *func; 4079 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4080 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 4081 int i, fr; 4082 4083 idset_reset(precise_ids); 4084 4085 for (fr = bt->frame; fr >= 0; fr--) { 4086 func = st->frame[fr]; 4087 4088 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr)); 4089 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 4090 reg = &func->regs[i]; 4091 if (!reg->id || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 4092 continue; 4093 if (idset_push(precise_ids, reg->id)) 4094 return -EFAULT; 4095 } 4096 4097 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); 4098 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 4099 if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) 4100 break; 4101 if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) 4102 continue; 4103 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 4104 if (!reg->id) 4105 continue; 4106 if (idset_push(precise_ids, reg->id)) 4107 return -EFAULT; 4108 } 4109 } 4110 4111 for (fr = 0; fr <= st->curframe; ++fr) { 4112 func = st->frame[fr]; 4113 4114 for (i = BPF_REG_0; i < BPF_REG_10; ++i) { 4115 reg = &func->regs[i]; 4116 if (!reg->id) 4117 continue; 4118 if (!idset_contains(precise_ids, reg->id)) 4119 continue; 4120 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); 4121 } 4122 for (i = 0; i < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; ++i) { 4123 if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) 4124 continue; 4125 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 4126 if (!reg->id) 4127 continue; 4128 if (!idset_contains(precise_ids, reg->id)) 4129 continue; 4130 bt_set_frame_slot(bt, fr, i); 4131 } 4132 } 4133 4134 return 0; 4135 } 4136 4137 /* 4138 * __mark_chain_precision() backtracks BPF program instruction sequence and 4139 * chain of verifier states making sure that register *regno* (if regno >= 0) 4140 * and/or stack slot *spi* (if spi >= 0) are marked as precisely tracked 4141 * SCALARS, as well as any other registers and slots that contribute to 4142 * a tracked state of given registers/stack slots, depending on specific BPF 4143 * assembly instructions (see backtrack_insns() for exact instruction handling 4144 * logic). This backtracking relies on recorded jmp_history and is able to 4145 * traverse entire chain of parent states. This process ends only when all the 4146 * necessary registers/slots and their transitive dependencies are marked as 4147 * precise. 4148 * 4149 * One important and subtle aspect is that precise marks *do not matter* in 4150 * the currently verified state (current state). It is important to understand 4151 * why this is the case. 4152 * 4153 * First, note that current state is the state that is not yet "checkpointed", 4154 * i.e., it is not yet put into env->explored_states, and it has no children 4155 * states as well. It's ephemeral, and can end up either a) being discarded if 4156 * compatible explored state is found at some point or BPF_EXIT instruction is 4157 * reached or b) checkpointed and put into env->explored_states, branching out 4158 * into one or more children states. 4159 * 4160 * In the former case, precise markings in current state are completely 4161 * ignored by state comparison code (see regsafe() for details). Only 4162 * checkpointed ("old") state precise markings are important, and if old 4163 * state's register/slot is precise, regsafe() assumes current state's 4164 * register/slot as precise and checks value ranges exactly and precisely. If 4165 * states turn out to be compatible, current state's necessary precise 4166 * markings and any required parent states' precise markings are enforced 4167 * after the fact with propagate_precision() logic, after the fact. But it's 4168 * important to realize that in this case, even after marking current state 4169 * registers/slots as precise, we immediately discard current state. So what 4170 * actually matters is any of the precise markings propagated into current 4171 * state's parent states, which are always checkpointed (due to b) case above). 4172 * As such, for scenario a) it doesn't matter if current state has precise 4173 * markings set or not. 4174 * 4175 * Now, for the scenario b), checkpointing and forking into child(ren) 4176 * state(s). Note that before current state gets to checkpointing step, any 4177 * processed instruction always assumes precise SCALAR register/slot 4178 * knowledge: if precise value or range is useful to prune jump branch, BPF 4179 * verifier takes this opportunity enthusiastically. Similarly, when 4180 * register's value is used to calculate offset or memory address, exact 4181 * knowledge of SCALAR range is assumed, checked, and enforced. So, similar to 4182 * what we mentioned above about state comparison ignoring precise markings 4183 * during state comparison, BPF verifier ignores and also assumes precise 4184 * markings *at will* during instruction verification process. But as verifier 4185 * assumes precision, it also propagates any precision dependencies across 4186 * parent states, which are not yet finalized, so can be further restricted 4187 * based on new knowledge gained from restrictions enforced by their children 4188 * states. This is so that once those parent states are finalized, i.e., when 4189 * they have no more active children state, state comparison logic in 4190 * is_state_visited() would enforce strict and precise SCALAR ranges, if 4191 * required for correctness. 4192 * 4193 * To build a bit more intuition, note also that once a state is checkpointed, 4194 * the path we took to get to that state is not important. This is crucial 4195 * property for state pruning. When state is checkpointed and finalized at 4196 * some instruction index, it can be correctly and safely used to "short 4197 * circuit" any *compatible* state that reaches exactly the same instruction 4198 * index. I.e., if we jumped to that instruction from a completely different 4199 * code path than original finalized state was derived from, it doesn't 4200 * matter, current state can be discarded because from that instruction 4201 * forward having a compatible state will ensure we will safely reach the 4202 * exit. States describe preconditions for further exploration, but completely 4203 * forget the history of how we got here. 4204 * 4205 * This also means that even if we needed precise SCALAR range to get to 4206 * finalized state, but from that point forward *that same* SCALAR register is 4207 * never used in a precise context (i.e., it's precise value is not needed for 4208 * correctness), it's correct and safe to mark such register as "imprecise" 4209 * (i.e., precise marking set to false). This is what we rely on when we do 4210 * not set precise marking in current state. If no child state requires 4211 * precision for any given SCALAR register, it's safe to dictate that it can 4212 * be imprecise. If any child state does require this register to be precise, 4213 * we'll mark it precise later retroactively during precise markings 4214 * propagation from child state to parent states. 4215 * 4216 * Skipping precise marking setting in current state is a mild version of 4217 * relying on the above observation. But we can utilize this property even 4218 * more aggressively by proactively forgetting any precise marking in the 4219 * current state (which we inherited from the parent state), right before we 4220 * checkpoint it and branch off into new child state. This is done by 4221 * mark_all_scalars_imprecise() to hopefully get more permissive and generic 4222 * finalized states which help in short circuiting more future states. 4223 */ 4224 static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4225 { 4226 struct backtrack_state *bt = &env->bt; 4227 struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state; 4228 int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 4229 int last_idx = env->insn_idx; 4230 int subseq_idx = -1; 4231 struct bpf_func_state *func; 4232 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4233 bool skip_first = true; 4234 int i, fr, err; 4235 4236 if (!env->bpf_capable) 4237 return 0; 4238 4239 /* set frame number from which we are starting to backtrack */ 4240 bt_init(bt, env->cur_state->curframe); 4241 4242 /* Do sanity checks against current state of register and/or stack 4243 * slot, but don't set precise flag in current state, as precision 4244 * tracking in the current state is unnecessary. 4245 */ 4246 func = st->frame[bt->frame]; 4247 if (regno >= 0) { 4248 reg = &func->regs[regno]; 4249 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 4250 WARN_ONCE(1, "backtracing misuse"); 4251 return -EFAULT; 4252 } 4253 bt_set_reg(bt, regno); 4254 } 4255 4256 if (bt_empty(bt)) 4257 return 0; 4258 4259 for (;;) { 4260 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 4261 u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt; 4262 4263 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4264 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: last_idx %d first_idx %d subseq_idx %d \n", 4265 bt->frame, last_idx, first_idx, subseq_idx); 4266 } 4267 4268 /* If some register with scalar ID is marked as precise, 4269 * make sure that all registers sharing this ID are also precise. 4270 * This is needed to estimate effect of find_equal_scalars(). 4271 * Do this at the last instruction of each state, 4272 * bpf_reg_state::id fields are valid for these instructions. 4273 * 4274 * Allows to track precision in situation like below: 4275 * 4276 * r2 = unknown value 4277 * ... 4278 * --- state #0 --- 4279 * ... 4280 * r1 = r2 // r1 and r2 now share the same ID 4281 * ... 4282 * --- state #1 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} --- 4283 * ... 4284 * if (r2 > 10) goto exit; // find_equal_scalars() assigns range to r1 4285 * ... 4286 * --- state #2 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} --- 4287 * r3 = r10 4288 * r3 += r1 // need to mark both r1 and r2 4289 */ 4290 if (mark_precise_scalar_ids(env, st)) 4291 return -EFAULT; 4292 4293 if (last_idx < 0) { 4294 /* we are at the entry into subprog, which 4295 * is expected for global funcs, but only if 4296 * requested precise registers are R1-R5 4297 * (which are global func's input arguments) 4298 */ 4299 if (st->curframe == 0 && 4300 st->frame[0]->subprogno > 0 && 4301 st->frame[0]->callsite == BPF_MAIN_FUNC && 4302 bt_stack_mask(bt) == 0 && 4303 (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) == 0) { 4304 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4305 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 4306 reg = &st->frame[0]->regs[i]; 4307 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 4308 if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) 4309 reg->precise = true; 4310 } 4311 return 0; 4312 } 4313 4314 verbose(env, "BUG backtracking func entry subprog %d reg_mask %x stack_mask %llx\n", 4315 st->frame[0]->subprogno, bt_reg_mask(bt), bt_stack_mask(bt)); 4316 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 4317 return -EFAULT; 4318 } 4319 4320 for (i = last_idx;;) { 4321 if (skip_first) { 4322 err = 0; 4323 skip_first = false; 4324 } else { 4325 err = backtrack_insn(env, i, subseq_idx, bt); 4326 } 4327 if (err == -ENOTSUPP) { 4328 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, env->cur_state); 4329 bt_reset(bt); 4330 return 0; 4331 } else if (err) { 4332 return err; 4333 } 4334 if (bt_empty(bt)) 4335 /* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state. 4336 * Since this state is already marked, just return. 4337 * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state. 4338 */ 4339 return 0; 4340 subseq_idx = i; 4341 i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history); 4342 if (i == -ENOENT) 4343 break; 4344 if (i >= env->prog->len) { 4345 /* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0 4346 * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask 4347 * to backtrack. 4348 * It means the backtracking missed the spot where 4349 * particular register was initialized with a constant. 4350 */ 4351 verbose(env, "BUG backtracking idx %d\n", i); 4352 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 4353 return -EFAULT; 4354 } 4355 } 4356 st = st->parent; 4357 if (!st) 4358 break; 4359 4360 for (fr = bt->frame; fr >= 0; fr--) { 4361 func = st->frame[fr]; 4362 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr)); 4363 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 4364 reg = &func->regs[i]; 4365 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 4366 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); 4367 continue; 4368 } 4369 if (reg->precise) 4370 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); 4371 else 4372 reg->precise = true; 4373 } 4374 4375 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); 4376 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 4377 if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) { 4378 /* the sequence of instructions: 4379 * 2: (bf) r3 = r10 4380 * 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0 4381 * 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) 4382 * doesn't contain jmps. It's backtracked 4383 * as a single block. 4384 * During backtracking insn 3 is not recognized as 4385 * stack access, so at the end of backtracking 4386 * stack slot fp-8 is still marked in stack_mask. 4387 * However the parent state may not have accessed 4388 * fp-8 and it's "unallocated" stack space. 4389 * In such case fallback to conservative. 4390 */ 4391 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, env->cur_state); 4392 bt_reset(bt); 4393 return 0; 4394 } 4395 4396 if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) { 4397 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, i); 4398 continue; 4399 } 4400 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 4401 if (reg->precise) 4402 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, i); 4403 else 4404 reg->precise = true; 4405 } 4406 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4407 fmt_reg_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, 4408 bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr)); 4409 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: parent state regs=%s ", 4410 fr, env->tmp_str_buf); 4411 fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, 4412 bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); 4413 verbose(env, "stack=%s: ", env->tmp_str_buf); 4414 print_verifier_state(env, func, true); 4415 } 4416 } 4417 4418 if (bt_empty(bt)) 4419 return 0; 4420 4421 subseq_idx = first_idx; 4422 last_idx = st->last_insn_idx; 4423 first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 4424 } 4425 4426 /* if we still have requested precise regs or slots, we missed 4427 * something (e.g., stack access through non-r10 register), so 4428 * fallback to marking all precise 4429 */ 4430 if (!bt_empty(bt)) { 4431 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, env->cur_state); 4432 bt_reset(bt); 4433 } 4434 4435 return 0; 4436 } 4437 4438 int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4439 { 4440 return __mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 4441 } 4442 4443 /* mark_chain_precision_batch() assumes that env->bt is set in the caller to 4444 * desired reg and stack masks across all relevant frames 4445 */ 4446 static int mark_chain_precision_batch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 4447 { 4448 return __mark_chain_precision(env, -1); 4449 } 4450 4451 static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) 4452 { 4453 switch (base_type(type)) { 4454 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 4455 case PTR_TO_STACK: 4456 case PTR_TO_CTX: 4457 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 4458 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 4459 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 4460 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 4461 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 4462 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 4463 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 4464 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 4465 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 4466 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 4467 case PTR_TO_BUF: 4468 case PTR_TO_MEM: 4469 case PTR_TO_FUNC: 4470 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 4471 return true; 4472 default: 4473 return false; 4474 } 4475 } 4476 4477 /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */ 4478 static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4479 { 4480 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 4481 } 4482 4483 static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4484 { 4485 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 4486 } 4487 4488 static bool __is_scalar_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4489 { 4490 return tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off) && 4491 reg->smin_value == S64_MIN && reg->smax_value == S64_MAX && 4492 reg->umin_value == 0 && reg->umax_value == U64_MAX && 4493 reg->s32_min_value == S32_MIN && reg->s32_max_value == S32_MAX && 4494 reg->u32_min_value == 0 && reg->u32_max_value == U32_MAX; 4495 } 4496 4497 static bool register_is_bounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4498 { 4499 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !__is_scalar_unbounded(reg); 4500 } 4501 4502 static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks, 4503 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4504 { 4505 if (allow_ptr_leaks) 4506 return false; 4507 4508 return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE; 4509 } 4510 4511 /* Copy src state preserving dst->parent and dst->live fields */ 4512 static void copy_register_state(struct bpf_reg_state *dst, const struct bpf_reg_state *src) 4513 { 4514 struct bpf_reg_state *parent = dst->parent; 4515 enum bpf_reg_liveness live = dst->live; 4516 4517 *dst = *src; 4518 dst->parent = parent; 4519 dst->live = live; 4520 } 4521 4522 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, 4523 int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4524 int size) 4525 { 4526 int i; 4527 4528 copy_register_state(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, reg); 4529 if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) 4530 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 4531 4532 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE; i > BPF_REG_SIZE - size; i--) 4533 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1] = STACK_SPILL; 4534 4535 /* size < 8 bytes spill */ 4536 for (; i; i--) 4537 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1]); 4538 } 4539 4540 static bool is_bpf_st_mem(struct bpf_insn *insn) 4541 { 4542 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ST && BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM; 4543 } 4544 4545 /* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers, 4546 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() 4547 */ 4548 static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4549 /* stack frame we're writing to */ 4550 struct bpf_func_state *state, 4551 int off, int size, int value_regno, 4552 int insn_idx) 4553 { 4554 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 4555 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err; 4556 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 4557 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL; 4558 u32 dst_reg = insn->dst_reg; 4559 4560 /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0, 4561 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits 4562 */ 4563 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && 4564 is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && 4565 size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 4566 verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); 4567 return -EACCES; 4568 } 4569 4570 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 4571 if (value_regno >= 0) 4572 reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 4573 if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) { 4574 bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type); 4575 4576 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 4577 u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]; 4578 4579 if (type != STACK_MISC && type != STACK_ZERO) { 4580 sanitize = true; 4581 break; 4582 } 4583 } 4584 4585 if (sanitize) 4586 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_spill = true; 4587 } 4588 4589 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 4590 if (err) 4591 return err; 4592 4593 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 4594 if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && register_is_bounded(reg) && 4595 !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) { 4596 if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) { 4597 /* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit 4598 * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of 4599 * scalar via different register has to be conservative. 4600 * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise 4601 * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant. 4602 */ 4603 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 4604 if (err) 4605 return err; 4606 } 4607 save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size); 4608 /* Break the relation on a narrowing spill. */ 4609 if (fls64(reg->umax_value) > BITS_PER_BYTE * size) 4610 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id = 0; 4611 } else if (!reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && 4612 insn->imm != 0 && env->bpf_capable) { 4613 struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg = {}; 4614 4615 __mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, insn->imm); 4616 fake_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 4617 save_register_state(state, spi, &fake_reg, size); 4618 } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) { 4619 /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ 4620 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 4621 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 4622 verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); 4623 return -EACCES; 4624 } 4625 if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 4626 verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n"); 4627 return -EINVAL; 4628 } 4629 save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size); 4630 } else { 4631 u8 type = STACK_MISC; 4632 4633 /* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */ 4634 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 4635 /* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr/dynptr/iter. */ 4636 if (is_stack_slot_special(&state->stack[spi])) 4637 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 4638 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]); 4639 4640 /* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written 4641 * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon 4642 * when stack slots are partially written. 4643 * This heuristic means that read propagation will be 4644 * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks 4645 * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs 4646 * writes+reads less than 8 bytes 4647 */ 4648 if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) 4649 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 4650 4651 /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ 4652 if ((reg && register_is_null(reg)) || 4653 (!reg && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm == 0)) { 4654 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 4655 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 4656 if (err) 4657 return err; 4658 type = STACK_ZERO; 4659 } 4660 4661 /* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */ 4662 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) 4663 state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] = 4664 type; 4665 } 4666 return 0; 4667 } 4668 4669 /* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is 4670 * known to contain a variable offset. 4671 * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively 4672 * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the 4673 * dynamic range is potentially written to. 4674 * 4675 * 'off' includes 'regno->off'. 4676 * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to 4677 * the stack. 4678 * 4679 * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know 4680 * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for 4681 * future reads cannot be terminated by this write. 4682 * 4683 * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered 4684 * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets 4685 * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to 4686 * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets. 4687 */ 4688 static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4689 /* func where register points to */ 4690 struct bpf_func_state *state, 4691 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 4692 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 4693 { 4694 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 4695 int min_off, max_off; 4696 int i, err; 4697 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL; 4698 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 4699 bool writing_zero = false; 4700 /* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any 4701 * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO 4702 */ 4703 bool zero_used = false; 4704 4705 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 4706 ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno]; 4707 min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off; 4708 max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size; 4709 if (value_regno >= 0) 4710 value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 4711 if ((value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg)) || 4712 (!value_reg && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm == 0)) 4713 writing_zero = true; 4714 4715 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 4716 int spi; 4717 4718 spi = __get_spi(i); 4719 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 4720 if (err) 4721 return err; 4722 } 4723 4724 /* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */ 4725 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 4726 u8 new_type, *stype; 4727 int slot, spi; 4728 4729 slot = -i - 1; 4730 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 4731 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 4732 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 4733 4734 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && *stype != STACK_MISC && *stype != STACK_ZERO) { 4735 /* Reject the write if range we may write to has not 4736 * been initialized beforehand. If we didn't reject 4737 * here, the ptr status would be erased below (even 4738 * though not all slots are actually overwritten), 4739 * possibly opening the door to leaks. 4740 * 4741 * We do however catch STACK_INVALID case below, and 4742 * only allow reading possibly uninitialized memory 4743 * later for CAP_PERFMON, as the write may not happen to 4744 * that slot. 4745 */ 4746 verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d", 4747 insn_idx, i); 4748 return -EINVAL; 4749 } 4750 4751 /* Erase all spilled pointers. */ 4752 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 4753 4754 /* Update the slot type. */ 4755 new_type = STACK_MISC; 4756 if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) { 4757 new_type = STACK_ZERO; 4758 zero_used = true; 4759 } 4760 /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to 4761 * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot 4762 * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as 4763 * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory. 4764 * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots 4765 * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject 4766 * them, the error would be too confusing. 4767 */ 4768 if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) { 4769 verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d", 4770 insn_idx, i); 4771 return -EINVAL; 4772 } 4773 *stype = new_type; 4774 } 4775 if (zero_used) { 4776 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 4777 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 4778 if (err) 4779 return err; 4780 } 4781 return 0; 4782 } 4783 4784 /* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off, 4785 * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the 4786 * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then 4787 * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be 4788 * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must 4789 * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as 4790 * read. 4791 */ 4792 static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4793 /* func where src register points to */ 4794 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state, 4795 int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno) 4796 { 4797 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 4798 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 4799 int i, slot, spi; 4800 u8 *stype; 4801 int zeros = 0; 4802 4803 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 4804 slot = -i - 1; 4805 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 4806 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 4807 stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 4808 if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO) 4809 break; 4810 zeros++; 4811 } 4812 if (zeros == max_off - min_off) { 4813 /* any access_size read into register is zero extended, 4814 * so the whole register == const_zero 4815 */ 4816 __mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[dst_regno]); 4817 /* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet, 4818 * so mark it precise here, so that later 4819 * backtracking can stop here. 4820 * Backtracking may not need this if this register 4821 * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment. 4822 * Forward propagation of precise flag is not 4823 * necessary either. This mark is only to stop 4824 * backtracking. Any register that contributed 4825 * to const 0 was marked precise before spill. 4826 */ 4827 state->regs[dst_regno].precise = true; 4828 } else { 4829 /* have read misc data from the stack */ 4830 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 4831 } 4832 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 4833 } 4834 4835 /* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by 4836 * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a 4837 * spilled reg. 4838 * 4839 * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a 4840 * register. 4841 * 4842 * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds. 4843 */ 4844 static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4845 /* func where src register points to */ 4846 struct bpf_func_state *reg_state, 4847 int off, int size, int dst_regno) 4848 { 4849 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 4850 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 4851 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 4852 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4853 u8 *stype, type; 4854 4855 stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 4856 reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 4857 4858 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 4859 4860 if (is_spilled_reg(®_state->stack[spi])) { 4861 u8 spill_size = 1; 4862 4863 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; i > 0 && stype[i - 1] == STACK_SPILL; i--) 4864 spill_size++; 4865 4866 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE || spill_size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 4867 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 4868 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 4869 verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n"); 4870 return -EACCES; 4871 } 4872 4873 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 4874 if (dst_regno < 0) 4875 return 0; 4876 4877 if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == spill_size) { 4878 /* The earlier check_reg_arg() has decided the 4879 * subreg_def for this insn. Save it first. 4880 */ 4881 s32 subreg_def = state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def; 4882 4883 copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg); 4884 state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def = subreg_def; 4885 } else { 4886 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 4887 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 4888 if (type == STACK_SPILL) 4889 continue; 4890 if (type == STACK_MISC) 4891 continue; 4892 if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack) 4893 continue; 4894 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 4895 off, i, size); 4896 return -EACCES; 4897 } 4898 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 4899 } 4900 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 4901 return 0; 4902 } 4903 4904 if (dst_regno >= 0) { 4905 /* restore register state from stack */ 4906 copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg); 4907 /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely 4908 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited() 4909 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions 4910 */ 4911 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 4912 } else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) { 4913 /* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether 4914 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE 4915 * (e.g. for XADD). 4916 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that 4917 * with spilled pointers. 4918 */ 4919 verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n", 4920 off); 4921 return -EACCES; 4922 } 4923 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 4924 } else { 4925 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 4926 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 4927 if (type == STACK_MISC) 4928 continue; 4929 if (type == STACK_ZERO) 4930 continue; 4931 if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack) 4932 continue; 4933 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 4934 off, i, size); 4935 return -EACCES; 4936 } 4937 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 4938 if (dst_regno >= 0) 4939 mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno); 4940 } 4941 return 0; 4942 } 4943 4944 enum bpf_access_src { 4945 ACCESS_DIRECT = 1, /* the access is performed by an instruction */ 4946 ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */ 4947 }; 4948 4949 static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4950 int regno, int off, int access_size, 4951 bool zero_size_allowed, 4952 enum bpf_access_src type, 4953 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta); 4954 4955 static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4956 { 4957 return cur_regs(env) + regno; 4958 } 4959 4960 /* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register 4961 * 'dst_regno'. 4962 * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'), 4963 * but not its variable offset. 4964 * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned. 4965 * 4966 * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with 4967 * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when 4968 * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing 4969 * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable 4970 * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used 4971 * instead. 4972 */ 4973 static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4974 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno) 4975 { 4976 /* The state of the source register. */ 4977 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 4978 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg); 4979 int err; 4980 int min_off, max_off; 4981 4982 /* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted. 4983 */ 4984 err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 4985 false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL); 4986 if (err) 4987 return err; 4988 4989 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 4990 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 4991 mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno); 4992 return 0; 4993 } 4994 4995 /* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or 4996 * check_stack_read_var_off. 4997 * 4998 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack 4999 * bounds. 5000 * 5001 * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It 5002 * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register. 5003 */ 5004 static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5005 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 5006 int dst_regno) 5007 { 5008 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 5009 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 5010 int err; 5011 /* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */ 5012 bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 5013 5014 /* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a 5015 * register, in order to not leak pointers (see 5016 * check_stack_read_fixed_off). 5017 */ 5018 if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) { 5019 char tn_buf[48]; 5020 5021 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5022 verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n", 5023 tn_buf, off, size); 5024 return -EACCES; 5025 } 5026 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity 5027 * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack 5028 * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). The check in 5029 * check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic() called by 5030 * adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() prevents users from creating stack pointers 5031 * with variable offsets, therefore no check is required here. Further, 5032 * just checking it here would be insufficient as speculative stack 5033 * writes could still lead to unsafe speculative behaviour. 5034 */ 5035 if (!var_off) { 5036 off += reg->var_off.value; 5037 err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 5038 dst_regno); 5039 } else { 5040 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 5041 * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this 5042 * branch. 5043 */ 5044 err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 5045 dst_regno); 5046 } 5047 return err; 5048 } 5049 5050 5051 /* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or 5052 * check_stack_write_var_off. 5053 * 5054 * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack. 5055 * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any). 5056 * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can 5057 * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register. 5058 * 5059 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size. 5060 */ 5061 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5062 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 5063 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 5064 { 5065 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 5066 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 5067 int err; 5068 5069 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5070 off += reg->var_off.value; 5071 err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 5072 value_regno, insn_idx); 5073 } else { 5074 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 5075 * than fixed offset ones. 5076 */ 5077 err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state, 5078 ptr_regno, off, size, 5079 value_regno, insn_idx); 5080 } 5081 return err; 5082 } 5083 5084 static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5085 int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type) 5086 { 5087 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 5088 struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr; 5089 u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map); 5090 5091 if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) { 5092 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5093 map->value_size, off, size); 5094 return -EACCES; 5095 } 5096 5097 if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) { 5098 verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5099 map->value_size, off, size); 5100 return -EACCES; 5101 } 5102 5103 return 0; 5104 } 5105 5106 /* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */ 5107 static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 5108 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 5109 bool zero_size_allowed) 5110 { 5111 bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed); 5112 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 5113 5114 if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size) 5115 return 0; 5116 5117 reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 5118 switch (reg->type) { 5119 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 5120 verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5121 mem_size, off, size); 5122 break; 5123 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 5124 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5125 mem_size, off, size); 5126 break; 5127 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 5128 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 5129 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 5130 verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", 5131 off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size); 5132 break; 5133 case PTR_TO_MEM: 5134 default: 5135 verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n", 5136 mem_size, off, size); 5137 } 5138 5139 return -EACCES; 5140 } 5141 5142 /* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */ 5143 static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5144 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 5145 bool zero_size_allowed) 5146 { 5147 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 5148 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 5149 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 5150 int err; 5151 5152 /* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we 5153 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off 5154 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. 5155 * 5156 * The minimum value is only important with signed 5157 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a 5158 * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our 5159 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use 5160 * will have a set floor within our range. 5161 */ 5162 if (reg->smin_value < 0 && 5163 (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN || 5164 (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) || 5165 reg->smin_value + off < 0)) { 5166 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 5167 regno); 5168 return -EACCES; 5169 } 5170 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size, 5171 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 5172 if (err) { 5173 verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 5174 regno); 5175 return err; 5176 } 5177 5178 /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be 5179 * sure we won't do bad things. 5180 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too. 5181 */ 5182 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 5183 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access\n", 5184 regno); 5185 return -EACCES; 5186 } 5187 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size, 5188 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 5189 if (err) { 5190 verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 5191 regno); 5192 return err; 5193 } 5194 5195 return 0; 5196 } 5197 5198 static int __check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5199 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 5200 bool fixed_off_ok) 5201 { 5202 /* Access to this pointer-typed register or passing it to a helper 5203 * is only allowed in its original, unmodified form. 5204 */ 5205 5206 if (reg->off < 0) { 5207 verbose(env, "negative offset %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 5208 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 5209 return -EACCES; 5210 } 5211 5212 if (!fixed_off_ok && reg->off) { 5213 verbose(env, "dereference of modified %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 5214 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 5215 return -EACCES; 5216 } 5217 5218 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 5219 char tn_buf[48]; 5220 5221 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5222 verbose(env, "variable %s access var_off=%s disallowed\n", 5223 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), tn_buf); 5224 return -EACCES; 5225 } 5226 5227 return 0; 5228 } 5229 5230 int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5231 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno) 5232 { 5233 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 5234 } 5235 5236 static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5237 struct btf_field *kptr_field, 5238 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno) 5239 { 5240 const char *targ_name = btf_type_name(kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id); 5241 int perm_flags; 5242 const char *reg_name = ""; 5243 5244 if (btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 5245 perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_TRUSTED | MEM_RCU; 5246 5247 /* Only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */ 5248 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 5249 perm_flags |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 5250 } else { 5251 perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_ALLOC; 5252 } 5253 5254 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags)) 5255 goto bad_type; 5256 5257 /* We need to verify reg->type and reg->btf, before accessing reg->btf */ 5258 reg_name = btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 5259 5260 /* For ref_ptr case, release function check should ensure we get one 5261 * referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and that its fixed offset is 0. For the 5262 * normal store of unreferenced kptr, we must ensure var_off is zero. 5263 * Since ref_ptr cannot be accessed directly by BPF insns, checks for 5264 * reg->off and reg->ref_obj_id are not needed here. 5265 */ 5266 if (__check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true)) 5267 return -EACCES; 5268 5269 /* A full type match is needed, as BTF can be vmlinux, module or prog BTF, and 5270 * we also need to take into account the reg->off. 5271 * 5272 * We want to support cases like: 5273 * 5274 * struct foo { 5275 * struct bar br; 5276 * struct baz bz; 5277 * }; 5278 * 5279 * struct foo *v; 5280 * v = func(); // PTR_TO_BTF_ID 5281 * val->foo = v; // reg->off is zero, btf and btf_id match type 5282 * val->bar = &v->br; // reg->off is still zero, but we need to retry with 5283 * // first member type of struct after comparison fails 5284 * val->baz = &v->bz; // reg->off is non-zero, so struct needs to be walked 5285 * // to match type 5286 * 5287 * In the kptr_ref case, check_func_arg_reg_off already ensures reg->off 5288 * is zero. We must also ensure that btf_struct_ids_match does not walk 5289 * the struct to match type against first member of struct, i.e. reject 5290 * second case from above. Hence, when type is BPF_KPTR_REF, we set 5291 * strict mode to true for type match. 5292 */ 5293 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 5294 kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, 5295 kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF)) 5296 goto bad_type; 5297 return 0; 5298 bad_type: 5299 verbose(env, "invalid kptr access, R%d type=%s%s ", regno, 5300 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), reg_name); 5301 verbose(env, "expected=%s%s", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID), targ_name); 5302 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 5303 verbose(env, " or %s%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED), 5304 targ_name); 5305 else 5306 verbose(env, "\n"); 5307 return -EINVAL; 5308 } 5309 5310 /* The non-sleepable programs and sleepable programs with explicit bpf_rcu_read_lock() 5311 * can dereference RCU protected pointers and result is PTR_TRUSTED. 5312 */ 5313 static bool in_rcu_cs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 5314 { 5315 return env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock || 5316 env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr || 5317 !env->prog->aux->sleepable; 5318 } 5319 5320 /* Once GCC supports btf_type_tag the following mechanism will be replaced with tag check */ 5321 BTF_SET_START(rcu_protected_types) 5322 BTF_ID(struct, prog_test_ref_kfunc) 5323 BTF_ID(struct, cgroup) 5324 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_cpumask) 5325 BTF_ID(struct, task_struct) 5326 BTF_SET_END(rcu_protected_types) 5327 5328 static bool rcu_protected_object(const struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id) 5329 { 5330 if (!btf_is_kernel(btf)) 5331 return false; 5332 return btf_id_set_contains(&rcu_protected_types, btf_id); 5333 } 5334 5335 static bool rcu_safe_kptr(const struct btf_field *field) 5336 { 5337 const struct btf_field_kptr *kptr = &field->kptr; 5338 5339 return field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF && rcu_protected_object(kptr->btf, kptr->btf_id); 5340 } 5341 5342 static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5343 int value_regno, int insn_idx, 5344 struct btf_field *kptr_field) 5345 { 5346 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 5347 int class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 5348 struct bpf_reg_state *val_reg; 5349 5350 /* Things we already checked for in check_map_access and caller: 5351 * - Reject cases where variable offset may touch kptr 5352 * - size of access (must be BPF_DW) 5353 * - tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) 5354 * - kptr_field->offset == off + reg->var_off.value 5355 */ 5356 /* Only BPF_[LDX,STX,ST] | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW is supported */ 5357 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { 5358 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_MEM instruction mode\n"); 5359 return -EACCES; 5360 } 5361 5362 /* We only allow loading referenced kptr, since it will be marked as 5363 * untrusted, similar to unreferenced kptr. 5364 */ 5365 if (class != BPF_LDX && kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF) { 5366 verbose(env, "store to referenced kptr disallowed\n"); 5367 return -EACCES; 5368 } 5369 5370 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 5371 val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); 5372 /* We can simply mark the value_regno receiving the pointer 5373 * value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type. 5374 */ 5375 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, kptr_field->kptr.btf, 5376 kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, 5377 rcu_safe_kptr(kptr_field) && in_rcu_cs(env) ? 5378 PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU : 5379 PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED); 5380 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 5381 val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); 5382 if (!register_is_null(val_reg) && 5383 map_kptr_match_type(env, kptr_field, val_reg, value_regno)) 5384 return -EACCES; 5385 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 5386 if (insn->imm) { 5387 verbose(env, "BPF_ST imm must be 0 when storing to kptr at off=%u\n", 5388 kptr_field->offset); 5389 return -EACCES; 5390 } 5391 } else { 5392 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_LDX/BPF_STX/BPF_ST\n"); 5393 return -EACCES; 5394 } 5395 return 0; 5396 } 5397 5398 /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */ 5399 static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5400 int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed, 5401 enum bpf_access_src src) 5402 { 5403 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 5404 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 5405 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 5406 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 5407 struct btf_record *rec; 5408 int err, i; 5409 5410 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, map->value_size, 5411 zero_size_allowed); 5412 if (err) 5413 return err; 5414 5415 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(map->record)) 5416 return 0; 5417 rec = map->record; 5418 for (i = 0; i < rec->cnt; i++) { 5419 struct btf_field *field = &rec->fields[i]; 5420 u32 p = field->offset; 5421 5422 /* If any part of a field can be touched by load/store, reject 5423 * this program. To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2), 5424 * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2. 5425 */ 5426 if (reg->smin_value + off < p + btf_field_type_size(field->type) && 5427 p < reg->umax_value + off + size) { 5428 switch (field->type) { 5429 case BPF_KPTR_UNREF: 5430 case BPF_KPTR_REF: 5431 if (src != ACCESS_DIRECT) { 5432 verbose(env, "kptr cannot be accessed indirectly by helper\n"); 5433 return -EACCES; 5434 } 5435 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5436 verbose(env, "kptr access cannot have variable offset\n"); 5437 return -EACCES; 5438 } 5439 if (p != off + reg->var_off.value) { 5440 verbose(env, "kptr access misaligned expected=%u off=%llu\n", 5441 p, off + reg->var_off.value); 5442 return -EACCES; 5443 } 5444 if (size != bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_DW)) { 5445 verbose(env, "kptr access size must be BPF_DW\n"); 5446 return -EACCES; 5447 } 5448 break; 5449 default: 5450 verbose(env, "%s cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n", 5451 btf_field_type_name(field->type)); 5452 return -EACCES; 5453 } 5454 } 5455 } 5456 return 0; 5457 } 5458 5459 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff 5460 5461 static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5462 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 5463 enum bpf_access_type t) 5464 { 5465 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 5466 5467 switch (prog_type) { 5468 /* Program types only with direct read access go here! */ 5469 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN: 5470 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT: 5471 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL: 5472 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 5473 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 5474 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 5475 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 5476 return false; 5477 fallthrough; 5478 5479 /* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */ 5480 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 5481 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 5482 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 5483 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT: 5484 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB: 5485 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG: 5486 if (meta) 5487 return meta->pkt_access; 5488 5489 env->seen_direct_write = true; 5490 return true; 5491 5492 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 5493 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 5494 env->seen_direct_write = true; 5495 5496 return true; 5497 5498 default: 5499 return false; 5500 } 5501 } 5502 5503 static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, 5504 int size, bool zero_size_allowed) 5505 { 5506 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 5507 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 5508 int err; 5509 5510 /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any 5511 * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed 5512 * offset. 5513 */ 5514 5515 /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough 5516 * detail to prove they're safe. 5517 */ 5518 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 5519 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 5520 regno); 5521 return -EACCES; 5522 } 5523 5524 err = reg->range < 0 ? -EINVAL : 5525 __check_mem_access(env, regno, off, size, reg->range, 5526 zero_size_allowed); 5527 if (err) { 5528 verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno); 5529 return err; 5530 } 5531 5532 /* __check_mem_access has made sure "off + size - 1" is within u16. 5533 * reg->umax_value can't be bigger than MAX_PACKET_OFF which is 0xffff, 5534 * otherwise find_good_pkt_pointers would have refused to set range info 5535 * that __check_mem_access would have rejected this pkt access. 5536 * Therefore, "off + reg->umax_value + size - 1" won't overflow u32. 5537 */ 5538 env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = 5539 max_t(u32, env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset, 5540 off + reg->umax_value + size - 1); 5541 5542 return err; 5543 } 5544 5545 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */ 5546 static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size, 5547 enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, 5548 struct btf **btf, u32 *btf_id) 5549 { 5550 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = { 5551 .reg_type = *reg_type, 5552 .log = &env->log, 5553 }; 5554 5555 if (env->ops->is_valid_access && 5556 env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, &info)) { 5557 /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a 5558 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole 5559 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower 5560 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size 5561 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other 5562 * type of narrower access. 5563 */ 5564 *reg_type = info.reg_type; 5565 5566 if (base_type(*reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 5567 *btf = info.btf; 5568 *btf_id = info.btf_id; 5569 } else { 5570 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size; 5571 } 5572 /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ 5573 if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) 5574 env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size; 5575 return 0; 5576 } 5577 5578 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); 5579 return -EACCES; 5580 } 5581 5582 static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, 5583 int size) 5584 { 5585 if (size < 0 || off < 0 || 5586 (u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) { 5587 verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n", 5588 off, size); 5589 return -EACCES; 5590 } 5591 return 0; 5592 } 5593 5594 static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, 5595 u32 regno, int off, int size, 5596 enum bpf_access_type t) 5597 { 5598 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 5599 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 5600 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {}; 5601 bool valid; 5602 5603 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 5604 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 5605 regno); 5606 return -EACCES; 5607 } 5608 5609 switch (reg->type) { 5610 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 5611 valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 5612 break; 5613 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 5614 valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 5615 break; 5616 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 5617 valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 5618 break; 5619 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 5620 valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 5621 break; 5622 default: 5623 valid = false; 5624 } 5625 5626 5627 if (valid) { 5628 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = 5629 info.ctx_field_size; 5630 return 0; 5631 } 5632 5633 verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n", 5634 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type), off, size); 5635 5636 return -EACCES; 5637 } 5638 5639 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5640 { 5641 return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno)); 5642 } 5643 5644 static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5645 { 5646 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5647 5648 return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX; 5649 } 5650 5651 static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5652 { 5653 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5654 5655 return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type); 5656 } 5657 5658 static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5659 { 5660 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5661 5662 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 5663 } 5664 5665 static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5666 { 5667 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5668 5669 /* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */ 5670 return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS; 5671 } 5672 5673 static u32 *reg2btf_ids[__BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX] = { 5674 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 5675 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK], 5676 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 5677 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_TCP], 5678 #endif 5679 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = btf_bpf_map_id, 5680 }; 5681 5682 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 5683 { 5684 /* A referenced register is always trusted. */ 5685 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 5686 return true; 5687 5688 /* Types listed in the reg2btf_ids are always trusted */ 5689 if (reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)] && 5690 !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type)) 5691 return true; 5692 5693 /* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the 5694 * MEM_ALLOC or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the 5695 * other type modifiers may be safe, but we elect to take an opt-in 5696 * approach here as some (e.g. PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_MAYBE_NULL) are 5697 * not. 5698 * 5699 * Eventually, we should make PTR_TRUSTED the single source of truth 5700 * for whether a register is trusted. 5701 */ 5702 return type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS && 5703 !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type); 5704 } 5705 5706 static bool is_rcu_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 5707 { 5708 return reg->type & MEM_RCU; 5709 } 5710 5711 static void clear_trusted_flags(enum bpf_type_flag *flag) 5712 { 5713 *flag &= ~(BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS | MEM_RCU); 5714 } 5715 5716 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5717 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5718 int off, int size, bool strict) 5719 { 5720 struct tnum reg_off; 5721 int ip_align; 5722 5723 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 5724 if (!strict || size == 1) 5725 return 0; 5726 5727 /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling 5728 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of 5729 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms 5730 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get 5731 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate 5732 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an 5733 * unconditional IP align value of '2'. 5734 */ 5735 ip_align = 2; 5736 5737 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off)); 5738 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 5739 char tn_buf[48]; 5740 5741 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5742 verbose(env, 5743 "misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n", 5744 ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 5745 return -EACCES; 5746 } 5747 5748 return 0; 5749 } 5750 5751 static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5752 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5753 const char *pointer_desc, 5754 int off, int size, bool strict) 5755 { 5756 struct tnum reg_off; 5757 5758 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 5759 if (!strict || size == 1) 5760 return 0; 5761 5762 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off)); 5763 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 5764 char tn_buf[48]; 5765 5766 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5767 verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n", 5768 pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 5769 return -EACCES; 5770 } 5771 5772 return 0; 5773 } 5774 5775 static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5776 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, 5777 int size, bool strict_alignment_once) 5778 { 5779 bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once; 5780 const char *pointer_desc = ""; 5781 5782 switch (reg->type) { 5783 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 5784 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 5785 /* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits 5786 * right in front, treat it the very same way. 5787 */ 5788 return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict); 5789 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 5790 pointer_desc = "flow keys "; 5791 break; 5792 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 5793 pointer_desc = "key "; 5794 break; 5795 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 5796 pointer_desc = "value "; 5797 break; 5798 case PTR_TO_CTX: 5799 pointer_desc = "context "; 5800 break; 5801 case PTR_TO_STACK: 5802 pointer_desc = "stack "; 5803 /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off() 5804 * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being 5805 * aligned. 5806 */ 5807 strict = true; 5808 break; 5809 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 5810 pointer_desc = "sock "; 5811 break; 5812 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 5813 pointer_desc = "sock_common "; 5814 break; 5815 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 5816 pointer_desc = "tcp_sock "; 5817 break; 5818 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 5819 pointer_desc = "xdp_sock "; 5820 break; 5821 default: 5822 break; 5823 } 5824 return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size, 5825 strict); 5826 } 5827 5828 /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function 5829 * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call. 5830 * Ignore jump and exit insns. 5831 * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm 5832 * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites 5833 */ 5834 static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 5835 { 5836 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 5837 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 5838 int depth = 0, frame = 0, i, subprog_end; 5839 bool tail_call_reachable = false; 5840 int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 5841 int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 5842 int j; 5843 5844 i = subprog[idx].start; 5845 process_func: 5846 /* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when 5847 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack 5848 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario 5849 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = 5850 * 8k). 5851 * 5852 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example: 5853 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128 5854 * subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256 5855 * tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256 5856 * func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320) 5857 * subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64 5858 * subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128 5859 * tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128 5860 * func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416) 5861 * 5862 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid 5863 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above. 5864 */ 5865 if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) { 5866 verbose(env, 5867 "tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n", 5868 depth); 5869 return -EACCES; 5870 } 5871 /* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity 5872 * of interpreter stack size 5873 */ 5874 depth += round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 5875 if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) { 5876 verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n", 5877 frame + 1, depth); 5878 return -EACCES; 5879 } 5880 continue_func: 5881 subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start; 5882 for (; i < subprog_end; i++) { 5883 int next_insn, sidx; 5884 5885 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i)) 5886 continue; 5887 /* remember insn and function to return to */ 5888 ret_insn[frame] = i + 1; 5889 ret_prog[frame] = idx; 5890 5891 /* find the callee */ 5892 next_insn = i + insn[i].imm + 1; 5893 sidx = find_subprog(env, next_insn); 5894 if (sidx < 0) { 5895 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 5896 next_insn); 5897 return -EFAULT; 5898 } 5899 if (subprog[sidx].is_async_cb) { 5900 if (subprog[sidx].has_tail_call) { 5901 verbose(env, "verifier bug. subprog has tail_call and async cb\n"); 5902 return -EFAULT; 5903 } 5904 /* async callbacks don't increase bpf prog stack size unless called directly */ 5905 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i)) 5906 continue; 5907 } 5908 i = next_insn; 5909 idx = sidx; 5910 5911 if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) 5912 tail_call_reachable = true; 5913 5914 frame++; 5915 if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 5916 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n", 5917 frame); 5918 return -E2BIG; 5919 } 5920 goto process_func; 5921 } 5922 /* if tail call got detected across bpf2bpf calls then mark each of the 5923 * currently present subprog frames as tail call reachable subprogs; 5924 * this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the 5925 * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls 5926 */ 5927 if (tail_call_reachable) 5928 for (j = 0; j < frame; j++) 5929 subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true; 5930 if (subprog[0].tail_call_reachable) 5931 env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true; 5932 5933 /* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog' 5934 * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT 5935 */ 5936 if (frame == 0) 5937 return 0; 5938 depth -= round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 5939 frame--; 5940 i = ret_insn[frame]; 5941 idx = ret_prog[frame]; 5942 goto continue_func; 5943 } 5944 5945 static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 5946 { 5947 struct bpf_subprog_info *si = env->subprog_info; 5948 int ret; 5949 5950 for (int i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 5951 if (!i || si[i].is_async_cb) { 5952 ret = check_max_stack_depth_subprog(env, i); 5953 if (ret < 0) 5954 return ret; 5955 } 5956 continue; 5957 } 5958 return 0; 5959 } 5960 5961 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 5962 static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5963 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx) 5964 { 5965 int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog; 5966 5967 subprog = find_subprog(env, start); 5968 if (subprog < 0) { 5969 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 5970 start); 5971 return -EFAULT; 5972 } 5973 return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth; 5974 } 5975 #endif 5976 5977 static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5978 const char *buf_info, 5979 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5980 int regno, int off, int size) 5981 { 5982 if (off < 0) { 5983 verbose(env, 5984 "R%d invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n", 5985 regno, buf_info, off, size); 5986 return -EACCES; 5987 } 5988 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 5989 char tn_buf[48]; 5990 5991 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5992 verbose(env, 5993 "R%d invalid variable buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 5994 regno, off, tn_buf); 5995 return -EACCES; 5996 } 5997 5998 return 0; 5999 } 6000 6001 static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6002 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6003 int regno, int off, int size) 6004 { 6005 int err; 6006 6007 err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, regno, off, size); 6008 if (err) 6009 return err; 6010 6011 if (off + size > env->prog->aux->max_tp_access) 6012 env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = off + size; 6013 6014 return 0; 6015 } 6016 6017 static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6018 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6019 int regno, int off, int size, 6020 bool zero_size_allowed, 6021 u32 *max_access) 6022 { 6023 const char *buf_info = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type) ? "rdonly" : "rdwr"; 6024 int err; 6025 6026 err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, regno, off, size); 6027 if (err) 6028 return err; 6029 6030 if (off + size > *max_access) 6031 *max_access = off + size; 6032 6033 return 0; 6034 } 6035 6036 /* BPF architecture zero extends alu32 ops into 64-bit registesr */ 6037 static void zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 6038 { 6039 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 6040 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 6041 } 6042 6043 /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes) 6044 * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE 6045 */ 6046 static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6047 { 6048 u64 mask; 6049 6050 /* clear high bits in bit representation */ 6051 reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size); 6052 6053 /* fix arithmetic bounds */ 6054 mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1; 6055 if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) { 6056 reg->umin_value &= mask; 6057 reg->umax_value &= mask; 6058 } else { 6059 reg->umin_value = 0; 6060 reg->umax_value = mask; 6061 } 6062 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 6063 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 6064 6065 /* If size is smaller than 32bit register the 32bit register 6066 * values are also truncated so we push 64-bit bounds into 6067 * 32-bit bounds. Above were truncated < 32-bits already. 6068 */ 6069 if (size >= 4) 6070 return; 6071 __reg_combine_64_into_32(reg); 6072 } 6073 6074 static void set_sext64_default_val(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6075 { 6076 if (size == 1) { 6077 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S8_MIN; 6078 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S8_MAX; 6079 } else if (size == 2) { 6080 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S16_MIN; 6081 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S16_MAX; 6082 } else { 6083 /* size == 4 */ 6084 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 6085 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 6086 } 6087 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value = 0; 6088 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 6089 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 6090 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; 6091 } 6092 6093 static void coerce_reg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6094 { 6095 s64 init_s64_max, init_s64_min, s64_max, s64_min, u64_cval; 6096 u64 top_smax_value, top_smin_value; 6097 u64 num_bits = size * 8; 6098 6099 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6100 u64_cval = reg->var_off.value; 6101 if (size == 1) 6102 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s8)u64_cval); 6103 else if (size == 2) 6104 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s16)u64_cval); 6105 else 6106 /* size == 4 */ 6107 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s32)u64_cval); 6108 6109 u64_cval = reg->var_off.value; 6110 reg->smax_value = reg->smin_value = u64_cval; 6111 reg->umax_value = reg->umin_value = u64_cval; 6112 reg->s32_max_value = reg->s32_min_value = u64_cval; 6113 reg->u32_max_value = reg->u32_min_value = u64_cval; 6114 return; 6115 } 6116 6117 top_smax_value = ((u64)reg->smax_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6118 top_smin_value = ((u64)reg->smin_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6119 6120 if (top_smax_value != top_smin_value) 6121 goto out; 6122 6123 /* find the s64_min and s64_min after sign extension */ 6124 if (size == 1) { 6125 init_s64_max = (s8)reg->smax_value; 6126 init_s64_min = (s8)reg->smin_value; 6127 } else if (size == 2) { 6128 init_s64_max = (s16)reg->smax_value; 6129 init_s64_min = (s16)reg->smin_value; 6130 } else { 6131 init_s64_max = (s32)reg->smax_value; 6132 init_s64_min = (s32)reg->smin_value; 6133 } 6134 6135 s64_max = max(init_s64_max, init_s64_min); 6136 s64_min = min(init_s64_max, init_s64_min); 6137 6138 /* both of s64_max/s64_min positive or negative */ 6139 if ((s64_max >= 0) == (s64_min >= 0)) { 6140 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = s64_min; 6141 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = s64_max; 6142 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value = s64_min; 6143 reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value = s64_max; 6144 reg->var_off = tnum_range(s64_min, s64_max); 6145 return; 6146 } 6147 6148 out: 6149 set_sext64_default_val(reg, size); 6150 } 6151 6152 static void set_sext32_default_val(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6153 { 6154 if (size == 1) { 6155 reg->s32_min_value = S8_MIN; 6156 reg->s32_max_value = S8_MAX; 6157 } else { 6158 /* size == 2 */ 6159 reg->s32_min_value = S16_MIN; 6160 reg->s32_max_value = S16_MAX; 6161 } 6162 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 6163 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 6164 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_unknown); 6165 } 6166 6167 static void coerce_subreg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6168 { 6169 s32 init_s32_max, init_s32_min, s32_max, s32_min, u32_val; 6170 u32 top_smax_value, top_smin_value; 6171 u32 num_bits = size * 8; 6172 6173 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6174 u32_val = reg->var_off.value; 6175 if (size == 1) 6176 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s8)u32_val); 6177 else 6178 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s16)u32_val); 6179 6180 u32_val = reg->var_off.value; 6181 reg->s32_min_value = reg->s32_max_value = u32_val; 6182 reg->u32_min_value = reg->u32_max_value = u32_val; 6183 return; 6184 } 6185 6186 top_smax_value = ((u32)reg->s32_max_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6187 top_smin_value = ((u32)reg->s32_min_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6188 6189 if (top_smax_value != top_smin_value) 6190 goto out; 6191 6192 /* find the s32_min and s32_min after sign extension */ 6193 if (size == 1) { 6194 init_s32_max = (s8)reg->s32_max_value; 6195 init_s32_min = (s8)reg->s32_min_value; 6196 } else { 6197 /* size == 2 */ 6198 init_s32_max = (s16)reg->s32_max_value; 6199 init_s32_min = (s16)reg->s32_min_value; 6200 } 6201 s32_max = max(init_s32_max, init_s32_min); 6202 s32_min = min(init_s32_max, init_s32_min); 6203 6204 if ((s32_min >= 0) == (s32_max >= 0)) { 6205 reg->s32_min_value = s32_min; 6206 reg->s32_max_value = s32_max; 6207 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)s32_min; 6208 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)s32_max; 6209 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_range(s32_min, s32_max)); 6210 return; 6211 } 6212 6213 out: 6214 set_sext32_default_val(reg, size); 6215 } 6216 6217 static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map) 6218 { 6219 /* A map is considered read-only if the following condition are true: 6220 * 6221 * 1) BPF program side cannot change any of the map content. The 6222 * BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG flag is throughout the lifetime of a map 6223 * and was set at map creation time. 6224 * 2) The map value(s) have been initialized from user space by a 6225 * loader and then "frozen", such that no new map update/delete 6226 * operations from syscall side are possible for the rest of 6227 * the map's lifetime from that point onwards. 6228 * 3) Any parallel/pending map update/delete operations from syscall 6229 * side have been completed. Only after that point, it's safe to 6230 * assume that map value(s) are immutable. 6231 */ 6232 return (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 6233 READ_ONCE(map->frozen) && 6234 !bpf_map_write_active(map); 6235 } 6236 6237 static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val, 6238 bool is_ldsx) 6239 { 6240 void *ptr; 6241 u64 addr; 6242 int err; 6243 6244 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 6245 if (err) 6246 return err; 6247 ptr = (void *)(long)addr + off; 6248 6249 switch (size) { 6250 case sizeof(u8): 6251 *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s8 *)ptr : (u64)*(u8 *)ptr; 6252 break; 6253 case sizeof(u16): 6254 *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s16 *)ptr : (u64)*(u16 *)ptr; 6255 break; 6256 case sizeof(u32): 6257 *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s32 *)ptr : (u64)*(u32 *)ptr; 6258 break; 6259 case sizeof(u64): 6260 *val = *(u64 *)ptr; 6261 break; 6262 default: 6263 return -EINVAL; 6264 } 6265 return 0; 6266 } 6267 6268 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu) 6269 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu_or_null) 6270 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted) 6271 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted_or_null) 6272 6273 /* 6274 * Allow list few fields as RCU trusted or full trusted. 6275 * This logic doesn't allow mix tagging and will be removed once GCC supports 6276 * btf_type_tag. 6277 */ 6278 6279 /* RCU trusted: these fields are trusted in RCU CS and never NULL */ 6280 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct) { 6281 const cpumask_t *cpus_ptr; 6282 struct css_set __rcu *cgroups; 6283 struct task_struct __rcu *real_parent; 6284 struct task_struct *group_leader; 6285 }; 6286 6287 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup) { 6288 /* cgrp->kn is always accessible as documented in kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c */ 6289 struct kernfs_node *kn; 6290 }; 6291 6292 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set) { 6293 struct cgroup *dfl_cgrp; 6294 }; 6295 6296 /* RCU trusted: these fields are trusted in RCU CS and can be NULL */ 6297 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct mm_struct) { 6298 struct file __rcu *exe_file; 6299 }; 6300 6301 /* skb->sk, req->sk are not RCU protected, but we mark them as such 6302 * because bpf prog accessible sockets are SOCK_RCU_FREE. 6303 */ 6304 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct sk_buff) { 6305 struct sock *sk; 6306 }; 6307 6308 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct request_sock) { 6309 struct sock *sk; 6310 }; 6311 6312 /* full trusted: these fields are trusted even outside of RCU CS and never NULL */ 6313 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta) { 6314 struct seq_file *seq; 6315 }; 6316 6317 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task) { 6318 struct bpf_iter_meta *meta; 6319 struct task_struct *task; 6320 }; 6321 6322 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm) { 6323 struct file *file; 6324 }; 6325 6326 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file) { 6327 struct inode *f_inode; 6328 }; 6329 6330 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry) { 6331 /* no negative dentry-s in places where bpf can see it */ 6332 struct inode *d_inode; 6333 }; 6334 6335 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket) { 6336 struct sock *sk; 6337 }; 6338 6339 static bool type_is_rcu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6340 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6341 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 6342 { 6343 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct)); 6344 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup)); 6345 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set)); 6346 6347 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_rcu"); 6348 } 6349 6350 static bool type_is_rcu_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6351 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6352 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 6353 { 6354 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct mm_struct)); 6355 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct sk_buff)); 6356 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct request_sock)); 6357 6358 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_rcu_or_null"); 6359 } 6360 6361 static bool type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6362 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6363 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 6364 { 6365 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta)); 6366 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task)); 6367 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm)); 6368 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file)); 6369 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry)); 6370 6371 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_trusted"); 6372 } 6373 6374 static bool type_is_trusted_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6375 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6376 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 6377 { 6378 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket)); 6379 6380 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, 6381 "__safe_trusted_or_null"); 6382 } 6383 6384 static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6385 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 6386 int regno, int off, int size, 6387 enum bpf_access_type atype, 6388 int value_regno) 6389 { 6390 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 6391 const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 6392 const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off); 6393 const char *field_name = NULL; 6394 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 6395 u32 btf_id = 0; 6396 int ret; 6397 6398 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 6399 verbose(env, 6400 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 6401 tname); 6402 return -EPERM; 6403 } 6404 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 6405 verbose(env, 6406 "Cannot access kernel 'struct %s' from non-GPL compatible program\n", 6407 tname); 6408 return -EINVAL; 6409 } 6410 if (off < 0) { 6411 verbose(env, 6412 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 6413 regno, tname, off); 6414 return -EACCES; 6415 } 6416 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 6417 char tn_buf[48]; 6418 6419 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 6420 verbose(env, 6421 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 6422 regno, tname, off, tn_buf); 6423 return -EACCES; 6424 } 6425 6426 if (reg->type & MEM_USER) { 6427 verbose(env, 6428 "R%d is ptr_%s access user memory: off=%d\n", 6429 regno, tname, off); 6430 return -EACCES; 6431 } 6432 6433 if (reg->type & MEM_PERCPU) { 6434 verbose(env, 6435 "R%d is ptr_%s access percpu memory: off=%d\n", 6436 regno, tname, off); 6437 return -EACCES; 6438 } 6439 6440 if (env->ops->btf_struct_access && !type_is_alloc(reg->type) && atype == BPF_WRITE) { 6441 if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 6442 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: reg->btf must be kernel btf\n"); 6443 return -EFAULT; 6444 } 6445 ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size); 6446 } else { 6447 /* Writes are permitted with default btf_struct_access for 6448 * program allocated objects (which always have ref_obj_id > 0), 6449 * but not for untrusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC. 6450 */ 6451 if (atype != BPF_READ && !type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 6452 verbose(env, "only read is supported\n"); 6453 return -EACCES; 6454 } 6455 6456 if (type_is_alloc(reg->type) && !type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) && 6457 !reg->ref_obj_id) { 6458 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id for allocated object must be non-zero\n"); 6459 return -EFAULT; 6460 } 6461 6462 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, &field_name); 6463 } 6464 6465 if (ret < 0) 6466 return ret; 6467 6468 if (ret != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 6469 /* just mark; */ 6470 6471 } else if (type_flag(reg->type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED) { 6472 /* If this is an untrusted pointer, all pointers formed by walking it 6473 * also inherit the untrusted flag. 6474 */ 6475 flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED; 6476 6477 } else if (is_trusted_reg(reg) || is_rcu_reg(reg)) { 6478 /* By default any pointer obtained from walking a trusted pointer is no 6479 * longer trusted, unless the field being accessed has explicitly been 6480 * marked as inheriting its parent's state of trust (either full or RCU). 6481 * For example: 6482 * 'cgroups' pointer is untrusted if task->cgroups dereference 6483 * happened in a sleepable program outside of bpf_rcu_read_lock() 6484 * section. In a non-sleepable program it's trusted while in RCU CS (aka MEM_RCU). 6485 * Note bpf_rcu_read_unlock() converts MEM_RCU pointers to PTR_UNTRUSTED. 6486 * 6487 * A regular RCU-protected pointer with __rcu tag can also be deemed 6488 * trusted if we are in an RCU CS. Such pointer can be NULL. 6489 */ 6490 if (type_is_trusted(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 6491 flag |= PTR_TRUSTED; 6492 } else if (type_is_trusted_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 6493 flag |= PTR_TRUSTED | PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 6494 } else if (in_rcu_cs(env) && !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 6495 if (type_is_rcu(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 6496 /* ignore __rcu tag and mark it MEM_RCU */ 6497 flag |= MEM_RCU; 6498 } else if (flag & MEM_RCU || 6499 type_is_rcu_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 6500 /* __rcu tagged pointers can be NULL */ 6501 flag |= MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 6502 6503 /* We always trust them */ 6504 if (type_is_rcu_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id) && 6505 flag & PTR_UNTRUSTED) 6506 flag &= ~PTR_UNTRUSTED; 6507 } else if (flag & (MEM_PERCPU | MEM_USER)) { 6508 /* keep as-is */ 6509 } else { 6510 /* walking unknown pointers yields old deprecated PTR_TO_BTF_ID */ 6511 clear_trusted_flags(&flag); 6512 } 6513 } else { 6514 /* 6515 * If not in RCU CS or MEM_RCU pointer can be NULL then 6516 * aggressively mark as untrusted otherwise such 6517 * pointers will be plain PTR_TO_BTF_ID without flags 6518 * and will be allowed to be passed into helpers for 6519 * compat reasons. 6520 */ 6521 flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED; 6522 } 6523 } else { 6524 /* Old compat. Deprecated */ 6525 clear_trusted_flags(&flag); 6526 } 6527 6528 if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 6529 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag); 6530 6531 return 0; 6532 } 6533 6534 static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6535 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 6536 int regno, int off, int size, 6537 enum bpf_access_type atype, 6538 int value_regno) 6539 { 6540 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 6541 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 6542 struct bpf_reg_state map_reg; 6543 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 6544 const struct btf_type *t; 6545 const char *tname; 6546 u32 btf_id; 6547 int ret; 6548 6549 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 6550 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 6551 return -ENOTSUPP; 6552 } 6553 6554 if (!map->ops->map_btf_id || !*map->ops->map_btf_id) { 6555 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported for map type %d\n", 6556 map->map_type); 6557 return -ENOTSUPP; 6558 } 6559 6560 t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id); 6561 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); 6562 6563 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 6564 verbose(env, 6565 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 6566 tname); 6567 return -EPERM; 6568 } 6569 6570 if (off < 0) { 6571 verbose(env, "R%d is %s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 6572 regno, tname, off); 6573 return -EACCES; 6574 } 6575 6576 if (atype != BPF_READ) { 6577 verbose(env, "only read from %s is supported\n", tname); 6578 return -EACCES; 6579 } 6580 6581 /* Simulate access to a PTR_TO_BTF_ID */ 6582 memset(&map_reg, 0, sizeof(map_reg)); 6583 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, &map_reg, 0, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id, 0); 6584 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, &map_reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, NULL); 6585 if (ret < 0) 6586 return ret; 6587 6588 if (value_regno >= 0) 6589 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id, flag); 6590 6591 return 0; 6592 } 6593 6594 /* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The 6595 * maximum valid offset is -1. 6596 * 6597 * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and 6598 * -state->allocated_stack for reads. 6599 */ 6600 static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6601 s64 off, 6602 struct bpf_func_state *state, 6603 enum bpf_access_type t) 6604 { 6605 int min_valid_off; 6606 6607 if (t == BPF_WRITE || env->allow_uninit_stack) 6608 min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK; 6609 else 6610 min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack; 6611 6612 if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1) 6613 return -EACCES; 6614 return 0; 6615 } 6616 6617 /* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack 6618 * bounds. 6619 * 6620 * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any). 6621 */ 6622 static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( 6623 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6624 int regno, int off, int access_size, 6625 enum bpf_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type) 6626 { 6627 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 6628 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 6629 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 6630 s64 min_off, max_off; 6631 int err; 6632 char *err_extra; 6633 6634 if (src == ACCESS_HELPER) 6635 /* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */ 6636 err_extra = " indirect access to"; 6637 else if (type == BPF_READ) 6638 err_extra = " read from"; 6639 else 6640 err_extra = " write to"; 6641 6642 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6643 min_off = (s64)reg->var_off.value + off; 6644 max_off = min_off + access_size; 6645 } else { 6646 if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || 6647 reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 6648 verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n", 6649 err_extra, regno); 6650 return -EACCES; 6651 } 6652 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 6653 max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size; 6654 } 6655 6656 err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(env, min_off, state, type); 6657 if (!err && max_off > 0) 6658 err = -EINVAL; /* out of stack access into non-negative offsets */ 6659 if (!err && access_size < 0) 6660 /* access_size should not be negative (or overflow an int); others checks 6661 * along the way should have prevented such an access. 6662 */ 6663 err = -EFAULT; /* invalid negative access size; integer overflow? */ 6664 6665 if (err) { 6666 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6667 verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n", 6668 err_extra, regno, off, access_size); 6669 } else { 6670 char tn_buf[48]; 6671 6672 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 6673 verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s size=%d\n", 6674 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, access_size); 6675 } 6676 return err; 6677 } 6678 6679 return grow_stack_state(env, state, round_up(-min_off, BPF_REG_SIZE)); 6680 } 6681 6682 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) 6683 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory 6684 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory 6685 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory 6686 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory 6687 */ 6688 static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, 6689 int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t, 6690 int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once, bool is_ldsx) 6691 { 6692 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 6693 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 6694 int size, err = 0; 6695 6696 size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size); 6697 if (size < 0) 6698 return size; 6699 6700 /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */ 6701 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once); 6702 if (err) 6703 return err; 6704 6705 /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */ 6706 off += reg->off; 6707 6708 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { 6709 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 6710 verbose(env, "write to change key R%d not allowed\n", regno); 6711 return -EACCES; 6712 } 6713 6714 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 6715 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 6716 if (err) 6717 return err; 6718 if (value_regno >= 0) 6719 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6720 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 6721 struct btf_field *kptr_field = NULL; 6722 6723 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 6724 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 6725 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); 6726 return -EACCES; 6727 } 6728 err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t); 6729 if (err) 6730 return err; 6731 err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false, ACCESS_DIRECT); 6732 if (err) 6733 return err; 6734 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 6735 kptr_field = btf_record_find(reg->map_ptr->record, 6736 off + reg->var_off.value, BPF_KPTR); 6737 if (kptr_field) { 6738 err = check_map_kptr_access(env, regno, value_regno, insn_idx, kptr_field); 6739 } else if (t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 6740 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 6741 6742 /* if map is read-only, track its contents as scalars */ 6743 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) && 6744 bpf_map_is_rdonly(map) && 6745 map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 6746 int map_off = off + reg->var_off.value; 6747 u64 val = 0; 6748 6749 err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size, 6750 &val, is_ldsx); 6751 if (err) 6752 return err; 6753 6754 regs[value_regno].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 6755 __mark_reg_known(®s[value_regno], val); 6756 } else { 6757 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6758 } 6759 } 6760 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM) { 6761 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 6762 6763 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 6764 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 6765 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6766 return -EACCES; 6767 } 6768 6769 if (t == BPF_WRITE && rdonly_mem) { 6770 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 6771 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6772 return -EACCES; 6773 } 6774 6775 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 6776 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 6777 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno); 6778 return -EACCES; 6779 } 6780 6781 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 6782 reg->mem_size, false); 6783 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (t == BPF_READ || rdonly_mem)) 6784 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6785 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { 6786 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE; 6787 struct btf *btf = NULL; 6788 u32 btf_id = 0; 6789 6790 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 6791 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 6792 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); 6793 return -EACCES; 6794 } 6795 6796 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno); 6797 if (err < 0) 6798 return err; 6799 6800 err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type, &btf, 6801 &btf_id); 6802 if (err) 6803 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 6804 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 6805 /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a 6806 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter 6807 * case, we know the offset is zero. 6808 */ 6809 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 6810 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6811 } else { 6812 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, 6813 value_regno); 6814 if (type_may_be_null(reg_type)) 6815 regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen; 6816 /* A load of ctx field could have different 6817 * actual load size with the one encoded in the 6818 * insn. When the dst is PTR, it is for sure not 6819 * a sub-register. 6820 */ 6821 regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 6822 if (base_type(reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 6823 regs[value_regno].btf = btf; 6824 regs[value_regno].btf_id = btf_id; 6825 } 6826 } 6827 regs[value_regno].type = reg_type; 6828 } 6829 6830 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 6831 /* Basic bounds checks. */ 6832 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, ACCESS_DIRECT, t); 6833 if (err) 6834 return err; 6835 6836 if (t == BPF_READ) 6837 err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size, 6838 value_regno); 6839 else 6840 err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size, 6841 value_regno, insn_idx); 6842 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) { 6843 if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) { 6844 verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n"); 6845 return -EACCES; 6846 } 6847 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 6848 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 6849 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n", 6850 value_regno); 6851 return -EACCES; 6852 } 6853 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false); 6854 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 6855 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6856 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS) { 6857 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 6858 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 6859 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into flow keys\n", 6860 value_regno); 6861 return -EACCES; 6862 } 6863 6864 err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size); 6865 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 6866 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6867 } else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) { 6868 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 6869 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 6870 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6871 return -EACCES; 6872 } 6873 err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t); 6874 if (!err && value_regno >= 0) 6875 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6876 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER) { 6877 err = check_tp_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size); 6878 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 6879 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6880 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 6881 !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 6882 err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 6883 value_regno); 6884 } else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) { 6885 err = check_ptr_to_map_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 6886 value_regno); 6887 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BUF) { 6888 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 6889 u32 *max_access; 6890 6891 if (rdonly_mem) { 6892 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 6893 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 6894 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6895 return -EACCES; 6896 } 6897 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 6898 } else { 6899 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 6900 } 6901 6902 err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false, 6903 max_access); 6904 6905 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (rdonly_mem || t == BPF_READ)) 6906 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6907 } else { 6908 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 6909 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6910 return -EACCES; 6911 } 6912 6913 if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ && 6914 regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 6915 if (!is_ldsx) 6916 /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */ 6917 coerce_reg_to_size(®s[value_regno], size); 6918 else 6919 coerce_reg_to_size_sx(®s[value_regno], size); 6920 } 6921 return err; 6922 } 6923 6924 static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn) 6925 { 6926 int load_reg; 6927 int err; 6928 6929 switch (insn->imm) { 6930 case BPF_ADD: 6931 case BPF_ADD | BPF_FETCH: 6932 case BPF_AND: 6933 case BPF_AND | BPF_FETCH: 6934 case BPF_OR: 6935 case BPF_OR | BPF_FETCH: 6936 case BPF_XOR: 6937 case BPF_XOR | BPF_FETCH: 6938 case BPF_XCHG: 6939 case BPF_CMPXCHG: 6940 break; 6941 default: 6942 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC uses invalid atomic opcode %02x\n", insn->imm); 6943 return -EINVAL; 6944 } 6945 6946 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 6947 verbose(env, "invalid atomic operand size\n"); 6948 return -EINVAL; 6949 } 6950 6951 /* check src1 operand */ 6952 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 6953 if (err) 6954 return err; 6955 6956 /* check src2 operand */ 6957 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 6958 if (err) 6959 return err; 6960 6961 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) { 6962 /* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */ 6963 const u32 aux_reg = BPF_REG_0; 6964 6965 err = check_reg_arg(env, aux_reg, SRC_OP); 6966 if (err) 6967 return err; 6968 6969 if (is_pointer_value(env, aux_reg)) { 6970 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", aux_reg); 6971 return -EACCES; 6972 } 6973 } 6974 6975 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 6976 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg); 6977 return -EACCES; 6978 } 6979 6980 if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 6981 is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 6982 is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 6983 is_sk_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 6984 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 6985 insn->dst_reg, 6986 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type)); 6987 return -EACCES; 6988 } 6989 6990 if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) { 6991 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 6992 load_reg = BPF_REG_0; 6993 else 6994 load_reg = insn->src_reg; 6995 6996 /* check and record load of old value */ 6997 err = check_reg_arg(env, load_reg, DST_OP); 6998 if (err) 6999 return err; 7000 } else { 7001 /* This instruction accesses a memory location but doesn't 7002 * actually load it into a register. 7003 */ 7004 load_reg = -1; 7005 } 7006 7007 /* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch 7008 * case to simulate the register fill. 7009 */ 7010 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 7011 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true, false); 7012 if (!err && load_reg >= 0) 7013 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 7014 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg, 7015 true, false); 7016 if (err) 7017 return err; 7018 7019 /* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */ 7020 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 7021 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true, false); 7022 if (err) 7023 return err; 7024 7025 return 0; 7026 } 7027 7028 /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through 7029 * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending 7030 * on the access type and privileges, that all elements of the stack are 7031 * initialized. 7032 * 7033 * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any). 7034 * 7035 * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the 7036 * read offsets are marked as read. 7037 */ 7038 static int check_stack_range_initialized( 7039 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off, 7040 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 7041 enum bpf_access_src type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7042 { 7043 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 7044 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 7045 int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi; 7046 char *err_extra = type == ACCESS_HELPER ? " indirect" : ""; 7047 enum bpf_access_type bounds_check_type; 7048 /* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are 7049 * read-only. 7050 */ 7051 bool clobber = false; 7052 7053 if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) { 7054 verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n"); 7055 return -EACCES; 7056 } 7057 7058 if (type == ACCESS_HELPER) { 7059 /* The bounds checks for writes are more permissive than for 7060 * reads. However, if raw_mode is not set, we'll do extra 7061 * checks below. 7062 */ 7063 bounds_check_type = BPF_WRITE; 7064 clobber = true; 7065 } else { 7066 bounds_check_type = BPF_READ; 7067 } 7068 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size, 7069 type, bounds_check_type); 7070 if (err) 7071 return err; 7072 7073 7074 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 7075 min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off; 7076 } else { 7077 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for 7078 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in 7079 * Spectre masking for stack ALU. 7080 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). 7081 */ 7082 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 7083 char tn_buf[48]; 7084 7085 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 7086 verbose(env, "R%d%s variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", 7087 regno, err_extra, tn_buf); 7088 return -EACCES; 7089 } 7090 /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed 7091 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to 7092 * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on 7093 * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may 7094 * cause uninitialized stack leaking. 7095 */ 7096 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) 7097 meta = NULL; 7098 7099 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 7100 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 7101 } 7102 7103 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 7104 /* Ensure we won't be overwriting dynptrs when simulating byte 7105 * by byte access in check_helper_call using meta.access_size. 7106 * This would be a problem if we have a helper in the future 7107 * which takes: 7108 * 7109 * helper(uninit_mem, len, dynptr) 7110 * 7111 * Now, uninint_mem may overlap with dynptr pointer. Hence, it 7112 * may end up writing to dynptr itself when touching memory from 7113 * arg 1. This can be relaxed on a case by case basis for known 7114 * safe cases, but reject due to the possibilitiy of aliasing by 7115 * default. 7116 */ 7117 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 7118 int stack_off = -i - 1; 7119 7120 spi = __get_spi(i); 7121 /* raw_mode may write past allocated_stack */ 7122 if (state->allocated_stack <= stack_off) 7123 continue; 7124 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[stack_off % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_DYNPTR) { 7125 verbose(env, "potential write to dynptr at off=%d disallowed\n", i); 7126 return -EACCES; 7127 } 7128 } 7129 meta->access_size = access_size; 7130 meta->regno = regno; 7131 return 0; 7132 } 7133 7134 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 7135 u8 *stype; 7136 7137 slot = -i - 1; 7138 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 7139 if (state->allocated_stack <= slot) { 7140 verbose(env, "verifier bug: allocated_stack too small"); 7141 return -EFAULT; 7142 } 7143 7144 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 7145 if (*stype == STACK_MISC) 7146 goto mark; 7147 if ((*stype == STACK_ZERO) || 7148 (*stype == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)) { 7149 if (clobber) { 7150 /* helper can write anything into the stack */ 7151 *stype = STACK_MISC; 7152 } 7153 goto mark; 7154 } 7155 7156 if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && 7157 (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE || 7158 env->allow_ptr_leaks)) { 7159 if (clobber) { 7160 __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 7161 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 7162 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[j]); 7163 } 7164 goto mark; 7165 } 7166 7167 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 7168 verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n", 7169 err_extra, regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size); 7170 } else { 7171 char tn_buf[48]; 7172 7173 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 7174 verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n", 7175 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size); 7176 } 7177 return -EACCES; 7178 mark: 7179 /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause 7180 * the whole slot to be marked as 'read' 7181 */ 7182 mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 7183 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, 7184 REG_LIVE_READ64); 7185 /* We do not set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN for stack slot, as we can not 7186 * be sure that whether stack slot is written to or not. Hence, 7187 * we must still conservatively propagate reads upwards even if 7188 * helper may write to the entire memory range. 7189 */ 7190 } 7191 return 0; 7192 } 7193 7194 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 7195 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 7196 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7197 { 7198 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7199 u32 *max_access; 7200 7201 switch (base_type(reg->type)) { 7202 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 7203 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 7204 return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 7205 zero_size_allowed); 7206 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 7207 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 7208 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 7209 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7210 return -EACCES; 7211 } 7212 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 7213 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 7214 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 7215 if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 7216 meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : 7217 BPF_READ)) 7218 return -EACCES; 7219 return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 7220 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER); 7221 case PTR_TO_MEM: 7222 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 7223 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 7224 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 7225 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7226 return -EACCES; 7227 } 7228 } 7229 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, 7230 access_size, reg->mem_size, 7231 zero_size_allowed); 7232 case PTR_TO_BUF: 7233 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 7234 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 7235 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 7236 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7237 return -EACCES; 7238 } 7239 7240 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 7241 } else { 7242 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 7243 } 7244 return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off, 7245 access_size, zero_size_allowed, 7246 max_access); 7247 case PTR_TO_STACK: 7248 return check_stack_range_initialized( 7249 env, 7250 regno, reg->off, access_size, 7251 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta); 7252 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 7253 return check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, reg->off, 7254 access_size, BPF_READ, -1); 7255 case PTR_TO_CTX: 7256 /* in case the function doesn't know how to access the context, 7257 * (because we are in a program of type SYSCALL for example), we 7258 * can not statically check its size. 7259 * Dynamically check it now. 7260 */ 7261 if (!env->ops->convert_ctx_access) { 7262 enum bpf_access_type atype = meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ; 7263 int offset = access_size - 1; 7264 7265 /* Allow zero-byte read from PTR_TO_CTX */ 7266 if (access_size == 0) 7267 return zero_size_allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; 7268 7269 return check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, regno, offset, BPF_B, 7270 atype, -1, false, false); 7271 } 7272 7273 fallthrough; 7274 default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */ 7275 /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ 7276 if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 && 7277 register_is_null(reg)) 7278 return 0; 7279 7280 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s ", regno, 7281 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7282 verbose(env, "expected=%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_STACK)); 7283 return -EACCES; 7284 } 7285 } 7286 7287 static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7288 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 7289 bool zero_size_allowed, 7290 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7291 { 7292 int err; 7293 7294 /* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers 7295 * that enforce this value as an upper bound on return values. 7296 * See do_refine_retval_range() for helpers that can refine 7297 * the return value. C type of helper is u32 so we pull register 7298 * bound from umax_value however, if negative verifier errors 7299 * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an 7300 * int type and negative retvals are allowed. 7301 */ 7302 meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value; 7303 7304 /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check 7305 * happens using its boundaries. 7306 */ 7307 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 7308 /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw 7309 * mode so that the program is required to 7310 * initialize all the memory that the helper could 7311 * just partially fill up. 7312 */ 7313 meta = NULL; 7314 7315 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 7316 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n", 7317 regno); 7318 return -EACCES; 7319 } 7320 7321 if (reg->umin_value == 0) { 7322 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0, 7323 zero_size_allowed, 7324 meta); 7325 if (err) 7326 return err; 7327 } 7328 7329 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) { 7330 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", 7331 regno); 7332 return -EACCES; 7333 } 7334 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 7335 reg->umax_value, 7336 zero_size_allowed, meta); 7337 if (!err) 7338 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 7339 return err; 7340 } 7341 7342 int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 7343 u32 regno, u32 mem_size) 7344 { 7345 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(reg->type); 7346 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 7347 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 7348 int err; 7349 7350 if (register_is_null(reg)) 7351 return 0; 7352 7353 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 7354 /* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory 7355 * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as 7356 * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller. 7357 */ 7358 if (may_be_null) { 7359 saved_reg = *reg; 7360 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 7361 } 7362 7363 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta); 7364 /* Check access for BPF_WRITE */ 7365 meta.raw_mode = true; 7366 err = err ?: check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta); 7367 7368 if (may_be_null) 7369 *reg = saved_reg; 7370 7371 return err; 7372 } 7373 7374 static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 7375 u32 regno) 7376 { 7377 struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno - 1]; 7378 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(mem_reg->type); 7379 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 7380 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 7381 int err; 7382 7383 WARN_ON_ONCE(regno < BPF_REG_2 || regno > BPF_REG_5); 7384 7385 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 7386 7387 if (may_be_null) { 7388 saved_reg = *mem_reg; 7389 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(mem_reg); 7390 } 7391 7392 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta); 7393 /* Check access for BPF_WRITE */ 7394 meta.raw_mode = true; 7395 err = err ?: check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta); 7396 7397 if (may_be_null) 7398 *mem_reg = saved_reg; 7399 return err; 7400 } 7401 7402 /* Implementation details: 7403 * bpf_map_lookup returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL. 7404 * bpf_obj_new returns PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_MAYBE_NULL. 7405 * Two bpf_map_lookups (even with the same key) will have different reg->id. 7406 * Two separate bpf_obj_new will also have different reg->id. 7407 * For traditional PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, the verifier 7408 * clears reg->id after value_or_null->value transition, since the verifier only 7409 * cares about the range of access to valid map value pointer and doesn't care 7410 * about actual address of the map element. 7411 * For maps with 'struct bpf_spin_lock' inside map value the verifier keeps 7412 * reg->id > 0 after value_or_null->value transition. By doing so 7413 * two bpf_map_lookups will be considered two different pointers that 7414 * point to different bpf_spin_locks. Likewise for pointers to allocated objects 7415 * returned from bpf_obj_new. 7416 * The verifier allows taking only one bpf_spin_lock at a time to avoid 7417 * dead-locks. 7418 * Since only one bpf_spin_lock is allowed the checks are simpler than 7419 * reg_is_refcounted() logic. The verifier needs to remember only 7420 * one spin_lock instead of array of acquired_refs. 7421 * cur_state->active_lock remembers which map value element or allocated 7422 * object got locked and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock. 7423 */ 7424 static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 7425 bool is_lock) 7426 { 7427 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7428 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 7429 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 7430 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 7431 struct bpf_map *map = NULL; 7432 struct btf *btf = NULL; 7433 struct btf_record *rec; 7434 7435 if (!is_const) { 7436 verbose(env, 7437 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_spin_lock has to be at the constant offset\n", 7438 regno); 7439 return -EINVAL; 7440 } 7441 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 7442 map = reg->map_ptr; 7443 if (!map->btf) { 7444 verbose(env, 7445 "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_spin_lock\n", 7446 map->name); 7447 return -EINVAL; 7448 } 7449 } else { 7450 btf = reg->btf; 7451 } 7452 7453 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 7454 if (!btf_record_has_field(rec, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 7455 verbose(env, "%s '%s' has no valid bpf_spin_lock\n", map ? "map" : "local", 7456 map ? map->name : "kptr"); 7457 return -EINVAL; 7458 } 7459 if (rec->spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) { 7460 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_spin_lock' that is at %d\n", 7461 val + reg->off, rec->spin_lock_off); 7462 return -EINVAL; 7463 } 7464 if (is_lock) { 7465 if (cur->active_lock.ptr) { 7466 verbose(env, 7467 "Locking two bpf_spin_locks are not allowed\n"); 7468 return -EINVAL; 7469 } 7470 if (map) 7471 cur->active_lock.ptr = map; 7472 else 7473 cur->active_lock.ptr = btf; 7474 cur->active_lock.id = reg->id; 7475 } else { 7476 void *ptr; 7477 7478 if (map) 7479 ptr = map; 7480 else 7481 ptr = btf; 7482 7483 if (!cur->active_lock.ptr) { 7484 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock without taking a lock\n"); 7485 return -EINVAL; 7486 } 7487 if (cur->active_lock.ptr != ptr || 7488 cur->active_lock.id != reg->id) { 7489 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock of different lock\n"); 7490 return -EINVAL; 7491 } 7492 7493 invalidate_non_owning_refs(env); 7494 7495 cur->active_lock.ptr = NULL; 7496 cur->active_lock.id = 0; 7497 } 7498 return 0; 7499 } 7500 7501 static int process_timer_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 7502 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7503 { 7504 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7505 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 7506 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 7507 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 7508 7509 if (!is_const) { 7510 verbose(env, 7511 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_timer has to be at the constant offset\n", 7512 regno); 7513 return -EINVAL; 7514 } 7515 if (!map->btf) { 7516 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_timer\n", 7517 map->name); 7518 return -EINVAL; 7519 } 7520 if (!btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { 7521 verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid bpf_timer\n", map->name); 7522 return -EINVAL; 7523 } 7524 if (map->record->timer_off != val + reg->off) { 7525 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_timer' that is at %d\n", 7526 val + reg->off, map->record->timer_off); 7527 return -EINVAL; 7528 } 7529 if (meta->map_ptr) { 7530 verbose(env, "verifier bug. Two map pointers in a timer helper\n"); 7531 return -EFAULT; 7532 } 7533 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 7534 meta->map_ptr = map; 7535 return 0; 7536 } 7537 7538 static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 7539 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7540 { 7541 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7542 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 7543 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 7544 u32 kptr_off; 7545 7546 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 7547 verbose(env, 7548 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. kptr has to be at the constant offset\n", 7549 regno); 7550 return -EINVAL; 7551 } 7552 if (!map_ptr->btf) { 7553 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_kptr_xchg\n", 7554 map_ptr->name); 7555 return -EINVAL; 7556 } 7557 if (!btf_record_has_field(map_ptr->record, BPF_KPTR)) { 7558 verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid kptr\n", map_ptr->name); 7559 return -EINVAL; 7560 } 7561 7562 meta->map_ptr = map_ptr; 7563 kptr_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 7564 kptr_field = btf_record_find(map_ptr->record, kptr_off, BPF_KPTR); 7565 if (!kptr_field) { 7566 verbose(env, "off=%d doesn't point to kptr\n", kptr_off); 7567 return -EACCES; 7568 } 7569 if (kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF) { 7570 verbose(env, "off=%d kptr isn't referenced kptr\n", kptr_off); 7571 return -EACCES; 7572 } 7573 meta->kptr_field = kptr_field; 7574 return 0; 7575 } 7576 7577 /* There are two register types representing a bpf_dynptr, one is PTR_TO_STACK 7578 * which points to a stack slot, and the other is CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR. 7579 * 7580 * In both cases we deal with the first 8 bytes, but need to mark the next 8 7581 * bytes as STACK_DYNPTR in case of PTR_TO_STACK. In case of 7582 * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, we are guaranteed to get the beginning of the object. 7583 * 7584 * Mutability of bpf_dynptr is at two levels, one is at the level of struct 7585 * bpf_dynptr itself, i.e. whether the helper is receiving a pointer to struct 7586 * bpf_dynptr or pointer to const struct bpf_dynptr. In the former case, it can 7587 * mutate the view of the dynptr and also possibly destroy it. In the latter 7588 * case, it cannot mutate the bpf_dynptr itself but it can still mutate the 7589 * memory that dynptr points to. 7590 * 7591 * The verifier will keep track both levels of mutation (bpf_dynptr's in 7592 * reg->type and the memory's in reg->dynptr.type), but there is no support for 7593 * readonly dynptr view yet, hence only the first case is tracked and checked. 7594 * 7595 * This is consistent with how C applies the const modifier to a struct object, 7596 * where the pointer itself inside bpf_dynptr becomes const but not what it 7597 * points to. 7598 * 7599 * Helpers which do not mutate the bpf_dynptr set MEM_RDONLY in their argument 7600 * type, and declare it as 'const struct bpf_dynptr *' in their prototype. 7601 */ 7602 static int process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_idx, 7603 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int clone_ref_obj_id) 7604 { 7605 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7606 int err; 7607 7608 /* MEM_UNINIT and MEM_RDONLY are exclusive, when applied to an 7609 * ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR (or ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_*): 7610 */ 7611 if ((arg_type & (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) == (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) { 7612 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: misconfigured dynptr helper type flags\n"); 7613 return -EFAULT; 7614 } 7615 7616 /* MEM_UNINIT - Points to memory that is an appropriate candidate for 7617 * constructing a mutable bpf_dynptr object. 7618 * 7619 * Currently, this is only possible with PTR_TO_STACK 7620 * pointing to a region of at least 16 bytes which doesn't 7621 * contain an existing bpf_dynptr. 7622 * 7623 * MEM_RDONLY - Points to a initialized bpf_dynptr that will not be 7624 * mutated or destroyed. However, the memory it points to 7625 * may be mutated. 7626 * 7627 * None - Points to a initialized dynptr that can be mutated and 7628 * destroyed, including mutation of the memory it points 7629 * to. 7630 */ 7631 if (arg_type & MEM_UNINIT) { 7632 int i; 7633 7634 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg)) { 7635 verbose(env, "Dynptr has to be an uninitialized dynptr\n"); 7636 return -EINVAL; 7637 } 7638 7639 /* we write BPF_DW bits (8 bytes) at a time */ 7640 for (i = 0; i < BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE; i += 8) { 7641 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno, 7642 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 7643 if (err) 7644 return err; 7645 } 7646 7647 err = mark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, reg, arg_type, insn_idx, clone_ref_obj_id); 7648 } else /* MEM_RDONLY and None case from above */ { 7649 /* For the reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK case, bpf_dynptr is never const */ 7650 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR && !(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) { 7651 verbose(env, "cannot pass pointer to const bpf_dynptr, the helper mutates it\n"); 7652 return -EINVAL; 7653 } 7654 7655 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(env, reg)) { 7656 verbose(env, 7657 "Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #%d\n", 7658 regno); 7659 return -EINVAL; 7660 } 7661 7662 /* Fold modifiers (in this case, MEM_RDONLY) when checking expected type */ 7663 if (!is_dynptr_type_expected(env, reg, arg_type & ~MEM_RDONLY)) { 7664 verbose(env, 7665 "Expected a dynptr of type %s as arg #%d\n", 7666 dynptr_type_str(arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type)), regno); 7667 return -EINVAL; 7668 } 7669 7670 err = mark_dynptr_read(env, reg); 7671 } 7672 return err; 7673 } 7674 7675 static u32 iter_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int spi) 7676 { 7677 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 7678 7679 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 7680 } 7681 7682 static bool is_iter_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7683 { 7684 return meta->kfunc_flags & (KF_ITER_NEW | KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_ITER_DESTROY); 7685 } 7686 7687 static bool is_iter_new_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7688 { 7689 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_NEW; 7690 } 7691 7692 static bool is_iter_next_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7693 { 7694 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_NEXT; 7695 } 7696 7697 static bool is_iter_destroy_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7698 { 7699 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_DESTROY; 7700 } 7701 7702 static bool is_kfunc_arg_iter(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, int arg) 7703 { 7704 /* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() guarantees that first argument of any iter 7705 * kfunc is iter state pointer 7706 */ 7707 return arg == 0 && is_iter_kfunc(meta); 7708 } 7709 7710 static int process_iter_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_idx, 7711 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7712 { 7713 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7714 const struct btf_type *t; 7715 const struct btf_param *arg; 7716 int spi, err, i, nr_slots; 7717 u32 btf_id; 7718 7719 /* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() ensures we don't need to validate anything here */ 7720 arg = &btf_params(meta->func_proto)[0]; 7721 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta->btf, arg->type, NULL); /* PTR */ 7722 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta->btf, t->type, &btf_id); /* STRUCT */ 7723 nr_slots = t->size / BPF_REG_SIZE; 7724 7725 if (is_iter_new_kfunc(meta)) { 7726 /* bpf_iter_<type>_new() expects pointer to uninit iter state */ 7727 if (!is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg, nr_slots)) { 7728 verbose(env, "expected uninitialized iter_%s as arg #%d\n", 7729 iter_type_str(meta->btf, btf_id), regno); 7730 return -EINVAL; 7731 } 7732 7733 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots * 8; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) { 7734 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno, 7735 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 7736 if (err) 7737 return err; 7738 } 7739 7740 err = mark_stack_slots_iter(env, reg, insn_idx, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots); 7741 if (err) 7742 return err; 7743 } else { 7744 /* iter_next() or iter_destroy() expect initialized iter state*/ 7745 if (!is_iter_reg_valid_init(env, reg, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots)) { 7746 verbose(env, "expected an initialized iter_%s as arg #%d\n", 7747 iter_type_str(meta->btf, btf_id), regno); 7748 return -EINVAL; 7749 } 7750 7751 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 7752 if (spi < 0) 7753 return spi; 7754 7755 err = mark_iter_read(env, reg, spi, nr_slots); 7756 if (err) 7757 return err; 7758 7759 /* remember meta->iter info for process_iter_next_call() */ 7760 meta->iter.spi = spi; 7761 meta->iter.frameno = reg->frameno; 7762 meta->ref_obj_id = iter_ref_obj_id(env, reg, spi); 7763 7764 if (is_iter_destroy_kfunc(meta)) { 7765 err = unmark_stack_slots_iter(env, reg, nr_slots); 7766 if (err) 7767 return err; 7768 } 7769 } 7770 7771 return 0; 7772 } 7773 7774 /* Look for a previous loop entry at insn_idx: nearest parent state 7775 * stopped at insn_idx with callsites matching those in cur->frame. 7776 */ 7777 static struct bpf_verifier_state *find_prev_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7778 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, 7779 int insn_idx) 7780 { 7781 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 7782 struct bpf_verifier_state *st; 7783 7784 /* Explored states are pushed in stack order, most recent states come first */ 7785 sl = *explored_state(env, insn_idx); 7786 for (; sl; sl = sl->next) { 7787 /* If st->branches != 0 state is a part of current DFS verification path, 7788 * hence cur & st for a loop. 7789 */ 7790 st = &sl->state; 7791 if (st->insn_idx == insn_idx && st->branches && same_callsites(st, cur) && 7792 st->dfs_depth < cur->dfs_depth) 7793 return st; 7794 } 7795 7796 return NULL; 7797 } 7798 7799 static void reset_idmap_scratch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 7800 static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 7801 const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 7802 struct bpf_idmap *idmap); 7803 7804 static void maybe_widen_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7805 struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 7806 struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 7807 { 7808 if (rold->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 7809 return; 7810 if (rold->type != rcur->type) 7811 return; 7812 if (rold->precise || rcur->precise || regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap)) 7813 return; 7814 __mark_reg_unknown(env, rcur); 7815 } 7816 7817 static int widen_imprecise_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7818 struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 7819 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 7820 { 7821 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; 7822 int i, fr; 7823 7824 reset_idmap_scratch(env); 7825 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 7826 fold = old->frame[fr]; 7827 fcur = cur->frame[fr]; 7828 7829 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 7830 maybe_widen_reg(env, 7831 &fold->regs[i], 7832 &fcur->regs[i], 7833 &env->idmap_scratch); 7834 7835 for (i = 0; i < fold->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 7836 if (!is_spilled_reg(&fold->stack[i]) || 7837 !is_spilled_reg(&fcur->stack[i])) 7838 continue; 7839 7840 maybe_widen_reg(env, 7841 &fold->stack[i].spilled_ptr, 7842 &fcur->stack[i].spilled_ptr, 7843 &env->idmap_scratch); 7844 } 7845 } 7846 return 0; 7847 } 7848 7849 static struct bpf_reg_state *get_iter_from_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st, 7850 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7851 { 7852 int iter_frameno = meta->iter.frameno; 7853 int iter_spi = meta->iter.spi; 7854 7855 return &cur_st->frame[iter_frameno]->stack[iter_spi].spilled_ptr; 7856 } 7857 7858 /* process_iter_next_call() is called when verifier gets to iterator's next 7859 * "method" (e.g., bpf_iter_num_next() for numbers iterator) call. We'll refer 7860 * to it as just "iter_next()" in comments below. 7861 * 7862 * BPF verifier relies on a crucial contract for any iter_next() 7863 * implementation: it should *eventually* return NULL, and once that happens 7864 * it should keep returning NULL. That is, once iterator exhausts elements to 7865 * iterate, it should never reset or spuriously return new elements. 7866 * 7867 * With the assumption of such contract, process_iter_next_call() simulates 7868 * a fork in the verifier state to validate loop logic correctness and safety 7869 * without having to simulate infinite amount of iterations. 7870 * 7871 * In current state, we first assume that iter_next() returned NULL and 7872 * iterator state is set to DRAINED (BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED). In such 7873 * conditions we should not form an infinite loop and should eventually reach 7874 * exit. 7875 * 7876 * Besides that, we also fork current state and enqueue it for later 7877 * verification. In a forked state we keep iterator state as ACTIVE 7878 * (BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) and assume non-NULL return from iter_next(). We 7879 * also bump iteration depth to prevent erroneous infinite loop detection 7880 * later on (see iter_active_depths_differ() comment for details). In this 7881 * state we assume that we'll eventually loop back to another iter_next() 7882 * calls (it could be in exactly same location or in some other instruction, 7883 * it doesn't matter, we don't make any unnecessary assumptions about this, 7884 * everything revolves around iterator state in a stack slot, not which 7885 * instruction is calling iter_next()). When that happens, we either will come 7886 * to iter_next() with equivalent state and can conclude that next iteration 7887 * will proceed in exactly the same way as we just verified, so it's safe to 7888 * assume that loop converges. If not, we'll go on another iteration 7889 * simulation with a different input state, until all possible starting states 7890 * are validated or we reach maximum number of instructions limit. 7891 * 7892 * This way, we will either exhaustively discover all possible input states 7893 * that iterator loop can start with and eventually will converge, or we'll 7894 * effectively regress into bounded loop simulation logic and either reach 7895 * maximum number of instructions if loop is not provably convergent, or there 7896 * is some statically known limit on number of iterations (e.g., if there is 7897 * an explicit `if n > 100 then break;` statement somewhere in the loop). 7898 * 7899 * Iteration convergence logic in is_state_visited() relies on exact 7900 * states comparison, which ignores read and precision marks. 7901 * This is necessary because read and precision marks are not finalized 7902 * while in the loop. Exact comparison might preclude convergence for 7903 * simple programs like below: 7904 * 7905 * i = 0; 7906 * while(iter_next(&it)) 7907 * i++; 7908 * 7909 * At each iteration step i++ would produce a new distinct state and 7910 * eventually instruction processing limit would be reached. 7911 * 7912 * To avoid such behavior speculatively forget (widen) range for 7913 * imprecise scalar registers, if those registers were not precise at the 7914 * end of the previous iteration and do not match exactly. 7915 * 7916 * This is a conservative heuristic that allows to verify wide range of programs, 7917 * however it precludes verification of programs that conjure an 7918 * imprecise value on the first loop iteration and use it as precise on a second. 7919 * For example, the following safe program would fail to verify: 7920 * 7921 * struct bpf_num_iter it; 7922 * int arr[10]; 7923 * int i = 0, a = 0; 7924 * bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, 10); 7925 * while (bpf_iter_num_next(&it)) { 7926 * if (a == 0) { 7927 * a = 1; 7928 * i = 7; // Because i changed verifier would forget 7929 * // it's range on second loop entry. 7930 * } else { 7931 * arr[i] = 42; // This would fail to verify. 7932 * } 7933 * } 7934 * bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it); 7935 */ 7936 static int process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, 7937 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7938 { 7939 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st = env->cur_state, *queued_st, *prev_st; 7940 struct bpf_func_state *cur_fr = cur_st->frame[cur_st->curframe], *queued_fr; 7941 struct bpf_reg_state *cur_iter, *queued_iter; 7942 7943 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(struct bpf_iter); 7944 7945 cur_iter = get_iter_from_state(cur_st, meta); 7946 7947 if (cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE && 7948 cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED) { 7949 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected iterator state %d (%s)\n", 7950 cur_iter->iter.state, iter_state_str(cur_iter->iter.state)); 7951 return -EFAULT; 7952 } 7953 7954 if (cur_iter->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) { 7955 /* Because iter_next() call is a checkpoint is_state_visitied() 7956 * should guarantee parent state with same call sites and insn_idx. 7957 */ 7958 if (!cur_st->parent || cur_st->parent->insn_idx != insn_idx || 7959 !same_callsites(cur_st->parent, cur_st)) { 7960 verbose(env, "bug: bad parent state for iter next call"); 7961 return -EFAULT; 7962 } 7963 /* Note cur_st->parent in the call below, it is necessary to skip 7964 * checkpoint created for cur_st by is_state_visited() 7965 * right at this instruction. 7966 */ 7967 prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, cur_st->parent, insn_idx); 7968 /* branch out active iter state */ 7969 queued_st = push_stack(env, insn_idx + 1, insn_idx, false); 7970 if (!queued_st) 7971 return -ENOMEM; 7972 7973 queued_iter = get_iter_from_state(queued_st, meta); 7974 queued_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE; 7975 queued_iter->iter.depth++; 7976 if (prev_st) 7977 widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, queued_st); 7978 7979 queued_fr = queued_st->frame[queued_st->curframe]; 7980 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&queued_fr->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 7981 } 7982 7983 /* switch to DRAINED state, but keep the depth unchanged */ 7984 /* mark current iter state as drained and assume returned NULL */ 7985 cur_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED; 7986 __mark_reg_const_zero(&cur_fr->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 7987 7988 return 0; 7989 } 7990 7991 static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 7992 { 7993 return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE || 7994 type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO; 7995 } 7996 7997 static bool arg_type_is_raw_mem(enum bpf_arg_type type) 7998 { 7999 return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM && 8000 type & MEM_UNINIT; 8001 } 8002 8003 static bool arg_type_is_release(enum bpf_arg_type type) 8004 { 8005 return type & OBJ_RELEASE; 8006 } 8007 8008 static bool arg_type_is_dynptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) 8009 { 8010 return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 8011 } 8012 8013 static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8014 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 8015 enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type) 8016 { 8017 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 8018 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 8019 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type\n"); 8020 return -EACCES; 8021 } 8022 8023 switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) { 8024 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 8025 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 8026 if (*arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 8027 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON; 8028 } else { 8029 verbose(env, "invalid arg_type for sockmap/sockhash\n"); 8030 return -EINVAL; 8031 } 8032 break; 8033 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 8034 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem) 8035 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 8036 break; 8037 default: 8038 break; 8039 } 8040 return 0; 8041 } 8042 8043 struct bpf_reg_types { 8044 const enum bpf_reg_type types[10]; 8045 u32 *btf_id; 8046 }; 8047 8048 static const struct bpf_reg_types sock_types = { 8049 .types = { 8050 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 8051 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 8052 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 8053 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 8054 }, 8055 }; 8056 8057 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 8058 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_id_sock_common_types = { 8059 .types = { 8060 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 8061 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 8062 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 8063 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 8064 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 8065 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 8066 }, 8067 .btf_id = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 8068 }; 8069 #endif 8070 8071 static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = { 8072 .types = { 8073 PTR_TO_STACK, 8074 PTR_TO_PACKET, 8075 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 8076 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 8077 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 8078 PTR_TO_MEM, 8079 PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF, 8080 PTR_TO_BUF, 8081 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 8082 }, 8083 }; 8084 8085 static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = { 8086 .types = { 8087 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 8088 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, 8089 } 8090 }; 8091 8092 static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } }; 8093 static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } }; 8094 static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } }; 8095 static const struct bpf_reg_types ringbuf_mem_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF } }; 8096 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_TO_MAP } }; 8097 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = { 8098 .types = { 8099 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 8100 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 8101 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU, 8102 }, 8103 }; 8104 static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { 8105 .types = { 8106 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU, 8107 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED, 8108 } 8109 }; 8110 static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } }; 8111 static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } }; 8112 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_str_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 8113 static const struct bpf_reg_types timer_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 8114 static const struct bpf_reg_types kptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 8115 static const struct bpf_reg_types dynptr_types = { 8116 .types = { 8117 PTR_TO_STACK, 8118 CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, 8119 } 8120 }; 8121 8122 static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = { 8123 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = &mem_types, 8124 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = &mem_types, 8125 [ARG_CONST_SIZE] = &scalar_types, 8126 [ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 8127 [ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 8128 [ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR] = &const_map_ptr_types, 8129 [ARG_PTR_TO_CTX] = &context_types, 8130 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &sock_types, 8131 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 8132 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_id_sock_common_types, 8133 #endif 8134 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &fullsock_types, 8135 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = &btf_ptr_types, 8136 [ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK] = &spin_lock_types, 8137 [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM] = &mem_types, 8138 [ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM] = &ringbuf_mem_types, 8139 [ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = &percpu_btf_ptr_types, 8140 [ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC] = &func_ptr_types, 8141 [ARG_PTR_TO_STACK] = &stack_ptr_types, 8142 [ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR] = &const_str_ptr_types, 8143 [ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER] = &timer_types, 8144 [ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR] = &kptr_types, 8145 [ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = &dynptr_types, 8146 }; 8147 8148 static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 8149 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, 8150 const u32 *arg_btf_id, 8151 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 8152 { 8153 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 8154 enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type; 8155 const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible; 8156 int i, j; 8157 8158 compatible = compatible_reg_types[base_type(arg_type)]; 8159 if (!compatible) { 8160 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unsupported arg type %d\n", arg_type); 8161 return -EFAULT; 8162 } 8163 8164 /* ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY, 8165 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM and NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY 8166 * 8167 * Same for MAYBE_NULL: 8168 * 8169 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL, 8170 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM but NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL 8171 * 8172 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM that is tagged with a dynptr type. 8173 * 8174 * Therefore we fold these flags depending on the arg_type before comparison. 8175 */ 8176 if (arg_type & MEM_RDONLY) 8177 type &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 8178 if (arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) 8179 type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 8180 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) 8181 type &= ~DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK; 8182 8183 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && type_is_alloc(type)) 8184 type &= ~MEM_ALLOC; 8185 8186 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) { 8187 expected = compatible->types[i]; 8188 if (expected == NOT_INIT) 8189 break; 8190 8191 if (type == expected) 8192 goto found; 8193 } 8194 8195 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=", regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 8196 for (j = 0; j + 1 < i; j++) 8197 verbose(env, "%s, ", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 8198 verbose(env, "%s\n", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 8199 return -EACCES; 8200 8201 found: 8202 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 8203 return 0; 8204 8205 if (compatible == &mem_types) { 8206 if (!(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) { 8207 verbose(env, 8208 "%s() may write into memory pointed by R%d type=%s\n", 8209 func_id_name(meta->func_id), 8210 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 8211 return -EACCES; 8212 } 8213 return 0; 8214 } 8215 8216 switch ((int)reg->type) { 8217 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 8218 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: 8219 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU: 8220 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL: 8221 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU: 8222 { 8223 /* For bpf_sk_release, it needs to match against first member 8224 * 'struct sock_common', hence make an exception for it. This 8225 * allows bpf_sk_release to work for multiple socket types. 8226 */ 8227 bool strict_type_match = arg_type_is_release(arg_type) && 8228 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_release; 8229 8230 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && 8231 (!type_may_be_null(arg_type) || arg_type_is_release(arg_type))) { 8232 verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to helper arg%d\n", regno); 8233 return -EACCES; 8234 } 8235 8236 if (!arg_btf_id) { 8237 if (!compatible->btf_id) { 8238 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing arg compatible BTF ID\n"); 8239 return -EFAULT; 8240 } 8241 arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id; 8242 } 8243 8244 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 8245 if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) 8246 return -EACCES; 8247 } else { 8248 if (arg_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 8249 verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); 8250 verbose(env, "R%d has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON type\n", 8251 regno); 8252 return -EACCES; 8253 } 8254 8255 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 8256 btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id, 8257 strict_type_match)) { 8258 verbose(env, "R%d is of type %s but %s is expected\n", 8259 regno, btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id), 8260 btf_type_name(btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id)); 8261 return -EACCES; 8262 } 8263 } 8264 break; 8265 } 8266 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 8267 if (meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_lock && meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock && 8268 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 8269 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unimplemented handling of MEM_ALLOC\n"); 8270 return -EFAULT; 8271 } 8272 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 8273 if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) 8274 return -EACCES; 8275 } 8276 break; 8277 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU: 8278 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED: 8279 /* Handled by helper specific checks */ 8280 break; 8281 default: 8282 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: invalid PTR_TO_BTF_ID register for type match\n"); 8283 return -EFAULT; 8284 } 8285 return 0; 8286 } 8287 8288 static struct btf_field * 8289 reg_find_field_offset(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, s32 off, u32 fields) 8290 { 8291 struct btf_field *field; 8292 struct btf_record *rec; 8293 8294 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 8295 if (!rec) 8296 return NULL; 8297 8298 field = btf_record_find(rec, off, fields); 8299 if (!field) 8300 return NULL; 8301 8302 return field; 8303 } 8304 8305 int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8306 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 8307 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 8308 { 8309 u32 type = reg->type; 8310 8311 /* When referenced register is passed to release function, its fixed 8312 * offset must be 0. 8313 * 8314 * We will check arg_type_is_release reg has ref_obj_id when storing 8315 * meta->release_regno. 8316 */ 8317 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) { 8318 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR with OBJ_RELEASE is a bit special, as it 8319 * may not directly point to the object being released, but to 8320 * dynptr pointing to such object, which might be at some offset 8321 * on the stack. In that case, we simply to fallback to the 8322 * default handling. 8323 */ 8324 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type) && type == PTR_TO_STACK) 8325 return 0; 8326 8327 /* Doing check_ptr_off_reg check for the offset will catch this 8328 * because fixed_off_ok is false, but checking here allows us 8329 * to give the user a better error message. 8330 */ 8331 if (reg->off) { 8332 verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func or trusted arg to kfunc\n", 8333 regno); 8334 return -EINVAL; 8335 } 8336 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 8337 } 8338 8339 switch (type) { 8340 /* Pointer types where both fixed and variable offset is explicitly allowed: */ 8341 case PTR_TO_STACK: 8342 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 8343 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 8344 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 8345 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 8346 case PTR_TO_MEM: 8347 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY: 8348 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF: 8349 case PTR_TO_BUF: 8350 case PTR_TO_BUF | MEM_RDONLY: 8351 case SCALAR_VALUE: 8352 return 0; 8353 /* All the rest must be rejected, except PTR_TO_BTF_ID which allows 8354 * fixed offset. 8355 */ 8356 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 8357 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 8358 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: 8359 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU: 8360 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF: 8361 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF | MEM_RCU: 8362 /* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function, 8363 * its fixed offset must be 0. In the other cases, fixed offset 8364 * can be non-zero. This was already checked above. So pass 8365 * fixed_off_ok as true to allow fixed offset for all other 8366 * cases. var_off always must be 0 for PTR_TO_BTF_ID, hence we 8367 * still need to do checks instead of returning. 8368 */ 8369 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true); 8370 default: 8371 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 8372 } 8373 } 8374 8375 static struct bpf_reg_state *get_dynptr_arg_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8376 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, 8377 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 8378 { 8379 struct bpf_reg_state *state = NULL; 8380 int i; 8381 8382 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) 8383 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[i])) { 8384 if (state) { 8385 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: multiple dynptr args\n"); 8386 return NULL; 8387 } 8388 state = ®s[BPF_REG_1 + i]; 8389 } 8390 8391 if (!state) 8392 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr arg found\n"); 8393 8394 return state; 8395 } 8396 8397 static int dynptr_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 8398 { 8399 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 8400 int spi; 8401 8402 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 8403 return reg->id; 8404 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 8405 if (spi < 0) 8406 return spi; 8407 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id; 8408 } 8409 8410 static int dynptr_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 8411 { 8412 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 8413 int spi; 8414 8415 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 8416 return reg->ref_obj_id; 8417 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 8418 if (spi < 0) 8419 return spi; 8420 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 8421 } 8422 8423 static enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_get_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8424 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 8425 { 8426 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 8427 int spi; 8428 8429 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 8430 return reg->dynptr.type; 8431 8432 spi = __get_spi(reg->off); 8433 if (spi < 0) { 8434 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: invalid spi when querying dynptr type\n"); 8435 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID; 8436 } 8437 8438 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type; 8439 } 8440 8441 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, 8442 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 8443 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, 8444 int insn_idx) 8445 { 8446 u32 regno = BPF_REG_1 + arg; 8447 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 8448 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[arg]; 8449 enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type; 8450 u32 *arg_btf_id = NULL; 8451 int err = 0; 8452 8453 if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE) 8454 return 0; 8455 8456 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP); 8457 if (err) 8458 return err; 8459 8460 if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { 8461 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { 8462 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", 8463 regno); 8464 return -EACCES; 8465 } 8466 return 0; 8467 } 8468 8469 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && 8470 !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) { 8471 verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n"); 8472 return -EACCES; 8473 } 8474 8475 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 8476 err = resolve_map_arg_type(env, meta, &arg_type); 8477 if (err) 8478 return err; 8479 } 8480 8481 if (register_is_null(reg) && type_may_be_null(arg_type)) 8482 /* A NULL register has a SCALAR_VALUE type, so skip 8483 * type checking. 8484 */ 8485 goto skip_type_check; 8486 8487 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 8488 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 8489 base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 8490 arg_btf_id = fn->arg_btf_id[arg]; 8491 8492 err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, arg_btf_id, meta); 8493 if (err) 8494 return err; 8495 8496 err = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 8497 if (err) 8498 return err; 8499 8500 skip_type_check: 8501 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) { 8502 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type)) { 8503 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 8504 int spi; 8505 8506 /* Only dynptr created on stack can be released, thus 8507 * the get_spi and stack state checks for spilled_ptr 8508 * should only be done before process_dynptr_func for 8509 * PTR_TO_STACK. 8510 */ 8511 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 8512 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 8513 if (spi < 0 || !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id) { 8514 verbose(env, "arg %d is an unacquired reference\n", regno); 8515 return -EINVAL; 8516 } 8517 } else { 8518 verbose(env, "cannot release unowned const bpf_dynptr\n"); 8519 return -EINVAL; 8520 } 8521 } else if (!reg->ref_obj_id && !register_is_null(reg)) { 8522 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced when passed to release function\n", 8523 regno); 8524 return -EINVAL; 8525 } 8526 if (meta->release_regno) { 8527 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one release argument\n"); 8528 return -EFAULT; 8529 } 8530 meta->release_regno = regno; 8531 } 8532 8533 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 8534 if (meta->ref_obj_id) { 8535 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", 8536 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 8537 meta->ref_obj_id); 8538 return -EFAULT; 8539 } 8540 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 8541 } 8542 8543 switch (base_type(arg_type)) { 8544 case ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR: 8545 /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */ 8546 if (meta->map_ptr) { 8547 /* Use map_uid (which is unique id of inner map) to reject: 8548 * inner_map1 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key1) 8549 * inner_map2 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key2) 8550 * if (inner_map1 && inner_map2) { 8551 * timer = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner_map1); 8552 * if (timer) 8553 * // mismatch would have been allowed 8554 * bpf_timer_init(timer, inner_map2); 8555 * } 8556 * 8557 * Comparing map_ptr is enough to distinguish normal and outer maps. 8558 */ 8559 if (meta->map_ptr != reg->map_ptr || 8560 meta->map_uid != reg->map_uid) { 8561 verbose(env, 8562 "timer pointer in R1 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R2 map_uid=%d\n", 8563 meta->map_uid, reg->map_uid); 8564 return -EINVAL; 8565 } 8566 } 8567 meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 8568 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 8569 break; 8570 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 8571 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call: 8572 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within 8573 * stack limits and initialized 8574 */ 8575 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 8576 /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before 8577 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before 8578 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means 8579 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier 8580 */ 8581 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); 8582 return -EACCES; 8583 } 8584 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 8585 meta->map_ptr->key_size, false, 8586 NULL); 8587 break; 8588 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 8589 if (type_may_be_null(arg_type) && register_is_null(reg)) 8590 return 0; 8591 8592 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call: 8593 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity 8594 */ 8595 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 8596 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 8597 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); 8598 return -EACCES; 8599 } 8600 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 8601 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 8602 meta->map_ptr->value_size, false, 8603 meta); 8604 break; 8605 case ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID: 8606 if (!reg->btf_id) { 8607 verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno); 8608 return -EACCES; 8609 } 8610 meta->ret_btf = reg->btf; 8611 meta->ret_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 8612 break; 8613 case ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK: 8614 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) { 8615 verbose(env, "can't spin_{lock,unlock} in rbtree cb\n"); 8616 return -EACCES; 8617 } 8618 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) { 8619 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, true); 8620 if (err) 8621 return err; 8622 } else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) { 8623 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, false); 8624 if (err) 8625 return err; 8626 } else { 8627 verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n"); 8628 return -EFAULT; 8629 } 8630 break; 8631 case ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER: 8632 err = process_timer_func(env, regno, meta); 8633 if (err) 8634 return err; 8635 break; 8636 case ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC: 8637 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; 8638 break; 8639 case ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 8640 /* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the 8641 * next is_mem_size argument below. 8642 */ 8643 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 8644 if (arg_type & MEM_FIXED_SIZE) { 8645 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, fn->arg_size[arg], false, meta); 8646 if (err) 8647 return err; 8648 if (arg_type & MEM_ALIGNED) 8649 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, fn->arg_size[arg], true); 8650 } 8651 break; 8652 case ARG_CONST_SIZE: 8653 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, false, meta); 8654 break; 8655 case ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 8656 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, meta); 8657 break; 8658 case ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 8659 err = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx, arg_type, 0); 8660 if (err) 8661 return err; 8662 break; 8663 case ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 8664 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8665 verbose(env, "R%d is not a known constant'\n", 8666 regno); 8667 return -EACCES; 8668 } 8669 meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value; 8670 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 8671 if (err) 8672 return err; 8673 break; 8674 case ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR: 8675 { 8676 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 8677 int map_off; 8678 u64 map_addr; 8679 char *str_ptr; 8680 8681 if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) { 8682 verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno); 8683 return -EACCES; 8684 } 8685 8686 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8687 verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno); 8688 return -EACCES; 8689 } 8690 8691 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 8692 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 8693 return -EACCES; 8694 } 8695 8696 err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, 8697 map->value_size - reg->off, false, 8698 ACCESS_HELPER); 8699 if (err) 8700 return err; 8701 8702 map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 8703 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off); 8704 if (err) { 8705 verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n"); 8706 return err; 8707 } 8708 8709 str_ptr = (char *)(long)(map_addr); 8710 if (!strnchr(str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off, 0)) { 8711 verbose(env, "string is not zero-terminated\n"); 8712 return -EINVAL; 8713 } 8714 break; 8715 } 8716 case ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR: 8717 err = process_kptr_func(env, regno, meta); 8718 if (err) 8719 return err; 8720 break; 8721 } 8722 8723 return err; 8724 } 8725 8726 static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id) 8727 { 8728 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type; 8729 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 8730 8731 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && 8732 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem) 8733 return false; 8734 8735 /* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these 8736 * contexts, so updating is safe. 8737 */ 8738 switch (type) { 8739 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 8740 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER) 8741 return true; 8742 break; 8743 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: 8744 /* map_update allowed only via dedicated helpers with event type checks */ 8745 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem) 8746 return true; 8747 break; 8748 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 8749 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 8750 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 8751 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 8752 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 8753 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 8754 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 8755 return true; 8756 default: 8757 break; 8758 } 8759 8760 verbose(env, "cannot update sockmap in this context\n"); 8761 return false; 8762 } 8763 8764 static bool allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 8765 { 8766 return env->prog->jit_requested && 8767 bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(); 8768 } 8769 8770 static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8771 struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) 8772 { 8773 if (!map) 8774 return 0; 8775 8776 /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */ 8777 switch (map->map_type) { 8778 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY: 8779 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 8780 goto error; 8781 break; 8782 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY: 8783 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read && 8784 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output && 8785 func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_output && 8786 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value && 8787 func_id != BPF_FUNC_xdp_output) 8788 goto error; 8789 break; 8790 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 8791 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output && 8792 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve && 8793 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query && 8794 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr && 8795 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr && 8796 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr) 8797 goto error; 8798 break; 8799 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 8800 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain) 8801 goto error; 8802 break; 8803 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE: 8804 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid) 8805 goto error; 8806 break; 8807 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: 8808 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup && 8809 func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup) 8810 goto error; 8811 break; 8812 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE: 8813 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE: 8814 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage) 8815 goto error; 8816 break; 8817 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP: 8818 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH: 8819 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 8820 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 8821 goto error; 8822 break; 8823 /* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases 8824 * appear. 8825 */ 8826 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP: 8827 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) 8828 goto error; 8829 break; 8830 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP: 8831 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 8832 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 8833 goto error; 8834 break; 8835 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 8836 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 8837 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 8838 goto error; 8839 break; 8840 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 8841 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map && 8842 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update && 8843 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map && 8844 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 8845 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 8846 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 8847 goto error; 8848 break; 8849 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 8850 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash && 8851 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update && 8852 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash && 8853 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 8854 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 8855 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 8856 goto error; 8857 break; 8858 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY: 8859 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport) 8860 goto error; 8861 break; 8862 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE: 8863 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK: 8864 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 8865 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 8866 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 8867 goto error; 8868 break; 8869 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 8870 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get && 8871 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete && 8872 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 8873 goto error; 8874 break; 8875 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 8876 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get && 8877 func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete && 8878 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 8879 goto error; 8880 break; 8881 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 8882 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get && 8883 func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete && 8884 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 8885 goto error; 8886 break; 8887 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE: 8888 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get && 8889 func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete && 8890 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 8891 goto error; 8892 break; 8893 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 8894 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 8895 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 8896 goto error; 8897 break; 8898 default: 8899 break; 8900 } 8901 8902 /* ... and second from the function itself. */ 8903 switch (func_id) { 8904 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 8905 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) 8906 goto error; 8907 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && !allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) { 8908 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 8909 return -EINVAL; 8910 } 8911 break; 8912 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read: 8913 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: 8914 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value: 8915 case BPF_FUNC_skb_output: 8916 case BPF_FUNC_xdp_output: 8917 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY) 8918 goto error; 8919 break; 8920 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output: 8921 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve: 8922 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query: 8923 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr: 8924 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr: 8925 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr: 8926 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF) 8927 goto error; 8928 break; 8929 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 8930 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF) 8931 goto error; 8932 break; 8933 case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid: 8934 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE) 8935 goto error; 8936 break; 8937 case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup: 8938 case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: 8939 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY) 8940 goto error; 8941 break; 8942 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 8943 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP && 8944 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH && 8945 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP && 8946 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) 8947 goto error; 8948 break; 8949 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map: 8950 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map: 8951 case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update: 8952 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP) 8953 goto error; 8954 break; 8955 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash: 8956 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash: 8957 case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update: 8958 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 8959 goto error; 8960 break; 8961 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 8962 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE && 8963 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE) 8964 goto error; 8965 break; 8966 case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport: 8967 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY && 8968 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP && 8969 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 8970 goto error; 8971 break; 8972 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 8973 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 8974 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK) 8975 goto error; 8976 break; 8977 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 8978 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 8979 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 8980 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK && 8981 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER) 8982 goto error; 8983 break; 8984 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 8985 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY && 8986 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH && 8987 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH) 8988 goto error; 8989 break; 8990 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get: 8991 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete: 8992 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE) 8993 goto error; 8994 break; 8995 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get: 8996 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete: 8997 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) 8998 goto error; 8999 break; 9000 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get: 9001 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete: 9002 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE) 9003 goto error; 9004 break; 9005 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get: 9006 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete: 9007 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE) 9008 goto error; 9009 break; 9010 default: 9011 break; 9012 } 9013 9014 return 0; 9015 error: 9016 verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n", 9017 map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 9018 return -EINVAL; 9019 } 9020 9021 static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 9022 { 9023 int count = 0; 9024 9025 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg1_type)) 9026 count++; 9027 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg2_type)) 9028 count++; 9029 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg3_type)) 9030 count++; 9031 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg4_type)) 9032 count++; 9033 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg5_type)) 9034 count++; 9035 9036 /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, 9037 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have 9038 * right now. 9039 */ 9040 return count <= 1; 9041 } 9042 9043 static bool check_args_pair_invalid(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int arg) 9044 { 9045 bool is_fixed = fn->arg_type[arg] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE; 9046 bool has_size = fn->arg_size[arg] != 0; 9047 bool is_next_size = false; 9048 9049 if (arg + 1 < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type)) 9050 is_next_size = arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg_type[arg + 1]); 9051 9052 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[arg]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) 9053 return is_next_size; 9054 9055 return has_size == is_next_size || is_next_size == is_fixed; 9056 } 9057 9058 static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 9059 { 9060 /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' 9061 * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need 9062 * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy 9063 * helper function specification. 9064 */ 9065 if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) || 9066 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 0) || 9067 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 1) || 9068 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 2) || 9069 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 3) || 9070 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 4)) 9071 return false; 9072 9073 return true; 9074 } 9075 9076 static bool check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 9077 { 9078 int i; 9079 9080 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) { 9081 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 9082 return !!fn->arg_btf_id[i]; 9083 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 9084 return fn->arg_btf_id[i] == BPF_PTR_POISON; 9085 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && fn->arg_btf_id[i] && 9086 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 9087 (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM || 9088 !(fn->arg_type[i] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE))) 9089 return false; 9090 } 9091 9092 return true; 9093 } 9094 9095 static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id) 9096 { 9097 return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) && 9098 check_arg_pair_ok(fn) && 9099 check_btf_id_ok(fn) ? 0 : -EINVAL; 9100 } 9101 9102 /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] 9103 * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE. 9104 * 9105 * This also applies to dynptr slices belonging to skb and xdp dynptrs, 9106 * since these slices point to packet data. 9107 */ 9108 static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9109 { 9110 struct bpf_func_state *state; 9111 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 9112 9113 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 9114 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg) || reg_is_dynptr_slice_pkt(reg)) 9115 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 9116 })); 9117 } 9118 9119 enum { 9120 AT_PKT_END = -1, 9121 BEYOND_PKT_END = -2, 9122 }; 9123 9124 static void mark_pkt_end(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, int regn, bool range_open) 9125 { 9126 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 9127 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regn]; 9128 9129 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET) 9130 /* PTR_TO_PACKET_META is not supported yet */ 9131 return; 9132 9133 /* The 'reg' is pkt > pkt_end or pkt >= pkt_end. 9134 * How far beyond pkt_end it goes is unknown. 9135 * if (!range_open) it's the case of pkt >= pkt_end 9136 * if (range_open) it's the case of pkt > pkt_end 9137 * hence this pointer is at least 1 byte bigger than pkt_end 9138 */ 9139 if (range_open) 9140 reg->range = BEYOND_PKT_END; 9141 else 9142 reg->range = AT_PKT_END; 9143 } 9144 9145 /* The pointer with the specified id has released its reference to kernel 9146 * resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference. 9147 */ 9148 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9149 int ref_obj_id) 9150 { 9151 struct bpf_func_state *state; 9152 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 9153 int err; 9154 9155 err = release_reference_state(cur_func(env), ref_obj_id); 9156 if (err) 9157 return err; 9158 9159 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 9160 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) 9161 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 9162 })); 9163 9164 return 0; 9165 } 9166 9167 static void invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9168 { 9169 struct bpf_func_state *unused; 9170 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 9171 9172 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, unused, reg, ({ 9173 if (type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) 9174 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 9175 })); 9176 } 9177 9178 static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9179 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 9180 { 9181 int i; 9182 9183 /* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */ 9184 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 9185 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 9186 __check_reg_arg(env, regs, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 9187 } 9188 } 9189 9190 typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9191 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9192 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 9193 int insn_idx); 9194 9195 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9196 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9197 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx); 9198 9199 static int setup_func_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog, int callsite, 9200 set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb, 9201 struct bpf_verifier_state *state) 9202 { 9203 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 9204 int err; 9205 9206 if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 9207 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n", 9208 state->curframe + 2); 9209 return -E2BIG; 9210 } 9211 9212 if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) { 9213 verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n", 9214 state->curframe + 1); 9215 return -EFAULT; 9216 } 9217 9218 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 9219 callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL); 9220 if (!callee) 9221 return -ENOMEM; 9222 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee; 9223 9224 /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write 9225 * into its own stack before reading from it. 9226 * callee can read/write into caller's stack 9227 */ 9228 init_func_state(env, callee, 9229 /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */ 9230 callsite, 9231 state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */, 9232 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 9233 /* Transfer references to the callee */ 9234 err = copy_reference_state(callee, caller); 9235 err = err ?: set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, callsite); 9236 if (err) 9237 goto err_out; 9238 9239 /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */ 9240 state->curframe++; 9241 9242 return 0; 9243 9244 err_out: 9245 free_func_state(callee); 9246 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; 9247 return err; 9248 } 9249 9250 static int push_callback_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 9251 int insn_idx, int subprog, 9252 set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb) 9253 { 9254 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state, *callback_state; 9255 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 9256 int err; 9257 9258 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 9259 err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs); 9260 if (err == -EFAULT) 9261 return err; 9262 9263 /* set_callee_state is used for direct subprog calls, but we are 9264 * interested in validating only BPF helpers that can call subprogs as 9265 * callbacks 9266 */ 9267 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && 9268 !is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)) { 9269 verbose(env, "verifier bug: kfunc %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n", 9270 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 9271 return -EFAULT; 9272 } else if (!bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && 9273 !is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) { /* helper */ 9274 verbose(env, "verifier bug: helper %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n", 9275 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 9276 return -EFAULT; 9277 } 9278 9279 if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 9280 insn->src_reg == 0 && 9281 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { 9282 struct bpf_verifier_state *async_cb; 9283 9284 /* there is no real recursion here. timer callbacks are async */ 9285 env->subprog_info[subprog].is_async_cb = true; 9286 async_cb = push_async_cb(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, 9287 insn_idx, subprog); 9288 if (!async_cb) 9289 return -EFAULT; 9290 callee = async_cb->frame[0]; 9291 callee->async_entry_cnt = caller->async_entry_cnt + 1; 9292 9293 /* Convert bpf_timer_set_callback() args into timer callback args */ 9294 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, insn_idx); 9295 if (err) 9296 return err; 9297 9298 return 0; 9299 } 9300 9301 /* for callback functions enqueue entry to callback and 9302 * proceed with next instruction within current frame. 9303 */ 9304 callback_state = push_stack(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, insn_idx, false); 9305 if (!callback_state) 9306 return -ENOMEM; 9307 9308 err = setup_func_entry(env, subprog, insn_idx, set_callee_state_cb, 9309 callback_state); 9310 if (err) 9311 return err; 9312 9313 callback_state->callback_unroll_depth++; 9314 callback_state->frame[callback_state->curframe - 1]->callback_depth++; 9315 caller->callback_depth = 0; 9316 return 0; 9317 } 9318 9319 static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 9320 int *insn_idx) 9321 { 9322 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 9323 struct bpf_func_state *caller; 9324 int err, subprog, target_insn; 9325 9326 target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1; 9327 subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn); 9328 if (subprog < 0) { 9329 verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", target_insn); 9330 return -EFAULT; 9331 } 9332 9333 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 9334 err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs); 9335 if (err == -EFAULT) 9336 return err; 9337 if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) { 9338 if (err) { 9339 verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n", subprog); 9340 return err; 9341 } 9342 9343 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 9344 verbose(env, "Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n", subprog); 9345 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 9346 9347 /* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */ 9348 mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); 9349 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 9350 9351 /* continue with next insn after call */ 9352 return 0; 9353 } 9354 9355 /* for regular function entry setup new frame and continue 9356 * from that frame. 9357 */ 9358 err = setup_func_entry(env, subprog, *insn_idx, set_callee_state, state); 9359 if (err) 9360 return err; 9361 9362 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 9363 9364 /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */ 9365 *insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1; 9366 9367 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 9368 verbose(env, "caller:\n"); 9369 print_verifier_state(env, caller, true); 9370 verbose(env, "callee:\n"); 9371 print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe], true); 9372 } 9373 9374 return 0; 9375 } 9376 9377 int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9378 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9379 struct bpf_func_state *callee) 9380 { 9381 /* bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, 9382 * void *callback_ctx, u64 flags); 9383 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 9384 * void *callback_ctx); 9385 */ 9386 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 9387 9388 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 9389 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 9390 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 9391 9392 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 9393 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 9394 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 9395 9396 /* pointer to stack or null */ 9397 callee->regs[BPF_REG_4] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 9398 9399 /* unused */ 9400 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 9401 return 0; 9402 } 9403 9404 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9405 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9406 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx) 9407 { 9408 int i; 9409 9410 /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access. The copy includes parent 9411 * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain 9412 */ 9413 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 9414 callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i]; 9415 return 0; 9416 } 9417 9418 static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9419 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9420 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 9421 int insn_idx) 9422 { 9423 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 9424 struct bpf_map *map; 9425 int err; 9426 9427 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(insn_aux)) { 9428 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 9429 return -EINVAL; 9430 } 9431 9432 map = BPF_MAP_PTR(insn_aux->map_ptr_state); 9433 if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args || 9434 !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) { 9435 verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n"); 9436 return -ENOTSUPP; 9437 } 9438 9439 err = map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args(env, caller, callee); 9440 if (err) 9441 return err; 9442 9443 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 9444 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 9445 return 0; 9446 } 9447 9448 static int set_loop_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9449 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9450 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 9451 int insn_idx) 9452 { 9453 /* bpf_loop(u32 nr_loops, void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, 9454 * u64 flags); 9455 * callback_fn(u32 index, void *callback_ctx); 9456 */ 9457 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 9458 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 9459 9460 /* unused */ 9461 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 9462 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 9463 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 9464 9465 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 9466 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 9467 return 0; 9468 } 9469 9470 static int set_timer_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9471 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9472 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 9473 int insn_idx) 9474 { 9475 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 9476 9477 /* bpf_timer_set_callback(struct bpf_timer *timer, void *callback_fn); 9478 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value); 9479 */ 9480 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 9481 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 9482 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr = map_ptr; 9483 9484 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 9485 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 9486 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = map_ptr; 9487 9488 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 9489 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 9490 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = map_ptr; 9491 9492 /* unused */ 9493 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 9494 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 9495 callee->in_async_callback_fn = true; 9496 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 9497 return 0; 9498 } 9499 9500 static int set_find_vma_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9501 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9502 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 9503 int insn_idx) 9504 { 9505 /* bpf_find_vma(struct task_struct *task, u64 addr, 9506 * void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, u64 flags) 9507 * (callback_fn)(struct task_struct *task, 9508 * struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *callback_ctx); 9509 */ 9510 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 9511 9512 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 9513 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 9514 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf = btf_vmlinux; 9515 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf_id = btf_tracing_ids[BTF_TRACING_TYPE_VMA], 9516 9517 /* pointer to stack or null */ 9518 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_4]; 9519 9520 /* unused */ 9521 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 9522 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 9523 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 9524 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 9525 return 0; 9526 } 9527 9528 static int set_user_ringbuf_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9529 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9530 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 9531 int insn_idx) 9532 { 9533 /* bpf_user_ringbuf_drain(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, void 9534 * callback_ctx, u64 flags); 9535 * callback_fn(const struct bpf_dynptr_t* dynptr, void *callback_ctx); 9536 */ 9537 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 9538 mark_dynptr_cb_reg(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_1], BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL); 9539 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 9540 9541 /* unused */ 9542 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 9543 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 9544 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 9545 9546 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 9547 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 9548 return 0; 9549 } 9550 9551 static int set_rbtree_add_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9552 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9553 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 9554 int insn_idx) 9555 { 9556 /* void bpf_rbtree_add_impl(struct bpf_rb_root *root, struct bpf_rb_node *node, 9557 * bool (less)(struct bpf_rb_node *a, const struct bpf_rb_node *b)); 9558 * 9559 * 'struct bpf_rb_node *node' arg to bpf_rbtree_add_impl is the same PTR_TO_BTF_ID w/ offset 9560 * that 'less' callback args will be receiving. However, 'node' arg was release_reference'd 9561 * by this point, so look at 'root' 9562 */ 9563 struct btf_field *field; 9564 9565 field = reg_find_field_offset(&caller->regs[BPF_REG_1], caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].off, 9566 BPF_RB_ROOT); 9567 if (!field || !field->graph_root.value_btf_id) 9568 return -EFAULT; 9569 9570 mark_reg_graph_node(callee->regs, BPF_REG_1, &field->graph_root); 9571 ref_set_non_owning(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 9572 mark_reg_graph_node(callee->regs, BPF_REG_2, &field->graph_root); 9573 ref_set_non_owning(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 9574 9575 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 9576 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 9577 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 9578 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 9579 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 9580 return 0; 9581 } 9582 9583 static bool is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 9584 9585 /* Are we currently verifying the callback for a rbtree helper that must 9586 * be called with lock held? If so, no need to complain about unreleased 9587 * lock 9588 */ 9589 static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9590 { 9591 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 9592 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 9593 struct bpf_func_state *callee; 9594 int kfunc_btf_id; 9595 9596 if (!state->curframe) 9597 return false; 9598 9599 callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; 9600 9601 if (!callee->in_callback_fn) 9602 return false; 9603 9604 kfunc_btf_id = insn[callee->callsite].imm; 9605 return is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id); 9606 } 9607 9608 static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) 9609 { 9610 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state, *prev_st; 9611 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 9612 struct bpf_reg_state *r0; 9613 bool in_callback_fn; 9614 int err; 9615 9616 callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; 9617 r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]; 9618 if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 9619 /* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer 9620 * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller, 9621 * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack 9622 * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits, 9623 * but let's be conservative 9624 */ 9625 verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n"); 9626 return -EINVAL; 9627 } 9628 9629 caller = state->frame[state->curframe - 1]; 9630 if (callee->in_callback_fn) { 9631 /* enforce R0 return value range [0, 1]. */ 9632 struct tnum range = callee->callback_ret_range; 9633 9634 if (r0->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 9635 verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n"); 9636 return -EACCES; 9637 } 9638 9639 /* we are going to rely on register's precise value */ 9640 err = mark_reg_read(env, r0, r0->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 9641 err = err ?: mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_0); 9642 if (err) 9643 return err; 9644 9645 if (!tnum_in(range, r0->var_off)) { 9646 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, &range, "callback return", "R0"); 9647 return -EINVAL; 9648 } 9649 if (!calls_callback(env, callee->callsite)) { 9650 verbose(env, "BUG: in callback at %d, callsite %d !calls_callback\n", 9651 *insn_idx, callee->callsite); 9652 return -EFAULT; 9653 } 9654 } else { 9655 /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */ 9656 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; 9657 } 9658 9659 /* callback_fn frame should have released its own additions to parent's 9660 * reference state at this point, or check_reference_leak would 9661 * complain, hence it must be the same as the caller. There is no need 9662 * to copy it back. 9663 */ 9664 if (!callee->in_callback_fn) { 9665 /* Transfer references to the caller */ 9666 err = copy_reference_state(caller, callee); 9667 if (err) 9668 return err; 9669 } 9670 9671 /* for callbacks like bpf_loop or bpf_for_each_map_elem go back to callsite, 9672 * there function call logic would reschedule callback visit. If iteration 9673 * converges is_state_visited() would prune that visit eventually. 9674 */ 9675 in_callback_fn = callee->in_callback_fn; 9676 if (in_callback_fn) 9677 *insn_idx = callee->callsite; 9678 else 9679 *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; 9680 9681 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 9682 verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n"); 9683 print_verifier_state(env, callee, true); 9684 verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx); 9685 print_verifier_state(env, caller, true); 9686 } 9687 /* clear everything in the callee */ 9688 free_func_state(callee); 9689 state->frame[state->curframe--] = NULL; 9690 9691 /* for callbacks widen imprecise scalars to make programs like below verify: 9692 * 9693 * struct ctx { int i; } 9694 * void cb(int idx, struct ctx *ctx) { ctx->i++; ... } 9695 * ... 9696 * struct ctx = { .i = 0; } 9697 * bpf_loop(100, cb, &ctx, 0); 9698 * 9699 * This is similar to what is done in process_iter_next_call() for open 9700 * coded iterators. 9701 */ 9702 prev_st = in_callback_fn ? find_prev_entry(env, state, *insn_idx) : NULL; 9703 if (prev_st) { 9704 err = widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, state); 9705 if (err) 9706 return err; 9707 } 9708 return 0; 9709 } 9710 9711 static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, 9712 int func_id, 9713 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 9714 { 9715 struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0]; 9716 9717 if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER) 9718 return; 9719 9720 switch (func_id) { 9721 case BPF_FUNC_get_stack: 9722 case BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack: 9723 case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str: 9724 case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str: 9725 case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str: 9726 ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value; 9727 ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value; 9728 ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 9729 ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 9730 reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg); 9731 break; 9732 case BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id: 9733 ret_reg->umax_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 9734 ret_reg->u32_max_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 9735 ret_reg->smax_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 9736 ret_reg->s32_max_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 9737 ret_reg->umin_value = 0; 9738 ret_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 9739 ret_reg->smin_value = 0; 9740 ret_reg->s32_min_value = 0; 9741 reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg); 9742 break; 9743 } 9744 } 9745 9746 static int 9747 record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 9748 int func_id, int insn_idx) 9749 { 9750 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 9751 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 9752 9753 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call && 9754 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 9755 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && 9756 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 9757 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem && 9758 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 9759 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 9760 func_id != BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem && 9761 func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 9762 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem) 9763 return 0; 9764 9765 if (map == NULL) { 9766 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 9767 return -EINVAL; 9768 } 9769 9770 /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions 9771 * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the 9772 * state of the map from program side. 9773 */ 9774 if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 9775 (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 9776 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 9777 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 9778 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) { 9779 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n"); 9780 return -EACCES; 9781 } 9782 9783 if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state)) 9784 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, 9785 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 9786 else if (BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) != meta->map_ptr) 9787 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON, 9788 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 9789 return 0; 9790 } 9791 9792 static int 9793 record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 9794 int func_id, int insn_idx) 9795 { 9796 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 9797 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg; 9798 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 9799 u64 val, max; 9800 int err; 9801 9802 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 9803 return 0; 9804 if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) { 9805 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 9806 return -EINVAL; 9807 } 9808 9809 reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 9810 val = reg->var_off.value; 9811 max = map->max_entries; 9812 9813 if (!(register_is_const(reg) && val < max)) { 9814 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 9815 return 0; 9816 } 9817 9818 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3); 9819 if (err) 9820 return err; 9821 if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux)) 9822 bpf_map_key_store(aux, val); 9823 else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 9824 bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val) 9825 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 9826 return 0; 9827 } 9828 9829 static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9830 { 9831 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 9832 bool refs_lingering = false; 9833 int i; 9834 9835 if (state->frameno && !state->in_callback_fn) 9836 return 0; 9837 9838 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 9839 if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno) 9840 continue; 9841 verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n", 9842 state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx); 9843 refs_lingering = true; 9844 } 9845 return refs_lingering ? -EINVAL : 0; 9846 } 9847 9848 static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9849 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 9850 { 9851 struct bpf_reg_state *fmt_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 9852 struct bpf_reg_state *data_len_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_5]; 9853 struct bpf_map *fmt_map = fmt_reg->map_ptr; 9854 struct bpf_bprintf_data data = {}; 9855 int err, fmt_map_off, num_args; 9856 u64 fmt_addr; 9857 char *fmt; 9858 9859 /* data must be an array of u64 */ 9860 if (data_len_reg->var_off.value % 8) 9861 return -EINVAL; 9862 num_args = data_len_reg->var_off.value / 8; 9863 9864 /* fmt being ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR guarantees that var_off is const 9865 * and map_direct_value_addr is set. 9866 */ 9867 fmt_map_off = fmt_reg->off + fmt_reg->var_off.value; 9868 err = fmt_map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(fmt_map, &fmt_addr, 9869 fmt_map_off); 9870 if (err) { 9871 verbose(env, "verifier bug\n"); 9872 return -EFAULT; 9873 } 9874 fmt = (char *)(long)fmt_addr + fmt_map_off; 9875 9876 /* We are also guaranteed that fmt+fmt_map_off is NULL terminated, we 9877 * can focus on validating the format specifiers. 9878 */ 9879 err = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, num_args, &data); 9880 if (err < 0) 9881 verbose(env, "Invalid format string\n"); 9882 9883 return err; 9884 } 9885 9886 static int check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9887 { 9888 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 9889 int func_id = BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip; 9890 9891 if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) { 9892 if (!bpf_prog_has_trampoline(env->prog)) { 9893 verbose(env, "func %s#%d supported only for fentry/fexit/fmod_ret programs\n", 9894 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 9895 return -ENOTSUPP; 9896 } 9897 return 0; 9898 } else if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) { 9899 return 0; 9900 } 9901 9902 verbose(env, "func %s#%d not supported for program type %d\n", 9903 func_id_name(func_id), func_id, type); 9904 return -ENOTSUPP; 9905 } 9906 9907 static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9908 { 9909 return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]; 9910 } 9911 9912 static bool loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9913 { 9914 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 9915 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[BPF_REG_4]; 9916 bool reg_is_null = register_is_null(reg); 9917 9918 if (reg_is_null) 9919 mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_4); 9920 9921 return reg_is_null; 9922 } 9923 9924 static void update_loop_inline_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 subprogno) 9925 { 9926 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *state = &cur_aux(env)->loop_inline_state; 9927 9928 if (!state->initialized) { 9929 state->initialized = 1; 9930 state->fit_for_inline = loop_flag_is_zero(env); 9931 state->callback_subprogno = subprogno; 9932 return; 9933 } 9934 9935 if (!state->fit_for_inline) 9936 return; 9937 9938 state->fit_for_inline = (loop_flag_is_zero(env) && 9939 state->callback_subprogno == subprogno); 9940 } 9941 9942 static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 9943 int *insn_idx_p) 9944 { 9945 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 9946 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL; 9947 enum bpf_return_type ret_type; 9948 enum bpf_type_flag ret_flag; 9949 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 9950 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 9951 int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 9952 bool changes_data; 9953 int i, err, func_id; 9954 9955 /* find function prototype */ 9956 func_id = insn->imm; 9957 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) { 9958 verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 9959 func_id); 9960 return -EINVAL; 9961 } 9962 9963 if (env->ops->get_func_proto) 9964 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog); 9965 if (!fn) { 9966 verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 9967 func_id); 9968 return -EINVAL; 9969 } 9970 9971 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */ 9972 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) { 9973 verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 9974 return -EINVAL; 9975 } 9976 9977 if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) { 9978 verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n"); 9979 return -EINVAL; 9980 } 9981 9982 if (!env->prog->aux->sleepable && fn->might_sleep) { 9983 verbose(env, "helper call might sleep in a non-sleepable prog\n"); 9984 return -EINVAL; 9985 } 9986 9987 /* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */ 9988 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func); 9989 if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { 9990 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n", 9991 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 9992 return -EINVAL; 9993 } 9994 9995 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 9996 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access; 9997 9998 err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id); 9999 if (err) { 10000 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 10001 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 10002 return err; 10003 } 10004 10005 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 10006 if (fn->might_sleep) { 10007 verbose(env, "sleepable helper %s#%d in rcu_read_lock region\n", 10008 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 10009 return -EINVAL; 10010 } 10011 10012 if (env->prog->aux->sleepable && is_storage_get_function(func_id)) 10013 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].storage_get_func_atomic = true; 10014 } 10015 10016 meta.func_id = func_id; 10017 /* check args */ 10018 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) { 10019 err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn, insn_idx); 10020 if (err) 10021 return err; 10022 } 10023 10024 err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 10025 if (err) 10026 return err; 10027 10028 err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 10029 if (err) 10030 return err; 10031 10032 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset 10033 * is inferred from register state. 10034 */ 10035 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) { 10036 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, 10037 BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 10038 if (err) 10039 return err; 10040 } 10041 10042 regs = cur_regs(env); 10043 10044 if (meta.release_regno) { 10045 err = -EINVAL; 10046 /* This can only be set for PTR_TO_STACK, as CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot 10047 * be released by any dynptr helper. Hence, unmark_stack_slots_dynptr 10048 * is safe to do directly. 10049 */ 10050 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno - BPF_REG_1])) { 10051 if (regs[meta.release_regno].type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 10052 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot be released\n"); 10053 return -EFAULT; 10054 } 10055 err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, ®s[meta.release_regno]); 10056 } else if (meta.ref_obj_id) { 10057 err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id); 10058 } else if (register_is_null(®s[meta.release_regno])) { 10059 /* meta.ref_obj_id can only be 0 if register that is meant to be 10060 * released is NULL, which must be > R0. 10061 */ 10062 err = 0; 10063 } 10064 if (err) { 10065 verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 10066 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 10067 return err; 10068 } 10069 } 10070 10071 switch (func_id) { 10072 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 10073 err = check_reference_leak(env); 10074 if (err) { 10075 verbose(env, "tail_call would lead to reference leak\n"); 10076 return err; 10077 } 10078 break; 10079 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 10080 /* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0, 10081 * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error. 10082 */ 10083 if (!register_is_null(®s[BPF_REG_2])) { 10084 verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n"); 10085 return -EINVAL; 10086 } 10087 break; 10088 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 10089 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 10090 set_map_elem_callback_state); 10091 break; 10092 case BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback: 10093 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 10094 set_timer_callback_state); 10095 break; 10096 case BPF_FUNC_find_vma: 10097 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 10098 set_find_vma_callback_state); 10099 break; 10100 case BPF_FUNC_snprintf: 10101 err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs); 10102 break; 10103 case BPF_FUNC_loop: 10104 update_loop_inline_state(env, meta.subprogno); 10105 /* Verifier relies on R1 value to determine if bpf_loop() iteration 10106 * is finished, thus mark it precise. 10107 */ 10108 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_1); 10109 if (err) 10110 return err; 10111 if (cur_func(env)->callback_depth < regs[BPF_REG_1].umax_value) { 10112 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 10113 set_loop_callback_state); 10114 } else { 10115 cur_func(env)->callback_depth = 0; 10116 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 10117 verbose(env, "frame%d bpf_loop iteration limit reached\n", 10118 env->cur_state->curframe); 10119 } 10120 break; 10121 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_from_mem: 10122 if (regs[BPF_REG_1].type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 10123 verbose(env, "Unsupported reg type %s for bpf_dynptr_from_mem data\n", 10124 reg_type_str(env, regs[BPF_REG_1].type)); 10125 return -EACCES; 10126 } 10127 break; 10128 case BPF_FUNC_set_retval: 10129 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 10130 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 10131 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 10132 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 10133 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 10134 */ 10135 verbose(env, "BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 10136 return -EINVAL; 10137 } 10138 } 10139 break; 10140 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data: 10141 { 10142 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 10143 int id, ref_obj_id; 10144 10145 reg = get_dynptr_arg_reg(env, fn, regs); 10146 if (!reg) 10147 return -EFAULT; 10148 10149 10150 if (meta.dynptr_id) { 10151 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: meta.dynptr_id already set\n"); 10152 return -EFAULT; 10153 } 10154 if (meta.ref_obj_id) { 10155 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: meta.ref_obj_id already set\n"); 10156 return -EFAULT; 10157 } 10158 10159 id = dynptr_id(env, reg); 10160 if (id < 0) { 10161 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr id\n"); 10162 return id; 10163 } 10164 10165 ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg); 10166 if (ref_obj_id < 0) { 10167 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr ref_obj_id\n"); 10168 return ref_obj_id; 10169 } 10170 10171 meta.dynptr_id = id; 10172 meta.ref_obj_id = ref_obj_id; 10173 10174 break; 10175 } 10176 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_write: 10177 { 10178 enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type; 10179 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 10180 10181 reg = get_dynptr_arg_reg(env, fn, regs); 10182 if (!reg) 10183 return -EFAULT; 10184 10185 dynptr_type = dynptr_get_type(env, reg); 10186 if (dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) 10187 return -EFAULT; 10188 10189 if (dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB) 10190 /* this will trigger clear_all_pkt_pointers(), which will 10191 * invalidate all dynptr slices associated with the skb 10192 */ 10193 changes_data = true; 10194 10195 break; 10196 } 10197 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 10198 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 10199 set_user_ringbuf_callback_state); 10200 break; 10201 } 10202 10203 if (err) 10204 return err; 10205 10206 /* reset caller saved regs */ 10207 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 10208 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 10209 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 10210 } 10211 10212 /* helper call returns 64-bit value. */ 10213 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 10214 10215 /* update return register (already marked as written above) */ 10216 ret_type = fn->ret_type; 10217 ret_flag = type_flag(ret_type); 10218 10219 switch (base_type(ret_type)) { 10220 case RET_INTEGER: 10221 /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */ 10222 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10223 break; 10224 case RET_VOID: 10225 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT; 10226 break; 10227 case RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 10228 /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */ 10229 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10230 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access() 10231 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access 10232 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() 10233 */ 10234 if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { 10235 verbose(env, 10236 "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 10237 return -EINVAL; 10238 } 10239 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; 10240 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_uid = meta.map_uid; 10241 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | ret_flag; 10242 if (!type_may_be_null(ret_type) && 10243 btf_record_has_field(meta.map_ptr->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 10244 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 10245 } 10246 break; 10247 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET: 10248 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10249 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET | ret_flag; 10250 break; 10251 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 10252 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10253 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON | ret_flag; 10254 break; 10255 case RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 10256 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10257 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK | ret_flag; 10258 break; 10259 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM: 10260 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10261 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 10262 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size; 10263 break; 10264 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID: 10265 { 10266 const struct btf_type *t; 10267 10268 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10269 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta.ret_btf, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL); 10270 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 10271 u32 tsize; 10272 const struct btf_type *ret; 10273 const char *tname; 10274 10275 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 10276 ret = btf_resolve_size(meta.ret_btf, t, &tsize); 10277 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 10278 tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta.ret_btf, t->name_off); 10279 verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 10280 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 10281 return -EINVAL; 10282 } 10283 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 10284 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize; 10285 } else { 10286 /* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it 10287 * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise 10288 * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in 10289 * check_mem_access(). 10290 */ 10291 ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 10292 10293 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 10294 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf; 10295 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 10296 } 10297 break; 10298 } 10299 case RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 10300 { 10301 struct btf *ret_btf; 10302 int ret_btf_id; 10303 10304 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10305 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 10306 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 10307 ret_btf = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf; 10308 ret_btf_id = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf_id; 10309 if (!btf_is_kernel(ret_btf)) 10310 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_ALLOC; 10311 } else { 10312 if (fn->ret_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 10313 verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); 10314 verbose(env, "func %s has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON return type\n", 10315 func_id_name(func_id)); 10316 return -EINVAL; 10317 } 10318 ret_btf = btf_vmlinux; 10319 ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id; 10320 } 10321 if (ret_btf_id == 0) { 10322 verbose(env, "invalid return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 10323 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), 10324 func_id); 10325 return -EINVAL; 10326 } 10327 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 10328 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 10329 break; 10330 } 10331 default: 10332 verbose(env, "unknown return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 10333 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 10334 return -EINVAL; 10335 } 10336 10337 if (type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type)) 10338 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 10339 10340 if (helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 10341 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: func %s#%d sets ref_obj_id more than once\n", 10342 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 10343 return -EFAULT; 10344 } 10345 10346 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) 10347 regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta.dynptr_id; 10348 10349 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id) || is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) { 10350 /* For release_reference() */ 10351 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 10352 } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 10353 int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 10354 10355 if (id < 0) 10356 return id; 10357 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */ 10358 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 10359 /* For release_reference() */ 10360 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 10361 } 10362 10363 do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); 10364 10365 err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id); 10366 if (err) 10367 return err; 10368 10369 if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack || 10370 func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) && 10371 !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) { 10372 const char *err_str; 10373 10374 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 10375 err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack); 10376 err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n"; 10377 #else 10378 err = -ENOTSUPP; 10379 err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n"; 10380 #endif 10381 if (err) { 10382 verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 10383 return err; 10384 } 10385 10386 env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true; 10387 } 10388 10389 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stackid || func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack) 10390 env->prog->call_get_stack = true; 10391 10392 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 10393 if (check_get_func_ip(env)) 10394 return -ENOTSUPP; 10395 env->prog->call_get_func_ip = true; 10396 } 10397 10398 if (changes_data) 10399 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 10400 return 0; 10401 } 10402 10403 /* mark_btf_func_reg_size() is used when the reg size is determined by 10404 * the BTF func_proto's return value size and argument. 10405 */ 10406 static void mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 10407 size_t reg_size) 10408 { 10409 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 10410 10411 if (regno == BPF_REG_0) { 10412 /* Function return value */ 10413 reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 10414 reg->subreg_def = reg_size == sizeof(u64) ? 10415 DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 10416 } else { 10417 /* Function argument */ 10418 if (reg_size == sizeof(u64)) { 10419 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 10420 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 10421 } else { 10422 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ32); 10423 } 10424 } 10425 } 10426 10427 static bool is_kfunc_acquire(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10428 { 10429 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ACQUIRE; 10430 } 10431 10432 static bool is_kfunc_release(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10433 { 10434 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RELEASE; 10435 } 10436 10437 static bool is_kfunc_trusted_args(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10438 { 10439 return (meta->kfunc_flags & KF_TRUSTED_ARGS) || is_kfunc_release(meta); 10440 } 10441 10442 static bool is_kfunc_sleepable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10443 { 10444 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_SLEEPABLE; 10445 } 10446 10447 static bool is_kfunc_destructive(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10448 { 10449 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_DESTRUCTIVE; 10450 } 10451 10452 static bool is_kfunc_rcu(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10453 { 10454 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU; 10455 } 10456 10457 static bool __kfunc_param_match_suffix(const struct btf *btf, 10458 const struct btf_param *arg, 10459 const char *suffix) 10460 { 10461 int suffix_len = strlen(suffix), len; 10462 const char *param_name; 10463 10464 /* In the future, this can be ported to use BTF tagging */ 10465 param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off); 10466 if (str_is_empty(param_name)) 10467 return false; 10468 len = strlen(param_name); 10469 if (len < suffix_len) 10470 return false; 10471 param_name += len - suffix_len; 10472 return !strncmp(param_name, suffix, suffix_len); 10473 } 10474 10475 static bool is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(const struct btf *btf, 10476 const struct btf_param *arg, 10477 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 10478 { 10479 const struct btf_type *t; 10480 10481 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 10482 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 10483 return false; 10484 10485 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__sz"); 10486 } 10487 10488 static bool is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(const struct btf *btf, 10489 const struct btf_param *arg, 10490 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 10491 { 10492 const struct btf_type *t; 10493 10494 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 10495 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 10496 return false; 10497 10498 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__szk"); 10499 } 10500 10501 static bool is_kfunc_arg_optional(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10502 { 10503 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__opt"); 10504 } 10505 10506 static bool is_kfunc_arg_constant(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10507 { 10508 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__k"); 10509 } 10510 10511 static bool is_kfunc_arg_ignore(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10512 { 10513 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__ign"); 10514 } 10515 10516 static bool is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10517 { 10518 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__alloc"); 10519 } 10520 10521 static bool is_kfunc_arg_uninit(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10522 { 10523 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__uninit"); 10524 } 10525 10526 static bool is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10527 { 10528 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__refcounted_kptr"); 10529 } 10530 10531 static bool is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(const struct btf *btf, 10532 const struct btf_param *arg, 10533 const char *name) 10534 { 10535 int len, target_len = strlen(name); 10536 const char *param_name; 10537 10538 param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off); 10539 if (str_is_empty(param_name)) 10540 return false; 10541 len = strlen(param_name); 10542 if (len != target_len) 10543 return false; 10544 if (strcmp(param_name, name)) 10545 return false; 10546 10547 return true; 10548 } 10549 10550 enum { 10551 KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID, 10552 KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID, 10553 KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID, 10554 KF_ARG_RB_ROOT_ID, 10555 KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID, 10556 }; 10557 10558 BTF_ID_LIST(kf_arg_btf_ids) 10559 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_dynptr_kern) 10560 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_head) 10561 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_node) 10562 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_rb_root) 10563 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_rb_node) 10564 10565 static bool __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(const struct btf *btf, 10566 const struct btf_param *arg, int type) 10567 { 10568 const struct btf_type *t; 10569 u32 res_id; 10570 10571 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 10572 if (!t) 10573 return false; 10574 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 10575 return false; 10576 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &res_id); 10577 if (!t) 10578 return false; 10579 return btf_types_are_same(btf, res_id, btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[type]); 10580 } 10581 10582 static bool is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10583 { 10584 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID); 10585 } 10586 10587 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_head(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10588 { 10589 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID); 10590 } 10591 10592 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10593 { 10594 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID); 10595 } 10596 10597 static bool is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_root(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10598 { 10599 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RB_ROOT_ID); 10600 } 10601 10602 static bool is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10603 { 10604 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID); 10605 } 10606 10607 static bool is_kfunc_arg_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct btf *btf, 10608 const struct btf_param *arg) 10609 { 10610 const struct btf_type *t; 10611 10612 t = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf, arg->type, NULL); 10613 if (!t) 10614 return false; 10615 10616 return true; 10617 } 10618 10619 /* Returns true if struct is composed of scalars, 4 levels of nesting allowed */ 10620 static bool __btf_type_is_scalar_struct(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10621 const struct btf *btf, 10622 const struct btf_type *t, int rec) 10623 { 10624 const struct btf_type *member_type; 10625 const struct btf_member *member; 10626 u32 i; 10627 10628 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) 10629 return false; 10630 10631 for_each_member(i, t, member) { 10632 const struct btf_array *array; 10633 10634 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, member->type, NULL); 10635 if (btf_type_is_struct(member_type)) { 10636 if (rec >= 3) { 10637 verbose(env, "max struct nesting depth exceeded\n"); 10638 return false; 10639 } 10640 if (!__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, btf, member_type, rec + 1)) 10641 return false; 10642 continue; 10643 } 10644 if (btf_type_is_array(member_type)) { 10645 array = btf_array(member_type); 10646 if (!array->nelems) 10647 return false; 10648 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, array->type, NULL); 10649 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 10650 return false; 10651 continue; 10652 } 10653 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 10654 return false; 10655 } 10656 return true; 10657 } 10658 10659 enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type { 10660 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, 10661 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID, /* Allocated object */ 10662 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR, /* Refcounted local kptr */ 10663 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, 10664 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER, 10665 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD, 10666 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE, 10667 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID, /* Also covers reg2btf_ids conversions */ 10668 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, 10669 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE, /* Size derived from next argument, skip it */ 10670 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK, 10671 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT, 10672 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE, 10673 }; 10674 10675 enum special_kfunc_type { 10676 KF_bpf_obj_new_impl, 10677 KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl, 10678 KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl, 10679 KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl, 10680 KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl, 10681 KF_bpf_list_pop_front, 10682 KF_bpf_list_pop_back, 10683 KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx, 10684 KF_bpf_rdonly_cast, 10685 KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock, 10686 KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock, 10687 KF_bpf_rbtree_remove, 10688 KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl, 10689 KF_bpf_rbtree_first, 10690 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb, 10691 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_xdp, 10692 KF_bpf_dynptr_slice, 10693 KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr, 10694 KF_bpf_dynptr_clone, 10695 }; 10696 10697 BTF_SET_START(special_kfunc_set) 10698 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl) 10699 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl) 10700 BTF_ID(func, bpf_refcount_acquire_impl) 10701 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front_impl) 10702 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back_impl) 10703 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front) 10704 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back) 10705 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx) 10706 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast) 10707 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_remove) 10708 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_add_impl) 10709 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_first) 10710 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_skb) 10711 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_xdp) 10712 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice) 10713 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr) 10714 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_clone) 10715 BTF_SET_END(special_kfunc_set) 10716 10717 BTF_ID_LIST(special_kfunc_list) 10718 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl) 10719 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl) 10720 BTF_ID(func, bpf_refcount_acquire_impl) 10721 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front_impl) 10722 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back_impl) 10723 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front) 10724 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back) 10725 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx) 10726 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast) 10727 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_lock) 10728 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_unlock) 10729 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_remove) 10730 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_add_impl) 10731 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_first) 10732 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_skb) 10733 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_xdp) 10734 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice) 10735 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr) 10736 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_clone) 10737 10738 static bool is_kfunc_ret_null(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10739 { 10740 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl] && 10741 meta->arg_owning_ref) { 10742 return false; 10743 } 10744 10745 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RET_NULL; 10746 } 10747 10748 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10749 { 10750 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock]; 10751 } 10752 10753 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10754 { 10755 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock]; 10756 } 10757 10758 static enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type 10759 get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10760 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 10761 const struct btf_type *t, const struct btf_type *ref_t, 10762 const char *ref_tname, const struct btf_param *args, 10763 int argno, int nargs) 10764 { 10765 u32 regno = argno + 1; 10766 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 10767 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 10768 bool arg_mem_size = false; 10769 10770 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) 10771 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 10772 10773 /* In this function, we verify the kfunc's BTF as per the argument type, 10774 * leaving the rest of the verification with respect to the register 10775 * type to our caller. When a set of conditions hold in the BTF type of 10776 * arguments, we resolve it to a known kfunc_ptr_arg_type. 10777 */ 10778 if (btf_get_prog_ctx_type(&env->log, meta->btf, t, resolve_prog_type(env->prog), argno)) 10779 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 10780 10781 if (is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10782 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID; 10783 10784 if (is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10785 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR; 10786 10787 if (is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10788 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 10789 10790 if (is_kfunc_arg_iter(meta, argno)) 10791 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER; 10792 10793 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_head(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10794 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD; 10795 10796 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_node(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10797 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE; 10798 10799 if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_root(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10800 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT; 10801 10802 if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10803 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE; 10804 10805 if ((base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)])) { 10806 if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) { 10807 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 10808 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 10809 return -EINVAL; 10810 } 10811 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 10812 } 10813 10814 if (is_kfunc_arg_callback(env, meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10815 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK; 10816 10817 10818 if (argno + 1 < nargs && 10819 (is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], ®s[regno + 1]) || 10820 is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], ®s[regno + 1]))) 10821 arg_mem_size = true; 10822 10823 /* This is the catch all argument type of register types supported by 10824 * check_helper_mem_access. However, we only allow when argument type is 10825 * pointer to scalar, or struct composed (recursively) of scalars. When 10826 * arg_mem_size is true, the pointer can be void *. 10827 */ 10828 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(ref_t) && !__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, meta->btf, ref_t, 0) && 10829 (arg_mem_size ? !btf_type_is_void(ref_t) : 1)) { 10830 verbose(env, "arg#%d pointer type %s %s must point to %sscalar, or struct with scalar\n", 10831 argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, arg_mem_size ? "void, " : ""); 10832 return -EINVAL; 10833 } 10834 return arg_mem_size ? KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE : KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM; 10835 } 10836 10837 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10838 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 10839 const struct btf_type *ref_t, 10840 const char *ref_tname, u32 ref_id, 10841 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 10842 int argno) 10843 { 10844 const struct btf_type *reg_ref_t; 10845 bool strict_type_match = false; 10846 const struct btf *reg_btf; 10847 const char *reg_ref_tname; 10848 u32 reg_ref_id; 10849 10850 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 10851 reg_btf = reg->btf; 10852 reg_ref_id = reg->btf_id; 10853 } else { 10854 reg_btf = btf_vmlinux; 10855 reg_ref_id = *reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]; 10856 } 10857 10858 /* Enforce strict type matching for calls to kfuncs that are acquiring 10859 * or releasing a reference, or are no-cast aliases. We do _not_ 10860 * enforce strict matching for plain KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs by default, 10861 * as we want to enable BPF programs to pass types that are bitwise 10862 * equivalent without forcing them to explicitly cast with something 10863 * like bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx(). 10864 * 10865 * For example, say we had a type like the following: 10866 * 10867 * struct bpf_cpumask { 10868 * cpumask_t cpumask; 10869 * refcount_t usage; 10870 * }; 10871 * 10872 * Note that as specified in <linux/cpumask.h>, cpumask_t is typedef'ed 10873 * to a struct cpumask, so it would be safe to pass a struct 10874 * bpf_cpumask * to a kfunc expecting a struct cpumask *. 10875 * 10876 * The philosophy here is similar to how we allow scalars of different 10877 * types to be passed to kfuncs as long as the size is the same. The 10878 * only difference here is that we're simply allowing 10879 * btf_struct_ids_match() to walk the struct at the 0th offset, and 10880 * resolve types. 10881 */ 10882 if (is_kfunc_acquire(meta) || 10883 (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) || 10884 btf_type_ids_nocast_alias(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, meta->btf, ref_id)) 10885 strict_type_match = true; 10886 10887 WARN_ON_ONCE(is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && reg->off); 10888 10889 reg_ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(reg_btf, reg_ref_id, ®_ref_id); 10890 reg_ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg_btf, reg_ref_t->name_off); 10891 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, reg->off, meta->btf, ref_id, strict_type_match)) { 10892 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d expected pointer to %s %s but R%d has a pointer to %s %s\n", 10893 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, argno + 1, 10894 btf_type_str(reg_ref_t), reg_ref_tname); 10895 return -EINVAL; 10896 } 10897 return 0; 10898 } 10899 10900 static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 10901 { 10902 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 10903 struct btf_record *rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 10904 10905 if (!state->active_lock.ptr) { 10906 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_set_non_owning w/o active lock\n"); 10907 return -EFAULT; 10908 } 10909 10910 if (type_flag(reg->type) & NON_OWN_REF) { 10911 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: NON_OWN_REF already set\n"); 10912 return -EFAULT; 10913 } 10914 10915 reg->type |= NON_OWN_REF; 10916 if (rec->refcount_off >= 0) 10917 reg->type |= MEM_RCU; 10918 10919 return 0; 10920 } 10921 10922 static int ref_convert_owning_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 ref_obj_id) 10923 { 10924 struct bpf_func_state *state, *unused; 10925 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 10926 int i; 10927 10928 state = cur_func(env); 10929 10930 if (!ref_obj_id) { 10931 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id is zero for " 10932 "owning -> non-owning conversion\n"); 10933 return -EFAULT; 10934 } 10935 10936 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 10937 if (state->refs[i].id != ref_obj_id) 10938 continue; 10939 10940 /* Clear ref_obj_id here so release_reference doesn't clobber 10941 * the whole reg 10942 */ 10943 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, unused, reg, ({ 10944 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) { 10945 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 10946 ref_set_non_owning(env, reg); 10947 } 10948 })); 10949 return 0; 10950 } 10951 10952 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref state missing for ref_obj_id\n"); 10953 return -EFAULT; 10954 } 10955 10956 /* Implementation details: 10957 * 10958 * Each register points to some region of memory, which we define as an 10959 * allocation. Each allocation may embed a bpf_spin_lock which protects any 10960 * special BPF objects (bpf_list_head, bpf_rb_root, etc.) part of the same 10961 * allocation. The lock and the data it protects are colocated in the same 10962 * memory region. 10963 * 10964 * Hence, everytime a register holds a pointer value pointing to such 10965 * allocation, the verifier preserves a unique reg->id for it. 10966 * 10967 * The verifier remembers the lock 'ptr' and the lock 'id' whenever 10968 * bpf_spin_lock is called. 10969 * 10970 * To enable this, lock state in the verifier captures two values: 10971 * active_lock.ptr = Register's type specific pointer 10972 * active_lock.id = A unique ID for each register pointer value 10973 * 10974 * Currently, PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC are the two 10975 * supported register types. 10976 * 10977 * The active_lock.ptr in case of map values is the reg->map_ptr, and in case of 10978 * allocated objects is the reg->btf pointer. 10979 * 10980 * The active_lock.id is non-unique for maps supporting direct_value_addr, as we 10981 * can establish the provenance of the map value statically for each distinct 10982 * lookup into such maps. They always contain a single map value hence unique 10983 * IDs for each pseudo load pessimizes the algorithm and rejects valid programs. 10984 * 10985 * So, in case of global variables, they use array maps with max_entries = 1, 10986 * hence their active_lock.ptr becomes map_ptr and id = 0 (since they all point 10987 * into the same map value as max_entries is 1, as described above). 10988 * 10989 * In case of inner map lookups, the inner map pointer has same map_ptr as the 10990 * outer map pointer (in verifier context), but each lookup into an inner map 10991 * assigns a fresh reg->id to the lookup, so while lookups into distinct inner 10992 * maps from the same outer map share the same map_ptr as active_lock.ptr, they 10993 * will get different reg->id assigned to each lookup, hence different 10994 * active_lock.id. 10995 * 10996 * In case of allocated objects, active_lock.ptr is the reg->btf, and the 10997 * reg->id is a unique ID preserved after the NULL pointer check on the pointer 10998 * returned from bpf_obj_new. Each allocation receives a new reg->id. 10999 */ 11000 static int check_reg_allocation_locked(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 11001 { 11002 void *ptr; 11003 u32 id; 11004 11005 switch ((int)reg->type) { 11006 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 11007 ptr = reg->map_ptr; 11008 break; 11009 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 11010 ptr = reg->btf; 11011 break; 11012 default: 11013 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reg type for lock check\n"); 11014 return -EFAULT; 11015 } 11016 id = reg->id; 11017 11018 if (!env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) 11019 return -EINVAL; 11020 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr != ptr || 11021 env->cur_state->active_lock.id != id) { 11022 verbose(env, "held lock and object are not in the same allocation\n"); 11023 return -EINVAL; 11024 } 11025 return 0; 11026 } 11027 11028 static bool is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 11029 { 11030 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 11031 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] || 11032 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] || 11033 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back]; 11034 } 11035 11036 static bool is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 11037 { 11038 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl] || 11039 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] || 11040 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_first]; 11041 } 11042 11043 static bool is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 11044 { 11045 return is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(btf_id) || is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(btf_id) || 11046 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]; 11047 } 11048 11049 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 11050 { 11051 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]; 11052 } 11053 11054 static bool is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 11055 { 11056 return is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(btf_id); 11057 } 11058 11059 static bool check_kfunc_is_graph_root_api(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11060 enum btf_field_type head_field_type, 11061 u32 kfunc_btf_id) 11062 { 11063 bool ret; 11064 11065 switch (head_field_type) { 11066 case BPF_LIST_HEAD: 11067 ret = is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id); 11068 break; 11069 case BPF_RB_ROOT: 11070 ret = is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id); 11071 break; 11072 default: 11073 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected graph root argument type %s\n", 11074 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type)); 11075 return false; 11076 } 11077 11078 if (!ret) 11079 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: %s head arg for unknown kfunc\n", 11080 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type)); 11081 return ret; 11082 } 11083 11084 static bool check_kfunc_is_graph_node_api(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11085 enum btf_field_type node_field_type, 11086 u32 kfunc_btf_id) 11087 { 11088 bool ret; 11089 11090 switch (node_field_type) { 11091 case BPF_LIST_NODE: 11092 ret = (kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 11093 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl]); 11094 break; 11095 case BPF_RB_NODE: 11096 ret = (kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] || 11097 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]); 11098 break; 11099 default: 11100 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected graph node argument type %s\n", 11101 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type)); 11102 return false; 11103 } 11104 11105 if (!ret) 11106 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: %s node arg for unknown kfunc\n", 11107 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type)); 11108 return ret; 11109 } 11110 11111 static int 11112 __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11113 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 11114 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 11115 enum btf_field_type head_field_type, 11116 struct btf_field **head_field) 11117 { 11118 const char *head_type_name; 11119 struct btf_field *field; 11120 struct btf_record *rec; 11121 u32 head_off; 11122 11123 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) { 11124 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call\n"); 11125 return -EFAULT; 11126 } 11127 11128 if (!check_kfunc_is_graph_root_api(env, head_field_type, meta->func_id)) 11129 return -EFAULT; 11130 11131 head_type_name = btf_field_type_name(head_field_type); 11132 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 11133 verbose(env, 11134 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n", 11135 regno, head_type_name); 11136 return -EINVAL; 11137 } 11138 11139 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 11140 head_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 11141 field = btf_record_find(rec, head_off, head_field_type); 11142 if (!field) { 11143 verbose(env, "%s not found at offset=%u\n", head_type_name, head_off); 11144 return -EINVAL; 11145 } 11146 11147 /* All functions require bpf_list_head to be protected using a bpf_spin_lock */ 11148 if (check_reg_allocation_locked(env, reg)) { 11149 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock at off=%d must be held for %s\n", 11150 rec->spin_lock_off, head_type_name); 11151 return -EINVAL; 11152 } 11153 11154 if (*head_field) { 11155 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: repeating %s arg\n", head_type_name); 11156 return -EFAULT; 11157 } 11158 *head_field = field; 11159 return 0; 11160 } 11161 11162 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11163 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 11164 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 11165 { 11166 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(env, reg, regno, meta, BPF_LIST_HEAD, 11167 &meta->arg_list_head.field); 11168 } 11169 11170 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11171 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 11172 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 11173 { 11174 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(env, reg, regno, meta, BPF_RB_ROOT, 11175 &meta->arg_rbtree_root.field); 11176 } 11177 11178 static int 11179 __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11180 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 11181 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 11182 enum btf_field_type head_field_type, 11183 enum btf_field_type node_field_type, 11184 struct btf_field **node_field) 11185 { 11186 const char *node_type_name; 11187 const struct btf_type *et, *t; 11188 struct btf_field *field; 11189 u32 node_off; 11190 11191 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) { 11192 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call\n"); 11193 return -EFAULT; 11194 } 11195 11196 if (!check_kfunc_is_graph_node_api(env, node_field_type, meta->func_id)) 11197 return -EFAULT; 11198 11199 node_type_name = btf_field_type_name(node_field_type); 11200 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 11201 verbose(env, 11202 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n", 11203 regno, node_type_name); 11204 return -EINVAL; 11205 } 11206 11207 node_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 11208 field = reg_find_field_offset(reg, node_off, node_field_type); 11209 if (!field || field->offset != node_off) { 11210 verbose(env, "%s not found at offset=%u\n", node_type_name, node_off); 11211 return -EINVAL; 11212 } 11213 11214 field = *node_field; 11215 11216 et = btf_type_by_id(field->graph_root.btf, field->graph_root.value_btf_id); 11217 t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 11218 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, 0, field->graph_root.btf, 11219 field->graph_root.value_btf_id, true)) { 11220 verbose(env, "operation on %s expects arg#1 %s at offset=%d " 11221 "in struct %s, but arg is at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 11222 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type), 11223 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type), 11224 field->graph_root.node_offset, 11225 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off), 11226 node_off, btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off)); 11227 return -EINVAL; 11228 } 11229 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; 11230 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 11231 11232 if (node_off != field->graph_root.node_offset) { 11233 verbose(env, "arg#1 offset=%d, but expected %s at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 11234 node_off, btf_field_type_name(node_field_type), 11235 field->graph_root.node_offset, 11236 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off)); 11237 return -EINVAL; 11238 } 11239 11240 return 0; 11241 } 11242 11243 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11244 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 11245 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 11246 { 11247 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(env, reg, regno, meta, 11248 BPF_LIST_HEAD, BPF_LIST_NODE, 11249 &meta->arg_list_head.field); 11250 } 11251 11252 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11253 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 11254 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 11255 { 11256 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(env, reg, regno, meta, 11257 BPF_RB_ROOT, BPF_RB_NODE, 11258 &meta->arg_rbtree_root.field); 11259 } 11260 11261 static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 11262 int insn_idx) 11263 { 11264 const char *func_name = meta->func_name, *ref_tname; 11265 const struct btf *btf = meta->btf; 11266 const struct btf_param *args; 11267 struct btf_record *rec; 11268 u32 i, nargs; 11269 int ret; 11270 11271 args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta->func_proto + 1); 11272 nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta->func_proto); 11273 if (nargs > MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) { 11274 verbose(env, "Function %s has %d > %d args\n", func_name, nargs, 11275 MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS); 11276 return -EINVAL; 11277 } 11278 11279 /* Check that BTF function arguments match actual types that the 11280 * verifier sees. 11281 */ 11282 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 11283 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[i + 1]; 11284 const struct btf_type *t, *ref_t, *resolve_ret; 11285 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = ARG_DONTCARE; 11286 u32 regno = i + 1, ref_id, type_size; 11287 bool is_ret_buf_sz = false; 11288 int kf_arg_type; 11289 11290 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, args[i].type, NULL); 11291 11292 if (is_kfunc_arg_ignore(btf, &args[i])) 11293 continue; 11294 11295 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 11296 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 11297 verbose(env, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno); 11298 return -EINVAL; 11299 } 11300 11301 if (is_kfunc_arg_constant(meta->btf, &args[i])) { 11302 if (meta->arg_constant.found) { 11303 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: only one constant argument permitted\n"); 11304 return -EFAULT; 11305 } 11306 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 11307 verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno); 11308 return -EINVAL; 11309 } 11310 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 11311 if (ret < 0) 11312 return ret; 11313 meta->arg_constant.found = true; 11314 meta->arg_constant.value = reg->var_off.value; 11315 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdonly_buf_size")) { 11316 meta->r0_rdonly = true; 11317 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 11318 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdwr_buf_size")) { 11319 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 11320 } 11321 11322 if (is_ret_buf_sz) { 11323 if (meta->r0_size) { 11324 verbose(env, "2 or more rdonly/rdwr_buf_size parameters for kfunc"); 11325 return -EINVAL; 11326 } 11327 11328 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 11329 verbose(env, "R%d is not a const\n", regno); 11330 return -EINVAL; 11331 } 11332 11333 meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value; 11334 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 11335 if (ret) 11336 return ret; 11337 } 11338 continue; 11339 } 11340 11341 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 11342 verbose(env, "Unrecognized arg#%d type %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t)); 11343 return -EINVAL; 11344 } 11345 11346 if ((is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) || is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) && 11347 (register_is_null(reg) || type_may_be_null(reg->type))) { 11348 verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg%d\n", i); 11349 return -EACCES; 11350 } 11351 11352 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 11353 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && meta->ref_obj_id) { 11354 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", 11355 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 11356 meta->ref_obj_id); 11357 return -EFAULT; 11358 } 11359 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 11360 if (is_kfunc_release(meta)) 11361 meta->release_regno = regno; 11362 } 11363 11364 ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &ref_id); 11365 ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, ref_t->name_off); 11366 11367 kf_arg_type = get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(env, meta, t, ref_t, ref_tname, args, i, nargs); 11368 if (kf_arg_type < 0) 11369 return kf_arg_type; 11370 11371 switch (kf_arg_type) { 11372 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 11373 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 11374 if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && !is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) 11375 break; 11376 11377 if (!is_trusted_reg(reg)) { 11378 if (!is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) { 11379 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno); 11380 return -EINVAL; 11381 } 11382 if (!is_rcu_reg(reg)) { 11383 verbose(env, "R%d must be a rcu pointer\n", regno); 11384 return -EINVAL; 11385 } 11386 } 11387 11388 fallthrough; 11389 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 11390 /* Trusted arguments have the same offset checks as release arguments */ 11391 arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE; 11392 break; 11393 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 11394 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER: 11395 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 11396 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 11397 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT: 11398 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE: 11399 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 11400 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 11401 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK: 11402 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR: 11403 /* Trusted by default */ 11404 break; 11405 default: 11406 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 11407 return -EFAULT; 11408 } 11409 11410 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) 11411 arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE; 11412 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 11413 if (ret < 0) 11414 return ret; 11415 11416 switch (kf_arg_type) { 11417 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 11418 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 11419 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to ctx, but got %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t)); 11420 return -EINVAL; 11421 } 11422 11423 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 11424 ret = get_kern_ctx_btf_id(&env->log, resolve_prog_type(env->prog)); 11425 if (ret < 0) 11426 return -EINVAL; 11427 meta->ret_btf_id = ret; 11428 } 11429 break; 11430 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 11431 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 11432 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 11433 return -EINVAL; 11434 } 11435 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 11436 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 11437 return -EINVAL; 11438 } 11439 if (meta->btf == btf_vmlinux && 11440 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 11441 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; 11442 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 11443 } 11444 break; 11445 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 11446 { 11447 enum bpf_arg_type dynptr_arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 11448 int clone_ref_obj_id = 0; 11449 11450 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK && 11451 reg->type != CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 11452 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to stack or dynptr_ptr\n", i); 11453 return -EINVAL; 11454 } 11455 11456 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 11457 dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_RDONLY; 11458 11459 if (is_kfunc_arg_uninit(btf, &args[i])) 11460 dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_UNINIT; 11461 11462 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) { 11463 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB; 11464 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_xdp]) { 11465 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP; 11466 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_clone] && 11467 (dynptr_arg_type & MEM_UNINIT)) { 11468 enum bpf_dynptr_type parent_type = meta->initialized_dynptr.type; 11469 11470 if (parent_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) { 11471 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr type for parent of clone\n"); 11472 return -EFAULT; 11473 } 11474 11475 dynptr_arg_type |= (unsigned int)get_dynptr_type_flag(parent_type); 11476 clone_ref_obj_id = meta->initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id; 11477 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(parent_type) && !clone_ref_obj_id) { 11478 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing ref obj id for parent of clone\n"); 11479 return -EFAULT; 11480 } 11481 } 11482 11483 ret = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx, dynptr_arg_type, clone_ref_obj_id); 11484 if (ret < 0) 11485 return ret; 11486 11487 if (!(dynptr_arg_type & MEM_UNINIT)) { 11488 int id = dynptr_id(env, reg); 11489 11490 if (id < 0) { 11491 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr id\n"); 11492 return id; 11493 } 11494 meta->initialized_dynptr.id = id; 11495 meta->initialized_dynptr.type = dynptr_get_type(env, reg); 11496 meta->initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg); 11497 } 11498 11499 break; 11500 } 11501 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER: 11502 ret = process_iter_arg(env, regno, insn_idx, meta); 11503 if (ret < 0) 11504 return ret; 11505 break; 11506 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 11507 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 11508 reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 11509 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i); 11510 return -EINVAL; 11511 } 11512 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 11513 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 11514 return -EINVAL; 11515 } 11516 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(env, reg, regno, meta); 11517 if (ret < 0) 11518 return ret; 11519 break; 11520 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT: 11521 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 11522 reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 11523 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i); 11524 return -EINVAL; 11525 } 11526 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 11527 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 11528 return -EINVAL; 11529 } 11530 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_root(env, reg, regno, meta); 11531 if (ret < 0) 11532 return ret; 11533 break; 11534 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 11535 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 11536 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 11537 return -EINVAL; 11538 } 11539 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 11540 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 11541 return -EINVAL; 11542 } 11543 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(env, reg, regno, meta); 11544 if (ret < 0) 11545 return ret; 11546 break; 11547 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE: 11548 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove]) { 11549 if (!type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) || reg->ref_obj_id) { 11550 verbose(env, "rbtree_remove node input must be non-owning ref\n"); 11551 return -EINVAL; 11552 } 11553 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) { 11554 verbose(env, "rbtree_remove not allowed in rbtree cb\n"); 11555 return -EINVAL; 11556 } 11557 } else { 11558 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 11559 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 11560 return -EINVAL; 11561 } 11562 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 11563 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 11564 return -EINVAL; 11565 } 11566 } 11567 11568 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(env, reg, regno, meta); 11569 if (ret < 0) 11570 return ret; 11571 break; 11572 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 11573 /* Only base_type is checked, further checks are done here */ 11574 if ((base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 11575 (bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type) && !is_rcu_reg(reg))) && 11576 !reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]) { 11577 verbose(env, "arg#%d is %s ", i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 11578 verbose(env, "expected %s or socket\n", 11579 reg_type_str(env, base_type(reg->type) | 11580 (type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS))); 11581 return -EINVAL; 11582 } 11583 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(env, reg, ref_t, ref_tname, ref_id, meta, i); 11584 if (ret < 0) 11585 return ret; 11586 break; 11587 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 11588 resolve_ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, ref_t, &type_size); 11589 if (IS_ERR(resolve_ret)) { 11590 verbose(env, "arg#%d reference type('%s %s') size cannot be determined: %ld\n", 11591 i, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, PTR_ERR(resolve_ret)); 11592 return -EINVAL; 11593 } 11594 ret = check_mem_reg(env, reg, regno, type_size); 11595 if (ret < 0) 11596 return ret; 11597 break; 11598 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 11599 { 11600 struct bpf_reg_state *buff_reg = ®s[regno]; 11601 const struct btf_param *buff_arg = &args[i]; 11602 struct bpf_reg_state *size_reg = ®s[regno + 1]; 11603 const struct btf_param *size_arg = &args[i + 1]; 11604 11605 if (!register_is_null(buff_reg) || !is_kfunc_arg_optional(meta->btf, buff_arg)) { 11606 ret = check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(env, size_reg, regno + 1); 11607 if (ret < 0) { 11608 verbose(env, "arg#%d arg#%d memory, len pair leads to invalid memory access\n", i, i + 1); 11609 return ret; 11610 } 11611 } 11612 11613 if (is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, size_arg, size_reg)) { 11614 if (meta->arg_constant.found) { 11615 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: only one constant argument permitted\n"); 11616 return -EFAULT; 11617 } 11618 if (!tnum_is_const(size_reg->var_off)) { 11619 verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno + 1); 11620 return -EINVAL; 11621 } 11622 meta->arg_constant.found = true; 11623 meta->arg_constant.value = size_reg->var_off.value; 11624 } 11625 11626 /* Skip next '__sz' or '__szk' argument */ 11627 i++; 11628 break; 11629 } 11630 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK: 11631 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_FUNC) { 11632 verbose(env, "arg%d expected pointer to func\n", i); 11633 return -EINVAL; 11634 } 11635 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; 11636 break; 11637 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR: 11638 if (!type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 11639 verbose(env, "arg#%d is neither owning or non-owning ref\n", i); 11640 return -EINVAL; 11641 } 11642 if (!type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) 11643 meta->arg_owning_ref = true; 11644 11645 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 11646 if (!rec) { 11647 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: Couldn't find btf_record\n"); 11648 return -EFAULT; 11649 } 11650 11651 if (rec->refcount_off < 0) { 11652 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a type with bpf_refcount field\n", i); 11653 return -EINVAL; 11654 } 11655 11656 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; 11657 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 11658 break; 11659 } 11660 } 11661 11662 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && !meta->release_regno) { 11663 verbose(env, "release kernel function %s expects refcounted PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n", 11664 func_name); 11665 return -EINVAL; 11666 } 11667 11668 return 0; 11669 } 11670 11671 static int fetch_kfunc_meta(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11672 struct bpf_insn *insn, 11673 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 11674 const char **kfunc_name) 11675 { 11676 const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto; 11677 u32 func_id, *kfunc_flags; 11678 const char *func_name; 11679 struct btf *desc_btf; 11680 11681 if (kfunc_name) 11682 *kfunc_name = NULL; 11683 11684 if (!insn->imm) 11685 return -EINVAL; 11686 11687 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, insn->off); 11688 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 11689 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 11690 11691 func_id = insn->imm; 11692 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 11693 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 11694 if (kfunc_name) 11695 *kfunc_name = func_name; 11696 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 11697 11698 kfunc_flags = btf_kfunc_id_set_contains(desc_btf, func_id, env->prog); 11699 if (!kfunc_flags) { 11700 return -EACCES; 11701 } 11702 11703 memset(meta, 0, sizeof(*meta)); 11704 meta->btf = desc_btf; 11705 meta->func_id = func_id; 11706 meta->kfunc_flags = *kfunc_flags; 11707 meta->func_proto = func_proto; 11708 meta->func_name = func_name; 11709 11710 return 0; 11711 } 11712 11713 static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 11714 int *insn_idx_p) 11715 { 11716 const struct btf_type *t, *ptr_type; 11717 u32 i, nargs, ptr_type_id, release_ref_obj_id; 11718 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 11719 const char *func_name, *ptr_type_name; 11720 bool sleepable, rcu_lock, rcu_unlock; 11721 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; 11722 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux; 11723 int err, insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 11724 const struct btf_param *args; 11725 const struct btf_type *ret_t; 11726 struct btf *desc_btf; 11727 11728 /* skip for now, but return error when we find this in fixup_kfunc_call */ 11729 if (!insn->imm) 11730 return 0; 11731 11732 err = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, insn, &meta, &func_name); 11733 if (err == -EACCES && func_name) 11734 verbose(env, "calling kernel function %s is not allowed\n", func_name); 11735 if (err) 11736 return err; 11737 desc_btf = meta.btf; 11738 insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 11739 11740 insn_aux->is_iter_next = is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta); 11741 11742 if (is_kfunc_destructive(&meta) && !capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) { 11743 verbose(env, "destructive kfunc calls require CAP_SYS_BOOT capability\n"); 11744 return -EACCES; 11745 } 11746 11747 sleepable = is_kfunc_sleepable(&meta); 11748 if (sleepable && !env->prog->aux->sleepable) { 11749 verbose(env, "program must be sleepable to call sleepable kfunc %s\n", func_name); 11750 return -EACCES; 11751 } 11752 11753 /* Check the arguments */ 11754 err = check_kfunc_args(env, &meta, insn_idx); 11755 if (err < 0) 11756 return err; 11757 11758 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 11759 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 11760 set_rbtree_add_callback_state); 11761 if (err) { 11762 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n", 11763 func_name, meta.func_id); 11764 return err; 11765 } 11766 } 11767 11768 rcu_lock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(&meta); 11769 rcu_unlock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(&meta); 11770 11771 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 11772 struct bpf_func_state *state; 11773 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 11774 11775 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env) && (rcu_lock || rcu_unlock)) { 11776 verbose(env, "Calling bpf_rcu_read_{lock,unlock} in unnecessary rbtree callback\n"); 11777 return -EACCES; 11778 } 11779 11780 if (rcu_lock) { 11781 verbose(env, "nested rcu read lock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name); 11782 return -EINVAL; 11783 } else if (rcu_unlock) { 11784 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 11785 if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) { 11786 reg->type &= ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL); 11787 reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 11788 } 11789 })); 11790 env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock = false; 11791 } else if (sleepable) { 11792 verbose(env, "kernel func %s is sleepable within rcu_read_lock region\n", func_name); 11793 return -EACCES; 11794 } 11795 } else if (rcu_lock) { 11796 env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock = true; 11797 } else if (rcu_unlock) { 11798 verbose(env, "unmatched rcu read unlock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name); 11799 return -EINVAL; 11800 } 11801 11802 /* In case of release function, we get register number of refcounted 11803 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID in bpf_kfunc_arg_meta, do the release now. 11804 */ 11805 if (meta.release_regno) { 11806 err = release_reference(env, regs[meta.release_regno].ref_obj_id); 11807 if (err) { 11808 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 11809 func_name, meta.func_id); 11810 return err; 11811 } 11812 } 11813 11814 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 11815 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] || 11816 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 11817 release_ref_obj_id = regs[BPF_REG_2].ref_obj_id; 11818 insn_aux->insert_off = regs[BPF_REG_2].off; 11819 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf, meta.arg_btf_id); 11820 err = ref_convert_owning_non_owning(env, release_ref_obj_id); 11821 if (err) { 11822 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d conversion of owning ref to non-owning failed\n", 11823 func_name, meta.func_id); 11824 return err; 11825 } 11826 11827 err = release_reference(env, release_ref_obj_id); 11828 if (err) { 11829 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 11830 func_name, meta.func_id); 11831 return err; 11832 } 11833 } 11834 11835 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) 11836 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 11837 11838 /* Check return type */ 11839 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, meta.func_proto->type, NULL); 11840 11841 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta) && !btf_type_is_struct_ptr(meta.btf, t)) { 11842 /* Only exception is bpf_obj_new_impl */ 11843 if (meta.btf != btf_vmlinux || 11844 (meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] && 11845 meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl])) { 11846 verbose(env, "acquire kernel function does not return PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n"); 11847 return -EINVAL; 11848 } 11849 } 11850 11851 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 11852 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11853 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, t->size); 11854 } else if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 11855 ptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, t->type, &ptr_type_id); 11856 11857 if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && btf_id_set_contains(&special_kfunc_set, meta.func_id)) { 11858 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) { 11859 struct btf *ret_btf; 11860 u32 ret_btf_id; 11861 11862 if (unlikely(!bpf_global_ma_set)) 11863 return -ENOMEM; 11864 11865 if (((u64)(u32)meta.arg_constant.value) != meta.arg_constant.value) { 11866 verbose(env, "local type ID argument must be in range [0, U32_MAX]\n"); 11867 return -EINVAL; 11868 } 11869 11870 ret_btf = env->prog->aux->btf; 11871 ret_btf_id = meta.arg_constant.value; 11872 11873 /* This may be NULL due to user not supplying a BTF */ 11874 if (!ret_btf) { 11875 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new requires prog BTF\n"); 11876 return -EINVAL; 11877 } 11878 11879 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 11880 if (!ret_t || !__btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 11881 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct\n"); 11882 return -EINVAL; 11883 } 11884 11885 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11886 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 11887 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 11888 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 11889 11890 insn_aux->obj_new_size = ret_t->size; 11891 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = 11892 btf_find_struct_meta(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 11893 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) { 11894 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11895 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 11896 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.arg_btf; 11897 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.arg_btf_id; 11898 11899 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = 11900 btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf, 11901 meta.arg_btf_id); 11902 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] || 11903 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back]) { 11904 struct btf_field *field = meta.arg_list_head.field; 11905 11906 mark_reg_graph_node(regs, BPF_REG_0, &field->graph_root); 11907 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] || 11908 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_first]) { 11909 struct btf_field *field = meta.arg_rbtree_root.field; 11910 11911 mark_reg_graph_node(regs, BPF_REG_0, &field->graph_root); 11912 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 11913 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11914 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED; 11915 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 11916 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 11917 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 11918 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, meta.arg_constant.value); 11919 if (!ret_t || !btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 11920 verbose(env, 11921 "kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast type ID argument must be of a struct\n"); 11922 return -EINVAL; 11923 } 11924 11925 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11926 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; 11927 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 11928 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.arg_constant.value; 11929 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice] || 11930 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr]) { 11931 enum bpf_type_flag type_flag = get_dynptr_type_flag(meta.initialized_dynptr.type); 11932 11933 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11934 11935 if (!meta.arg_constant.found) { 11936 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: bpf_dynptr_slice(_rdwr) no constant size\n"); 11937 return -EFAULT; 11938 } 11939 11940 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.arg_constant.value; 11941 11942 /* PTR_MAYBE_NULL will be added when is_kfunc_ret_null is checked */ 11943 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | type_flag; 11944 11945 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice]) { 11946 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY; 11947 } else { 11948 /* this will set env->seen_direct_write to true */ 11949 if (!may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE)) { 11950 verbose(env, "the prog does not allow writes to packet data\n"); 11951 return -EINVAL; 11952 } 11953 } 11954 11955 if (!meta.initialized_dynptr.id) { 11956 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr id\n"); 11957 return -EFAULT; 11958 } 11959 regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta.initialized_dynptr.id; 11960 11961 /* we don't need to set BPF_REG_0's ref obj id 11962 * because packet slices are not refcounted (see 11963 * dynptr_type_refcounted) 11964 */ 11965 } else { 11966 verbose(env, "kernel function %s unhandled dynamic return type\n", 11967 meta.func_name); 11968 return -EFAULT; 11969 } 11970 } else if (!__btf_type_is_struct(ptr_type)) { 11971 if (!meta.r0_size) { 11972 __u32 sz; 11973 11974 if (!IS_ERR(btf_resolve_size(desc_btf, ptr_type, &sz))) { 11975 meta.r0_size = sz; 11976 meta.r0_rdonly = true; 11977 } 11978 } 11979 if (!meta.r0_size) { 11980 ptr_type_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, 11981 ptr_type->name_off); 11982 verbose(env, 11983 "kernel function %s returns pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 11984 func_name, 11985 btf_type_str(ptr_type), 11986 ptr_type_name); 11987 return -EINVAL; 11988 } 11989 11990 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11991 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM; 11992 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.r0_size; 11993 11994 if (meta.r0_rdonly) 11995 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY; 11996 11997 /* Ensures we don't access the memory after a release_reference() */ 11998 if (meta.ref_obj_id) 11999 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 12000 } else { 12001 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 12002 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 12003 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 12004 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ptr_type_id; 12005 12006 if (is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) { 12007 struct bpf_reg_state *cur_iter; 12008 12009 cur_iter = get_iter_from_state(env->cur_state, &meta); 12010 12011 if (cur_iter->type & MEM_RCU) /* KF_RCU_PROTECTED */ 12012 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RCU; 12013 else 12014 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_TRUSTED; 12015 } 12016 } 12017 12018 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) { 12019 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 12020 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg, see 93c230e3f5bd6 */ 12021 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 12022 } 12023 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(void *)); 12024 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta)) { 12025 int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 12026 12027 if (id < 0) 12028 return id; 12029 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) 12030 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 12031 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 12032 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_first]) { 12033 ref_set_non_owning(env, ®s[BPF_REG_0]); 12034 } 12035 12036 if (reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(®s[BPF_REG_0]) && !regs[BPF_REG_0].id) 12037 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 12038 } else if (btf_type_is_void(t)) { 12039 if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && btf_id_set_contains(&special_kfunc_set, meta.func_id)) { 12040 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 12041 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = 12042 btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf, 12043 meta.arg_btf_id); 12044 } 12045 } 12046 } 12047 12048 nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta.func_proto); 12049 args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta.func_proto + 1); 12050 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 12051 u32 regno = i + 1; 12052 12053 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, args[i].type, NULL); 12054 if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 12055 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, sizeof(void *)); 12056 else 12057 /* scalar. ensured by btf_check_kfunc_arg_match() */ 12058 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, t->size); 12059 } 12060 12061 if (is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) { 12062 err = process_iter_next_call(env, insn_idx, &meta); 12063 if (err) 12064 return err; 12065 } 12066 12067 return 0; 12068 } 12069 12070 static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 12071 { 12072 /* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 12073 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b); 12074 12075 if (b < 0) 12076 return res > a; 12077 return res < a; 12078 } 12079 12080 static bool signed_add32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 12081 { 12082 /* Do the add in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ 12083 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a + (u32)b); 12084 12085 if (b < 0) 12086 return res > a; 12087 return res < a; 12088 } 12089 12090 static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 12091 { 12092 /* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 12093 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b); 12094 12095 if (b < 0) 12096 return res < a; 12097 return res > a; 12098 } 12099 12100 static bool signed_sub32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 12101 { 12102 /* Do the sub in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ 12103 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a - (u32)b); 12104 12105 if (b < 0) 12106 return res < a; 12107 return res > a; 12108 } 12109 12110 static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12111 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 12112 enum bpf_reg_type type) 12113 { 12114 bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 12115 s64 val = reg->var_off.value; 12116 s64 smin = reg->smin_value; 12117 12118 if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) { 12119 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n", 12120 reg_type_str(env, type), val); 12121 return false; 12122 } 12123 12124 if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 12125 verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n", 12126 reg_type_str(env, type), reg->off); 12127 return false; 12128 } 12129 12130 if (smin == S64_MIN) { 12131 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n", 12132 reg_type_str(env, type)); 12133 return false; 12134 } 12135 12136 if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 12137 verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n", 12138 smin, reg_type_str(env, type)); 12139 return false; 12140 } 12141 12142 return true; 12143 } 12144 12145 enum { 12146 REASON_BOUNDS = -1, 12147 REASON_TYPE = -2, 12148 REASON_PATHS = -3, 12149 REASON_LIMIT = -4, 12150 REASON_STACK = -5, 12151 }; 12152 12153 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 12154 u32 *alu_limit, bool mask_to_left) 12155 { 12156 u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0; 12157 12158 switch (ptr_reg->type) { 12159 case PTR_TO_STACK: 12160 /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the 12161 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar 12162 * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is 12163 * currently prohibited for unprivileged. 12164 */ 12165 max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left; 12166 ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off); 12167 break; 12168 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 12169 max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size; 12170 ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ? 12171 ptr_reg->smin_value : 12172 ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off; 12173 break; 12174 default: 12175 return REASON_TYPE; 12176 } 12177 12178 if (ptr_limit >= max) 12179 return REASON_LIMIT; 12180 *alu_limit = ptr_limit; 12181 return 0; 12182 } 12183 12184 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12185 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 12186 { 12187 return env->bypass_spec_v1 || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K; 12188 } 12189 12190 static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 12191 u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit) 12192 { 12193 /* If we arrived here from different branches with different 12194 * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work. 12195 */ 12196 if (aux->alu_state && 12197 (aux->alu_state != alu_state || 12198 aux->alu_limit != alu_limit)) 12199 return REASON_PATHS; 12200 12201 /* Corresponding fixup done in do_misc_fixups(). */ 12202 aux->alu_state = alu_state; 12203 aux->alu_limit = alu_limit; 12204 return 0; 12205 } 12206 12207 static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12208 struct bpf_insn *insn) 12209 { 12210 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 12211 12212 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 12213 return 0; 12214 12215 return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0); 12216 } 12217 12218 static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode) 12219 { 12220 return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB; 12221 } 12222 12223 struct bpf_sanitize_info { 12224 struct bpf_insn_aux_data aux; 12225 bool mask_to_left; 12226 }; 12227 12228 static struct bpf_verifier_state * 12229 sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12230 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 12231 u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx) 12232 { 12233 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; 12234 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 12235 12236 branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true); 12237 if (branch && insn) { 12238 regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs; 12239 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 12240 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 12241 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 12242 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 12243 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg); 12244 } 12245 } 12246 return branch; 12247 } 12248 12249 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12250 struct bpf_insn *insn, 12251 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 12252 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 12253 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12254 struct bpf_sanitize_info *info, 12255 const bool commit_window) 12256 { 12257 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : &info->aux; 12258 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 12259 bool off_is_imm = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 12260 bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0; 12261 bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg; 12262 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 12263 u32 alu_state, alu_limit; 12264 struct bpf_reg_state tmp; 12265 bool ret; 12266 int err; 12267 12268 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 12269 return 0; 12270 12271 /* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative 12272 * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care 12273 * to explore bad access from here. 12274 */ 12275 if (vstate->speculative) 12276 goto do_sim; 12277 12278 if (!commit_window) { 12279 if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) && 12280 (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0)) 12281 return REASON_BOUNDS; 12282 12283 info->mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) || 12284 (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg); 12285 } 12286 12287 err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left); 12288 if (err < 0) 12289 return err; 12290 12291 if (commit_window) { 12292 /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on 12293 * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation. 12294 */ 12295 alu_state = info->aux.alu_state; 12296 alu_limit = abs(info->aux.alu_limit - alu_limit); 12297 } else { 12298 alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0; 12299 alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0; 12300 alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? 12301 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; 12302 12303 /* Limit pruning on unknown scalars to enable deep search for 12304 * potential masking differences from other program paths. 12305 */ 12306 if (!off_is_imm) 12307 env->explore_alu_limits = true; 12308 } 12309 12310 err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit); 12311 if (err < 0) 12312 return err; 12313 do_sim: 12314 /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already 12315 * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification 12316 * stack. 12317 * 12318 * Also, when register is a known constant, we rewrite register-based 12319 * operation to immediate-based, and thus do not need masking (and as 12320 * a consequence, do not need to simulate the zero-truncation either). 12321 */ 12322 if (commit_window || off_is_imm) 12323 return 0; 12324 12325 /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under 12326 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of 12327 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off 12328 * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there 12329 * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example, 12330 * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction 12331 * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore 12332 * bad access. 12333 */ 12334 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) { 12335 tmp = *dst_reg; 12336 copy_register_state(dst_reg, ptr_reg); 12337 } 12338 ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1, 12339 env->insn_idx); 12340 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret) 12341 *dst_reg = tmp; 12342 return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0; 12343 } 12344 12345 static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12346 { 12347 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 12348 12349 /* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the 12350 * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in 12351 * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still 12352 * rewrite/sanitize them. 12353 */ 12354 if (!vstate->speculative) 12355 env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt; 12356 } 12357 12358 static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12359 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason, 12360 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 12361 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 12362 { 12363 static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root"; 12364 const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub"; 12365 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg; 12366 12367 switch (reason) { 12368 case REASON_BOUNDS: 12369 verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n", 12370 off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err); 12371 break; 12372 case REASON_TYPE: 12373 verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n", 12374 off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err); 12375 break; 12376 case REASON_PATHS: 12377 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n", 12378 dst, op, err); 12379 break; 12380 case REASON_LIMIT: 12381 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n", 12382 dst, op, err); 12383 break; 12384 case REASON_STACK: 12385 verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n", 12386 dst, err); 12387 break; 12388 default: 12389 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reason (%d)\n", 12390 reason); 12391 break; 12392 } 12393 12394 return -EACCES; 12395 } 12396 12397 /* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't 12398 * have a variable offset. 12399 * 12400 * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it 12401 * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU. See also 12402 * retrieve_ptr_limit(). 12403 * 12404 * 12405 * 'off' includes 'reg->off'. 12406 */ 12407 static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( 12408 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12409 int regno, 12410 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 12411 int off) 12412 { 12413 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 12414 char tn_buf[48]; 12415 12416 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 12417 verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n", 12418 regno, tn_buf, off); 12419 return -EACCES; 12420 } 12421 12422 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) { 12423 verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, " 12424 "prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off); 12425 return -EACCES; 12426 } 12427 12428 return 0; 12429 } 12430 12431 static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12432 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 12433 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 12434 { 12435 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 12436 12437 /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds 12438 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. 12439 */ 12440 if (env->bypass_spec_v1) 12441 return 0; 12442 12443 switch (dst_reg->type) { 12444 case PTR_TO_STACK: 12445 if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg, 12446 dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value)) 12447 return -EACCES; 12448 break; 12449 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 12450 if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false, ACCESS_HELPER)) { 12451 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " 12452 "prohibited for !root\n", dst); 12453 return -EACCES; 12454 } 12455 break; 12456 default: 12457 break; 12458 } 12459 12460 return 0; 12461 } 12462 12463 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. 12464 * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. 12465 * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a 12466 * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks. 12467 */ 12468 static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12469 struct bpf_insn *insn, 12470 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 12471 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg) 12472 { 12473 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 12474 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 12475 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg; 12476 bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 12477 s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value, 12478 smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; 12479 u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, 12480 umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; 12481 struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {}; 12482 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 12483 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 12484 int ret; 12485 12486 dst_reg = ®s[dst]; 12487 12488 if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 12489 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 12490 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from 12491 * e.g. dead branches. 12492 */ 12493 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 12494 return 0; 12495 } 12496 12497 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { 12498 /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */ 12499 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 12500 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 12501 return 0; 12502 } 12503 12504 verbose(env, 12505 "R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 12506 dst); 12507 return -EACCES; 12508 } 12509 12510 if (ptr_reg->type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { 12511 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n", 12512 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 12513 return -EACCES; 12514 } 12515 12516 switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) { 12517 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 12518 if (known) 12519 break; 12520 fallthrough; 12521 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 12522 /* smin_val represents the known value */ 12523 if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD) 12524 break; 12525 fallthrough; 12526 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 12527 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 12528 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 12529 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 12530 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 12531 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", 12532 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 12533 return -EACCES; 12534 default: 12535 break; 12536 } 12537 12538 /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id. 12539 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset. 12540 */ 12541 dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type; 12542 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 12543 12544 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) || 12545 !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 12546 return -EINVAL; 12547 12548 /* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */ 12549 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 12550 12551 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 12552 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 12553 &info, false); 12554 if (ret < 0) 12555 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 12556 } 12557 12558 switch (opcode) { 12559 case BPF_ADD: 12560 /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow 12561 * the s32 'off' field 12562 */ 12563 if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val == 12564 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) { 12565 /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */ 12566 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 12567 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 12568 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 12569 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 12570 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 12571 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val; 12572 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 12573 break; 12574 } 12575 /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off 12576 * == 0, since it's a scalar. 12577 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive 12578 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id' 12579 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET. 12580 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets 12581 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset 12582 * from ptr_reg. 12583 */ 12584 if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) || 12585 signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) { 12586 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12587 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12588 } else { 12589 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val; 12590 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val; 12591 } 12592 if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr || 12593 umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) { 12594 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 12595 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 12596 } else { 12597 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val; 12598 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val; 12599 } 12600 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 12601 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 12602 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 12603 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 12604 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 12605 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 12606 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 12607 } 12608 break; 12609 case BPF_SUB: 12610 if (dst_reg == off_reg) { 12611 /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ 12612 verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", 12613 dst); 12614 return -EACCES; 12615 } 12616 /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to 12617 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not 12618 * be able to deal with it. 12619 */ 12620 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 12621 verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n", 12622 dst); 12623 return -EACCES; 12624 } 12625 if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val == 12626 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) { 12627 /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */ 12628 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 12629 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 12630 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 12631 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 12632 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 12633 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 12634 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val; 12635 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 12636 break; 12637 } 12638 /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known 12639 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good. 12640 */ 12641 if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) || 12642 signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) { 12643 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12644 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12645 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12646 } else { 12647 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val; 12648 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val; 12649 } 12650 if (umin_ptr < umax_val) { 12651 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12652 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 12653 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 12654 } else { 12655 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 12656 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val; 12657 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val; 12658 } 12659 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 12660 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 12661 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 12662 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 12663 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 12664 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 12665 if (smin_val < 0) 12666 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 12667 } 12668 break; 12669 case BPF_AND: 12670 case BPF_OR: 12671 case BPF_XOR: 12672 /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */ 12673 verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n", 12674 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 12675 return -EACCES; 12676 default: 12677 /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */ 12678 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n", 12679 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 12680 return -EACCES; 12681 } 12682 12683 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 12684 return -EINVAL; 12685 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 12686 if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0) 12687 return -EACCES; 12688 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 12689 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 12690 &info, true); 12691 if (ret < 0) 12692 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 12693 } 12694 12695 return 0; 12696 } 12697 12698 static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12699 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12700 { 12701 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12702 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 12703 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 12704 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 12705 12706 if (signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smin_val) || 12707 signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smax_val)) { 12708 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12709 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12710 } else { 12711 dst_reg->s32_min_value += smin_val; 12712 dst_reg->s32_max_value += smax_val; 12713 } 12714 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value + umin_val < umin_val || 12715 dst_reg->u32_max_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 12716 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 12717 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 12718 } else { 12719 dst_reg->u32_min_value += umin_val; 12720 dst_reg->u32_max_value += umax_val; 12721 } 12722 } 12723 12724 static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12725 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12726 { 12727 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12728 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 12729 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 12730 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 12731 12732 if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) || 12733 signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) { 12734 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12735 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12736 } else { 12737 dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val; 12738 dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val; 12739 } 12740 if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val || 12741 dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 12742 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 12743 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 12744 } else { 12745 dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val; 12746 dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val; 12747 } 12748 } 12749 12750 static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12751 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12752 { 12753 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12754 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 12755 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 12756 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 12757 12758 if (signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smax_val) || 12759 signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smin_val)) { 12760 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12761 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12762 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12763 } else { 12764 dst_reg->s32_min_value -= smax_val; 12765 dst_reg->s32_max_value -= smin_val; 12766 } 12767 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value < umax_val) { 12768 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12769 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 12770 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 12771 } else { 12772 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 12773 dst_reg->u32_min_value -= umax_val; 12774 dst_reg->u32_max_value -= umin_val; 12775 } 12776 } 12777 12778 static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12779 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12780 { 12781 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12782 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 12783 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 12784 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 12785 12786 if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) || 12787 signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) { 12788 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12789 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12790 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12791 } else { 12792 dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val; 12793 dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val; 12794 } 12795 if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) { 12796 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12797 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 12798 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 12799 } else { 12800 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 12801 dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val; 12802 dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val; 12803 } 12804 } 12805 12806 static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12807 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12808 { 12809 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12810 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 12811 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 12812 12813 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0) { 12814 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 12815 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 12816 return; 12817 } 12818 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 12819 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S32_MAX). 12820 */ 12821 if (umax_val > U16_MAX || dst_reg->u32_max_value > U16_MAX) { 12822 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 12823 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 12824 return; 12825 } 12826 dst_reg->u32_min_value *= umin_val; 12827 dst_reg->u32_max_value *= umax_val; 12828 if (dst_reg->u32_max_value > S32_MAX) { 12829 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12830 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12831 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12832 } else { 12833 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 12834 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 12835 } 12836 } 12837 12838 static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12839 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12840 { 12841 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12842 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 12843 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 12844 12845 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) { 12846 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 12847 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 12848 return; 12849 } 12850 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 12851 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX). 12852 */ 12853 if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) { 12854 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 12855 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 12856 return; 12857 } 12858 dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val; 12859 dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val; 12860 if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) { 12861 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12862 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12863 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12864 } else { 12865 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 12866 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 12867 } 12868 } 12869 12870 static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12871 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12872 { 12873 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 12874 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 12875 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 12876 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12877 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 12878 12879 if (src_known && dst_known) { 12880 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 12881 return; 12882 } 12883 12884 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 12885 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 12886 */ 12887 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 12888 dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val); 12889 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 12890 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 12891 * ain't nobody got time for that. 12892 */ 12893 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12894 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12895 } else { 12896 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 12897 * cast result into s64. 12898 */ 12899 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 12900 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 12901 } 12902 } 12903 12904 static void scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12905 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12906 { 12907 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 12908 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 12909 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12910 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 12911 12912 if (src_known && dst_known) { 12913 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 12914 return; 12915 } 12916 12917 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 12918 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 12919 */ 12920 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 12921 dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val); 12922 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 12923 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 12924 * ain't nobody got time for that. 12925 */ 12926 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12927 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12928 } else { 12929 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 12930 * cast result into s64. 12931 */ 12932 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 12933 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 12934 } 12935 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 12936 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 12937 } 12938 12939 static void scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12940 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12941 { 12942 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 12943 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 12944 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 12945 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12946 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 12947 12948 if (src_known && dst_known) { 12949 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 12950 return; 12951 } 12952 12953 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 12954 * maximum of the operands' minima 12955 */ 12956 dst_reg->u32_min_value = max(dst_reg->u32_min_value, umin_val); 12957 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 12958 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 12959 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 12960 * ain't nobody got time for that. 12961 */ 12962 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12963 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12964 } else { 12965 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 12966 * cast result into s64. 12967 */ 12968 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 12969 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 12970 } 12971 } 12972 12973 static void scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12974 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12975 { 12976 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 12977 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 12978 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12979 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 12980 12981 if (src_known && dst_known) { 12982 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 12983 return; 12984 } 12985 12986 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 12987 * maximum of the operands' minima 12988 */ 12989 dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val); 12990 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 12991 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 12992 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 12993 * ain't nobody got time for that. 12994 */ 12995 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12996 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12997 } else { 12998 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 12999 * cast result into s64. 13000 */ 13001 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 13002 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 13003 } 13004 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 13005 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 13006 } 13007 13008 static void scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13009 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13010 { 13011 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 13012 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 13013 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 13014 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 13015 13016 if (src_known && dst_known) { 13017 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 13018 return; 13019 } 13020 13021 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var32_off. */ 13022 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 13023 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 13024 13025 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 13026 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 13027 * so safe to cast u32 result into s32. 13028 */ 13029 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 13030 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 13031 } else { 13032 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 13033 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 13034 } 13035 } 13036 13037 static void scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13038 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13039 { 13040 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 13041 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 13042 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 13043 13044 if (src_known && dst_known) { 13045 /* dst_reg->var_off.value has been updated earlier */ 13046 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 13047 return; 13048 } 13049 13050 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var_off. */ 13051 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 13052 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 13053 13054 if (dst_reg->smin_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 13055 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 13056 * so safe to cast u64 result into s64. 13057 */ 13058 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 13059 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 13060 } else { 13061 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 13062 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 13063 } 13064 13065 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 13066 } 13067 13068 static void __scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13069 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 13070 { 13071 /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick 13072 * up from var_off) 13073 */ 13074 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 13075 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 13076 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 13077 if (umax_val > 31 || dst_reg->u32_max_value > 1ULL << (31 - umax_val)) { 13078 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 13079 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 13080 } else { 13081 dst_reg->u32_min_value <<= umin_val; 13082 dst_reg->u32_max_value <<= umax_val; 13083 } 13084 } 13085 13086 static void scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13087 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13088 { 13089 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 13090 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 13091 /* u32 alu operation will zext upper bits */ 13092 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 13093 13094 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 13095 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_lshift(subreg, umin_val)); 13096 /* Not required but being careful mark reg64 bounds as unknown so 13097 * that we are forced to pick them up from tnum and zext later and 13098 * if some path skips this step we are still safe. 13099 */ 13100 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 13101 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 13102 } 13103 13104 static void __scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13105 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 13106 { 13107 /* Special case <<32 because it is a common compiler pattern to sign 13108 * extend subreg by doing <<32 s>>32. In this case if 32bit bounds are 13109 * positive we know this shift will also be positive so we can track 13110 * bounds correctly. Otherwise we lose all sign bit information except 13111 * what we can pick up from var_off. Perhaps we can generalize this 13112 * later to shifts of any length. 13113 */ 13114 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_max_value >= 0) 13115 dst_reg->smax_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_max_value << 32; 13116 else 13117 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 13118 13119 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0) 13120 dst_reg->smin_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_min_value << 32; 13121 else 13122 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 13123 13124 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 13125 if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) { 13126 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 13127 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 13128 } else { 13129 dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val; 13130 dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val; 13131 } 13132 } 13133 13134 static void scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13135 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13136 { 13137 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 13138 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 13139 13140 /* scalar64 calc uses 32bit unshifted bounds so must be called first */ 13141 __scalar64_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 13142 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 13143 13144 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 13145 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 13146 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 13147 } 13148 13149 static void scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13150 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13151 { 13152 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 13153 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 13154 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 13155 13156 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 13157 * be negative, then either: 13158 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 13159 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 13160 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 13161 * signed bounds 13162 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 13163 * about the result 13164 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 13165 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 13166 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 13167 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 13168 * var_off of the result. 13169 */ 13170 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 13171 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 13172 13173 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(subreg, umin_val); 13174 dst_reg->u32_min_value >>= umax_val; 13175 dst_reg->u32_max_value >>= umin_val; 13176 13177 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 13178 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 13179 } 13180 13181 static void scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13182 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13183 { 13184 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 13185 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 13186 13187 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 13188 * be negative, then either: 13189 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 13190 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 13191 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 13192 * signed bounds 13193 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 13194 * about the result 13195 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 13196 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 13197 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 13198 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 13199 * var_off of the result. 13200 */ 13201 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 13202 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 13203 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 13204 dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val; 13205 dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val; 13206 13207 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 13208 * on bits being shifted in. Take easy way out and mark unbounded 13209 * so we can recalculate later from tnum. 13210 */ 13211 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 13212 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 13213 } 13214 13215 static void scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13216 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13217 { 13218 u64 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 13219 13220 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and 13221 * umax_val is equal to umin_val. 13222 */ 13223 dst_reg->s32_min_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_min_value) >> umin_val); 13224 dst_reg->s32_max_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_max_value) >> umin_val); 13225 13226 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off), umin_val, 32); 13227 13228 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 13229 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 13230 */ 13231 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 13232 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 13233 13234 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 13235 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 13236 } 13237 13238 static void scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13239 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13240 { 13241 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 13242 13243 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and umax_val is equal 13244 * to umin_val. 13245 */ 13246 dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val; 13247 dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val; 13248 13249 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val, 64); 13250 13251 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 13252 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 13253 */ 13254 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 13255 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 13256 13257 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 13258 * on bits being shifted in from upper 32-bits. Take easy way out 13259 * and mark unbounded so we can recalculate later from tnum. 13260 */ 13261 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 13262 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 13263 } 13264 13265 /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual 13266 * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts 13267 * need extra checks in the 32-bit case. 13268 */ 13269 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13270 struct bpf_insn *insn, 13271 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13272 struct bpf_reg_state src_reg) 13273 { 13274 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 13275 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 13276 bool src_known; 13277 s64 smin_val, smax_val; 13278 u64 umin_val, umax_val; 13279 s32 s32_min_val, s32_max_val; 13280 u32 u32_min_val, u32_max_val; 13281 u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32; 13282 bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64); 13283 int ret; 13284 13285 smin_val = src_reg.smin_value; 13286 smax_val = src_reg.smax_value; 13287 umin_val = src_reg.umin_value; 13288 umax_val = src_reg.umax_value; 13289 13290 s32_min_val = src_reg.s32_min_value; 13291 s32_max_val = src_reg.s32_max_value; 13292 u32_min_val = src_reg.u32_min_value; 13293 u32_max_val = src_reg.u32_max_value; 13294 13295 if (alu32) { 13296 src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 13297 if ((src_known && 13298 (s32_min_val != s32_max_val || u32_min_val != u32_max_val)) || 13299 s32_min_val > s32_max_val || u32_min_val > u32_max_val) { 13300 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 13301 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 13302 */ 13303 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 13304 return 0; 13305 } 13306 } else { 13307 src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 13308 if ((src_known && 13309 (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 13310 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 13311 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 13312 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 13313 */ 13314 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 13315 return 0; 13316 } 13317 } 13318 13319 if (!src_known && 13320 opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) { 13321 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 13322 return 0; 13323 } 13324 13325 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 13326 ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn); 13327 if (ret < 0) 13328 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL); 13329 } 13330 13331 /* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops. 13332 * There are two classes of instructions: The first class we track both 13333 * alu32 and alu64 sign/unsigned bounds independently this provides the 13334 * greatest amount of precision when alu operations are mixed with jmp32 13335 * operations. These operations are BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, BPF_MUL, BPF_ADD, 13336 * and BPF_OR. This is possible because these ops have fairly easy to 13337 * understand and calculate behavior in both 32-bit and 64-bit alu ops. 13338 * See alu32 verifier tests for examples. The second class of 13339 * operations, BPF_LSH, BPF_RSH, and BPF_ARSH, however are not so easy 13340 * with regards to tracking sign/unsigned bounds because the bits may 13341 * cross subreg boundaries in the alu64 case. When this happens we mark 13342 * the reg unbounded in the subreg bound space and use the resulting 13343 * tnum to calculate an approximation of the sign/unsigned bounds. 13344 */ 13345 switch (opcode) { 13346 case BPF_ADD: 13347 scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13348 scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13349 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 13350 break; 13351 case BPF_SUB: 13352 scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13353 scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13354 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 13355 break; 13356 case BPF_MUL: 13357 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 13358 scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13359 scalar_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13360 break; 13361 case BPF_AND: 13362 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 13363 scalar32_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13364 scalar_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13365 break; 13366 case BPF_OR: 13367 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 13368 scalar32_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13369 scalar_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13370 break; 13371 case BPF_XOR: 13372 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_xor(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 13373 scalar32_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13374 scalar_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13375 break; 13376 case BPF_LSH: 13377 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 13378 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 13379 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 13380 */ 13381 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 13382 break; 13383 } 13384 if (alu32) 13385 scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13386 else 13387 scalar_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13388 break; 13389 case BPF_RSH: 13390 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 13391 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 13392 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 13393 */ 13394 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 13395 break; 13396 } 13397 if (alu32) 13398 scalar32_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13399 else 13400 scalar_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13401 break; 13402 case BPF_ARSH: 13403 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 13404 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 13405 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 13406 */ 13407 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 13408 break; 13409 } 13410 if (alu32) 13411 scalar32_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13412 else 13413 scalar_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13414 break; 13415 default: 13416 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 13417 break; 13418 } 13419 13420 /* ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register */ 13421 if (alu32) 13422 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 13423 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 13424 return 0; 13425 } 13426 13427 /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max 13428 * and var_off. 13429 */ 13430 static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13431 struct bpf_insn *insn) 13432 { 13433 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 13434 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 13435 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg; 13436 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0}; 13437 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 13438 int err; 13439 13440 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 13441 src_reg = NULL; 13442 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 13443 ptr_reg = dst_reg; 13444 else 13445 /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be 13446 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by find_equal_scalars() 13447 */ 13448 dst_reg->id = 0; 13449 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 13450 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 13451 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 13452 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 13453 /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields 13454 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except 13455 * pointer subtraction 13456 */ 13457 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 13458 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 13459 return 0; 13460 } 13461 verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n", 13462 insn->dst_reg, 13463 bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 13464 return -EACCES; 13465 } else { 13466 /* scalar += pointer 13467 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our 13468 * src/dest handling in computing the range 13469 */ 13470 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 13471 if (err) 13472 return err; 13473 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 13474 src_reg, dst_reg); 13475 } 13476 } else if (ptr_reg) { 13477 /* pointer += scalar */ 13478 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 13479 if (err) 13480 return err; 13481 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 13482 dst_reg, src_reg); 13483 } else if (dst_reg->precise) { 13484 /* if dst_reg is precise, src_reg should be precise as well */ 13485 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 13486 if (err) 13487 return err; 13488 } 13489 } else { 13490 /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only 13491 * need to be able to read from this state. 13492 */ 13493 off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 13494 __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm); 13495 src_reg = &off_reg; 13496 if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */ 13497 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 13498 ptr_reg, src_reg); 13499 } 13500 13501 /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */ 13502 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) { 13503 print_verifier_state(env, state, true); 13504 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); 13505 return -EINVAL; 13506 } 13507 if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) { 13508 print_verifier_state(env, state, true); 13509 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); 13510 return -EINVAL; 13511 } 13512 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); 13513 } 13514 13515 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */ 13516 static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 13517 { 13518 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 13519 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 13520 int err; 13521 13522 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { 13523 if (opcode == BPF_NEG) { 13524 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 13525 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 13526 insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) { 13527 verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n"); 13528 return -EINVAL; 13529 } 13530 } else { 13531 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 13532 (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) || 13533 (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 && 13534 BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_TO_LE)) { 13535 verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n"); 13536 return -EINVAL; 13537 } 13538 } 13539 13540 /* check src operand */ 13541 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 13542 if (err) 13543 return err; 13544 13545 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 13546 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 13547 insn->dst_reg); 13548 return -EACCES; 13549 } 13550 13551 /* check dest operand */ 13552 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 13553 if (err) 13554 return err; 13555 13556 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 13557 13558 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 13559 if (insn->imm != 0) { 13560 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 13561 return -EINVAL; 13562 } 13563 13564 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU) { 13565 if (insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 8 && insn->off != 16) { 13566 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 13567 return -EINVAL; 13568 } 13569 } else { 13570 if (insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 8 && insn->off != 16 && 13571 insn->off != 32) { 13572 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 13573 return -EINVAL; 13574 } 13575 } 13576 13577 /* check src operand */ 13578 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 13579 if (err) 13580 return err; 13581 } else { 13582 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 13583 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 13584 return -EINVAL; 13585 } 13586 } 13587 13588 /* check dest operand, mark as required later */ 13589 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 13590 if (err) 13591 return err; 13592 13593 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 13594 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg; 13595 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg; 13596 bool need_id = src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id && 13597 !tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 13598 13599 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 13600 if (insn->off == 0) { 13601 /* case: R1 = R2 13602 * copy register state to dest reg 13603 */ 13604 if (need_id) 13605 /* Assign src and dst registers the same ID 13606 * that will be used by find_equal_scalars() 13607 * to propagate min/max range. 13608 */ 13609 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 13610 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 13611 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 13612 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 13613 } else { 13614 /* case: R1 = (s8, s16 s32)R2 */ 13615 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 13616 verbose(env, 13617 "R%d sign-extension part of pointer\n", 13618 insn->src_reg); 13619 return -EACCES; 13620 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 13621 bool no_sext; 13622 13623 no_sext = src_reg->umax_value < (1ULL << (insn->off - 1)); 13624 if (no_sext && need_id) 13625 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 13626 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 13627 if (!no_sext) 13628 dst_reg->id = 0; 13629 coerce_reg_to_size_sx(dst_reg, insn->off >> 3); 13630 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 13631 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 13632 } else { 13633 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 13634 } 13635 } 13636 } else { 13637 /* R1 = (u32) R2 */ 13638 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 13639 verbose(env, 13640 "R%d partial copy of pointer\n", 13641 insn->src_reg); 13642 return -EACCES; 13643 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 13644 if (insn->off == 0) { 13645 bool is_src_reg_u32 = src_reg->umax_value <= U32_MAX; 13646 13647 if (is_src_reg_u32 && need_id) 13648 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 13649 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 13650 /* Make sure ID is cleared if src_reg is not in u32 13651 * range otherwise dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly 13652 * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars() 13653 */ 13654 if (!is_src_reg_u32) 13655 dst_reg->id = 0; 13656 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 13657 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 13658 } else { 13659 /* case: W1 = (s8, s16)W2 */ 13660 bool no_sext = src_reg->umax_value < (1ULL << (insn->off - 1)); 13661 13662 if (no_sext && need_id) 13663 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 13664 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 13665 if (!no_sext) 13666 dst_reg->id = 0; 13667 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 13668 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 13669 coerce_subreg_to_size_sx(dst_reg, insn->off >> 3); 13670 } 13671 } else { 13672 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, 13673 insn->dst_reg); 13674 } 13675 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 13676 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 13677 } 13678 } else { 13679 /* case: R = imm 13680 * remember the value we stored into this reg 13681 */ 13682 /* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */ 13683 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 13684 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 13685 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 13686 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 13687 insn->imm); 13688 } else { 13689 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 13690 (u32)insn->imm); 13691 } 13692 } 13693 13694 } else if (opcode > BPF_END) { 13695 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode); 13696 return -EINVAL; 13697 13698 } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */ 13699 13700 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 13701 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off > 1 || 13702 (insn->off == 1 && opcode != BPF_MOD && opcode != BPF_DIV)) { 13703 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 13704 return -EINVAL; 13705 } 13706 /* check src1 operand */ 13707 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 13708 if (err) 13709 return err; 13710 } else { 13711 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off > 1 || 13712 (insn->off == 1 && opcode != BPF_MOD && opcode != BPF_DIV)) { 13713 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 13714 return -EINVAL; 13715 } 13716 } 13717 13718 /* check src2 operand */ 13719 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 13720 if (err) 13721 return err; 13722 13723 if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) && 13724 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) { 13725 verbose(env, "div by zero\n"); 13726 return -EINVAL; 13727 } 13728 13729 if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH || 13730 opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 13731 int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32; 13732 13733 if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) { 13734 verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm); 13735 return -EINVAL; 13736 } 13737 } 13738 13739 /* check dest operand */ 13740 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 13741 if (err) 13742 return err; 13743 13744 return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn); 13745 } 13746 13747 return 0; 13748 } 13749 13750 static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 13751 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13752 enum bpf_reg_type type, 13753 bool range_right_open) 13754 { 13755 struct bpf_func_state *state; 13756 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 13757 int new_range; 13758 13759 if (dst_reg->off < 0 || 13760 (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open)) 13761 /* This doesn't give us any range */ 13762 return; 13763 13764 if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF || 13765 dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF) 13766 /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less 13767 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt. 13768 */ 13769 return; 13770 13771 new_range = dst_reg->off; 13772 if (range_right_open) 13773 new_range++; 13774 13775 /* Examples for register markings: 13776 * 13777 * pkt_data in dst register: 13778 * 13779 * r2 = r3; 13780 * r2 += 8; 13781 * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception> 13782 * <access okay> 13783 * 13784 * r2 = r3; 13785 * r2 += 8; 13786 * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay> 13787 * <handle exception> 13788 * 13789 * Where: 13790 * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg 13791 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 13792 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 13793 * 13794 * pkt_data in src register: 13795 * 13796 * r2 = r3; 13797 * r2 += 8; 13798 * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay> 13799 * <handle exception> 13800 * 13801 * r2 = r3; 13802 * r2 += 8; 13803 * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception> 13804 * <access okay> 13805 * 13806 * Where: 13807 * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg 13808 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 13809 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 13810 * 13811 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) 13812 * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) 13813 * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on 13814 * the check. 13815 */ 13816 13817 /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we 13818 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big 13819 * the range won't allow anything. 13820 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16. 13821 */ 13822 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 13823 if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) 13824 /* keep the maximum range already checked */ 13825 reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range); 13826 })); 13827 } 13828 13829 static int is_branch32_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 val, u8 opcode) 13830 { 13831 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 13832 s32 sval = (s32)val; 13833 13834 switch (opcode) { 13835 case BPF_JEQ: 13836 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 13837 return !!tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 13838 else if (val < reg->u32_min_value || val > reg->u32_max_value) 13839 return 0; 13840 break; 13841 case BPF_JNE: 13842 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 13843 return !tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 13844 else if (val < reg->u32_min_value || val > reg->u32_max_value) 13845 return 1; 13846 break; 13847 case BPF_JSET: 13848 if ((~subreg.mask & subreg.value) & val) 13849 return 1; 13850 if (!((subreg.mask | subreg.value) & val)) 13851 return 0; 13852 break; 13853 case BPF_JGT: 13854 if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 13855 return 1; 13856 else if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 13857 return 0; 13858 break; 13859 case BPF_JSGT: 13860 if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 13861 return 1; 13862 else if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) 13863 return 0; 13864 break; 13865 case BPF_JLT: 13866 if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 13867 return 1; 13868 else if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 13869 return 0; 13870 break; 13871 case BPF_JSLT: 13872 if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 13873 return 1; 13874 else if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 13875 return 0; 13876 break; 13877 case BPF_JGE: 13878 if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 13879 return 1; 13880 else if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 13881 return 0; 13882 break; 13883 case BPF_JSGE: 13884 if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 13885 return 1; 13886 else if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 13887 return 0; 13888 break; 13889 case BPF_JLE: 13890 if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 13891 return 1; 13892 else if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 13893 return 0; 13894 break; 13895 case BPF_JSLE: 13896 if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) 13897 return 1; 13898 else if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 13899 return 0; 13900 break; 13901 } 13902 13903 return -1; 13904 } 13905 13906 13907 static int is_branch64_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode) 13908 { 13909 s64 sval = (s64)val; 13910 13911 switch (opcode) { 13912 case BPF_JEQ: 13913 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 13914 return !!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 13915 else if (val < reg->umin_value || val > reg->umax_value) 13916 return 0; 13917 break; 13918 case BPF_JNE: 13919 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 13920 return !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 13921 else if (val < reg->umin_value || val > reg->umax_value) 13922 return 1; 13923 break; 13924 case BPF_JSET: 13925 if ((~reg->var_off.mask & reg->var_off.value) & val) 13926 return 1; 13927 if (!((reg->var_off.mask | reg->var_off.value) & val)) 13928 return 0; 13929 break; 13930 case BPF_JGT: 13931 if (reg->umin_value > val) 13932 return 1; 13933 else if (reg->umax_value <= val) 13934 return 0; 13935 break; 13936 case BPF_JSGT: 13937 if (reg->smin_value > sval) 13938 return 1; 13939 else if (reg->smax_value <= sval) 13940 return 0; 13941 break; 13942 case BPF_JLT: 13943 if (reg->umax_value < val) 13944 return 1; 13945 else if (reg->umin_value >= val) 13946 return 0; 13947 break; 13948 case BPF_JSLT: 13949 if (reg->smax_value < sval) 13950 return 1; 13951 else if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 13952 return 0; 13953 break; 13954 case BPF_JGE: 13955 if (reg->umin_value >= val) 13956 return 1; 13957 else if (reg->umax_value < val) 13958 return 0; 13959 break; 13960 case BPF_JSGE: 13961 if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 13962 return 1; 13963 else if (reg->smax_value < sval) 13964 return 0; 13965 break; 13966 case BPF_JLE: 13967 if (reg->umax_value <= val) 13968 return 1; 13969 else if (reg->umin_value > val) 13970 return 0; 13971 break; 13972 case BPF_JSLE: 13973 if (reg->smax_value <= sval) 13974 return 1; 13975 else if (reg->smin_value > sval) 13976 return 0; 13977 break; 13978 } 13979 13980 return -1; 13981 } 13982 13983 /* compute branch direction of the expression "if (reg opcode val) goto target;" 13984 * and return: 13985 * 1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed 13986 * 0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn 13987 * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg < 5)" is unknown when register value 13988 * range [0,10] 13989 */ 13990 static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode, 13991 bool is_jmp32) 13992 { 13993 if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg)) { 13994 if (!reg_not_null(reg)) 13995 return -1; 13996 13997 /* If pointer is valid tests against zero will fail so we can 13998 * use this to direct branch taken. 13999 */ 14000 if (val != 0) 14001 return -1; 14002 14003 switch (opcode) { 14004 case BPF_JEQ: 14005 return 0; 14006 case BPF_JNE: 14007 return 1; 14008 default: 14009 return -1; 14010 } 14011 } 14012 14013 if (is_jmp32) 14014 return is_branch32_taken(reg, val, opcode); 14015 return is_branch64_taken(reg, val, opcode); 14016 } 14017 14018 static int flip_opcode(u32 opcode) 14019 { 14020 /* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */ 14021 static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = { 14022 /* these stay the same */ 14023 [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = BPF_JEQ, 14024 [BPF_JNE >> 4] = BPF_JNE, 14025 [BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET, 14026 /* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */ 14027 [BPF_JGE >> 4] = BPF_JLE, 14028 [BPF_JGT >> 4] = BPF_JLT, 14029 [BPF_JLE >> 4] = BPF_JGE, 14030 [BPF_JLT >> 4] = BPF_JGT, 14031 [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = BPF_JSLE, 14032 [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = BPF_JSLT, 14033 [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = BPF_JSGE, 14034 [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = BPF_JSGT 14035 }; 14036 return opcode_flip[opcode >> 4]; 14037 } 14038 14039 static int is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 14040 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 14041 u8 opcode) 14042 { 14043 struct bpf_reg_state *pkt; 14044 14045 if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 14046 pkt = dst_reg; 14047 } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 14048 pkt = src_reg; 14049 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 14050 } else { 14051 return -1; 14052 } 14053 14054 if (pkt->range >= 0) 14055 return -1; 14056 14057 switch (opcode) { 14058 case BPF_JLE: 14059 /* pkt <= pkt_end */ 14060 fallthrough; 14061 case BPF_JGT: 14062 /* pkt > pkt_end */ 14063 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END) 14064 /* pkt has at last one extra byte beyond pkt_end */ 14065 return opcode == BPF_JGT; 14066 break; 14067 case BPF_JLT: 14068 /* pkt < pkt_end */ 14069 fallthrough; 14070 case BPF_JGE: 14071 /* pkt >= pkt_end */ 14072 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END || pkt->range == AT_PKT_END) 14073 return opcode == BPF_JGE; 14074 break; 14075 } 14076 return -1; 14077 } 14078 14079 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the 14080 * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're 14081 * simply doing a BPF_K check. 14082 * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values. 14083 */ 14084 static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 14085 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 14086 u64 val, u32 val32, 14087 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 14088 { 14089 struct tnum false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off); 14090 struct tnum false_64off = false_reg->var_off; 14091 struct tnum true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off); 14092 struct tnum true_64off = true_reg->var_off; 14093 s64 sval = (s64)val; 14094 s32 sval32 = (s32)val32; 14095 14096 /* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its 14097 * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into 14098 * the same object, but we don't bother with that. 14099 * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we 14100 * only need to check one of them for pointerness. 14101 */ 14102 if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg)) 14103 return; 14104 14105 switch (opcode) { 14106 /* JEQ/JNE comparison doesn't change the register equivalence. 14107 * 14108 * r1 = r2; 14109 * if (r1 == 42) goto label; 14110 * ... 14111 * label: // here both r1 and r2 are known to be 42. 14112 * 14113 * Hence when marking register as known preserve it's ID. 14114 */ 14115 case BPF_JEQ: 14116 if (is_jmp32) { 14117 __mark_reg32_known(true_reg, val32); 14118 true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off); 14119 } else { 14120 ___mark_reg_known(true_reg, val); 14121 true_64off = true_reg->var_off; 14122 } 14123 break; 14124 case BPF_JNE: 14125 if (is_jmp32) { 14126 __mark_reg32_known(false_reg, val32); 14127 false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off); 14128 } else { 14129 ___mark_reg_known(false_reg, val); 14130 false_64off = false_reg->var_off; 14131 } 14132 break; 14133 case BPF_JSET: 14134 if (is_jmp32) { 14135 false_32off = tnum_and(false_32off, tnum_const(~val32)); 14136 if (is_power_of_2(val32)) 14137 true_32off = tnum_or(true_32off, 14138 tnum_const(val32)); 14139 } else { 14140 false_64off = tnum_and(false_64off, tnum_const(~val)); 14141 if (is_power_of_2(val)) 14142 true_64off = tnum_or(true_64off, 14143 tnum_const(val)); 14144 } 14145 break; 14146 case BPF_JGE: 14147 case BPF_JGT: 14148 { 14149 if (is_jmp32) { 14150 u32 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 : val32 - 1; 14151 u32 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 + 1 : val32; 14152 14153 false_reg->u32_max_value = min(false_reg->u32_max_value, 14154 false_umax); 14155 true_reg->u32_min_value = max(true_reg->u32_min_value, 14156 true_umin); 14157 } else { 14158 u64 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val : val - 1; 14159 u64 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val + 1 : val; 14160 14161 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, false_umax); 14162 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, true_umin); 14163 } 14164 break; 14165 } 14166 case BPF_JSGE: 14167 case BPF_JSGT: 14168 { 14169 if (is_jmp32) { 14170 s32 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 : sval32 - 1; 14171 s32 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 + 1 : sval32; 14172 14173 false_reg->s32_max_value = min(false_reg->s32_max_value, false_smax); 14174 true_reg->s32_min_value = max(true_reg->s32_min_value, true_smin); 14175 } else { 14176 s64 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval : sval - 1; 14177 s64 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval + 1 : sval; 14178 14179 false_reg->smax_value = min(false_reg->smax_value, false_smax); 14180 true_reg->smin_value = max(true_reg->smin_value, true_smin); 14181 } 14182 break; 14183 } 14184 case BPF_JLE: 14185 case BPF_JLT: 14186 { 14187 if (is_jmp32) { 14188 u32 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 : val32 + 1; 14189 u32 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 - 1 : val32; 14190 14191 false_reg->u32_min_value = max(false_reg->u32_min_value, 14192 false_umin); 14193 true_reg->u32_max_value = min(true_reg->u32_max_value, 14194 true_umax); 14195 } else { 14196 u64 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val : val + 1; 14197 u64 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val - 1 : val; 14198 14199 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, false_umin); 14200 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, true_umax); 14201 } 14202 break; 14203 } 14204 case BPF_JSLE: 14205 case BPF_JSLT: 14206 { 14207 if (is_jmp32) { 14208 s32 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 : sval32 + 1; 14209 s32 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 - 1 : sval32; 14210 14211 false_reg->s32_min_value = max(false_reg->s32_min_value, false_smin); 14212 true_reg->s32_max_value = min(true_reg->s32_max_value, true_smax); 14213 } else { 14214 s64 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval : sval + 1; 14215 s64 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval - 1 : sval; 14216 14217 false_reg->smin_value = max(false_reg->smin_value, false_smin); 14218 true_reg->smax_value = min(true_reg->smax_value, true_smax); 14219 } 14220 break; 14221 } 14222 default: 14223 return; 14224 } 14225 14226 if (is_jmp32) { 14227 false_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(false_64off), 14228 tnum_subreg(false_32off)); 14229 true_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(true_64off), 14230 tnum_subreg(true_32off)); 14231 __reg_combine_32_into_64(false_reg); 14232 __reg_combine_32_into_64(true_reg); 14233 } else { 14234 false_reg->var_off = false_64off; 14235 true_reg->var_off = true_64off; 14236 __reg_combine_64_into_32(false_reg); 14237 __reg_combine_64_into_32(true_reg); 14238 } 14239 } 14240 14241 /* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is 14242 * the variable reg. 14243 */ 14244 static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 14245 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 14246 u64 val, u32 val32, 14247 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 14248 { 14249 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 14250 /* This uses zero as "not present in table"; luckily the zero opcode, 14251 * BPF_JA, can't get here. 14252 */ 14253 if (opcode) 14254 reg_set_min_max(true_reg, false_reg, val, val32, opcode, is_jmp32); 14255 } 14256 14257 /* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */ 14258 static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 14259 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 14260 { 14261 src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value, 14262 dst_reg->umin_value); 14263 src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value, 14264 dst_reg->umax_value); 14265 src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value, 14266 dst_reg->smin_value); 14267 src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value, 14268 dst_reg->smax_value); 14269 src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off, 14270 dst_reg->var_off); 14271 reg_bounds_sync(src_reg); 14272 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 14273 } 14274 14275 static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src, 14276 struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst, 14277 struct bpf_reg_state *false_src, 14278 struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst, 14279 u8 opcode) 14280 { 14281 switch (opcode) { 14282 case BPF_JEQ: 14283 __reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst); 14284 break; 14285 case BPF_JNE: 14286 __reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst); 14287 break; 14288 } 14289 } 14290 14291 static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, 14292 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id, 14293 bool is_null) 14294 { 14295 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id && 14296 (is_rcu_reg(reg) || !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id))) { 14297 /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should have been 14298 * known-zero, because we don't allow pointer arithmetic on 14299 * pointers that might be NULL. If we see this happening, don't 14300 * convert the register. 14301 * 14302 * But in some cases, some helpers that return local kptrs 14303 * advance offset for the returned pointer. In those cases, it 14304 * is fine to expect to see reg->off. 14305 */ 14306 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value || !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0))) 14307 return; 14308 if (!(type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type) || type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) && 14309 WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->off)) 14310 return; 14311 14312 if (is_null) { 14313 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 14314 /* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point 14315 * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it, 14316 * so that state pruning has chances to take effect. 14317 */ 14318 reg->id = 0; 14319 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 14320 14321 return; 14322 } 14323 14324 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 14325 14326 if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) { 14327 /* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset 14328 * in release_reference(). 14329 * 14330 * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other 14331 * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset. 14332 */ 14333 reg->id = 0; 14334 } 14335 } 14336 } 14337 14338 /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually 14339 * be folded together at some point. 14340 */ 14341 static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno, 14342 bool is_null) 14343 { 14344 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 14345 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; 14346 u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id; 14347 u32 id = regs[regno].id; 14348 14349 if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null) 14350 /* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch. 14351 * No one could have freed the reference state before 14352 * doing the NULL check. 14353 */ 14354 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_state(state, id)); 14355 14356 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 14357 mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, reg, id, is_null); 14358 })); 14359 } 14360 14361 static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn, 14362 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 14363 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 14364 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch, 14365 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch) 14366 { 14367 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X) 14368 return false; 14369 14370 /* Pointers are always 64-bit. */ 14371 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32) 14372 return false; 14373 14374 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 14375 case BPF_JGT: 14376 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 14377 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 14378 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 14379 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 14380 /* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */ 14381 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 14382 dst_reg->type, false); 14383 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 14384 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 14385 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 14386 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 14387 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 14388 /* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 14389 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 14390 src_reg->type, true); 14391 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 14392 } else { 14393 return false; 14394 } 14395 break; 14396 case BPF_JLT: 14397 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 14398 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 14399 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 14400 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 14401 /* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */ 14402 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 14403 dst_reg->type, true); 14404 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 14405 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 14406 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 14407 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 14408 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 14409 /* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 14410 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 14411 src_reg->type, false); 14412 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 14413 } else { 14414 return false; 14415 } 14416 break; 14417 case BPF_JGE: 14418 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 14419 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 14420 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 14421 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 14422 /* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */ 14423 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 14424 dst_reg->type, true); 14425 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 14426 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 14427 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 14428 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 14429 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 14430 /* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */ 14431 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 14432 src_reg->type, false); 14433 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 14434 } else { 14435 return false; 14436 } 14437 break; 14438 case BPF_JLE: 14439 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 14440 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 14441 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 14442 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 14443 /* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */ 14444 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 14445 dst_reg->type, false); 14446 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 14447 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 14448 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 14449 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 14450 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 14451 /* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */ 14452 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 14453 src_reg->type, true); 14454 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 14455 } else { 14456 return false; 14457 } 14458 break; 14459 default: 14460 return false; 14461 } 14462 14463 return true; 14464 } 14465 14466 static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 14467 struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg) 14468 { 14469 struct bpf_func_state *state; 14470 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 14471 14472 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 14473 if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id) 14474 copy_register_state(reg, known_reg); 14475 })); 14476 } 14477 14478 static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14479 struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx) 14480 { 14481 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state; 14482 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch; 14483 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs; 14484 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL; 14485 struct bpf_reg_state *eq_branch_regs; 14486 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 14487 bool is_jmp32; 14488 int pred = -1; 14489 int err; 14490 14491 /* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */ 14492 if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JSLE) { 14493 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode); 14494 return -EINVAL; 14495 } 14496 14497 /* check src2 operand */ 14498 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 14499 if (err) 14500 return err; 14501 14502 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 14503 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 14504 if (insn->imm != 0) { 14505 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 14506 return -EINVAL; 14507 } 14508 14509 /* check src1 operand */ 14510 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 14511 if (err) 14512 return err; 14513 14514 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 14515 if (!(reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg)) && 14516 is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 14517 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 14518 insn->src_reg); 14519 return -EACCES; 14520 } 14521 } else { 14522 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 14523 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 14524 return -EINVAL; 14525 } 14526 } 14527 14528 is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32; 14529 14530 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 14531 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode, is_jmp32); 14532 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 14533 is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off))) { 14534 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 14535 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 14536 opcode, 14537 is_jmp32); 14538 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 14539 !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)) { 14540 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 14541 src_reg->var_off.value, 14542 opcode, 14543 is_jmp32); 14544 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 14545 is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off))) { 14546 pred = is_branch_taken(src_reg, 14547 tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value, 14548 flip_opcode(opcode), 14549 is_jmp32); 14550 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 14551 !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off)) { 14552 pred = is_branch_taken(src_reg, 14553 dst_reg->var_off.value, 14554 flip_opcode(opcode), 14555 is_jmp32); 14556 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && 14557 reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg) && 14558 !is_jmp32) { 14559 pred = is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg, opcode); 14560 } 14561 14562 if (pred >= 0) { 14563 /* If we get here with a dst_reg pointer type it is because 14564 * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison. 14565 */ 14566 if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg)) 14567 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 14568 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err && 14569 !__is_pointer_value(false, src_reg)) 14570 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 14571 if (err) 14572 return err; 14573 } 14574 14575 if (pred == 1) { 14576 /* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push 14577 * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative 14578 * execution. 14579 */ 14580 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && 14581 !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1, 14582 *insn_idx)) 14583 return -EFAULT; 14584 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 14585 print_insn_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]); 14586 *insn_idx += insn->off; 14587 return 0; 14588 } else if (pred == 0) { 14589 /* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the 14590 * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for 14591 * simulation under speculative execution. 14592 */ 14593 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && 14594 !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, 14595 *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, 14596 *insn_idx)) 14597 return -EFAULT; 14598 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 14599 print_insn_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]); 14600 return 0; 14601 } 14602 14603 other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx, 14604 false); 14605 if (!other_branch) 14606 return -EFAULT; 14607 other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs; 14608 14609 /* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust 14610 * our min/max values for our dst register. 14611 * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same 14612 * object, I suppose, see the PTR_MAYBE_NULL related if block below), 14613 * because otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't 14614 * comparable. 14615 */ 14616 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 14617 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 14618 14619 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 14620 src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 14621 if (tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off) || 14622 (is_jmp32 && 14623 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off)))) 14624 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 14625 dst_reg, 14626 src_reg->var_off.value, 14627 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 14628 opcode, is_jmp32); 14629 else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off) || 14630 (is_jmp32 && 14631 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off)))) 14632 reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 14633 src_reg, 14634 dst_reg->var_off.value, 14635 tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value, 14636 opcode, is_jmp32); 14637 else if (!is_jmp32 && 14638 (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE)) 14639 /* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */ 14640 reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 14641 &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 14642 src_reg, dst_reg, opcode); 14643 if (src_reg->id && 14644 !WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) { 14645 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, src_reg); 14646 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 14647 } 14648 14649 } 14650 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 14651 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 14652 dst_reg, insn->imm, (u32)insn->imm, 14653 opcode, is_jmp32); 14654 } 14655 14656 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id && 14657 !WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) { 14658 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, dst_reg); 14659 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 14660 } 14661 14662 /* if one pointer register is compared to another pointer 14663 * register check if PTR_MAYBE_NULL could be lifted. 14664 * E.g. register A - maybe null 14665 * register B - not null 14666 * for JNE A, B, ... - A is not null in the false branch; 14667 * for JEQ A, B, ... - A is not null in the true branch. 14668 * 14669 * Since PTR_TO_BTF_ID points to a kernel struct that does 14670 * not need to be null checked by the BPF program, i.e., 14671 * could be null even without PTR_MAYBE_NULL marking, so 14672 * only propagate nullness when neither reg is that type. 14673 */ 14674 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && 14675 __is_pointer_value(false, src_reg) && __is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg) && 14676 type_may_be_null(src_reg->type) != type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type) && 14677 base_type(src_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 14678 base_type(dst_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 14679 eq_branch_regs = NULL; 14680 switch (opcode) { 14681 case BPF_JEQ: 14682 eq_branch_regs = other_branch_regs; 14683 break; 14684 case BPF_JNE: 14685 eq_branch_regs = regs; 14686 break; 14687 default: 14688 /* do nothing */ 14689 break; 14690 } 14691 if (eq_branch_regs) { 14692 if (type_may_be_null(src_reg->type)) 14693 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 14694 else 14695 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 14696 } 14697 } 14698 14699 /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem(). 14700 * NOTE: these optimizations below are related with pointer comparison 14701 * which will never be JMP32. 14702 */ 14703 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && 14704 insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && 14705 type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) { 14706 /* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either 14707 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional. 14708 */ 14709 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, 14710 opcode == BPF_JNE); 14711 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, 14712 opcode == BPF_JEQ); 14713 } else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg], 14714 this_branch, other_branch) && 14715 is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 14716 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 14717 insn->dst_reg); 14718 return -EACCES; 14719 } 14720 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 14721 print_insn_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]); 14722 return 0; 14723 } 14724 14725 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ 14726 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 14727 { 14728 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 14729 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 14730 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg; 14731 struct bpf_map *map; 14732 int err; 14733 14734 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 14735 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n"); 14736 return -EINVAL; 14737 } 14738 if (insn->off != 0) { 14739 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n"); 14740 return -EINVAL; 14741 } 14742 14743 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 14744 if (err) 14745 return err; 14746 14747 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 14748 if (insn->src_reg == 0) { 14749 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; 14750 14751 dst_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 14752 __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], imm); 14753 return 0; 14754 } 14755 14756 /* All special src_reg cases are listed below. From this point onwards 14757 * we either succeed and assign a corresponding dst_reg->type after 14758 * zeroing the offset, or fail and reject the program. 14759 */ 14760 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 14761 14762 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 14763 dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type; 14764 switch (base_type(dst_reg->type)) { 14765 case PTR_TO_MEM: 14766 dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size; 14767 break; 14768 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 14769 dst_reg->btf = aux->btf_var.btf; 14770 dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id; 14771 break; 14772 default: 14773 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 14774 return -EFAULT; 14775 } 14776 return 0; 14777 } 14778 14779 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 14780 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 14781 u32 subprogno = find_subprog(env, 14782 env->insn_idx + insn->imm + 1); 14783 14784 if (!aux->func_info) { 14785 verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n"); 14786 return -EINVAL; 14787 } 14788 if (aux->func_info_aux[subprogno].linkage != BTF_FUNC_STATIC) { 14789 verbose(env, "callback function not static\n"); 14790 return -EINVAL; 14791 } 14792 14793 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 14794 dst_reg->subprogno = subprogno; 14795 return 0; 14796 } 14797 14798 map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index]; 14799 dst_reg->map_ptr = map; 14800 14801 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE || 14802 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE) { 14803 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 14804 dst_reg->off = aux->map_off; 14805 WARN_ON_ONCE(map->max_entries != 1); 14806 /* We want reg->id to be same (0) as map_value is not distinct */ 14807 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 14808 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 14809 dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 14810 } else { 14811 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 14812 return -EINVAL; 14813 } 14814 14815 return 0; 14816 } 14817 14818 static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type) 14819 { 14820 switch (type) { 14821 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 14822 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 14823 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 14824 return true; 14825 default: 14826 return false; 14827 } 14828 } 14829 14830 /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions: 14831 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb 14832 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers, 14833 * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0 14834 * 14835 * Implicit input: 14836 * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX 14837 * 14838 * Explicit input: 14839 * SRC == any register 14840 * IMM == 32-bit immediate 14841 * 14842 * Output: 14843 * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness 14844 */ 14845 static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 14846 { 14847 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 14848 static const int ctx_reg = BPF_REG_6; 14849 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 14850 int i, err; 14851 14852 if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) { 14853 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); 14854 return -EINVAL; 14855 } 14856 14857 if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) { 14858 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 14859 return -EINVAL; 14860 } 14861 14862 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 14863 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW || 14864 (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) { 14865 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n"); 14866 return -EINVAL; 14867 } 14868 14869 /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */ 14870 err = check_reg_arg(env, ctx_reg, SRC_OP); 14871 if (err) 14872 return err; 14873 14874 /* Disallow usage of BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] with reference tracking, as 14875 * gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to 14876 * reference leak. 14877 */ 14878 err = check_reference_leak(env); 14879 if (err) { 14880 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be mixed with socket references\n"); 14881 return err; 14882 } 14883 14884 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) { 14885 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_spin_lock-ed region\n"); 14886 return -EINVAL; 14887 } 14888 14889 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 14890 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_rcu_read_lock-ed region\n"); 14891 return -EINVAL; 14892 } 14893 14894 if (regs[ctx_reg].type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 14895 verbose(env, 14896 "at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n"); 14897 return -EINVAL; 14898 } 14899 14900 if (mode == BPF_IND) { 14901 /* check explicit source operand */ 14902 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 14903 if (err) 14904 return err; 14905 } 14906 14907 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, ®s[ctx_reg], ctx_reg); 14908 if (err < 0) 14909 return err; 14910 14911 /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */ 14912 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 14913 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 14914 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 14915 } 14916 14917 /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains 14918 * the value fetched from the packet. 14919 * Already marked as written above. 14920 */ 14921 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 14922 /* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */ 14923 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 14924 return 0; 14925 } 14926 14927 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14928 { 14929 struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown; 14930 const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 14931 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 14932 struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1), const_0 = tnum_const(0); 14933 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 14934 int err; 14935 struct bpf_func_state *frame = env->cur_state->frame[0]; 14936 const bool is_subprog = frame->subprogno; 14937 14938 /* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */ 14939 if (!is_subprog) { 14940 switch (prog_type) { 14941 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 14942 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) 14943 /* See below, can be 0 or 0-1 depending on hook. */ 14944 break; 14945 fallthrough; 14946 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: 14947 if (!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 14948 return 0; 14949 break; 14950 default: 14951 break; 14952 } 14953 } 14954 14955 /* eBPF calling convention is such that R0 is used 14956 * to return the value from eBPF program. 14957 * Make sure that it's readable at this time 14958 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote 14959 * something into it earlier 14960 */ 14961 err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP); 14962 if (err) 14963 return err; 14964 14965 if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) { 14966 verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n"); 14967 return -EACCES; 14968 } 14969 14970 reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0; 14971 14972 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn) { 14973 /* enforce return zero from async callbacks like timer */ 14974 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 14975 verbose(env, "In async callback the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", 14976 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 14977 return -EINVAL; 14978 } 14979 14980 if (!tnum_in(const_0, reg->var_off)) { 14981 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &const_0, "async callback", "R0"); 14982 return -EINVAL; 14983 } 14984 return 0; 14985 } 14986 14987 if (is_subprog) { 14988 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 14989 verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R0 is not a scalar value (%s)\n", 14990 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 14991 return -EINVAL; 14992 } 14993 return 0; 14994 } 14995 14996 switch (prog_type) { 14997 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: 14998 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG || 14999 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG || 15000 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME || 15001 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME || 15002 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME || 15003 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME) 15004 range = tnum_range(1, 1); 15005 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND || 15006 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND) 15007 range = tnum_range(0, 3); 15008 break; 15009 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 15010 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) { 15011 range = tnum_range(0, 3); 15012 enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3); 15013 } 15014 break; 15015 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: 15016 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: 15017 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE: 15018 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: 15019 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 15020 break; 15021 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 15022 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_btf_id) 15023 return 0; 15024 range = tnum_const(0); 15025 break; 15026 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 15027 switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) { 15028 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 15029 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 15030 range = tnum_const(0); 15031 break; 15032 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 15033 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 15034 return 0; 15035 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 15036 break; 15037 default: 15038 return -ENOTSUPP; 15039 } 15040 break; 15041 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 15042 range = tnum_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS); 15043 break; 15044 15045 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 15046 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 15047 /* Regular BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM programs can return 15048 * any value. 15049 */ 15050 return 0; 15051 } 15052 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 15053 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 15054 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 15055 */ 15056 range = tnum_range(1, 1); 15057 } 15058 break; 15059 15060 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_NETFILTER: 15061 range = tnum_range(NF_DROP, NF_ACCEPT); 15062 break; 15063 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: 15064 /* freplace program can return anything as its return value 15065 * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program. 15066 */ 15067 default: 15068 return 0; 15069 } 15070 15071 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 15072 verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", 15073 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 15074 return -EINVAL; 15075 } 15076 15077 if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { 15078 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "program exit", "R0"); 15079 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP && 15080 prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 15081 !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 15082 verbose(env, "Note, BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 15083 return -EINVAL; 15084 } 15085 15086 if (!tnum_is_unknown(enforce_attach_type_range) && 15087 tnum_in(enforce_attach_type_range, reg->var_off)) 15088 env->prog->enforce_expected_attach_type = 1; 15089 return 0; 15090 } 15091 15092 /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code 15093 * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v): 15094 * 2 label v as discovered 15095 * 3 let S be a stack 15096 * 4 S.push(v) 15097 * 5 while S is not empty 15098 * 6 t <- S.peek() 15099 * 7 if t is what we're looking for: 15100 * 8 return t 15101 * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do 15102 * 10 if edge e is already labelled 15103 * 11 continue with the next edge 15104 * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e) 15105 * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored 15106 * 14 label e as tree-edge 15107 * 15 label w as discovered 15108 * 16 S.push(w) 15109 * 17 continue at 5 15110 * 18 else if vertex w is discovered 15111 * 19 label e as back-edge 15112 * 20 else 15113 * 21 // vertex w is explored 15114 * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge 15115 * 23 label t as explored 15116 * 24 S.pop() 15117 * 15118 * convention: 15119 * 0x10 - discovered 15120 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled 15121 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled 15122 * 0x20 - explored 15123 */ 15124 15125 enum { 15126 DISCOVERED = 0x10, 15127 EXPLORED = 0x20, 15128 FALLTHROUGH = 1, 15129 BRANCH = 2, 15130 }; 15131 15132 static void mark_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 15133 { 15134 env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true; 15135 } 15136 15137 static bool is_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 15138 { 15139 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point; 15140 } 15141 15142 static void mark_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 15143 { 15144 env->insn_aux_data[idx].force_checkpoint = true; 15145 } 15146 15147 static bool is_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 15148 { 15149 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].force_checkpoint; 15150 } 15151 15152 static void mark_calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 15153 { 15154 env->insn_aux_data[idx].calls_callback = true; 15155 } 15156 15157 static bool calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 15158 { 15159 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].calls_callback; 15160 } 15161 15162 enum { 15163 DONE_EXPLORING = 0, 15164 KEEP_EXPLORING = 1, 15165 }; 15166 15167 /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above: 15168 * t - index of current instruction 15169 * w - next instruction 15170 * e - edge 15171 */ 15172 static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15173 { 15174 int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack; 15175 int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state; 15176 15177 if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH)) 15178 return DONE_EXPLORING; 15179 15180 if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH)) 15181 return DONE_EXPLORING; 15182 15183 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { 15184 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 15185 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 15186 return -EINVAL; 15187 } 15188 15189 if (e == BRANCH) { 15190 /* mark branch target for state pruning */ 15191 mark_prune_point(env, w); 15192 mark_jmp_point(env, w); 15193 } 15194 15195 if (insn_state[w] == 0) { 15196 /* tree-edge */ 15197 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 15198 insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED; 15199 if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len) 15200 return -E2BIG; 15201 insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; 15202 return KEEP_EXPLORING; 15203 } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { 15204 if (env->bpf_capable) 15205 return DONE_EXPLORING; 15206 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 15207 verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w); 15208 verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 15209 return -EINVAL; 15210 } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) { 15211 /* forward- or cross-edge */ 15212 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 15213 } else { 15214 verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n"); 15215 return -EFAULT; 15216 } 15217 return DONE_EXPLORING; 15218 } 15219 15220 static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, struct bpf_insn *insns, 15221 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15222 bool visit_callee) 15223 { 15224 int ret, insn_sz; 15225 15226 insn_sz = bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[t]) ? 2 : 1; 15227 ret = push_insn(t, t + insn_sz, FALLTHROUGH, env); 15228 if (ret) 15229 return ret; 15230 15231 mark_prune_point(env, t + insn_sz); 15232 /* when we exit from subprog, we need to record non-linear history */ 15233 mark_jmp_point(env, t + insn_sz); 15234 15235 if (visit_callee) { 15236 mark_prune_point(env, t); 15237 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env); 15238 } 15239 return ret; 15240 } 15241 15242 /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following: 15243 * < 0 - an error occurred 15244 * DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored 15245 * KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored 15246 */ 15247 static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15248 { 15249 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi, *insn = &insns[t]; 15250 int ret, off, insn_sz; 15251 15252 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) 15253 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, true); 15254 15255 /* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */ 15256 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP && 15257 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP32) { 15258 insn_sz = bpf_is_ldimm64(insn) ? 2 : 1; 15259 return push_insn(t, t + insn_sz, FALLTHROUGH, env); 15260 } 15261 15262 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 15263 case BPF_EXIT: 15264 return DONE_EXPLORING; 15265 15266 case BPF_CALL: 15267 if (insn->src_reg == 0 && insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) 15268 /* Mark this call insn as a prune point to trigger 15269 * is_state_visited() check before call itself is 15270 * processed by __check_func_call(). Otherwise new 15271 * async state will be pushed for further exploration. 15272 */ 15273 mark_prune_point(env, t); 15274 /* For functions that invoke callbacks it is not known how many times 15275 * callback would be called. Verifier models callback calling functions 15276 * by repeatedly visiting callback bodies and returning to origin call 15277 * instruction. 15278 * In order to stop such iteration verifier needs to identify when a 15279 * state identical some state from a previous iteration is reached. 15280 * Check below forces creation of checkpoint before callback calling 15281 * instruction to allow search for such identical states. 15282 */ 15283 if (is_sync_callback_calling_insn(insn)) { 15284 mark_calls_callback(env, t); 15285 mark_force_checkpoint(env, t); 15286 mark_prune_point(env, t); 15287 mark_jmp_point(env, t); 15288 } 15289 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 15290 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; 15291 15292 ret = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, insn, &meta, NULL); 15293 if (ret == 0 && is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) { 15294 mark_prune_point(env, t); 15295 /* Checking and saving state checkpoints at iter_next() call 15296 * is crucial for fast convergence of open-coded iterator loop 15297 * logic, so we need to force it. If we don't do that, 15298 * is_state_visited() might skip saving a checkpoint, causing 15299 * unnecessarily long sequence of not checkpointed 15300 * instructions and jumps, leading to exhaustion of jump 15301 * history buffer, and potentially other undesired outcomes. 15302 * It is expected that with correct open-coded iterators 15303 * convergence will happen quickly, so we don't run a risk of 15304 * exhausting memory. 15305 */ 15306 mark_force_checkpoint(env, t); 15307 } 15308 } 15309 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL); 15310 15311 case BPF_JA: 15312 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K) 15313 return -EINVAL; 15314 15315 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP) 15316 off = insn->off; 15317 else 15318 off = insn->imm; 15319 15320 /* unconditional jump with single edge */ 15321 ret = push_insn(t, t + off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); 15322 if (ret) 15323 return ret; 15324 15325 mark_prune_point(env, t + off + 1); 15326 mark_jmp_point(env, t + off + 1); 15327 15328 return ret; 15329 15330 default: 15331 /* conditional jump with two edges */ 15332 mark_prune_point(env, t); 15333 15334 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); 15335 if (ret) 15336 return ret; 15337 15338 return push_insn(t, t + insn->off + 1, BRANCH, env); 15339 } 15340 } 15341 15342 /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program 15343 * loop == back-edge in directed graph 15344 */ 15345 static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15346 { 15347 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 15348 int *insn_stack, *insn_state; 15349 int ret = 0; 15350 int i; 15351 15352 insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 15353 if (!insn_state) 15354 return -ENOMEM; 15355 15356 insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 15357 if (!insn_stack) { 15358 kvfree(insn_state); 15359 return -ENOMEM; 15360 } 15361 15362 insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */ 15363 insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */ 15364 env->cfg.cur_stack = 1; 15365 15366 while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) { 15367 int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1]; 15368 15369 ret = visit_insn(t, env); 15370 switch (ret) { 15371 case DONE_EXPLORING: 15372 insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; 15373 env->cfg.cur_stack--; 15374 break; 15375 case KEEP_EXPLORING: 15376 break; 15377 default: 15378 if (ret > 0) { 15379 verbose(env, "visit_insn internal bug\n"); 15380 ret = -EFAULT; 15381 } 15382 goto err_free; 15383 } 15384 } 15385 15386 if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) { 15387 verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n"); 15388 ret = -EFAULT; 15389 goto err_free; 15390 } 15391 15392 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 15393 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[i]; 15394 15395 if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) { 15396 verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i); 15397 ret = -EINVAL; 15398 goto err_free; 15399 } 15400 if (bpf_is_ldimm64(insn)) { 15401 if (insn_state[i + 1] != 0) { 15402 verbose(env, "jump into the middle of ldimm64 insn %d\n", i); 15403 ret = -EINVAL; 15404 goto err_free; 15405 } 15406 i++; /* skip second half of ldimm64 */ 15407 } 15408 } 15409 ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */ 15410 15411 err_free: 15412 kvfree(insn_state); 15413 kvfree(insn_stack); 15414 env->cfg.insn_state = env->cfg.insn_stack = NULL; 15415 return ret; 15416 } 15417 15418 static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15419 { 15420 int i; 15421 15422 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15423 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 15424 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 15425 return -EINVAL; 15426 } 15427 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 15428 verbose(env, "tail_call is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 15429 return -EINVAL; 15430 } 15431 } 15432 return 0; 15433 } 15434 15435 /* The minimum supported BTF func info size */ 15436 #define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE 8 15437 #define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 252 15438 15439 static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15440 const union bpf_attr *attr, 15441 bpfptr_t uattr) 15442 { 15443 const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type; 15444 u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size; 15445 u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info); 15446 struct bpf_func_info *krecord; 15447 struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL; 15448 struct bpf_prog *prog; 15449 const struct btf *btf; 15450 bpfptr_t urecord; 15451 u32 prev_offset = 0; 15452 bool scalar_return; 15453 int ret = -ENOMEM; 15454 15455 nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt; 15456 if (!nfuncs) { 15457 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 15458 return -EINVAL; 15459 return 0; 15460 } 15461 15462 if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) { 15463 verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n"); 15464 return -EINVAL; 15465 } 15466 15467 urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size; 15468 if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE || 15469 urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE || 15470 urec_size % sizeof(u32)) { 15471 verbose(env, "invalid func info rec size %u\n", urec_size); 15472 return -EINVAL; 15473 } 15474 15475 prog = env->prog; 15476 btf = prog->aux->btf; 15477 15478 urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel); 15479 min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size); 15480 15481 krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 15482 if (!krecord) 15483 return -ENOMEM; 15484 info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 15485 if (!info_aux) 15486 goto err_free; 15487 15488 for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) { 15489 ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size); 15490 if (ret) { 15491 if (ret == -E2BIG) { 15492 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in func info"); 15493 /* set the size kernel expects so loader can zero 15494 * out the rest of the record. 15495 */ 15496 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 15497 offsetof(union bpf_attr, func_info_rec_size), 15498 &min_size, sizeof(min_size))) 15499 ret = -EFAULT; 15500 } 15501 goto err_free; 15502 } 15503 15504 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&krecord[i], urecord, min_size)) { 15505 ret = -EFAULT; 15506 goto err_free; 15507 } 15508 15509 /* check insn_off */ 15510 ret = -EINVAL; 15511 if (i == 0) { 15512 if (krecord[i].insn_off) { 15513 verbose(env, 15514 "nonzero insn_off %u for the first func info record", 15515 krecord[i].insn_off); 15516 goto err_free; 15517 } 15518 } else if (krecord[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) { 15519 verbose(env, 15520 "same or smaller insn offset (%u) than previous func info record (%u)", 15521 krecord[i].insn_off, prev_offset); 15522 goto err_free; 15523 } 15524 15525 if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) { 15526 verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n"); 15527 goto err_free; 15528 } 15529 15530 /* check type_id */ 15531 type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id); 15532 if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) { 15533 verbose(env, "invalid type id %d in func info", 15534 krecord[i].type_id); 15535 goto err_free; 15536 } 15537 info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info); 15538 15539 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type); 15540 if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto))) 15541 /* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */ 15542 goto err_free; 15543 ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL); 15544 scalar_return = 15545 btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_is_any_enum(ret_type); 15546 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 15547 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 15548 goto err_free; 15549 } 15550 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 15551 verbose(env, "tail_call is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 15552 goto err_free; 15553 } 15554 15555 prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off; 15556 bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size); 15557 } 15558 15559 prog->aux->func_info = krecord; 15560 prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs; 15561 prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux; 15562 return 0; 15563 15564 err_free: 15565 kvfree(krecord); 15566 kfree(info_aux); 15567 return ret; 15568 } 15569 15570 static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15571 { 15572 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 15573 int i; 15574 15575 if (!aux->func_info) 15576 return; 15577 15578 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 15579 aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start; 15580 } 15581 15582 #define MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE offsetofend(struct bpf_line_info, line_col) 15583 #define MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 15584 15585 static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15586 const union bpf_attr *attr, 15587 bpfptr_t uattr) 15588 { 15589 u32 i, s, nr_linfo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size, prev_offset = 0; 15590 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub; 15591 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 15592 struct bpf_prog *prog; 15593 const struct btf *btf; 15594 bpfptr_t ulinfo; 15595 int err; 15596 15597 nr_linfo = attr->line_info_cnt; 15598 if (!nr_linfo) 15599 return 0; 15600 if (nr_linfo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_line_info)) 15601 return -EINVAL; 15602 15603 rec_size = attr->line_info_rec_size; 15604 if (rec_size < MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE || 15605 rec_size > MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE || 15606 rec_size & (sizeof(u32) - 1)) 15607 return -EINVAL; 15608 15609 /* Need to zero it in case the userspace may 15610 * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object. 15611 */ 15612 linfo = kvcalloc(nr_linfo, sizeof(struct bpf_line_info), 15613 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 15614 if (!linfo) 15615 return -ENOMEM; 15616 15617 prog = env->prog; 15618 btf = prog->aux->btf; 15619 15620 s = 0; 15621 sub = env->subprog_info; 15622 ulinfo = make_bpfptr(attr->line_info, uattr.is_kernel); 15623 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_line_info); 15624 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 15625 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) { 15626 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, expected_size, rec_size); 15627 if (err) { 15628 if (err == -E2BIG) { 15629 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in line_info"); 15630 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 15631 offsetof(union bpf_attr, line_info_rec_size), 15632 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 15633 err = -EFAULT; 15634 } 15635 goto err_free; 15636 } 15637 15638 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&linfo[i], ulinfo, ncopy)) { 15639 err = -EFAULT; 15640 goto err_free; 15641 } 15642 15643 /* 15644 * Check insn_off to ensure 15645 * 1) strictly increasing AND 15646 * 2) bounded by prog->len 15647 * 15648 * The linfo[0].insn_off == 0 check logically falls into 15649 * the later "missing bpf_line_info for func..." case 15650 * because the first linfo[0].insn_off must be the 15651 * first sub also and the first sub must have 15652 * subprog_info[0].start == 0. 15653 */ 15654 if ((i && linfo[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) || 15655 linfo[i].insn_off >= prog->len) { 15656 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].insn_off:%u (prev_offset:%u prog->len:%u)\n", 15657 i, linfo[i].insn_off, prev_offset, 15658 prog->len); 15659 err = -EINVAL; 15660 goto err_free; 15661 } 15662 15663 if (!prog->insnsi[linfo[i].insn_off].code) { 15664 verbose(env, 15665 "Invalid insn code at line_info[%u].insn_off\n", 15666 i); 15667 err = -EINVAL; 15668 goto err_free; 15669 } 15670 15671 if (!btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].line_off) || 15672 !btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].file_name_off)) { 15673 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].line_off or .file_name_off\n", i); 15674 err = -EINVAL; 15675 goto err_free; 15676 } 15677 15678 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 15679 if (linfo[i].insn_off == sub[s].start) { 15680 sub[s].linfo_idx = i; 15681 s++; 15682 } else if (sub[s].start < linfo[i].insn_off) { 15683 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for func#%u\n", s); 15684 err = -EINVAL; 15685 goto err_free; 15686 } 15687 } 15688 15689 prev_offset = linfo[i].insn_off; 15690 bpfptr_add(&ulinfo, rec_size); 15691 } 15692 15693 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 15694 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for %u funcs starting from func#%u\n", 15695 env->subprog_cnt - s, s); 15696 err = -EINVAL; 15697 goto err_free; 15698 } 15699 15700 prog->aux->linfo = linfo; 15701 prog->aux->nr_linfo = nr_linfo; 15702 15703 return 0; 15704 15705 err_free: 15706 kvfree(linfo); 15707 return err; 15708 } 15709 15710 #define MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo) 15711 #define MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 15712 15713 static int check_core_relo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15714 const union bpf_attr *attr, 15715 bpfptr_t uattr) 15716 { 15717 u32 i, nr_core_relo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size; 15718 struct bpf_core_relo core_relo = {}; 15719 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 15720 const struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf; 15721 struct bpf_core_ctx ctx = { 15722 .log = &env->log, 15723 .btf = btf, 15724 }; 15725 bpfptr_t u_core_relo; 15726 int err; 15727 15728 nr_core_relo = attr->core_relo_cnt; 15729 if (!nr_core_relo) 15730 return 0; 15731 if (nr_core_relo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo)) 15732 return -EINVAL; 15733 15734 rec_size = attr->core_relo_rec_size; 15735 if (rec_size < MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 15736 rec_size > MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 15737 rec_size % sizeof(u32)) 15738 return -EINVAL; 15739 15740 u_core_relo = make_bpfptr(attr->core_relos, uattr.is_kernel); 15741 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo); 15742 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 15743 15744 /* Unlike func_info and line_info, copy and apply each CO-RE 15745 * relocation record one at a time. 15746 */ 15747 for (i = 0; i < nr_core_relo; i++) { 15748 /* future proofing when sizeof(bpf_core_relo) changes */ 15749 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(u_core_relo, expected_size, rec_size); 15750 if (err) { 15751 if (err == -E2BIG) { 15752 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in core_relo"); 15753 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 15754 offsetof(union bpf_attr, core_relo_rec_size), 15755 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 15756 err = -EFAULT; 15757 } 15758 break; 15759 } 15760 15761 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&core_relo, u_core_relo, ncopy)) { 15762 err = -EFAULT; 15763 break; 15764 } 15765 15766 if (core_relo.insn_off % 8 || core_relo.insn_off / 8 >= prog->len) { 15767 verbose(env, "Invalid core_relo[%u].insn_off:%u prog->len:%u\n", 15768 i, core_relo.insn_off, prog->len); 15769 err = -EINVAL; 15770 break; 15771 } 15772 15773 err = bpf_core_apply(&ctx, &core_relo, i, 15774 &prog->insnsi[core_relo.insn_off / 8]); 15775 if (err) 15776 break; 15777 bpfptr_add(&u_core_relo, rec_size); 15778 } 15779 return err; 15780 } 15781 15782 static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15783 const union bpf_attr *attr, 15784 bpfptr_t uattr) 15785 { 15786 struct btf *btf; 15787 int err; 15788 15789 if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) { 15790 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 15791 return -EINVAL; 15792 return 0; 15793 } 15794 15795 btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd); 15796 if (IS_ERR(btf)) 15797 return PTR_ERR(btf); 15798 if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) { 15799 btf_put(btf); 15800 return -EACCES; 15801 } 15802 env->prog->aux->btf = btf; 15803 15804 err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr); 15805 if (err) 15806 return err; 15807 15808 err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr); 15809 if (err) 15810 return err; 15811 15812 err = check_core_relo(env, attr, uattr); 15813 if (err) 15814 return err; 15815 15816 return 0; 15817 } 15818 15819 /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */ 15820 static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old, 15821 struct bpf_reg_state *cur) 15822 { 15823 return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value && 15824 old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value && 15825 old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value && 15826 old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value && 15827 old->u32_min_value <= cur->u32_min_value && 15828 old->u32_max_value >= cur->u32_max_value && 15829 old->s32_min_value <= cur->s32_min_value && 15830 old->s32_max_value >= cur->s32_max_value; 15831 } 15832 15833 /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have 15834 * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from 15835 * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids. 15836 * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent 15837 * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But 15838 * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about 15839 * that. 15840 * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If 15841 * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map. 15842 */ 15843 static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 15844 { 15845 struct bpf_id_pair *map = idmap->map; 15846 unsigned int i; 15847 15848 /* either both IDs should be set or both should be zero */ 15849 if (!!old_id != !!cur_id) 15850 return false; 15851 15852 if (old_id == 0) /* cur_id == 0 as well */ 15853 return true; 15854 15855 for (i = 0; i < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) { 15856 if (!map[i].old) { 15857 /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */ 15858 map[i].old = old_id; 15859 map[i].cur = cur_id; 15860 return true; 15861 } 15862 if (map[i].old == old_id) 15863 return map[i].cur == cur_id; 15864 if (map[i].cur == cur_id) 15865 return false; 15866 } 15867 /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */ 15868 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 15869 return false; 15870 } 15871 15872 /* Similar to check_ids(), but allocate a unique temporary ID 15873 * for 'old_id' or 'cur_id' of zero. 15874 * This makes pairs like '0 vs unique ID', 'unique ID vs 0' valid. 15875 */ 15876 static bool check_scalar_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 15877 { 15878 old_id = old_id ? old_id : ++idmap->tmp_id_gen; 15879 cur_id = cur_id ? cur_id : ++idmap->tmp_id_gen; 15880 15881 return check_ids(old_id, cur_id, idmap); 15882 } 15883 15884 static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15885 struct bpf_func_state *st) 15886 { 15887 enum bpf_reg_liveness live; 15888 int i, j; 15889 15890 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 15891 live = st->regs[i].live; 15892 /* liveness must not touch this register anymore */ 15893 st->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 15894 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 15895 /* since the register is unused, clear its state 15896 * to make further comparison simpler 15897 */ 15898 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]); 15899 } 15900 15901 for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 15902 live = st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live; 15903 /* liveness must not touch this stack slot anymore */ 15904 st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 15905 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { 15906 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr); 15907 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 15908 st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; 15909 } 15910 } 15911 } 15912 15913 static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15914 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 15915 { 15916 int i; 15917 15918 if (st->frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 15919 /* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */ 15920 return; 15921 15922 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) 15923 clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i]); 15924 } 15925 15926 /* the parentage chains form a tree. 15927 * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and 15928 * pushed into state stack for future exploration. 15929 * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifer states 15930 * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already, 15931 * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when 15932 * the verifier explores other branches. 15933 * Example: 15934 * 1: r0 = 1 15935 * 2: if r1 == 100 goto pc+1 15936 * 3: r0 = 2 15937 * 4: exit 15938 * when the verifier reaches exit insn the register r0 in the state list of 15939 * insn 2 will be seen as !REG_LIVE_READ. Then the verifier pops the other_branch 15940 * of insn 2 and goes exploring further. At the insn 4 it will walk the 15941 * parentage chain from insn 4 into insn 2 and will mark r0 as REG_LIVE_READ. 15942 * 15943 * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring 15944 * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second 15945 * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and 15946 * their final liveness marks are already propagated. 15947 * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited() 15948 * we can call this clean_live_states() function to mark all liveness states 15949 * as REG_LIVE_DONE to indicate that 'parent' pointers of 'struct bpf_reg_state' 15950 * will not be used. 15951 * This function also clears the registers and stack for states that !READ 15952 * to simplify state merging. 15953 * 15954 * Important note here that walking the same branch instruction in the callee 15955 * doesn't meant that the states are DONE. The verifier has to compare 15956 * the callsites 15957 */ 15958 static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn, 15959 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 15960 { 15961 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 15962 15963 sl = *explored_state(env, insn); 15964 while (sl) { 15965 if (sl->state.branches) 15966 goto next; 15967 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn || 15968 !same_callsites(&sl->state, cur)) 15969 goto next; 15970 clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state); 15971 next: 15972 sl = sl->next; 15973 } 15974 } 15975 15976 static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 15977 const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 15978 struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 15979 { 15980 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && 15981 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) && 15982 check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap); 15983 } 15984 15985 /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ 15986 static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 15987 struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap, bool exact) 15988 { 15989 if (exact) 15990 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap); 15991 15992 if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 15993 /* explored state didn't use this */ 15994 return true; 15995 if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) 15996 /* explored state can't have used this */ 15997 return true; 15998 if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT) 15999 return false; 16000 16001 /* Enforce that register types have to match exactly, including their 16002 * modifiers (like PTR_MAYBE_NULL, MEM_RDONLY, etc), as a general 16003 * rule. 16004 * 16005 * One can make a point that using a pointer register as unbounded 16006 * SCALAR would be technically acceptable, but this could lead to 16007 * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak while pointers 16008 * are not. We could make this safe in special cases if root is 16009 * calling us, but it's probably not worth the hassle. 16010 * 16011 * Also, register types that are *not* MAYBE_NULL could technically be 16012 * safe to use as their MAYBE_NULL variants (e.g., PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE 16013 * is safe to be used as PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, provided both point 16014 * to the same map). 16015 * However, if the old MAYBE_NULL register then got NULL checked, 16016 * doing so could have affected others with the same id, and we can't 16017 * check for that because we lost the id when we converted to 16018 * a non-MAYBE_NULL variant. 16019 * So, as a general rule we don't allow mixing MAYBE_NULL and 16020 * non-MAYBE_NULL registers as well. 16021 */ 16022 if (rold->type != rcur->type) 16023 return false; 16024 16025 switch (base_type(rold->type)) { 16026 case SCALAR_VALUE: 16027 if (env->explore_alu_limits) { 16028 /* explore_alu_limits disables tnum_in() and range_within() 16029 * logic and requires everything to be strict 16030 */ 16031 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && 16032 check_scalar_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); 16033 } 16034 if (!rold->precise) 16035 return true; 16036 /* Why check_ids() for scalar registers? 16037 * 16038 * Consider the following BPF code: 16039 * 1: r6 = ... unbound scalar, ID=a ... 16040 * 2: r7 = ... unbound scalar, ID=b ... 16041 * 3: if (r6 > r7) goto +1 16042 * 4: r6 = r7 16043 * 5: if (r6 > X) goto ... 16044 * 6: ... memory operation using r7 ... 16045 * 16046 * First verification path is [1-6]: 16047 * - at (4) same bpf_reg_state::id (b) would be assigned to r6 and r7; 16048 * - at (5) r6 would be marked <= X, find_equal_scalars() would also mark 16049 * r7 <= X, because r6 and r7 share same id. 16050 * Next verification path is [1-4, 6]. 16051 * 16052 * Instruction (6) would be reached in two states: 16053 * I. r6{.id=b}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-6; 16054 * II. r6{.id=a}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-4, 6. 16055 * 16056 * Use check_ids() to distinguish these states. 16057 * --- 16058 * Also verify that new value satisfies old value range knowledge. 16059 */ 16060 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 16061 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) && 16062 check_scalar_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); 16063 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 16064 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 16065 case PTR_TO_MEM: 16066 case PTR_TO_BUF: 16067 case PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER: 16068 /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and 16069 * everything else matches, we are OK. 16070 */ 16071 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)) == 0 && 16072 range_within(rold, rcur) && 16073 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) && 16074 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) && 16075 check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap); 16076 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 16077 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 16078 /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr 16079 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are 16080 * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off, 16081 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or 16082 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access. 16083 */ 16084 if (rold->range > rcur->range) 16085 return false; 16086 /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment; 16087 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range. 16088 */ 16089 if (rold->off != rcur->off) 16090 return false; 16091 /* id relations must be preserved */ 16092 if (!check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap)) 16093 return false; 16094 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 16095 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 16096 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 16097 case PTR_TO_STACK: 16098 /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to 16099 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar 16100 */ 16101 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap) && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; 16102 default: 16103 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap); 16104 } 16105 } 16106 16107 static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 16108 struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap, bool exact) 16109 { 16110 int i, spi; 16111 16112 /* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional 16113 * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state 16114 * didn't use them 16115 */ 16116 for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) { 16117 struct bpf_reg_state *old_reg, *cur_reg; 16118 16119 spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE; 16120 16121 if (exact && 16122 (i >= cur->allocated_stack || 16123 old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != 16124 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE])) 16125 return false; 16126 16127 if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ) && !exact) { 16128 i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; 16129 /* explored state didn't use this */ 16130 continue; 16131 } 16132 16133 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID) 16134 continue; 16135 16136 if (env->allow_uninit_stack && 16137 old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC) 16138 continue; 16139 16140 /* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack 16141 * and these slots were used 16142 */ 16143 if (i >= cur->allocated_stack) 16144 return false; 16145 16146 /* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack 16147 * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack. 16148 * The opposite is not true 16149 */ 16150 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC && 16151 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) 16152 continue; 16153 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != 16154 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]) 16155 /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in 16156 * this stack slot, but current has STACK_MISC -> 16157 * this verifier states are not equivalent, 16158 * return false to continue verification of this path 16159 */ 16160 return false; 16161 if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE != BPF_REG_SIZE - 1) 16162 continue; 16163 /* Both old and cur are having same slot_type */ 16164 switch (old->stack[spi].slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]) { 16165 case STACK_SPILL: 16166 /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing 16167 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types 16168 * are the same as well. 16169 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored 16170 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8} 16171 * but current path has stored: 16172 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16} 16173 * such verifier states are not equivalent. 16174 * return false to continue verification of this path 16175 */ 16176 if (!regsafe(env, &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 16177 &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, idmap, exact)) 16178 return false; 16179 break; 16180 case STACK_DYNPTR: 16181 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 16182 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 16183 if (old_reg->dynptr.type != cur_reg->dynptr.type || 16184 old_reg->dynptr.first_slot != cur_reg->dynptr.first_slot || 16185 !check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap)) 16186 return false; 16187 break; 16188 case STACK_ITER: 16189 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 16190 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 16191 /* iter.depth is not compared between states as it 16192 * doesn't matter for correctness and would otherwise 16193 * prevent convergence; we maintain it only to prevent 16194 * infinite loop check triggering, see 16195 * iter_active_depths_differ() 16196 */ 16197 if (old_reg->iter.btf != cur_reg->iter.btf || 16198 old_reg->iter.btf_id != cur_reg->iter.btf_id || 16199 old_reg->iter.state != cur_reg->iter.state || 16200 /* ignore {old_reg,cur_reg}->iter.depth, see above */ 16201 !check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap)) 16202 return false; 16203 break; 16204 case STACK_MISC: 16205 case STACK_ZERO: 16206 case STACK_INVALID: 16207 continue; 16208 /* Ensure that new unhandled slot types return false by default */ 16209 default: 16210 return false; 16211 } 16212 } 16213 return true; 16214 } 16215 16216 static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur, 16217 struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 16218 { 16219 int i; 16220 16221 if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs) 16222 return false; 16223 16224 for (i = 0; i < old->acquired_refs; i++) { 16225 if (!check_ids(old->refs[i].id, cur->refs[i].id, idmap)) 16226 return false; 16227 } 16228 16229 return true; 16230 } 16231 16232 /* compare two verifier states 16233 * 16234 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since 16235 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them 16236 * 16237 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of 16238 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has 16239 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution 16240 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already 16241 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish. 16242 * 16243 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative 16244 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one. 16245 * Example: 16246 * explored current 16247 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) 16248 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) 16249 * 16250 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more 16251 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means 16252 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too 16253 * 16254 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid 16255 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that 16256 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely 16257 */ 16258 static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 16259 struct bpf_func_state *cur, bool exact) 16260 { 16261 int i; 16262 16263 if (old->callback_depth > cur->callback_depth) 16264 return false; 16265 16266 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 16267 if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], 16268 &env->idmap_scratch, exact)) 16269 return false; 16270 16271 if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch, exact)) 16272 return false; 16273 16274 if (!refsafe(old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch)) 16275 return false; 16276 16277 return true; 16278 } 16279 16280 static void reset_idmap_scratch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16281 { 16282 env->idmap_scratch.tmp_id_gen = env->id_gen; 16283 memset(&env->idmap_scratch.map, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch.map)); 16284 } 16285 16286 static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16287 struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 16288 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, 16289 bool exact) 16290 { 16291 int i; 16292 16293 if (old->curframe != cur->curframe) 16294 return false; 16295 16296 reset_idmap_scratch(env); 16297 16298 /* Verification state from speculative execution simulation 16299 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one. 16300 */ 16301 if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative) 16302 return false; 16303 16304 if (old->active_lock.ptr != cur->active_lock.ptr) 16305 return false; 16306 16307 /* Old and cur active_lock's have to be either both present 16308 * or both absent. 16309 */ 16310 if (!!old->active_lock.id != !!cur->active_lock.id) 16311 return false; 16312 16313 if (old->active_lock.id && 16314 !check_ids(old->active_lock.id, cur->active_lock.id, &env->idmap_scratch)) 16315 return false; 16316 16317 if (old->active_rcu_lock != cur->active_rcu_lock) 16318 return false; 16319 16320 /* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same 16321 * and all frame states need to be equivalent 16322 */ 16323 for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) { 16324 if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 16325 return false; 16326 if (!func_states_equal(env, old->frame[i], cur->frame[i], exact)) 16327 return false; 16328 } 16329 return true; 16330 } 16331 16332 /* Return 0 if no propagation happened. Return negative error code if error 16333 * happened. Otherwise, return the propagated bit. 16334 */ 16335 static int propagate_liveness_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16336 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 16337 struct bpf_reg_state *parent_reg) 16338 { 16339 u8 parent_flag = parent_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 16340 u8 flag = reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 16341 int err; 16342 16343 /* When comes here, read flags of PARENT_REG or REG could be any of 16344 * REG_LIVE_READ64, REG_LIVE_READ32, REG_LIVE_NONE. There is no need 16345 * of propagation if PARENT_REG has strongest REG_LIVE_READ64. 16346 */ 16347 if (parent_flag == REG_LIVE_READ64 || 16348 /* Or if there is no read flag from REG. */ 16349 !flag || 16350 /* Or if the read flag from REG is the same as PARENT_REG. */ 16351 parent_flag == flag) 16352 return 0; 16353 16354 err = mark_reg_read(env, reg, parent_reg, flag); 16355 if (err) 16356 return err; 16357 16358 return flag; 16359 } 16360 16361 /* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the 16362 * straight-line code between a state and its parent. When we arrive at an 16363 * equivalent state (jump target or such) we didn't arrive by the straight-line 16364 * code, so read marks in the state must propagate to the parent regardless 16365 * of the state's write marks. That's what 'parent == state->parent' comparison 16366 * in mark_reg_read() is for. 16367 */ 16368 static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16369 const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 16370 struct bpf_verifier_state *vparent) 16371 { 16372 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg, *parent_reg; 16373 struct bpf_func_state *state, *parent; 16374 int i, frame, err = 0; 16375 16376 if (vparent->curframe != vstate->curframe) { 16377 WARN(1, "propagate_live: parent frame %d current frame %d\n", 16378 vparent->curframe, vstate->curframe); 16379 return -EFAULT; 16380 } 16381 /* Propagate read liveness of registers... */ 16382 BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG); 16383 for (frame = 0; frame <= vstate->curframe; frame++) { 16384 parent = vparent->frame[frame]; 16385 state = vstate->frame[frame]; 16386 parent_reg = parent->regs; 16387 state_reg = state->regs; 16388 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness, it's read-only */ 16389 for (i = frame < vstate->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 16390 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, &state_reg[i], 16391 &parent_reg[i]); 16392 if (err < 0) 16393 return err; 16394 if (err == REG_LIVE_READ64) 16395 mark_insn_zext(env, &parent_reg[i]); 16396 } 16397 16398 /* Propagate stack slots. */ 16399 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE && 16400 i < parent->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 16401 parent_reg = &parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 16402 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 16403 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, state_reg, 16404 parent_reg); 16405 if (err < 0) 16406 return err; 16407 } 16408 } 16409 return 0; 16410 } 16411 16412 /* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and 16413 * propagate them into the current state 16414 */ 16415 static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16416 const struct bpf_verifier_state *old) 16417 { 16418 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg; 16419 struct bpf_func_state *state; 16420 int i, err = 0, fr; 16421 bool first; 16422 16423 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 16424 state = old->frame[fr]; 16425 state_reg = state->regs; 16426 first = true; 16427 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) { 16428 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 16429 !state_reg->precise || 16430 !(state_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 16431 continue; 16432 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 16433 if (first) 16434 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating r%d", fr, i); 16435 else 16436 verbose(env, ",r%d", i); 16437 } 16438 bt_set_frame_reg(&env->bt, fr, i); 16439 first = false; 16440 } 16441 16442 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 16443 if (!is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i])) 16444 continue; 16445 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 16446 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 16447 !state_reg->precise || 16448 !(state_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 16449 continue; 16450 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 16451 if (first) 16452 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating fp%d", 16453 fr, (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 16454 else 16455 verbose(env, ",fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 16456 } 16457 bt_set_frame_slot(&env->bt, fr, i); 16458 first = false; 16459 } 16460 if (!first) 16461 verbose(env, "\n"); 16462 } 16463 16464 err = mark_chain_precision_batch(env); 16465 if (err < 0) 16466 return err; 16467 16468 return 0; 16469 } 16470 16471 static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 16472 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 16473 { 16474 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; 16475 int i, fr = cur->curframe; 16476 16477 if (old->curframe != fr) 16478 return false; 16479 16480 fold = old->frame[fr]; 16481 fcur = cur->frame[fr]; 16482 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 16483 if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i], 16484 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent))) 16485 return false; 16486 return true; 16487 } 16488 16489 static bool is_iter_next_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 16490 { 16491 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].is_iter_next; 16492 } 16493 16494 /* is_state_visited() handles iter_next() (see process_iter_next_call() for 16495 * terminology) calls specially: as opposed to bounded BPF loops, it *expects* 16496 * states to match, which otherwise would look like an infinite loop. So while 16497 * iter_next() calls are taken care of, we still need to be careful and 16498 * prevent erroneous and too eager declaration of "ininite loop", when 16499 * iterators are involved. 16500 * 16501 * Here's a situation in pseudo-BPF assembly form: 16502 * 16503 * 0: again: ; set up iter_next() call args 16504 * 1: r1 = &it ; <CHECKPOINT HERE> 16505 * 2: call bpf_iter_num_next ; this is iter_next() call 16506 * 3: if r0 == 0 goto done 16507 * 4: ... something useful here ... 16508 * 5: goto again ; another iteration 16509 * 6: done: 16510 * 7: r1 = &it 16511 * 8: call bpf_iter_num_destroy ; clean up iter state 16512 * 9: exit 16513 * 16514 * This is a typical loop. Let's assume that we have a prune point at 1:, 16515 * before we get to `call bpf_iter_num_next` (e.g., because of that `goto 16516 * again`, assuming other heuristics don't get in a way). 16517 * 16518 * When we first time come to 1:, let's say we have some state X. We proceed 16519 * to 2:, fork states, enqueue ACTIVE, validate NULL case successfully, exit. 16520 * Now we come back to validate that forked ACTIVE state. We proceed through 16521 * 3-5, come to goto, jump to 1:. Let's assume our state didn't change, so we 16522 * are converging. But the problem is that we don't know that yet, as this 16523 * convergence has to happen at iter_next() call site only. So if nothing is 16524 * done, at 1: verifier will use bounded loop logic and declare infinite 16525 * looping (and would be *technically* correct, if not for iterator's 16526 * "eventual sticky NULL" contract, see process_iter_next_call()). But we 16527 * don't want that. So what we do in process_iter_next_call() when we go on 16528 * another ACTIVE iteration, we bump slot->iter.depth, to mark that it's 16529 * a different iteration. So when we suspect an infinite loop, we additionally 16530 * check if any of the *ACTIVE* iterator states depths differ. If yes, we 16531 * pretend we are not looping and wait for next iter_next() call. 16532 * 16533 * This only applies to ACTIVE state. In DRAINED state we don't expect to 16534 * loop, because that would actually mean infinite loop, as DRAINED state is 16535 * "sticky", and so we'll keep returning into the same instruction with the 16536 * same state (at least in one of possible code paths). 16537 * 16538 * This approach allows to keep infinite loop heuristic even in the face of 16539 * active iterator. E.g., C snippet below is and will be detected as 16540 * inifintely looping: 16541 * 16542 * struct bpf_iter_num it; 16543 * int *p, x; 16544 * 16545 * bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, 10); 16546 * while ((p = bpf_iter_num_next(&t))) { 16547 * x = p; 16548 * while (x--) {} // <<-- infinite loop here 16549 * } 16550 * 16551 */ 16552 static bool iter_active_depths_differ(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 16553 { 16554 struct bpf_reg_state *slot, *cur_slot; 16555 struct bpf_func_state *state; 16556 int i, fr; 16557 16558 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 16559 state = old->frame[fr]; 16560 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 16561 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_ITER) 16562 continue; 16563 16564 slot = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 16565 if (slot->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) 16566 continue; 16567 16568 cur_slot = &cur->frame[fr]->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 16569 if (cur_slot->iter.depth != slot->iter.depth) 16570 return true; 16571 } 16572 } 16573 return false; 16574 } 16575 16576 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 16577 { 16578 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; 16579 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev; 16580 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new, *loop_entry; 16581 int i, j, n, err, states_cnt = 0; 16582 bool force_new_state = env->test_state_freq || is_force_checkpoint(env, insn_idx); 16583 bool add_new_state = force_new_state; 16584 bool force_exact; 16585 16586 /* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions 16587 * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1 16588 * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen 16589 * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions. 16590 * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric. 16591 * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier 16592 * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup. 16593 */ 16594 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 && 16595 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8) 16596 add_new_state = true; 16597 16598 pprev = explored_state(env, insn_idx); 16599 sl = *pprev; 16600 16601 clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur); 16602 16603 while (sl) { 16604 states_cnt++; 16605 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx) 16606 goto next; 16607 16608 if (sl->state.branches) { 16609 struct bpf_func_state *frame = sl->state.frame[sl->state.curframe]; 16610 16611 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn && 16612 frame->async_entry_cnt != cur->frame[cur->curframe]->async_entry_cnt) { 16613 /* Different async_entry_cnt means that the verifier is 16614 * processing another entry into async callback. 16615 * Seeing the same state is not an indication of infinite 16616 * loop or infinite recursion. 16617 * But finding the same state doesn't mean that it's safe 16618 * to stop processing the current state. The previous state 16619 * hasn't yet reached bpf_exit, since state.branches > 0. 16620 * Checking in_async_callback_fn alone is not enough either. 16621 * Since the verifier still needs to catch infinite loops 16622 * inside async callbacks. 16623 */ 16624 goto skip_inf_loop_check; 16625 } 16626 /* BPF open-coded iterators loop detection is special. 16627 * states_maybe_looping() logic is too simplistic in detecting 16628 * states that *might* be equivalent, because it doesn't know 16629 * about ID remapping, so don't even perform it. 16630 * See process_iter_next_call() and iter_active_depths_differ() 16631 * for overview of the logic. When current and one of parent 16632 * states are detected as equivalent, it's a good thing: we prove 16633 * convergence and can stop simulating further iterations. 16634 * It's safe to assume that iterator loop will finish, taking into 16635 * account iter_next() contract of eventually returning 16636 * sticky NULL result. 16637 * 16638 * Note, that states have to be compared exactly in this case because 16639 * read and precision marks might not be finalized inside the loop. 16640 * E.g. as in the program below: 16641 * 16642 * 1. r7 = -16 16643 * 2. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 16644 * 3. while (bpf_iter_num_next(&fp[-8])) { 16645 * 4. if (r6 != 42) { 16646 * 5. r7 = -32 16647 * 6. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 16648 * 7. continue 16649 * 8. } 16650 * 9. r0 = r10 16651 * 10. r0 += r7 16652 * 11. r8 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0) 16653 * 12. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 16654 * 13. } 16655 * 16656 * Here verifier would first visit path 1-3, create a checkpoint at 3 16657 * with r7=-16, continue to 4-7,3. Existing checkpoint at 3 does 16658 * not have read or precision mark for r7 yet, thus inexact states 16659 * comparison would discard current state with r7=-32 16660 * => unsafe memory access at 11 would not be caught. 16661 */ 16662 if (is_iter_next_insn(env, insn_idx)) { 16663 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, true)) { 16664 struct bpf_func_state *cur_frame; 16665 struct bpf_reg_state *iter_state, *iter_reg; 16666 int spi; 16667 16668 cur_frame = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; 16669 /* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() enforces that 16670 * iter state pointer is always the first arg 16671 */ 16672 iter_reg = &cur_frame->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 16673 /* current state is valid due to states_equal(), 16674 * so we can assume valid iter and reg state, 16675 * no need for extra (re-)validations 16676 */ 16677 spi = __get_spi(iter_reg->off + iter_reg->var_off.value); 16678 iter_state = &func(env, iter_reg)->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 16679 if (iter_state->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) { 16680 update_loop_entry(cur, &sl->state); 16681 goto hit; 16682 } 16683 } 16684 goto skip_inf_loop_check; 16685 } 16686 if (calls_callback(env, insn_idx)) { 16687 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, true)) 16688 goto hit; 16689 goto skip_inf_loop_check; 16690 } 16691 /* attempt to detect infinite loop to avoid unnecessary doomed work */ 16692 if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) && 16693 states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, false) && 16694 !iter_active_depths_differ(&sl->state, cur) && 16695 sl->state.callback_unroll_depth == cur->callback_unroll_depth) { 16696 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 16697 verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx); 16698 verbose(env, "cur state:"); 16699 print_verifier_state(env, cur->frame[cur->curframe], true); 16700 verbose(env, "old state:"); 16701 print_verifier_state(env, sl->state.frame[cur->curframe], true); 16702 return -EINVAL; 16703 } 16704 /* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state 16705 * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct 16706 * states and may not help future pruning. 16707 * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that 16708 * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly. 16709 * The most abusive loop will be: 16710 * r1 += 1 16711 * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2 16712 * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states. 16713 * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states 16714 * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning. 16715 */ 16716 skip_inf_loop_check: 16717 if (!force_new_state && 16718 env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 && 16719 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100) 16720 add_new_state = false; 16721 goto miss; 16722 } 16723 /* If sl->state is a part of a loop and this loop's entry is a part of 16724 * current verification path then states have to be compared exactly. 16725 * 'force_exact' is needed to catch the following case: 16726 * 16727 * initial Here state 'succ' was processed first, 16728 * | it was eventually tracked to produce a 16729 * V state identical to 'hdr'. 16730 * .---------> hdr All branches from 'succ' had been explored 16731 * | | and thus 'succ' has its .branches == 0. 16732 * | V 16733 * | .------... Suppose states 'cur' and 'succ' correspond 16734 * | | | to the same instruction + callsites. 16735 * | V V In such case it is necessary to check 16736 * | ... ... if 'succ' and 'cur' are states_equal(). 16737 * | | | If 'succ' and 'cur' are a part of the 16738 * | V V same loop exact flag has to be set. 16739 * | succ <- cur To check if that is the case, verify 16740 * | | if loop entry of 'succ' is in current 16741 * | V DFS path. 16742 * | ... 16743 * | | 16744 * '----' 16745 * 16746 * Additional details are in the comment before get_loop_entry(). 16747 */ 16748 loop_entry = get_loop_entry(&sl->state); 16749 force_exact = loop_entry && loop_entry->branches > 0; 16750 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, force_exact)) { 16751 if (force_exact) 16752 update_loop_entry(cur, loop_entry); 16753 hit: 16754 sl->hit_cnt++; 16755 /* reached equivalent register/stack state, 16756 * prune the search. 16757 * Registers read by the continuation are read by us. 16758 * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they 16759 * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation 16760 * from reaching our parent (an explored_state). Our 16761 * own state will get the read marks recorded, but 16762 * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning 16763 * this state and will pop a new one. 16764 */ 16765 err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur); 16766 16767 /* if previous state reached the exit with precision and 16768 * current state is equivalent to it (except precsion marks) 16769 * the precision needs to be propagated back in 16770 * the current state. 16771 */ 16772 err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur); 16773 err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state); 16774 if (err) 16775 return err; 16776 return 1; 16777 } 16778 miss: 16779 /* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count. 16780 * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state 16781 * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have 16782 * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning 16783 * and some at the end) to help pruning. 16784 */ 16785 if (add_new_state) 16786 sl->miss_cnt++; 16787 /* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial 16788 * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view. 16789 * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time, 16790 * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed. 16791 * 'n' controls how many times state could miss before eviction. 16792 * Use bigger 'n' for checkpoints because evicting checkpoint states 16793 * too early would hinder iterator convergence. 16794 */ 16795 n = is_force_checkpoint(env, insn_idx) && sl->state.branches > 0 ? 64 : 3; 16796 if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * n + n) { 16797 /* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to 16798 * speed up verification 16799 */ 16800 *pprev = sl->next; 16801 if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE && 16802 !sl->state.used_as_loop_entry) { 16803 u32 br = sl->state.branches; 16804 16805 WARN_ONCE(br, 16806 "BUG live_done but branches_to_explore %d\n", 16807 br); 16808 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 16809 kfree(sl); 16810 env->peak_states--; 16811 } else { 16812 /* cannot free this state, since parentage chain may 16813 * walk it later. Add it for free_list instead to 16814 * be freed at the end of verification 16815 */ 16816 sl->next = env->free_list; 16817 env->free_list = sl; 16818 } 16819 sl = *pprev; 16820 continue; 16821 } 16822 next: 16823 pprev = &sl->next; 16824 sl = *pprev; 16825 } 16826 16827 if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt) 16828 env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt; 16829 16830 if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) 16831 return 0; 16832 16833 if (!add_new_state) 16834 return 0; 16835 16836 /* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one. 16837 * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, 16838 * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe) 16839 * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be 16840 * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx) 16841 * again on the way to bpf_exit. 16842 * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state 16843 * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0. 16844 */ 16845 new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL); 16846 if (!new_sl) 16847 return -ENOMEM; 16848 env->total_states++; 16849 env->peak_states++; 16850 env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed; 16851 env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed; 16852 16853 /* forget precise markings we inherited, see __mark_chain_precision */ 16854 if (env->bpf_capable) 16855 mark_all_scalars_imprecise(env, cur); 16856 16857 /* add new state to the head of linked list */ 16858 new = &new_sl->state; 16859 err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur); 16860 if (err) { 16861 free_verifier_state(new, false); 16862 kfree(new_sl); 16863 return err; 16864 } 16865 new->insn_idx = insn_idx; 16866 WARN_ONCE(new->branches != 1, 16867 "BUG is_state_visited:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d\n", new->branches, insn_idx); 16868 16869 cur->parent = new; 16870 cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx; 16871 cur->dfs_depth = new->dfs_depth + 1; 16872 clear_jmp_history(cur); 16873 new_sl->next = *explored_state(env, insn_idx); 16874 *explored_state(env, insn_idx) = new_sl; 16875 /* connect new state to parentage chain. Current frame needs all 16876 * registers connected. Only r6 - r9 of the callers are alive (pushed 16877 * to the stack implicitly by JITs) so in callers' frames connect just 16878 * r6 - r9 as an optimization. Callers will have r1 - r5 connected to 16879 * the state of the call instruction (with WRITTEN set), and r0 comes 16880 * from callee with its full parentage chain, anyway. 16881 */ 16882 /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes 16883 * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us. 16884 * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark 16885 * their parent and current state never has children yet. Only 16886 * explored_states can get read marks.) 16887 */ 16888 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 16889 for (i = j < cur->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 16890 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].parent = &new->frame[j]->regs[i]; 16891 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 16892 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 16893 } 16894 16895 /* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */ 16896 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 16897 struct bpf_func_state *frame = cur->frame[j]; 16898 struct bpf_func_state *newframe = new->frame[j]; 16899 16900 for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 16901 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 16902 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.parent = 16903 &newframe->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 16904 } 16905 } 16906 return 0; 16907 } 16908 16909 /* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */ 16910 static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type) 16911 { 16912 switch (base_type(type)) { 16913 case PTR_TO_CTX: 16914 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 16915 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 16916 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 16917 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 16918 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 16919 return false; 16920 default: 16921 return true; 16922 } 16923 } 16924 16925 /* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we 16926 * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok 16927 * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch: 16928 * 16929 * R1 = sock_ptr 16930 * goto X; 16931 * ... 16932 * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr; 16933 * goto X; 16934 * ... 16935 * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0); 16936 */ 16937 static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev) 16938 { 16939 return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) || 16940 !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev)); 16941 } 16942 16943 static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type type, 16944 bool allow_trust_missmatch) 16945 { 16946 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; 16947 16948 if (*prev_type == NOT_INIT) { 16949 /* Saw a valid insn 16950 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off) 16951 * save type to validate intersecting paths 16952 */ 16953 *prev_type = type; 16954 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(type, *prev_type)) { 16955 /* Abuser program is trying to use the same insn 16956 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) 16957 * with different pointer types: 16958 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and 16959 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. 16960 * Reject it. 16961 */ 16962 if (allow_trust_missmatch && 16963 base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 16964 base_type(*prev_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 16965 /* 16966 * Have to support a use case when one path through 16967 * the program yields TRUSTED pointer while another 16968 * is UNTRUSTED. Fallback to UNTRUSTED to generate 16969 * BPF_PROBE_MEM/BPF_PROBE_MEMSX. 16970 */ 16971 *prev_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; 16972 } else { 16973 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 16974 return -EINVAL; 16975 } 16976 } 16977 16978 return 0; 16979 } 16980 16981 static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16982 { 16983 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 16984 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 16985 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 16986 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 16987 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 16988 bool do_print_state = false; 16989 int prev_insn_idx = -1; 16990 16991 for (;;) { 16992 struct bpf_insn *insn; 16993 u8 class; 16994 int err; 16995 16996 env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 16997 if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { 16998 verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", 16999 env->insn_idx, insn_cnt); 17000 return -EFAULT; 17001 } 17002 17003 insn = &insns[env->insn_idx]; 17004 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 17005 17006 if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { 17007 verbose(env, 17008 "BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", 17009 env->insn_processed); 17010 return -E2BIG; 17011 } 17012 17013 state->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 17014 17015 if (is_prune_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { 17016 err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx); 17017 if (err < 0) 17018 return err; 17019 if (err == 1) { 17020 /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ 17021 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 17022 if (do_print_state) 17023 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n", 17024 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 17025 env->cur_state->speculative ? 17026 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 17027 else 17028 verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx); 17029 } 17030 goto process_bpf_exit; 17031 } 17032 } 17033 17034 if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { 17035 err = push_jmp_history(env, state); 17036 if (err) 17037 return err; 17038 } 17039 17040 if (signal_pending(current)) 17041 return -EAGAIN; 17042 17043 if (need_resched()) 17044 cond_resched(); 17045 17046 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 && do_print_state) { 17047 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:", 17048 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 17049 env->cur_state->speculative ? 17050 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 17051 print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe], true); 17052 do_print_state = false; 17053 } 17054 17055 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 17056 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 17057 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 17058 .cb_print = verbose, 17059 .private_data = env, 17060 }; 17061 17062 if (verifier_state_scratched(env)) 17063 print_insn_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]); 17064 17065 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 17066 env->prev_log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 17067 verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx); 17068 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 17069 env->prev_insn_print_pos = env->log.end_pos - env->prev_log_pos; 17070 env->prev_log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 17071 } 17072 17073 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 17074 err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx, 17075 env->prev_insn_idx); 17076 if (err) 17077 return err; 17078 } 17079 17080 regs = cur_regs(env); 17081 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 17082 prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx; 17083 17084 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 17085 err = check_alu_op(env, insn); 17086 if (err) 17087 return err; 17088 17089 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 17090 enum bpf_reg_type src_reg_type; 17091 17092 /* check for reserved fields is already done */ 17093 17094 /* check src operand */ 17095 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 17096 if (err) 17097 return err; 17098 17099 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 17100 if (err) 17101 return err; 17102 17103 src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type; 17104 17105 /* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable, 17106 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func 17107 */ 17108 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg, 17109 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 17110 BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false, 17111 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEMSX); 17112 if (err) 17113 return err; 17114 17115 err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, src_reg_type, true); 17116 if (err) 17117 return err; 17118 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 17119 enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type; 17120 17121 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) { 17122 err = check_atomic(env, env->insn_idx, insn); 17123 if (err) 17124 return err; 17125 env->insn_idx++; 17126 continue; 17127 } 17128 17129 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) { 17130 verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); 17131 return -EINVAL; 17132 } 17133 17134 /* check src1 operand */ 17135 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 17136 if (err) 17137 return err; 17138 /* check src2 operand */ 17139 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 17140 if (err) 17141 return err; 17142 17143 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; 17144 17145 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 17146 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 17147 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 17148 BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false, false); 17149 if (err) 17150 return err; 17151 17152 err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false); 17153 if (err) 17154 return err; 17155 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 17156 enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type; 17157 17158 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || 17159 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 17160 verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); 17161 return -EINVAL; 17162 } 17163 /* check src operand */ 17164 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 17165 if (err) 17166 return err; 17167 17168 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; 17169 17170 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 17171 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 17172 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 17173 BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 17174 if (err) 17175 return err; 17176 17177 err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false); 17178 if (err) 17179 return err; 17180 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 17181 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 17182 17183 env->jmps_processed++; 17184 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 17185 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 17186 (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL 17187 && insn->off != 0) || 17188 (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 && 17189 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL && 17190 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) || 17191 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 17192 class == BPF_JMP32) { 17193 verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); 17194 return -EINVAL; 17195 } 17196 17197 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) { 17198 if ((insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_0 && insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) || 17199 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) || 17200 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && 17201 (insn->off != 0 || !is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(insn->imm)))) { 17202 verbose(env, "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n"); 17203 return -EINVAL; 17204 } 17205 } 17206 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 17207 err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 17208 else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 17209 err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 17210 else 17211 err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 17212 if (err) 17213 return err; 17214 17215 mark_reg_scratched(env, BPF_REG_0); 17216 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { 17217 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 17218 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 17219 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 17220 (class == BPF_JMP && insn->imm != 0) || 17221 (class == BPF_JMP32 && insn->off != 0)) { 17222 verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); 17223 return -EINVAL; 17224 } 17225 17226 if (class == BPF_JMP) 17227 env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1; 17228 else 17229 env->insn_idx += insn->imm + 1; 17230 continue; 17231 17232 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 17233 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 17234 insn->imm != 0 || 17235 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 17236 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 17237 class == BPF_JMP32) { 17238 verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); 17239 return -EINVAL; 17240 } 17241 17242 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr && 17243 !in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) { 17244 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock is missing\n"); 17245 return -EINVAL; 17246 } 17247 17248 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock && 17249 !in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) { 17250 verbose(env, "bpf_rcu_read_unlock is missing\n"); 17251 return -EINVAL; 17252 } 17253 17254 /* We must do check_reference_leak here before 17255 * prepare_func_exit to handle the case when 17256 * state->curframe > 0, it may be a callback 17257 * function, for which reference_state must 17258 * match caller reference state when it exits. 17259 */ 17260 err = check_reference_leak(env); 17261 if (err) 17262 return err; 17263 17264 if (state->curframe) { 17265 /* exit from nested function */ 17266 err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); 17267 if (err) 17268 return err; 17269 do_print_state = true; 17270 continue; 17271 } 17272 17273 err = check_return_code(env); 17274 if (err) 17275 return err; 17276 process_bpf_exit: 17277 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 17278 update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state); 17279 err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, 17280 &env->insn_idx, pop_log); 17281 if (err < 0) { 17282 if (err != -ENOENT) 17283 return err; 17284 break; 17285 } else { 17286 do_print_state = true; 17287 continue; 17288 } 17289 } else { 17290 err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 17291 if (err) 17292 return err; 17293 } 17294 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 17295 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 17296 17297 if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) { 17298 err = check_ld_abs(env, insn); 17299 if (err) 17300 return err; 17301 17302 } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) { 17303 err = check_ld_imm(env, insn); 17304 if (err) 17305 return err; 17306 17307 env->insn_idx++; 17308 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 17309 } else { 17310 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); 17311 return -EINVAL; 17312 } 17313 } else { 17314 verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class); 17315 return -EINVAL; 17316 } 17317 17318 env->insn_idx++; 17319 } 17320 17321 return 0; 17322 } 17323 17324 static int find_btf_percpu_datasec(struct btf *btf) 17325 { 17326 const struct btf_type *t; 17327 const char *tname; 17328 int i, n; 17329 17330 /* 17331 * Both vmlinux and module each have their own ".data..percpu" 17332 * DATASECs in BTF. So for module's case, we need to skip vmlinux BTF 17333 * types to look at only module's own BTF types. 17334 */ 17335 n = btf_nr_types(btf); 17336 if (btf_is_module(btf)) 17337 i = btf_nr_types(btf_vmlinux); 17338 else 17339 i = 1; 17340 17341 for(; i < n; i++) { 17342 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, i); 17343 if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) != BTF_KIND_DATASEC) 17344 continue; 17345 17346 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 17347 if (!strcmp(tname, ".data..percpu")) 17348 return i; 17349 } 17350 17351 return -ENOENT; 17352 } 17353 17354 /* replace pseudo btf_id with kernel symbol address */ 17355 static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 17356 struct bpf_insn *insn, 17357 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 17358 { 17359 const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi; 17360 const struct btf_type *datasec; 17361 struct btf_mod_pair *btf_mod; 17362 const struct btf_type *t; 17363 const char *sym_name; 17364 bool percpu = false; 17365 u32 type, id = insn->imm; 17366 struct btf *btf; 17367 s32 datasec_id; 17368 u64 addr; 17369 int i, btf_fd, err; 17370 17371 btf_fd = insn[1].imm; 17372 if (btf_fd) { 17373 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); 17374 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 17375 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF object FD specified.\n"); 17376 return -EINVAL; 17377 } 17378 } else { 17379 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 17380 verbose(env, "kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\n"); 17381 return -EINVAL; 17382 } 17383 btf = btf_vmlinux; 17384 btf_get(btf); 17385 } 17386 17387 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id); 17388 if (!t) { 17389 verbose(env, "ldimm64 insn specifies invalid btf_id %d.\n", id); 17390 err = -ENOENT; 17391 goto err_put; 17392 } 17393 17394 if (!btf_type_is_var(t) && !btf_type_is_func(t)) { 17395 verbose(env, "pseudo btf_id %d in ldimm64 isn't KIND_VAR or KIND_FUNC\n", id); 17396 err = -EINVAL; 17397 goto err_put; 17398 } 17399 17400 sym_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 17401 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(sym_name); 17402 if (!addr) { 17403 verbose(env, "ldimm64 failed to find the address for kernel symbol '%s'.\n", 17404 sym_name); 17405 err = -ENOENT; 17406 goto err_put; 17407 } 17408 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 17409 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 17410 17411 if (btf_type_is_func(t)) { 17412 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY; 17413 aux->btf_var.mem_size = 0; 17414 goto check_btf; 17415 } 17416 17417 datasec_id = find_btf_percpu_datasec(btf); 17418 if (datasec_id > 0) { 17419 datasec = btf_type_by_id(btf, datasec_id); 17420 for_each_vsi(i, datasec, vsi) { 17421 if (vsi->type == id) { 17422 percpu = true; 17423 break; 17424 } 17425 } 17426 } 17427 17428 type = t->type; 17429 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, type, NULL); 17430 if (percpu) { 17431 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU; 17432 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 17433 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 17434 } else if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 17435 const struct btf_type *ret; 17436 const char *tname; 17437 u32 tsize; 17438 17439 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 17440 ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, t, &tsize); 17441 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 17442 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 17443 verbose(env, "ldimm64 unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 17444 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 17445 err = -EINVAL; 17446 goto err_put; 17447 } 17448 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY; 17449 aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize; 17450 } else { 17451 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 17452 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 17453 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 17454 } 17455 check_btf: 17456 /* check whether we recorded this BTF (and maybe module) already */ 17457 for (i = 0; i < env->used_btf_cnt; i++) { 17458 if (env->used_btfs[i].btf == btf) { 17459 btf_put(btf); 17460 return 0; 17461 } 17462 } 17463 17464 if (env->used_btf_cnt >= MAX_USED_BTFS) { 17465 err = -E2BIG; 17466 goto err_put; 17467 } 17468 17469 btf_mod = &env->used_btfs[env->used_btf_cnt]; 17470 btf_mod->btf = btf; 17471 btf_mod->module = NULL; 17472 17473 /* if we reference variables from kernel module, bump its refcount */ 17474 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 17475 btf_mod->module = btf_try_get_module(btf); 17476 if (!btf_mod->module) { 17477 err = -ENXIO; 17478 goto err_put; 17479 } 17480 } 17481 17482 env->used_btf_cnt++; 17483 17484 return 0; 17485 err_put: 17486 btf_put(btf); 17487 return err; 17488 } 17489 17490 static bool is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type) 17491 { 17492 switch (type) { 17493 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: 17494 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT: 17495 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT: 17496 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 17497 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE: 17498 return true; 17499 default: 17500 return false; 17501 } 17502 } 17503 17504 static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 17505 struct bpf_map *map, 17506 struct bpf_prog *prog) 17507 17508 { 17509 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 17510 17511 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_LIST_HEAD) || 17512 btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_RB_ROOT)) { 17513 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 17514 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_{list_head,rb_root} yet\n"); 17515 return -EINVAL; 17516 } 17517 } 17518 17519 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 17520 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) { 17521 verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 17522 return -EINVAL; 17523 } 17524 17525 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 17526 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 17527 return -EINVAL; 17528 } 17529 } 17530 17531 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { 17532 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 17533 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_timer yet\n"); 17534 return -EINVAL; 17535 } 17536 } 17537 17538 if ((bpf_prog_is_offloaded(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_offloaded(map)) && 17539 !bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) { 17540 verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n"); 17541 return -EINVAL; 17542 } 17543 17544 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { 17545 verbose(env, "bpf_struct_ops map cannot be used in prog\n"); 17546 return -EINVAL; 17547 } 17548 17549 if (prog->aux->sleepable) 17550 switch (map->map_type) { 17551 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH: 17552 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH: 17553 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY: 17554 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH: 17555 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY: 17556 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH: 17557 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 17558 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 17559 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 17560 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 17561 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 17562 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 17563 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 17564 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE: 17565 break; 17566 default: 17567 verbose(env, 17568 "Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, ringbuf and local storage maps\n"); 17569 return -EINVAL; 17570 } 17571 17572 return 0; 17573 } 17574 17575 static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map) 17576 { 17577 return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE || 17578 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE); 17579 } 17580 17581 /* find and rewrite pseudo imm in ld_imm64 instructions: 17582 * 17583 * 1. if it accesses map FD, replace it with actual map pointer. 17584 * 2. if it accesses btf_id of a VAR, replace it with pointer to the var. 17585 * 17586 * NOTE: btf_vmlinux is required for converting pseudo btf_id. 17587 */ 17588 static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17589 { 17590 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 17591 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 17592 int i, j, err; 17593 17594 err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog); 17595 if (err) 17596 return err; 17597 17598 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 17599 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 17600 ((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM && BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEMSX) || 17601 insn->imm != 0)) { 17602 verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n"); 17603 return -EINVAL; 17604 } 17605 17606 if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) { 17607 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 17608 struct bpf_map *map; 17609 struct fd f; 17610 u64 addr; 17611 u32 fd; 17612 17613 if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 || 17614 insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 || 17615 insn[1].off != 0) { 17616 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 17617 return -EINVAL; 17618 } 17619 17620 if (insn[0].src_reg == 0) 17621 /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */ 17622 goto next_insn; 17623 17624 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 17625 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 17626 err = check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux); 17627 if (err) 17628 return err; 17629 goto next_insn; 17630 } 17631 17632 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 17633 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 17634 aux->ptr_type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 17635 goto next_insn; 17636 } 17637 17638 /* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is 17639 * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn. 17640 */ 17641 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 17642 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE: 17643 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 17644 break; 17645 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD: 17646 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 17647 if (insn[1].imm == 0) 17648 break; 17649 fallthrough; 17650 default: 17651 verbose(env, "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 17652 return -EINVAL; 17653 } 17654 17655 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 17656 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 17657 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 17658 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 17659 verbose(env, "fd_idx without fd_array is invalid\n"); 17660 return -EPROTO; 17661 } 17662 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&fd, env->fd_array, 17663 insn[0].imm * sizeof(fd), 17664 sizeof(fd))) 17665 return -EFAULT; 17666 break; 17667 default: 17668 fd = insn[0].imm; 17669 break; 17670 } 17671 17672 f = fdget(fd); 17673 map = __bpf_map_get(f); 17674 if (IS_ERR(map)) { 17675 verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", fd); 17676 return PTR_ERR(map); 17677 } 17678 17679 err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog); 17680 if (err) { 17681 fdput(f); 17682 return err; 17683 } 17684 17685 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 17686 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 17687 insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 17688 addr = (unsigned long)map; 17689 } else { 17690 u32 off = insn[1].imm; 17691 17692 if (off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 17693 verbose(env, "direct value offset of %u is not allowed\n", off); 17694 fdput(f); 17695 return -EINVAL; 17696 } 17697 17698 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 17699 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 17700 fdput(f); 17701 return -EINVAL; 17702 } 17703 17704 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 17705 if (err) { 17706 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n", 17707 map->value_size, off); 17708 fdput(f); 17709 return err; 17710 } 17711 17712 aux->map_off = off; 17713 addr += off; 17714 } 17715 17716 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 17717 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 17718 17719 /* check whether we recorded this map already */ 17720 for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++) { 17721 if (env->used_maps[j] == map) { 17722 aux->map_index = j; 17723 fdput(f); 17724 goto next_insn; 17725 } 17726 } 17727 17728 if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) { 17729 fdput(f); 17730 return -E2BIG; 17731 } 17732 17733 if (env->prog->aux->sleepable) 17734 atomic64_inc(&map->sleepable_refcnt); 17735 /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier, 17736 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it 17737 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded 17738 * and all maps are released in bpf_free_used_maps() 17739 */ 17740 bpf_map_inc(map); 17741 17742 aux->map_index = env->used_map_cnt; 17743 env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map; 17744 17745 if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) && 17746 bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog->aux, map)) { 17747 verbose(env, "only one cgroup storage of each type is allowed\n"); 17748 fdput(f); 17749 return -EBUSY; 17750 } 17751 17752 fdput(f); 17753 next_insn: 17754 insn++; 17755 i++; 17756 continue; 17757 } 17758 17759 /* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */ 17760 if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) { 17761 verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code); 17762 return -EINVAL; 17763 } 17764 } 17765 17766 /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid 17767 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd. 17768 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access. 17769 */ 17770 return 0; 17771 } 17772 17773 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 17774 static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17775 { 17776 __bpf_free_used_maps(env->prog->aux, env->used_maps, 17777 env->used_map_cnt); 17778 } 17779 17780 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 17781 static void release_btfs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17782 { 17783 __bpf_free_used_btfs(env->prog->aux, env->used_btfs, 17784 env->used_btf_cnt); 17785 } 17786 17787 /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */ 17788 static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17789 { 17790 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 17791 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 17792 int i; 17793 17794 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 17795 if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) 17796 continue; 17797 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) 17798 continue; 17799 insn->src_reg = 0; 17800 } 17801 } 17802 17803 /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range 17804 * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying 17805 * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero 17806 */ 17807 static void adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 17808 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, 17809 struct bpf_prog *new_prog, u32 off, u32 cnt) 17810 { 17811 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *old_data = env->insn_aux_data; 17812 struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi; 17813 u32 old_seen = old_data[off].seen; 17814 u32 prog_len; 17815 int i; 17816 17817 /* aux info at OFF always needs adjustment, no matter fast path 17818 * (cnt == 1) is taken or not. There is no guarantee INSN at OFF is the 17819 * original insn at old prog. 17820 */ 17821 old_data[off].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + off + cnt - 1); 17822 17823 if (cnt == 1) 17824 return; 17825 prog_len = new_prog->len; 17826 17827 memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off); 17828 memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off, 17829 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1)); 17830 for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) { 17831 /* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */ 17832 new_data[i].seen = old_seen; 17833 new_data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + i); 17834 } 17835 env->insn_aux_data = new_data; 17836 vfree(old_data); 17837 } 17838 17839 static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) 17840 { 17841 int i; 17842 17843 if (len == 1) 17844 return; 17845 /* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */ 17846 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 17847 if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off) 17848 continue; 17849 env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1; 17850 } 17851 } 17852 17853 static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 len) 17854 { 17855 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 17856 int i, sz = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 17857 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *desc; 17858 17859 for (i = 0; i < sz; i++) { 17860 desc = &tab[i]; 17861 if (desc->insn_idx <= off) 17862 continue; 17863 desc->insn_idx += len - 1; 17864 } 17865 } 17866 17867 static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 17868 const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len) 17869 { 17870 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 17871 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data = NULL; 17872 17873 if (len > 1) { 17874 new_data = vzalloc(array_size(env->prog->len + len - 1, 17875 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data))); 17876 if (!new_data) 17877 return NULL; 17878 } 17879 17880 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len); 17881 if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) { 17882 if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE) 17883 verbose(env, 17884 "insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n", 17885 env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx); 17886 vfree(new_data); 17887 return NULL; 17888 } 17889 adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_data, new_prog, off, len); 17890 adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len); 17891 adjust_poke_descs(new_prog, off, len); 17892 return new_prog; 17893 } 17894 17895 static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 17896 u32 off, u32 cnt) 17897 { 17898 int i, j; 17899 17900 /* find first prog starting at or after off (first to remove) */ 17901 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 17902 if (env->subprog_info[i].start >= off) 17903 break; 17904 /* find first prog starting at or after off + cnt (first to stay) */ 17905 for (j = i; j < env->subprog_cnt; j++) 17906 if (env->subprog_info[j].start >= off + cnt) 17907 break; 17908 /* if j doesn't start exactly at off + cnt, we are just removing 17909 * the front of previous prog 17910 */ 17911 if (env->subprog_info[j].start != off + cnt) 17912 j--; 17913 17914 if (j > i) { 17915 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 17916 int move; 17917 17918 /* move fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 17919 move = env->subprog_cnt + 1 - j; 17920 17921 memmove(env->subprog_info + i, 17922 env->subprog_info + j, 17923 sizeof(*env->subprog_info) * move); 17924 env->subprog_cnt -= j - i; 17925 17926 /* remove func_info */ 17927 if (aux->func_info) { 17928 move = aux->func_info_cnt - j; 17929 17930 memmove(aux->func_info + i, 17931 aux->func_info + j, 17932 sizeof(*aux->func_info) * move); 17933 aux->func_info_cnt -= j - i; 17934 /* func_info->insn_off is set after all code rewrites, 17935 * in adjust_btf_func() - no need to adjust 17936 */ 17937 } 17938 } else { 17939 /* convert i from "first prog to remove" to "first to adjust" */ 17940 if (env->subprog_info[i].start == off) 17941 i++; 17942 } 17943 17944 /* update fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 17945 for (; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 17946 env->subprog_info[i].start -= cnt; 17947 17948 return 0; 17949 } 17950 17951 static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 17952 u32 cnt) 17953 { 17954 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 17955 u32 i, l_off, l_cnt, nr_linfo; 17956 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 17957 17958 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 17959 if (!nr_linfo) 17960 return 0; 17961 17962 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 17963 17964 /* find first line info to remove, count lines to be removed */ 17965 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) 17966 if (linfo[i].insn_off >= off) 17967 break; 17968 17969 l_off = i; 17970 l_cnt = 0; 17971 for (; i < nr_linfo; i++) 17972 if (linfo[i].insn_off < off + cnt) 17973 l_cnt++; 17974 else 17975 break; 17976 17977 /* First live insn doesn't match first live linfo, it needs to "inherit" 17978 * last removed linfo. prog is already modified, so prog->len == off 17979 * means no live instructions after (tail of the program was removed). 17980 */ 17981 if (prog->len != off && l_cnt && 17982 (i == nr_linfo || linfo[i].insn_off != off + cnt)) { 17983 l_cnt--; 17984 linfo[--i].insn_off = off + cnt; 17985 } 17986 17987 /* remove the line info which refer to the removed instructions */ 17988 if (l_cnt) { 17989 memmove(linfo + l_off, linfo + i, 17990 sizeof(*linfo) * (nr_linfo - i)); 17991 17992 prog->aux->nr_linfo -= l_cnt; 17993 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 17994 } 17995 17996 /* pull all linfo[i].insn_off >= off + cnt in by cnt */ 17997 for (i = l_off; i < nr_linfo; i++) 17998 linfo[i].insn_off -= cnt; 17999 18000 /* fix up all subprogs (incl. 'exit') which start >= off */ 18001 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 18002 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx > l_off) { 18003 /* program may have started in the removed region but 18004 * may not be fully removed 18005 */ 18006 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx >= l_off + l_cnt) 18007 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx -= l_cnt; 18008 else 18009 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx = l_off; 18010 } 18011 18012 return 0; 18013 } 18014 18015 static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt) 18016 { 18017 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 18018 unsigned int orig_prog_len = env->prog->len; 18019 int err; 18020 18021 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 18022 bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(env, off, cnt); 18023 18024 err = bpf_remove_insns(env->prog, off, cnt); 18025 if (err) 18026 return err; 18027 18028 err = adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 18029 if (err) 18030 return err; 18031 18032 err = bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 18033 if (err) 18034 return err; 18035 18036 memmove(aux_data + off, aux_data + off + cnt, 18037 sizeof(*aux_data) * (orig_prog_len - off - cnt)); 18038 18039 return 0; 18040 } 18041 18042 /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not 18043 * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can 18044 * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code 18045 * with 'ja -1'. 18046 * 18047 * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the 18048 * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then 18049 * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception 18050 * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead 18051 * code could be located. 18052 */ 18053 static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18054 { 18055 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 18056 struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1); 18057 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 18058 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 18059 int i; 18060 18061 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 18062 if (aux_data[i].seen) 18063 continue; 18064 memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap)); 18065 aux_data[i].zext_dst = false; 18066 } 18067 } 18068 18069 static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code) 18070 { 18071 u8 op; 18072 18073 op = BPF_OP(code); 18074 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32) 18075 return op != BPF_JA; 18076 18077 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP) 18078 return false; 18079 18080 return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL; 18081 } 18082 18083 static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18084 { 18085 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 18086 struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 18087 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 18088 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 18089 int i; 18090 18091 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 18092 if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code)) 18093 continue; 18094 18095 if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen) 18096 ja.off = insn->off; 18097 else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen) 18098 ja.off = 0; 18099 else 18100 continue; 18101 18102 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 18103 bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(env, i, &ja); 18104 18105 memcpy(insn, &ja, sizeof(ja)); 18106 } 18107 } 18108 18109 static int opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18110 { 18111 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 18112 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 18113 int i, err; 18114 18115 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 18116 int j; 18117 18118 j = 0; 18119 while (i + j < insn_cnt && !aux_data[i + j].seen) 18120 j++; 18121 if (!j) 18122 continue; 18123 18124 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, j); 18125 if (err) 18126 return err; 18127 insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 18128 } 18129 18130 return 0; 18131 } 18132 18133 static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18134 { 18135 const struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 18136 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 18137 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 18138 int i, err; 18139 18140 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 18141 if (memcmp(&insn[i], &ja, sizeof(ja))) 18142 continue; 18143 18144 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, 1); 18145 if (err) 18146 return err; 18147 insn_cnt--; 18148 i--; 18149 } 18150 18151 return 0; 18152 } 18153 18154 static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18155 const union bpf_attr *attr) 18156 { 18157 struct bpf_insn *patch, zext_patch[2], rnd_hi32_patch[4]; 18158 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 18159 int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len; 18160 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 18161 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 18162 bool rnd_hi32; 18163 18164 rnd_hi32 = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32; 18165 zext_patch[1] = BPF_ZEXT_REG(0); 18166 rnd_hi32_patch[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 18167 rnd_hi32_patch[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); 18168 rnd_hi32_patch[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, 0, BPF_REG_AX); 18169 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { 18170 int adj_idx = i + delta; 18171 struct bpf_insn insn; 18172 int load_reg; 18173 18174 insn = insns[adj_idx]; 18175 load_reg = insn_def_regno(&insn); 18176 if (!aux[adj_idx].zext_dst) { 18177 u8 code, class; 18178 u32 imm_rnd; 18179 18180 if (!rnd_hi32) 18181 continue; 18182 18183 code = insn.code; 18184 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 18185 if (load_reg == -1) 18186 continue; 18187 18188 /* NOTE: arg "reg" (the fourth one) is only used for 18189 * BPF_STX + SRC_OP, so it is safe to pass NULL 18190 * here. 18191 */ 18192 if (is_reg64(env, &insn, load_reg, NULL, DST_OP)) { 18193 if (class == BPF_LD && 18194 BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IMM) 18195 i++; 18196 continue; 18197 } 18198 18199 /* ctx load could be transformed into wider load. */ 18200 if (class == BPF_LDX && 18201 aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX) 18202 continue; 18203 18204 imm_rnd = get_random_u32(); 18205 rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn; 18206 rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd; 18207 rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = load_reg; 18208 patch = rnd_hi32_patch; 18209 patch_len = 4; 18210 goto apply_patch_buffer; 18211 } 18212 18213 /* Add in an zero-extend instruction if a) the JIT has requested 18214 * it or b) it's a CMPXCHG. 18215 * 18216 * The latter is because: BPF_CMPXCHG always loads a value into 18217 * R0, therefore always zero-extends. However some archs' 18218 * equivalent instruction only does this load when the 18219 * comparison is successful. This detail of CMPXCHG is 18220 * orthogonal to the general zero-extension behaviour of the 18221 * CPU, so it's treated independently of bpf_jit_needs_zext. 18222 */ 18223 if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext() && !is_cmpxchg_insn(&insn)) 18224 continue; 18225 18226 /* Zero-extension is done by the caller. */ 18227 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(&insn)) 18228 continue; 18229 18230 if (WARN_ON(load_reg == -1)) { 18231 verbose(env, "verifier bug. zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined\n"); 18232 return -EFAULT; 18233 } 18234 18235 zext_patch[0] = insn; 18236 zext_patch[1].dst_reg = load_reg; 18237 zext_patch[1].src_reg = load_reg; 18238 patch = zext_patch; 18239 patch_len = 2; 18240 apply_patch_buffer: 18241 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, adj_idx, patch, patch_len); 18242 if (!new_prog) 18243 return -ENOMEM; 18244 env->prog = new_prog; 18245 insns = new_prog->insnsi; 18246 aux = env->insn_aux_data; 18247 delta += patch_len - 1; 18248 } 18249 18250 return 0; 18251 } 18252 18253 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a 18254 * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure: 18255 * struct __sk_buff -> struct sk_buff 18256 * struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock 18257 */ 18258 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18259 { 18260 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops; 18261 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0; 18262 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 18263 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn; 18264 u32 target_size, size_default, off; 18265 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 18266 enum bpf_access_type type; 18267 bool is_narrower_load; 18268 18269 if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) { 18270 if (!ops->gen_prologue) { 18271 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 18272 return -EINVAL; 18273 } 18274 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, 18275 env->prog); 18276 if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 18277 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 18278 return -EINVAL; 18279 } else if (cnt) { 18280 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); 18281 if (!new_prog) 18282 return -ENOMEM; 18283 18284 env->prog = new_prog; 18285 delta += cnt - 1; 18286 } 18287 } 18288 18289 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 18290 return 0; 18291 18292 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta; 18293 18294 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 18295 bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access; 18296 u8 mode; 18297 18298 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 18299 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 18300 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 18301 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 18302 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_B) || 18303 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_H) || 18304 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_W)) { 18305 type = BPF_READ; 18306 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 18307 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 18308 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 18309 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 18310 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 18311 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 18312 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 18313 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { 18314 type = BPF_WRITE; 18315 } else { 18316 continue; 18317 } 18318 18319 if (type == BPF_WRITE && 18320 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_spill) { 18321 struct bpf_insn patch[] = { 18322 *insn, 18323 BPF_ST_NOSPEC(), 18324 }; 18325 18326 cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch); 18327 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt); 18328 if (!new_prog) 18329 return -ENOMEM; 18330 18331 delta += cnt - 1; 18332 env->prog = new_prog; 18333 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18334 continue; 18335 } 18336 18337 switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) { 18338 case PTR_TO_CTX: 18339 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access) 18340 continue; 18341 convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access; 18342 break; 18343 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 18344 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 18345 convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access; 18346 break; 18347 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 18348 convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 18349 break; 18350 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 18351 convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 18352 break; 18353 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 18354 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 18355 /* PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC always has a valid lifetime, unlike 18356 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and an active ref_obj_id, but the same cannot 18357 * be said once it is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, hence we must handle 18358 * any faults for loads into such types. BPF_WRITE is disallowed 18359 * for this case. 18360 */ 18361 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 18362 if (type == BPF_READ) { 18363 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM) 18364 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | 18365 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); 18366 else 18367 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEMSX | 18368 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); 18369 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; 18370 } 18371 continue; 18372 default: 18373 continue; 18374 } 18375 18376 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size; 18377 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn); 18378 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 18379 18380 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field, 18381 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific 18382 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful, 18383 * we will apply proper mask to the result. 18384 */ 18385 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size; 18386 size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size); 18387 off = insn->off; 18388 if (is_narrower_load) { 18389 u8 size_code; 18390 18391 if (type == BPF_WRITE) { 18392 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n"); 18393 return -EINVAL; 18394 } 18395 18396 size_code = BPF_H; 18397 if (ctx_field_size == 4) 18398 size_code = BPF_W; 18399 else if (ctx_field_size == 8) 18400 size_code = BPF_DW; 18401 18402 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1); 18403 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code; 18404 } 18405 18406 target_size = 0; 18407 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, 18408 &target_size); 18409 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) || 18410 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { 18411 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 18412 return -EINVAL; 18413 } 18414 18415 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { 18416 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset( 18417 off, size, size_default) * 8; 18418 if (shift && cnt + 1 >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 18419 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx load misconfigured\n"); 18420 return -EINVAL; 18421 } 18422 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) { 18423 if (shift) 18424 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH, 18425 insn->dst_reg, 18426 shift); 18427 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 18428 (1 << size * 8) - 1); 18429 } else { 18430 if (shift) 18431 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, 18432 insn->dst_reg, 18433 shift); 18434 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 18435 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1); 18436 } 18437 } 18438 if (mode == BPF_MEMSX) 18439 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X, 18440 insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg, 18441 size * 8, 0); 18442 18443 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 18444 if (!new_prog) 18445 return -ENOMEM; 18446 18447 delta += cnt - 1; 18448 18449 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */ 18450 env->prog = new_prog; 18451 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18452 } 18453 18454 return 0; 18455 } 18456 18457 static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18458 { 18459 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp; 18460 int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog; 18461 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 18462 struct bpf_insn *insn; 18463 void *old_bpf_func; 18464 int err, num_exentries; 18465 18466 if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1) 18467 return 0; 18468 18469 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 18470 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 18471 continue; 18472 18473 /* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but 18474 * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is 18475 * propagated in any case. 18476 */ 18477 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 18478 if (subprog < 0) { 18479 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 18480 i + insn->imm + 1); 18481 return -EFAULT; 18482 } 18483 /* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of 18484 * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs 18485 */ 18486 insn->off = subprog; 18487 /* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback 18488 * to interpreter will be needed 18489 */ 18490 env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; 18491 /* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */ 18492 insn->imm = 1; 18493 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) 18494 /* jit (e.g. x86_64) may emit fewer instructions 18495 * if it learns a u32 imm is the same as a u64 imm. 18496 * Force a non zero here. 18497 */ 18498 insn[1].imm = 1; 18499 } 18500 18501 err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog); 18502 if (err) 18503 goto out_undo_insn; 18504 18505 err = -ENOMEM; 18506 func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL); 18507 if (!func) 18508 goto out_undo_insn; 18509 18510 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18511 subprog_start = subprog_end; 18512 subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start; 18513 18514 len = subprog_end - subprog_start; 18515 /* bpf_prog_run() doesn't call subprogs directly, 18516 * hence main prog stats include the runtime of subprogs. 18517 * subprogs don't have IDs and not reachable via prog_get_next_id 18518 * func[i]->stats will never be accessed and stays NULL 18519 */ 18520 func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER); 18521 if (!func[i]) 18522 goto out_free; 18523 memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start], 18524 len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn)); 18525 func[i]->type = prog->type; 18526 func[i]->len = len; 18527 if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i])) 18528 goto out_free; 18529 func[i]->is_func = 1; 18530 func[i]->aux->func_idx = i; 18531 /* Below members will be freed only at prog->aux */ 18532 func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf; 18533 func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info; 18534 func[i]->aux->func_info_cnt = prog->aux->func_info_cnt; 18535 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 18536 func[i]->aux->size_poke_tab = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 18537 18538 for (j = 0; j < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) { 18539 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke; 18540 18541 poke = &prog->aux->poke_tab[j]; 18542 if (poke->insn_idx < subprog_end && 18543 poke->insn_idx >= subprog_start) 18544 poke->aux = func[i]->aux; 18545 } 18546 18547 func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F'; 18548 func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 18549 func[i]->jit_requested = 1; 18550 func[i]->blinding_requested = prog->blinding_requested; 18551 func[i]->aux->kfunc_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 18552 func[i]->aux->kfunc_btf_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 18553 func[i]->aux->linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 18554 func[i]->aux->nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 18555 func[i]->aux->jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo; 18556 func[i]->aux->linfo_idx = env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx; 18557 num_exentries = 0; 18558 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 18559 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 18560 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 18561 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM || 18562 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX)) 18563 num_exentries++; 18564 } 18565 func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries; 18566 func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable; 18567 func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 18568 if (!func[i]->jited) { 18569 err = -ENOTSUPP; 18570 goto out_free; 18571 } 18572 cond_resched(); 18573 } 18574 18575 /* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed 18576 * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and 18577 * run last pass of JIT 18578 */ 18579 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18580 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 18581 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 18582 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 18583 subprog = insn->off; 18584 insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func; 18585 insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32; 18586 continue; 18587 } 18588 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 18589 continue; 18590 subprog = insn->off; 18591 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(func[subprog]->bpf_func); 18592 } 18593 18594 /* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses 18595 * of the JITed images for each function in the program 18596 * 18597 * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field 18598 * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start 18599 * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base 18600 * 18601 * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee 18602 * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of 18603 * the call instruction, as an index for this list 18604 */ 18605 func[i]->aux->func = func; 18606 func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 18607 } 18608 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18609 old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func; 18610 tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 18611 if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) { 18612 verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 18613 err = -ENOTSUPP; 18614 goto out_free; 18615 } 18616 cond_resched(); 18617 } 18618 18619 /* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and 18620 * populate kallsysm. Begin at the first subprogram, since 18621 * bpf_prog_load will add the kallsyms for the main program. 18622 */ 18623 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18624 bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]); 18625 bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]); 18626 } 18627 18628 /* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main 18629 * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can 18630 * later look the same as if they were interpreted only. 18631 */ 18632 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 18633 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 18634 insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 18635 insn[1].imm = insn->off; 18636 insn->off = 0; 18637 continue; 18638 } 18639 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 18640 continue; 18641 insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 18642 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1); 18643 insn->imm = subprog; 18644 } 18645 18646 prog->jited = 1; 18647 prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func; 18648 prog->jited_len = func[0]->jited_len; 18649 prog->aux->extable = func[0]->aux->extable; 18650 prog->aux->num_exentries = func[0]->aux->num_exentries; 18651 prog->aux->func = func; 18652 prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 18653 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 18654 return 0; 18655 out_free: 18656 /* We failed JIT'ing, so at this point we need to unregister poke 18657 * descriptors from subprogs, so that kernel is not attempting to 18658 * patch it anymore as we're freeing the subprog JIT memory. 18659 */ 18660 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 18661 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 18662 map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, prog->aux); 18663 } 18664 /* At this point we're guaranteed that poke descriptors are not 18665 * live anymore. We can just unlink its descriptor table as it's 18666 * released with the main prog. 18667 */ 18668 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18669 if (!func[i]) 18670 continue; 18671 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = NULL; 18672 bpf_jit_free(func[i]); 18673 } 18674 kfree(func); 18675 out_undo_insn: 18676 /* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */ 18677 prog->jit_requested = 0; 18678 prog->blinding_requested = 0; 18679 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 18680 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 18681 continue; 18682 insn->off = 0; 18683 insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 18684 } 18685 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 18686 return err; 18687 } 18688 18689 static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18690 { 18691 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 18692 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 18693 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 18694 bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog); 18695 int i, depth; 18696 #endif 18697 int err = 0; 18698 18699 if (env->prog->jit_requested && 18700 !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 18701 err = jit_subprogs(env); 18702 if (err == 0) 18703 return 0; 18704 if (err == -EFAULT) 18705 return err; 18706 } 18707 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 18708 if (has_kfunc_call) { 18709 verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 18710 return -EINVAL; 18711 } 18712 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) { 18713 /* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls 18714 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 18715 */ 18716 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 18717 return -EINVAL; 18718 } 18719 for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 18720 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 18721 /* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls 18722 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 18723 */ 18724 verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 18725 return -EINVAL; 18726 } 18727 18728 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 18729 continue; 18730 depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i); 18731 if (depth < 0) 18732 return depth; 18733 bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth); 18734 } 18735 err = 0; 18736 #endif 18737 return err; 18738 } 18739 18740 /* replace a generic kfunc with a specialized version if necessary */ 18741 static void specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18742 u32 func_id, u16 offset, unsigned long *addr) 18743 { 18744 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 18745 bool seen_direct_write; 18746 void *xdp_kfunc; 18747 bool is_rdonly; 18748 18749 if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(func_id)) { 18750 xdp_kfunc = bpf_dev_bound_resolve_kfunc(prog, func_id); 18751 if (xdp_kfunc) { 18752 *addr = (unsigned long)xdp_kfunc; 18753 return; 18754 } 18755 /* fallback to default kfunc when not supported by netdev */ 18756 } 18757 18758 if (offset) 18759 return; 18760 18761 if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) { 18762 seen_direct_write = env->seen_direct_write; 18763 is_rdonly = !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE); 18764 18765 if (is_rdonly) 18766 *addr = (unsigned long)bpf_dynptr_from_skb_rdonly; 18767 18768 /* restore env->seen_direct_write to its original value, since 18769 * may_access_direct_pkt_data mutates it 18770 */ 18771 env->seen_direct_write = seen_direct_write; 18772 } 18773 } 18774 18775 static void __fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux, 18776 u16 struct_meta_reg, 18777 u16 node_offset_reg, 18778 struct bpf_insn *insn, 18779 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, 18780 int *cnt) 18781 { 18782 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta; 18783 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(struct_meta_reg, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 18784 18785 insn_buf[0] = addr[0]; 18786 insn_buf[1] = addr[1]; 18787 insn_buf[2] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(node_offset_reg, insn_aux->insert_off); 18788 insn_buf[3] = *insn; 18789 *cnt = 4; 18790 } 18791 18792 static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 18793 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, int insn_idx, int *cnt) 18794 { 18795 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 18796 18797 if (!insn->imm) { 18798 verbose(env, "invalid kernel function call not eliminated in verifier pass\n"); 18799 return -EINVAL; 18800 } 18801 18802 *cnt = 0; 18803 18804 /* insn->imm has the btf func_id. Replace it with an offset relative to 18805 * __bpf_call_base, unless the JIT needs to call functions that are 18806 * further than 32 bits away (bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()). 18807 */ 18808 desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm, insn->off); 18809 if (!desc) { 18810 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u\n", 18811 insn->imm); 18812 return -EFAULT; 18813 } 18814 18815 if (!bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()) 18816 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(desc->addr); 18817 if (insn->off) 18818 return 0; 18819 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) { 18820 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 18821 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 18822 u64 obj_new_size = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].obj_new_size; 18823 18824 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, obj_new_size); 18825 insn_buf[1] = addr[0]; 18826 insn_buf[2] = addr[1]; 18827 insn_buf[3] = *insn; 18828 *cnt = 4; 18829 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl] || 18830 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) { 18831 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 18832 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 18833 18834 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl] && 18835 !kptr_struct_meta) { 18836 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d\n", 18837 insn_idx); 18838 return -EFAULT; 18839 } 18840 18841 insn_buf[0] = addr[0]; 18842 insn_buf[1] = addr[1]; 18843 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 18844 *cnt = 3; 18845 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] || 18846 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 18847 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 18848 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 18849 int struct_meta_reg = BPF_REG_3; 18850 int node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_4; 18851 18852 /* rbtree_add has extra 'less' arg, so args-to-fixup are in diff regs */ 18853 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 18854 struct_meta_reg = BPF_REG_4; 18855 node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_5; 18856 } 18857 18858 if (!kptr_struct_meta) { 18859 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d\n", 18860 insn_idx); 18861 return -EFAULT; 18862 } 18863 18864 __fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(&env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx], struct_meta_reg, 18865 node_offset_reg, insn, insn_buf, cnt); 18866 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx] || 18867 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 18868 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 18869 *cnt = 1; 18870 } 18871 return 0; 18872 } 18873 18874 /* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass. 18875 * These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations. 18876 */ 18877 static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18878 { 18879 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 18880 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = prog->expected_attach_type; 18881 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 18882 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 18883 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn; 18884 const int insn_cnt = prog->len; 18885 const struct bpf_map_ops *ops; 18886 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 18887 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16]; 18888 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 18889 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 18890 int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0; 18891 18892 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 18893 /* Make divide-by-zero exceptions impossible. */ 18894 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 18895 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || 18896 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 18897 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { 18898 bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64; 18899 bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV; 18900 struct bpf_insn *patchlet; 18901 struct bpf_insn chk_and_div[] = { 18902 /* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */ 18903 BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 18904 BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 18905 0, 2, 0), 18906 BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), 18907 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), 18908 *insn, 18909 }; 18910 struct bpf_insn chk_and_mod[] = { 18911 /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */ 18912 BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 18913 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 18914 0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0), 18915 *insn, 18916 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), 18917 BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), 18918 }; 18919 18920 patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_div : chk_and_mod; 18921 cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_div) : 18922 ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_mod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0); 18923 18924 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt); 18925 if (!new_prog) 18926 return -ENOMEM; 18927 18928 delta += cnt - 1; 18929 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18930 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18931 continue; 18932 } 18933 18934 /* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */ 18935 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD && 18936 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS || 18937 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { 18938 cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf); 18939 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 18940 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 18941 return -EINVAL; 18942 } 18943 18944 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 18945 if (!new_prog) 18946 return -ENOMEM; 18947 18948 delta += cnt - 1; 18949 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18950 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18951 continue; 18952 } 18953 18954 /* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */ 18955 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) || 18956 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) { 18957 const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X; 18958 const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X; 18959 struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0]; 18960 bool issrc, isneg, isimm; 18961 u32 off_reg; 18962 18963 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 18964 if (!aux->alu_state || 18965 aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER) 18966 continue; 18967 18968 isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE; 18969 issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) == 18970 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC; 18971 isimm = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE; 18972 18973 off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg; 18974 if (isimm) { 18975 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 18976 } else { 18977 if (isneg) 18978 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 18979 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 18980 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 18981 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 18982 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 18983 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63); 18984 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 18985 } 18986 if (!issrc) 18987 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg); 18988 insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX; 18989 if (isneg) 18990 insn->code = insn->code == code_add ? 18991 code_sub : code_add; 18992 *patch++ = *insn; 18993 if (issrc && isneg && !isimm) 18994 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 18995 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 18996 18997 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 18998 if (!new_prog) 18999 return -ENOMEM; 19000 19001 delta += cnt - 1; 19002 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19003 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19004 continue; 19005 } 19006 19007 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) 19008 continue; 19009 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 19010 continue; 19011 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 19012 ret = fixup_kfunc_call(env, insn, insn_buf, i + delta, &cnt); 19013 if (ret) 19014 return ret; 19015 if (cnt == 0) 19016 continue; 19017 19018 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 19019 if (!new_prog) 19020 return -ENOMEM; 19021 19022 delta += cnt - 1; 19023 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19024 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19025 continue; 19026 } 19027 19028 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm) 19029 prog->dst_needed = 1; 19030 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32) 19031 bpf_user_rnd_init_once(); 19032 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return) 19033 prog->kprobe_override = 1; 19034 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 19035 /* If we tail call into other programs, we 19036 * cannot make any assumptions since they can 19037 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in 19038 * the program array. 19039 */ 19040 prog->cb_access = 1; 19041 if (!allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) 19042 prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK; 19043 prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF; 19044 19045 /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid 19046 * conditional branch in the interpreter for every normal 19047 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler 19048 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet 19049 */ 19050 insn->imm = 0; 19051 insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL; 19052 19053 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 19054 if (env->bpf_capable && !prog->blinding_requested && 19055 prog->jit_requested && 19056 !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 19057 !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) && 19058 !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) { 19059 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = { 19060 .reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL, 19061 .tail_call.map = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state), 19062 .tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux), 19063 .insn_idx = i + delta, 19064 }; 19065 19066 ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(prog, &desc); 19067 if (ret < 0) { 19068 verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n"); 19069 return ret; 19070 } 19071 19072 insn->imm = ret + 1; 19073 continue; 19074 } 19075 19076 if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) 19077 continue; 19078 19079 /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call 19080 * emit two extra insns: 19081 * if (index >= max_entries) goto out; 19082 * index &= array->index_mask; 19083 * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation 19084 */ 19085 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) { 19086 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 19087 return -EINVAL; 19088 } 19089 19090 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 19091 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, 19092 map_ptr->max_entries, 2); 19093 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, 19094 container_of(map_ptr, 19095 struct bpf_array, 19096 map)->index_mask); 19097 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 19098 cnt = 3; 19099 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 19100 if (!new_prog) 19101 return -ENOMEM; 19102 19103 delta += cnt - 1; 19104 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19105 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19106 continue; 19107 } 19108 19109 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { 19110 /* The verifier will process callback_fn as many times as necessary 19111 * with different maps and the register states prepared by 19112 * set_timer_callback_state will be accurate. 19113 * 19114 * The following use case is valid: 19115 * map1 is shared by prog1, prog2, prog3. 19116 * prog1 calls bpf_timer_init for some map1 elements 19117 * prog2 calls bpf_timer_set_callback for some map1 elements. 19118 * Those that were not bpf_timer_init-ed will return -EINVAL. 19119 * prog3 calls bpf_timer_start for some map1 elements. 19120 * Those that were not both bpf_timer_init-ed and 19121 * bpf_timer_set_callback-ed will return -EINVAL. 19122 */ 19123 struct bpf_insn ld_addrs[2] = { 19124 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_3, (long)prog->aux), 19125 }; 19126 19127 insn_buf[0] = ld_addrs[0]; 19128 insn_buf[1] = ld_addrs[1]; 19129 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 19130 cnt = 3; 19131 19132 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 19133 if (!new_prog) 19134 return -ENOMEM; 19135 19136 delta += cnt - 1; 19137 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19138 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19139 goto patch_call_imm; 19140 } 19141 19142 if (is_storage_get_function(insn->imm)) { 19143 if (!env->prog->aux->sleepable || 19144 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].storage_get_func_atomic) 19145 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_ATOMIC); 19146 else 19147 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_KERNEL); 19148 insn_buf[1] = *insn; 19149 cnt = 2; 19150 19151 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 19152 if (!new_prog) 19153 return -ENOMEM; 19154 19155 delta += cnt - 1; 19156 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19157 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19158 goto patch_call_imm; 19159 } 19160 19161 /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup 19162 * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit 19163 * only. 19164 */ 19165 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 19166 (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem || 19167 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 19168 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 19169 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 19170 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem || 19171 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem || 19172 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map || 19173 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 19174 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem)) { 19175 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 19176 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) 19177 goto patch_call_imm; 19178 19179 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 19180 ops = map_ptr->ops; 19181 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 19182 ops->map_gen_lookup) { 19183 cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf); 19184 if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP) 19185 goto patch_map_ops_generic; 19186 if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 19187 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 19188 return -EINVAL; 19189 } 19190 19191 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, 19192 insn_buf, cnt); 19193 if (!new_prog) 19194 return -ENOMEM; 19195 19196 delta += cnt - 1; 19197 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19198 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19199 continue; 19200 } 19201 19202 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem, 19203 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 19204 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem, 19205 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 19206 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem, 19207 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 19208 u64 flags))NULL)); 19209 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_push_elem, 19210 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value, 19211 u64 flags))NULL)); 19212 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_pop_elem, 19213 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 19214 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_peek_elem, 19215 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 19216 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_redirect, 19217 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, u64 index, u64 flags))NULL)); 19218 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_for_each_callback, 19219 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, 19220 bpf_callback_t callback_fn, 19221 void *callback_ctx, 19222 u64 flags))NULL)); 19223 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem, 19224 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u32 cpu))NULL)); 19225 19226 patch_map_ops_generic: 19227 switch (insn->imm) { 19228 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: 19229 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_elem); 19230 continue; 19231 case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem: 19232 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_update_elem); 19233 continue; 19234 case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem: 19235 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_delete_elem); 19236 continue; 19237 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 19238 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_push_elem); 19239 continue; 19240 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 19241 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_pop_elem); 19242 continue; 19243 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 19244 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_peek_elem); 19245 continue; 19246 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 19247 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_redirect); 19248 continue; 19249 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 19250 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_for_each_callback); 19251 continue; 19252 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 19253 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem); 19254 continue; 19255 } 19256 19257 goto patch_call_imm; 19258 } 19259 19260 /* Implement bpf_jiffies64 inline. */ 19261 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 19262 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) { 19263 struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = { 19264 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 19265 (unsigned long)&jiffies), 19266 }; 19267 19268 insn_buf[0] = ld_jiffies_addr[0]; 19269 insn_buf[1] = ld_jiffies_addr[1]; 19270 insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 19271 BPF_REG_0, 0); 19272 cnt = 3; 19273 19274 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 19275 cnt); 19276 if (!new_prog) 19277 return -ENOMEM; 19278 19279 delta += cnt - 1; 19280 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19281 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19282 continue; 19283 } 19284 19285 /* Implement bpf_get_func_arg inline. */ 19286 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 19287 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg) { 19288 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 19289 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 19290 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, 6); 19291 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_2, 3); 19292 insn_buf[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1); 19293 insn_buf[4] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0); 19294 insn_buf[5] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 19295 insn_buf[6] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 19296 insn_buf[7] = BPF_JMP_A(1); 19297 insn_buf[8] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EINVAL); 19298 cnt = 9; 19299 19300 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 19301 if (!new_prog) 19302 return -ENOMEM; 19303 19304 delta += cnt - 1; 19305 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19306 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19307 continue; 19308 } 19309 19310 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ret inline. */ 19311 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 19312 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ret) { 19313 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT || 19314 eatype == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 19315 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 19316 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 19317 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_0, 3); 19318 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 19319 insn_buf[3] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 19320 insn_buf[4] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, 0); 19321 insn_buf[5] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 19322 cnt = 6; 19323 } else { 19324 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EOPNOTSUPP); 19325 cnt = 1; 19326 } 19327 19328 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 19329 if (!new_prog) 19330 return -ENOMEM; 19331 19332 delta += cnt - 1; 19333 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19334 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19335 continue; 19336 } 19337 19338 /* Implement get_func_arg_cnt inline. */ 19339 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 19340 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg_cnt) { 19341 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 19342 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 19343 19344 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 19345 if (!new_prog) 19346 return -ENOMEM; 19347 19348 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19349 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19350 continue; 19351 } 19352 19353 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ip inline. */ 19354 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 19355 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 19356 /* Load IP address from ctx - 16 */ 19357 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -16); 19358 19359 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 19360 if (!new_prog) 19361 return -ENOMEM; 19362 19363 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19364 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19365 continue; 19366 } 19367 19368 patch_call_imm: 19369 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog); 19370 /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed 19371 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions 19372 */ 19373 if (!fn->func) { 19374 verbose(env, 19375 "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 19376 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 19377 return -EFAULT; 19378 } 19379 insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base; 19380 } 19381 19382 /* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */ 19383 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 19384 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 19385 if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track || 19386 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack || 19387 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) { 19388 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 19389 return -EINVAL; 19390 } 19391 19392 ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux); 19393 if (ret < 0) { 19394 verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n"); 19395 return ret; 19396 } 19397 } 19398 19399 sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm_off(env->prog); 19400 19401 return 0; 19402 } 19403 19404 static struct bpf_prog *inline_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 19405 int position, 19406 s32 stack_base, 19407 u32 callback_subprogno, 19408 u32 *cnt) 19409 { 19410 s32 r6_offset = stack_base + 0 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 19411 s32 r7_offset = stack_base + 1 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 19412 s32 r8_offset = stack_base + 2 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 19413 int reg_loop_max = BPF_REG_6; 19414 int reg_loop_cnt = BPF_REG_7; 19415 int reg_loop_ctx = BPF_REG_8; 19416 19417 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 19418 u32 callback_start; 19419 u32 call_insn_offset; 19420 s32 callback_offset; 19421 19422 /* This represents an inlined version of bpf_iter.c:bpf_loop, 19423 * be careful to modify this code in sync. 19424 */ 19425 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[] = { 19426 /* Return error and jump to the end of the patch if 19427 * expected number of iterations is too big. 19428 */ 19429 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_1, BPF_MAX_LOOPS, 2), 19430 BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -E2BIG), 19431 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 16), 19432 /* spill R6, R7, R8 to use these as loop vars */ 19433 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, r6_offset), 19434 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, r7_offset), 19435 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_8, r8_offset), 19436 /* initialize loop vars */ 19437 BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_max, BPF_REG_1), 19438 BPF_MOV32_IMM(reg_loop_cnt, 0), 19439 BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_ctx, BPF_REG_3), 19440 /* loop header, 19441 * if reg_loop_cnt >= reg_loop_max skip the loop body 19442 */ 19443 BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, reg_loop_cnt, reg_loop_max, 5), 19444 /* callback call, 19445 * correct callback offset would be set after patching 19446 */ 19447 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, reg_loop_cnt), 19448 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, reg_loop_ctx), 19449 BPF_CALL_REL(0), 19450 /* increment loop counter */ 19451 BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, reg_loop_cnt, 1), 19452 /* jump to loop header if callback returned 0 */ 19453 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, -6), 19454 /* return value of bpf_loop, 19455 * set R0 to the number of iterations 19456 */ 19457 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, reg_loop_cnt), 19458 /* restore original values of R6, R7, R8 */ 19459 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10, r6_offset), 19460 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_10, r7_offset), 19461 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_10, r8_offset), 19462 }; 19463 19464 *cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf); 19465 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, position, insn_buf, *cnt); 19466 if (!new_prog) 19467 return new_prog; 19468 19469 /* callback start is known only after patching */ 19470 callback_start = env->subprog_info[callback_subprogno].start; 19471 /* Note: insn_buf[12] is an offset of BPF_CALL_REL instruction */ 19472 call_insn_offset = position + 12; 19473 callback_offset = callback_start - call_insn_offset - 1; 19474 new_prog->insnsi[call_insn_offset].imm = callback_offset; 19475 19476 return new_prog; 19477 } 19478 19479 static bool is_bpf_loop_call(struct bpf_insn *insn) 19480 { 19481 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 19482 insn->src_reg == 0 && 19483 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_loop; 19484 } 19485 19486 /* For all sub-programs in the program (including main) check 19487 * insn_aux_data to see if there are bpf_loop calls that require 19488 * inlining. If such calls are found the calls are replaced with a 19489 * sequence of instructions produced by `inline_bpf_loop` function and 19490 * subprog stack_depth is increased by the size of 3 registers. 19491 * This stack space is used to spill values of the R6, R7, R8. These 19492 * registers are used to store the loop bound, counter and context 19493 * variables. 19494 */ 19495 static int optimize_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 19496 { 19497 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info; 19498 int i, cur_subprog = 0, cnt, delta = 0; 19499 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 19500 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 19501 u16 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 19502 u16 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 19503 u16 stack_depth_extra = 0; 19504 19505 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 19506 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *inline_state = 19507 &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].loop_inline_state; 19508 19509 if (is_bpf_loop_call(insn) && inline_state->fit_for_inline) { 19510 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 19511 19512 stack_depth_extra = BPF_REG_SIZE * 3 + stack_depth_roundup; 19513 new_prog = inline_bpf_loop(env, 19514 i + delta, 19515 -(stack_depth + stack_depth_extra), 19516 inline_state->callback_subprogno, 19517 &cnt); 19518 if (!new_prog) 19519 return -ENOMEM; 19520 19521 delta += cnt - 1; 19522 env->prog = new_prog; 19523 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19524 } 19525 19526 if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) { 19527 subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra; 19528 cur_subprog++; 19529 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 19530 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 19531 stack_depth_extra = 0; 19532 } 19533 } 19534 19535 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 19536 19537 return 0; 19538 } 19539 19540 static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 19541 { 19542 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln; 19543 int i; 19544 19545 sl = env->free_list; 19546 while (sl) { 19547 sln = sl->next; 19548 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 19549 kfree(sl); 19550 sl = sln; 19551 } 19552 env->free_list = NULL; 19553 19554 if (!env->explored_states) 19555 return; 19556 19557 for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) { 19558 sl = env->explored_states[i]; 19559 19560 while (sl) { 19561 sln = sl->next; 19562 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 19563 kfree(sl); 19564 sl = sln; 19565 } 19566 env->explored_states[i] = NULL; 19567 } 19568 } 19569 19570 static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 19571 { 19572 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 19573 struct bpf_verifier_state *state; 19574 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 19575 int ret, i; 19576 19577 env->prev_linfo = NULL; 19578 env->pass_cnt++; 19579 19580 state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL); 19581 if (!state) 19582 return -ENOMEM; 19583 state->curframe = 0; 19584 state->speculative = false; 19585 state->branches = 1; 19586 state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL); 19587 if (!state->frame[0]) { 19588 kfree(state); 19589 return -ENOMEM; 19590 } 19591 env->cur_state = state; 19592 init_func_state(env, state->frame[0], 19593 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 19594 0 /* frameno */, 19595 subprog); 19596 state->first_insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start; 19597 state->last_insn_idx = -1; 19598 19599 regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs; 19600 if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 19601 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog, regs); 19602 if (ret) 19603 goto out; 19604 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) { 19605 if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_CTX) 19606 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 19607 else if (regs[i].type == SCALAR_VALUE) 19608 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 19609 else if (base_type(regs[i].type) == PTR_TO_MEM) { 19610 const u32 mem_size = regs[i].mem_size; 19611 19612 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 19613 regs[i].mem_size = mem_size; 19614 regs[i].id = ++env->id_gen; 19615 } 19616 } 19617 } else { 19618 /* 1st arg to a function */ 19619 regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX; 19620 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1); 19621 ret = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, regs); 19622 if (ret == -EFAULT) 19623 /* unlikely verifier bug. abort. 19624 * ret == 0 and ret < 0 are sadly acceptable for 19625 * main() function due to backward compatibility. 19626 * Like socket filter program may be written as: 19627 * int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) 19628 * and never dereference that ctx in the program. 19629 * 'struct pt_regs' is a type mismatch for socket 19630 * filter that should be using 'struct __sk_buff'. 19631 */ 19632 goto out; 19633 } 19634 19635 ret = do_check(env); 19636 out: 19637 /* check for NULL is necessary, since cur_state can be freed inside 19638 * do_check() under memory pressure. 19639 */ 19640 if (env->cur_state) { 19641 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 19642 env->cur_state = NULL; 19643 } 19644 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 19645 if (!ret && pop_log) 19646 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0); 19647 free_states(env); 19648 return ret; 19649 } 19650 19651 /* Verify all global functions in a BPF program one by one based on their BTF. 19652 * All global functions must pass verification. Otherwise the whole program is rejected. 19653 * Consider: 19654 * int bar(int); 19655 * int foo(int f) 19656 * { 19657 * return bar(f); 19658 * } 19659 * int bar(int b) 19660 * { 19661 * ... 19662 * } 19663 * foo() will be verified first for R1=any_scalar_value. During verification it 19664 * will be assumed that bar() already verified successfully and call to bar() 19665 * from foo() will be checked for type match only. Later bar() will be verified 19666 * independently to check that it's safe for R1=any_scalar_value. 19667 */ 19668 static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 19669 { 19670 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 19671 int i, ret; 19672 19673 if (!aux->func_info) 19674 return 0; 19675 19676 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 19677 if (aux->func_info_aux[i].linkage != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL) 19678 continue; 19679 env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start; 19680 WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0); 19681 ret = do_check_common(env, i); 19682 if (ret) { 19683 return ret; 19684 } else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 19685 verbose(env, 19686 "Func#%d is safe for any args that match its prototype\n", 19687 i); 19688 } 19689 } 19690 return 0; 19691 } 19692 19693 static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 19694 { 19695 int ret; 19696 19697 env->insn_idx = 0; 19698 ret = do_check_common(env, 0); 19699 if (!ret) 19700 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 19701 return ret; 19702 } 19703 19704 19705 static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 19706 { 19707 int i; 19708 19709 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) { 19710 verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n", 19711 div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000)); 19712 verbose(env, "stack depth "); 19713 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 19714 u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 19715 19716 verbose(env, "%d", depth); 19717 if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt) 19718 verbose(env, "+"); 19719 } 19720 verbose(env, "\n"); 19721 } 19722 verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d " 19723 "total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n", 19724 env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS, 19725 env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states, 19726 env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk); 19727 } 19728 19729 static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 19730 { 19731 const struct btf_type *t, *func_proto; 19732 const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops; 19733 const struct btf_member *member; 19734 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 19735 u32 btf_id, member_idx; 19736 const char *mname; 19737 19738 if (!prog->gpl_compatible) { 19739 verbose(env, "struct ops programs must have a GPL compatible license\n"); 19740 return -EINVAL; 19741 } 19742 19743 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 19744 st_ops = bpf_struct_ops_find(btf_id); 19745 if (!st_ops) { 19746 verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a supported struct\n", 19747 btf_id); 19748 return -ENOTSUPP; 19749 } 19750 19751 t = st_ops->type; 19752 member_idx = prog->expected_attach_type; 19753 if (member_idx >= btf_type_vlen(t)) { 19754 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member idx %u of struct %s\n", 19755 member_idx, st_ops->name); 19756 return -EINVAL; 19757 } 19758 19759 member = &btf_type_member(t)[member_idx]; 19760 mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, member->name_off); 19761 func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf_vmlinux, member->type, 19762 NULL); 19763 if (!func_proto) { 19764 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member %s(@idx %u) of struct %s\n", 19765 mname, member_idx, st_ops->name); 19766 return -EINVAL; 19767 } 19768 19769 if (st_ops->check_member) { 19770 int err = st_ops->check_member(t, member, prog); 19771 19772 if (err) { 19773 verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n", 19774 mname, st_ops->name); 19775 return err; 19776 } 19777 } 19778 19779 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = func_proto; 19780 prog->aux->attach_func_name = mname; 19781 env->ops = st_ops->verifier_ops; 19782 19783 return 0; 19784 } 19785 #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" 19786 19787 static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name) 19788 { 19789 if (within_error_injection_list(addr) || 19790 !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) 19791 return 0; 19792 19793 return -EINVAL; 19794 } 19795 19796 /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on 19797 * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list 19798 */ 19799 BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 19800 /* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context. 19801 * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view. 19802 */ 19803 BTF_ID(func, __filemap_add_folio) 19804 BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page) 19805 BTF_ID(func, should_failslab) 19806 BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 19807 19808 static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id) 19809 { 19810 return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id); 19811 } 19812 19813 int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, 19814 const struct bpf_prog *prog, 19815 const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog, 19816 u32 btf_id, 19817 struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info) 19818 { 19819 bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT; 19820 const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_"; 19821 int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i; 19822 const struct btf_type *t; 19823 bool conservative = true; 19824 const char *tname; 19825 struct btf *btf; 19826 long addr = 0; 19827 struct module *mod = NULL; 19828 19829 if (!btf_id) { 19830 bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n"); 19831 return -EINVAL; 19832 } 19833 btf = tgt_prog ? tgt_prog->aux->btf : prog->aux->attach_btf; 19834 if (!btf) { 19835 bpf_log(log, 19836 "FENTRY/FEXIT program can only be attached to another program annotated with BTF\n"); 19837 return -EINVAL; 19838 } 19839 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id); 19840 if (!t) { 19841 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id); 19842 return -EINVAL; 19843 } 19844 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 19845 if (!tname) { 19846 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id); 19847 return -EINVAL; 19848 } 19849 if (tgt_prog) { 19850 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = tgt_prog->aux; 19851 19852 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) && 19853 !bpf_prog_dev_bound_match(prog, tgt_prog)) { 19854 bpf_log(log, "Target program bound device mismatch"); 19855 return -EINVAL; 19856 } 19857 19858 for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++) 19859 if (aux->func_info[i].type_id == btf_id) { 19860 subprog = i; 19861 break; 19862 } 19863 if (subprog == -1) { 19864 bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname); 19865 return -EINVAL; 19866 } 19867 conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable; 19868 if (prog_extension) { 19869 if (conservative) { 19870 bpf_log(log, 19871 "Cannot replace static functions\n"); 19872 return -EINVAL; 19873 } 19874 if (!prog->jit_requested) { 19875 bpf_log(log, 19876 "Extension programs should be JITed\n"); 19877 return -EINVAL; 19878 } 19879 } 19880 if (!tgt_prog->jited) { 19881 bpf_log(log, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n"); 19882 return -EINVAL; 19883 } 19884 if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) { 19885 /* Cannot fentry/fexit another fentry/fexit program. 19886 * Cannot attach program extension to another extension. 19887 * It's ok to attach fentry/fexit to extension program. 19888 */ 19889 bpf_log(log, "Cannot recursively attach\n"); 19890 return -EINVAL; 19891 } 19892 if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 19893 prog_extension && 19894 (tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FENTRY || 19895 tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT)) { 19896 /* Program extensions can extend all program types 19897 * except fentry/fexit. The reason is the following. 19898 * The fentry/fexit programs are used for performance 19899 * analysis, stats and can be attached to any program 19900 * type except themselves. When extension program is 19901 * replacing XDP function it is necessary to allow 19902 * performance analysis of all functions. Both original 19903 * XDP program and its program extension. Hence 19904 * attaching fentry/fexit to BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is 19905 * allowed. If extending of fentry/fexit was allowed it 19906 * would be possible to create long call chain 19907 * fentry->extension->fentry->extension beyond 19908 * reasonable stack size. Hence extending fentry is not 19909 * allowed. 19910 */ 19911 bpf_log(log, "Cannot extend fentry/fexit\n"); 19912 return -EINVAL; 19913 } 19914 } else { 19915 if (prog_extension) { 19916 bpf_log(log, "Cannot replace kernel functions\n"); 19917 return -EINVAL; 19918 } 19919 } 19920 19921 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 19922 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 19923 if (tgt_prog) { 19924 bpf_log(log, 19925 "Only FENTRY/FEXIT progs are attachable to another BPF prog\n"); 19926 return -EINVAL; 19927 } 19928 if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) { 19929 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n", 19930 btf_id); 19931 return -EINVAL; 19932 } 19933 if (strncmp(prefix, tname, sizeof(prefix) - 1)) { 19934 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n", 19935 btf_id, tname); 19936 return -EINVAL; 19937 } 19938 tname += sizeof(prefix) - 1; 19939 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 19940 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 19941 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 19942 return -EINVAL; 19943 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 19944 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 19945 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 19946 return -EINVAL; 19947 19948 break; 19949 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 19950 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 19951 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 19952 btf_id); 19953 return -EINVAL; 19954 } 19955 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 19956 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 19957 return -EINVAL; 19958 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 19959 if (ret) 19960 return ret; 19961 break; 19962 default: 19963 if (!prog_extension) 19964 return -EINVAL; 19965 fallthrough; 19966 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 19967 case BPF_LSM_MAC: 19968 case BPF_LSM_CGROUP: 19969 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 19970 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 19971 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 19972 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 19973 btf_id); 19974 return -EINVAL; 19975 } 19976 if (prog_extension && 19977 btf_check_type_match(log, prog, btf, t)) 19978 return -EINVAL; 19979 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 19980 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 19981 return -EINVAL; 19982 19983 if ((prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type || prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type) && 19984 (!tgt_prog || prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type != tgt_prog->type || 19985 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type != tgt_prog->expected_attach_type)) 19986 return -EINVAL; 19987 19988 if (tgt_prog && conservative) 19989 t = NULL; 19990 19991 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 19992 if (ret < 0) 19993 return ret; 19994 19995 if (tgt_prog) { 19996 if (subprog == 0) 19997 addr = (long) tgt_prog->bpf_func; 19998 else 19999 addr = (long) tgt_prog->aux->func[subprog]->bpf_func; 20000 } else { 20001 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 20002 mod = btf_try_get_module(btf); 20003 if (mod) 20004 addr = find_kallsyms_symbol_value(mod, tname); 20005 else 20006 addr = 0; 20007 } else { 20008 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname); 20009 } 20010 if (!addr) { 20011 module_put(mod); 20012 bpf_log(log, 20013 "The address of function %s cannot be found\n", 20014 tname); 20015 return -ENOENT; 20016 } 20017 } 20018 20019 if (prog->aux->sleepable) { 20020 ret = -EINVAL; 20021 switch (prog->type) { 20022 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 20023 20024 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are 20025 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist. 20026 */ 20027 if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) && 20028 within_error_injection_list(addr)) 20029 ret = 0; 20030 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can also be sleepable if they are 20031 * in the fmodret id set with the KF_SLEEPABLE flag. 20032 */ 20033 else { 20034 u32 *flags = btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id, 20035 prog); 20036 20037 if (flags && (*flags & KF_SLEEPABLE)) 20038 ret = 0; 20039 } 20040 break; 20041 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 20042 /* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs. 20043 * Only some of them are sleepable. 20044 */ 20045 if (bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(btf_id)) 20046 ret = 0; 20047 break; 20048 default: 20049 break; 20050 } 20051 if (ret) { 20052 module_put(mod); 20053 bpf_log(log, "%s is not sleepable\n", tname); 20054 return ret; 20055 } 20056 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 20057 if (tgt_prog) { 20058 module_put(mod); 20059 bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n"); 20060 return -EINVAL; 20061 } 20062 ret = -EINVAL; 20063 if (btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id, prog) || 20064 !check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname)) 20065 ret = 0; 20066 if (ret) { 20067 module_put(mod); 20068 bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname); 20069 return ret; 20070 } 20071 } 20072 20073 break; 20074 } 20075 tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr; 20076 tgt_info->tgt_name = tname; 20077 tgt_info->tgt_type = t; 20078 tgt_info->tgt_mod = mod; 20079 return 0; 20080 } 20081 20082 BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny) 20083 BTF_ID_UNUSED 20084 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP 20085 BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable) 20086 BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable) 20087 #endif 20088 #if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU 20089 BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict) 20090 #endif 20091 #if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) || defined(CONFIG_TRACE_PREEMPT_TOGGLE) 20092 BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_add) 20093 BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_sub) 20094 #endif 20095 #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU 20096 BTF_ID(func, __rcu_read_lock) 20097 BTF_ID(func, __rcu_read_unlock) 20098 #endif 20099 BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny) 20100 20101 static bool can_be_sleepable(struct bpf_prog *prog) 20102 { 20103 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) { 20104 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 20105 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 20106 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 20107 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 20108 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 20109 return true; 20110 default: 20111 return false; 20112 } 20113 } 20114 return prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM || 20115 prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE /* only for uprobes */ || 20116 prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS; 20117 } 20118 20119 static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 20120 { 20121 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 20122 struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->dst_prog; 20123 struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {}; 20124 u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 20125 struct bpf_trampoline *tr; 20126 int ret; 20127 u64 key; 20128 20129 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL) { 20130 if (prog->aux->sleepable) 20131 /* attach_btf_id checked to be zero already */ 20132 return 0; 20133 verbose(env, "Syscall programs can only be sleepable\n"); 20134 return -EINVAL; 20135 } 20136 20137 if (prog->aux->sleepable && !can_be_sleepable(prog)) { 20138 verbose(env, "Only fentry/fexit/fmod_ret, lsm, iter, uprobe, and struct_ops programs can be sleepable\n"); 20139 return -EINVAL; 20140 } 20141 20142 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) 20143 return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env); 20144 20145 if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 20146 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 20147 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 20148 return 0; 20149 20150 ret = bpf_check_attach_target(&env->log, prog, tgt_prog, btf_id, &tgt_info); 20151 if (ret) 20152 return ret; 20153 20154 if (tgt_prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 20155 /* to make freplace equivalent to their targets, they need to 20156 * inherit env->ops and expected_attach_type for the rest of the 20157 * verification 20158 */ 20159 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type]; 20160 prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 20161 } 20162 20163 /* store info about the attachment target that will be used later */ 20164 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = tgt_info.tgt_type; 20165 prog->aux->attach_func_name = tgt_info.tgt_name; 20166 prog->aux->mod = tgt_info.tgt_mod; 20167 20168 if (tgt_prog) { 20169 prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type = tgt_prog->type; 20170 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 20171 } 20172 20173 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) { 20174 prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true; 20175 return 0; 20176 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) { 20177 if (!bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog)) 20178 return -EINVAL; 20179 return 0; 20180 } 20181 20182 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { 20183 ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog); 20184 if (ret < 0) 20185 return ret; 20186 } else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 20187 btf_id_set_contains(&btf_id_deny, btf_id)) { 20188 return -EINVAL; 20189 } 20190 20191 key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, prog->aux->attach_btf, btf_id); 20192 tr = bpf_trampoline_get(key, &tgt_info); 20193 if (!tr) 20194 return -ENOMEM; 20195 20196 if (tgt_prog && tgt_prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) 20197 tr->flags = BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX; 20198 20199 prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr; 20200 return 0; 20201 } 20202 20203 struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void) 20204 { 20205 if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { 20206 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 20207 if (!btf_vmlinux) 20208 btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux(); 20209 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 20210 } 20211 return btf_vmlinux; 20212 } 20213 20214 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u32 uattr_size) 20215 { 20216 u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns(); 20217 struct bpf_verifier_env *env; 20218 int i, len, ret = -EINVAL, err; 20219 u32 log_true_size; 20220 bool is_priv; 20221 20222 /* no program is valid */ 20223 if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0) 20224 return -EINVAL; 20225 20226 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, 20227 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called 20228 */ 20229 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); 20230 if (!env) 20231 return -ENOMEM; 20232 20233 env->bt.env = env; 20234 20235 len = (*prog)->len; 20236 env->insn_aux_data = 20237 vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data), len)); 20238 ret = -ENOMEM; 20239 if (!env->insn_aux_data) 20240 goto err_free_env; 20241 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 20242 env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i; 20243 env->prog = *prog; 20244 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type]; 20245 env->fd_array = make_bpfptr(attr->fd_array, uattr.is_kernel); 20246 is_priv = bpf_capable(); 20247 20248 bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(); 20249 20250 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ 20251 if (!is_priv) 20252 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 20253 20254 /* user could have requested verbose verifier output 20255 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace 20256 */ 20257 ret = bpf_vlog_init(&env->log, attr->log_level, 20258 (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf, 20259 attr->log_size); 20260 if (ret) 20261 goto err_unlock; 20262 20263 mark_verifier_state_clean(env); 20264 20265 if (IS_ERR(btf_vmlinux)) { 20266 /* Either gcc or pahole or kernel are broken. */ 20267 verbose(env, "in-kernel BTF is malformed\n"); 20268 ret = PTR_ERR(btf_vmlinux); 20269 goto skip_full_check; 20270 } 20271 20272 env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); 20273 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) 20274 env->strict_alignment = true; 20275 if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT) 20276 env->strict_alignment = false; 20277 20278 env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(); 20279 env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack(); 20280 env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(); 20281 env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(); 20282 env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable(); 20283 20284 if (is_priv) 20285 env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ; 20286 20287 env->explored_states = kvcalloc(state_htab_size(env), 20288 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *), 20289 GFP_USER); 20290 ret = -ENOMEM; 20291 if (!env->explored_states) 20292 goto skip_full_check; 20293 20294 ret = add_subprog_and_kfunc(env); 20295 if (ret < 0) 20296 goto skip_full_check; 20297 20298 ret = check_subprogs(env); 20299 if (ret < 0) 20300 goto skip_full_check; 20301 20302 ret = check_btf_info(env, attr, uattr); 20303 if (ret < 0) 20304 goto skip_full_check; 20305 20306 ret = check_attach_btf_id(env); 20307 if (ret) 20308 goto skip_full_check; 20309 20310 ret = resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(env); 20311 if (ret < 0) 20312 goto skip_full_check; 20313 20314 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 20315 ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog); 20316 if (ret) 20317 goto skip_full_check; 20318 } 20319 20320 ret = check_cfg(env); 20321 if (ret < 0) 20322 goto skip_full_check; 20323 20324 ret = do_check_subprogs(env); 20325 ret = ret ?: do_check_main(env); 20326 20327 if (ret == 0 && bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 20328 ret = bpf_prog_offload_finalize(env); 20329 20330 skip_full_check: 20331 kvfree(env->explored_states); 20332 20333 if (ret == 0) 20334 ret = check_max_stack_depth(env); 20335 20336 /* instruction rewrites happen after this point */ 20337 if (ret == 0) 20338 ret = optimize_bpf_loop(env); 20339 20340 if (is_priv) { 20341 if (ret == 0) 20342 opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(env); 20343 if (ret == 0) 20344 ret = opt_remove_dead_code(env); 20345 if (ret == 0) 20346 ret = opt_remove_nops(env); 20347 } else { 20348 if (ret == 0) 20349 sanitize_dead_code(env); 20350 } 20351 20352 if (ret == 0) 20353 /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */ 20354 ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env); 20355 20356 if (ret == 0) 20357 ret = do_misc_fixups(env); 20358 20359 /* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched 20360 * insns could be handled correctly. 20361 */ 20362 if (ret == 0 && !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 20363 ret = opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(env, attr); 20364 env->prog->aux->verifier_zext = bpf_jit_needs_zext() ? !ret 20365 : false; 20366 } 20367 20368 if (ret == 0) 20369 ret = fixup_call_args(env); 20370 20371 env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time; 20372 print_verification_stats(env); 20373 env->prog->aux->verified_insns = env->insn_processed; 20374 20375 /* preserve original error even if log finalization is successful */ 20376 err = bpf_vlog_finalize(&env->log, &log_true_size); 20377 if (err) 20378 ret = err; 20379 20380 if (uattr_size >= offsetofend(union bpf_attr, log_true_size) && 20381 copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, offsetof(union bpf_attr, log_true_size), 20382 &log_true_size, sizeof(log_true_size))) { 20383 ret = -EFAULT; 20384 goto err_release_maps; 20385 } 20386 20387 if (ret) 20388 goto err_release_maps; 20389 20390 if (env->used_map_cnt) { 20391 /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */ 20392 env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt, 20393 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]), 20394 GFP_KERNEL); 20395 20396 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) { 20397 ret = -ENOMEM; 20398 goto err_release_maps; 20399 } 20400 20401 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps, 20402 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt); 20403 env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt; 20404 } 20405 if (env->used_btf_cnt) { 20406 /* if program passed verifier, update used_btfs in bpf_prog_aux */ 20407 env->prog->aux->used_btfs = kmalloc_array(env->used_btf_cnt, 20408 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]), 20409 GFP_KERNEL); 20410 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) { 20411 ret = -ENOMEM; 20412 goto err_release_maps; 20413 } 20414 20415 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_btfs, env->used_btfs, 20416 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]) * env->used_btf_cnt); 20417 env->prog->aux->used_btf_cnt = env->used_btf_cnt; 20418 } 20419 if (env->used_map_cnt || env->used_btf_cnt) { 20420 /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic 20421 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions 20422 */ 20423 convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env); 20424 } 20425 20426 adjust_btf_func(env); 20427 20428 err_release_maps: 20429 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) 20430 /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release 20431 * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them. 20432 */ 20433 release_maps(env); 20434 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) 20435 release_btfs(env); 20436 20437 /* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets 20438 for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning 20439 */ 20440 if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 20441 env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0; 20442 20443 *prog = env->prog; 20444 err_unlock: 20445 if (!is_priv) 20446 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 20447 vfree(env->insn_aux_data); 20448 err_free_env: 20449 kfree(env); 20450 return ret; 20451 } 20452