xref: /openbmc/linux/kernel/bpf/verifier.c (revision 05911c5d)
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
3  * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook
4  * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io
5  */
6 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h>
7 #include <linux/kernel.h>
8 #include <linux/types.h>
9 #include <linux/slab.h>
10 #include <linux/bpf.h>
11 #include <linux/btf.h>
12 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
13 #include <linux/filter.h>
14 #include <net/netlink.h>
15 #include <linux/file.h>
16 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
17 #include <linux/stringify.h>
18 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
19 #include <linux/sort.h>
20 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
21 #include <linux/ctype.h>
22 #include <linux/error-injection.h>
23 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
24 #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
25 
26 #include "disasm.h"
27 
28 static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = {
29 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \
30 	[_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops,
31 #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops)
32 #define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name)
33 #include <linux/bpf_types.h>
34 #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE
35 #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE
36 #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE
37 };
38 
39 /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program
40  * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state.
41  * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn.
42  *
43  * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG.
44  * It rejects the following programs:
45  * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns
46  * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge)
47  * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function)
48  * - out of bounds or malformed jumps
49  * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn.
50  * Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the
51  * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of
52  * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs.
53  * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k
54  *
55  * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction
56  * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics.
57  * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is
58  * copied to R1.
59  *
60  * All registers are 64-bit.
61  * R0 - return register
62  * R1-R5 argument passing registers
63  * R6-R9 callee saved registers
64  * R10 - frame pointer read-only
65  *
66  * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context
67  * and has type PTR_TO_CTX.
68  *
69  * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case:
70  *    BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
71  *    BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20),
72  * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1
73  * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize
74  * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack.
75  * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK
76  * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking).
77  * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant.
78  *
79  * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which
80  * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer.
81  * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type)
82  *
83  * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register
84  * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are
85  * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function.
86  *
87  * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value'
88  * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible.
89  *
90  * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against
91  * function argument constraints.
92  *
93  * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints.
94  * It means that the register type passed to this function must be
95  * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as
96  * 'pointer to map element key'
97  *
98  * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem():
99  *   .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL,
100  *   .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR,
101  *   .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
102  *
103  * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null'
104  * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and
105  * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside
106  * the helper function as a pointer to map element key.
107  *
108  * On the kernel side the helper function looks like:
109  * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5)
110  * {
111  *    struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1;
112  *    void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2;
113  *    void *value;
114  *
115  *    here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that
116  *    [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on
117  *    the stack of eBPF program.
118  * }
119  *
120  * Corresponding eBPF program may look like:
121  *    BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),  // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR
122  *    BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK
123  *    BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd),      // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP
124  *    BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
125  * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees:
126  * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok,
127  * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes
128  *
129  * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far,
130  * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits
131  * and were initialized prior to this call.
132  * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at
133  * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets
134  * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function
135  * returns ether pointer to map value or NULL.
136  *
137  * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off'
138  * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to
139  * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false
140  * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op().
141  *
142  * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5
143  * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable.
144  *
145  * The following reference types represent a potential reference to a kernel
146  * resource which, after first being allocated, must be checked and freed by
147  * the BPF program:
148  * - PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, PTR_TO_SOCKET
149  *
150  * When the verifier sees a helper call return a reference type, it allocates a
151  * pointer id for the reference and stores it in the current function state.
152  * Similar to the way that PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL is converted into
153  * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL becomes PTR_TO_SOCKET when the type
154  * passes through a NULL-check conditional. For the branch wherein the state is
155  * changed to CONST_IMM, the verifier releases the reference.
156  *
157  * For each helper function that allocates a reference, such as
158  * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), there is a corresponding release function, such as
159  * bpf_sk_release(). When a reference type passes into the release function,
160  * the verifier also releases the reference. If any unchecked or unreleased
161  * reference remains at the end of the program, the verifier rejects it.
162  */
163 
164 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */
165 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
166 	/* verifer state is 'st'
167 	 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx'
168 	 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx'
169 	 */
170 	struct bpf_verifier_state st;
171 	int insn_idx;
172 	int prev_insn_idx;
173 	struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next;
174 	/* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */
175 	u32 log_pos;
176 };
177 
178 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ	8192
179 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES	64
180 
181 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON	(1ULL << 63)
182 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN	(1ULL << 62)
183 
184 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV	1UL
185 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON	((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) +	\
186 					  POISON_POINTER_DELTA))
187 #define BPF_MAP_PTR(X)		((struct bpf_map *)((X) & ~BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV))
188 
189 static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
190 {
191 	return BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON;
192 }
193 
194 static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
195 {
196 	return aux->map_ptr_state & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV;
197 }
198 
199 static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
200 			      const struct bpf_map *map, bool unpriv)
201 {
202 	BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV);
203 	unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux);
204 	aux->map_ptr_state = (unsigned long)map |
205 			     (unpriv ? BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV : 0UL);
206 }
207 
208 static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
209 {
210 	return aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON;
211 }
212 
213 static bool bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
214 {
215 	return !(aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN);
216 }
217 
218 static u64 bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
219 {
220 	return aux->map_key_state & ~(BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON);
221 }
222 
223 static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state)
224 {
225 	bool poisoned = bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux);
226 
227 	aux->map_key_state = state | BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN |
228 			     (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL);
229 }
230 
231 static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
232 {
233 	return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
234 	       insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL;
235 }
236 
237 static bool bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
238 {
239 	return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
240 	       insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL;
241 }
242 
243 static bool bpf_pseudo_func(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
244 {
245 	return insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW) &&
246 	       insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC;
247 }
248 
249 struct bpf_call_arg_meta {
250 	struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
251 	bool raw_mode;
252 	bool pkt_access;
253 	int regno;
254 	int access_size;
255 	int mem_size;
256 	u64 msize_max_value;
257 	int ref_obj_id;
258 	int func_id;
259 	struct btf *btf;
260 	u32 btf_id;
261 	struct btf *ret_btf;
262 	u32 ret_btf_id;
263 	u32 subprogno;
264 };
265 
266 struct btf *btf_vmlinux;
267 
268 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);
269 
270 static const struct bpf_line_info *
271 find_linfo(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_off)
272 {
273 	const struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
274 	const struct bpf_prog *prog;
275 	u32 i, nr_linfo;
276 
277 	prog = env->prog;
278 	nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
279 
280 	if (!nr_linfo || insn_off >= prog->len)
281 		return NULL;
282 
283 	linfo = prog->aux->linfo;
284 	for (i = 1; i < nr_linfo; i++)
285 		if (insn_off < linfo[i].insn_off)
286 			break;
287 
288 	return &linfo[i - 1];
289 }
290 
291 void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const char *fmt,
292 		       va_list args)
293 {
294 	unsigned int n;
295 
296 	n = vscnprintf(log->kbuf, BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE, fmt, args);
297 
298 	WARN_ONCE(n >= BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE - 1,
299 		  "verifier log line truncated - local buffer too short\n");
300 
301 	n = min(log->len_total - log->len_used - 1, n);
302 	log->kbuf[n] = '\0';
303 
304 	if (log->level == BPF_LOG_KERNEL) {
305 		pr_err("BPF:%s\n", log->kbuf);
306 		return;
307 	}
308 	if (!copy_to_user(log->ubuf + log->len_used, log->kbuf, n + 1))
309 		log->len_used += n;
310 	else
311 		log->ubuf = NULL;
312 }
313 
314 static void bpf_vlog_reset(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, u32 new_pos)
315 {
316 	char zero = 0;
317 
318 	if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log))
319 		return;
320 
321 	log->len_used = new_pos;
322 	if (put_user(zero, log->ubuf + new_pos))
323 		log->ubuf = NULL;
324 }
325 
326 /* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier.
327  * bpf_verifier_log_write() is used to dump the verification trace to the log,
328  * so the user can figure out what's wrong with the program
329  */
330 __printf(2, 3) void bpf_verifier_log_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
331 					   const char *fmt, ...)
332 {
333 	va_list args;
334 
335 	if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log))
336 		return;
337 
338 	va_start(args, fmt);
339 	bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args);
340 	va_end(args);
341 }
342 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_verifier_log_write);
343 
344 __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...)
345 {
346 	struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data;
347 	va_list args;
348 
349 	if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log))
350 		return;
351 
352 	va_start(args, fmt);
353 	bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args);
354 	va_end(args);
355 }
356 
357 __printf(2, 3) void bpf_log(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
358 			    const char *fmt, ...)
359 {
360 	va_list args;
361 
362 	if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log))
363 		return;
364 
365 	va_start(args, fmt);
366 	bpf_verifier_vlog(log, fmt, args);
367 	va_end(args);
368 }
369 
370 static const char *ltrim(const char *s)
371 {
372 	while (isspace(*s))
373 		s++;
374 
375 	return s;
376 }
377 
378 __printf(3, 4) static void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
379 					 u32 insn_off,
380 					 const char *prefix_fmt, ...)
381 {
382 	const struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
383 
384 	if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log))
385 		return;
386 
387 	linfo = find_linfo(env, insn_off);
388 	if (!linfo || linfo == env->prev_linfo)
389 		return;
390 
391 	if (prefix_fmt) {
392 		va_list args;
393 
394 		va_start(args, prefix_fmt);
395 		bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, prefix_fmt, args);
396 		va_end(args);
397 	}
398 
399 	verbose(env, "%s\n",
400 		ltrim(btf_name_by_offset(env->prog->aux->btf,
401 					 linfo->line_off)));
402 
403 	env->prev_linfo = linfo;
404 }
405 
406 static void verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
407 				   struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
408 				   struct tnum *range, const char *ctx,
409 				   const char *reg_name)
410 {
411 	char tn_buf[48];
412 
413 	verbose(env, "At %s the register %s ", ctx, reg_name);
414 	if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) {
415 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
416 		verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf);
417 	} else {
418 		verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value");
419 	}
420 	tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), *range);
421 	verbose(env, " should have been in %s\n", tn_buf);
422 }
423 
424 static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
425 {
426 	return type == PTR_TO_PACKET ||
427 	       type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META;
428 }
429 
430 static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
431 {
432 	return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET ||
433 		type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON ||
434 		type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK ||
435 		type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK;
436 }
437 
438 static bool reg_type_not_null(enum bpf_reg_type type)
439 {
440 	return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET ||
441 		type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK ||
442 		type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
443 		type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
444 		type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON;
445 }
446 
447 static bool reg_type_may_be_null(enum bpf_reg_type type)
448 {
449 	return type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL ||
450 	       type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL ||
451 	       type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL ||
452 	       type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL ||
453 	       type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL ||
454 	       type == PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL ||
455 	       type == PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL ||
456 	       type == PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL;
457 }
458 
459 static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
460 {
461 	return reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
462 		map_value_has_spin_lock(reg->map_ptr);
463 }
464 
465 static bool reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(enum bpf_reg_type type)
466 {
467 	return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET ||
468 		type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL ||
469 		type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK ||
470 		type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL ||
471 		type == PTR_TO_MEM ||
472 		type == PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL;
473 }
474 
475 static bool arg_type_may_be_refcounted(enum bpf_arg_type type)
476 {
477 	return type == ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON;
478 }
479 
480 static bool arg_type_may_be_null(enum bpf_arg_type type)
481 {
482 	return type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL ||
483 	       type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL ||
484 	       type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX_OR_NULL ||
485 	       type == ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL ||
486 	       type == ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL ||
487 	       type == ARG_PTR_TO_STACK_OR_NULL;
488 }
489 
490 /* Determine whether the function releases some resources allocated by another
491  * function call. The first reference type argument will be assumed to be
492  * released by release_reference().
493  */
494 static bool is_release_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
495 {
496 	return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_release ||
497 	       func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit ||
498 	       func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard;
499 }
500 
501 static bool may_be_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
502 {
503 	return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp ||
504 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp ||
505 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp ||
506 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem ||
507 	        func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve;
508 }
509 
510 static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id,
511 				const struct bpf_map *map)
512 {
513 	enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC;
514 
515 	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp ||
516 	    func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp ||
517 	    func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp ||
518 	    func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve)
519 		return true;
520 
521 	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
522 	    (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP ||
523 	     map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH))
524 		return true;
525 
526 	return false;
527 }
528 
529 static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
530 {
531 	return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock ||
532 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock ||
533 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_sock ||
534 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp6_sock ||
535 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_udp6_sock ||
536 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock ||
537 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_request_sock;
538 }
539 
540 static bool is_cmpxchg_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
541 {
542 	return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
543 	       BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC &&
544 	       insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG;
545 }
546 
547 /* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' */
548 static const char * const reg_type_str[] = {
549 	[NOT_INIT]		= "?",
550 	[SCALAR_VALUE]		= "inv",
551 	[PTR_TO_CTX]		= "ctx",
552 	[CONST_PTR_TO_MAP]	= "map_ptr",
553 	[PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE]	= "map_value",
554 	[PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL] = "map_value_or_null",
555 	[PTR_TO_STACK]		= "fp",
556 	[PTR_TO_PACKET]		= "pkt",
557 	[PTR_TO_PACKET_META]	= "pkt_meta",
558 	[PTR_TO_PACKET_END]	= "pkt_end",
559 	[PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS]	= "flow_keys",
560 	[PTR_TO_SOCKET]		= "sock",
561 	[PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL] = "sock_or_null",
562 	[PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON]	= "sock_common",
563 	[PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL] = "sock_common_or_null",
564 	[PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK]	= "tcp_sock",
565 	[PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL] = "tcp_sock_or_null",
566 	[PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER]	= "tp_buffer",
567 	[PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK]	= "xdp_sock",
568 	[PTR_TO_BTF_ID]		= "ptr_",
569 	[PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL]	= "ptr_or_null_",
570 	[PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID]	= "percpu_ptr_",
571 	[PTR_TO_MEM]		= "mem",
572 	[PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL]	= "mem_or_null",
573 	[PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF]	= "rdonly_buf",
574 	[PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL] = "rdonly_buf_or_null",
575 	[PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF]	= "rdwr_buf",
576 	[PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL] = "rdwr_buf_or_null",
577 	[PTR_TO_FUNC]		= "func",
578 	[PTR_TO_MAP_KEY]	= "map_key",
579 };
580 
581 static char slot_type_char[] = {
582 	[STACK_INVALID]	= '?',
583 	[STACK_SPILL]	= 'r',
584 	[STACK_MISC]	= 'm',
585 	[STACK_ZERO]	= '0',
586 };
587 
588 static void print_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
589 			   enum bpf_reg_liveness live)
590 {
591 	if (live & (REG_LIVE_READ | REG_LIVE_WRITTEN | REG_LIVE_DONE))
592 	    verbose(env, "_");
593 	if (live & REG_LIVE_READ)
594 		verbose(env, "r");
595 	if (live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)
596 		verbose(env, "w");
597 	if (live & REG_LIVE_DONE)
598 		verbose(env, "D");
599 }
600 
601 static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
602 				   const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
603 {
604 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
605 
606 	return cur->frame[reg->frameno];
607 }
608 
609 static const char *kernel_type_name(const struct btf* btf, u32 id)
610 {
611 	return btf_name_by_offset(btf, btf_type_by_id(btf, id)->name_off);
612 }
613 
614 static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
615 				 const struct bpf_func_state *state)
616 {
617 	const struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
618 	enum bpf_reg_type t;
619 	int i;
620 
621 	if (state->frameno)
622 		verbose(env, " frame%d:", state->frameno);
623 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
624 		reg = &state->regs[i];
625 		t = reg->type;
626 		if (t == NOT_INIT)
627 			continue;
628 		verbose(env, " R%d", i);
629 		print_liveness(env, reg->live);
630 		verbose(env, "=%s", reg_type_str[t]);
631 		if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise)
632 			verbose(env, "P");
633 		if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) &&
634 		    tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
635 			/* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */
636 			verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off);
637 		} else {
638 			if (t == PTR_TO_BTF_ID ||
639 			    t == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL ||
640 			    t == PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID)
641 				verbose(env, "%s", kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id));
642 			verbose(env, "(id=%d", reg->id);
643 			if (reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(t))
644 				verbose(env, ",ref_obj_id=%d", reg->ref_obj_id);
645 			if (t != SCALAR_VALUE)
646 				verbose(env, ",off=%d", reg->off);
647 			if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t))
648 				verbose(env, ",r=%d", reg->range);
649 			else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP ||
650 				 t == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
651 				 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
652 				 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL)
653 				verbose(env, ",ks=%d,vs=%d",
654 					reg->map_ptr->key_size,
655 					reg->map_ptr->value_size);
656 			if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
657 				/* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but
658 				 * could be a pointer whose offset is too big
659 				 * for reg->off
660 				 */
661 				verbose(env, ",imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value);
662 			} else {
663 				if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value &&
664 				    reg->smin_value != S64_MIN)
665 					verbose(env, ",smin_value=%lld",
666 						(long long)reg->smin_value);
667 				if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value &&
668 				    reg->smax_value != S64_MAX)
669 					verbose(env, ",smax_value=%lld",
670 						(long long)reg->smax_value);
671 				if (reg->umin_value != 0)
672 					verbose(env, ",umin_value=%llu",
673 						(unsigned long long)reg->umin_value);
674 				if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX)
675 					verbose(env, ",umax_value=%llu",
676 						(unsigned long long)reg->umax_value);
677 				if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) {
678 					char tn_buf[48];
679 
680 					tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
681 					verbose(env, ",var_off=%s", tn_buf);
682 				}
683 				if (reg->s32_min_value != reg->smin_value &&
684 				    reg->s32_min_value != S32_MIN)
685 					verbose(env, ",s32_min_value=%d",
686 						(int)(reg->s32_min_value));
687 				if (reg->s32_max_value != reg->smax_value &&
688 				    reg->s32_max_value != S32_MAX)
689 					verbose(env, ",s32_max_value=%d",
690 						(int)(reg->s32_max_value));
691 				if (reg->u32_min_value != reg->umin_value &&
692 				    reg->u32_min_value != U32_MIN)
693 					verbose(env, ",u32_min_value=%d",
694 						(int)(reg->u32_min_value));
695 				if (reg->u32_max_value != reg->umax_value &&
696 				    reg->u32_max_value != U32_MAX)
697 					verbose(env, ",u32_max_value=%d",
698 						(int)(reg->u32_max_value));
699 			}
700 			verbose(env, ")");
701 		}
702 	}
703 	for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
704 		char types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE + 1];
705 		bool valid = false;
706 		int j;
707 
708 		for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) {
709 			if (state->stack[i].slot_type[j] != STACK_INVALID)
710 				valid = true;
711 			types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[
712 					state->stack[i].slot_type[j]];
713 		}
714 		types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0;
715 		if (!valid)
716 			continue;
717 		verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE);
718 		print_liveness(env, state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live);
719 		if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) {
720 			reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
721 			t = reg->type;
722 			verbose(env, "=%s", reg_type_str[t]);
723 			if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise)
724 				verbose(env, "P");
725 			if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
726 				verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off);
727 		} else {
728 			verbose(env, "=%s", types_buf);
729 		}
730 	}
731 	if (state->acquired_refs && state->refs[0].id) {
732 		verbose(env, " refs=%d", state->refs[0].id);
733 		for (i = 1; i < state->acquired_refs; i++)
734 			if (state->refs[i].id)
735 				verbose(env, ",%d", state->refs[i].id);
736 	}
737 	verbose(env, "\n");
738 }
739 
740 #define COPY_STATE_FN(NAME, COUNT, FIELD, SIZE)				\
741 static int copy_##NAME##_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst,		\
742 			       const struct bpf_func_state *src)	\
743 {									\
744 	if (!src->FIELD)						\
745 		return 0;						\
746 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dst->COUNT < src->COUNT)) {			\
747 		/* internal bug, make state invalid to reject the program */ \
748 		memset(dst, 0, sizeof(*dst));				\
749 		return -EFAULT;						\
750 	}								\
751 	memcpy(dst->FIELD, src->FIELD,					\
752 	       sizeof(*src->FIELD) * (src->COUNT / SIZE));		\
753 	return 0;							\
754 }
755 /* copy_reference_state() */
756 COPY_STATE_FN(reference, acquired_refs, refs, 1)
757 /* copy_stack_state() */
758 COPY_STATE_FN(stack, allocated_stack, stack, BPF_REG_SIZE)
759 #undef COPY_STATE_FN
760 
761 #define REALLOC_STATE_FN(NAME, COUNT, FIELD, SIZE)			\
762 static int realloc_##NAME##_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int size, \
763 				  bool copy_old)			\
764 {									\
765 	u32 old_size = state->COUNT;					\
766 	struct bpf_##NAME##_state *new_##FIELD;				\
767 	int slot = size / SIZE;						\
768 									\
769 	if (size <= old_size || !size) {				\
770 		if (copy_old)						\
771 			return 0;					\
772 		state->COUNT = slot * SIZE;				\
773 		if (!size && old_size) {				\
774 			kfree(state->FIELD);				\
775 			state->FIELD = NULL;				\
776 		}							\
777 		return 0;						\
778 	}								\
779 	new_##FIELD = kmalloc_array(slot, sizeof(struct bpf_##NAME##_state), \
780 				    GFP_KERNEL);			\
781 	if (!new_##FIELD)						\
782 		return -ENOMEM;						\
783 	if (copy_old) {							\
784 		if (state->FIELD)					\
785 			memcpy(new_##FIELD, state->FIELD,		\
786 			       sizeof(*new_##FIELD) * (old_size / SIZE)); \
787 		memset(new_##FIELD + old_size / SIZE, 0,		\
788 		       sizeof(*new_##FIELD) * (size - old_size) / SIZE); \
789 	}								\
790 	state->COUNT = slot * SIZE;					\
791 	kfree(state->FIELD);						\
792 	state->FIELD = new_##FIELD;					\
793 	return 0;							\
794 }
795 /* realloc_reference_state() */
796 REALLOC_STATE_FN(reference, acquired_refs, refs, 1)
797 /* realloc_stack_state() */
798 REALLOC_STATE_FN(stack, allocated_stack, stack, BPF_REG_SIZE)
799 #undef REALLOC_STATE_FN
800 
801 /* do_check() starts with zero-sized stack in struct bpf_verifier_state to
802  * make it consume minimal amount of memory. check_stack_write() access from
803  * the program calls into realloc_func_state() to grow the stack size.
804  * Note there is a non-zero 'parent' pointer inside bpf_verifier_state
805  * which realloc_stack_state() copies over. It points to previous
806  * bpf_verifier_state which is never reallocated.
807  */
808 static int realloc_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int stack_size,
809 			      int refs_size, bool copy_old)
810 {
811 	int err = realloc_reference_state(state, refs_size, copy_old);
812 	if (err)
813 		return err;
814 	return realloc_stack_state(state, stack_size, copy_old);
815 }
816 
817 /* Acquire a pointer id from the env and update the state->refs to include
818  * this new pointer reference.
819  * On success, returns a valid pointer id to associate with the register
820  * On failure, returns a negative errno.
821  */
822 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
823 {
824 	struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env);
825 	int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs;
826 	int id, err;
827 
828 	err = realloc_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1, true);
829 	if (err)
830 		return err;
831 	id = ++env->id_gen;
832 	state->refs[new_ofs].id = id;
833 	state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx;
834 
835 	return id;
836 }
837 
838 /* release function corresponding to acquire_reference_state(). Idempotent. */
839 static int release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id)
840 {
841 	int i, last_idx;
842 
843 	last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1;
844 	for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) {
845 		if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) {
846 			if (last_idx && i != last_idx)
847 				memcpy(&state->refs[i], &state->refs[last_idx],
848 				       sizeof(*state->refs));
849 			memset(&state->refs[last_idx], 0, sizeof(*state->refs));
850 			state->acquired_refs--;
851 			return 0;
852 		}
853 	}
854 	return -EINVAL;
855 }
856 
857 static int transfer_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst,
858 				    struct bpf_func_state *src)
859 {
860 	int err = realloc_reference_state(dst, src->acquired_refs, false);
861 	if (err)
862 		return err;
863 	err = copy_reference_state(dst, src);
864 	if (err)
865 		return err;
866 	return 0;
867 }
868 
869 static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state)
870 {
871 	if (!state)
872 		return;
873 	kfree(state->refs);
874 	kfree(state->stack);
875 	kfree(state);
876 }
877 
878 static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
879 {
880 	kfree(state->jmp_history);
881 	state->jmp_history = NULL;
882 	state->jmp_history_cnt = 0;
883 }
884 
885 static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
886 				bool free_self)
887 {
888 	int i;
889 
890 	for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) {
891 		free_func_state(state->frame[i]);
892 		state->frame[i] = NULL;
893 	}
894 	clear_jmp_history(state);
895 	if (free_self)
896 		kfree(state);
897 }
898 
899 /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space
900  * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack
901  */
902 static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst,
903 			   const struct bpf_func_state *src)
904 {
905 	int err;
906 
907 	err = realloc_func_state(dst, src->allocated_stack, src->acquired_refs,
908 				 false);
909 	if (err)
910 		return err;
911 	memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, acquired_refs));
912 	err = copy_reference_state(dst, src);
913 	if (err)
914 		return err;
915 	return copy_stack_state(dst, src);
916 }
917 
918 static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state,
919 			       const struct bpf_verifier_state *src)
920 {
921 	struct bpf_func_state *dst;
922 	u32 jmp_sz = sizeof(struct bpf_idx_pair) * src->jmp_history_cnt;
923 	int i, err;
924 
925 	if (dst_state->jmp_history_cnt < src->jmp_history_cnt) {
926 		kfree(dst_state->jmp_history);
927 		dst_state->jmp_history = kmalloc(jmp_sz, GFP_USER);
928 		if (!dst_state->jmp_history)
929 			return -ENOMEM;
930 	}
931 	memcpy(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history, jmp_sz);
932 	dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt;
933 
934 	/* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */
935 	for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) {
936 		free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]);
937 		dst_state->frame[i] = NULL;
938 	}
939 	dst_state->speculative = src->speculative;
940 	dst_state->curframe = src->curframe;
941 	dst_state->active_spin_lock = src->active_spin_lock;
942 	dst_state->branches = src->branches;
943 	dst_state->parent = src->parent;
944 	dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx;
945 	dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx;
946 	for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) {
947 		dst = dst_state->frame[i];
948 		if (!dst) {
949 			dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL);
950 			if (!dst)
951 				return -ENOMEM;
952 			dst_state->frame[i] = dst;
953 		}
954 		err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]);
955 		if (err)
956 			return err;
957 	}
958 	return 0;
959 }
960 
961 static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
962 {
963 	while (st) {
964 		u32 br = --st->branches;
965 
966 		/* WARN_ON(br > 1) technically makes sense here,
967 		 * but see comment in push_stack(), hence:
968 		 */
969 		WARN_ONCE((int)br < 0,
970 			  "BUG update_branch_counts:branches_to_explore=%d\n",
971 			  br);
972 		if (br)
973 			break;
974 		st = st->parent;
975 	}
976 }
977 
978 static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx,
979 		     int *insn_idx, bool pop_log)
980 {
981 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
982 	struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head;
983 	int err;
984 
985 	if (env->head == NULL)
986 		return -ENOENT;
987 
988 	if (cur) {
989 		err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st);
990 		if (err)
991 			return err;
992 	}
993 	if (pop_log)
994 		bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos);
995 	if (insn_idx)
996 		*insn_idx = head->insn_idx;
997 	if (prev_insn_idx)
998 		*prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx;
999 	elem = head->next;
1000 	free_verifier_state(&head->st, false);
1001 	kfree(head);
1002 	env->head = elem;
1003 	env->stack_size--;
1004 	return 0;
1005 }
1006 
1007 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1008 					     int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx,
1009 					     bool speculative)
1010 {
1011 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
1012 	struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
1013 	int err;
1014 
1015 	elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL);
1016 	if (!elem)
1017 		goto err;
1018 
1019 	elem->insn_idx = insn_idx;
1020 	elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
1021 	elem->next = env->head;
1022 	elem->log_pos = env->log.len_used;
1023 	env->head = elem;
1024 	env->stack_size++;
1025 	err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur);
1026 	if (err)
1027 		goto err;
1028 	elem->st.speculative |= speculative;
1029 	if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) {
1030 		verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n",
1031 			env->stack_size);
1032 		goto err;
1033 	}
1034 	if (elem->st.parent) {
1035 		++elem->st.parent->branches;
1036 		/* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here,
1037 		 * but
1038 		 * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch
1039 		 * instructions
1040 		 * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create
1041 		 * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current
1042 		 * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state
1043 		 * which might have large 'branches' count.
1044 		 */
1045 	}
1046 	return &elem->st;
1047 err:
1048 	free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true);
1049 	env->cur_state = NULL;
1050 	/* pop all elements and return */
1051 	while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false));
1052 	return NULL;
1053 }
1054 
1055 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6
1056 static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = {
1057 	BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5
1058 };
1059 
1060 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1061 				struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
1062 
1063 /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */
1064 static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
1065 {
1066 	reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm);
1067 	reg->smin_value = (s64)imm;
1068 	reg->smax_value = (s64)imm;
1069 	reg->umin_value = imm;
1070 	reg->umax_value = imm;
1071 
1072 	reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm;
1073 	reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm;
1074 	reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm;
1075 	reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm;
1076 }
1077 
1078 /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as
1079  * known to have the value @imm.
1080  */
1081 static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
1082 {
1083 	/* Clear id, off, and union(map_ptr, range) */
1084 	memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0,
1085 	       offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type));
1086 	___mark_reg_known(reg, imm);
1087 }
1088 
1089 static void __mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
1090 {
1091 	reg->var_off = tnum_const_subreg(reg->var_off, imm);
1092 	reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm;
1093 	reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm;
1094 	reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm;
1095 	reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm;
1096 }
1097 
1098 /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero.  This should be
1099  * used only on registers holding a pointer type.
1100  */
1101 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1102 {
1103 	__mark_reg_known(reg, 0);
1104 }
1105 
1106 static void __mark_reg_const_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1107 {
1108 	__mark_reg_known(reg, 0);
1109 	reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
1110 }
1111 
1112 static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1113 				struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
1114 {
1115 	if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
1116 		verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno);
1117 		/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
1118 		for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
1119 			__mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
1120 		return;
1121 	}
1122 	__mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno);
1123 }
1124 
1125 static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1126 {
1127 	switch (reg->type) {
1128 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: {
1129 		const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
1130 
1131 		if (map->inner_map_meta) {
1132 			reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
1133 			reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta;
1134 		} else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) {
1135 			reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK;
1136 		} else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP ||
1137 			   map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) {
1138 			reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET;
1139 		} else {
1140 			reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
1141 		}
1142 		break;
1143 	}
1144 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL:
1145 		reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET;
1146 		break;
1147 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL:
1148 		reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON;
1149 		break;
1150 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL:
1151 		reg->type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK;
1152 		break;
1153 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL:
1154 		reg->type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
1155 		break;
1156 	case PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL:
1157 		reg->type = PTR_TO_MEM;
1158 		break;
1159 	case PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL:
1160 		reg->type = PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF;
1161 		break;
1162 	case PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL:
1163 		reg->type = PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF;
1164 		break;
1165 	default:
1166 		WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown nullable register type");
1167 	}
1168 }
1169 
1170 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1171 {
1172 	return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type);
1173 }
1174 
1175 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1176 {
1177 	return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) ||
1178 	       reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END;
1179 }
1180 
1181 /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */
1182 static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
1183 				    enum bpf_reg_type which)
1184 {
1185 	/* The register can already have a range from prior markings.
1186 	 * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its
1187 	 * origin.
1188 	 */
1189 	return reg->type == which &&
1190 	       reg->id == 0 &&
1191 	       reg->off == 0 &&
1192 	       tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0);
1193 }
1194 
1195 /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */
1196 static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1197 {
1198 	reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
1199 	reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
1200 	reg->umin_value = 0;
1201 	reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
1202 
1203 	reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
1204 	reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
1205 	reg->u32_min_value = 0;
1206 	reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
1207 }
1208 
1209 static void __mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1210 {
1211 	reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
1212 	reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
1213 	reg->umin_value = 0;
1214 	reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
1215 }
1216 
1217 static void __mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1218 {
1219 	reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
1220 	reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
1221 	reg->u32_min_value = 0;
1222 	reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
1223 }
1224 
1225 static void __update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1226 {
1227 	struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off);
1228 
1229 	/* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */
1230 	reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value,
1231 			var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MIN));
1232 	/* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */
1233 	reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value,
1234 			var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MAX));
1235 	reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)var32_off.value);
1236 	reg->u32_max_value = min(reg->u32_max_value,
1237 				 (u32)(var32_off.value | var32_off.mask));
1238 }
1239 
1240 static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1241 {
1242 	/* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */
1243 	reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value,
1244 				reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN));
1245 	/* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */
1246 	reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value,
1247 				reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX));
1248 	reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value);
1249 	reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value,
1250 			      reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask);
1251 }
1252 
1253 static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1254 {
1255 	__update_reg32_bounds(reg);
1256 	__update_reg64_bounds(reg);
1257 }
1258 
1259 /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */
1260 static void __reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1261 {
1262 	/* Learn sign from signed bounds.
1263 	 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds
1264 	 * are the same, so combine.  This works even in the negative case, e.g.
1265 	 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff.
1266 	 */
1267 	if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 || reg->s32_max_value < 0) {
1268 		reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value =
1269 			max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value);
1270 		reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value =
1271 			min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value);
1272 		return;
1273 	}
1274 	/* Learn sign from unsigned bounds.  Signed bounds cross the sign
1275 	 * boundary, so we must be careful.
1276 	 */
1277 	if ((s32)reg->u32_max_value >= 0) {
1278 		/* Positive.  We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax
1279 		 * is positive, hence safe.
1280 		 */
1281 		reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value;
1282 		reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value =
1283 			min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value);
1284 	} else if ((s32)reg->u32_min_value < 0) {
1285 		/* Negative.  We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin
1286 		 * is negative, hence safe.
1287 		 */
1288 		reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value =
1289 			max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value);
1290 		reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value;
1291 	}
1292 }
1293 
1294 static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1295 {
1296 	/* Learn sign from signed bounds.
1297 	 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds
1298 	 * are the same, so combine.  This works even in the negative case, e.g.
1299 	 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff.
1300 	 */
1301 	if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) {
1302 		reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value,
1303 							  reg->umin_value);
1304 		reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value,
1305 							  reg->umax_value);
1306 		return;
1307 	}
1308 	/* Learn sign from unsigned bounds.  Signed bounds cross the sign
1309 	 * boundary, so we must be careful.
1310 	 */
1311 	if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) {
1312 		/* Positive.  We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax
1313 		 * is positive, hence safe.
1314 		 */
1315 		reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value;
1316 		reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value,
1317 							  reg->umax_value);
1318 	} else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) {
1319 		/* Negative.  We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin
1320 		 * is negative, hence safe.
1321 		 */
1322 		reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value,
1323 							  reg->umin_value);
1324 		reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value;
1325 	}
1326 }
1327 
1328 static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1329 {
1330 	__reg32_deduce_bounds(reg);
1331 	__reg64_deduce_bounds(reg);
1332 }
1333 
1334 /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */
1335 static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1336 {
1337 	struct tnum var64_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off,
1338 					       tnum_range(reg->umin_value,
1339 							  reg->umax_value));
1340 	struct tnum var32_off = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg->var_off),
1341 						tnum_range(reg->u32_min_value,
1342 							   reg->u32_max_value));
1343 
1344 	reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off);
1345 }
1346 
1347 static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1348 {
1349 	reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value;
1350 	reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value;
1351 	/* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds
1352 	 * but must be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds
1353 	 * and refine later from tnum.
1354 	 */
1355 	if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && reg->s32_max_value >= 0)
1356 		reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value;
1357 	else
1358 		reg->smax_value = U32_MAX;
1359 	if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0)
1360 		reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value;
1361 	else
1362 		reg->smin_value = 0;
1363 }
1364 
1365 static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1366 {
1367 	/* special case when 64-bit register has upper 32-bit register
1368 	 * zeroed. Typically happens after zext or <<32, >>32 sequence
1369 	 * allowing us to use 32-bit bounds directly,
1370 	 */
1371 	if (tnum_equals_const(tnum_clear_subreg(reg->var_off), 0)) {
1372 		__reg_assign_32_into_64(reg);
1373 	} else {
1374 		/* Otherwise the best we can do is push lower 32bit known and
1375 		 * unknown bits into register (var_off set from jmp logic)
1376 		 * then learn as much as possible from the 64-bit tnum
1377 		 * known and unknown bits. The previous smin/smax bounds are
1378 		 * invalid here because of jmp32 compare so mark them unknown
1379 		 * so they do not impact tnum bounds calculation.
1380 		 */
1381 		__mark_reg64_unbounded(reg);
1382 		__update_reg_bounds(reg);
1383 	}
1384 
1385 	/* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
1386 	 * slightly.  e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
1387 	 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
1388 	 */
1389 	__reg_deduce_bounds(reg);
1390 	__reg_bound_offset(reg);
1391 	__update_reg_bounds(reg);
1392 }
1393 
1394 static bool __reg64_bound_s32(s64 a)
1395 {
1396 	return a > S32_MIN && a < S32_MAX;
1397 }
1398 
1399 static bool __reg64_bound_u32(u64 a)
1400 {
1401 	return a > U32_MIN && a < U32_MAX;
1402 }
1403 
1404 static void __reg_combine_64_into_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1405 {
1406 	__mark_reg32_unbounded(reg);
1407 
1408 	if (__reg64_bound_s32(reg->smin_value) && __reg64_bound_s32(reg->smax_value)) {
1409 		reg->s32_min_value = (s32)reg->smin_value;
1410 		reg->s32_max_value = (s32)reg->smax_value;
1411 	}
1412 	if (__reg64_bound_u32(reg->umin_value) && __reg64_bound_u32(reg->umax_value)) {
1413 		reg->u32_min_value = (u32)reg->umin_value;
1414 		reg->u32_max_value = (u32)reg->umax_value;
1415 	}
1416 
1417 	/* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
1418 	 * slightly.  e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
1419 	 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
1420 	 */
1421 	__reg_deduce_bounds(reg);
1422 	__reg_bound_offset(reg);
1423 	__update_reg_bounds(reg);
1424 }
1425 
1426 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */
1427 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1428 			       struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1429 {
1430 	/*
1431 	 * Clear type, id, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and
1432 	 * padding between 'type' and union
1433 	 */
1434 	memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off));
1435 	reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
1436 	reg->var_off = tnum_unknown;
1437 	reg->frameno = 0;
1438 	reg->precise = env->subprog_cnt > 1 || !env->bpf_capable;
1439 	__mark_reg_unbounded(reg);
1440 }
1441 
1442 static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1443 			     struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
1444 {
1445 	if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
1446 		verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno);
1447 		/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */
1448 		for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++)
1449 			__mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
1450 		return;
1451 	}
1452 	__mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno);
1453 }
1454 
1455 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1456 				struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1457 {
1458 	__mark_reg_unknown(env, reg);
1459 	reg->type = NOT_INIT;
1460 }
1461 
1462 static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1463 			      struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
1464 {
1465 	if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
1466 		verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno);
1467 		/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */
1468 		for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++)
1469 			__mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
1470 		return;
1471 	}
1472 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
1473 }
1474 
1475 static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1476 			    struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno,
1477 			    enum bpf_reg_type reg_type,
1478 			    struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id)
1479 {
1480 	if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
1481 		mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno);
1482 		return;
1483 	}
1484 	mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno);
1485 	regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
1486 	regs[regno].btf = btf;
1487 	regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id;
1488 }
1489 
1490 #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG	(0)
1491 static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1492 			   struct bpf_func_state *state)
1493 {
1494 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
1495 	int i;
1496 
1497 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
1498 		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i);
1499 		regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
1500 		regs[i].parent = NULL;
1501 		regs[i].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
1502 	}
1503 
1504 	/* frame pointer */
1505 	regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK;
1506 	mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP);
1507 	regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno;
1508 }
1509 
1510 #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1)
1511 static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1512 			    struct bpf_func_state *state,
1513 			    int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno)
1514 {
1515 	state->callsite = callsite;
1516 	state->frameno = frameno;
1517 	state->subprogno = subprogno;
1518 	init_reg_state(env, state);
1519 }
1520 
1521 enum reg_arg_type {
1522 	SRC_OP,		/* register is used as source operand */
1523 	DST_OP,		/* register is used as destination operand */
1524 	DST_OP_NO_MARK	/* same as above, check only, don't mark */
1525 };
1526 
1527 static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b)
1528 {
1529 	return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start -
1530 	       ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start;
1531 }
1532 
1533 static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off)
1534 {
1535 	struct bpf_subprog_info *p;
1536 
1537 	p = bsearch(&off, env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt,
1538 		    sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs);
1539 	if (!p)
1540 		return -ENOENT;
1541 	return p - env->subprog_info;
1542 
1543 }
1544 
1545 static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off)
1546 {
1547 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
1548 	int ret;
1549 
1550 	if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) {
1551 		verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n");
1552 		return -EINVAL;
1553 	}
1554 	ret = find_subprog(env, off);
1555 	if (ret >= 0)
1556 		return ret;
1557 	if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) {
1558 		verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n");
1559 		return -E2BIG;
1560 	}
1561 	/* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */
1562 	env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off;
1563 	sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt,
1564 	     sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL);
1565 	return env->subprog_cnt - 1;
1566 }
1567 
1568 struct bpf_kfunc_desc {
1569 	struct btf_func_model func_model;
1570 	u32 func_id;
1571 	s32 imm;
1572 };
1573 
1574 #define MAX_KFUNC_DESCS 256
1575 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab {
1576 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc descs[MAX_KFUNC_DESCS];
1577 	u32 nr_descs;
1578 };
1579 
1580 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id(const void *a, const void *b)
1581 {
1582 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a;
1583 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b;
1584 
1585 	/* func_id is not greater than BTF_MAX_TYPE */
1586 	return d0->func_id - d1->func_id;
1587 }
1588 
1589 static const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *
1590 find_kfunc_desc(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id)
1591 {
1592 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = {
1593 		.func_id = func_id,
1594 	};
1595 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
1596 
1597 	tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
1598 	return bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs,
1599 		       sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id);
1600 }
1601 
1602 static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id)
1603 {
1604 	const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto;
1605 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
1606 	struct bpf_prog_aux *prog_aux;
1607 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc;
1608 	const char *func_name;
1609 	unsigned long addr;
1610 	int err;
1611 
1612 	prog_aux = env->prog->aux;
1613 	tab = prog_aux->kfunc_tab;
1614 	if (!tab) {
1615 		if (!btf_vmlinux) {
1616 			verbose(env, "calling kernel function is not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n");
1617 			return -ENOTSUPP;
1618 		}
1619 
1620 		if (!env->prog->jit_requested) {
1621 			verbose(env, "JIT is required for calling kernel function\n");
1622 			return -ENOTSUPP;
1623 		}
1624 
1625 		if (!bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call()) {
1626 			verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kernel function\n");
1627 			return -ENOTSUPP;
1628 		}
1629 
1630 		if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible) {
1631 			verbose(env, "cannot call kernel function from non-GPL compatible program\n");
1632 			return -EINVAL;
1633 		}
1634 
1635 		tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*tab), GFP_KERNEL);
1636 		if (!tab)
1637 			return -ENOMEM;
1638 		prog_aux->kfunc_tab = tab;
1639 	}
1640 
1641 	if (find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, func_id))
1642 		return 0;
1643 
1644 	if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_DESCS) {
1645 		verbose(env, "too many different kernel function calls\n");
1646 		return -E2BIG;
1647 	}
1648 
1649 	func = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, func_id);
1650 	if (!func || !btf_type_is_func(func)) {
1651 		verbose(env, "kernel btf_id %u is not a function\n",
1652 			func_id);
1653 		return -EINVAL;
1654 	}
1655 	func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, func->type);
1656 	if (!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)) {
1657 		verbose(env, "kernel function btf_id %u does not have a valid func_proto\n",
1658 			func_id);
1659 		return -EINVAL;
1660 	}
1661 
1662 	func_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, func->name_off);
1663 	addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(func_name);
1664 	if (!addr) {
1665 		verbose(env, "cannot find address for kernel function %s\n",
1666 			func_name);
1667 		return -EINVAL;
1668 	}
1669 
1670 	desc = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++];
1671 	desc->func_id = func_id;
1672 	desc->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(addr) - __bpf_call_base;
1673 	err = btf_distill_func_proto(&env->log, btf_vmlinux,
1674 				     func_proto, func_name,
1675 				     &desc->func_model);
1676 	if (!err)
1677 		sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]),
1678 		     kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id, NULL);
1679 	return err;
1680 }
1681 
1682 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm(const void *a, const void *b)
1683 {
1684 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a;
1685 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b;
1686 
1687 	if (d0->imm > d1->imm)
1688 		return 1;
1689 	else if (d0->imm < d1->imm)
1690 		return -1;
1691 	return 0;
1692 }
1693 
1694 static void sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm(struct bpf_prog *prog)
1695 {
1696 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
1697 
1698 	tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
1699 	if (!tab)
1700 		return;
1701 
1702 	sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]),
1703 	     kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm, NULL);
1704 }
1705 
1706 bool bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
1707 {
1708 	return !!prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
1709 }
1710 
1711 const struct btf_func_model *
1712 bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
1713 			 const struct bpf_insn *insn)
1714 {
1715 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = {
1716 		.imm = insn->imm,
1717 	};
1718 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *res;
1719 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
1720 
1721 	tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
1722 	res = bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs,
1723 		      sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm);
1724 
1725 	return res ? &res->func_model : NULL;
1726 }
1727 
1728 static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
1729 {
1730 	struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
1731 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
1732 	int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
1733 
1734 	/* Add entry function. */
1735 	ret = add_subprog(env, 0);
1736 	if (ret)
1737 		return ret;
1738 
1739 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
1740 		if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn) &&
1741 		    !bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn))
1742 			continue;
1743 
1744 		if (!env->bpf_capable) {
1745 			verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n");
1746 			return -EPERM;
1747 		}
1748 
1749 		if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
1750 			ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1);
1751 			if (ret >= 0)
1752 				/* remember subprog */
1753 				insn[1].imm = ret;
1754 		} else if (bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) {
1755 			ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1);
1756 		} else {
1757 			ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm);
1758 		}
1759 
1760 		if (ret < 0)
1761 			return ret;
1762 	}
1763 
1764 	/* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration
1765 	 * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased.
1766 	 */
1767 	subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt;
1768 
1769 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
1770 		for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
1771 			verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start);
1772 
1773 	return 0;
1774 }
1775 
1776 static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
1777 {
1778 	int i, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0;
1779 	struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
1780 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
1781 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
1782 
1783 	/* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */
1784 	subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start;
1785 	subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start;
1786 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
1787 		u8 code = insn[i].code;
1788 
1789 		if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
1790 		    insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call &&
1791 		    insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
1792 			subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true;
1793 		if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_LD &&
1794 		    (BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IND))
1795 			subprog[cur_subprog].has_ld_abs = true;
1796 		if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32)
1797 			goto next;
1798 		if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL)
1799 			goto next;
1800 		off = i + insn[i].off + 1;
1801 		if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) {
1802 			verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off);
1803 			return -EINVAL;
1804 		}
1805 next:
1806 		if (i == subprog_end - 1) {
1807 			/* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another
1808 			 * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit
1809 			 * or unconditional jump back
1810 			 */
1811 			if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) &&
1812 			    code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
1813 				verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n");
1814 				return -EINVAL;
1815 			}
1816 			subprog_start = subprog_end;
1817 			cur_subprog++;
1818 			if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt)
1819 				subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start;
1820 		}
1821 	}
1822 	return 0;
1823 }
1824 
1825 /* Parentage chain of this register (or stack slot) should take care of all
1826  * issues like callee-saved registers, stack slot allocation time, etc.
1827  */
1828 static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1829 			 const struct bpf_reg_state *state,
1830 			 struct bpf_reg_state *parent, u8 flag)
1831 {
1832 	bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */
1833 	int cnt = 0;
1834 
1835 	while (parent) {
1836 		/* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */
1837 		if (writes && state->live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)
1838 			break;
1839 		if (parent->live & REG_LIVE_DONE) {
1840 			verbose(env, "verifier BUG type %s var_off %lld off %d\n",
1841 				reg_type_str[parent->type],
1842 				parent->var_off.value, parent->off);
1843 			return -EFAULT;
1844 		}
1845 		/* The first condition is more likely to be true than the
1846 		 * second, checked it first.
1847 		 */
1848 		if ((parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ) == flag ||
1849 		    parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ64)
1850 			/* The parentage chain never changes and
1851 			 * this parent was already marked as LIVE_READ.
1852 			 * There is no need to keep walking the chain again and
1853 			 * keep re-marking all parents as LIVE_READ.
1854 			 * This case happens when the same register is read
1855 			 * multiple times without writes into it in-between.
1856 			 * Also, if parent has the stronger REG_LIVE_READ64 set,
1857 			 * then no need to set the weak REG_LIVE_READ32.
1858 			 */
1859 			break;
1860 		/* ... then we depend on parent's value */
1861 		parent->live |= flag;
1862 		/* REG_LIVE_READ64 overrides REG_LIVE_READ32. */
1863 		if (flag == REG_LIVE_READ64)
1864 			parent->live &= ~REG_LIVE_READ32;
1865 		state = parent;
1866 		parent = state->parent;
1867 		writes = true;
1868 		cnt++;
1869 	}
1870 
1871 	if (env->longest_mark_read_walk < cnt)
1872 		env->longest_mark_read_walk = cnt;
1873 	return 0;
1874 }
1875 
1876 /* This function is supposed to be used by the following 32-bit optimization
1877  * code only. It returns TRUE if the source or destination register operates
1878  * on 64-bit, otherwise return FALSE.
1879  */
1880 static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
1881 		     u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum reg_arg_type t)
1882 {
1883 	u8 code, class, op;
1884 
1885 	code = insn->code;
1886 	class = BPF_CLASS(code);
1887 	op = BPF_OP(code);
1888 	if (class == BPF_JMP) {
1889 		/* BPF_EXIT for "main" will reach here. Return TRUE
1890 		 * conservatively.
1891 		 */
1892 		if (op == BPF_EXIT)
1893 			return true;
1894 		if (op == BPF_CALL) {
1895 			/* BPF to BPF call will reach here because of marking
1896 			 * caller saved clobber with DST_OP_NO_MARK for which we
1897 			 * don't care the register def because they are anyway
1898 			 * marked as NOT_INIT already.
1899 			 */
1900 			if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
1901 				return false;
1902 			/* Helper call will reach here because of arg type
1903 			 * check, conservatively return TRUE.
1904 			 */
1905 			if (t == SRC_OP)
1906 				return true;
1907 
1908 			return false;
1909 		}
1910 	}
1911 
1912 	if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP ||
1913 	    /* BPF_END always use BPF_ALU class. */
1914 	    (class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64))
1915 		return true;
1916 
1917 	if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_JMP32)
1918 		return false;
1919 
1920 	if (class == BPF_LDX) {
1921 		if (t != SRC_OP)
1922 			return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW;
1923 		/* LDX source must be ptr. */
1924 		return true;
1925 	}
1926 
1927 	if (class == BPF_STX) {
1928 		/* BPF_STX (including atomic variants) has multiple source
1929 		 * operands, one of which is a ptr. Check whether the caller is
1930 		 * asking about it.
1931 		 */
1932 		if (t == SRC_OP && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
1933 			return true;
1934 		return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW;
1935 	}
1936 
1937 	if (class == BPF_LD) {
1938 		u8 mode = BPF_MODE(code);
1939 
1940 		/* LD_IMM64 */
1941 		if (mode == BPF_IMM)
1942 			return true;
1943 
1944 		/* Both LD_IND and LD_ABS return 32-bit data. */
1945 		if (t != SRC_OP)
1946 			return  false;
1947 
1948 		/* Implicit ctx ptr. */
1949 		if (regno == BPF_REG_6)
1950 			return true;
1951 
1952 		/* Explicit source could be any width. */
1953 		return true;
1954 	}
1955 
1956 	if (class == BPF_ST)
1957 		/* The only source register for BPF_ST is a ptr. */
1958 		return true;
1959 
1960 	/* Conservatively return true at default. */
1961 	return true;
1962 }
1963 
1964 /* Return the regno defined by the insn, or -1. */
1965 static int insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
1966 {
1967 	switch (BPF_CLASS(insn->code)) {
1968 	case BPF_JMP:
1969 	case BPF_JMP32:
1970 	case BPF_ST:
1971 		return -1;
1972 	case BPF_STX:
1973 		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC &&
1974 		    (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH)) {
1975 			if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG)
1976 				return BPF_REG_0;
1977 			else
1978 				return insn->src_reg;
1979 		} else {
1980 			return -1;
1981 		}
1982 	default:
1983 		return insn->dst_reg;
1984 	}
1985 }
1986 
1987 /* Return TRUE if INSN has defined any 32-bit value explicitly. */
1988 static bool insn_has_def32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
1989 {
1990 	int dst_reg = insn_def_regno(insn);
1991 
1992 	if (dst_reg == -1)
1993 		return false;
1994 
1995 	return !is_reg64(env, insn, dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP);
1996 }
1997 
1998 static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1999 			   struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2000 {
2001 	s32 def_idx = reg->subreg_def;
2002 
2003 	if (def_idx == DEF_NOT_SUBREG)
2004 		return;
2005 
2006 	env->insn_aux_data[def_idx - 1].zext_dst = true;
2007 	/* The dst will be zero extended, so won't be sub-register anymore. */
2008 	reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
2009 }
2010 
2011 static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
2012 			 enum reg_arg_type t)
2013 {
2014 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
2015 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
2016 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx;
2017 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg, *regs = state->regs;
2018 	bool rw64;
2019 
2020 	if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) {
2021 		verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno);
2022 		return -EINVAL;
2023 	}
2024 
2025 	reg = &regs[regno];
2026 	rw64 = is_reg64(env, insn, regno, reg, t);
2027 	if (t == SRC_OP) {
2028 		/* check whether register used as source operand can be read */
2029 		if (reg->type == NOT_INIT) {
2030 			verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
2031 			return -EACCES;
2032 		}
2033 		/* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */
2034 		if (regno == BPF_REG_FP)
2035 			return 0;
2036 
2037 		if (rw64)
2038 			mark_insn_zext(env, reg);
2039 
2040 		return mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent,
2041 				     rw64 ? REG_LIVE_READ64 : REG_LIVE_READ32);
2042 	} else {
2043 		/* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */
2044 		if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) {
2045 			verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n");
2046 			return -EACCES;
2047 		}
2048 		reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
2049 		reg->subreg_def = rw64 ? DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1;
2050 		if (t == DST_OP)
2051 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno);
2052 	}
2053 	return 0;
2054 }
2055 
2056 /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */
2057 static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2058 			    struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
2059 {
2060 	u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt;
2061 	struct bpf_idx_pair *p;
2062 
2063 	cnt++;
2064 	p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, cnt * sizeof(*p), GFP_USER);
2065 	if (!p)
2066 		return -ENOMEM;
2067 	p[cnt - 1].idx = env->insn_idx;
2068 	p[cnt - 1].prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx;
2069 	cur->jmp_history = p;
2070 	cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt;
2071 	return 0;
2072 }
2073 
2074 /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded
2075  * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution.
2076  */
2077 static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i,
2078 			     u32 *history)
2079 {
2080 	u32 cnt = *history;
2081 
2082 	if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) {
2083 		i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx;
2084 		(*history)--;
2085 	} else {
2086 		i--;
2087 	}
2088 	return i;
2089 }
2090 
2091 static const char *disasm_kfunc_name(void *data, const struct bpf_insn *insn)
2092 {
2093 	const struct btf_type *func;
2094 
2095 	if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL)
2096 		return NULL;
2097 
2098 	func = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, insn->imm);
2099 	return btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, func->name_off);
2100 }
2101 
2102 /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to
2103  * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and
2104  * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state.
2105  */
2106 static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx,
2107 			  u32 *reg_mask, u64 *stack_mask)
2108 {
2109 	const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = {
2110 		.cb_call	= disasm_kfunc_name,
2111 		.cb_print	= verbose,
2112 		.private_data	= env,
2113 	};
2114 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx;
2115 	u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
2116 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
2117 	u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
2118 	u32 dreg = 1u << insn->dst_reg;
2119 	u32 sreg = 1u << insn->src_reg;
2120 	u32 spi;
2121 
2122 	if (insn->code == 0)
2123 		return 0;
2124 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
2125 		verbose(env, "regs=%x stack=%llx before ", *reg_mask, *stack_mask);
2126 		verbose(env, "%d: ", idx);
2127 		print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks);
2128 	}
2129 
2130 	if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
2131 		if (!(*reg_mask & dreg))
2132 			return 0;
2133 		if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
2134 			if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2135 				/* dreg = sreg
2136 				 * dreg needs precision after this insn
2137 				 * sreg needs precision before this insn
2138 				 */
2139 				*reg_mask &= ~dreg;
2140 				*reg_mask |= sreg;
2141 			} else {
2142 				/* dreg = K
2143 				 * dreg needs precision after this insn.
2144 				 * Corresponding register is already marked
2145 				 * as precise=true in this verifier state.
2146 				 * No further markings in parent are necessary
2147 				 */
2148 				*reg_mask &= ~dreg;
2149 			}
2150 		} else {
2151 			if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2152 				/* dreg += sreg
2153 				 * both dreg and sreg need precision
2154 				 * before this insn
2155 				 */
2156 				*reg_mask |= sreg;
2157 			} /* else dreg += K
2158 			   * dreg still needs precision before this insn
2159 			   */
2160 		}
2161 	} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
2162 		if (!(*reg_mask & dreg))
2163 			return 0;
2164 		*reg_mask &= ~dreg;
2165 
2166 		/* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision.
2167 		 * Load from any other memory can be zero extended.
2168 		 * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated
2169 		 * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state.
2170 		 * No further tracking necessary.
2171 		 */
2172 		if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP)
2173 			return 0;
2174 		if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW)
2175 			return 0;
2176 
2177 		/* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack.
2178 		 * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be
2179 		 * tracked with precision
2180 		 */
2181 		spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
2182 		if (spi >= 64) {
2183 			verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi);
2184 			WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
2185 			return -EFAULT;
2186 		}
2187 		*stack_mask |= 1ull << spi;
2188 	} else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) {
2189 		if (*reg_mask & dreg)
2190 			/* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg
2191 			 * to access memory. It means backtracking
2192 			 * encountered a case of pointer subtraction.
2193 			 */
2194 			return -ENOTSUPP;
2195 		/* scalars can only be spilled into stack */
2196 		if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP)
2197 			return 0;
2198 		if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW)
2199 			return 0;
2200 		spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
2201 		if (spi >= 64) {
2202 			verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi);
2203 			WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
2204 			return -EFAULT;
2205 		}
2206 		if (!(*stack_mask & (1ull << spi)))
2207 			return 0;
2208 		*stack_mask &= ~(1ull << spi);
2209 		if (class == BPF_STX)
2210 			*reg_mask |= sreg;
2211 	} else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) {
2212 		if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
2213 			if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
2214 				return -ENOTSUPP;
2215 			/* regular helper call sets R0 */
2216 			*reg_mask &= ~1;
2217 			if (*reg_mask & 0x3f) {
2218 				/* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5
2219 				 * they should have been found already.
2220 				 */
2221 				verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", *reg_mask);
2222 				WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
2223 				return -EFAULT;
2224 			}
2225 		} else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
2226 			return -ENOTSUPP;
2227 		}
2228 	} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
2229 		if (!(*reg_mask & dreg))
2230 			return 0;
2231 		*reg_mask &= ~dreg;
2232 		/* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind.
2233 		 * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision
2234 		 * into parent is necessary
2235 		 */
2236 		if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS)
2237 			/* to be analyzed */
2238 			return -ENOTSUPP;
2239 	}
2240 	return 0;
2241 }
2242 
2243 /* the scalar precision tracking algorithm:
2244  * . at the start all registers have precise=false.
2245  * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns.
2246  * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in:
2247  *   .  ptr + scalar alu
2248  *   . if (scalar cond K|scalar)
2249  *   .  helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected
2250  *   backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and
2251  *   stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar regisers
2252  *   should be precise.
2253  * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots)
2254  *   are equivalent if both are not precise.
2255  *
2256  * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain,
2257  * since many different registers and stack slots could have been
2258  * used to compute single precise scalar.
2259  *
2260  * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then
2261  * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects
2262  * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper
2263  * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe.
2264  *
2265  * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states.
2266  * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn.
2267  * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later.
2268  *
2269  * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like:
2270  *   R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0)
2271  * r9 -= r8
2272  * r5 = r9
2273  * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7
2274  *    R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff))
2275  * r5 += 1
2276  * ...
2277  * call bpf_perf_event_output#25
2278  *   where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO
2279  *
2280  * and this case:
2281  * r6 = 1
2282  * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0
2283  * r0 += r6
2284  * if r0 == 0 goto
2285  *
2286  * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame.
2287  *
2288  * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started,
2289  * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees
2290  * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to
2291  * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences")
2292  *
2293  * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking.
2294  */
2295 static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2296 				     struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
2297 {
2298 	struct bpf_func_state *func;
2299 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
2300 	int i, j;
2301 
2302 	/* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path.
2303 	 * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars.
2304 	 */
2305 	for (; st; st = st->parent)
2306 		for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) {
2307 			func = st->frame[i];
2308 			for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) {
2309 				reg = &func->regs[j];
2310 				if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
2311 					continue;
2312 				reg->precise = true;
2313 			}
2314 			for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) {
2315 				if (func->stack[j].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL)
2316 					continue;
2317 				reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr;
2318 				if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
2319 					continue;
2320 				reg->precise = true;
2321 			}
2322 		}
2323 }
2324 
2325 static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
2326 				  int spi)
2327 {
2328 	struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state;
2329 	int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx;
2330 	int last_idx = env->insn_idx;
2331 	struct bpf_func_state *func;
2332 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
2333 	u32 reg_mask = regno >= 0 ? 1u << regno : 0;
2334 	u64 stack_mask = spi >= 0 ? 1ull << spi : 0;
2335 	bool skip_first = true;
2336 	bool new_marks = false;
2337 	int i, err;
2338 
2339 	if (!env->bpf_capable)
2340 		return 0;
2341 
2342 	func = st->frame[st->curframe];
2343 	if (regno >= 0) {
2344 		reg = &func->regs[regno];
2345 		if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
2346 			WARN_ONCE(1, "backtracing misuse");
2347 			return -EFAULT;
2348 		}
2349 		if (!reg->precise)
2350 			new_marks = true;
2351 		else
2352 			reg_mask = 0;
2353 		reg->precise = true;
2354 	}
2355 
2356 	while (spi >= 0) {
2357 		if (func->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) {
2358 			stack_mask = 0;
2359 			break;
2360 		}
2361 		reg = &func->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
2362 		if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
2363 			stack_mask = 0;
2364 			break;
2365 		}
2366 		if (!reg->precise)
2367 			new_marks = true;
2368 		else
2369 			stack_mask = 0;
2370 		reg->precise = true;
2371 		break;
2372 	}
2373 
2374 	if (!new_marks)
2375 		return 0;
2376 	if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask)
2377 		return 0;
2378 	for (;;) {
2379 		DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64);
2380 		u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt;
2381 
2382 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
2383 			verbose(env, "last_idx %d first_idx %d\n", last_idx, first_idx);
2384 		for (i = last_idx;;) {
2385 			if (skip_first) {
2386 				err = 0;
2387 				skip_first = false;
2388 			} else {
2389 				err = backtrack_insn(env, i, &reg_mask, &stack_mask);
2390 			}
2391 			if (err == -ENOTSUPP) {
2392 				mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st);
2393 				return 0;
2394 			} else if (err) {
2395 				return err;
2396 			}
2397 			if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask)
2398 				/* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state.
2399 				 * Since this state is already marked, just return.
2400 				 * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state.
2401 				 */
2402 				return 0;
2403 			if (i == first_idx)
2404 				break;
2405 			i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history);
2406 			if (i >= env->prog->len) {
2407 				/* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0
2408 				 * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask
2409 				 * to backtrack.
2410 				 * It means the backtracking missed the spot where
2411 				 * particular register was initialized with a constant.
2412 				 */
2413 				verbose(env, "BUG backtracking idx %d\n", i);
2414 				WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
2415 				return -EFAULT;
2416 			}
2417 		}
2418 		st = st->parent;
2419 		if (!st)
2420 			break;
2421 
2422 		new_marks = false;
2423 		func = st->frame[st->curframe];
2424 		bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask);
2425 		for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) {
2426 			reg = &func->regs[i];
2427 			if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
2428 				reg_mask &= ~(1u << i);
2429 				continue;
2430 			}
2431 			if (!reg->precise)
2432 				new_marks = true;
2433 			reg->precise = true;
2434 		}
2435 
2436 		bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask);
2437 		for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) {
2438 			if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) {
2439 				/* the sequence of instructions:
2440 				 * 2: (bf) r3 = r10
2441 				 * 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0
2442 				 * 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)
2443 				 * doesn't contain jmps. It's backtracked
2444 				 * as a single block.
2445 				 * During backtracking insn 3 is not recognized as
2446 				 * stack access, so at the end of backtracking
2447 				 * stack slot fp-8 is still marked in stack_mask.
2448 				 * However the parent state may not have accessed
2449 				 * fp-8 and it's "unallocated" stack space.
2450 				 * In such case fallback to conservative.
2451 				 */
2452 				mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st);
2453 				return 0;
2454 			}
2455 
2456 			if (func->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) {
2457 				stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i);
2458 				continue;
2459 			}
2460 			reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
2461 			if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
2462 				stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i);
2463 				continue;
2464 			}
2465 			if (!reg->precise)
2466 				new_marks = true;
2467 			reg->precise = true;
2468 		}
2469 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
2470 			print_verifier_state(env, func);
2471 			verbose(env, "parent %s regs=%x stack=%llx marks\n",
2472 				new_marks ? "didn't have" : "already had",
2473 				reg_mask, stack_mask);
2474 		}
2475 
2476 		if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask)
2477 			break;
2478 		if (!new_marks)
2479 			break;
2480 
2481 		last_idx = st->last_insn_idx;
2482 		first_idx = st->first_insn_idx;
2483 	}
2484 	return 0;
2485 }
2486 
2487 static int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
2488 {
2489 	return __mark_chain_precision(env, regno, -1);
2490 }
2491 
2492 static int mark_chain_precision_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int spi)
2493 {
2494 	return __mark_chain_precision(env, -1, spi);
2495 }
2496 
2497 static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
2498 {
2499 	switch (type) {
2500 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
2501 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
2502 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
2503 	case PTR_TO_CTX:
2504 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
2505 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
2506 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
2507 	case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
2508 	case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
2509 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
2510 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL:
2511 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
2512 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL:
2513 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
2514 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL:
2515 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
2516 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
2517 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL:
2518 	case PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF:
2519 	case PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL:
2520 	case PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF:
2521 	case PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL:
2522 	case PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID:
2523 	case PTR_TO_MEM:
2524 	case PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL:
2525 	case PTR_TO_FUNC:
2526 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
2527 		return true;
2528 	default:
2529 		return false;
2530 	}
2531 }
2532 
2533 /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */
2534 static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2535 {
2536 	return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0);
2537 }
2538 
2539 static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2540 {
2541 	return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
2542 }
2543 
2544 static bool __is_scalar_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2545 {
2546 	return tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off) &&
2547 	       reg->smin_value == S64_MIN && reg->smax_value == S64_MAX &&
2548 	       reg->umin_value == 0 && reg->umax_value == U64_MAX &&
2549 	       reg->s32_min_value == S32_MIN && reg->s32_max_value == S32_MAX &&
2550 	       reg->u32_min_value == 0 && reg->u32_max_value == U32_MAX;
2551 }
2552 
2553 static bool register_is_bounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2554 {
2555 	return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !__is_scalar_unbounded(reg);
2556 }
2557 
2558 static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
2559 			       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2560 {
2561 	if (allow_ptr_leaks)
2562 		return false;
2563 
2564 	return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE;
2565 }
2566 
2567 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state,
2568 				int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2569 {
2570 	int i;
2571 
2572 	state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg;
2573 	state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
2574 
2575 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
2576 		state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL;
2577 }
2578 
2579 /* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers,
2580  * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access()
2581  */
2582 static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2583 				       /* stack frame we're writing to */
2584 				       struct bpf_func_state *state,
2585 				       int off, int size, int value_regno,
2586 				       int insn_idx)
2587 {
2588 	struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
2589 	int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err;
2590 	u32 dst_reg = env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx].dst_reg;
2591 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL;
2592 
2593 	err = realloc_func_state(state, round_up(slot + 1, BPF_REG_SIZE),
2594 				 state->acquired_refs, true);
2595 	if (err)
2596 		return err;
2597 	/* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0,
2598 	 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits
2599 	 */
2600 	if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
2601 	    state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL &&
2602 	    size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
2603 		verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n");
2604 		return -EACCES;
2605 	}
2606 
2607 	cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
2608 	if (value_regno >= 0)
2609 		reg = &cur->regs[value_regno];
2610 
2611 	if (reg && size == BPF_REG_SIZE && register_is_bounded(reg) &&
2612 	    !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) {
2613 		if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) {
2614 			/* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit
2615 			 * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of
2616 			 * scalar via different register has to be conervative.
2617 			 * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise
2618 			 * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant.
2619 			 */
2620 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
2621 			if (err)
2622 				return err;
2623 		}
2624 		save_register_state(state, spi, reg);
2625 	} else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) {
2626 		/* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */
2627 		if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
2628 			verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
2629 			verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n");
2630 			return -EACCES;
2631 		}
2632 
2633 		if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
2634 			verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n");
2635 			return -EINVAL;
2636 		}
2637 
2638 		if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) {
2639 			bool sanitize = false;
2640 
2641 			if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL &&
2642 			    register_is_const(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr))
2643 				sanitize = true;
2644 			for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
2645 				if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC) {
2646 					sanitize = true;
2647 					break;
2648 				}
2649 			if (sanitize) {
2650 				int *poff = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_off;
2651 				int soff = (-spi - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE;
2652 
2653 				/* detected reuse of integer stack slot with a pointer
2654 				 * which means either llvm is reusing stack slot or
2655 				 * an attacker is trying to exploit CVE-2018-3639
2656 				 * (speculative store bypass)
2657 				 * Have to sanitize that slot with preemptive
2658 				 * store of zero.
2659 				 */
2660 				if (*poff && *poff != soff) {
2661 					/* disallow programs where single insn stores
2662 					 * into two different stack slots, since verifier
2663 					 * cannot sanitize them
2664 					 */
2665 					verbose(env,
2666 						"insn %d cannot access two stack slots fp%d and fp%d",
2667 						insn_idx, *poff, soff);
2668 					return -EINVAL;
2669 				}
2670 				*poff = soff;
2671 			}
2672 		}
2673 		save_register_state(state, spi, reg);
2674 	} else {
2675 		u8 type = STACK_MISC;
2676 
2677 		/* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */
2678 		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;
2679 		/* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr. */
2680 		if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL)
2681 			for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
2682 				state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_MISC;
2683 
2684 		/* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written
2685 		 * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon
2686 		 * when stack slots are partially written.
2687 		 * This heuristic means that read propagation will be
2688 		 * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks
2689 		 * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs
2690 		 * writes+reads less than 8 bytes
2691 		 */
2692 		if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE)
2693 			state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
2694 
2695 		/* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */
2696 		if (reg && register_is_null(reg)) {
2697 			/* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */
2698 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
2699 			if (err)
2700 				return err;
2701 			type = STACK_ZERO;
2702 		}
2703 
2704 		/* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */
2705 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
2706 			state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] =
2707 				type;
2708 	}
2709 	return 0;
2710 }
2711 
2712 /* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is
2713  * known to contain a variable offset.
2714  * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively
2715  * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the
2716  * dynamic range is potentially written to.
2717  *
2718  * 'off' includes 'regno->off'.
2719  * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to
2720  * the stack.
2721  *
2722  * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know
2723  * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for
2724  * future reads cannot be terminated by this write.
2725  *
2726  * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered
2727  * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets
2728  * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to
2729  * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets.
2730  */
2731 static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2732 				     /* func where register points to */
2733 				     struct bpf_func_state *state,
2734 				     int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
2735 				     int value_regno, int insn_idx)
2736 {
2737 	struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
2738 	int min_off, max_off;
2739 	int i, err;
2740 	struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL;
2741 	bool writing_zero = false;
2742 	/* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any
2743 	 * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO
2744 	 */
2745 	bool zero_used = false;
2746 
2747 	cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
2748 	ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno];
2749 	min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off;
2750 	max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size;
2751 	if (value_regno >= 0)
2752 		value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno];
2753 	if (value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg))
2754 		writing_zero = true;
2755 
2756 	err = realloc_func_state(state, round_up(-min_off, BPF_REG_SIZE),
2757 				 state->acquired_refs, true);
2758 	if (err)
2759 		return err;
2760 
2761 
2762 	/* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */
2763 	for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
2764 		u8 new_type, *stype;
2765 		int slot, spi;
2766 
2767 		slot = -i - 1;
2768 		spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
2769 		stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];
2770 
2771 		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks
2772 				&& *stype != NOT_INIT
2773 				&& *stype != SCALAR_VALUE) {
2774 			/* Reject the write if there's are spilled pointers in
2775 			 * range. If we didn't reject here, the ptr status
2776 			 * would be erased below (even though not all slots are
2777 			 * actually overwritten), possibly opening the door to
2778 			 * leaks.
2779 			 */
2780 			verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d",
2781 				insn_idx, i);
2782 			return -EINVAL;
2783 		}
2784 
2785 		/* Erase all spilled pointers. */
2786 		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;
2787 
2788 		/* Update the slot type. */
2789 		new_type = STACK_MISC;
2790 		if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) {
2791 			new_type = STACK_ZERO;
2792 			zero_used = true;
2793 		}
2794 		/* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to
2795 		 * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot
2796 		 * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as
2797 		 * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory.
2798 		 * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots
2799 		 * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject
2800 		 * them, the error would be too confusing.
2801 		 */
2802 		if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) {
2803 			verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d",
2804 					insn_idx, i);
2805 			return -EINVAL;
2806 		}
2807 		*stype = new_type;
2808 	}
2809 	if (zero_used) {
2810 		/* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */
2811 		err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
2812 		if (err)
2813 			return err;
2814 	}
2815 	return 0;
2816 }
2817 
2818 /* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off,
2819  * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the
2820  * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then
2821  * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be
2822  * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must
2823  * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as
2824  * read.
2825  */
2826 static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2827 				/* func where src register points to */
2828 				struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state,
2829 				int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno)
2830 {
2831 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
2832 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
2833 	int i, slot, spi;
2834 	u8 *stype;
2835 	int zeros = 0;
2836 
2837 	for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
2838 		slot = -i - 1;
2839 		spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
2840 		stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
2841 		if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO)
2842 			break;
2843 		zeros++;
2844 	}
2845 	if (zeros == max_off - min_off) {
2846 		/* any access_size read into register is zero extended,
2847 		 * so the whole register == const_zero
2848 		 */
2849 		__mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[dst_regno]);
2850 		/* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet,
2851 		 * so mark it precise here, so that later
2852 		 * backtracking can stop here.
2853 		 * Backtracking may not need this if this register
2854 		 * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment.
2855 		 * Forward propagation of precise flag is not
2856 		 * necessary either. This mark is only to stop
2857 		 * backtracking. Any register that contributed
2858 		 * to const 0 was marked precise before spill.
2859 		 */
2860 		state->regs[dst_regno].precise = true;
2861 	} else {
2862 		/* have read misc data from the stack */
2863 		mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno);
2864 	}
2865 	state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
2866 }
2867 
2868 /* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by
2869  * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a
2870  * spilled reg.
2871  *
2872  * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a
2873  * register.
2874  *
2875  * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds.
2876  */
2877 static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2878 				      /* func where src register points to */
2879 				      struct bpf_func_state *reg_state,
2880 				      int off, int size, int dst_regno)
2881 {
2882 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
2883 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
2884 	int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
2885 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
2886 	u8 *stype;
2887 
2888 	stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
2889 	reg = &reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
2890 
2891 	if (stype[0] == STACK_SPILL) {
2892 		if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
2893 			if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
2894 				verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; ");
2895 				verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n");
2896 				return -EACCES;
2897 			}
2898 			if (dst_regno >= 0) {
2899 				mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno);
2900 				state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
2901 			}
2902 			mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
2903 			return 0;
2904 		}
2905 		for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
2906 			if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL) {
2907 				verbose(env, "corrupted spill memory\n");
2908 				return -EACCES;
2909 			}
2910 		}
2911 
2912 		if (dst_regno >= 0) {
2913 			/* restore register state from stack */
2914 			state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg;
2915 			/* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely
2916 			 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited()
2917 			 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions
2918 			 */
2919 			state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
2920 		} else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) {
2921 			/* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether
2922 			 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE
2923 			 * (e.g. for XADD).
2924 			 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that
2925 			 * with spilled pointers.
2926 			 */
2927 			verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n",
2928 				off);
2929 			return -EACCES;
2930 		}
2931 		mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
2932 	} else {
2933 		u8 type;
2934 
2935 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
2936 			type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE];
2937 			if (type == STACK_MISC)
2938 				continue;
2939 			if (type == STACK_ZERO)
2940 				continue;
2941 			verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
2942 				off, i, size);
2943 			return -EACCES;
2944 		}
2945 		mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
2946 		if (dst_regno >= 0)
2947 			mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno);
2948 	}
2949 	return 0;
2950 }
2951 
2952 enum stack_access_src {
2953 	ACCESS_DIRECT = 1,  /* the access is performed by an instruction */
2954 	ACCESS_HELPER = 2,  /* the access is performed by a helper */
2955 };
2956 
2957 static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2958 					 int regno, int off, int access_size,
2959 					 bool zero_size_allowed,
2960 					 enum stack_access_src type,
2961 					 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta);
2962 
2963 static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
2964 {
2965 	return cur_regs(env) + regno;
2966 }
2967 
2968 /* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register
2969  * 'dst_regno'.
2970  * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'),
2971  * but not its variable offset.
2972  * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned.
2973  *
2974  * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with
2975  * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when
2976  * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing
2977  * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable
2978  * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used
2979  * instead.
2980  */
2981 static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2982 				    int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno)
2983 {
2984 	/* The state of the source register. */
2985 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
2986 	struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg);
2987 	int err;
2988 	int min_off, max_off;
2989 
2990 	/* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted.
2991 	 */
2992 	err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
2993 					    false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL);
2994 	if (err)
2995 		return err;
2996 
2997 	min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
2998 	max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
2999 	mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno);
3000 	return 0;
3001 }
3002 
3003 /* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or
3004  * check_stack_read_var_off.
3005  *
3006  * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack
3007  * bounds.
3008  *
3009  * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It
3010  * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register.
3011  */
3012 static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3013 			    int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
3014 			    int dst_regno)
3015 {
3016 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
3017 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
3018 	int err;
3019 	/* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */
3020 	bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
3021 
3022 	/* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a
3023 	 * register, in order to not leak pointers (see
3024 	 * check_stack_read_fixed_off).
3025 	 */
3026 	if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) {
3027 		char tn_buf[48];
3028 
3029 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
3030 		verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
3031 			tn_buf, off, size);
3032 		return -EACCES;
3033 	}
3034 	/* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity
3035 	 * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack
3036 	 * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
3037 	 */
3038 	if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && var_off) {
3039 		char tn_buf[48];
3040 
3041 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
3042 		verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
3043 				ptr_regno, tn_buf);
3044 		return -EACCES;
3045 	}
3046 
3047 	if (!var_off) {
3048 		off += reg->var_off.value;
3049 		err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
3050 						 dst_regno);
3051 	} else {
3052 		/* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
3053 		 * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this
3054 		 * branch.
3055 		 */
3056 		err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
3057 					       dst_regno);
3058 	}
3059 	return err;
3060 }
3061 
3062 
3063 /* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or
3064  * check_stack_write_var_off.
3065  *
3066  * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack.
3067  * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any).
3068  * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can
3069  * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register.
3070  *
3071  * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size.
3072  */
3073 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3074 			     int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
3075 			     int value_regno, int insn_idx)
3076 {
3077 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
3078 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
3079 	int err;
3080 
3081 	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
3082 		off += reg->var_off.value;
3083 		err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
3084 						  value_regno, insn_idx);
3085 	} else {
3086 		/* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
3087 		 * than fixed offset ones.
3088 		 */
3089 		err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state,
3090 						ptr_regno, off, size,
3091 						value_regno, insn_idx);
3092 	}
3093 	return err;
3094 }
3095 
3096 static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
3097 				 int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type)
3098 {
3099 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
3100 	struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr;
3101 	u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map);
3102 
3103 	if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) {
3104 		verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
3105 			map->value_size, off, size);
3106 		return -EACCES;
3107 	}
3108 
3109 	if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) {
3110 		verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
3111 			map->value_size, off, size);
3112 		return -EACCES;
3113 	}
3114 
3115 	return 0;
3116 }
3117 
3118 /* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */
3119 static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
3120 			      int off, int size, u32 mem_size,
3121 			      bool zero_size_allowed)
3122 {
3123 	bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed);
3124 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
3125 
3126 	if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size)
3127 		return 0;
3128 
3129 	reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno];
3130 	switch (reg->type) {
3131 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
3132 		verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
3133 			mem_size, off, size);
3134 		break;
3135 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
3136 		verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
3137 			mem_size, off, size);
3138 		break;
3139 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
3140 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
3141 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
3142 		verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
3143 			off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size);
3144 		break;
3145 	case PTR_TO_MEM:
3146 	default:
3147 		verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n",
3148 			mem_size, off, size);
3149 	}
3150 
3151 	return -EACCES;
3152 }
3153 
3154 /* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */
3155 static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
3156 				   int off, int size, u32 mem_size,
3157 				   bool zero_size_allowed)
3158 {
3159 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
3160 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
3161 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
3162 	int err;
3163 
3164 	/* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we
3165 	 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off
3166 	 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe.
3167 	 */
3168 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
3169 		print_verifier_state(env, state);
3170 
3171 	/* The minimum value is only important with signed
3172 	 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
3173 	 * value is 0.  If we are using signed variables for our
3174 	 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
3175 	 * will have a set floor within our range.
3176 	 */
3177 	if (reg->smin_value < 0 &&
3178 	    (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN ||
3179 	     (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) ||
3180 	      reg->smin_value + off < 0)) {
3181 		verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
3182 			regno);
3183 		return -EACCES;
3184 	}
3185 	err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size,
3186 				 mem_size, zero_size_allowed);
3187 	if (err) {
3188 		verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n",
3189 			regno);
3190 		return err;
3191 	}
3192 
3193 	/* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be
3194 	 * sure we won't do bad things.
3195 	 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too.
3196 	 */
3197 	if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
3198 		verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access\n",
3199 			regno);
3200 		return -EACCES;
3201 	}
3202 	err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size,
3203 				 mem_size, zero_size_allowed);
3204 	if (err) {
3205 		verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n",
3206 			regno);
3207 		return err;
3208 	}
3209 
3210 	return 0;
3211 }
3212 
3213 /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */
3214 static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
3215 			    int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed)
3216 {
3217 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
3218 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
3219 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
3220 	struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
3221 	int err;
3222 
3223 	err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, map->value_size,
3224 				      zero_size_allowed);
3225 	if (err)
3226 		return err;
3227 
3228 	if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) {
3229 		u32 lock = map->spin_lock_off;
3230 
3231 		/* if any part of struct bpf_spin_lock can be touched by
3232 		 * load/store reject this program.
3233 		 * To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2)
3234 		 * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2.
3235 		 */
3236 		if (reg->smin_value + off < lock + sizeof(struct bpf_spin_lock) &&
3237 		     lock < reg->umax_value + off + size) {
3238 			verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n");
3239 			return -EACCES;
3240 		}
3241 	}
3242 	return err;
3243 }
3244 
3245 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff
3246 
3247 static enum bpf_prog_type resolve_prog_type(struct bpf_prog *prog)
3248 {
3249 	return prog->aux->dst_prog ? prog->aux->dst_prog->type : prog->type;
3250 }
3251 
3252 static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3253 				       const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
3254 				       enum bpf_access_type t)
3255 {
3256 	enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
3257 
3258 	switch (prog_type) {
3259 	/* Program types only with direct read access go here! */
3260 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN:
3261 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT:
3262 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL:
3263 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT:
3264 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR:
3265 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
3266 		if (t == BPF_WRITE)
3267 			return false;
3268 		fallthrough;
3269 
3270 	/* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */
3271 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
3272 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
3273 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
3274 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT:
3275 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB:
3276 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG:
3277 		if (meta)
3278 			return meta->pkt_access;
3279 
3280 		env->seen_direct_write = true;
3281 		return true;
3282 
3283 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT:
3284 		if (t == BPF_WRITE)
3285 			env->seen_direct_write = true;
3286 
3287 		return true;
3288 
3289 	default:
3290 		return false;
3291 	}
3292 }
3293 
3294 static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
3295 			       int size, bool zero_size_allowed)
3296 {
3297 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
3298 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
3299 	int err;
3300 
3301 	/* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any
3302 	 * reg->range we have comes after that.  We are only checking the fixed
3303 	 * offset.
3304 	 */
3305 
3306 	/* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough
3307 	 * detail to prove they're safe.
3308 	 */
3309 	if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
3310 		verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
3311 			regno);
3312 		return -EACCES;
3313 	}
3314 
3315 	err = reg->range < 0 ? -EINVAL :
3316 	      __check_mem_access(env, regno, off, size, reg->range,
3317 				 zero_size_allowed);
3318 	if (err) {
3319 		verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno);
3320 		return err;
3321 	}
3322 
3323 	/* __check_mem_access has made sure "off + size - 1" is within u16.
3324 	 * reg->umax_value can't be bigger than MAX_PACKET_OFF which is 0xffff,
3325 	 * otherwise find_good_pkt_pointers would have refused to set range info
3326 	 * that __check_mem_access would have rejected this pkt access.
3327 	 * Therefore, "off + reg->umax_value + size - 1" won't overflow u32.
3328 	 */
3329 	env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset =
3330 		max_t(u32, env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset,
3331 		      off + reg->umax_value + size - 1);
3332 
3333 	return err;
3334 }
3335 
3336 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields.  Supports fixed offsets only */
3337 static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size,
3338 			    enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type,
3339 			    struct btf **btf, u32 *btf_id)
3340 {
3341 	struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {
3342 		.reg_type = *reg_type,
3343 		.log = &env->log,
3344 	};
3345 
3346 	if (env->ops->is_valid_access &&
3347 	    env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, &info)) {
3348 		/* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a
3349 		 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole
3350 		 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower
3351 		 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size
3352 		 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other
3353 		 * type of narrower access.
3354 		 */
3355 		*reg_type = info.reg_type;
3356 
3357 		if (*reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || *reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL) {
3358 			*btf = info.btf;
3359 			*btf_id = info.btf_id;
3360 		} else {
3361 			env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size;
3362 		}
3363 		/* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */
3364 		if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size)
3365 			env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size;
3366 		return 0;
3367 	}
3368 
3369 	verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
3370 	return -EACCES;
3371 }
3372 
3373 static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off,
3374 				  int size)
3375 {
3376 	if (size < 0 || off < 0 ||
3377 	    (u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) {
3378 		verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n",
3379 			off, size);
3380 		return -EACCES;
3381 	}
3382 	return 0;
3383 }
3384 
3385 static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
3386 			     u32 regno, int off, int size,
3387 			     enum bpf_access_type t)
3388 {
3389 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
3390 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
3391 	struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {};
3392 	bool valid;
3393 
3394 	if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
3395 		verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
3396 			regno);
3397 		return -EACCES;
3398 	}
3399 
3400 	switch (reg->type) {
3401 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
3402 		valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
3403 		break;
3404 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
3405 		valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
3406 		break;
3407 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
3408 		valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
3409 		break;
3410 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
3411 		valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
3412 		break;
3413 	default:
3414 		valid = false;
3415 	}
3416 
3417 
3418 	if (valid) {
3419 		env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size =
3420 			info.ctx_field_size;
3421 		return 0;
3422 	}
3423 
3424 	verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n",
3425 		regno, reg_type_str[reg->type], off, size);
3426 
3427 	return -EACCES;
3428 }
3429 
3430 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
3431 {
3432 	return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno));
3433 }
3434 
3435 static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
3436 {
3437 	const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
3438 
3439 	return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX;
3440 }
3441 
3442 static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
3443 {
3444 	const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
3445 
3446 	return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type);
3447 }
3448 
3449 static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
3450 {
3451 	const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
3452 
3453 	return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type);
3454 }
3455 
3456 static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
3457 {
3458 	const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
3459 
3460 	/* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */
3461 	return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS;
3462 }
3463 
3464 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3465 				   const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
3466 				   int off, int size, bool strict)
3467 {
3468 	struct tnum reg_off;
3469 	int ip_align;
3470 
3471 	/* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
3472 	if (!strict || size == 1)
3473 		return 0;
3474 
3475 	/* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling
3476 	 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of
3477 	 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'.  And on platforms
3478 	 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get
3479 	 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate
3480 	 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking.  Therefore use an
3481 	 * unconditional IP align value of '2'.
3482 	 */
3483 	ip_align = 2;
3484 
3485 	reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off));
3486 	if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) {
3487 		char tn_buf[48];
3488 
3489 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
3490 		verbose(env,
3491 			"misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n",
3492 			ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
3493 		return -EACCES;
3494 	}
3495 
3496 	return 0;
3497 }
3498 
3499 static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3500 				       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
3501 				       const char *pointer_desc,
3502 				       int off, int size, bool strict)
3503 {
3504 	struct tnum reg_off;
3505 
3506 	/* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
3507 	if (!strict || size == 1)
3508 		return 0;
3509 
3510 	reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off));
3511 	if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) {
3512 		char tn_buf[48];
3513 
3514 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
3515 		verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n",
3516 			pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
3517 		return -EACCES;
3518 	}
3519 
3520 	return 0;
3521 }
3522 
3523 static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3524 			       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off,
3525 			       int size, bool strict_alignment_once)
3526 {
3527 	bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once;
3528 	const char *pointer_desc = "";
3529 
3530 	switch (reg->type) {
3531 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
3532 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
3533 		/* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits
3534 		 * right in front, treat it the very same way.
3535 		 */
3536 		return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict);
3537 	case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
3538 		pointer_desc = "flow keys ";
3539 		break;
3540 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
3541 		pointer_desc = "key ";
3542 		break;
3543 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
3544 		pointer_desc = "value ";
3545 		break;
3546 	case PTR_TO_CTX:
3547 		pointer_desc = "context ";
3548 		break;
3549 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
3550 		pointer_desc = "stack ";
3551 		/* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off()
3552 		 * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being
3553 		 * aligned.
3554 		 */
3555 		strict = true;
3556 		break;
3557 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
3558 		pointer_desc = "sock ";
3559 		break;
3560 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
3561 		pointer_desc = "sock_common ";
3562 		break;
3563 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
3564 		pointer_desc = "tcp_sock ";
3565 		break;
3566 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
3567 		pointer_desc = "xdp_sock ";
3568 		break;
3569 	default:
3570 		break;
3571 	}
3572 	return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size,
3573 					   strict);
3574 }
3575 
3576 static int update_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3577 			      const struct bpf_func_state *func,
3578 			      int off)
3579 {
3580 	u16 stack = env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth;
3581 
3582 	if (stack >= -off)
3583 		return 0;
3584 
3585 	/* update known max for given subprogram */
3586 	env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth = -off;
3587 	return 0;
3588 }
3589 
3590 /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function
3591  * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call.
3592  * Ignore jump and exit insns.
3593  * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm
3594  * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites
3595  */
3596 static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
3597 {
3598 	int depth = 0, frame = 0, idx = 0, i = 0, subprog_end;
3599 	struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
3600 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
3601 	bool tail_call_reachable = false;
3602 	int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
3603 	int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
3604 	int j;
3605 
3606 process_func:
3607 	/* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when
3608 	 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack
3609 	 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario
3610 	 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 =
3611 	 * 8k).
3612 	 *
3613 	 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example:
3614 	 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128
3615 	 *  subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256
3616 	 *  tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256
3617 	 *   func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320)
3618 	 *   subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64
3619 	 *   subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128
3620 	 *   tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128
3621 	 *    func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416)
3622 	 *
3623 	 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid
3624 	 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above.
3625 	 */
3626 	if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) {
3627 		verbose(env,
3628 			"tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n",
3629 			depth);
3630 		return -EACCES;
3631 	}
3632 	/* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity
3633 	 * of interpreter stack size
3634 	 */
3635 	depth += round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32);
3636 	if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) {
3637 		verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n",
3638 			frame + 1, depth);
3639 		return -EACCES;
3640 	}
3641 continue_func:
3642 	subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start;
3643 	for (; i < subprog_end; i++) {
3644 		if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i))
3645 			continue;
3646 		/* remember insn and function to return to */
3647 		ret_insn[frame] = i + 1;
3648 		ret_prog[frame] = idx;
3649 
3650 		/* find the callee */
3651 		i = i + insn[i].imm + 1;
3652 		idx = find_subprog(env, i);
3653 		if (idx < 0) {
3654 			WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
3655 				  i);
3656 			return -EFAULT;
3657 		}
3658 
3659 		if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call)
3660 			tail_call_reachable = true;
3661 
3662 		frame++;
3663 		if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) {
3664 			verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n",
3665 				frame);
3666 			return -E2BIG;
3667 		}
3668 		goto process_func;
3669 	}
3670 	/* if tail call got detected across bpf2bpf calls then mark each of the
3671 	 * currently present subprog frames as tail call reachable subprogs;
3672 	 * this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the
3673 	 * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls
3674 	 */
3675 	if (tail_call_reachable)
3676 		for (j = 0; j < frame; j++)
3677 			subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true;
3678 
3679 	/* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog'
3680 	 * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT
3681 	 */
3682 	if (frame == 0)
3683 		return 0;
3684 	depth -= round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32);
3685 	frame--;
3686 	i = ret_insn[frame];
3687 	idx = ret_prog[frame];
3688 	goto continue_func;
3689 }
3690 
3691 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
3692 static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3693 				  const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx)
3694 {
3695 	int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog;
3696 
3697 	subprog = find_subprog(env, start);
3698 	if (subprog < 0) {
3699 		WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
3700 			  start);
3701 		return -EFAULT;
3702 	}
3703 	return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth;
3704 }
3705 #endif
3706 
3707 int check_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3708 		  const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno)
3709 {
3710 	/* Access to ctx or passing it to a helper is only allowed in
3711 	 * its original, unmodified form.
3712 	 */
3713 
3714 	if (reg->off) {
3715 		verbose(env, "dereference of modified ctx ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n",
3716 			regno, reg->off);
3717 		return -EACCES;
3718 	}
3719 
3720 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
3721 		char tn_buf[48];
3722 
3723 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
3724 		verbose(env, "variable ctx access var_off=%s disallowed\n", tn_buf);
3725 		return -EACCES;
3726 	}
3727 
3728 	return 0;
3729 }
3730 
3731 static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3732 				 const char *buf_info,
3733 				 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
3734 				 int regno, int off, int size)
3735 {
3736 	if (off < 0) {
3737 		verbose(env,
3738 			"R%d invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n",
3739 			regno, buf_info, off, size);
3740 		return -EACCES;
3741 	}
3742 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
3743 		char tn_buf[48];
3744 
3745 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
3746 		verbose(env,
3747 			"R%d invalid variable buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n",
3748 			regno, off, tn_buf);
3749 		return -EACCES;
3750 	}
3751 
3752 	return 0;
3753 }
3754 
3755 static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3756 				  const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
3757 				  int regno, int off, int size)
3758 {
3759 	int err;
3760 
3761 	err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, regno, off, size);
3762 	if (err)
3763 		return err;
3764 
3765 	if (off + size > env->prog->aux->max_tp_access)
3766 		env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = off + size;
3767 
3768 	return 0;
3769 }
3770 
3771 static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3772 			       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
3773 			       int regno, int off, int size,
3774 			       bool zero_size_allowed,
3775 			       const char *buf_info,
3776 			       u32 *max_access)
3777 {
3778 	int err;
3779 
3780 	err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, regno, off, size);
3781 	if (err)
3782 		return err;
3783 
3784 	if (off + size > *max_access)
3785 		*max_access = off + size;
3786 
3787 	return 0;
3788 }
3789 
3790 /* BPF architecture zero extends alu32 ops into 64-bit registesr */
3791 static void zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
3792 {
3793 	reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off);
3794 	__reg_assign_32_into_64(reg);
3795 }
3796 
3797 /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes)
3798  * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE
3799  */
3800 static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
3801 {
3802 	u64 mask;
3803 
3804 	/* clear high bits in bit representation */
3805 	reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size);
3806 
3807 	/* fix arithmetic bounds */
3808 	mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1;
3809 	if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) {
3810 		reg->umin_value &= mask;
3811 		reg->umax_value &= mask;
3812 	} else {
3813 		reg->umin_value = 0;
3814 		reg->umax_value = mask;
3815 	}
3816 	reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value;
3817 	reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value;
3818 
3819 	/* If size is smaller than 32bit register the 32bit register
3820 	 * values are also truncated so we push 64-bit bounds into
3821 	 * 32-bit bounds. Above were truncated < 32-bits already.
3822 	 */
3823 	if (size >= 4)
3824 		return;
3825 	__reg_combine_64_into_32(reg);
3826 }
3827 
3828 static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map)
3829 {
3830 	return (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && map->frozen;
3831 }
3832 
3833 static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val)
3834 {
3835 	void *ptr;
3836 	u64 addr;
3837 	int err;
3838 
3839 	err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off);
3840 	if (err)
3841 		return err;
3842 	ptr = (void *)(long)addr + off;
3843 
3844 	switch (size) {
3845 	case sizeof(u8):
3846 		*val = (u64)*(u8 *)ptr;
3847 		break;
3848 	case sizeof(u16):
3849 		*val = (u64)*(u16 *)ptr;
3850 		break;
3851 	case sizeof(u32):
3852 		*val = (u64)*(u32 *)ptr;
3853 		break;
3854 	case sizeof(u64):
3855 		*val = *(u64 *)ptr;
3856 		break;
3857 	default:
3858 		return -EINVAL;
3859 	}
3860 	return 0;
3861 }
3862 
3863 static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3864 				   struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
3865 				   int regno, int off, int size,
3866 				   enum bpf_access_type atype,
3867 				   int value_regno)
3868 {
3869 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
3870 	const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id);
3871 	const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off);
3872 	u32 btf_id;
3873 	int ret;
3874 
3875 	if (off < 0) {
3876 		verbose(env,
3877 			"R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n",
3878 			regno, tname, off);
3879 		return -EACCES;
3880 	}
3881 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
3882 		char tn_buf[48];
3883 
3884 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
3885 		verbose(env,
3886 			"R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n",
3887 			regno, tname, off, tn_buf);
3888 		return -EACCES;
3889 	}
3890 
3891 	if (env->ops->btf_struct_access) {
3892 		ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg->btf, t,
3893 						  off, size, atype, &btf_id);
3894 	} else {
3895 		if (atype != BPF_READ) {
3896 			verbose(env, "only read is supported\n");
3897 			return -EACCES;
3898 		}
3899 
3900 		ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg->btf, t, off, size,
3901 					atype, &btf_id);
3902 	}
3903 
3904 	if (ret < 0)
3905 		return ret;
3906 
3907 	if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
3908 		mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id);
3909 
3910 	return 0;
3911 }
3912 
3913 static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3914 				   struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
3915 				   int regno, int off, int size,
3916 				   enum bpf_access_type atype,
3917 				   int value_regno)
3918 {
3919 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
3920 	struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
3921 	const struct btf_type *t;
3922 	const char *tname;
3923 	u32 btf_id;
3924 	int ret;
3925 
3926 	if (!btf_vmlinux) {
3927 		verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n");
3928 		return -ENOTSUPP;
3929 	}
3930 
3931 	if (!map->ops->map_btf_id || !*map->ops->map_btf_id) {
3932 		verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported for map type %d\n",
3933 			map->map_type);
3934 		return -ENOTSUPP;
3935 	}
3936 
3937 	t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id);
3938 	tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off);
3939 
3940 	if (!env->allow_ptr_to_map_access) {
3941 		verbose(env,
3942 			"%s access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n",
3943 			tname);
3944 		return -EPERM;
3945 	}
3946 
3947 	if (off < 0) {
3948 		verbose(env, "R%d is %s invalid negative access: off=%d\n",
3949 			regno, tname, off);
3950 		return -EACCES;
3951 	}
3952 
3953 	if (atype != BPF_READ) {
3954 		verbose(env, "only read from %s is supported\n", tname);
3955 		return -EACCES;
3956 	}
3957 
3958 	ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, btf_vmlinux, t, off, size, atype, &btf_id);
3959 	if (ret < 0)
3960 		return ret;
3961 
3962 	if (value_regno >= 0)
3963 		mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id);
3964 
3965 	return 0;
3966 }
3967 
3968 /* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The
3969  * maximum valid offset is -1.
3970  *
3971  * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and
3972  * -state->allocated_stack for reads.
3973  */
3974 static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off,
3975 					  struct bpf_func_state *state,
3976 					  enum bpf_access_type t)
3977 {
3978 	int min_valid_off;
3979 
3980 	if (t == BPF_WRITE)
3981 		min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK;
3982 	else
3983 		min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack;
3984 
3985 	if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1)
3986 		return -EACCES;
3987 	return 0;
3988 }
3989 
3990 /* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack
3991  * bounds.
3992  *
3993  * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any).
3994  */
3995 static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
3996 		struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3997 		int regno, int off, int access_size,
3998 		enum stack_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type)
3999 {
4000 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
4001 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
4002 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
4003 	int min_off, max_off;
4004 	int err;
4005 	char *err_extra;
4006 
4007 	if (src == ACCESS_HELPER)
4008 		/* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */
4009 		err_extra = " indirect access to";
4010 	else if (type == BPF_READ)
4011 		err_extra = " read from";
4012 	else
4013 		err_extra = " write to";
4014 
4015 	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
4016 		min_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
4017 		if (access_size > 0)
4018 			max_off = min_off + access_size - 1;
4019 		else
4020 			max_off = min_off;
4021 	} else {
4022 		if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
4023 		    reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
4024 			verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n",
4025 				err_extra, regno);
4026 			return -EACCES;
4027 		}
4028 		min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
4029 		if (access_size > 0)
4030 			max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1;
4031 		else
4032 			max_off = min_off;
4033 	}
4034 
4035 	err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type);
4036 	if (!err)
4037 		err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(max_off, state, type);
4038 
4039 	if (err) {
4040 		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
4041 			verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n",
4042 				err_extra, regno, off, access_size);
4043 		} else {
4044 			char tn_buf[48];
4045 
4046 			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
4047 			verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s size=%d\n",
4048 				err_extra, regno, tn_buf, access_size);
4049 		}
4050 	}
4051 	return err;
4052 }
4053 
4054 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
4055  * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory
4056  * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory
4057  * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory
4058  * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory
4059  */
4060 static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno,
4061 			    int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t,
4062 			    int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once)
4063 {
4064 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
4065 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
4066 	struct bpf_func_state *state;
4067 	int size, err = 0;
4068 
4069 	size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size);
4070 	if (size < 0)
4071 		return size;
4072 
4073 	/* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */
4074 	err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once);
4075 	if (err)
4076 		return err;
4077 
4078 	/* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */
4079 	off += reg->off;
4080 
4081 	if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) {
4082 		if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
4083 			verbose(env, "write to change key R%d not allowed\n", regno);
4084 			return -EACCES;
4085 		}
4086 
4087 		err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size,
4088 					      reg->map_ptr->key_size, false);
4089 		if (err)
4090 			return err;
4091 		if (value_regno >= 0)
4092 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4093 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
4094 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
4095 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
4096 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno);
4097 			return -EACCES;
4098 		}
4099 		err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t);
4100 		if (err)
4101 			return err;
4102 		err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false);
4103 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
4104 			struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
4105 
4106 			/* if map is read-only, track its contents as scalars */
4107 			if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) &&
4108 			    bpf_map_is_rdonly(map) &&
4109 			    map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) {
4110 				int map_off = off + reg->var_off.value;
4111 				u64 val = 0;
4112 
4113 				err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size,
4114 							  &val);
4115 				if (err)
4116 					return err;
4117 
4118 				regs[value_regno].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
4119 				__mark_reg_known(&regs[value_regno], val);
4120 			} else {
4121 				mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4122 			}
4123 		}
4124 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MEM) {
4125 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
4126 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
4127 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno);
4128 			return -EACCES;
4129 		}
4130 		err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size,
4131 					      reg->mem_size, false);
4132 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
4133 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4134 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
4135 		enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE;
4136 		struct btf *btf = NULL;
4137 		u32 btf_id = 0;
4138 
4139 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
4140 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
4141 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno);
4142 			return -EACCES;
4143 		}
4144 
4145 		err = check_ctx_reg(env, reg, regno);
4146 		if (err < 0)
4147 			return err;
4148 
4149 		err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, &reg_type, &btf, &btf_id);
4150 		if (err)
4151 			verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
4152 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
4153 			/* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a
4154 			 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter
4155 			 * case, we know the offset is zero.
4156 			 */
4157 			if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
4158 				mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4159 			} else {
4160 				mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs,
4161 						    value_regno);
4162 				if (reg_type_may_be_null(reg_type))
4163 					regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen;
4164 				/* A load of ctx field could have different
4165 				 * actual load size with the one encoded in the
4166 				 * insn. When the dst is PTR, it is for sure not
4167 				 * a sub-register.
4168 				 */
4169 				regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
4170 				if (reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID ||
4171 				    reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL) {
4172 					regs[value_regno].btf = btf;
4173 					regs[value_regno].btf_id = btf_id;
4174 				}
4175 			}
4176 			regs[value_regno].type = reg_type;
4177 		}
4178 
4179 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
4180 		/* Basic bounds checks. */
4181 		err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, ACCESS_DIRECT, t);
4182 		if (err)
4183 			return err;
4184 
4185 		state = func(env, reg);
4186 		err = update_stack_depth(env, state, off);
4187 		if (err)
4188 			return err;
4189 
4190 		if (t == BPF_READ)
4191 			err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size,
4192 					       value_regno);
4193 		else
4194 			err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size,
4195 						value_regno, insn_idx);
4196 	} else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) {
4197 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) {
4198 			verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n");
4199 			return -EACCES;
4200 		}
4201 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
4202 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
4203 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n",
4204 				value_regno);
4205 			return -EACCES;
4206 		}
4207 		err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false);
4208 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
4209 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4210 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS) {
4211 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
4212 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
4213 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into flow keys\n",
4214 				value_regno);
4215 			return -EACCES;
4216 		}
4217 
4218 		err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size);
4219 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
4220 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4221 	} else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) {
4222 		if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
4223 			verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n",
4224 				regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]);
4225 			return -EACCES;
4226 		}
4227 		err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t);
4228 		if (!err && value_regno >= 0)
4229 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4230 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER) {
4231 		err = check_tp_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size);
4232 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
4233 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4234 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
4235 		err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t,
4236 					      value_regno);
4237 	} else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) {
4238 		err = check_ptr_to_map_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t,
4239 					      value_regno);
4240 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF) {
4241 		if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
4242 			verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n",
4243 				regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]);
4244 			return -EACCES;
4245 		}
4246 		err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false,
4247 					  "rdonly",
4248 					  &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access);
4249 		if (!err && value_regno >= 0)
4250 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4251 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF) {
4252 		err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false,
4253 					  "rdwr",
4254 					  &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access);
4255 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
4256 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4257 	} else {
4258 		verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno,
4259 			reg_type_str[reg->type]);
4260 		return -EACCES;
4261 	}
4262 
4263 	if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ &&
4264 	    regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
4265 		/* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */
4266 		coerce_reg_to_size(&regs[value_regno], size);
4267 	}
4268 	return err;
4269 }
4270 
4271 static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn)
4272 {
4273 	int load_reg;
4274 	int err;
4275 
4276 	switch (insn->imm) {
4277 	case BPF_ADD:
4278 	case BPF_ADD | BPF_FETCH:
4279 	case BPF_AND:
4280 	case BPF_AND | BPF_FETCH:
4281 	case BPF_OR:
4282 	case BPF_OR | BPF_FETCH:
4283 	case BPF_XOR:
4284 	case BPF_XOR | BPF_FETCH:
4285 	case BPF_XCHG:
4286 	case BPF_CMPXCHG:
4287 		break;
4288 	default:
4289 		verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC uses invalid atomic opcode %02x\n", insn->imm);
4290 		return -EINVAL;
4291 	}
4292 
4293 	if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
4294 		verbose(env, "invalid atomic operand size\n");
4295 		return -EINVAL;
4296 	}
4297 
4298 	/* check src1 operand */
4299 	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
4300 	if (err)
4301 		return err;
4302 
4303 	/* check src2 operand */
4304 	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
4305 	if (err)
4306 		return err;
4307 
4308 	if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) {
4309 		/* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */
4310 		err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP);
4311 		if (err)
4312 			return err;
4313 	}
4314 
4315 	if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
4316 		verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg);
4317 		return -EACCES;
4318 	}
4319 
4320 	if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
4321 	    is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
4322 	    is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
4323 	    is_sk_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
4324 		verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n",
4325 			insn->dst_reg,
4326 			reg_type_str[reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type]);
4327 		return -EACCES;
4328 	}
4329 
4330 	if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) {
4331 		if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG)
4332 			load_reg = BPF_REG_0;
4333 		else
4334 			load_reg = insn->src_reg;
4335 
4336 		/* check and record load of old value */
4337 		err = check_reg_arg(env, load_reg, DST_OP);
4338 		if (err)
4339 			return err;
4340 	} else {
4341 		/* This instruction accesses a memory location but doesn't
4342 		 * actually load it into a register.
4343 		 */
4344 		load_reg = -1;
4345 	}
4346 
4347 	/* check whether we can read the memory */
4348 	err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
4349 			       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg, true);
4350 	if (err)
4351 		return err;
4352 
4353 	/* check whether we can write into the same memory */
4354 	err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
4355 			       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true);
4356 	if (err)
4357 		return err;
4358 
4359 	return 0;
4360 }
4361 
4362 /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through
4363  * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending
4364  * on the access type, that all elements of the stack are initialized.
4365  *
4366  * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any).
4367  *
4368  * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the
4369  * read offsets are marked as read.
4370  */
4371 static int check_stack_range_initialized(
4372 		struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off,
4373 		int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
4374 		enum stack_access_src type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
4375 {
4376 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
4377 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
4378 	int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi;
4379 	char *err_extra = type == ACCESS_HELPER ? " indirect" : "";
4380 	enum bpf_access_type bounds_check_type;
4381 	/* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are
4382 	 * read-only.
4383 	 */
4384 	bool clobber = false;
4385 
4386 	if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) {
4387 		verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n");
4388 		return -EACCES;
4389 	}
4390 
4391 	if (type == ACCESS_HELPER) {
4392 		/* The bounds checks for writes are more permissive than for
4393 		 * reads. However, if raw_mode is not set, we'll do extra
4394 		 * checks below.
4395 		 */
4396 		bounds_check_type = BPF_WRITE;
4397 		clobber = true;
4398 	} else {
4399 		bounds_check_type = BPF_READ;
4400 	}
4401 	err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size,
4402 					       type, bounds_check_type);
4403 	if (err)
4404 		return err;
4405 
4406 
4407 	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
4408 		min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
4409 	} else {
4410 		/* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for
4411 		 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in
4412 		 * Spectre masking for stack ALU.
4413 		 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
4414 		 */
4415 		if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) {
4416 			char tn_buf[48];
4417 
4418 			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
4419 			verbose(env, "R%d%s variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
4420 				regno, err_extra, tn_buf);
4421 			return -EACCES;
4422 		}
4423 		/* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed
4424 		 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to
4425 		 * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on
4426 		 * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may
4427 		 * cause uninitialized stack leaking.
4428 		 */
4429 		if (meta && meta->raw_mode)
4430 			meta = NULL;
4431 
4432 		min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
4433 		max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
4434 	}
4435 
4436 	if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
4437 		meta->access_size = access_size;
4438 		meta->regno = regno;
4439 		return 0;
4440 	}
4441 
4442 	for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) {
4443 		u8 *stype;
4444 
4445 		slot = -i - 1;
4446 		spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
4447 		if (state->allocated_stack <= slot)
4448 			goto err;
4449 		stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];
4450 		if (*stype == STACK_MISC)
4451 			goto mark;
4452 		if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) {
4453 			if (clobber) {
4454 				/* helper can write anything into the stack */
4455 				*stype = STACK_MISC;
4456 			}
4457 			goto mark;
4458 		}
4459 
4460 		if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL &&
4461 		    state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID)
4462 			goto mark;
4463 
4464 		if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL &&
4465 		    (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE ||
4466 		     env->allow_ptr_leaks)) {
4467 			if (clobber) {
4468 				__mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
4469 				for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
4470 					state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] = STACK_MISC;
4471 			}
4472 			goto mark;
4473 		}
4474 
4475 err:
4476 		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
4477 			verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n",
4478 				err_extra, regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size);
4479 		} else {
4480 			char tn_buf[48];
4481 
4482 			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
4483 			verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n",
4484 				err_extra, regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size);
4485 		}
4486 		return -EACCES;
4487 mark:
4488 		/* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause
4489 		 * the whole slot to be marked as 'read'
4490 		 */
4491 		mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
4492 			      state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent,
4493 			      REG_LIVE_READ64);
4494 	}
4495 	return update_stack_depth(env, state, min_off);
4496 }
4497 
4498 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
4499 				   int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
4500 				   struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
4501 {
4502 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
4503 
4504 	switch (reg->type) {
4505 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
4506 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
4507 		return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
4508 					   zero_size_allowed);
4509 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
4510 		return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
4511 					       reg->map_ptr->key_size, false);
4512 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
4513 		if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
4514 					  meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE :
4515 					  BPF_READ))
4516 			return -EACCES;
4517 		return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
4518 					zero_size_allowed);
4519 	case PTR_TO_MEM:
4520 		return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off,
4521 					       access_size, reg->mem_size,
4522 					       zero_size_allowed);
4523 	case PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF:
4524 		if (meta && meta->raw_mode)
4525 			return -EACCES;
4526 		return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off,
4527 					   access_size, zero_size_allowed,
4528 					   "rdonly",
4529 					   &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access);
4530 	case PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF:
4531 		return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off,
4532 					   access_size, zero_size_allowed,
4533 					   "rdwr",
4534 					   &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access);
4535 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
4536 		return check_stack_range_initialized(
4537 				env,
4538 				regno, reg->off, access_size,
4539 				zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta);
4540 	default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */
4541 		/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
4542 		if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
4543 		    register_is_null(reg))
4544 			return 0;
4545 
4546 		verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
4547 			reg_type_str[reg->type],
4548 			reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
4549 		return -EACCES;
4550 	}
4551 }
4552 
4553 int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
4554 		   u32 regno, u32 mem_size)
4555 {
4556 	if (register_is_null(reg))
4557 		return 0;
4558 
4559 	if (reg_type_may_be_null(reg->type)) {
4560 		/* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory
4561 		 * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as
4562 		 * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller.
4563 		 */
4564 		const struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg = *reg;
4565 		int rv;
4566 
4567 		mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg);
4568 		rv = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, NULL);
4569 		*reg = saved_reg;
4570 		return rv;
4571 	}
4572 
4573 	return check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, NULL);
4574 }
4575 
4576 /* Implementation details:
4577  * bpf_map_lookup returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
4578  * Two bpf_map_lookups (even with the same key) will have different reg->id.
4579  * For traditional PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE the verifier clears reg->id after
4580  * value_or_null->value transition, since the verifier only cares about
4581  * the range of access to valid map value pointer and doesn't care about actual
4582  * address of the map element.
4583  * For maps with 'struct bpf_spin_lock' inside map value the verifier keeps
4584  * reg->id > 0 after value_or_null->value transition. By doing so
4585  * two bpf_map_lookups will be considered two different pointers that
4586  * point to different bpf_spin_locks.
4587  * The verifier allows taking only one bpf_spin_lock at a time to avoid
4588  * dead-locks.
4589  * Since only one bpf_spin_lock is allowed the checks are simpler than
4590  * reg_is_refcounted() logic. The verifier needs to remember only
4591  * one spin_lock instead of array of acquired_refs.
4592  * cur_state->active_spin_lock remembers which map value element got locked
4593  * and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock.
4594  */
4595 static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
4596 			     bool is_lock)
4597 {
4598 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
4599 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
4600 	bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
4601 	struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
4602 	u64 val = reg->var_off.value;
4603 
4604 	if (!is_const) {
4605 		verbose(env,
4606 			"R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_spin_lock has to be at the constant offset\n",
4607 			regno);
4608 		return -EINVAL;
4609 	}
4610 	if (!map->btf) {
4611 		verbose(env,
4612 			"map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_spin_lock\n",
4613 			map->name);
4614 		return -EINVAL;
4615 	}
4616 	if (!map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) {
4617 		if (map->spin_lock_off == -E2BIG)
4618 			verbose(env,
4619 				"map '%s' has more than one 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n",
4620 				map->name);
4621 		else if (map->spin_lock_off == -ENOENT)
4622 			verbose(env,
4623 				"map '%s' doesn't have 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n",
4624 				map->name);
4625 		else
4626 			verbose(env,
4627 				"map '%s' is not a struct type or bpf_spin_lock is mangled\n",
4628 				map->name);
4629 		return -EINVAL;
4630 	}
4631 	if (map->spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) {
4632 		verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n",
4633 			val + reg->off);
4634 		return -EINVAL;
4635 	}
4636 	if (is_lock) {
4637 		if (cur->active_spin_lock) {
4638 			verbose(env,
4639 				"Locking two bpf_spin_locks are not allowed\n");
4640 			return -EINVAL;
4641 		}
4642 		cur->active_spin_lock = reg->id;
4643 	} else {
4644 		if (!cur->active_spin_lock) {
4645 			verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock without taking a lock\n");
4646 			return -EINVAL;
4647 		}
4648 		if (cur->active_spin_lock != reg->id) {
4649 			verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock of different lock\n");
4650 			return -EINVAL;
4651 		}
4652 		cur->active_spin_lock = 0;
4653 	}
4654 	return 0;
4655 }
4656 
4657 static bool arg_type_is_mem_ptr(enum bpf_arg_type type)
4658 {
4659 	return type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM ||
4660 	       type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL ||
4661 	       type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM;
4662 }
4663 
4664 static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type)
4665 {
4666 	return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
4667 	       type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO;
4668 }
4669 
4670 static bool arg_type_is_alloc_size(enum bpf_arg_type type)
4671 {
4672 	return type == ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO;
4673 }
4674 
4675 static bool arg_type_is_int_ptr(enum bpf_arg_type type)
4676 {
4677 	return type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT ||
4678 	       type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG;
4679 }
4680 
4681 static int int_ptr_type_to_size(enum bpf_arg_type type)
4682 {
4683 	if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT)
4684 		return sizeof(u32);
4685 	else if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG)
4686 		return sizeof(u64);
4687 
4688 	return -EINVAL;
4689 }
4690 
4691 static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4692 				 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
4693 				 enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type)
4694 {
4695 	if (!meta->map_ptr) {
4696 		/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
4697 		verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type\n");
4698 		return -EACCES;
4699 	}
4700 
4701 	switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) {
4702 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
4703 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH:
4704 		if (*arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
4705 			*arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON;
4706 		} else {
4707 			verbose(env, "invalid arg_type for sockmap/sockhash\n");
4708 			return -EINVAL;
4709 		}
4710 		break;
4711 
4712 	default:
4713 		break;
4714 	}
4715 	return 0;
4716 }
4717 
4718 struct bpf_reg_types {
4719 	const enum bpf_reg_type types[10];
4720 	u32 *btf_id;
4721 };
4722 
4723 static const struct bpf_reg_types map_key_value_types = {
4724 	.types = {
4725 		PTR_TO_STACK,
4726 		PTR_TO_PACKET,
4727 		PTR_TO_PACKET_META,
4728 		PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
4729 		PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE,
4730 	},
4731 };
4732 
4733 static const struct bpf_reg_types sock_types = {
4734 	.types = {
4735 		PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON,
4736 		PTR_TO_SOCKET,
4737 		PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK,
4738 		PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK,
4739 	},
4740 };
4741 
4742 #ifdef CONFIG_NET
4743 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_id_sock_common_types = {
4744 	.types = {
4745 		PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON,
4746 		PTR_TO_SOCKET,
4747 		PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK,
4748 		PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK,
4749 		PTR_TO_BTF_ID,
4750 	},
4751 	.btf_id = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON],
4752 };
4753 #endif
4754 
4755 static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = {
4756 	.types = {
4757 		PTR_TO_STACK,
4758 		PTR_TO_PACKET,
4759 		PTR_TO_PACKET_META,
4760 		PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
4761 		PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE,
4762 		PTR_TO_MEM,
4763 		PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF,
4764 		PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF,
4765 	},
4766 };
4767 
4768 static const struct bpf_reg_types int_ptr_types = {
4769 	.types = {
4770 		PTR_TO_STACK,
4771 		PTR_TO_PACKET,
4772 		PTR_TO_PACKET_META,
4773 		PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
4774 		PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE,
4775 	},
4776 };
4777 
4778 static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } };
4779 static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } };
4780 static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } };
4781 static const struct bpf_reg_types alloc_mem_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MEM } };
4782 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_TO_MAP } };
4783 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_BTF_ID } };
4784 static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } };
4785 static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID } };
4786 static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } };
4787 static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } };
4788 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_str_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } };
4789 
4790 static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = {
4791 	[ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY]		= &map_key_value_types,
4792 	[ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE]		= &map_key_value_types,
4793 	[ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE]	= &map_key_value_types,
4794 	[ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL]	= &map_key_value_types,
4795 	[ARG_CONST_SIZE]		= &scalar_types,
4796 	[ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO]	= &scalar_types,
4797 	[ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO]	= &scalar_types,
4798 	[ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR]		= &const_map_ptr_types,
4799 	[ARG_PTR_TO_CTX]		= &context_types,
4800 	[ARG_PTR_TO_CTX_OR_NULL]	= &context_types,
4801 	[ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON]	= &sock_types,
4802 #ifdef CONFIG_NET
4803 	[ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON]	= &btf_id_sock_common_types,
4804 #endif
4805 	[ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET]		= &fullsock_types,
4806 	[ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL]	= &fullsock_types,
4807 	[ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID]		= &btf_ptr_types,
4808 	[ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK]		= &spin_lock_types,
4809 	[ARG_PTR_TO_MEM]		= &mem_types,
4810 	[ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL]	= &mem_types,
4811 	[ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM]		= &mem_types,
4812 	[ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM]		= &alloc_mem_types,
4813 	[ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL]	= &alloc_mem_types,
4814 	[ARG_PTR_TO_INT]		= &int_ptr_types,
4815 	[ARG_PTR_TO_LONG]		= &int_ptr_types,
4816 	[ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID]	= &percpu_btf_ptr_types,
4817 	[ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC]		= &func_ptr_types,
4818 	[ARG_PTR_TO_STACK_OR_NULL]	= &stack_ptr_types,
4819 	[ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR]		= &const_str_ptr_types,
4820 };
4821 
4822 static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
4823 			  enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,
4824 			  const u32 *arg_btf_id)
4825 {
4826 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
4827 	enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type;
4828 	const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible;
4829 	int i, j;
4830 
4831 	compatible = compatible_reg_types[arg_type];
4832 	if (!compatible) {
4833 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unsupported arg type %d\n", arg_type);
4834 		return -EFAULT;
4835 	}
4836 
4837 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) {
4838 		expected = compatible->types[i];
4839 		if (expected == NOT_INIT)
4840 			break;
4841 
4842 		if (type == expected)
4843 			goto found;
4844 	}
4845 
4846 	verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=", regno, reg_type_str[type]);
4847 	for (j = 0; j + 1 < i; j++)
4848 		verbose(env, "%s, ", reg_type_str[compatible->types[j]]);
4849 	verbose(env, "%s\n", reg_type_str[compatible->types[j]]);
4850 	return -EACCES;
4851 
4852 found:
4853 	if (type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
4854 		if (!arg_btf_id) {
4855 			if (!compatible->btf_id) {
4856 				verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing arg compatible BTF ID\n");
4857 				return -EFAULT;
4858 			}
4859 			arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id;
4860 		}
4861 
4862 		if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off,
4863 					  btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id)) {
4864 			verbose(env, "R%d is of type %s but %s is expected\n",
4865 				regno, kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id),
4866 				kernel_type_name(btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id));
4867 			return -EACCES;
4868 		}
4869 
4870 		if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
4871 			verbose(env, "R%d is a pointer to in-kernel struct with non-zero offset\n",
4872 				regno);
4873 			return -EACCES;
4874 		}
4875 	}
4876 
4877 	return 0;
4878 }
4879 
4880 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,
4881 			  struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
4882 			  const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
4883 {
4884 	u32 regno = BPF_REG_1 + arg;
4885 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
4886 	enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[arg];
4887 	enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type;
4888 	int err = 0;
4889 
4890 	if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE)
4891 		return 0;
4892 
4893 	err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP);
4894 	if (err)
4895 		return err;
4896 
4897 	if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) {
4898 		if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) {
4899 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n",
4900 				regno);
4901 			return -EACCES;
4902 		}
4903 		return 0;
4904 	}
4905 
4906 	if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) &&
4907 	    !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) {
4908 		verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n");
4909 		return -EACCES;
4910 	}
4911 
4912 	if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
4913 	    arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE ||
4914 	    arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
4915 		err = resolve_map_arg_type(env, meta, &arg_type);
4916 		if (err)
4917 			return err;
4918 	}
4919 
4920 	if (register_is_null(reg) && arg_type_may_be_null(arg_type))
4921 		/* A NULL register has a SCALAR_VALUE type, so skip
4922 		 * type checking.
4923 		 */
4924 		goto skip_type_check;
4925 
4926 	err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, fn->arg_btf_id[arg]);
4927 	if (err)
4928 		return err;
4929 
4930 	if (type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
4931 		err = check_ctx_reg(env, reg, regno);
4932 		if (err < 0)
4933 			return err;
4934 	}
4935 
4936 skip_type_check:
4937 	if (reg->ref_obj_id) {
4938 		if (meta->ref_obj_id) {
4939 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n",
4940 				regno, reg->ref_obj_id,
4941 				meta->ref_obj_id);
4942 			return -EFAULT;
4943 		}
4944 		meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id;
4945 	}
4946 
4947 	if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
4948 		/* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */
4949 		meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr;
4950 	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) {
4951 		/* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call:
4952 		 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within
4953 		 * stack limits and initialized
4954 		 */
4955 		if (!meta->map_ptr) {
4956 			/* in function declaration map_ptr must come before
4957 			 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before
4958 			 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means
4959 			 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier
4960 			 */
4961 			verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n");
4962 			return -EACCES;
4963 		}
4964 		err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno,
4965 					      meta->map_ptr->key_size, false,
4966 					      NULL);
4967 	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
4968 		   (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL &&
4969 		    !register_is_null(reg)) ||
4970 		   arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE) {
4971 		/* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call:
4972 		 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity
4973 		 */
4974 		if (!meta->map_ptr) {
4975 			/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
4976 			verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n");
4977 			return -EACCES;
4978 		}
4979 		meta->raw_mode = (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE);
4980 		err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno,
4981 					      meta->map_ptr->value_size, false,
4982 					      meta);
4983 	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID) {
4984 		if (!reg->btf_id) {
4985 			verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno);
4986 			return -EACCES;
4987 		}
4988 		meta->ret_btf = reg->btf;
4989 		meta->ret_btf_id = reg->btf_id;
4990 	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) {
4991 		if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) {
4992 			if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, true))
4993 				return -EACCES;
4994 		} else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) {
4995 			if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, false))
4996 				return -EACCES;
4997 		} else {
4998 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n");
4999 			return -EFAULT;
5000 		}
5001 	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC) {
5002 		meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno;
5003 	} else if (arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_type)) {
5004 		/* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the
5005 		 * next is_mem_size argument below.
5006 		 */
5007 		meta->raw_mode = (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM);
5008 	} else if (arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_type)) {
5009 		bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO);
5010 
5011 		/* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers
5012 		 * that enforce this value as an upper bound on return values.
5013 		 * See do_refine_retval_range() for helpers that can refine
5014 		 * the return value. C type of helper is u32 so we pull register
5015 		 * bound from umax_value however, if negative verifier errors
5016 		 * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an
5017 		 * int type and negative retvals are allowed.
5018 		 */
5019 		meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value;
5020 
5021 		/* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check
5022 		 * happens using its boundaries.
5023 		 */
5024 		if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
5025 			/* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw
5026 			 * mode so that the program is required to
5027 			 * initialize all the memory that the helper could
5028 			 * just partially fill up.
5029 			 */
5030 			meta = NULL;
5031 
5032 		if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
5033 			verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n",
5034 				regno);
5035 			return -EACCES;
5036 		}
5037 
5038 		if (reg->umin_value == 0) {
5039 			err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0,
5040 						      zero_size_allowed,
5041 						      meta);
5042 			if (err)
5043 				return err;
5044 		}
5045 
5046 		if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) {
5047 			verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n",
5048 				regno);
5049 			return -EACCES;
5050 		}
5051 		err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1,
5052 					      reg->umax_value,
5053 					      zero_size_allowed, meta);
5054 		if (!err)
5055 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno);
5056 	} else if (arg_type_is_alloc_size(arg_type)) {
5057 		if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
5058 			verbose(env, "R%d is not a known constant'\n",
5059 				regno);
5060 			return -EACCES;
5061 		}
5062 		meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value;
5063 	} else if (arg_type_is_int_ptr(arg_type)) {
5064 		int size = int_ptr_type_to_size(arg_type);
5065 
5066 		err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, size, false, meta);
5067 		if (err)
5068 			return err;
5069 		err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, size, true);
5070 	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR) {
5071 		struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
5072 		int map_off;
5073 		u64 map_addr;
5074 		char *str_ptr;
5075 
5076 		if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) {
5077 			verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno);
5078 			return -EACCES;
5079 		}
5080 
5081 		if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
5082 			verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno);
5083 			return -EACCES;
5084 		}
5085 
5086 		if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) {
5087 			verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n");
5088 			return -EACCES;
5089 		}
5090 
5091 		err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off,
5092 				       map->value_size - reg->off, false);
5093 		if (err)
5094 			return err;
5095 
5096 		map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
5097 		err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off);
5098 		if (err) {
5099 			verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n");
5100 			return err;
5101 		}
5102 
5103 		str_ptr = (char *)(long)(map_addr);
5104 		if (!strnchr(str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off, 0)) {
5105 			verbose(env, "string is not zero-terminated\n");
5106 			return -EINVAL;
5107 		}
5108 	}
5109 
5110 	return err;
5111 }
5112 
5113 static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id)
5114 {
5115 	enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type;
5116 	enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
5117 
5118 	if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
5119 		return false;
5120 
5121 	/* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these
5122 	 * contexts, so updating is safe.
5123 	 */
5124 	switch (type) {
5125 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
5126 		if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER)
5127 			return true;
5128 		break;
5129 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER:
5130 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
5131 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
5132 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
5133 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT:
5134 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR:
5135 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP:
5136 		return true;
5137 	default:
5138 		break;
5139 	}
5140 
5141 	verbose(env, "cannot update sockmap in this context\n");
5142 	return false;
5143 }
5144 
5145 static bool allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
5146 {
5147 	return env->prog->jit_requested && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64);
5148 }
5149 
5150 static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5151 					struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
5152 {
5153 	if (!map)
5154 		return 0;
5155 
5156 	/* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */
5157 	switch (map->map_type) {
5158 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
5159 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
5160 			goto error;
5161 		break;
5162 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY:
5163 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read &&
5164 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output &&
5165 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_output &&
5166 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value &&
5167 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_xdp_output)
5168 			goto error;
5169 		break;
5170 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF:
5171 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output &&
5172 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve &&
5173 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit &&
5174 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard &&
5175 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query)
5176 			goto error;
5177 		break;
5178 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE:
5179 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid)
5180 			goto error;
5181 		break;
5182 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY:
5183 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup &&
5184 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup)
5185 			goto error;
5186 		break;
5187 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE:
5188 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE:
5189 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage)
5190 			goto error;
5191 		break;
5192 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
5193 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH:
5194 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map &&
5195 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
5196 			goto error;
5197 		break;
5198 	/* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases
5199 	 * appear.
5200 	 */
5201 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP:
5202 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)
5203 			goto error;
5204 		break;
5205 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP:
5206 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map &&
5207 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
5208 			goto error;
5209 		break;
5210 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
5211 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
5212 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
5213 			goto error;
5214 		break;
5215 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
5216 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map &&
5217 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update &&
5218 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem &&
5219 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map &&
5220 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport &&
5221 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
5222 		    !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id))
5223 			goto error;
5224 		break;
5225 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH:
5226 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash &&
5227 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update &&
5228 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem &&
5229 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash &&
5230 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport &&
5231 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
5232 		    !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id))
5233 			goto error;
5234 		break;
5235 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY:
5236 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport)
5237 			goto error;
5238 		break;
5239 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE:
5240 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK:
5241 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem &&
5242 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem &&
5243 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem)
5244 			goto error;
5245 		break;
5246 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE:
5247 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get &&
5248 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete)
5249 			goto error;
5250 		break;
5251 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE:
5252 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get &&
5253 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete)
5254 			goto error;
5255 		break;
5256 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE:
5257 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get &&
5258 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete)
5259 			goto error;
5260 		break;
5261 	default:
5262 		break;
5263 	}
5264 
5265 	/* ... and second from the function itself. */
5266 	switch (func_id) {
5267 	case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
5268 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY)
5269 			goto error;
5270 		if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && !allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) {
5271 			verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
5272 			return -EINVAL;
5273 		}
5274 		break;
5275 	case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read:
5276 	case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output:
5277 	case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value:
5278 	case BPF_FUNC_skb_output:
5279 	case BPF_FUNC_xdp_output:
5280 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY)
5281 			goto error;
5282 		break;
5283 	case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid:
5284 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE)
5285 			goto error;
5286 		break;
5287 	case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup:
5288 	case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup:
5289 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY)
5290 			goto error;
5291 		break;
5292 	case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map:
5293 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP &&
5294 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH &&
5295 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP &&
5296 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP)
5297 			goto error;
5298 		break;
5299 	case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map:
5300 	case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map:
5301 	case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update:
5302 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP)
5303 			goto error;
5304 		break;
5305 	case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash:
5306 	case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash:
5307 	case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update:
5308 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)
5309 			goto error;
5310 		break;
5311 	case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage:
5312 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE &&
5313 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE)
5314 			goto error;
5315 		break;
5316 	case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport:
5317 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY &&
5318 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP &&
5319 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)
5320 			goto error;
5321 		break;
5322 	case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem:
5323 	case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem:
5324 	case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem:
5325 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE &&
5326 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK)
5327 			goto error;
5328 		break;
5329 	case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get:
5330 	case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete:
5331 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE)
5332 			goto error;
5333 		break;
5334 	case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get:
5335 	case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete:
5336 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE)
5337 			goto error;
5338 		break;
5339 	case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get:
5340 	case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete:
5341 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE)
5342 			goto error;
5343 		break;
5344 	default:
5345 		break;
5346 	}
5347 
5348 	return 0;
5349 error:
5350 	verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n",
5351 		map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
5352 	return -EINVAL;
5353 }
5354 
5355 static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
5356 {
5357 	int count = 0;
5358 
5359 	if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
5360 		count++;
5361 	if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
5362 		count++;
5363 	if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
5364 		count++;
5365 	if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
5366 		count++;
5367 	if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
5368 		count++;
5369 
5370 	/* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment,
5371 	 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have
5372 	 * right now.
5373 	 */
5374 	return count <= 1;
5375 }
5376 
5377 static bool check_args_pair_invalid(enum bpf_arg_type arg_curr,
5378 				    enum bpf_arg_type arg_next)
5379 {
5380 	return (arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_curr) &&
5381 	        !arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_next)) ||
5382 	       (!arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_curr) &&
5383 		arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_next));
5384 }
5385 
5386 static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
5387 {
5388 	/* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len'
5389 	 * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need
5390 	 * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy
5391 	 * helper function specification.
5392 	 */
5393 	if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) ||
5394 	    arg_type_is_mem_ptr(fn->arg5_type)  ||
5395 	    check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg1_type, fn->arg2_type) ||
5396 	    check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg2_type, fn->arg3_type) ||
5397 	    check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg3_type, fn->arg4_type) ||
5398 	    check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg4_type, fn->arg5_type))
5399 		return false;
5400 
5401 	return true;
5402 }
5403 
5404 static bool check_refcount_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id)
5405 {
5406 	int count = 0;
5407 
5408 	if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg1_type))
5409 		count++;
5410 	if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg2_type))
5411 		count++;
5412 	if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg3_type))
5413 		count++;
5414 	if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg4_type))
5415 		count++;
5416 	if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg5_type))
5417 		count++;
5418 
5419 	/* A reference acquiring function cannot acquire
5420 	 * another refcounted ptr.
5421 	 */
5422 	if (may_be_acquire_function(func_id) && count)
5423 		return false;
5424 
5425 	/* We only support one arg being unreferenced at the moment,
5426 	 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now.
5427 	 */
5428 	return count <= 1;
5429 }
5430 
5431 static bool check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
5432 {
5433 	int i;
5434 
5435 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) {
5436 		if (fn->arg_type[i] == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && !fn->arg_btf_id[i])
5437 			return false;
5438 
5439 		if (fn->arg_type[i] != ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && fn->arg_btf_id[i])
5440 			return false;
5441 	}
5442 
5443 	return true;
5444 }
5445 
5446 static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id)
5447 {
5448 	return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) &&
5449 	       check_arg_pair_ok(fn) &&
5450 	       check_btf_id_ok(fn) &&
5451 	       check_refcount_ok(fn, func_id) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
5452 }
5453 
5454 /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]
5455  * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE.
5456  */
5457 static void __clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5458 				     struct bpf_func_state *state)
5459 {
5460 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
5461 	int i;
5462 
5463 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
5464 		if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(&regs[i]))
5465 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i);
5466 
5467 	bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) {
5468 		if (!reg)
5469 			continue;
5470 		if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg))
5471 			__mark_reg_unknown(env, reg);
5472 	}
5473 }
5474 
5475 static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
5476 {
5477 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
5478 	int i;
5479 
5480 	for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++)
5481 		__clear_all_pkt_pointers(env, vstate->frame[i]);
5482 }
5483 
5484 enum {
5485 	AT_PKT_END = -1,
5486 	BEYOND_PKT_END = -2,
5487 };
5488 
5489 static void mark_pkt_end(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, int regn, bool range_open)
5490 {
5491 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
5492 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regn];
5493 
5494 	if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET)
5495 		/* PTR_TO_PACKET_META is not supported yet */
5496 		return;
5497 
5498 	/* The 'reg' is pkt > pkt_end or pkt >= pkt_end.
5499 	 * How far beyond pkt_end it goes is unknown.
5500 	 * if (!range_open) it's the case of pkt >= pkt_end
5501 	 * if (range_open) it's the case of pkt > pkt_end
5502 	 * hence this pointer is at least 1 byte bigger than pkt_end
5503 	 */
5504 	if (range_open)
5505 		reg->range = BEYOND_PKT_END;
5506 	else
5507 		reg->range = AT_PKT_END;
5508 }
5509 
5510 static void release_reg_references(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5511 				   struct bpf_func_state *state,
5512 				   int ref_obj_id)
5513 {
5514 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
5515 	int i;
5516 
5517 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
5518 		if (regs[i].ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id)
5519 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i);
5520 
5521 	bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) {
5522 		if (!reg)
5523 			continue;
5524 		if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id)
5525 			__mark_reg_unknown(env, reg);
5526 	}
5527 }
5528 
5529 /* The pointer with the specified id has released its reference to kernel
5530  * resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference.
5531  */
5532 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5533 			     int ref_obj_id)
5534 {
5535 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
5536 	int err;
5537 	int i;
5538 
5539 	err = release_reference_state(cur_func(env), ref_obj_id);
5540 	if (err)
5541 		return err;
5542 
5543 	for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++)
5544 		release_reg_references(env, vstate->frame[i], ref_obj_id);
5545 
5546 	return 0;
5547 }
5548 
5549 static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5550 				    struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
5551 {
5552 	int i;
5553 
5554 	/* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */
5555 	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
5556 		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
5557 		check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
5558 	}
5559 }
5560 
5561 typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5562 				   struct bpf_func_state *caller,
5563 				   struct bpf_func_state *callee,
5564 				   int insn_idx);
5565 
5566 static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
5567 			     int *insn_idx, int subprog,
5568 			     set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb)
5569 {
5570 	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
5571 	struct bpf_func_info_aux *func_info_aux;
5572 	struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee;
5573 	int err;
5574 	bool is_global = false;
5575 
5576 	if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) {
5577 		verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n",
5578 			state->curframe + 2);
5579 		return -E2BIG;
5580 	}
5581 
5582 	caller = state->frame[state->curframe];
5583 	if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) {
5584 		verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n",
5585 			state->curframe + 1);
5586 		return -EFAULT;
5587 	}
5588 
5589 	func_info_aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux;
5590 	if (func_info_aux)
5591 		is_global = func_info_aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL;
5592 	err = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, caller->regs);
5593 	if (err == -EFAULT)
5594 		return err;
5595 	if (is_global) {
5596 		if (err) {
5597 			verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n",
5598 				subprog);
5599 			return err;
5600 		} else {
5601 			if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
5602 				verbose(env,
5603 					"Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n",
5604 					subprog);
5605 			clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs);
5606 
5607 			/* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */
5608 			mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0);
5609 			caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
5610 
5611 			/* continue with next insn after call */
5612 			return 0;
5613 		}
5614 	}
5615 
5616 	callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL);
5617 	if (!callee)
5618 		return -ENOMEM;
5619 	state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee;
5620 
5621 	/* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write
5622 	 * into its own stack before reading from it.
5623 	 * callee can read/write into caller's stack
5624 	 */
5625 	init_func_state(env, callee,
5626 			/* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */
5627 			*insn_idx /* callsite */,
5628 			state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */,
5629 			subprog /* subprog number within this prog */);
5630 
5631 	/* Transfer references to the callee */
5632 	err = transfer_reference_state(callee, caller);
5633 	if (err)
5634 		return err;
5635 
5636 	err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx);
5637 	if (err)
5638 		return err;
5639 
5640 	clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs);
5641 
5642 	/* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */
5643 	state->curframe++;
5644 
5645 	/* and go analyze first insn of the callee */
5646 	*insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1;
5647 
5648 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
5649 		verbose(env, "caller:\n");
5650 		print_verifier_state(env, caller);
5651 		verbose(env, "callee:\n");
5652 		print_verifier_state(env, callee);
5653 	}
5654 	return 0;
5655 }
5656 
5657 int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5658 				   struct bpf_func_state *caller,
5659 				   struct bpf_func_state *callee)
5660 {
5661 	/* bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn,
5662 	 *      void *callback_ctx, u64 flags);
5663 	 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value,
5664 	 *      void *callback_ctx);
5665 	 */
5666 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1];
5667 
5668 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY;
5669 	__mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]);
5670 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr;
5671 
5672 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
5673 	__mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]);
5674 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr;
5675 
5676 	/* pointer to stack or null */
5677 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_4] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3];
5678 
5679 	/* unused */
5680 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
5681 	return 0;
5682 }
5683 
5684 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5685 			    struct bpf_func_state *caller,
5686 			    struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx)
5687 {
5688 	int i;
5689 
5690 	/* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access.  The copy includes parent
5691 	 * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain
5692 	 */
5693 	for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++)
5694 		callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i];
5695 	return 0;
5696 }
5697 
5698 static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
5699 			   int *insn_idx)
5700 {
5701 	int subprog, target_insn;
5702 
5703 	target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1;
5704 	subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn);
5705 	if (subprog < 0) {
5706 		verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
5707 			target_insn);
5708 		return -EFAULT;
5709 	}
5710 
5711 	return __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx, subprog, set_callee_state);
5712 }
5713 
5714 static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5715 				       struct bpf_func_state *caller,
5716 				       struct bpf_func_state *callee,
5717 				       int insn_idx)
5718 {
5719 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
5720 	struct bpf_map *map;
5721 	int err;
5722 
5723 	if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(insn_aux)) {
5724 		verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n");
5725 		return -EINVAL;
5726 	}
5727 
5728 	map = BPF_MAP_PTR(insn_aux->map_ptr_state);
5729 	if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args ||
5730 	    !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) {
5731 		verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n");
5732 		return -ENOTSUPP;
5733 	}
5734 
5735 	err = map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args(env, caller, callee);
5736 	if (err)
5737 		return err;
5738 
5739 	callee->in_callback_fn = true;
5740 	return 0;
5741 }
5742 
5743 static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx)
5744 {
5745 	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
5746 	struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee;
5747 	struct bpf_reg_state *r0;
5748 	int err;
5749 
5750 	callee = state->frame[state->curframe];
5751 	r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0];
5752 	if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
5753 		/* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer
5754 		 * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller,
5755 		 * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack
5756 		 * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits,
5757 		 * but let's be conservative
5758 		 */
5759 		verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n");
5760 		return -EINVAL;
5761 	}
5762 
5763 	state->curframe--;
5764 	caller = state->frame[state->curframe];
5765 	if (callee->in_callback_fn) {
5766 		/* enforce R0 return value range [0, 1]. */
5767 		struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1);
5768 
5769 		if (r0->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
5770 			verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n");
5771 			return -EACCES;
5772 		}
5773 		if (!tnum_in(range, r0->var_off)) {
5774 			verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, &range, "callback return", "R0");
5775 			return -EINVAL;
5776 		}
5777 	} else {
5778 		/* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */
5779 		caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0;
5780 	}
5781 
5782 	/* Transfer references to the caller */
5783 	err = transfer_reference_state(caller, callee);
5784 	if (err)
5785 		return err;
5786 
5787 	*insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1;
5788 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
5789 		verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n");
5790 		print_verifier_state(env, callee);
5791 		verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx);
5792 		print_verifier_state(env, caller);
5793 	}
5794 	/* clear everything in the callee */
5795 	free_func_state(callee);
5796 	state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL;
5797 	return 0;
5798 }
5799 
5800 static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type,
5801 				   int func_id,
5802 				   struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
5803 {
5804 	struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = &regs[BPF_REG_0];
5805 
5806 	if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER ||
5807 	    (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack &&
5808 	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack &&
5809 	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str &&
5810 	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str &&
5811 	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str))
5812 		return;
5813 
5814 	ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value;
5815 	ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value;
5816 	ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO;
5817 	ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO;
5818 	__reg_deduce_bounds(ret_reg);
5819 	__reg_bound_offset(ret_reg);
5820 	__update_reg_bounds(ret_reg);
5821 }
5822 
5823 static int
5824 record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
5825 		int func_id, int insn_idx)
5826 {
5827 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
5828 	struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr;
5829 
5830 	if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call &&
5831 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
5832 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem &&
5833 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem &&
5834 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem &&
5835 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem &&
5836 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem &&
5837 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem &&
5838 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)
5839 		return 0;
5840 
5841 	if (map == NULL) {
5842 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
5843 		return -EINVAL;
5844 	}
5845 
5846 	/* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions
5847 	 * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the
5848 	 * state of the map from program side.
5849 	 */
5850 	if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) &&
5851 	    (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem ||
5852 	     func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem ||
5853 	     func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem ||
5854 	     func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) {
5855 		verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n");
5856 		return -EACCES;
5857 	}
5858 
5859 	if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state))
5860 		bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr,
5861 				  !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1);
5862 	else if (BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) != meta->map_ptr)
5863 		bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON,
5864 				  !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1);
5865 	return 0;
5866 }
5867 
5868 static int
5869 record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
5870 		int func_id, int insn_idx)
5871 {
5872 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
5873 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg;
5874 	struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr;
5875 	struct tnum range;
5876 	u64 val;
5877 	int err;
5878 
5879 	if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
5880 		return 0;
5881 	if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) {
5882 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
5883 		return -EINVAL;
5884 	}
5885 
5886 	range = tnum_range(0, map->max_entries - 1);
5887 	reg = &regs[BPF_REG_3];
5888 
5889 	if (!register_is_const(reg) || !tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) {
5890 		bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON);
5891 		return 0;
5892 	}
5893 
5894 	err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3);
5895 	if (err)
5896 		return err;
5897 
5898 	val = reg->var_off.value;
5899 	if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux))
5900 		bpf_map_key_store(aux, val);
5901 	else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) &&
5902 		  bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val)
5903 		bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON);
5904 	return 0;
5905 }
5906 
5907 static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
5908 {
5909 	struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env);
5910 	int i;
5911 
5912 	for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) {
5913 		verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n",
5914 			state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx);
5915 	}
5916 	return state->acquired_refs ? -EINVAL : 0;
5917 }
5918 
5919 static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5920 				   struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
5921 {
5922 	struct bpf_reg_state *fmt_reg = &regs[BPF_REG_3];
5923 	struct bpf_reg_state *data_len_reg = &regs[BPF_REG_5];
5924 	struct bpf_map *fmt_map = fmt_reg->map_ptr;
5925 	int err, fmt_map_off, num_args;
5926 	u64 fmt_addr;
5927 	char *fmt;
5928 
5929 	/* data must be an array of u64 */
5930 	if (data_len_reg->var_off.value % 8)
5931 		return -EINVAL;
5932 	num_args = data_len_reg->var_off.value / 8;
5933 
5934 	/* fmt being ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR guarantees that var_off is const
5935 	 * and map_direct_value_addr is set.
5936 	 */
5937 	fmt_map_off = fmt_reg->off + fmt_reg->var_off.value;
5938 	err = fmt_map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(fmt_map, &fmt_addr,
5939 						  fmt_map_off);
5940 	if (err) {
5941 		verbose(env, "verifier bug\n");
5942 		return -EFAULT;
5943 	}
5944 	fmt = (char *)(long)fmt_addr + fmt_map_off;
5945 
5946 	/* We are also guaranteed that fmt+fmt_map_off is NULL terminated, we
5947 	 * can focus on validating the format specifiers.
5948 	 */
5949 	err = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, NULL, num_args);
5950 	if (err < 0)
5951 		verbose(env, "Invalid format string\n");
5952 
5953 	return err;
5954 }
5955 
5956 static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
5957 			     int *insn_idx_p)
5958 {
5959 	const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
5960 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
5961 	struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
5962 	int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p;
5963 	bool changes_data;
5964 	int i, err, func_id;
5965 
5966 	/* find function prototype */
5967 	func_id = insn->imm;
5968 	if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
5969 		verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
5970 			func_id);
5971 		return -EINVAL;
5972 	}
5973 
5974 	if (env->ops->get_func_proto)
5975 		fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog);
5976 	if (!fn) {
5977 		verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
5978 			func_id);
5979 		return -EINVAL;
5980 	}
5981 
5982 	/* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
5983 	if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
5984 		verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n");
5985 		return -EINVAL;
5986 	}
5987 
5988 	if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) {
5989 		verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n");
5990 		return -EINVAL;
5991 	}
5992 
5993 	/* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */
5994 	changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func);
5995 	if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
5996 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n",
5997 			func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
5998 		return -EINVAL;
5999 	}
6000 
6001 	memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
6002 	meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
6003 
6004 	err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id);
6005 	if (err) {
6006 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
6007 			func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
6008 		return err;
6009 	}
6010 
6011 	meta.func_id = func_id;
6012 	/* check args */
6013 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) {
6014 		err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn);
6015 		if (err)
6016 			return err;
6017 	}
6018 
6019 	err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx);
6020 	if (err)
6021 		return err;
6022 
6023 	err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx);
6024 	if (err)
6025 		return err;
6026 
6027 	/* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset
6028 	 * is inferred from register state.
6029 	 */
6030 	for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
6031 		err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B,
6032 				       BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
6033 		if (err)
6034 			return err;
6035 	}
6036 
6037 	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
6038 		err = check_reference_leak(env);
6039 		if (err) {
6040 			verbose(env, "tail_call would lead to reference leak\n");
6041 			return err;
6042 		}
6043 	} else if (is_release_function(func_id)) {
6044 		err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id);
6045 		if (err) {
6046 			verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n",
6047 				func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
6048 			return err;
6049 		}
6050 	}
6051 
6052 	regs = cur_regs(env);
6053 
6054 	/* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0,
6055 	 * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error.
6056 	 */
6057 	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage &&
6058 	    !register_is_null(&regs[BPF_REG_2])) {
6059 		verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n");
6060 		return -EINVAL;
6061 	}
6062 
6063 	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem) {
6064 		err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
6065 					set_map_elem_callback_state);
6066 		if (err < 0)
6067 			return -EINVAL;
6068 	}
6069 
6070 	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_snprintf) {
6071 		err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs);
6072 		if (err < 0)
6073 			return err;
6074 	}
6075 
6076 	/* reset caller saved regs */
6077 	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
6078 		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
6079 		check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
6080 	}
6081 
6082 	/* helper call returns 64-bit value. */
6083 	regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
6084 
6085 	/* update return register (already marked as written above) */
6086 	if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) {
6087 		/* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */
6088 		mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
6089 	} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) {
6090 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
6091 	} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL ||
6092 		   fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
6093 		/* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */
6094 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
6095 		/* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
6096 		 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
6097 		 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
6098 		 */
6099 		if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
6100 			verbose(env,
6101 				"kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
6102 			return -EINVAL;
6103 		}
6104 		regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
6105 		if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
6106 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
6107 			if (map_value_has_spin_lock(meta.map_ptr))
6108 				regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
6109 		} else {
6110 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL;
6111 		}
6112 	} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL) {
6113 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
6114 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL;
6115 	} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL) {
6116 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
6117 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL;
6118 	} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL) {
6119 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
6120 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL;
6121 	} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL) {
6122 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
6123 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL;
6124 		regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size;
6125 	} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID_OR_NULL ||
6126 		   fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID) {
6127 		const struct btf_type *t;
6128 
6129 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
6130 		t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta.ret_btf, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL);
6131 		if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) {
6132 			u32 tsize;
6133 			const struct btf_type *ret;
6134 			const char *tname;
6135 
6136 			/* resolve the type size of ksym. */
6137 			ret = btf_resolve_size(meta.ret_btf, t, &tsize);
6138 			if (IS_ERR(ret)) {
6139 				tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta.ret_btf, t->name_off);
6140 				verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n",
6141 					tname, PTR_ERR(ret));
6142 				return -EINVAL;
6143 			}
6144 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type =
6145 				fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID ?
6146 				PTR_TO_MEM : PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL;
6147 			regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize;
6148 		} else {
6149 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type =
6150 				fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID ?
6151 				PTR_TO_BTF_ID : PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL;
6152 			regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf;
6153 			regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id;
6154 		}
6155 	} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL ||
6156 		   fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
6157 		int ret_btf_id;
6158 
6159 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
6160 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID ?
6161 						     PTR_TO_BTF_ID :
6162 						     PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL;
6163 		ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id;
6164 		if (ret_btf_id == 0) {
6165 			verbose(env, "invalid return type %d of func %s#%d\n",
6166 				fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
6167 			return -EINVAL;
6168 		}
6169 		/* current BPF helper definitions are only coming from
6170 		 * built-in code with type IDs from  vmlinux BTF
6171 		 */
6172 		regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = btf_vmlinux;
6173 		regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id;
6174 	} else {
6175 		verbose(env, "unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n",
6176 			fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
6177 		return -EINVAL;
6178 	}
6179 
6180 	if (reg_type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type))
6181 		regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
6182 
6183 	if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) {
6184 		/* For release_reference() */
6185 		regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id;
6186 	} else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) {
6187 		int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
6188 
6189 		if (id < 0)
6190 			return id;
6191 		/* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */
6192 		regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id;
6193 		/* For release_reference() */
6194 		regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id;
6195 	}
6196 
6197 	do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta);
6198 
6199 	err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id);
6200 	if (err)
6201 		return err;
6202 
6203 	if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack ||
6204 	     func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) &&
6205 	    !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) {
6206 		const char *err_str;
6207 
6208 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
6209 		err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack);
6210 		err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n";
6211 #else
6212 		err = -ENOTSUPP;
6213 		err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n";
6214 #endif
6215 		if (err) {
6216 			verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
6217 			return err;
6218 		}
6219 
6220 		env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true;
6221 	}
6222 
6223 	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stackid || func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack)
6224 		env->prog->call_get_stack = true;
6225 
6226 	if (changes_data)
6227 		clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
6228 	return 0;
6229 }
6230 
6231 /* mark_btf_func_reg_size() is used when the reg size is determined by
6232  * the BTF func_proto's return value size and argument.
6233  */
6234 static void mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
6235 				   size_t reg_size)
6236 {
6237 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno];
6238 
6239 	if (regno == BPF_REG_0) {
6240 		/* Function return value */
6241 		reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
6242 		reg->subreg_def = reg_size == sizeof(u64) ?
6243 			DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1;
6244 	} else {
6245 		/* Function argument */
6246 		if (reg_size == sizeof(u64)) {
6247 			mark_insn_zext(env, reg);
6248 			mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
6249 		} else {
6250 			mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ32);
6251 		}
6252 	}
6253 }
6254 
6255 static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
6256 {
6257 	const struct btf_type *t, *func, *func_proto, *ptr_type;
6258 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
6259 	const char *func_name, *ptr_type_name;
6260 	u32 i, nargs, func_id, ptr_type_id;
6261 	const struct btf_param *args;
6262 	int err;
6263 
6264 	func_id = insn->imm;
6265 	func = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, func_id);
6266 	func_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, func->name_off);
6267 	func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, func->type);
6268 
6269 	if (!env->ops->check_kfunc_call ||
6270 	    !env->ops->check_kfunc_call(func_id)) {
6271 		verbose(env, "calling kernel function %s is not allowed\n",
6272 			func_name);
6273 		return -EACCES;
6274 	}
6275 
6276 	/* Check the arguments */
6277 	err = btf_check_kfunc_arg_match(env, btf_vmlinux, func_id, regs);
6278 	if (err)
6279 		return err;
6280 
6281 	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++)
6282 		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
6283 
6284 	/* Check return type */
6285 	t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf_vmlinux, func_proto->type, NULL);
6286 	if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) {
6287 		mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
6288 		mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, t->size);
6289 	} else if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) {
6290 		ptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf_vmlinux, t->type,
6291 						   &ptr_type_id);
6292 		if (!btf_type_is_struct(ptr_type)) {
6293 			ptr_type_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux,
6294 							   ptr_type->name_off);
6295 			verbose(env, "kernel function %s returns pointer type %s %s is not supported\n",
6296 				func_name, btf_type_str(ptr_type),
6297 				ptr_type_name);
6298 			return -EINVAL;
6299 		}
6300 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
6301 		regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = btf_vmlinux;
6302 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
6303 		regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ptr_type_id;
6304 		mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(void *));
6305 	} /* else { add_kfunc_call() ensures it is btf_type_is_void(t) } */
6306 
6307 	nargs = btf_type_vlen(func_proto);
6308 	args = (const struct btf_param *)(func_proto + 1);
6309 	for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) {
6310 		u32 regno = i + 1;
6311 
6312 		t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf_vmlinux, args[i].type, NULL);
6313 		if (btf_type_is_ptr(t))
6314 			mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, sizeof(void *));
6315 		else
6316 			/* scalar. ensured by btf_check_kfunc_arg_match() */
6317 			mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, t->size);
6318 	}
6319 
6320 	return 0;
6321 }
6322 
6323 static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
6324 {
6325 	/* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */
6326 	s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b);
6327 
6328 	if (b < 0)
6329 		return res > a;
6330 	return res < a;
6331 }
6332 
6333 static bool signed_add32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b)
6334 {
6335 	/* Do the add in u32, where overflow is well-defined */
6336 	s32 res = (s32)((u32)a + (u32)b);
6337 
6338 	if (b < 0)
6339 		return res > a;
6340 	return res < a;
6341 }
6342 
6343 static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
6344 {
6345 	/* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */
6346 	s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b);
6347 
6348 	if (b < 0)
6349 		return res < a;
6350 	return res > a;
6351 }
6352 
6353 static bool signed_sub32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b)
6354 {
6355 	/* Do the sub in u32, where overflow is well-defined */
6356 	s32 res = (s32)((u32)a - (u32)b);
6357 
6358 	if (b < 0)
6359 		return res < a;
6360 	return res > a;
6361 }
6362 
6363 static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6364 				  const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
6365 				  enum bpf_reg_type type)
6366 {
6367 	bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
6368 	s64 val = reg->var_off.value;
6369 	s64 smin = reg->smin_value;
6370 
6371 	if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) {
6372 		verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n",
6373 			reg_type_str[type], val);
6374 		return false;
6375 	}
6376 
6377 	if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
6378 		verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n",
6379 			reg_type_str[type], reg->off);
6380 		return false;
6381 	}
6382 
6383 	if (smin == S64_MIN) {
6384 		verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n",
6385 			reg_type_str[type]);
6386 		return false;
6387 	}
6388 
6389 	if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
6390 		verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n",
6391 			smin, reg_type_str[type]);
6392 		return false;
6393 	}
6394 
6395 	return true;
6396 }
6397 
6398 static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
6399 {
6400 	return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
6401 }
6402 
6403 enum {
6404 	REASON_BOUNDS	= -1,
6405 	REASON_TYPE	= -2,
6406 	REASON_PATHS	= -3,
6407 	REASON_LIMIT	= -4,
6408 	REASON_STACK	= -5,
6409 };
6410 
6411 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
6412 			      u32 *alu_limit, bool mask_to_left)
6413 {
6414 	u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
6415 
6416 	switch (ptr_reg->type) {
6417 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
6418 		/* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the
6419 		 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar
6420 		 * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is
6421 		 * currently prohibited for unprivileged.
6422 		 */
6423 		max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left;
6424 		ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off);
6425 		break;
6426 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
6427 		max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size;
6428 		ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ?
6429 			     ptr_reg->smin_value :
6430 			     ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off;
6431 		break;
6432 	default:
6433 		return REASON_TYPE;
6434 	}
6435 
6436 	if (ptr_limit >= max)
6437 		return REASON_LIMIT;
6438 	*alu_limit = ptr_limit;
6439 	return 0;
6440 }
6441 
6442 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6443 				    const struct bpf_insn *insn)
6444 {
6445 	return env->bypass_spec_v1 || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K;
6446 }
6447 
6448 static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
6449 				       u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit)
6450 {
6451 	/* If we arrived here from different branches with different
6452 	 * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work.
6453 	 */
6454 	if (aux->alu_state &&
6455 	    (aux->alu_state != alu_state ||
6456 	     aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
6457 		return REASON_PATHS;
6458 
6459 	/* Corresponding fixup done in do_misc_fixups(). */
6460 	aux->alu_state = alu_state;
6461 	aux->alu_limit = alu_limit;
6462 	return 0;
6463 }
6464 
6465 static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6466 			    struct bpf_insn *insn)
6467 {
6468 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
6469 
6470 	if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn))
6471 		return 0;
6472 
6473 	return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0);
6474 }
6475 
6476 static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode)
6477 {
6478 	return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB;
6479 }
6480 
6481 struct bpf_sanitize_info {
6482 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data aux;
6483 	bool mask_to_left;
6484 };
6485 
6486 static struct bpf_verifier_state *
6487 sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6488 			  const struct bpf_insn *insn,
6489 			  u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx)
6490 {
6491 	struct bpf_verifier_state *branch;
6492 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
6493 
6494 	branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true);
6495 	if (branch && insn) {
6496 		regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs;
6497 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
6498 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
6499 		} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
6500 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
6501 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg);
6502 		}
6503 	}
6504 	return branch;
6505 }
6506 
6507 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6508 			    struct bpf_insn *insn,
6509 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
6510 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
6511 			    struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
6512 			    struct bpf_sanitize_info *info,
6513 			    const bool commit_window)
6514 {
6515 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : &info->aux;
6516 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
6517 	bool off_is_imm = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
6518 	bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
6519 	bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
6520 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
6521 	u32 alu_state, alu_limit;
6522 	struct bpf_reg_state tmp;
6523 	bool ret;
6524 	int err;
6525 
6526 	if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn))
6527 		return 0;
6528 
6529 	/* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative
6530 	 * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care
6531 	 * to explore bad access from here.
6532 	 */
6533 	if (vstate->speculative)
6534 		goto do_sim;
6535 
6536 	if (!commit_window) {
6537 		if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
6538 		    (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
6539 			return REASON_BOUNDS;
6540 
6541 		info->mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD &&  off_is_neg) ||
6542 				     (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
6543 	}
6544 
6545 	err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left);
6546 	if (err < 0)
6547 		return err;
6548 
6549 	if (commit_window) {
6550 		/* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on
6551 		 * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation.
6552 		 */
6553 		alu_state = info->aux.alu_state;
6554 		alu_limit = abs(info->aux.alu_limit - alu_limit);
6555 	} else {
6556 		alu_state  = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
6557 		alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0;
6558 		alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
6559 			     BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
6560 	}
6561 
6562 	err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit);
6563 	if (err < 0)
6564 		return err;
6565 do_sim:
6566 	/* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already
6567 	 * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification
6568 	 * stack.
6569 	 *
6570 	 * Also, when register is a known constant, we rewrite register-based
6571 	 * operation to immediate-based, and thus do not need masking (and as
6572 	 * a consequence, do not need to simulate the zero-truncation either).
6573 	 */
6574 	if (commit_window || off_is_imm)
6575 		return 0;
6576 
6577 	/* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
6578 	 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of
6579 	 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off
6580 	 * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there
6581 	 * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example,
6582 	 * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction
6583 	 * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore
6584 	 * bad access.
6585 	 */
6586 	if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) {
6587 		tmp = *dst_reg;
6588 		*dst_reg = *ptr_reg;
6589 	}
6590 	ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1,
6591 					env->insn_idx);
6592 	if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret)
6593 		*dst_reg = tmp;
6594 	return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0;
6595 }
6596 
6597 static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
6598 {
6599 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
6600 
6601 	/* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the
6602 	 * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in
6603 	 * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still
6604 	 * rewrite/sanitize them.
6605 	 */
6606 	if (!vstate->speculative)
6607 		env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt;
6608 }
6609 
6610 static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6611 			const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason,
6612 			const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
6613 			const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
6614 {
6615 	static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root";
6616 	const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub";
6617 	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;
6618 
6619 	switch (reason) {
6620 	case REASON_BOUNDS:
6621 		verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n",
6622 			off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err);
6623 		break;
6624 	case REASON_TYPE:
6625 		verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n",
6626 			off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err);
6627 		break;
6628 	case REASON_PATHS:
6629 		verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n",
6630 			dst, op, err);
6631 		break;
6632 	case REASON_LIMIT:
6633 		verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n",
6634 			dst, op, err);
6635 		break;
6636 	case REASON_STACK:
6637 		verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n",
6638 			dst, err);
6639 		break;
6640 	default:
6641 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reason (%d)\n",
6642 			reason);
6643 		break;
6644 	}
6645 
6646 	return -EACCES;
6647 }
6648 
6649 /* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't
6650  * have a variable offset.
6651  *
6652  * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it
6653  * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU.  See also
6654  * retrieve_ptr_limit().
6655  *
6656  *
6657  * 'off' includes 'reg->off'.
6658  */
6659 static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(
6660 				struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6661 				int regno,
6662 				const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
6663 				int off)
6664 {
6665 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
6666 		char tn_buf[48];
6667 
6668 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
6669 		verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n",
6670 			regno, tn_buf, off);
6671 		return -EACCES;
6672 	}
6673 
6674 	if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
6675 		verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
6676 			"prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off);
6677 		return -EACCES;
6678 	}
6679 
6680 	return 0;
6681 }
6682 
6683 static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6684 				 const struct bpf_insn *insn,
6685 				 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
6686 {
6687 	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
6688 
6689 	/* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
6690 	 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
6691 	 */
6692 	if (env->bypass_spec_v1)
6693 		return 0;
6694 
6695 	switch (dst_reg->type) {
6696 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
6697 		if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg,
6698 					dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value))
6699 			return -EACCES;
6700 		break;
6701 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
6702 		if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
6703 			verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
6704 				"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
6705 			return -EACCES;
6706 		}
6707 		break;
6708 	default:
6709 		break;
6710 	}
6711 
6712 	return 0;
6713 }
6714 
6715 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
6716  * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately.
6717  * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a
6718  * scalar.  So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks.
6719  */
6720 static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6721 				   struct bpf_insn *insn,
6722 				   const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
6723 				   const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg)
6724 {
6725 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
6726 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
6727 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg;
6728 	bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
6729 	s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value,
6730 	    smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
6731 	u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
6732 	    umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
6733 	struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {};
6734 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
6735 	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
6736 	int ret;
6737 
6738 	dst_reg = &regs[dst];
6739 
6740 	if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) ||
6741 	    smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) {
6742 		/* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from
6743 		 * e.g. dead branches.
6744 		 */
6745 		__mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
6746 		return 0;
6747 	}
6748 
6749 	if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
6750 		/* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */
6751 		if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
6752 			__mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
6753 			return 0;
6754 		}
6755 
6756 		verbose(env,
6757 			"R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
6758 			dst);
6759 		return -EACCES;
6760 	}
6761 
6762 	switch (ptr_reg->type) {
6763 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
6764 		verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n",
6765 			dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]);
6766 		return -EACCES;
6767 	case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
6768 		/* smin_val represents the known value */
6769 		if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD)
6770 			break;
6771 		fallthrough;
6772 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
6773 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
6774 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL:
6775 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
6776 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL:
6777 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
6778 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL:
6779 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
6780 		verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n",
6781 			dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]);
6782 		return -EACCES;
6783 	default:
6784 		break;
6785 	}
6786 
6787 	/* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id.
6788 	 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset.
6789 	 */
6790 	dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type;
6791 	dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
6792 
6793 	if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) ||
6794 	    !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type))
6795 		return -EINVAL;
6796 
6797 	/* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */
6798 	__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
6799 
6800 	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
6801 		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
6802 				       &info, false);
6803 		if (ret < 0)
6804 			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
6805 	}
6806 
6807 	switch (opcode) {
6808 	case BPF_ADD:
6809 		/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
6810 		 * the s32 'off' field
6811 		 */
6812 		if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val ==
6813 			      (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) {
6814 			/* pointer += K.  Accumulate it into fixed offset */
6815 			dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
6816 			dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
6817 			dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
6818 			dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
6819 			dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
6820 			dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val;
6821 			dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
6822 			break;
6823 		}
6824 		/* A new variable offset is created.  Note that off_reg->off
6825 		 * == 0, since it's a scalar.
6826 		 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive
6827 		 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id'
6828 		 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET.
6829 		 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets
6830 		 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset
6831 		 * from ptr_reg.
6832 		 */
6833 		if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) ||
6834 		    signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) {
6835 			dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
6836 			dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
6837 		} else {
6838 			dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val;
6839 			dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val;
6840 		}
6841 		if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr ||
6842 		    umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) {
6843 			dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
6844 			dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
6845 		} else {
6846 			dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val;
6847 			dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val;
6848 		}
6849 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
6850 		dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
6851 		dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
6852 		if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
6853 			dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
6854 			/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
6855 			memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw));
6856 		}
6857 		break;
6858 	case BPF_SUB:
6859 		if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
6860 			/* scalar -= pointer.  Creates an unknown scalar */
6861 			verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
6862 				dst);
6863 			return -EACCES;
6864 		}
6865 		/* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to
6866 		 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not
6867 		 * be able to deal with it.
6868 		 */
6869 		if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
6870 			verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
6871 				dst);
6872 			return -EACCES;
6873 		}
6874 		if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val ==
6875 			      (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) {
6876 			/* pointer -= K.  Subtract it from fixed offset */
6877 			dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
6878 			dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
6879 			dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
6880 			dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
6881 			dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
6882 			dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
6883 			dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val;
6884 			dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
6885 			break;
6886 		}
6887 		/* A new variable offset is created.  If the subtrahend is known
6888 		 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good.
6889 		 */
6890 		if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) ||
6891 		    signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) {
6892 			/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
6893 			dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
6894 			dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
6895 		} else {
6896 			dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val;
6897 			dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val;
6898 		}
6899 		if (umin_ptr < umax_val) {
6900 			/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
6901 			dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
6902 			dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
6903 		} else {
6904 			/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
6905 			dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val;
6906 			dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val;
6907 		}
6908 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
6909 		dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
6910 		dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
6911 		if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
6912 			dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
6913 			/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
6914 			if (smin_val < 0)
6915 				memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw));
6916 		}
6917 		break;
6918 	case BPF_AND:
6919 	case BPF_OR:
6920 	case BPF_XOR:
6921 		/* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */
6922 		verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
6923 			dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
6924 		return -EACCES;
6925 	default:
6926 		/* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */
6927 		verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
6928 			dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
6929 		return -EACCES;
6930 	}
6931 
6932 	if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type))
6933 		return -EINVAL;
6934 
6935 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
6936 	__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
6937 	__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
6938 
6939 	if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0)
6940 		return -EACCES;
6941 	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
6942 		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
6943 				       &info, true);
6944 		if (ret < 0)
6945 			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
6946 	}
6947 
6948 	return 0;
6949 }
6950 
6951 static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
6952 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
6953 {
6954 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
6955 	s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value;
6956 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
6957 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
6958 
6959 	if (signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smin_val) ||
6960 	    signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smax_val)) {
6961 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
6962 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
6963 	} else {
6964 		dst_reg->s32_min_value += smin_val;
6965 		dst_reg->s32_max_value += smax_val;
6966 	}
6967 	if (dst_reg->u32_min_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
6968 	    dst_reg->u32_max_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
6969 		dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
6970 		dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
6971 	} else {
6972 		dst_reg->u32_min_value += umin_val;
6973 		dst_reg->u32_max_value += umax_val;
6974 	}
6975 }
6976 
6977 static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
6978 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
6979 {
6980 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
6981 	s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value;
6982 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
6983 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
6984 
6985 	if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
6986 	    signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
6987 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
6988 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
6989 	} else {
6990 		dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val;
6991 		dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val;
6992 	}
6993 	if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
6994 	    dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
6995 		dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
6996 		dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
6997 	} else {
6998 		dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val;
6999 		dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val;
7000 	}
7001 }
7002 
7003 static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7004 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7005 {
7006 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
7007 	s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value;
7008 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
7009 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
7010 
7011 	if (signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smax_val) ||
7012 	    signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smin_val)) {
7013 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
7014 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
7015 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
7016 	} else {
7017 		dst_reg->s32_min_value -= smax_val;
7018 		dst_reg->s32_max_value -= smin_val;
7019 	}
7020 	if (dst_reg->u32_min_value < umax_val) {
7021 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
7022 		dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
7023 		dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
7024 	} else {
7025 		/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
7026 		dst_reg->u32_min_value -= umax_val;
7027 		dst_reg->u32_max_value -= umin_val;
7028 	}
7029 }
7030 
7031 static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7032 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7033 {
7034 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
7035 	s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value;
7036 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
7037 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
7038 
7039 	if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
7040 	    signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
7041 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
7042 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
7043 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
7044 	} else {
7045 		dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val;
7046 		dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val;
7047 	}
7048 	if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) {
7049 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
7050 		dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
7051 		dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
7052 	} else {
7053 		/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
7054 		dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val;
7055 		dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val;
7056 	}
7057 }
7058 
7059 static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7060 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7061 {
7062 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
7063 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
7064 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
7065 
7066 	if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0) {
7067 		/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
7068 		__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
7069 		return;
7070 	}
7071 	/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
7072 	 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S32_MAX).
7073 	 */
7074 	if (umax_val > U16_MAX || dst_reg->u32_max_value > U16_MAX) {
7075 		/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
7076 		__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
7077 		return;
7078 	}
7079 	dst_reg->u32_min_value *= umin_val;
7080 	dst_reg->u32_max_value *= umax_val;
7081 	if (dst_reg->u32_max_value > S32_MAX) {
7082 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
7083 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
7084 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
7085 	} else {
7086 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
7087 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
7088 	}
7089 }
7090 
7091 static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7092 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7093 {
7094 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
7095 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
7096 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
7097 
7098 	if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
7099 		/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
7100 		__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
7101 		return;
7102 	}
7103 	/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
7104 	 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
7105 	 */
7106 	if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
7107 		/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
7108 		__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
7109 		return;
7110 	}
7111 	dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val;
7112 	dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val;
7113 	if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) {
7114 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
7115 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
7116 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
7117 	} else {
7118 		dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
7119 		dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
7120 	}
7121 }
7122 
7123 static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7124 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7125 {
7126 	bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
7127 	bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
7128 	struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
7129 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
7130 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
7131 
7132 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
7133 		__mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value);
7134 		return;
7135 	}
7136 
7137 	/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
7138 	 * bitwise.  Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
7139 	 */
7140 	dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value;
7141 	dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val);
7142 	if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
7143 		/* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
7144 		 * ain't nobody got time for that.
7145 		 */
7146 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
7147 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
7148 	} else {
7149 		/* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
7150 		 * cast result into s64.
7151 		 */
7152 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
7153 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
7154 	}
7155 }
7156 
7157 static void scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7158 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7159 {
7160 	bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
7161 	bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
7162 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
7163 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
7164 
7165 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
7166 		__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value);
7167 		return;
7168 	}
7169 
7170 	/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
7171 	 * bitwise.  Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
7172 	 */
7173 	dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
7174 	dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val);
7175 	if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
7176 		/* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
7177 		 * ain't nobody got time for that.
7178 		 */
7179 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
7180 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
7181 	} else {
7182 		/* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
7183 		 * cast result into s64.
7184 		 */
7185 		dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
7186 		dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
7187 	}
7188 	/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
7189 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
7190 }
7191 
7192 static void scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7193 				struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7194 {
7195 	bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
7196 	bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
7197 	struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
7198 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
7199 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
7200 
7201 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
7202 		__mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value);
7203 		return;
7204 	}
7205 
7206 	/* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
7207 	 * maximum of the operands' minima
7208 	 */
7209 	dst_reg->u32_min_value = max(dst_reg->u32_min_value, umin_val);
7210 	dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask;
7211 	if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
7212 		/* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
7213 		 * ain't nobody got time for that.
7214 		 */
7215 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
7216 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
7217 	} else {
7218 		/* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
7219 		 * cast result into s64.
7220 		 */
7221 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
7222 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
7223 	}
7224 }
7225 
7226 static void scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7227 			      struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7228 {
7229 	bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
7230 	bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
7231 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
7232 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
7233 
7234 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
7235 		__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value);
7236 		return;
7237 	}
7238 
7239 	/* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
7240 	 * maximum of the operands' minima
7241 	 */
7242 	dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val);
7243 	dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask;
7244 	if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
7245 		/* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
7246 		 * ain't nobody got time for that.
7247 		 */
7248 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
7249 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
7250 	} else {
7251 		/* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
7252 		 * cast result into s64.
7253 		 */
7254 		dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
7255 		dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
7256 	}
7257 	/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
7258 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
7259 }
7260 
7261 static void scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7262 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7263 {
7264 	bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
7265 	bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
7266 	struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
7267 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
7268 
7269 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
7270 		__mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value);
7271 		return;
7272 	}
7273 
7274 	/* We get both minimum and maximum from the var32_off. */
7275 	dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value;
7276 	dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask;
7277 
7278 	if (dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) {
7279 		/* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive,
7280 		 * so safe to cast u32 result into s32.
7281 		 */
7282 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
7283 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
7284 	} else {
7285 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
7286 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
7287 	}
7288 }
7289 
7290 static void scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7291 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7292 {
7293 	bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
7294 	bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
7295 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
7296 
7297 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
7298 		/* dst_reg->var_off.value has been updated earlier */
7299 		__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value);
7300 		return;
7301 	}
7302 
7303 	/* We get both minimum and maximum from the var_off. */
7304 	dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
7305 	dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask;
7306 
7307 	if (dst_reg->smin_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) {
7308 		/* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive,
7309 		 * so safe to cast u64 result into s64.
7310 		 */
7311 		dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
7312 		dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
7313 	} else {
7314 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
7315 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
7316 	}
7317 
7318 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
7319 }
7320 
7321 static void __scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7322 				   u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val)
7323 {
7324 	/* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
7325 	 * up from var_off)
7326 	 */
7327 	dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
7328 	dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
7329 	/* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
7330 	if (umax_val > 31 || dst_reg->u32_max_value > 1ULL << (31 - umax_val)) {
7331 		dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
7332 		dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
7333 	} else {
7334 		dst_reg->u32_min_value <<= umin_val;
7335 		dst_reg->u32_max_value <<= umax_val;
7336 	}
7337 }
7338 
7339 static void scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7340 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7341 {
7342 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
7343 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
7344 	/* u32 alu operation will zext upper bits */
7345 	struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
7346 
7347 	__scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val);
7348 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_lshift(subreg, umin_val));
7349 	/* Not required but being careful mark reg64 bounds as unknown so
7350 	 * that we are forced to pick them up from tnum and zext later and
7351 	 * if some path skips this step we are still safe.
7352 	 */
7353 	__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
7354 	__update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg);
7355 }
7356 
7357 static void __scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7358 				   u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val)
7359 {
7360 	/* Special case <<32 because it is a common compiler pattern to sign
7361 	 * extend subreg by doing <<32 s>>32. In this case if 32bit bounds are
7362 	 * positive we know this shift will also be positive so we can track
7363 	 * bounds correctly. Otherwise we lose all sign bit information except
7364 	 * what we can pick up from var_off. Perhaps we can generalize this
7365 	 * later to shifts of any length.
7366 	 */
7367 	if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_max_value >= 0)
7368 		dst_reg->smax_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_max_value << 32;
7369 	else
7370 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
7371 
7372 	if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0)
7373 		dst_reg->smin_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_min_value << 32;
7374 	else
7375 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
7376 
7377 	/* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
7378 	if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) {
7379 		dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
7380 		dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
7381 	} else {
7382 		dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val;
7383 		dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val;
7384 	}
7385 }
7386 
7387 static void scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7388 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7389 {
7390 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
7391 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
7392 
7393 	/* scalar64 calc uses 32bit unshifted bounds so must be called first */
7394 	__scalar64_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val);
7395 	__scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val);
7396 
7397 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
7398 	/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
7399 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
7400 }
7401 
7402 static void scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7403 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7404 {
7405 	struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
7406 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
7407 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
7408 
7409 	/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift.  If the value in dst_reg might
7410 	 * be negative, then either:
7411 	 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is
7412 	 *    unknown, so we lose our signed bounds
7413 	 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the
7414 	 *    signed bounds
7415 	 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing
7416 	 *    about the result
7417 	 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the
7418 	 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds.
7419 	 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds
7420 	 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and
7421 	 * var_off of the result.
7422 	 */
7423 	dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
7424 	dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
7425 
7426 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(subreg, umin_val);
7427 	dst_reg->u32_min_value >>= umax_val;
7428 	dst_reg->u32_max_value >>= umin_val;
7429 
7430 	__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
7431 	__update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg);
7432 }
7433 
7434 static void scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7435 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7436 {
7437 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
7438 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
7439 
7440 	/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift.  If the value in dst_reg might
7441 	 * be negative, then either:
7442 	 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is
7443 	 *    unknown, so we lose our signed bounds
7444 	 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the
7445 	 *    signed bounds
7446 	 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing
7447 	 *    about the result
7448 	 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the
7449 	 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds.
7450 	 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds
7451 	 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and
7452 	 * var_off of the result.
7453 	 */
7454 	dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
7455 	dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
7456 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
7457 	dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val;
7458 	dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val;
7459 
7460 	/* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends
7461 	 * on bits being shifted in. Take easy way out and mark unbounded
7462 	 * so we can recalculate later from tnum.
7463 	 */
7464 	__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
7465 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
7466 }
7467 
7468 static void scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7469 				  struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7470 {
7471 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
7472 
7473 	/* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and
7474 	 * umax_val is equal to umin_val.
7475 	 */
7476 	dst_reg->s32_min_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_min_value) >> umin_val);
7477 	dst_reg->s32_max_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_max_value) >> umin_val);
7478 
7479 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off), umin_val, 32);
7480 
7481 	/* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on
7482 	 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result.
7483 	 */
7484 	dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
7485 	dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
7486 
7487 	__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
7488 	__update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg);
7489 }
7490 
7491 static void scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7492 				struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
7493 {
7494 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
7495 
7496 	/* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and umax_val is equal
7497 	 * to umin_val.
7498 	 */
7499 	dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val;
7500 	dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val;
7501 
7502 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val, 64);
7503 
7504 	/* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on
7505 	 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result.
7506 	 */
7507 	dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
7508 	dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
7509 
7510 	/* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends
7511 	 * on bits being shifted in from upper 32-bits. Take easy way out
7512 	 * and mark unbounded so we can recalculate later from tnum.
7513 	 */
7514 	__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
7515 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
7516 }
7517 
7518 /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual
7519  * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts
7520  * need extra checks in the 32-bit case.
7521  */
7522 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7523 				      struct bpf_insn *insn,
7524 				      struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7525 				      struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
7526 {
7527 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
7528 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
7529 	bool src_known;
7530 	s64 smin_val, smax_val;
7531 	u64 umin_val, umax_val;
7532 	s32 s32_min_val, s32_max_val;
7533 	u32 u32_min_val, u32_max_val;
7534 	u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32;
7535 	bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64);
7536 	int ret;
7537 
7538 	smin_val = src_reg.smin_value;
7539 	smax_val = src_reg.smax_value;
7540 	umin_val = src_reg.umin_value;
7541 	umax_val = src_reg.umax_value;
7542 
7543 	s32_min_val = src_reg.s32_min_value;
7544 	s32_max_val = src_reg.s32_max_value;
7545 	u32_min_val = src_reg.u32_min_value;
7546 	u32_max_val = src_reg.u32_max_value;
7547 
7548 	if (alu32) {
7549 		src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
7550 		if ((src_known &&
7551 		     (s32_min_val != s32_max_val || u32_min_val != u32_max_val)) ||
7552 		    s32_min_val > s32_max_val || u32_min_val > u32_max_val) {
7553 			/* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds
7554 			 * derived from e.g. dead branches.
7555 			 */
7556 			__mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
7557 			return 0;
7558 		}
7559 	} else {
7560 		src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
7561 		if ((src_known &&
7562 		     (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) ||
7563 		    smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) {
7564 			/* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds
7565 			 * derived from e.g. dead branches.
7566 			 */
7567 			__mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
7568 			return 0;
7569 		}
7570 	}
7571 
7572 	if (!src_known &&
7573 	    opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) {
7574 		__mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
7575 		return 0;
7576 	}
7577 
7578 	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
7579 		ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
7580 		if (ret < 0)
7581 			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL);
7582 	}
7583 
7584 	/* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops.
7585 	 * There are two classes of instructions: The first class we track both
7586 	 * alu32 and alu64 sign/unsigned bounds independently this provides the
7587 	 * greatest amount of precision when alu operations are mixed with jmp32
7588 	 * operations. These operations are BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, BPF_MUL, BPF_ADD,
7589 	 * and BPF_OR. This is possible because these ops have fairly easy to
7590 	 * understand and calculate behavior in both 32-bit and 64-bit alu ops.
7591 	 * See alu32 verifier tests for examples. The second class of
7592 	 * operations, BPF_LSH, BPF_RSH, and BPF_ARSH, however are not so easy
7593 	 * with regards to tracking sign/unsigned bounds because the bits may
7594 	 * cross subreg boundaries in the alu64 case. When this happens we mark
7595 	 * the reg unbounded in the subreg bound space and use the resulting
7596 	 * tnum to calculate an approximation of the sign/unsigned bounds.
7597 	 */
7598 	switch (opcode) {
7599 	case BPF_ADD:
7600 		scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7601 		scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7602 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
7603 		break;
7604 	case BPF_SUB:
7605 		scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7606 		scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7607 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
7608 		break;
7609 	case BPF_MUL:
7610 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
7611 		scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7612 		scalar_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7613 		break;
7614 	case BPF_AND:
7615 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
7616 		scalar32_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7617 		scalar_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7618 		break;
7619 	case BPF_OR:
7620 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
7621 		scalar32_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7622 		scalar_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7623 		break;
7624 	case BPF_XOR:
7625 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_xor(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
7626 		scalar32_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7627 		scalar_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7628 		break;
7629 	case BPF_LSH:
7630 		if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
7631 			/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
7632 			 * This includes shifts by a negative number.
7633 			 */
7634 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
7635 			break;
7636 		}
7637 		if (alu32)
7638 			scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7639 		else
7640 			scalar_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7641 		break;
7642 	case BPF_RSH:
7643 		if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
7644 			/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
7645 			 * This includes shifts by a negative number.
7646 			 */
7647 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
7648 			break;
7649 		}
7650 		if (alu32)
7651 			scalar32_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7652 		else
7653 			scalar_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7654 		break;
7655 	case BPF_ARSH:
7656 		if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
7657 			/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
7658 			 * This includes shifts by a negative number.
7659 			 */
7660 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
7661 			break;
7662 		}
7663 		if (alu32)
7664 			scalar32_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7665 		else
7666 			scalar_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
7667 		break;
7668 	default:
7669 		mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
7670 		break;
7671 	}
7672 
7673 	/* ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register */
7674 	if (alu32)
7675 		zext_32_to_64(dst_reg);
7676 
7677 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
7678 	__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
7679 	__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
7680 	return 0;
7681 }
7682 
7683 /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max
7684  * and var_off.
7685  */
7686 static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7687 				   struct bpf_insn *insn)
7688 {
7689 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
7690 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
7691 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg;
7692 	struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0};
7693 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
7694 	int err;
7695 
7696 	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
7697 	src_reg = NULL;
7698 	if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
7699 		ptr_reg = dst_reg;
7700 	else
7701 		/* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be
7702 		 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by find_equal_scalars()
7703 		 */
7704 		dst_reg->id = 0;
7705 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
7706 		src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
7707 		if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
7708 			if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
7709 				/* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields
7710 				 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except
7711 				 * pointer subtraction
7712 				 */
7713 				if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
7714 					mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
7715 					return 0;
7716 				}
7717 				verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n",
7718 					insn->dst_reg,
7719 					bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
7720 				return -EACCES;
7721 			} else {
7722 				/* scalar += pointer
7723 				 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our
7724 				 * src/dest handling in computing the range
7725 				 */
7726 				err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg);
7727 				if (err)
7728 					return err;
7729 				return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
7730 							       src_reg, dst_reg);
7731 			}
7732 		} else if (ptr_reg) {
7733 			/* pointer += scalar */
7734 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg);
7735 			if (err)
7736 				return err;
7737 			return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
7738 						       dst_reg, src_reg);
7739 		}
7740 	} else {
7741 		/* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only
7742 		 * need to be able to read from this state.
7743 		 */
7744 		off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
7745 		__mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm);
7746 		src_reg = &off_reg;
7747 		if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */
7748 			return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
7749 						       ptr_reg, src_reg);
7750 	}
7751 
7752 	/* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */
7753 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) {
7754 		print_verifier_state(env, state);
7755 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n");
7756 		return -EINVAL;
7757 	}
7758 	if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) {
7759 		print_verifier_state(env, state);
7760 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n");
7761 		return -EINVAL;
7762 	}
7763 	return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
7764 }
7765 
7766 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */
7767 static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
7768 {
7769 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
7770 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
7771 	int err;
7772 
7773 	if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
7774 		if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
7775 			if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
7776 			    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
7777 			    insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
7778 				verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
7779 				return -EINVAL;
7780 			}
7781 		} else {
7782 			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
7783 			    (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
7784 			    BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
7785 				verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
7786 				return -EINVAL;
7787 			}
7788 		}
7789 
7790 		/* check src operand */
7791 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
7792 		if (err)
7793 			return err;
7794 
7795 		if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
7796 			verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
7797 				insn->dst_reg);
7798 			return -EACCES;
7799 		}
7800 
7801 		/* check dest operand */
7802 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
7803 		if (err)
7804 			return err;
7805 
7806 	} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
7807 
7808 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
7809 			if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
7810 				verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
7811 				return -EINVAL;
7812 			}
7813 
7814 			/* check src operand */
7815 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
7816 			if (err)
7817 				return err;
7818 		} else {
7819 			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
7820 				verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
7821 				return -EINVAL;
7822 			}
7823 		}
7824 
7825 		/* check dest operand, mark as required later */
7826 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
7827 		if (err)
7828 			return err;
7829 
7830 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
7831 			struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg;
7832 			struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg;
7833 
7834 			if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
7835 				/* case: R1 = R2
7836 				 * copy register state to dest reg
7837 				 */
7838 				if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id)
7839 					/* Assign src and dst registers the same ID
7840 					 * that will be used by find_equal_scalars()
7841 					 * to propagate min/max range.
7842 					 */
7843 					src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
7844 				*dst_reg = *src_reg;
7845 				dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
7846 				dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
7847 			} else {
7848 				/* R1 = (u32) R2 */
7849 				if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
7850 					verbose(env,
7851 						"R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
7852 						insn->src_reg);
7853 					return -EACCES;
7854 				} else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
7855 					*dst_reg = *src_reg;
7856 					/* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise
7857 					 * dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly
7858 					 * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars()
7859 					 */
7860 					dst_reg->id = 0;
7861 					dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
7862 					dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1;
7863 				} else {
7864 					mark_reg_unknown(env, regs,
7865 							 insn->dst_reg);
7866 				}
7867 				zext_32_to_64(dst_reg);
7868 			}
7869 		} else {
7870 			/* case: R = imm
7871 			 * remember the value we stored into this reg
7872 			 */
7873 			/* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */
7874 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
7875 			regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
7876 			if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
7877 				__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
7878 						 insn->imm);
7879 			} else {
7880 				__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
7881 						 (u32)insn->imm);
7882 			}
7883 		}
7884 
7885 	} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
7886 		verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
7887 		return -EINVAL;
7888 
7889 	} else {	/* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
7890 
7891 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
7892 			if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
7893 				verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
7894 				return -EINVAL;
7895 			}
7896 			/* check src1 operand */
7897 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
7898 			if (err)
7899 				return err;
7900 		} else {
7901 			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
7902 				verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
7903 				return -EINVAL;
7904 			}
7905 		}
7906 
7907 		/* check src2 operand */
7908 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
7909 		if (err)
7910 			return err;
7911 
7912 		if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
7913 		    BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
7914 			verbose(env, "div by zero\n");
7915 			return -EINVAL;
7916 		}
7917 
7918 		if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
7919 		     opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
7920 			int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
7921 
7922 			if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
7923 				verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
7924 				return -EINVAL;
7925 			}
7926 		}
7927 
7928 		/* check dest operand */
7929 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
7930 		if (err)
7931 			return err;
7932 
7933 		return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
7934 	}
7935 
7936 	return 0;
7937 }
7938 
7939 static void __find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_func_state *state,
7940 				     struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7941 				     enum bpf_reg_type type, int new_range)
7942 {
7943 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
7944 	int i;
7945 
7946 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
7947 		reg = &state->regs[i];
7948 		if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
7949 			/* keep the maximum range already checked */
7950 			reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range);
7951 	}
7952 
7953 	bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) {
7954 		if (!reg)
7955 			continue;
7956 		if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
7957 			reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range);
7958 	}
7959 }
7960 
7961 static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
7962 				   struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7963 				   enum bpf_reg_type type,
7964 				   bool range_right_open)
7965 {
7966 	int new_range, i;
7967 
7968 	if (dst_reg->off < 0 ||
7969 	    (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open))
7970 		/* This doesn't give us any range */
7971 		return;
7972 
7973 	if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF ||
7974 	    dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF)
7975 		/* Risk of overflow.  For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less
7976 		 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt.
7977 		 */
7978 		return;
7979 
7980 	new_range = dst_reg->off;
7981 	if (range_right_open)
7982 		new_range--;
7983 
7984 	/* Examples for register markings:
7985 	 *
7986 	 * pkt_data in dst register:
7987 	 *
7988 	 *   r2 = r3;
7989 	 *   r2 += 8;
7990 	 *   if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception>
7991 	 *   <access okay>
7992 	 *
7993 	 *   r2 = r3;
7994 	 *   r2 += 8;
7995 	 *   if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay>
7996 	 *   <handle exception>
7997 	 *
7998 	 *   Where:
7999 	 *     r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg
8000 	 *     r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
8001 	 *     r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
8002 	 *
8003 	 * pkt_data in src register:
8004 	 *
8005 	 *   r2 = r3;
8006 	 *   r2 += 8;
8007 	 *   if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay>
8008 	 *   <handle exception>
8009 	 *
8010 	 *   r2 = r3;
8011 	 *   r2 += 8;
8012 	 *   if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception>
8013 	 *   <access okay>
8014 	 *
8015 	 *   Where:
8016 	 *     pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg
8017 	 *     r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
8018 	 *     r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
8019 	 *
8020 	 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8)
8021 	 * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8)
8022 	 * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on
8023 	 * the check.
8024 	 */
8025 
8026 	/* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value.  And we
8027 	 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big
8028 	 * the range won't allow anything.
8029 	 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16.
8030 	 */
8031 	for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++)
8032 		__find_good_pkt_pointers(vstate->frame[i], dst_reg, type,
8033 					 new_range);
8034 }
8035 
8036 static int is_branch32_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 val, u8 opcode)
8037 {
8038 	struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off);
8039 	s32 sval = (s32)val;
8040 
8041 	switch (opcode) {
8042 	case BPF_JEQ:
8043 		if (tnum_is_const(subreg))
8044 			return !!tnum_equals_const(subreg, val);
8045 		break;
8046 	case BPF_JNE:
8047 		if (tnum_is_const(subreg))
8048 			return !tnum_equals_const(subreg, val);
8049 		break;
8050 	case BPF_JSET:
8051 		if ((~subreg.mask & subreg.value) & val)
8052 			return 1;
8053 		if (!((subreg.mask | subreg.value) & val))
8054 			return 0;
8055 		break;
8056 	case BPF_JGT:
8057 		if (reg->u32_min_value > val)
8058 			return 1;
8059 		else if (reg->u32_max_value <= val)
8060 			return 0;
8061 		break;
8062 	case BPF_JSGT:
8063 		if (reg->s32_min_value > sval)
8064 			return 1;
8065 		else if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval)
8066 			return 0;
8067 		break;
8068 	case BPF_JLT:
8069 		if (reg->u32_max_value < val)
8070 			return 1;
8071 		else if (reg->u32_min_value >= val)
8072 			return 0;
8073 		break;
8074 	case BPF_JSLT:
8075 		if (reg->s32_max_value < sval)
8076 			return 1;
8077 		else if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval)
8078 			return 0;
8079 		break;
8080 	case BPF_JGE:
8081 		if (reg->u32_min_value >= val)
8082 			return 1;
8083 		else if (reg->u32_max_value < val)
8084 			return 0;
8085 		break;
8086 	case BPF_JSGE:
8087 		if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval)
8088 			return 1;
8089 		else if (reg->s32_max_value < sval)
8090 			return 0;
8091 		break;
8092 	case BPF_JLE:
8093 		if (reg->u32_max_value <= val)
8094 			return 1;
8095 		else if (reg->u32_min_value > val)
8096 			return 0;
8097 		break;
8098 	case BPF_JSLE:
8099 		if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval)
8100 			return 1;
8101 		else if (reg->s32_min_value > sval)
8102 			return 0;
8103 		break;
8104 	}
8105 
8106 	return -1;
8107 }
8108 
8109 
8110 static int is_branch64_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode)
8111 {
8112 	s64 sval = (s64)val;
8113 
8114 	switch (opcode) {
8115 	case BPF_JEQ:
8116 		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
8117 			return !!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val);
8118 		break;
8119 	case BPF_JNE:
8120 		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
8121 			return !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val);
8122 		break;
8123 	case BPF_JSET:
8124 		if ((~reg->var_off.mask & reg->var_off.value) & val)
8125 			return 1;
8126 		if (!((reg->var_off.mask | reg->var_off.value) & val))
8127 			return 0;
8128 		break;
8129 	case BPF_JGT:
8130 		if (reg->umin_value > val)
8131 			return 1;
8132 		else if (reg->umax_value <= val)
8133 			return 0;
8134 		break;
8135 	case BPF_JSGT:
8136 		if (reg->smin_value > sval)
8137 			return 1;
8138 		else if (reg->smax_value <= sval)
8139 			return 0;
8140 		break;
8141 	case BPF_JLT:
8142 		if (reg->umax_value < val)
8143 			return 1;
8144 		else if (reg->umin_value >= val)
8145 			return 0;
8146 		break;
8147 	case BPF_JSLT:
8148 		if (reg->smax_value < sval)
8149 			return 1;
8150 		else if (reg->smin_value >= sval)
8151 			return 0;
8152 		break;
8153 	case BPF_JGE:
8154 		if (reg->umin_value >= val)
8155 			return 1;
8156 		else if (reg->umax_value < val)
8157 			return 0;
8158 		break;
8159 	case BPF_JSGE:
8160 		if (reg->smin_value >= sval)
8161 			return 1;
8162 		else if (reg->smax_value < sval)
8163 			return 0;
8164 		break;
8165 	case BPF_JLE:
8166 		if (reg->umax_value <= val)
8167 			return 1;
8168 		else if (reg->umin_value > val)
8169 			return 0;
8170 		break;
8171 	case BPF_JSLE:
8172 		if (reg->smax_value <= sval)
8173 			return 1;
8174 		else if (reg->smin_value > sval)
8175 			return 0;
8176 		break;
8177 	}
8178 
8179 	return -1;
8180 }
8181 
8182 /* compute branch direction of the expression "if (reg opcode val) goto target;"
8183  * and return:
8184  *  1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed
8185  *  0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn
8186  * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg < 5)" is unknown when register value
8187  *      range [0,10]
8188  */
8189 static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode,
8190 			   bool is_jmp32)
8191 {
8192 	if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg)) {
8193 		if (!reg_type_not_null(reg->type))
8194 			return -1;
8195 
8196 		/* If pointer is valid tests against zero will fail so we can
8197 		 * use this to direct branch taken.
8198 		 */
8199 		if (val != 0)
8200 			return -1;
8201 
8202 		switch (opcode) {
8203 		case BPF_JEQ:
8204 			return 0;
8205 		case BPF_JNE:
8206 			return 1;
8207 		default:
8208 			return -1;
8209 		}
8210 	}
8211 
8212 	if (is_jmp32)
8213 		return is_branch32_taken(reg, val, opcode);
8214 	return is_branch64_taken(reg, val, opcode);
8215 }
8216 
8217 static int flip_opcode(u32 opcode)
8218 {
8219 	/* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */
8220 	static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = {
8221 		/* these stay the same */
8222 		[BPF_JEQ  >> 4] = BPF_JEQ,
8223 		[BPF_JNE  >> 4] = BPF_JNE,
8224 		[BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET,
8225 		/* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */
8226 		[BPF_JGE  >> 4] = BPF_JLE,
8227 		[BPF_JGT  >> 4] = BPF_JLT,
8228 		[BPF_JLE  >> 4] = BPF_JGE,
8229 		[BPF_JLT  >> 4] = BPF_JGT,
8230 		[BPF_JSGE >> 4] = BPF_JSLE,
8231 		[BPF_JSGT >> 4] = BPF_JSLT,
8232 		[BPF_JSLE >> 4] = BPF_JSGE,
8233 		[BPF_JSLT >> 4] = BPF_JSGT
8234 	};
8235 	return opcode_flip[opcode >> 4];
8236 }
8237 
8238 static int is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8239 				   struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
8240 				   u8 opcode)
8241 {
8242 	struct bpf_reg_state *pkt;
8243 
8244 	if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
8245 		pkt = dst_reg;
8246 	} else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
8247 		pkt = src_reg;
8248 		opcode = flip_opcode(opcode);
8249 	} else {
8250 		return -1;
8251 	}
8252 
8253 	if (pkt->range >= 0)
8254 		return -1;
8255 
8256 	switch (opcode) {
8257 	case BPF_JLE:
8258 		/* pkt <= pkt_end */
8259 		fallthrough;
8260 	case BPF_JGT:
8261 		/* pkt > pkt_end */
8262 		if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END)
8263 			/* pkt has at last one extra byte beyond pkt_end */
8264 			return opcode == BPF_JGT;
8265 		break;
8266 	case BPF_JLT:
8267 		/* pkt < pkt_end */
8268 		fallthrough;
8269 	case BPF_JGE:
8270 		/* pkt >= pkt_end */
8271 		if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END || pkt->range == AT_PKT_END)
8272 			return opcode == BPF_JGE;
8273 		break;
8274 	}
8275 	return -1;
8276 }
8277 
8278 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the
8279  * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're
8280  * simply doing a BPF_K check.
8281  * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values.
8282  */
8283 static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
8284 			    struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg,
8285 			    u64 val, u32 val32,
8286 			    u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32)
8287 {
8288 	struct tnum false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off);
8289 	struct tnum false_64off = false_reg->var_off;
8290 	struct tnum true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off);
8291 	struct tnum true_64off = true_reg->var_off;
8292 	s64 sval = (s64)val;
8293 	s32 sval32 = (s32)val32;
8294 
8295 	/* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its
8296 	 * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into
8297 	 * the same object, but we don't bother with that.
8298 	 * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we
8299 	 * only need to check one of them for pointerness.
8300 	 */
8301 	if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg))
8302 		return;
8303 
8304 	switch (opcode) {
8305 	case BPF_JEQ:
8306 	case BPF_JNE:
8307 	{
8308 		struct bpf_reg_state *reg =
8309 			opcode == BPF_JEQ ? true_reg : false_reg;
8310 
8311 		/* JEQ/JNE comparison doesn't change the register equivalence.
8312 		 * r1 = r2;
8313 		 * if (r1 == 42) goto label;
8314 		 * ...
8315 		 * label: // here both r1 and r2 are known to be 42.
8316 		 *
8317 		 * Hence when marking register as known preserve it's ID.
8318 		 */
8319 		if (is_jmp32)
8320 			__mark_reg32_known(reg, val32);
8321 		else
8322 			___mark_reg_known(reg, val);
8323 		break;
8324 	}
8325 	case BPF_JSET:
8326 		if (is_jmp32) {
8327 			false_32off = tnum_and(false_32off, tnum_const(~val32));
8328 			if (is_power_of_2(val32))
8329 				true_32off = tnum_or(true_32off,
8330 						     tnum_const(val32));
8331 		} else {
8332 			false_64off = tnum_and(false_64off, tnum_const(~val));
8333 			if (is_power_of_2(val))
8334 				true_64off = tnum_or(true_64off,
8335 						     tnum_const(val));
8336 		}
8337 		break;
8338 	case BPF_JGE:
8339 	case BPF_JGT:
8340 	{
8341 		if (is_jmp32) {
8342 			u32 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32  : val32 - 1;
8343 			u32 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 + 1 : val32;
8344 
8345 			false_reg->u32_max_value = min(false_reg->u32_max_value,
8346 						       false_umax);
8347 			true_reg->u32_min_value = max(true_reg->u32_min_value,
8348 						      true_umin);
8349 		} else {
8350 			u64 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val    : val - 1;
8351 			u64 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val + 1 : val;
8352 
8353 			false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, false_umax);
8354 			true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, true_umin);
8355 		}
8356 		break;
8357 	}
8358 	case BPF_JSGE:
8359 	case BPF_JSGT:
8360 	{
8361 		if (is_jmp32) {
8362 			s32 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32    : sval32 - 1;
8363 			s32 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 + 1 : sval32;
8364 
8365 			false_reg->s32_max_value = min(false_reg->s32_max_value, false_smax);
8366 			true_reg->s32_min_value = max(true_reg->s32_min_value, true_smin);
8367 		} else {
8368 			s64 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval    : sval - 1;
8369 			s64 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval + 1 : sval;
8370 
8371 			false_reg->smax_value = min(false_reg->smax_value, false_smax);
8372 			true_reg->smin_value = max(true_reg->smin_value, true_smin);
8373 		}
8374 		break;
8375 	}
8376 	case BPF_JLE:
8377 	case BPF_JLT:
8378 	{
8379 		if (is_jmp32) {
8380 			u32 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32  : val32 + 1;
8381 			u32 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 - 1 : val32;
8382 
8383 			false_reg->u32_min_value = max(false_reg->u32_min_value,
8384 						       false_umin);
8385 			true_reg->u32_max_value = min(true_reg->u32_max_value,
8386 						      true_umax);
8387 		} else {
8388 			u64 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val    : val + 1;
8389 			u64 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val - 1 : val;
8390 
8391 			false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, false_umin);
8392 			true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, true_umax);
8393 		}
8394 		break;
8395 	}
8396 	case BPF_JSLE:
8397 	case BPF_JSLT:
8398 	{
8399 		if (is_jmp32) {
8400 			s32 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32    : sval32 + 1;
8401 			s32 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 - 1 : sval32;
8402 
8403 			false_reg->s32_min_value = max(false_reg->s32_min_value, false_smin);
8404 			true_reg->s32_max_value = min(true_reg->s32_max_value, true_smax);
8405 		} else {
8406 			s64 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval    : sval + 1;
8407 			s64 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval - 1 : sval;
8408 
8409 			false_reg->smin_value = max(false_reg->smin_value, false_smin);
8410 			true_reg->smax_value = min(true_reg->smax_value, true_smax);
8411 		}
8412 		break;
8413 	}
8414 	default:
8415 		return;
8416 	}
8417 
8418 	if (is_jmp32) {
8419 		false_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(false_64off),
8420 					     tnum_subreg(false_32off));
8421 		true_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(true_64off),
8422 					    tnum_subreg(true_32off));
8423 		__reg_combine_32_into_64(false_reg);
8424 		__reg_combine_32_into_64(true_reg);
8425 	} else {
8426 		false_reg->var_off = false_64off;
8427 		true_reg->var_off = true_64off;
8428 		__reg_combine_64_into_32(false_reg);
8429 		__reg_combine_64_into_32(true_reg);
8430 	}
8431 }
8432 
8433 /* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is
8434  * the variable reg.
8435  */
8436 static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
8437 				struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg,
8438 				u64 val, u32 val32,
8439 				u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32)
8440 {
8441 	opcode = flip_opcode(opcode);
8442 	/* This uses zero as "not present in table"; luckily the zero opcode,
8443 	 * BPF_JA, can't get here.
8444 	 */
8445 	if (opcode)
8446 		reg_set_min_max(true_reg, false_reg, val, val32, opcode, is_jmp32);
8447 }
8448 
8449 /* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */
8450 static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
8451 				  struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
8452 {
8453 	src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value,
8454 							dst_reg->umin_value);
8455 	src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value,
8456 							dst_reg->umax_value);
8457 	src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value,
8458 							dst_reg->smin_value);
8459 	src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value,
8460 							dst_reg->smax_value);
8461 	src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off,
8462 							     dst_reg->var_off);
8463 	/* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */
8464 	__update_reg_bounds(src_reg);
8465 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
8466 	/* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */
8467 	__reg_deduce_bounds(src_reg);
8468 	__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
8469 	/* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
8470 	__reg_bound_offset(src_reg);
8471 	__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
8472 	/* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
8473 	 * slightly.  e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
8474 	 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
8475 	 */
8476 	__update_reg_bounds(src_reg);
8477 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
8478 }
8479 
8480 static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src,
8481 				struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst,
8482 				struct bpf_reg_state *false_src,
8483 				struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst,
8484 				u8 opcode)
8485 {
8486 	switch (opcode) {
8487 	case BPF_JEQ:
8488 		__reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst);
8489 		break;
8490 	case BPF_JNE:
8491 		__reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst);
8492 		break;
8493 	}
8494 }
8495 
8496 static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state,
8497 				 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id,
8498 				 bool is_null)
8499 {
8500 	if (reg_type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id &&
8501 	    !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id)) {
8502 		/* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should
8503 		 * have been known-zero, because we don't allow pointer
8504 		 * arithmetic on pointers that might be NULL.
8505 		 */
8506 		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value ||
8507 				 !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0) ||
8508 				 reg->off)) {
8509 			__mark_reg_known_zero(reg);
8510 			reg->off = 0;
8511 		}
8512 		if (is_null) {
8513 			reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
8514 			/* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point
8515 			 * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it,
8516 			 * so that state pruning has chances to take effect.
8517 			 */
8518 			reg->id = 0;
8519 			reg->ref_obj_id = 0;
8520 
8521 			return;
8522 		}
8523 
8524 		mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg);
8525 
8526 		if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) {
8527 			/* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset
8528 			 * in release_reg_references().
8529 			 *
8530 			 * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other
8531 			 * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset.
8532 			 */
8533 			reg->id = 0;
8534 		}
8535 	}
8536 }
8537 
8538 static void __mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_func_state *state, u32 id,
8539 				    bool is_null)
8540 {
8541 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
8542 	int i;
8543 
8544 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
8545 		mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, &state->regs[i], id, is_null);
8546 
8547 	bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) {
8548 		if (!reg)
8549 			continue;
8550 		mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, reg, id, is_null);
8551 	}
8552 }
8553 
8554 /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually
8555  * be folded together at some point.
8556  */
8557 static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno,
8558 				  bool is_null)
8559 {
8560 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
8561 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
8562 	u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id;
8563 	u32 id = regs[regno].id;
8564 	int i;
8565 
8566 	if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null)
8567 		/* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch.
8568 		 * No one could have freed the reference state before
8569 		 * doing the NULL check.
8570 		 */
8571 		WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_state(state, id));
8572 
8573 	for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++)
8574 		__mark_ptr_or_null_regs(vstate->frame[i], id, is_null);
8575 }
8576 
8577 static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn,
8578 				   struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8579 				   struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
8580 				   struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch,
8581 				   struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch)
8582 {
8583 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X)
8584 		return false;
8585 
8586 	/* Pointers are always 64-bit. */
8587 	if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32)
8588 		return false;
8589 
8590 	switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) {
8591 	case BPF_JGT:
8592 		if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
8593 		     src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
8594 		    (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
8595 		     reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
8596 			/* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */
8597 			find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg,
8598 					       dst_reg->type, false);
8599 			mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, true);
8600 		} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
8601 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
8602 			   (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
8603 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
8604 			/* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */
8605 			find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg,
8606 					       src_reg->type, true);
8607 			mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, false);
8608 		} else {
8609 			return false;
8610 		}
8611 		break;
8612 	case BPF_JLT:
8613 		if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
8614 		     src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
8615 		    (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
8616 		     reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
8617 			/* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */
8618 			find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg,
8619 					       dst_reg->type, true);
8620 			mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, false);
8621 		} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
8622 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
8623 			   (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
8624 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
8625 			/* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */
8626 			find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg,
8627 					       src_reg->type, false);
8628 			mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, true);
8629 		} else {
8630 			return false;
8631 		}
8632 		break;
8633 	case BPF_JGE:
8634 		if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
8635 		     src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
8636 		    (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
8637 		     reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
8638 			/* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */
8639 			find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg,
8640 					       dst_reg->type, true);
8641 			mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, false);
8642 		} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
8643 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
8644 			   (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
8645 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
8646 			/* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */
8647 			find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg,
8648 					       src_reg->type, false);
8649 			mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, true);
8650 		} else {
8651 			return false;
8652 		}
8653 		break;
8654 	case BPF_JLE:
8655 		if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
8656 		     src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
8657 		    (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
8658 		     reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
8659 			/* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */
8660 			find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg,
8661 					       dst_reg->type, false);
8662 			mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, true);
8663 		} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
8664 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
8665 			   (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
8666 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
8667 			/* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */
8668 			find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg,
8669 					       src_reg->type, true);
8670 			mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, false);
8671 		} else {
8672 			return false;
8673 		}
8674 		break;
8675 	default:
8676 		return false;
8677 	}
8678 
8679 	return true;
8680 }
8681 
8682 static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
8683 			       struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg)
8684 {
8685 	struct bpf_func_state *state;
8686 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
8687 	int i, j;
8688 
8689 	for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) {
8690 		state = vstate->frame[i];
8691 		for (j = 0; j < MAX_BPF_REG; j++) {
8692 			reg = &state->regs[j];
8693 			if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id)
8694 				*reg = *known_reg;
8695 		}
8696 
8697 		bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(j, state, reg) {
8698 			if (!reg)
8699 				continue;
8700 			if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id)
8701 				*reg = *known_reg;
8702 		}
8703 	}
8704 }
8705 
8706 static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8707 			     struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx)
8708 {
8709 	struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state;
8710 	struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch;
8711 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs;
8712 	struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL;
8713 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
8714 	bool is_jmp32;
8715 	int pred = -1;
8716 	int err;
8717 
8718 	/* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */
8719 	if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JSLE) {
8720 		verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode);
8721 		return -EINVAL;
8722 	}
8723 
8724 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
8725 		if (insn->imm != 0) {
8726 			verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
8727 			return -EINVAL;
8728 		}
8729 
8730 		/* check src1 operand */
8731 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
8732 		if (err)
8733 			return err;
8734 
8735 		if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
8736 			verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
8737 				insn->src_reg);
8738 			return -EACCES;
8739 		}
8740 		src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
8741 	} else {
8742 		if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
8743 			verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
8744 			return -EINVAL;
8745 		}
8746 	}
8747 
8748 	/* check src2 operand */
8749 	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
8750 	if (err)
8751 		return err;
8752 
8753 	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
8754 	is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32;
8755 
8756 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
8757 		pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode, is_jmp32);
8758 	} else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
8759 		   is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off))) {
8760 		pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg,
8761 				       tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value,
8762 				       opcode,
8763 				       is_jmp32);
8764 	} else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
8765 		   !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)) {
8766 		pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg,
8767 				       src_reg->var_off.value,
8768 				       opcode,
8769 				       is_jmp32);
8770 	} else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) &&
8771 		   reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg) &&
8772 		   !is_jmp32) {
8773 		pred = is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg, opcode);
8774 	}
8775 
8776 	if (pred >= 0) {
8777 		/* If we get here with a dst_reg pointer type it is because
8778 		 * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison.
8779 		 */
8780 		if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg))
8781 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg);
8782 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err &&
8783 		    !__is_pointer_value(false, src_reg))
8784 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg);
8785 		if (err)
8786 			return err;
8787 	}
8788 
8789 	if (pred == 1) {
8790 		/* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push
8791 		 * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative
8792 		 * execution.
8793 		 */
8794 		if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 &&
8795 		    !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1,
8796 					       *insn_idx))
8797 			return -EFAULT;
8798 		*insn_idx += insn->off;
8799 		return 0;
8800 	} else if (pred == 0) {
8801 		/* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the
8802 		 * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for
8803 		 * simulation under speculative execution.
8804 		 */
8805 		if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 &&
8806 		    !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn,
8807 					       *insn_idx + insn->off + 1,
8808 					       *insn_idx))
8809 			return -EFAULT;
8810 		return 0;
8811 	}
8812 
8813 	other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx,
8814 				  false);
8815 	if (!other_branch)
8816 		return -EFAULT;
8817 	other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs;
8818 
8819 	/* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust
8820 	 * our min/max values for our dst register.
8821 	 * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same
8822 	 * object, I suppose, but we don't support that right now), because
8823 	 * otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't
8824 	 * comparable.
8825 	 */
8826 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
8827 		struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
8828 
8829 		if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
8830 		    src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
8831 			if (tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off) ||
8832 			    (is_jmp32 &&
8833 			     tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off))))
8834 				reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
8835 						dst_reg,
8836 						src_reg->var_off.value,
8837 						tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value,
8838 						opcode, is_jmp32);
8839 			else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off) ||
8840 				 (is_jmp32 &&
8841 				  tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off))))
8842 				reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg],
8843 						    src_reg,
8844 						    dst_reg->var_off.value,
8845 						    tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value,
8846 						    opcode, is_jmp32);
8847 			else if (!is_jmp32 &&
8848 				 (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE))
8849 				/* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */
8850 				reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg],
8851 						    &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
8852 						    src_reg, dst_reg, opcode);
8853 			if (src_reg->id &&
8854 			    !WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) {
8855 				find_equal_scalars(this_branch, src_reg);
8856 				find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]);
8857 			}
8858 
8859 		}
8860 	} else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
8861 		reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
8862 					dst_reg, insn->imm, (u32)insn->imm,
8863 					opcode, is_jmp32);
8864 	}
8865 
8866 	if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id &&
8867 	    !WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) {
8868 		find_equal_scalars(this_branch, dst_reg);
8869 		find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]);
8870 	}
8871 
8872 	/* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem().
8873 	 * NOTE: these optimizations below are related with pointer comparison
8874 	 *       which will never be JMP32.
8875 	 */
8876 	if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
8877 	    insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
8878 	    reg_type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) {
8879 		/* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either
8880 		 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional.
8881 		 */
8882 		mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg,
8883 				      opcode == BPF_JNE);
8884 		mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg,
8885 				      opcode == BPF_JEQ);
8886 	} else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, &regs[insn->src_reg],
8887 					   this_branch, other_branch) &&
8888 		   is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
8889 		verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
8890 			insn->dst_reg);
8891 		return -EACCES;
8892 	}
8893 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
8894 		print_verifier_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]);
8895 	return 0;
8896 }
8897 
8898 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
8899 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
8900 {
8901 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
8902 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
8903 	struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg;
8904 	struct bpf_map *map;
8905 	int err;
8906 
8907 	if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
8908 		verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n");
8909 		return -EINVAL;
8910 	}
8911 	if (insn->off != 0) {
8912 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n");
8913 		return -EINVAL;
8914 	}
8915 
8916 	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
8917 	if (err)
8918 		return err;
8919 
8920 	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
8921 	if (insn->src_reg == 0) {
8922 		u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
8923 
8924 		dst_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
8925 		__mark_reg_known(&regs[insn->dst_reg], imm);
8926 		return 0;
8927 	}
8928 
8929 	if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) {
8930 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
8931 
8932 		dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type;
8933 		switch (dst_reg->type) {
8934 		case PTR_TO_MEM:
8935 			dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size;
8936 			break;
8937 		case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
8938 		case PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID:
8939 			dst_reg->btf = aux->btf_var.btf;
8940 			dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id;
8941 			break;
8942 		default:
8943 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
8944 			return -EFAULT;
8945 		}
8946 		return 0;
8947 	}
8948 
8949 	if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) {
8950 		struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
8951 		u32 subprogno = insn[1].imm;
8952 
8953 		if (!aux->func_info) {
8954 			verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n");
8955 			return -EINVAL;
8956 		}
8957 		if (aux->func_info_aux[subprogno].linkage != BTF_FUNC_STATIC) {
8958 			verbose(env, "callback function not static\n");
8959 			return -EINVAL;
8960 		}
8961 
8962 		dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_FUNC;
8963 		dst_reg->subprogno = subprogno;
8964 		return 0;
8965 	}
8966 
8967 	map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index];
8968 	mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
8969 	dst_reg->map_ptr = map;
8970 
8971 	if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE) {
8972 		dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
8973 		dst_reg->off = aux->map_off;
8974 		if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map))
8975 			dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
8976 	} else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
8977 		dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
8978 	} else {
8979 		verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
8980 		return -EINVAL;
8981 	}
8982 
8983 	return 0;
8984 }
8985 
8986 static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type)
8987 {
8988 	switch (type) {
8989 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER:
8990 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
8991 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
8992 		return true;
8993 	default:
8994 		return false;
8995 	}
8996 }
8997 
8998 /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions:
8999  * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb
9000  * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers,
9001  *   preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0
9002  *
9003  * Implicit input:
9004  *   ctx == skb == R6 == CTX
9005  *
9006  * Explicit input:
9007  *   SRC == any register
9008  *   IMM == 32-bit immediate
9009  *
9010  * Output:
9011  *   R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness
9012  */
9013 static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
9014 {
9015 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
9016 	static const int ctx_reg = BPF_REG_6;
9017 	u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
9018 	int i, err;
9019 
9020 	if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) {
9021 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n");
9022 		return -EINVAL;
9023 	}
9024 
9025 	if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) {
9026 		verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
9027 		return -EINVAL;
9028 	}
9029 
9030 	if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
9031 	    BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW ||
9032 	    (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) {
9033 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n");
9034 		return -EINVAL;
9035 	}
9036 
9037 	/* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */
9038 	err = check_reg_arg(env, ctx_reg, SRC_OP);
9039 	if (err)
9040 		return err;
9041 
9042 	/* Disallow usage of BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] with reference tracking, as
9043 	 * gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to
9044 	 * reference leak.
9045 	 */
9046 	err = check_reference_leak(env);
9047 	if (err) {
9048 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be mixed with socket references\n");
9049 		return err;
9050 	}
9051 
9052 	if (env->cur_state->active_spin_lock) {
9053 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_spin_lock-ed region\n");
9054 		return -EINVAL;
9055 	}
9056 
9057 	if (regs[ctx_reg].type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
9058 		verbose(env,
9059 			"at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n");
9060 		return -EINVAL;
9061 	}
9062 
9063 	if (mode == BPF_IND) {
9064 		/* check explicit source operand */
9065 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
9066 		if (err)
9067 			return err;
9068 	}
9069 
9070 	err = check_ctx_reg(env, &regs[ctx_reg], ctx_reg);
9071 	if (err < 0)
9072 		return err;
9073 
9074 	/* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */
9075 	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
9076 		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
9077 		check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
9078 	}
9079 
9080 	/* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains
9081 	 * the value fetched from the packet.
9082 	 * Already marked as written above.
9083 	 */
9084 	mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
9085 	/* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */
9086 	regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1;
9087 	return 0;
9088 }
9089 
9090 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
9091 {
9092 	struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown;
9093 	const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
9094 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
9095 	struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1);
9096 	enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
9097 	int err;
9098 	const bool is_subprog = env->cur_state->frame[0]->subprogno;
9099 
9100 	/* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */
9101 	if (!is_subprog &&
9102 	    (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS ||
9103 	     prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) &&
9104 	    !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type)
9105 		return 0;
9106 
9107 	/* eBPF calling convetion is such that R0 is used
9108 	 * to return the value from eBPF program.
9109 	 * Make sure that it's readable at this time
9110 	 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote
9111 	 * something into it earlier
9112 	 */
9113 	err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP);
9114 	if (err)
9115 		return err;
9116 
9117 	if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) {
9118 		verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n");
9119 		return -EACCES;
9120 	}
9121 
9122 	reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0;
9123 	if (is_subprog) {
9124 		if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
9125 			verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R0 is not a scalar value (%s)\n",
9126 				reg_type_str[reg->type]);
9127 			return -EINVAL;
9128 		}
9129 		return 0;
9130 	}
9131 
9132 	switch (prog_type) {
9133 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR:
9134 		if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG ||
9135 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG ||
9136 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME ||
9137 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME ||
9138 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME ||
9139 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME)
9140 			range = tnum_range(1, 1);
9141 		if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND ||
9142 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND)
9143 			range = tnum_range(0, 3);
9144 		break;
9145 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
9146 		if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) {
9147 			range = tnum_range(0, 3);
9148 			enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3);
9149 		}
9150 		break;
9151 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK:
9152 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS:
9153 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE:
9154 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL:
9155 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT:
9156 		break;
9157 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT:
9158 		if (!env->prog->aux->attach_btf_id)
9159 			return 0;
9160 		range = tnum_const(0);
9161 		break;
9162 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
9163 		switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) {
9164 		case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY:
9165 		case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT:
9166 			range = tnum_const(0);
9167 			break;
9168 		case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP:
9169 		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
9170 			return 0;
9171 		case BPF_TRACE_ITER:
9172 			break;
9173 		default:
9174 			return -ENOTSUPP;
9175 		}
9176 		break;
9177 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP:
9178 		range = tnum_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS);
9179 		break;
9180 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT:
9181 		/* freplace program can return anything as its return value
9182 		 * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program.
9183 		 */
9184 	default:
9185 		return 0;
9186 	}
9187 
9188 	if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
9189 		verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n",
9190 			reg_type_str[reg->type]);
9191 		return -EINVAL;
9192 	}
9193 
9194 	if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) {
9195 		verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "program exit", "R0");
9196 		return -EINVAL;
9197 	}
9198 
9199 	if (!tnum_is_unknown(enforce_attach_type_range) &&
9200 	    tnum_in(enforce_attach_type_range, reg->var_off))
9201 		env->prog->enforce_expected_attach_type = 1;
9202 	return 0;
9203 }
9204 
9205 /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code
9206  * 1  procedure DFS-iterative(G,v):
9207  * 2      label v as discovered
9208  * 3      let S be a stack
9209  * 4      S.push(v)
9210  * 5      while S is not empty
9211  * 6            t <- S.pop()
9212  * 7            if t is what we're looking for:
9213  * 8                return t
9214  * 9            for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do
9215  * 10               if edge e is already labelled
9216  * 11                   continue with the next edge
9217  * 12               w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e)
9218  * 13               if vertex w is not discovered and not explored
9219  * 14                   label e as tree-edge
9220  * 15                   label w as discovered
9221  * 16                   S.push(w)
9222  * 17                   continue at 5
9223  * 18               else if vertex w is discovered
9224  * 19                   label e as back-edge
9225  * 20               else
9226  * 21                   // vertex w is explored
9227  * 22                   label e as forward- or cross-edge
9228  * 23           label t as explored
9229  * 24           S.pop()
9230  *
9231  * convention:
9232  * 0x10 - discovered
9233  * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled
9234  * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled
9235  * 0x20 - explored
9236  */
9237 
9238 enum {
9239 	DISCOVERED = 0x10,
9240 	EXPLORED = 0x20,
9241 	FALLTHROUGH = 1,
9242 	BRANCH = 2,
9243 };
9244 
9245 static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
9246 {
9247 	return env->prog->len;
9248 }
9249 
9250 static struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_state(
9251 					struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9252 					int idx)
9253 {
9254 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
9255 	struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe];
9256 
9257 	return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)];
9258 }
9259 
9260 static void init_explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
9261 {
9262 	env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true;
9263 }
9264 
9265 enum {
9266 	DONE_EXPLORING = 0,
9267 	KEEP_EXPLORING = 1,
9268 };
9269 
9270 /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above:
9271  * t - index of current instruction
9272  * w - next instruction
9273  * e - edge
9274  */
9275 static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9276 		     bool loop_ok)
9277 {
9278 	int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack;
9279 	int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state;
9280 
9281 	if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH))
9282 		return DONE_EXPLORING;
9283 
9284 	if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH))
9285 		return DONE_EXPLORING;
9286 
9287 	if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) {
9288 		verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t);
9289 		verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
9290 		return -EINVAL;
9291 	}
9292 
9293 	if (e == BRANCH)
9294 		/* mark branch target for state pruning */
9295 		init_explored_state(env, w);
9296 
9297 	if (insn_state[w] == 0) {
9298 		/* tree-edge */
9299 		insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
9300 		insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED;
9301 		if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len)
9302 			return -E2BIG;
9303 		insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w;
9304 		return KEEP_EXPLORING;
9305 	} else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) {
9306 		if (loop_ok && env->bpf_capable)
9307 			return DONE_EXPLORING;
9308 		verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t);
9309 		verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w);
9310 		verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
9311 		return -EINVAL;
9312 	} else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) {
9313 		/* forward- or cross-edge */
9314 		insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
9315 	} else {
9316 		verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n");
9317 		return -EFAULT;
9318 	}
9319 	return DONE_EXPLORING;
9320 }
9321 
9322 static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, int insn_cnt,
9323 				struct bpf_insn *insns,
9324 				struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9325 				bool visit_callee)
9326 {
9327 	int ret;
9328 
9329 	ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false);
9330 	if (ret)
9331 		return ret;
9332 
9333 	if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
9334 		init_explored_state(env, t + 1);
9335 	if (visit_callee) {
9336 		init_explored_state(env, t);
9337 		ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH,
9338 				env, false);
9339 	}
9340 	return ret;
9341 }
9342 
9343 /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following:
9344  *  < 0 - an error occurred
9345  *  DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored
9346  *  KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored
9347  */
9348 static int visit_insn(int t, int insn_cnt, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
9349 {
9350 	struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
9351 	int ret;
9352 
9353 	if (bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t))
9354 		return visit_func_call_insn(t, insn_cnt, insns, env, true);
9355 
9356 	/* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */
9357 	if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP &&
9358 	    BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP32)
9359 		return push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false);
9360 
9361 	switch (BPF_OP(insns[t].code)) {
9362 	case BPF_EXIT:
9363 		return DONE_EXPLORING;
9364 
9365 	case BPF_CALL:
9366 		return visit_func_call_insn(t, insn_cnt, insns, env,
9367 					    insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL);
9368 
9369 	case BPF_JA:
9370 		if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K)
9371 			return -EINVAL;
9372 
9373 		/* unconditional jump with single edge */
9374 		ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env,
9375 				true);
9376 		if (ret)
9377 			return ret;
9378 
9379 		/* unconditional jmp is not a good pruning point,
9380 		 * but it's marked, since backtracking needs
9381 		 * to record jmp history in is_state_visited().
9382 		 */
9383 		init_explored_state(env, t + insns[t].off + 1);
9384 		/* tell verifier to check for equivalent states
9385 		 * after every call and jump
9386 		 */
9387 		if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
9388 			init_explored_state(env, t + 1);
9389 
9390 		return ret;
9391 
9392 	default:
9393 		/* conditional jump with two edges */
9394 		init_explored_state(env, t);
9395 		ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, true);
9396 		if (ret)
9397 			return ret;
9398 
9399 		return push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env, true);
9400 	}
9401 }
9402 
9403 /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program
9404  * loop == back-edge in directed graph
9405  */
9406 static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
9407 {
9408 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
9409 	int *insn_stack, *insn_state;
9410 	int ret = 0;
9411 	int i;
9412 
9413 	insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
9414 	if (!insn_state)
9415 		return -ENOMEM;
9416 
9417 	insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
9418 	if (!insn_stack) {
9419 		kvfree(insn_state);
9420 		return -ENOMEM;
9421 	}
9422 
9423 	insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */
9424 	insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */
9425 	env->cfg.cur_stack = 1;
9426 
9427 	while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) {
9428 		int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1];
9429 
9430 		ret = visit_insn(t, insn_cnt, env);
9431 		switch (ret) {
9432 		case DONE_EXPLORING:
9433 			insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
9434 			env->cfg.cur_stack--;
9435 			break;
9436 		case KEEP_EXPLORING:
9437 			break;
9438 		default:
9439 			if (ret > 0) {
9440 				verbose(env, "visit_insn internal bug\n");
9441 				ret = -EFAULT;
9442 			}
9443 			goto err_free;
9444 		}
9445 	}
9446 
9447 	if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) {
9448 		verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n");
9449 		ret = -EFAULT;
9450 		goto err_free;
9451 	}
9452 
9453 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
9454 		if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
9455 			verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i);
9456 			ret = -EINVAL;
9457 			goto err_free;
9458 		}
9459 	}
9460 	ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
9461 
9462 err_free:
9463 	kvfree(insn_state);
9464 	kvfree(insn_stack);
9465 	env->cfg.insn_state = env->cfg.insn_stack = NULL;
9466 	return ret;
9467 }
9468 
9469 static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
9470 {
9471 	int i;
9472 
9473 	for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
9474 		if (env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) {
9475 			verbose(env, "LD_ABS is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n");
9476 			return -EINVAL;
9477 		}
9478 		if (env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) {
9479 			verbose(env, "tail_call is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n");
9480 			return -EINVAL;
9481 		}
9482 	}
9483 	return 0;
9484 }
9485 
9486 /* The minimum supported BTF func info size */
9487 #define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE	8
9488 #define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE	252
9489 
9490 static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9491 			  const union bpf_attr *attr,
9492 			  union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
9493 {
9494 	const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type;
9495 	u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size;
9496 	u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info);
9497 	struct bpf_func_info *krecord;
9498 	struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL;
9499 	struct bpf_prog *prog;
9500 	const struct btf *btf;
9501 	void __user *urecord;
9502 	u32 prev_offset = 0;
9503 	bool scalar_return;
9504 	int ret = -ENOMEM;
9505 
9506 	nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt;
9507 	if (!nfuncs) {
9508 		if (check_abnormal_return(env))
9509 			return -EINVAL;
9510 		return 0;
9511 	}
9512 
9513 	if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) {
9514 		verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n");
9515 		return -EINVAL;
9516 	}
9517 
9518 	urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size;
9519 	if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE ||
9520 	    urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE ||
9521 	    urec_size % sizeof(u32)) {
9522 		verbose(env, "invalid func info rec size %u\n", urec_size);
9523 		return -EINVAL;
9524 	}
9525 
9526 	prog = env->prog;
9527 	btf = prog->aux->btf;
9528 
9529 	urecord = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->func_info);
9530 	min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size);
9531 
9532 	krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
9533 	if (!krecord)
9534 		return -ENOMEM;
9535 	info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
9536 	if (!info_aux)
9537 		goto err_free;
9538 
9539 	for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) {
9540 		ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size);
9541 		if (ret) {
9542 			if (ret == -E2BIG) {
9543 				verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in func info");
9544 				/* set the size kernel expects so loader can zero
9545 				 * out the rest of the record.
9546 				 */
9547 				if (put_user(min_size, &uattr->func_info_rec_size))
9548 					ret = -EFAULT;
9549 			}
9550 			goto err_free;
9551 		}
9552 
9553 		if (copy_from_user(&krecord[i], urecord, min_size)) {
9554 			ret = -EFAULT;
9555 			goto err_free;
9556 		}
9557 
9558 		/* check insn_off */
9559 		ret = -EINVAL;
9560 		if (i == 0) {
9561 			if (krecord[i].insn_off) {
9562 				verbose(env,
9563 					"nonzero insn_off %u for the first func info record",
9564 					krecord[i].insn_off);
9565 				goto err_free;
9566 			}
9567 		} else if (krecord[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) {
9568 			verbose(env,
9569 				"same or smaller insn offset (%u) than previous func info record (%u)",
9570 				krecord[i].insn_off, prev_offset);
9571 			goto err_free;
9572 		}
9573 
9574 		if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) {
9575 			verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n");
9576 			goto err_free;
9577 		}
9578 
9579 		/* check type_id */
9580 		type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id);
9581 		if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) {
9582 			verbose(env, "invalid type id %d in func info",
9583 				krecord[i].type_id);
9584 			goto err_free;
9585 		}
9586 		info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info);
9587 
9588 		func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type);
9589 		if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)))
9590 			/* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */
9591 			goto err_free;
9592 		ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL);
9593 		scalar_return =
9594 			btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_type_is_enum(ret_type);
9595 		if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) {
9596 			verbose(env, "LD_ABS is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n");
9597 			goto err_free;
9598 		}
9599 		if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) {
9600 			verbose(env, "tail_call is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n");
9601 			goto err_free;
9602 		}
9603 
9604 		prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off;
9605 		urecord += urec_size;
9606 	}
9607 
9608 	prog->aux->func_info = krecord;
9609 	prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs;
9610 	prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux;
9611 	return 0;
9612 
9613 err_free:
9614 	kvfree(krecord);
9615 	kfree(info_aux);
9616 	return ret;
9617 }
9618 
9619 static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
9620 {
9621 	struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
9622 	int i;
9623 
9624 	if (!aux->func_info)
9625 		return;
9626 
9627 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
9628 		aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start;
9629 }
9630 
9631 #define MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE	(offsetof(struct bpf_line_info, line_col) + \
9632 		sizeof(((struct bpf_line_info *)(0))->line_col))
9633 #define MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE	MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE
9634 
9635 static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9636 			  const union bpf_attr *attr,
9637 			  union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
9638 {
9639 	u32 i, s, nr_linfo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size, prev_offset = 0;
9640 	struct bpf_subprog_info *sub;
9641 	struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
9642 	struct bpf_prog *prog;
9643 	const struct btf *btf;
9644 	void __user *ulinfo;
9645 	int err;
9646 
9647 	nr_linfo = attr->line_info_cnt;
9648 	if (!nr_linfo)
9649 		return 0;
9650 
9651 	rec_size = attr->line_info_rec_size;
9652 	if (rec_size < MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE ||
9653 	    rec_size > MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE ||
9654 	    rec_size & (sizeof(u32) - 1))
9655 		return -EINVAL;
9656 
9657 	/* Need to zero it in case the userspace may
9658 	 * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object.
9659 	 */
9660 	linfo = kvcalloc(nr_linfo, sizeof(struct bpf_line_info),
9661 			 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
9662 	if (!linfo)
9663 		return -ENOMEM;
9664 
9665 	prog = env->prog;
9666 	btf = prog->aux->btf;
9667 
9668 	s = 0;
9669 	sub = env->subprog_info;
9670 	ulinfo = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->line_info);
9671 	expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_line_info);
9672 	ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size);
9673 	for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) {
9674 		err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, expected_size, rec_size);
9675 		if (err) {
9676 			if (err == -E2BIG) {
9677 				verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in line_info");
9678 				if (put_user(expected_size,
9679 					     &uattr->line_info_rec_size))
9680 					err = -EFAULT;
9681 			}
9682 			goto err_free;
9683 		}
9684 
9685 		if (copy_from_user(&linfo[i], ulinfo, ncopy)) {
9686 			err = -EFAULT;
9687 			goto err_free;
9688 		}
9689 
9690 		/*
9691 		 * Check insn_off to ensure
9692 		 * 1) strictly increasing AND
9693 		 * 2) bounded by prog->len
9694 		 *
9695 		 * The linfo[0].insn_off == 0 check logically falls into
9696 		 * the later "missing bpf_line_info for func..." case
9697 		 * because the first linfo[0].insn_off must be the
9698 		 * first sub also and the first sub must have
9699 		 * subprog_info[0].start == 0.
9700 		 */
9701 		if ((i && linfo[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) ||
9702 		    linfo[i].insn_off >= prog->len) {
9703 			verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].insn_off:%u (prev_offset:%u prog->len:%u)\n",
9704 				i, linfo[i].insn_off, prev_offset,
9705 				prog->len);
9706 			err = -EINVAL;
9707 			goto err_free;
9708 		}
9709 
9710 		if (!prog->insnsi[linfo[i].insn_off].code) {
9711 			verbose(env,
9712 				"Invalid insn code at line_info[%u].insn_off\n",
9713 				i);
9714 			err = -EINVAL;
9715 			goto err_free;
9716 		}
9717 
9718 		if (!btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].line_off) ||
9719 		    !btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].file_name_off)) {
9720 			verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].line_off or .file_name_off\n", i);
9721 			err = -EINVAL;
9722 			goto err_free;
9723 		}
9724 
9725 		if (s != env->subprog_cnt) {
9726 			if (linfo[i].insn_off == sub[s].start) {
9727 				sub[s].linfo_idx = i;
9728 				s++;
9729 			} else if (sub[s].start < linfo[i].insn_off) {
9730 				verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for func#%u\n", s);
9731 				err = -EINVAL;
9732 				goto err_free;
9733 			}
9734 		}
9735 
9736 		prev_offset = linfo[i].insn_off;
9737 		ulinfo += rec_size;
9738 	}
9739 
9740 	if (s != env->subprog_cnt) {
9741 		verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for %u funcs starting from func#%u\n",
9742 			env->subprog_cnt - s, s);
9743 		err = -EINVAL;
9744 		goto err_free;
9745 	}
9746 
9747 	prog->aux->linfo = linfo;
9748 	prog->aux->nr_linfo = nr_linfo;
9749 
9750 	return 0;
9751 
9752 err_free:
9753 	kvfree(linfo);
9754 	return err;
9755 }
9756 
9757 static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9758 			  const union bpf_attr *attr,
9759 			  union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
9760 {
9761 	struct btf *btf;
9762 	int err;
9763 
9764 	if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) {
9765 		if (check_abnormal_return(env))
9766 			return -EINVAL;
9767 		return 0;
9768 	}
9769 
9770 	btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd);
9771 	if (IS_ERR(btf))
9772 		return PTR_ERR(btf);
9773 	if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) {
9774 		btf_put(btf);
9775 		return -EACCES;
9776 	}
9777 	env->prog->aux->btf = btf;
9778 
9779 	err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr);
9780 	if (err)
9781 		return err;
9782 
9783 	err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr);
9784 	if (err)
9785 		return err;
9786 
9787 	return 0;
9788 }
9789 
9790 /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */
9791 static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old,
9792 			 struct bpf_reg_state *cur)
9793 {
9794 	return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value &&
9795 	       old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value &&
9796 	       old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value &&
9797 	       old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value &&
9798 	       old->u32_min_value <= cur->u32_min_value &&
9799 	       old->u32_max_value >= cur->u32_max_value &&
9800 	       old->s32_min_value <= cur->s32_min_value &&
9801 	       old->s32_max_value >= cur->s32_max_value;
9802 }
9803 
9804 /* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */
9805 #define ID_MAP_SIZE	(MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE)
9806 struct idpair {
9807 	u32 old;
9808 	u32 cur;
9809 };
9810 
9811 /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have
9812  * the same id in the new state as well.  But that id could be different from
9813  * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids.
9814  * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent
9815  * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe.  But
9816  * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about
9817  * that.
9818  * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before.  If
9819  * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map.
9820  */
9821 static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct idpair *idmap)
9822 {
9823 	unsigned int i;
9824 
9825 	for (i = 0; i < ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) {
9826 		if (!idmap[i].old) {
9827 			/* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */
9828 			idmap[i].old = old_id;
9829 			idmap[i].cur = cur_id;
9830 			return true;
9831 		}
9832 		if (idmap[i].old == old_id)
9833 			return idmap[i].cur == cur_id;
9834 	}
9835 	/* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */
9836 	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
9837 	return false;
9838 }
9839 
9840 static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9841 			     struct bpf_func_state *st)
9842 {
9843 	enum bpf_reg_liveness live;
9844 	int i, j;
9845 
9846 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) {
9847 		live = st->regs[i].live;
9848 		/* liveness must not touch this register anymore */
9849 		st->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_DONE;
9850 		if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ))
9851 			/* since the register is unused, clear its state
9852 			 * to make further comparison simpler
9853 			 */
9854 			__mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]);
9855 	}
9856 
9857 	for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
9858 		live = st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live;
9859 		/* liveness must not touch this stack slot anymore */
9860 		st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_DONE;
9861 		if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) {
9862 			__mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr);
9863 			for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
9864 				st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID;
9865 		}
9866 	}
9867 }
9868 
9869 static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9870 				 struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
9871 {
9872 	int i;
9873 
9874 	if (st->frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE)
9875 		/* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */
9876 		return;
9877 
9878 	for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++)
9879 		clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i]);
9880 }
9881 
9882 /* the parentage chains form a tree.
9883  * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and
9884  * pushed into state stack for future exploration.
9885  * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifer states
9886  * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already,
9887  * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when
9888  * the verifier explores other branches.
9889  * Example:
9890  * 1: r0 = 1
9891  * 2: if r1 == 100 goto pc+1
9892  * 3: r0 = 2
9893  * 4: exit
9894  * when the verifier reaches exit insn the register r0 in the state list of
9895  * insn 2 will be seen as !REG_LIVE_READ. Then the verifier pops the other_branch
9896  * of insn 2 and goes exploring further. At the insn 4 it will walk the
9897  * parentage chain from insn 4 into insn 2 and will mark r0 as REG_LIVE_READ.
9898  *
9899  * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring
9900  * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second
9901  * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and
9902  * their final liveness markes are already propagated.
9903  * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited()
9904  * we can call this clean_live_states() function to mark all liveness states
9905  * as REG_LIVE_DONE to indicate that 'parent' pointers of 'struct bpf_reg_state'
9906  * will not be used.
9907  * This function also clears the registers and stack for states that !READ
9908  * to simplify state merging.
9909  *
9910  * Important note here that walking the same branch instruction in the callee
9911  * doesn't meant that the states are DONE. The verifier has to compare
9912  * the callsites
9913  */
9914 static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn,
9915 			      struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
9916 {
9917 	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
9918 	int i;
9919 
9920 	sl = *explored_state(env, insn);
9921 	while (sl) {
9922 		if (sl->state.branches)
9923 			goto next;
9924 		if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn ||
9925 		    sl->state.curframe != cur->curframe)
9926 			goto next;
9927 		for (i = 0; i <= cur->curframe; i++)
9928 			if (sl->state.frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite)
9929 				goto next;
9930 		clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state);
9931 next:
9932 		sl = sl->next;
9933 	}
9934 }
9935 
9936 /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */
9937 static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
9938 		    struct idpair *idmap)
9939 {
9940 	bool equal;
9941 
9942 	if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ))
9943 		/* explored state didn't use this */
9944 		return true;
9945 
9946 	equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)) == 0;
9947 
9948 	if (rold->type == PTR_TO_STACK)
9949 		/* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to
9950 		 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar
9951 		 */
9952 		return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno;
9953 
9954 	if (equal)
9955 		return true;
9956 
9957 	if (rold->type == NOT_INIT)
9958 		/* explored state can't have used this */
9959 		return true;
9960 	if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT)
9961 		return false;
9962 	switch (rold->type) {
9963 	case SCALAR_VALUE:
9964 		if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
9965 			if (!rold->precise && !rcur->precise)
9966 				return true;
9967 			/* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
9968 			return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
9969 			       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
9970 		} else {
9971 			/* We're trying to use a pointer in place of a scalar.
9972 			 * Even if the scalar was unbounded, this could lead to
9973 			 * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak
9974 			 * while pointers are not. We could make this safe in
9975 			 * special cases if root is calling us, but it's
9976 			 * probably not worth the hassle.
9977 			 */
9978 			return false;
9979 		}
9980 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
9981 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
9982 		/* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and
9983 		 * everything else matches, we are OK.
9984 		 * 'id' is not compared, since it's only used for maps with
9985 		 * bpf_spin_lock inside map element and in such cases if
9986 		 * the rest of the prog is valid for one map element then
9987 		 * it's valid for all map elements regardless of the key
9988 		 * used in bpf_map_lookup()
9989 		 */
9990 		return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
9991 		       range_within(rold, rcur) &&
9992 		       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
9993 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
9994 		/* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a
9995 		 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map.
9996 		 * However, if the old PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL then got NULL-
9997 		 * checked, doing so could have affected others with the same
9998 		 * id, and we can't check for that because we lost the id when
9999 		 * we converted to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.
10000 		 */
10001 		if (rcur->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL)
10002 			return false;
10003 		if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)))
10004 			return false;
10005 		/* Check our ids match any regs they're supposed to */
10006 		return check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap);
10007 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
10008 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
10009 		if (rcur->type != rold->type)
10010 			return false;
10011 		/* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr
10012 		 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are
10013 		 * still safe.  This is true even if old range < old off,
10014 		 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or
10015 		 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access.
10016 		 */
10017 		if (rold->range > rcur->range)
10018 			return false;
10019 		/* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment;
10020 		 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range.
10021 		 */
10022 		if (rold->off != rcur->off)
10023 			return false;
10024 		/* id relations must be preserved */
10025 		if (rold->id && !check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap))
10026 			return false;
10027 		/* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
10028 		return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
10029 		       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
10030 	case PTR_TO_CTX:
10031 	case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
10032 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
10033 	case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
10034 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
10035 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL:
10036 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
10037 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL:
10038 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
10039 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL:
10040 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
10041 		/* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above
10042 		 * would have accepted
10043 		 */
10044 	default:
10045 		/* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */
10046 		return false;
10047 	}
10048 
10049 	/* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */
10050 	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
10051 	return false;
10052 }
10053 
10054 static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_func_state *old,
10055 		      struct bpf_func_state *cur,
10056 		      struct idpair *idmap)
10057 {
10058 	int i, spi;
10059 
10060 	/* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional
10061 	 * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state
10062 	 * didn't use them
10063 	 */
10064 	for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) {
10065 		spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE;
10066 
10067 		if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)) {
10068 			i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1;
10069 			/* explored state didn't use this */
10070 			continue;
10071 		}
10072 
10073 		if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID)
10074 			continue;
10075 
10076 		/* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack
10077 		 * and these slots were used
10078 		 */
10079 		if (i >= cur->allocated_stack)
10080 			return false;
10081 
10082 		/* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack
10083 		 * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack.
10084 		 * The opposite is not true
10085 		 */
10086 		if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC &&
10087 		    cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO)
10088 			continue;
10089 		if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
10090 		    cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE])
10091 			/* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in
10092 			 * this stack slot, but current has STACK_MISC ->
10093 			 * this verifier states are not equivalent,
10094 			 * return false to continue verification of this path
10095 			 */
10096 			return false;
10097 		if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE)
10098 			continue;
10099 		if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL)
10100 			continue;
10101 		if (!regsafe(&old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
10102 			     &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
10103 			     idmap))
10104 			/* when explored and current stack slot are both storing
10105 			 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types
10106 			 * are the same as well.
10107 			 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored
10108 			 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8}
10109 			 * but current path has stored:
10110 			 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16}
10111 			 * such verifier states are not equivalent.
10112 			 * return false to continue verification of this path
10113 			 */
10114 			return false;
10115 	}
10116 	return true;
10117 }
10118 
10119 static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur)
10120 {
10121 	if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs)
10122 		return false;
10123 	return !memcmp(old->refs, cur->refs,
10124 		       sizeof(*old->refs) * old->acquired_refs);
10125 }
10126 
10127 /* compare two verifier states
10128  *
10129  * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since
10130  * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them
10131  *
10132  * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of
10133  * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has
10134  * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution
10135  * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already
10136  * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish.
10137  *
10138  * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative
10139  * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one.
10140  * Example:
10141  *       explored                   current
10142  * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC)
10143  * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC)
10144  *
10145  * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more
10146  * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means
10147  * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too
10148  *
10149  * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid
10150  * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that
10151  * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely
10152  */
10153 static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_func_state *old,
10154 			      struct bpf_func_state *cur)
10155 {
10156 	struct idpair *idmap;
10157 	bool ret = false;
10158 	int i;
10159 
10160 	idmap = kcalloc(ID_MAP_SIZE, sizeof(struct idpair), GFP_KERNEL);
10161 	/* If we failed to allocate the idmap, just say it's not safe */
10162 	if (!idmap)
10163 		return false;
10164 
10165 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
10166 		if (!regsafe(&old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], idmap))
10167 			goto out_free;
10168 	}
10169 
10170 	if (!stacksafe(old, cur, idmap))
10171 		goto out_free;
10172 
10173 	if (!refsafe(old, cur))
10174 		goto out_free;
10175 	ret = true;
10176 out_free:
10177 	kfree(idmap);
10178 	return ret;
10179 }
10180 
10181 static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10182 			 struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
10183 			 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
10184 {
10185 	int i;
10186 
10187 	if (old->curframe != cur->curframe)
10188 		return false;
10189 
10190 	/* Verification state from speculative execution simulation
10191 	 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one.
10192 	 */
10193 	if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative)
10194 		return false;
10195 
10196 	if (old->active_spin_lock != cur->active_spin_lock)
10197 		return false;
10198 
10199 	/* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same
10200 	 * and all frame states need to be equivalent
10201 	 */
10202 	for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) {
10203 		if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite)
10204 			return false;
10205 		if (!func_states_equal(old->frame[i], cur->frame[i]))
10206 			return false;
10207 	}
10208 	return true;
10209 }
10210 
10211 /* Return 0 if no propagation happened. Return negative error code if error
10212  * happened. Otherwise, return the propagated bit.
10213  */
10214 static int propagate_liveness_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10215 				  struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
10216 				  struct bpf_reg_state *parent_reg)
10217 {
10218 	u8 parent_flag = parent_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ;
10219 	u8 flag = reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ;
10220 	int err;
10221 
10222 	/* When comes here, read flags of PARENT_REG or REG could be any of
10223 	 * REG_LIVE_READ64, REG_LIVE_READ32, REG_LIVE_NONE. There is no need
10224 	 * of propagation if PARENT_REG has strongest REG_LIVE_READ64.
10225 	 */
10226 	if (parent_flag == REG_LIVE_READ64 ||
10227 	    /* Or if there is no read flag from REG. */
10228 	    !flag ||
10229 	    /* Or if the read flag from REG is the same as PARENT_REG. */
10230 	    parent_flag == flag)
10231 		return 0;
10232 
10233 	err = mark_reg_read(env, reg, parent_reg, flag);
10234 	if (err)
10235 		return err;
10236 
10237 	return flag;
10238 }
10239 
10240 /* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the
10241  * straight-line code between a state and its parent.  When we arrive at an
10242  * equivalent state (jump target or such) we didn't arrive by the straight-line
10243  * code, so read marks in the state must propagate to the parent regardless
10244  * of the state's write marks. That's what 'parent == state->parent' comparison
10245  * in mark_reg_read() is for.
10246  */
10247 static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10248 			      const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
10249 			      struct bpf_verifier_state *vparent)
10250 {
10251 	struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg, *parent_reg;
10252 	struct bpf_func_state *state, *parent;
10253 	int i, frame, err = 0;
10254 
10255 	if (vparent->curframe != vstate->curframe) {
10256 		WARN(1, "propagate_live: parent frame %d current frame %d\n",
10257 		     vparent->curframe, vstate->curframe);
10258 		return -EFAULT;
10259 	}
10260 	/* Propagate read liveness of registers... */
10261 	BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG);
10262 	for (frame = 0; frame <= vstate->curframe; frame++) {
10263 		parent = vparent->frame[frame];
10264 		state = vstate->frame[frame];
10265 		parent_reg = parent->regs;
10266 		state_reg = state->regs;
10267 		/* We don't need to worry about FP liveness, it's read-only */
10268 		for (i = frame < vstate->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) {
10269 			err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, &state_reg[i],
10270 						     &parent_reg[i]);
10271 			if (err < 0)
10272 				return err;
10273 			if (err == REG_LIVE_READ64)
10274 				mark_insn_zext(env, &parent_reg[i]);
10275 		}
10276 
10277 		/* Propagate stack slots. */
10278 		for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE &&
10279 			    i < parent->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
10280 			parent_reg = &parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
10281 			state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
10282 			err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, state_reg,
10283 						     parent_reg);
10284 			if (err < 0)
10285 				return err;
10286 		}
10287 	}
10288 	return 0;
10289 }
10290 
10291 /* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and
10292  * propagate them into the current state
10293  */
10294 static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10295 			       const struct bpf_verifier_state *old)
10296 {
10297 	struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg;
10298 	struct bpf_func_state *state;
10299 	int i, err = 0;
10300 
10301 	state = old->frame[old->curframe];
10302 	state_reg = state->regs;
10303 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) {
10304 		if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE ||
10305 		    !state_reg->precise)
10306 			continue;
10307 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
10308 			verbose(env, "propagating r%d\n", i);
10309 		err = mark_chain_precision(env, i);
10310 		if (err < 0)
10311 			return err;
10312 	}
10313 
10314 	for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
10315 		if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL)
10316 			continue;
10317 		state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
10318 		if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE ||
10319 		    !state_reg->precise)
10320 			continue;
10321 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
10322 			verbose(env, "propagating fp%d\n",
10323 				(-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE);
10324 		err = mark_chain_precision_stack(env, i);
10325 		if (err < 0)
10326 			return err;
10327 	}
10328 	return 0;
10329 }
10330 
10331 static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
10332 				 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
10333 {
10334 	struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur;
10335 	int i, fr = cur->curframe;
10336 
10337 	if (old->curframe != fr)
10338 		return false;
10339 
10340 	fold = old->frame[fr];
10341 	fcur = cur->frame[fr];
10342 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
10343 		if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i],
10344 			   offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)))
10345 			return false;
10346 	return true;
10347 }
10348 
10349 
10350 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
10351 {
10352 	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
10353 	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev;
10354 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new;
10355 	int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0;
10356 	bool add_new_state = env->test_state_freq ? true : false;
10357 
10358 	cur->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx;
10359 	if (!env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point)
10360 		/* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not
10361 		 * be doing state search here
10362 		 */
10363 		return 0;
10364 
10365 	/* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions
10366 	 * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1
10367 	 * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen
10368 	 * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions.
10369 	 * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric.
10370 	 * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier
10371 	 * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup.
10372 	 */
10373 	if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 &&
10374 	    env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8)
10375 		add_new_state = true;
10376 
10377 	pprev = explored_state(env, insn_idx);
10378 	sl = *pprev;
10379 
10380 	clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur);
10381 
10382 	while (sl) {
10383 		states_cnt++;
10384 		if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx)
10385 			goto next;
10386 		if (sl->state.branches) {
10387 			if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) &&
10388 			    states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) {
10389 				verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
10390 				verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx);
10391 				return -EINVAL;
10392 			}
10393 			/* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state
10394 			 * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct
10395 			 * states and may not help future pruning.
10396 			 * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that
10397 			 * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly.
10398 			 * The most abusive loop will be:
10399 			 * r1 += 1
10400 			 * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2
10401 			 * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states.
10402 			 * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states
10403 			 * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning.
10404 			 */
10405 			if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 &&
10406 			    env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100)
10407 				add_new_state = false;
10408 			goto miss;
10409 		}
10410 		if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) {
10411 			sl->hit_cnt++;
10412 			/* reached equivalent register/stack state,
10413 			 * prune the search.
10414 			 * Registers read by the continuation are read by us.
10415 			 * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they
10416 			 * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation
10417 			 * from reaching our parent (an explored_state).  Our
10418 			 * own state will get the read marks recorded, but
10419 			 * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning
10420 			 * this state and will pop a new one.
10421 			 */
10422 			err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur);
10423 
10424 			/* if previous state reached the exit with precision and
10425 			 * current state is equivalent to it (except precsion marks)
10426 			 * the precision needs to be propagated back in
10427 			 * the current state.
10428 			 */
10429 			err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur);
10430 			err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state);
10431 			if (err)
10432 				return err;
10433 			return 1;
10434 		}
10435 miss:
10436 		/* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count.
10437 		 * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state
10438 		 * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have
10439 		 * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning
10440 		 * and some at the end) to help pruning.
10441 		 */
10442 		if (add_new_state)
10443 			sl->miss_cnt++;
10444 		/* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial
10445 		 * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view.
10446 		 * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time,
10447 		 * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed.
10448 		 */
10449 		if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3) {
10450 			/* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to
10451 			 * speed up verification
10452 			 */
10453 			*pprev = sl->next;
10454 			if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) {
10455 				u32 br = sl->state.branches;
10456 
10457 				WARN_ONCE(br,
10458 					  "BUG live_done but branches_to_explore %d\n",
10459 					  br);
10460 				free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
10461 				kfree(sl);
10462 				env->peak_states--;
10463 			} else {
10464 				/* cannot free this state, since parentage chain may
10465 				 * walk it later. Add it for free_list instead to
10466 				 * be freed at the end of verification
10467 				 */
10468 				sl->next = env->free_list;
10469 				env->free_list = sl;
10470 			}
10471 			sl = *pprev;
10472 			continue;
10473 		}
10474 next:
10475 		pprev = &sl->next;
10476 		sl = *pprev;
10477 	}
10478 
10479 	if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt)
10480 		env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt;
10481 
10482 	if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES)
10483 		return push_jmp_history(env, cur);
10484 
10485 	if (!add_new_state)
10486 		return push_jmp_history(env, cur);
10487 
10488 	/* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one.
10489 	 * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet,
10490 	 * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe)
10491 	 * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be
10492 	 * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx)
10493 	 * again on the way to bpf_exit.
10494 	 * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state
10495 	 * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0.
10496 	 */
10497 	new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL);
10498 	if (!new_sl)
10499 		return -ENOMEM;
10500 	env->total_states++;
10501 	env->peak_states++;
10502 	env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed;
10503 	env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed;
10504 
10505 	/* add new state to the head of linked list */
10506 	new = &new_sl->state;
10507 	err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur);
10508 	if (err) {
10509 		free_verifier_state(new, false);
10510 		kfree(new_sl);
10511 		return err;
10512 	}
10513 	new->insn_idx = insn_idx;
10514 	WARN_ONCE(new->branches != 1,
10515 		  "BUG is_state_visited:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d\n", new->branches, insn_idx);
10516 
10517 	cur->parent = new;
10518 	cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx;
10519 	clear_jmp_history(cur);
10520 	new_sl->next = *explored_state(env, insn_idx);
10521 	*explored_state(env, insn_idx) = new_sl;
10522 	/* connect new state to parentage chain. Current frame needs all
10523 	 * registers connected. Only r6 - r9 of the callers are alive (pushed
10524 	 * to the stack implicitly by JITs) so in callers' frames connect just
10525 	 * r6 - r9 as an optimization. Callers will have r1 - r5 connected to
10526 	 * the state of the call instruction (with WRITTEN set), and r0 comes
10527 	 * from callee with its full parentage chain, anyway.
10528 	 */
10529 	/* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes
10530 	 * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us.
10531 	 * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark
10532 	 * their parent and current state never has children yet.  Only
10533 	 * explored_states can get read marks.)
10534 	 */
10535 	for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) {
10536 		for (i = j < cur->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++)
10537 			cur->frame[j]->regs[i].parent = &new->frame[j]->regs[i];
10538 		for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++)
10539 			cur->frame[j]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
10540 	}
10541 
10542 	/* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */
10543 	for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) {
10544 		struct bpf_func_state *frame = cur->frame[j];
10545 		struct bpf_func_state *newframe = new->frame[j];
10546 
10547 		for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
10548 			frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
10549 			frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.parent =
10550 						&newframe->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
10551 		}
10552 	}
10553 	return 0;
10554 }
10555 
10556 /* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */
10557 static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type)
10558 {
10559 	switch (type) {
10560 	case PTR_TO_CTX:
10561 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
10562 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL:
10563 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
10564 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL:
10565 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
10566 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL:
10567 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
10568 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
10569 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL:
10570 		return false;
10571 	default:
10572 		return true;
10573 	}
10574 }
10575 
10576 /* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we
10577  * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok
10578  * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch:
10579  *
10580  * R1 = sock_ptr
10581  * goto X;
10582  * ...
10583  * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr;
10584  * goto X;
10585  * ...
10586  * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0);
10587  */
10588 static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev)
10589 {
10590 	return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) ||
10591 			       !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev));
10592 }
10593 
10594 static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
10595 {
10596 	bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2);
10597 	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
10598 	struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
10599 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
10600 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
10601 	bool do_print_state = false;
10602 	int prev_insn_idx = -1;
10603 
10604 	for (;;) {
10605 		struct bpf_insn *insn;
10606 		u8 class;
10607 		int err;
10608 
10609 		env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
10610 		if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
10611 			verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n",
10612 				env->insn_idx, insn_cnt);
10613 			return -EFAULT;
10614 		}
10615 
10616 		insn = &insns[env->insn_idx];
10617 		class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
10618 
10619 		if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
10620 			verbose(env,
10621 				"BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n",
10622 				env->insn_processed);
10623 			return -E2BIG;
10624 		}
10625 
10626 		err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx);
10627 		if (err < 0)
10628 			return err;
10629 		if (err == 1) {
10630 			/* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
10631 			if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
10632 				if (do_print_state)
10633 					verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n",
10634 						env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx,
10635 						env->cur_state->speculative ?
10636 						" (speculative execution)" : "");
10637 				else
10638 					verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx);
10639 			}
10640 			goto process_bpf_exit;
10641 		}
10642 
10643 		if (signal_pending(current))
10644 			return -EAGAIN;
10645 
10646 		if (need_resched())
10647 			cond_resched();
10648 
10649 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 ||
10650 		    (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL && do_print_state)) {
10651 			if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
10652 				verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx);
10653 			else
10654 				verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:",
10655 					env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx,
10656 					env->cur_state->speculative ?
10657 					" (speculative execution)" : "");
10658 			print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]);
10659 			do_print_state = false;
10660 		}
10661 
10662 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
10663 			const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = {
10664 				.cb_call	= disasm_kfunc_name,
10665 				.cb_print	= verbose,
10666 				.private_data	= env,
10667 			};
10668 
10669 			verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; ");
10670 			verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx);
10671 			print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks);
10672 		}
10673 
10674 		if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) {
10675 			err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx,
10676 							   env->prev_insn_idx);
10677 			if (err)
10678 				return err;
10679 		}
10680 
10681 		regs = cur_regs(env);
10682 		sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
10683 		prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx;
10684 
10685 		if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
10686 			err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
10687 			if (err)
10688 				return err;
10689 
10690 		} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
10691 			enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type;
10692 
10693 			/* check for reserved fields is already done */
10694 
10695 			/* check src operand */
10696 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
10697 			if (err)
10698 				return err;
10699 
10700 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
10701 			if (err)
10702 				return err;
10703 
10704 			src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type;
10705 
10706 			/* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable,
10707 			 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func
10708 			 */
10709 			err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg,
10710 					       insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
10711 					       BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false);
10712 			if (err)
10713 				return err;
10714 
10715 			prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type;
10716 
10717 			if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) {
10718 				/* saw a valid insn
10719 				 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off)
10720 				 * save type to validate intersecting paths
10721 				 */
10722 				*prev_src_type = src_reg_type;
10723 
10724 			} else if (reg_type_mismatch(src_reg_type, *prev_src_type)) {
10725 				/* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn
10726 				 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off)
10727 				 * with different pointer types:
10728 				 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and
10729 				 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch.
10730 				 * Reject it.
10731 				 */
10732 				verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
10733 				return -EINVAL;
10734 			}
10735 
10736 		} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
10737 			enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type;
10738 
10739 			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) {
10740 				err = check_atomic(env, env->insn_idx, insn);
10741 				if (err)
10742 					return err;
10743 				env->insn_idx++;
10744 				continue;
10745 			}
10746 
10747 			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) {
10748 				verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
10749 				return -EINVAL;
10750 			}
10751 
10752 			/* check src1 operand */
10753 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
10754 			if (err)
10755 				return err;
10756 			/* check src2 operand */
10757 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
10758 			if (err)
10759 				return err;
10760 
10761 			dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;
10762 
10763 			/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
10764 			err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
10765 					       insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
10766 					       BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false);
10767 			if (err)
10768 				return err;
10769 
10770 			prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type;
10771 
10772 			if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) {
10773 				*prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type;
10774 			} else if (reg_type_mismatch(dst_reg_type, *prev_dst_type)) {
10775 				verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
10776 				return -EINVAL;
10777 			}
10778 
10779 		} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
10780 			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM ||
10781 			    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
10782 				verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n");
10783 				return -EINVAL;
10784 			}
10785 			/* check src operand */
10786 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
10787 			if (err)
10788 				return err;
10789 
10790 			if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
10791 				verbose(env, "BPF_ST stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n",
10792 					insn->dst_reg,
10793 					reg_type_str[reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type]);
10794 				return -EACCES;
10795 			}
10796 
10797 			/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
10798 			err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
10799 					       insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
10800 					       BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
10801 			if (err)
10802 				return err;
10803 
10804 		} else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) {
10805 			u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
10806 
10807 			env->jmps_processed++;
10808 			if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
10809 				if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
10810 				    insn->off != 0 ||
10811 				    (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 &&
10812 				     insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL &&
10813 				     insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) ||
10814 				    insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
10815 				    class == BPF_JMP32) {
10816 					verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n");
10817 					return -EINVAL;
10818 				}
10819 
10820 				if (env->cur_state->active_spin_lock &&
10821 				    (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL ||
10822 				     insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock)) {
10823 					verbose(env, "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n");
10824 					return -EINVAL;
10825 				}
10826 				if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
10827 					err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
10828 				else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL)
10829 					err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn);
10830 				else
10831 					err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
10832 				if (err)
10833 					return err;
10834 			} else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
10835 				if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
10836 				    insn->imm != 0 ||
10837 				    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
10838 				    insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
10839 				    class == BPF_JMP32) {
10840 					verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n");
10841 					return -EINVAL;
10842 				}
10843 
10844 				env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
10845 				continue;
10846 
10847 			} else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
10848 				if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
10849 				    insn->imm != 0 ||
10850 				    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
10851 				    insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
10852 				    class == BPF_JMP32) {
10853 					verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n");
10854 					return -EINVAL;
10855 				}
10856 
10857 				if (env->cur_state->active_spin_lock) {
10858 					verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock is missing\n");
10859 					return -EINVAL;
10860 				}
10861 
10862 				if (state->curframe) {
10863 					/* exit from nested function */
10864 					err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx);
10865 					if (err)
10866 						return err;
10867 					do_print_state = true;
10868 					continue;
10869 				}
10870 
10871 				err = check_reference_leak(env);
10872 				if (err)
10873 					return err;
10874 
10875 				err = check_return_code(env);
10876 				if (err)
10877 					return err;
10878 process_bpf_exit:
10879 				update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state);
10880 				err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx,
10881 						&env->insn_idx, pop_log);
10882 				if (err < 0) {
10883 					if (err != -ENOENT)
10884 						return err;
10885 					break;
10886 				} else {
10887 					do_print_state = true;
10888 					continue;
10889 				}
10890 			} else {
10891 				err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
10892 				if (err)
10893 					return err;
10894 			}
10895 		} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
10896 			u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
10897 
10898 			if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) {
10899 				err = check_ld_abs(env, insn);
10900 				if (err)
10901 					return err;
10902 
10903 			} else if (mode == BPF_IMM) {
10904 				err = check_ld_imm(env, insn);
10905 				if (err)
10906 					return err;
10907 
10908 				env->insn_idx++;
10909 				sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
10910 			} else {
10911 				verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
10912 				return -EINVAL;
10913 			}
10914 		} else {
10915 			verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class);
10916 			return -EINVAL;
10917 		}
10918 
10919 		env->insn_idx++;
10920 	}
10921 
10922 	return 0;
10923 }
10924 
10925 static int find_btf_percpu_datasec(struct btf *btf)
10926 {
10927 	const struct btf_type *t;
10928 	const char *tname;
10929 	int i, n;
10930 
10931 	/*
10932 	 * Both vmlinux and module each have their own ".data..percpu"
10933 	 * DATASECs in BTF. So for module's case, we need to skip vmlinux BTF
10934 	 * types to look at only module's own BTF types.
10935 	 */
10936 	n = btf_nr_types(btf);
10937 	if (btf_is_module(btf))
10938 		i = btf_nr_types(btf_vmlinux);
10939 	else
10940 		i = 1;
10941 
10942 	for(; i < n; i++) {
10943 		t = btf_type_by_id(btf, i);
10944 		if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) != BTF_KIND_DATASEC)
10945 			continue;
10946 
10947 		tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
10948 		if (!strcmp(tname, ".data..percpu"))
10949 			return i;
10950 	}
10951 
10952 	return -ENOENT;
10953 }
10954 
10955 /* replace pseudo btf_id with kernel symbol address */
10956 static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10957 			       struct bpf_insn *insn,
10958 			       struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
10959 {
10960 	const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi;
10961 	const struct btf_type *datasec;
10962 	struct btf_mod_pair *btf_mod;
10963 	const struct btf_type *t;
10964 	const char *sym_name;
10965 	bool percpu = false;
10966 	u32 type, id = insn->imm;
10967 	struct btf *btf;
10968 	s32 datasec_id;
10969 	u64 addr;
10970 	int i, btf_fd, err;
10971 
10972 	btf_fd = insn[1].imm;
10973 	if (btf_fd) {
10974 		btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd);
10975 		if (IS_ERR(btf)) {
10976 			verbose(env, "invalid module BTF object FD specified.\n");
10977 			return -EINVAL;
10978 		}
10979 	} else {
10980 		if (!btf_vmlinux) {
10981 			verbose(env, "kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\n");
10982 			return -EINVAL;
10983 		}
10984 		btf = btf_vmlinux;
10985 		btf_get(btf);
10986 	}
10987 
10988 	t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id);
10989 	if (!t) {
10990 		verbose(env, "ldimm64 insn specifies invalid btf_id %d.\n", id);
10991 		err = -ENOENT;
10992 		goto err_put;
10993 	}
10994 
10995 	if (!btf_type_is_var(t)) {
10996 		verbose(env, "pseudo btf_id %d in ldimm64 isn't KIND_VAR.\n", id);
10997 		err = -EINVAL;
10998 		goto err_put;
10999 	}
11000 
11001 	sym_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
11002 	addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(sym_name);
11003 	if (!addr) {
11004 		verbose(env, "ldimm64 failed to find the address for kernel symbol '%s'.\n",
11005 			sym_name);
11006 		err = -ENOENT;
11007 		goto err_put;
11008 	}
11009 
11010 	datasec_id = find_btf_percpu_datasec(btf);
11011 	if (datasec_id > 0) {
11012 		datasec = btf_type_by_id(btf, datasec_id);
11013 		for_each_vsi(i, datasec, vsi) {
11014 			if (vsi->type == id) {
11015 				percpu = true;
11016 				break;
11017 			}
11018 		}
11019 	}
11020 
11021 	insn[0].imm = (u32)addr;
11022 	insn[1].imm = addr >> 32;
11023 
11024 	type = t->type;
11025 	t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, type, NULL);
11026 	if (percpu) {
11027 		aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID;
11028 		aux->btf_var.btf = btf;
11029 		aux->btf_var.btf_id = type;
11030 	} else if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) {
11031 		const struct btf_type *ret;
11032 		const char *tname;
11033 		u32 tsize;
11034 
11035 		/* resolve the type size of ksym. */
11036 		ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, t, &tsize);
11037 		if (IS_ERR(ret)) {
11038 			tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
11039 			verbose(env, "ldimm64 unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n",
11040 				tname, PTR_ERR(ret));
11041 			err = -EINVAL;
11042 			goto err_put;
11043 		}
11044 		aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM;
11045 		aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize;
11046 	} else {
11047 		aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
11048 		aux->btf_var.btf = btf;
11049 		aux->btf_var.btf_id = type;
11050 	}
11051 
11052 	/* check whether we recorded this BTF (and maybe module) already */
11053 	for (i = 0; i < env->used_btf_cnt; i++) {
11054 		if (env->used_btfs[i].btf == btf) {
11055 			btf_put(btf);
11056 			return 0;
11057 		}
11058 	}
11059 
11060 	if (env->used_btf_cnt >= MAX_USED_BTFS) {
11061 		err = -E2BIG;
11062 		goto err_put;
11063 	}
11064 
11065 	btf_mod = &env->used_btfs[env->used_btf_cnt];
11066 	btf_mod->btf = btf;
11067 	btf_mod->module = NULL;
11068 
11069 	/* if we reference variables from kernel module, bump its refcount */
11070 	if (btf_is_module(btf)) {
11071 		btf_mod->module = btf_try_get_module(btf);
11072 		if (!btf_mod->module) {
11073 			err = -ENXIO;
11074 			goto err_put;
11075 		}
11076 	}
11077 
11078 	env->used_btf_cnt++;
11079 
11080 	return 0;
11081 err_put:
11082 	btf_put(btf);
11083 	return err;
11084 }
11085 
11086 static int check_map_prealloc(struct bpf_map *map)
11087 {
11088 	return (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH &&
11089 		map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH &&
11090 		map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS) ||
11091 		!(map->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC);
11092 }
11093 
11094 static bool is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type)
11095 {
11096 	switch (type) {
11097 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE:
11098 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT:
11099 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT:
11100 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT:
11101 		return true;
11102 	default:
11103 		return false;
11104 	}
11105 }
11106 
11107 static bool is_preallocated_map(struct bpf_map *map)
11108 {
11109 	if (!check_map_prealloc(map))
11110 		return false;
11111 	if (map->inner_map_meta && !check_map_prealloc(map->inner_map_meta))
11112 		return false;
11113 	return true;
11114 }
11115 
11116 static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11117 					struct bpf_map *map,
11118 					struct bpf_prog *prog)
11119 
11120 {
11121 	enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog);
11122 	/*
11123 	 * Validate that trace type programs use preallocated hash maps.
11124 	 *
11125 	 * For programs attached to PERF events this is mandatory as the
11126 	 * perf NMI can hit any arbitrary code sequence.
11127 	 *
11128 	 * All other trace types using preallocated hash maps are unsafe as
11129 	 * well because tracepoint or kprobes can be inside locked regions
11130 	 * of the memory allocator or at a place where a recursion into the
11131 	 * memory allocator would see inconsistent state.
11132 	 *
11133 	 * On RT enabled kernels run-time allocation of all trace type
11134 	 * programs is strictly prohibited due to lock type constraints. On
11135 	 * !RT kernels it is allowed for backwards compatibility reasons for
11136 	 * now, but warnings are emitted so developers are made aware of
11137 	 * the unsafety and can fix their programs before this is enforced.
11138 	 */
11139 	if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type) && !is_preallocated_map(map)) {
11140 		if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) {
11141 			verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n");
11142 			return -EINVAL;
11143 		}
11144 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT)) {
11145 			verbose(env, "trace type programs can only use preallocated hash map\n");
11146 			return -EINVAL;
11147 		}
11148 		WARN_ONCE(1, "trace type BPF program uses run-time allocation\n");
11149 		verbose(env, "trace type programs with run-time allocated hash maps are unsafe. Switch to preallocated hash maps.\n");
11150 	}
11151 
11152 	if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) {
11153 		if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) {
11154 			verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n");
11155 			return -EINVAL;
11156 		}
11157 
11158 		if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) {
11159 			verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n");
11160 			return -EINVAL;
11161 		}
11162 
11163 		if (prog->aux->sleepable) {
11164 			verbose(env, "sleepable progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n");
11165 			return -EINVAL;
11166 		}
11167 	}
11168 
11169 	if ((bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_dev_bound(map)) &&
11170 	    !bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) {
11171 		verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n");
11172 		return -EINVAL;
11173 	}
11174 
11175 	if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) {
11176 		verbose(env, "bpf_struct_ops map cannot be used in prog\n");
11177 		return -EINVAL;
11178 	}
11179 
11180 	if (prog->aux->sleepable)
11181 		switch (map->map_type) {
11182 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH:
11183 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH:
11184 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY:
11185 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH:
11186 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY:
11187 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH:
11188 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
11189 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
11190 			if (!is_preallocated_map(map)) {
11191 				verbose(env,
11192 					"Sleepable programs can only use preallocated maps\n");
11193 				return -EINVAL;
11194 			}
11195 			break;
11196 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF:
11197 			break;
11198 		default:
11199 			verbose(env,
11200 				"Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, and ringbuf maps\n");
11201 			return -EINVAL;
11202 		}
11203 
11204 	return 0;
11205 }
11206 
11207 static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map)
11208 {
11209 	return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE ||
11210 		map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE);
11211 }
11212 
11213 /* find and rewrite pseudo imm in ld_imm64 instructions:
11214  *
11215  * 1. if it accesses map FD, replace it with actual map pointer.
11216  * 2. if it accesses btf_id of a VAR, replace it with pointer to the var.
11217  *
11218  * NOTE: btf_vmlinux is required for converting pseudo btf_id.
11219  */
11220 static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11221 {
11222 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
11223 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
11224 	int i, j, err;
11225 
11226 	err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog);
11227 	if (err)
11228 		return err;
11229 
11230 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
11231 		if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
11232 		    (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
11233 			verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
11234 			return -EINVAL;
11235 		}
11236 
11237 		if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
11238 			struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux;
11239 			struct bpf_map *map;
11240 			struct fd f;
11241 			u64 addr;
11242 
11243 			if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
11244 			    insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
11245 			    insn[1].off != 0) {
11246 				verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
11247 				return -EINVAL;
11248 			}
11249 
11250 			if (insn[0].src_reg == 0)
11251 				/* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
11252 				goto next_insn;
11253 
11254 			if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) {
11255 				aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i];
11256 				err = check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux);
11257 				if (err)
11258 					return err;
11259 				goto next_insn;
11260 			}
11261 
11262 			if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) {
11263 				aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i];
11264 				aux->ptr_type = PTR_TO_FUNC;
11265 				goto next_insn;
11266 			}
11267 
11268 			/* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is
11269 			 * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn.
11270 			 */
11271 			if ((insn[0].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD &&
11272 			     insn[0].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE) ||
11273 			    (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD &&
11274 			     insn[1].imm != 0)) {
11275 				verbose(env,
11276 					"unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
11277 				return -EINVAL;
11278 			}
11279 
11280 			f = fdget(insn[0].imm);
11281 			map = __bpf_map_get(f);
11282 			if (IS_ERR(map)) {
11283 				verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
11284 					insn[0].imm);
11285 				return PTR_ERR(map);
11286 			}
11287 
11288 			err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog);
11289 			if (err) {
11290 				fdput(f);
11291 				return err;
11292 			}
11293 
11294 			aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i];
11295 			if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
11296 				addr = (unsigned long)map;
11297 			} else {
11298 				u32 off = insn[1].imm;
11299 
11300 				if (off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
11301 					verbose(env, "direct value offset of %u is not allowed\n", off);
11302 					fdput(f);
11303 					return -EINVAL;
11304 				}
11305 
11306 				if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) {
11307 					verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n");
11308 					fdput(f);
11309 					return -EINVAL;
11310 				}
11311 
11312 				err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off);
11313 				if (err) {
11314 					verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n",
11315 						map->value_size, off);
11316 					fdput(f);
11317 					return err;
11318 				}
11319 
11320 				aux->map_off = off;
11321 				addr += off;
11322 			}
11323 
11324 			insn[0].imm = (u32)addr;
11325 			insn[1].imm = addr >> 32;
11326 
11327 			/* check whether we recorded this map already */
11328 			for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++) {
11329 				if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
11330 					aux->map_index = j;
11331 					fdput(f);
11332 					goto next_insn;
11333 				}
11334 			}
11335 
11336 			if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
11337 				fdput(f);
11338 				return -E2BIG;
11339 			}
11340 
11341 			/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
11342 			 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it
11343 			 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
11344 			 * and all maps are released in free_used_maps()
11345 			 */
11346 			bpf_map_inc(map);
11347 
11348 			aux->map_index = env->used_map_cnt;
11349 			env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
11350 
11351 			if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) &&
11352 			    bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog->aux, map)) {
11353 				verbose(env, "only one cgroup storage of each type is allowed\n");
11354 				fdput(f);
11355 				return -EBUSY;
11356 			}
11357 
11358 			fdput(f);
11359 next_insn:
11360 			insn++;
11361 			i++;
11362 			continue;
11363 		}
11364 
11365 		/* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */
11366 		if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) {
11367 			verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code);
11368 			return -EINVAL;
11369 		}
11370 	}
11371 
11372 	/* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
11373 	 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
11374 	 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
11375 	 */
11376 	return 0;
11377 }
11378 
11379 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */
11380 static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11381 {
11382 	__bpf_free_used_maps(env->prog->aux, env->used_maps,
11383 			     env->used_map_cnt);
11384 }
11385 
11386 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */
11387 static void release_btfs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11388 {
11389 	__bpf_free_used_btfs(env->prog->aux, env->used_btfs,
11390 			     env->used_btf_cnt);
11391 }
11392 
11393 /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */
11394 static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11395 {
11396 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
11397 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
11398 	int i;
11399 
11400 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
11401 		if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW))
11402 			continue;
11403 		if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC)
11404 			continue;
11405 		insn->src_reg = 0;
11406 	}
11407 }
11408 
11409 /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range
11410  * insni[off, off + cnt).  Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying
11411  * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero
11412  */
11413 static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11414 				struct bpf_prog *new_prog, u32 off, u32 cnt)
11415 {
11416 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
11417 	struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi;
11418 	u32 old_seen = old_data[off].seen;
11419 	u32 prog_len;
11420 	int i;
11421 
11422 	/* aux info at OFF always needs adjustment, no matter fast path
11423 	 * (cnt == 1) is taken or not. There is no guarantee INSN at OFF is the
11424 	 * original insn at old prog.
11425 	 */
11426 	old_data[off].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + off + cnt - 1);
11427 
11428 	if (cnt == 1)
11429 		return 0;
11430 	prog_len = new_prog->len;
11431 	new_data = vzalloc(array_size(prog_len,
11432 				      sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data)));
11433 	if (!new_data)
11434 		return -ENOMEM;
11435 	memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
11436 	memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
11437 	       sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
11438 	for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) {
11439 		/* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */
11440 		new_data[i].seen = old_seen;
11441 		new_data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + i);
11442 	}
11443 	env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
11444 	vfree(old_data);
11445 	return 0;
11446 }
11447 
11448 static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len)
11449 {
11450 	int i;
11451 
11452 	if (len == 1)
11453 		return;
11454 	/* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */
11455 	for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
11456 		if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off)
11457 			continue;
11458 		env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1;
11459 	}
11460 }
11461 
11462 static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 len)
11463 {
11464 	struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *tab = prog->aux->poke_tab;
11465 	int i, sz = prog->aux->size_poke_tab;
11466 	struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *desc;
11467 
11468 	for (i = 0; i < sz; i++) {
11469 		desc = &tab[i];
11470 		desc->insn_idx += len - 1;
11471 	}
11472 }
11473 
11474 static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
11475 					    const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len)
11476 {
11477 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
11478 
11479 	new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len);
11480 	if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) {
11481 		if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE)
11482 			verbose(env,
11483 				"insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n",
11484 				env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx);
11485 		return NULL;
11486 	}
11487 	if (adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog, off, len))
11488 		return NULL;
11489 	adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len);
11490 	adjust_poke_descs(new_prog, len);
11491 	return new_prog;
11492 }
11493 
11494 static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11495 					      u32 off, u32 cnt)
11496 {
11497 	int i, j;
11498 
11499 	/* find first prog starting at or after off (first to remove) */
11500 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
11501 		if (env->subprog_info[i].start >= off)
11502 			break;
11503 	/* find first prog starting at or after off + cnt (first to stay) */
11504 	for (j = i; j < env->subprog_cnt; j++)
11505 		if (env->subprog_info[j].start >= off + cnt)
11506 			break;
11507 	/* if j doesn't start exactly at off + cnt, we are just removing
11508 	 * the front of previous prog
11509 	 */
11510 	if (env->subprog_info[j].start != off + cnt)
11511 		j--;
11512 
11513 	if (j > i) {
11514 		struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
11515 		int move;
11516 
11517 		/* move fake 'exit' subprog as well */
11518 		move = env->subprog_cnt + 1 - j;
11519 
11520 		memmove(env->subprog_info + i,
11521 			env->subprog_info + j,
11522 			sizeof(*env->subprog_info) * move);
11523 		env->subprog_cnt -= j - i;
11524 
11525 		/* remove func_info */
11526 		if (aux->func_info) {
11527 			move = aux->func_info_cnt - j;
11528 
11529 			memmove(aux->func_info + i,
11530 				aux->func_info + j,
11531 				sizeof(*aux->func_info) * move);
11532 			aux->func_info_cnt -= j - i;
11533 			/* func_info->insn_off is set after all code rewrites,
11534 			 * in adjust_btf_func() - no need to adjust
11535 			 */
11536 		}
11537 	} else {
11538 		/* convert i from "first prog to remove" to "first to adjust" */
11539 		if (env->subprog_info[i].start == off)
11540 			i++;
11541 	}
11542 
11543 	/* update fake 'exit' subprog as well */
11544 	for (; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++)
11545 		env->subprog_info[i].start -= cnt;
11546 
11547 	return 0;
11548 }
11549 
11550 static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
11551 				      u32 cnt)
11552 {
11553 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
11554 	u32 i, l_off, l_cnt, nr_linfo;
11555 	struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
11556 
11557 	nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
11558 	if (!nr_linfo)
11559 		return 0;
11560 
11561 	linfo = prog->aux->linfo;
11562 
11563 	/* find first line info to remove, count lines to be removed */
11564 	for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++)
11565 		if (linfo[i].insn_off >= off)
11566 			break;
11567 
11568 	l_off = i;
11569 	l_cnt = 0;
11570 	for (; i < nr_linfo; i++)
11571 		if (linfo[i].insn_off < off + cnt)
11572 			l_cnt++;
11573 		else
11574 			break;
11575 
11576 	/* First live insn doesn't match first live linfo, it needs to "inherit"
11577 	 * last removed linfo.  prog is already modified, so prog->len == off
11578 	 * means no live instructions after (tail of the program was removed).
11579 	 */
11580 	if (prog->len != off && l_cnt &&
11581 	    (i == nr_linfo || linfo[i].insn_off != off + cnt)) {
11582 		l_cnt--;
11583 		linfo[--i].insn_off = off + cnt;
11584 	}
11585 
11586 	/* remove the line info which refer to the removed instructions */
11587 	if (l_cnt) {
11588 		memmove(linfo + l_off, linfo + i,
11589 			sizeof(*linfo) * (nr_linfo - i));
11590 
11591 		prog->aux->nr_linfo -= l_cnt;
11592 		nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
11593 	}
11594 
11595 	/* pull all linfo[i].insn_off >= off + cnt in by cnt */
11596 	for (i = l_off; i < nr_linfo; i++)
11597 		linfo[i].insn_off -= cnt;
11598 
11599 	/* fix up all subprogs (incl. 'exit') which start >= off */
11600 	for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++)
11601 		if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx > l_off) {
11602 			/* program may have started in the removed region but
11603 			 * may not be fully removed
11604 			 */
11605 			if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx >= l_off + l_cnt)
11606 				env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx -= l_cnt;
11607 			else
11608 				env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx = l_off;
11609 		}
11610 
11611 	return 0;
11612 }
11613 
11614 static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt)
11615 {
11616 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
11617 	unsigned int orig_prog_len = env->prog->len;
11618 	int err;
11619 
11620 	if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux))
11621 		bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(env, off, cnt);
11622 
11623 	err = bpf_remove_insns(env->prog, off, cnt);
11624 	if (err)
11625 		return err;
11626 
11627 	err = adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(env, off, cnt);
11628 	if (err)
11629 		return err;
11630 
11631 	err = bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(env, off, cnt);
11632 	if (err)
11633 		return err;
11634 
11635 	memmove(aux_data + off,	aux_data + off + cnt,
11636 		sizeof(*aux_data) * (orig_prog_len - off - cnt));
11637 
11638 	return 0;
11639 }
11640 
11641 /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not
11642  * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can
11643  * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code
11644  * with 'ja -1'.
11645  *
11646  * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the
11647  * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then
11648  * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception
11649  * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead
11650  * code could be located.
11651  */
11652 static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11653 {
11654 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
11655 	struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1);
11656 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
11657 	const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
11658 	int i;
11659 
11660 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
11661 		if (aux_data[i].seen)
11662 			continue;
11663 		memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap));
11664 	}
11665 }
11666 
11667 static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code)
11668 {
11669 	u8 op;
11670 
11671 	if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32)
11672 		return true;
11673 
11674 	if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP)
11675 		return false;
11676 
11677 	op = BPF_OP(code);
11678 	return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL;
11679 }
11680 
11681 static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11682 {
11683 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
11684 	struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0);
11685 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
11686 	const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
11687 	int i;
11688 
11689 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
11690 		if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code))
11691 			continue;
11692 
11693 		if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen)
11694 			ja.off = insn->off;
11695 		else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen)
11696 			ja.off = 0;
11697 		else
11698 			continue;
11699 
11700 		if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux))
11701 			bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(env, i, &ja);
11702 
11703 		memcpy(insn, &ja, sizeof(ja));
11704 	}
11705 }
11706 
11707 static int opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11708 {
11709 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
11710 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
11711 	int i, err;
11712 
11713 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
11714 		int j;
11715 
11716 		j = 0;
11717 		while (i + j < insn_cnt && !aux_data[i + j].seen)
11718 			j++;
11719 		if (!j)
11720 			continue;
11721 
11722 		err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, j);
11723 		if (err)
11724 			return err;
11725 		insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
11726 	}
11727 
11728 	return 0;
11729 }
11730 
11731 static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11732 {
11733 	const struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0);
11734 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
11735 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
11736 	int i, err;
11737 
11738 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
11739 		if (memcmp(&insn[i], &ja, sizeof(ja)))
11740 			continue;
11741 
11742 		err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, 1);
11743 		if (err)
11744 			return err;
11745 		insn_cnt--;
11746 		i--;
11747 	}
11748 
11749 	return 0;
11750 }
11751 
11752 static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11753 					 const union bpf_attr *attr)
11754 {
11755 	struct bpf_insn *patch, zext_patch[2], rnd_hi32_patch[4];
11756 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data;
11757 	int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len;
11758 	struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
11759 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
11760 	bool rnd_hi32;
11761 
11762 	rnd_hi32 = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32;
11763 	zext_patch[1] = BPF_ZEXT_REG(0);
11764 	rnd_hi32_patch[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
11765 	rnd_hi32_patch[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32);
11766 	rnd_hi32_patch[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, 0, BPF_REG_AX);
11767 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
11768 		int adj_idx = i + delta;
11769 		struct bpf_insn insn;
11770 		int load_reg;
11771 
11772 		insn = insns[adj_idx];
11773 		load_reg = insn_def_regno(&insn);
11774 		if (!aux[adj_idx].zext_dst) {
11775 			u8 code, class;
11776 			u32 imm_rnd;
11777 
11778 			if (!rnd_hi32)
11779 				continue;
11780 
11781 			code = insn.code;
11782 			class = BPF_CLASS(code);
11783 			if (load_reg == -1)
11784 				continue;
11785 
11786 			/* NOTE: arg "reg" (the fourth one) is only used for
11787 			 *       BPF_STX + SRC_OP, so it is safe to pass NULL
11788 			 *       here.
11789 			 */
11790 			if (is_reg64(env, &insn, load_reg, NULL, DST_OP)) {
11791 				if (class == BPF_LD &&
11792 				    BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IMM)
11793 					i++;
11794 				continue;
11795 			}
11796 
11797 			/* ctx load could be transformed into wider load. */
11798 			if (class == BPF_LDX &&
11799 			    aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX)
11800 				continue;
11801 
11802 			imm_rnd = get_random_int();
11803 			rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn;
11804 			rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd;
11805 			rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = load_reg;
11806 			patch = rnd_hi32_patch;
11807 			patch_len = 4;
11808 			goto apply_patch_buffer;
11809 		}
11810 
11811 		/* Add in an zero-extend instruction if a) the JIT has requested
11812 		 * it or b) it's a CMPXCHG.
11813 		 *
11814 		 * The latter is because: BPF_CMPXCHG always loads a value into
11815 		 * R0, therefore always zero-extends. However some archs'
11816 		 * equivalent instruction only does this load when the
11817 		 * comparison is successful. This detail of CMPXCHG is
11818 		 * orthogonal to the general zero-extension behaviour of the
11819 		 * CPU, so it's treated independently of bpf_jit_needs_zext.
11820 		 */
11821 		if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext() && !is_cmpxchg_insn(&insn))
11822 			continue;
11823 
11824 		if (WARN_ON(load_reg == -1)) {
11825 			verbose(env, "verifier bug. zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined\n");
11826 			return -EFAULT;
11827 		}
11828 
11829 		zext_patch[0] = insn;
11830 		zext_patch[1].dst_reg = load_reg;
11831 		zext_patch[1].src_reg = load_reg;
11832 		patch = zext_patch;
11833 		patch_len = 2;
11834 apply_patch_buffer:
11835 		new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, adj_idx, patch, patch_len);
11836 		if (!new_prog)
11837 			return -ENOMEM;
11838 		env->prog = new_prog;
11839 		insns = new_prog->insnsi;
11840 		aux = env->insn_aux_data;
11841 		delta += patch_len - 1;
11842 	}
11843 
11844 	return 0;
11845 }
11846 
11847 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a
11848  * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure:
11849  *     struct __sk_buff    -> struct sk_buff
11850  *     struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock
11851  */
11852 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11853 {
11854 	const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops;
11855 	int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0;
11856 	const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
11857 	struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn;
11858 	u32 target_size, size_default, off;
11859 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
11860 	enum bpf_access_type type;
11861 	bool is_narrower_load;
11862 
11863 	if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) {
11864 		if (!ops->gen_prologue) {
11865 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
11866 			return -EINVAL;
11867 		}
11868 		cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write,
11869 					env->prog);
11870 		if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
11871 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
11872 			return -EINVAL;
11873 		} else if (cnt) {
11874 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt);
11875 			if (!new_prog)
11876 				return -ENOMEM;
11877 
11878 			env->prog = new_prog;
11879 			delta += cnt - 1;
11880 		}
11881 	}
11882 
11883 	if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux))
11884 		return 0;
11885 
11886 	insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta;
11887 
11888 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
11889 		bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access;
11890 
11891 		if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
11892 		    insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
11893 		    insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
11894 		    insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
11895 			type = BPF_READ;
11896 		else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
11897 			 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
11898 			 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
11899 			 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
11900 			type = BPF_WRITE;
11901 		else
11902 			continue;
11903 
11904 		if (type == BPF_WRITE &&
11905 		    env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off) {
11906 			struct bpf_insn patch[] = {
11907 				/* Sanitize suspicious stack slot with zero.
11908 				 * There are no memory dependencies for this store,
11909 				 * since it's only using frame pointer and immediate
11910 				 * constant of zero
11911 				 */
11912 				BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP,
11913 					   env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off,
11914 					   0),
11915 				/* the original STX instruction will immediately
11916 				 * overwrite the same stack slot with appropriate value
11917 				 */
11918 				*insn,
11919 			};
11920 
11921 			cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch);
11922 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt);
11923 			if (!new_prog)
11924 				return -ENOMEM;
11925 
11926 			delta    += cnt - 1;
11927 			env->prog = new_prog;
11928 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
11929 			continue;
11930 		}
11931 
11932 		switch (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) {
11933 		case PTR_TO_CTX:
11934 			if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
11935 				continue;
11936 			convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access;
11937 			break;
11938 		case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
11939 		case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
11940 			convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access;
11941 			break;
11942 		case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
11943 			convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
11944 			break;
11945 		case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
11946 			convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
11947 			break;
11948 		case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
11949 			if (type == BPF_READ) {
11950 				insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM |
11951 					BPF_SIZE((insn)->code);
11952 				env->prog->aux->num_exentries++;
11953 			} else if (resolve_prog_type(env->prog) != BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) {
11954 				verbose(env, "Writes through BTF pointers are not allowed\n");
11955 				return -EINVAL;
11956 			}
11957 			continue;
11958 		default:
11959 			continue;
11960 		}
11961 
11962 		ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size;
11963 		size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn);
11964 
11965 		/* If the read access is a narrower load of the field,
11966 		 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific
11967 		 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful,
11968 		 * we will apply proper mask to the result.
11969 		 */
11970 		is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size;
11971 		size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size);
11972 		off = insn->off;
11973 		if (is_narrower_load) {
11974 			u8 size_code;
11975 
11976 			if (type == BPF_WRITE) {
11977 				verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n");
11978 				return -EINVAL;
11979 			}
11980 
11981 			size_code = BPF_H;
11982 			if (ctx_field_size == 4)
11983 				size_code = BPF_W;
11984 			else if (ctx_field_size == 8)
11985 				size_code = BPF_DW;
11986 
11987 			insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1);
11988 			insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code;
11989 		}
11990 
11991 		target_size = 0;
11992 		cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog,
11993 					 &target_size);
11994 		if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) ||
11995 		    (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) {
11996 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
11997 			return -EINVAL;
11998 		}
11999 
12000 		if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) {
12001 			u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset(
12002 				off, size, size_default) * 8;
12003 			if (ctx_field_size <= 4) {
12004 				if (shift)
12005 					insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH,
12006 									insn->dst_reg,
12007 									shift);
12008 				insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
12009 								(1 << size * 8) - 1);
12010 			} else {
12011 				if (shift)
12012 					insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH,
12013 									insn->dst_reg,
12014 									shift);
12015 				insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
12016 								(1ULL << size * 8) - 1);
12017 			}
12018 		}
12019 
12020 		new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
12021 		if (!new_prog)
12022 			return -ENOMEM;
12023 
12024 		delta += cnt - 1;
12025 
12026 		/* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
12027 		env->prog = new_prog;
12028 		insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
12029 	}
12030 
12031 	return 0;
12032 }
12033 
12034 static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
12035 {
12036 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp;
12037 	int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog;
12038 	struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
12039 	struct bpf_insn *insn;
12040 	void *old_bpf_func;
12041 	int err, num_exentries;
12042 
12043 	if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1)
12044 		return 0;
12045 
12046 	for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
12047 		if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
12048 			env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm;
12049 			/* subprog is encoded in insn[1].imm */
12050 			continue;
12051 		}
12052 
12053 		if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
12054 			continue;
12055 		/* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but
12056 		 * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is
12057 		 * propagated in any case.
12058 		 */
12059 		subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1);
12060 		if (subprog < 0) {
12061 			WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
12062 				  i + insn->imm + 1);
12063 			return -EFAULT;
12064 		}
12065 		/* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of
12066 		 * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs
12067 		 */
12068 		insn->off = subprog;
12069 		/* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback
12070 		 * to interpreter will be needed
12071 		 */
12072 		env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm;
12073 		/* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */
12074 		insn->imm = 1;
12075 	}
12076 
12077 	err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog);
12078 	if (err)
12079 		goto out_undo_insn;
12080 
12081 	err = -ENOMEM;
12082 	func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL);
12083 	if (!func)
12084 		goto out_undo_insn;
12085 
12086 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
12087 		subprog_start = subprog_end;
12088 		subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start;
12089 
12090 		len = subprog_end - subprog_start;
12091 		/* BPF_PROG_RUN doesn't call subprogs directly,
12092 		 * hence main prog stats include the runtime of subprogs.
12093 		 * subprogs don't have IDs and not reachable via prog_get_next_id
12094 		 * func[i]->stats will never be accessed and stays NULL
12095 		 */
12096 		func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER);
12097 		if (!func[i])
12098 			goto out_free;
12099 		memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start],
12100 		       len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn));
12101 		func[i]->type = prog->type;
12102 		func[i]->len = len;
12103 		if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i]))
12104 			goto out_free;
12105 		func[i]->is_func = 1;
12106 		func[i]->aux->func_idx = i;
12107 		/* the btf and func_info will be freed only at prog->aux */
12108 		func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf;
12109 		func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info;
12110 
12111 		for (j = 0; j < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) {
12112 			u32 insn_idx = prog->aux->poke_tab[j].insn_idx;
12113 			int ret;
12114 
12115 			if (!(insn_idx >= subprog_start &&
12116 			      insn_idx <= subprog_end))
12117 				continue;
12118 
12119 			ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(func[i],
12120 							  &prog->aux->poke_tab[j]);
12121 			if (ret < 0) {
12122 				verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n");
12123 				goto out_free;
12124 			}
12125 
12126 			func[i]->insnsi[insn_idx - subprog_start].imm = ret + 1;
12127 
12128 			map_ptr = func[i]->aux->poke_tab[ret].tail_call.map;
12129 			ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, func[i]->aux);
12130 			if (ret < 0) {
12131 				verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n");
12132 				goto out_free;
12133 			}
12134 		}
12135 
12136 		/* Use bpf_prog_F_tag to indicate functions in stack traces.
12137 		 * Long term would need debug info to populate names
12138 		 */
12139 		func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F';
12140 		func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
12141 		func[i]->jit_requested = 1;
12142 		func[i]->aux->kfunc_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
12143 		func[i]->aux->linfo = prog->aux->linfo;
12144 		func[i]->aux->nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
12145 		func[i]->aux->jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo;
12146 		func[i]->aux->linfo_idx = env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx;
12147 		num_exentries = 0;
12148 		insn = func[i]->insnsi;
12149 		for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) {
12150 			if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
12151 			    BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM)
12152 				num_exentries++;
12153 		}
12154 		func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries;
12155 		func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable;
12156 		func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
12157 		if (!func[i]->jited) {
12158 			err = -ENOTSUPP;
12159 			goto out_free;
12160 		}
12161 		cond_resched();
12162 	}
12163 
12164 	/* Untrack main program's aux structs so that during map_poke_run()
12165 	 * we will not stumble upon the unfilled poke descriptors; each
12166 	 * of the main program's poke descs got distributed across subprogs
12167 	 * and got tracked onto map, so we are sure that none of them will
12168 	 * be missed after the operation below
12169 	 */
12170 	for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) {
12171 		map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map;
12172 
12173 		map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, prog->aux);
12174 	}
12175 
12176 	/* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed
12177 	 * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and
12178 	 * run last pass of JIT
12179 	 */
12180 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
12181 		insn = func[i]->insnsi;
12182 		for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) {
12183 			if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
12184 				subprog = insn[1].imm;
12185 				insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func;
12186 				insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32;
12187 				continue;
12188 			}
12189 			if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
12190 				continue;
12191 			subprog = insn->off;
12192 			insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(func[subprog]->bpf_func) -
12193 				    __bpf_call_base;
12194 		}
12195 
12196 		/* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses
12197 		 * of the JITed images for each function in the program
12198 		 *
12199 		 * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field
12200 		 * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start
12201 		 * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base
12202 		 *
12203 		 * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee
12204 		 * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of
12205 		 * the call instruction, as an index for this list
12206 		 */
12207 		func[i]->aux->func = func;
12208 		func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
12209 	}
12210 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
12211 		old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func;
12212 		tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
12213 		if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) {
12214 			verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
12215 			err = -ENOTSUPP;
12216 			goto out_free;
12217 		}
12218 		cond_resched();
12219 	}
12220 
12221 	/* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and
12222 	 * populate kallsysm
12223 	 */
12224 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
12225 		bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]);
12226 		bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]);
12227 	}
12228 
12229 	/* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main
12230 	 * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can
12231 	 * later look the same as if they were interpreted only.
12232 	 */
12233 	for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
12234 		if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
12235 			insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
12236 			insn[1].imm = find_subprog(env, i + insn[0].imm + 1);
12237 			continue;
12238 		}
12239 		if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
12240 			continue;
12241 		insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
12242 		subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1);
12243 		insn->imm = subprog;
12244 	}
12245 
12246 	prog->jited = 1;
12247 	prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func;
12248 	prog->aux->func = func;
12249 	prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
12250 	bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog);
12251 	return 0;
12252 out_free:
12253 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
12254 		if (!func[i])
12255 			continue;
12256 
12257 		for (j = 0; j < func[i]->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) {
12258 			map_ptr = func[i]->aux->poke_tab[j].tail_call.map;
12259 			map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, func[i]->aux);
12260 		}
12261 		bpf_jit_free(func[i]);
12262 	}
12263 	kfree(func);
12264 out_undo_insn:
12265 	/* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */
12266 	prog->jit_requested = 0;
12267 	for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
12268 		if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
12269 			continue;
12270 		insn->off = 0;
12271 		insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
12272 	}
12273 	bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog);
12274 	return err;
12275 }
12276 
12277 static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
12278 {
12279 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
12280 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
12281 	struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
12282 	bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog);
12283 	int i, depth;
12284 #endif
12285 	int err = 0;
12286 
12287 	if (env->prog->jit_requested &&
12288 	    !bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) {
12289 		err = jit_subprogs(env);
12290 		if (err == 0)
12291 			return 0;
12292 		if (err == -EFAULT)
12293 			return err;
12294 	}
12295 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
12296 	if (has_kfunc_call) {
12297 		verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
12298 		return -EINVAL;
12299 	}
12300 	if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) {
12301 		/* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls
12302 		 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
12303 		 */
12304 		verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
12305 		return -EINVAL;
12306 	}
12307 	for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
12308 		if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
12309 			/* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls
12310 			 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
12311 			 */
12312 			verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
12313 			return -EINVAL;
12314 		}
12315 
12316 		if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
12317 			continue;
12318 		depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i);
12319 		if (depth < 0)
12320 			return depth;
12321 		bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth);
12322 	}
12323 	err = 0;
12324 #endif
12325 	return err;
12326 }
12327 
12328 static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
12329 			    struct bpf_insn *insn)
12330 {
12331 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc;
12332 
12333 	/* insn->imm has the btf func_id. Replace it with
12334 	 * an address (relative to __bpf_base_call).
12335 	 */
12336 	desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm);
12337 	if (!desc) {
12338 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u\n",
12339 			insn->imm);
12340 		return -EFAULT;
12341 	}
12342 
12343 	insn->imm = desc->imm;
12344 
12345 	return 0;
12346 }
12347 
12348 /* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass.
12349  * These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations.
12350  */
12351 static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
12352 {
12353 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
12354 	bool expect_blinding = bpf_jit_blinding_enabled(prog);
12355 	struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
12356 	const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
12357 	const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
12358 	const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
12359 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux;
12360 	struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
12361 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
12362 	struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
12363 	int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0;
12364 
12365 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
12366 		/* Make divide-by-zero exceptions impossible. */
12367 		if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) ||
12368 		    insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) ||
12369 		    insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) ||
12370 		    insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) {
12371 			bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64;
12372 			bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV;
12373 			struct bpf_insn *patchlet;
12374 			struct bpf_insn chk_and_div[] = {
12375 				/* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */
12376 				BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
12377 					     BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg,
12378 					     0, 2, 0),
12379 				BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg),
12380 				BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1),
12381 				*insn,
12382 			};
12383 			struct bpf_insn chk_and_mod[] = {
12384 				/* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */
12385 				BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
12386 					     BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg,
12387 					     0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0),
12388 				*insn,
12389 				BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1),
12390 				BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg),
12391 			};
12392 
12393 			patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_div : chk_and_mod;
12394 			cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_div) :
12395 				      ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_mod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0);
12396 
12397 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt);
12398 			if (!new_prog)
12399 				return -ENOMEM;
12400 
12401 			delta    += cnt - 1;
12402 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
12403 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
12404 			continue;
12405 		}
12406 
12407 		/* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */
12408 		if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD &&
12409 		    (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS ||
12410 		     BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) {
12411 			cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf);
12412 			if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
12413 				verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
12414 				return -EINVAL;
12415 			}
12416 
12417 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
12418 			if (!new_prog)
12419 				return -ENOMEM;
12420 
12421 			delta    += cnt - 1;
12422 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
12423 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
12424 			continue;
12425 		}
12426 
12427 		/* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */
12428 		if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) ||
12429 		    insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) {
12430 			const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X;
12431 			const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X;
12432 			struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0];
12433 			bool issrc, isneg, isimm;
12434 			u32 off_reg;
12435 
12436 			aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
12437 			if (!aux->alu_state ||
12438 			    aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER)
12439 				continue;
12440 
12441 			isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE;
12442 			issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) ==
12443 				BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC;
12444 			isimm = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE;
12445 
12446 			off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg;
12447 			if (isimm) {
12448 				*patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit);
12449 			} else {
12450 				if (isneg)
12451 					*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
12452 				*patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit);
12453 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
12454 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
12455 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
12456 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63);
12457 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
12458 			}
12459 			if (!issrc)
12460 				*patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg);
12461 			insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX;
12462 			if (isneg)
12463 				insn->code = insn->code == code_add ?
12464 					     code_sub : code_add;
12465 			*patch++ = *insn;
12466 			if (issrc && isneg && !isimm)
12467 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
12468 			cnt = patch - insn_buf;
12469 
12470 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
12471 			if (!new_prog)
12472 				return -ENOMEM;
12473 
12474 			delta    += cnt - 1;
12475 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
12476 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
12477 			continue;
12478 		}
12479 
12480 		if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
12481 			continue;
12482 		if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
12483 			continue;
12484 		if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) {
12485 			ret = fixup_kfunc_call(env, insn);
12486 			if (ret)
12487 				return ret;
12488 			continue;
12489 		}
12490 
12491 		if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
12492 			prog->dst_needed = 1;
12493 		if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
12494 			bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
12495 		if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return)
12496 			prog->kprobe_override = 1;
12497 		if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
12498 			/* If we tail call into other programs, we
12499 			 * cannot make any assumptions since they can
12500 			 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in
12501 			 * the program array.
12502 			 */
12503 			prog->cb_access = 1;
12504 			if (!allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env))
12505 				prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK;
12506 			prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF;
12507 
12508 			/* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
12509 			 * conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal
12510 			 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
12511 			 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
12512 			 */
12513 			insn->imm = 0;
12514 			insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL;
12515 
12516 			aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
12517 			if (env->bpf_capable && !expect_blinding &&
12518 			    prog->jit_requested &&
12519 			    !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) &&
12520 			    !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) &&
12521 			    !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) {
12522 				struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = {
12523 					.reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL,
12524 					.tail_call.map = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state),
12525 					.tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux),
12526 					.insn_idx = i + delta,
12527 				};
12528 
12529 				ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(prog, &desc);
12530 				if (ret < 0) {
12531 					verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n");
12532 					return ret;
12533 				}
12534 
12535 				insn->imm = ret + 1;
12536 				continue;
12537 			}
12538 
12539 			if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux))
12540 				continue;
12541 
12542 			/* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call
12543 			 * emit two extra insns:
12544 			 * if (index >= max_entries) goto out;
12545 			 * index &= array->index_mask;
12546 			 * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation
12547 			 */
12548 			if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) {
12549 				verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n");
12550 				return -EINVAL;
12551 			}
12552 
12553 			map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state);
12554 			insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3,
12555 						  map_ptr->max_entries, 2);
12556 			insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3,
12557 						    container_of(map_ptr,
12558 								 struct bpf_array,
12559 								 map)->index_mask);
12560 			insn_buf[2] = *insn;
12561 			cnt = 3;
12562 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
12563 			if (!new_prog)
12564 				return -ENOMEM;
12565 
12566 			delta    += cnt - 1;
12567 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
12568 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
12569 			continue;
12570 		}
12571 
12572 		/* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup
12573 		 * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit
12574 		 * only.
12575 		 */
12576 		if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 &&
12577 		    (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem ||
12578 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem ||
12579 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem ||
12580 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem   ||
12581 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem    ||
12582 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem   ||
12583 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)) {
12584 			aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
12585 			if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux))
12586 				goto patch_call_imm;
12587 
12588 			map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state);
12589 			ops = map_ptr->ops;
12590 			if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
12591 			    ops->map_gen_lookup) {
12592 				cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf);
12593 				if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP)
12594 					goto patch_map_ops_generic;
12595 				if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
12596 					verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
12597 					return -EINVAL;
12598 				}
12599 
12600 				new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta,
12601 							       insn_buf, cnt);
12602 				if (!new_prog)
12603 					return -ENOMEM;
12604 
12605 				delta    += cnt - 1;
12606 				env->prog = prog = new_prog;
12607 				insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
12608 				continue;
12609 			}
12610 
12611 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem,
12612 				     (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL));
12613 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem,
12614 				     (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL));
12615 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem,
12616 				     (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value,
12617 					      u64 flags))NULL));
12618 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_push_elem,
12619 				     (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value,
12620 					      u64 flags))NULL));
12621 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_pop_elem,
12622 				     (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL));
12623 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_peek_elem,
12624 				     (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL));
12625 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_redirect,
12626 				     (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, u32 ifindex, u64 flags))NULL));
12627 
12628 patch_map_ops_generic:
12629 			switch (insn->imm) {
12630 			case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem:
12631 				insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_lookup_elem) -
12632 					    __bpf_call_base;
12633 				continue;
12634 			case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem:
12635 				insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_update_elem) -
12636 					    __bpf_call_base;
12637 				continue;
12638 			case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem:
12639 				insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_delete_elem) -
12640 					    __bpf_call_base;
12641 				continue;
12642 			case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem:
12643 				insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_push_elem) -
12644 					    __bpf_call_base;
12645 				continue;
12646 			case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem:
12647 				insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_pop_elem) -
12648 					    __bpf_call_base;
12649 				continue;
12650 			case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem:
12651 				insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_peek_elem) -
12652 					    __bpf_call_base;
12653 				continue;
12654 			case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map:
12655 				insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_redirect) -
12656 					    __bpf_call_base;
12657 				continue;
12658 			}
12659 
12660 			goto patch_call_imm;
12661 		}
12662 
12663 		/* Implement bpf_jiffies64 inline. */
12664 		if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 &&
12665 		    insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) {
12666 			struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = {
12667 				BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0,
12668 					     (unsigned long)&jiffies),
12669 			};
12670 
12671 			insn_buf[0] = ld_jiffies_addr[0];
12672 			insn_buf[1] = ld_jiffies_addr[1];
12673 			insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0,
12674 						  BPF_REG_0, 0);
12675 			cnt = 3;
12676 
12677 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf,
12678 						       cnt);
12679 			if (!new_prog)
12680 				return -ENOMEM;
12681 
12682 			delta    += cnt - 1;
12683 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
12684 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
12685 			continue;
12686 		}
12687 
12688 patch_call_imm:
12689 		fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog);
12690 		/* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
12691 		 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
12692 		 */
12693 		if (!fn->func) {
12694 			verbose(env,
12695 				"kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
12696 				func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
12697 			return -EFAULT;
12698 		}
12699 		insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
12700 	}
12701 
12702 	/* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */
12703 	for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) {
12704 		map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map;
12705 		if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track ||
12706 		    !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack ||
12707 		    !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) {
12708 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
12709 			return -EINVAL;
12710 		}
12711 
12712 		ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux);
12713 		if (ret < 0) {
12714 			verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n");
12715 			return ret;
12716 		}
12717 	}
12718 
12719 	sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm(env->prog);
12720 
12721 	return 0;
12722 }
12723 
12724 static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
12725 {
12726 	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
12727 	int i;
12728 
12729 	sl = env->free_list;
12730 	while (sl) {
12731 		sln = sl->next;
12732 		free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
12733 		kfree(sl);
12734 		sl = sln;
12735 	}
12736 	env->free_list = NULL;
12737 
12738 	if (!env->explored_states)
12739 		return;
12740 
12741 	for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) {
12742 		sl = env->explored_states[i];
12743 
12744 		while (sl) {
12745 			sln = sl->next;
12746 			free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
12747 			kfree(sl);
12748 			sl = sln;
12749 		}
12750 		env->explored_states[i] = NULL;
12751 	}
12752 }
12753 
12754 /* The verifier is using insn_aux_data[] to store temporary data during
12755  * verification and to store information for passes that run after the
12756  * verification like dead code sanitization. do_check_common() for subprogram N
12757  * may analyze many other subprograms. sanitize_insn_aux_data() clears all
12758  * temporary data after do_check_common() finds that subprogram N cannot be
12759  * verified independently. pass_cnt counts the number of times
12760  * do_check_common() was run and insn->aux->seen tells the pass number
12761  * insn_aux_data was touched. These variables are compared to clear temporary
12762  * data from failed pass. For testing and experiments do_check_common() can be
12763  * run multiple times even when prior attempt to verify is unsuccessful.
12764  *
12765  * Note that special handling is needed on !env->bypass_spec_v1 if this is
12766  * ever called outside of error path with subsequent program rejection.
12767  */
12768 static void sanitize_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
12769 {
12770 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
12771 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux;
12772 	int i, class;
12773 
12774 	for (i = 0; i < env->prog->len; i++) {
12775 		class = BPF_CLASS(insn[i].code);
12776 		if (class != BPF_LDX && class != BPF_STX)
12777 			continue;
12778 		aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i];
12779 		if (aux->seen != env->pass_cnt)
12780 			continue;
12781 		memset(aux, 0, offsetof(typeof(*aux), orig_idx));
12782 	}
12783 }
12784 
12785 static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
12786 {
12787 	bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2);
12788 	struct bpf_verifier_state *state;
12789 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
12790 	int ret, i;
12791 
12792 	env->prev_linfo = NULL;
12793 	env->pass_cnt++;
12794 
12795 	state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL);
12796 	if (!state)
12797 		return -ENOMEM;
12798 	state->curframe = 0;
12799 	state->speculative = false;
12800 	state->branches = 1;
12801 	state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL);
12802 	if (!state->frame[0]) {
12803 		kfree(state);
12804 		return -ENOMEM;
12805 	}
12806 	env->cur_state = state;
12807 	init_func_state(env, state->frame[0],
12808 			BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */,
12809 			0 /* frameno */,
12810 			subprog);
12811 
12812 	regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs;
12813 	if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) {
12814 		ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog, regs);
12815 		if (ret)
12816 			goto out;
12817 		for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) {
12818 			if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_CTX)
12819 				mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i);
12820 			else if (regs[i].type == SCALAR_VALUE)
12821 				mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i);
12822 			else if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL) {
12823 				const u32 mem_size = regs[i].mem_size;
12824 
12825 				mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i);
12826 				regs[i].mem_size = mem_size;
12827 				regs[i].id = ++env->id_gen;
12828 			}
12829 		}
12830 	} else {
12831 		/* 1st arg to a function */
12832 		regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX;
12833 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1);
12834 		ret = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, regs);
12835 		if (ret == -EFAULT)
12836 			/* unlikely verifier bug. abort.
12837 			 * ret == 0 and ret < 0 are sadly acceptable for
12838 			 * main() function due to backward compatibility.
12839 			 * Like socket filter program may be written as:
12840 			 * int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx)
12841 			 * and never dereference that ctx in the program.
12842 			 * 'struct pt_regs' is a type mismatch for socket
12843 			 * filter that should be using 'struct __sk_buff'.
12844 			 */
12845 			goto out;
12846 	}
12847 
12848 	ret = do_check(env);
12849 out:
12850 	/* check for NULL is necessary, since cur_state can be freed inside
12851 	 * do_check() under memory pressure.
12852 	 */
12853 	if (env->cur_state) {
12854 		free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true);
12855 		env->cur_state = NULL;
12856 	}
12857 	while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false));
12858 	if (!ret && pop_log)
12859 		bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0);
12860 	free_states(env);
12861 	if (ret)
12862 		/* clean aux data in case subprog was rejected */
12863 		sanitize_insn_aux_data(env);
12864 	return ret;
12865 }
12866 
12867 /* Verify all global functions in a BPF program one by one based on their BTF.
12868  * All global functions must pass verification. Otherwise the whole program is rejected.
12869  * Consider:
12870  * int bar(int);
12871  * int foo(int f)
12872  * {
12873  *    return bar(f);
12874  * }
12875  * int bar(int b)
12876  * {
12877  *    ...
12878  * }
12879  * foo() will be verified first for R1=any_scalar_value. During verification it
12880  * will be assumed that bar() already verified successfully and call to bar()
12881  * from foo() will be checked for type match only. Later bar() will be verified
12882  * independently to check that it's safe for R1=any_scalar_value.
12883  */
12884 static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
12885 {
12886 	struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
12887 	int i, ret;
12888 
12889 	if (!aux->func_info)
12890 		return 0;
12891 
12892 	for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
12893 		if (aux->func_info_aux[i].linkage != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL)
12894 			continue;
12895 		env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start;
12896 		WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0);
12897 		ret = do_check_common(env, i);
12898 		if (ret) {
12899 			return ret;
12900 		} else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
12901 			verbose(env,
12902 				"Func#%d is safe for any args that match its prototype\n",
12903 				i);
12904 		}
12905 	}
12906 	return 0;
12907 }
12908 
12909 static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
12910 {
12911 	int ret;
12912 
12913 	env->insn_idx = 0;
12914 	ret = do_check_common(env, 0);
12915 	if (!ret)
12916 		env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth;
12917 	return ret;
12918 }
12919 
12920 
12921 static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
12922 {
12923 	int i;
12924 
12925 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) {
12926 		verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n",
12927 			div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000));
12928 		verbose(env, "stack depth ");
12929 		for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
12930 			u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
12931 
12932 			verbose(env, "%d", depth);
12933 			if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt)
12934 				verbose(env, "+");
12935 		}
12936 		verbose(env, "\n");
12937 	}
12938 	verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d "
12939 		"total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n",
12940 		env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS,
12941 		env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states,
12942 		env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk);
12943 }
12944 
12945 static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
12946 {
12947 	const struct btf_type *t, *func_proto;
12948 	const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops;
12949 	const struct btf_member *member;
12950 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
12951 	u32 btf_id, member_idx;
12952 	const char *mname;
12953 
12954 	if (!prog->gpl_compatible) {
12955 		verbose(env, "struct ops programs must have a GPL compatible license\n");
12956 		return -EINVAL;
12957 	}
12958 
12959 	btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id;
12960 	st_ops = bpf_struct_ops_find(btf_id);
12961 	if (!st_ops) {
12962 		verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a supported struct\n",
12963 			btf_id);
12964 		return -ENOTSUPP;
12965 	}
12966 
12967 	t = st_ops->type;
12968 	member_idx = prog->expected_attach_type;
12969 	if (member_idx >= btf_type_vlen(t)) {
12970 		verbose(env, "attach to invalid member idx %u of struct %s\n",
12971 			member_idx, st_ops->name);
12972 		return -EINVAL;
12973 	}
12974 
12975 	member = &btf_type_member(t)[member_idx];
12976 	mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, member->name_off);
12977 	func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf_vmlinux, member->type,
12978 					       NULL);
12979 	if (!func_proto) {
12980 		verbose(env, "attach to invalid member %s(@idx %u) of struct %s\n",
12981 			mname, member_idx, st_ops->name);
12982 		return -EINVAL;
12983 	}
12984 
12985 	if (st_ops->check_member) {
12986 		int err = st_ops->check_member(t, member);
12987 
12988 		if (err) {
12989 			verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n",
12990 				mname, st_ops->name);
12991 			return err;
12992 		}
12993 	}
12994 
12995 	prog->aux->attach_func_proto = func_proto;
12996 	prog->aux->attach_func_name = mname;
12997 	env->ops = st_ops->verifier_ops;
12998 
12999 	return 0;
13000 }
13001 #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_"
13002 
13003 static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name)
13004 {
13005 	if (within_error_injection_list(addr) ||
13006 	    !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1))
13007 		return 0;
13008 
13009 	return -EINVAL;
13010 }
13011 
13012 /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on
13013  * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list
13014  */
13015 BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject)
13016 /* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context.
13017  * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view.
13018  */
13019 BTF_ID(func, __add_to_page_cache_locked)
13020 BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page)
13021 BTF_ID(func, should_failslab)
13022 BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject)
13023 
13024 static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id)
13025 {
13026 	return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id);
13027 }
13028 
13029 int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
13030 			    const struct bpf_prog *prog,
13031 			    const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog,
13032 			    u32 btf_id,
13033 			    struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info)
13034 {
13035 	bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT;
13036 	const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_";
13037 	int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i;
13038 	const struct btf_type *t;
13039 	bool conservative = true;
13040 	const char *tname;
13041 	struct btf *btf;
13042 	long addr = 0;
13043 
13044 	if (!btf_id) {
13045 		bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n");
13046 		return -EINVAL;
13047 	}
13048 	btf = tgt_prog ? tgt_prog->aux->btf : prog->aux->attach_btf;
13049 	if (!btf) {
13050 		bpf_log(log,
13051 			"FENTRY/FEXIT program can only be attached to another program annotated with BTF\n");
13052 		return -EINVAL;
13053 	}
13054 	t = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id);
13055 	if (!t) {
13056 		bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id);
13057 		return -EINVAL;
13058 	}
13059 	tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
13060 	if (!tname) {
13061 		bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id);
13062 		return -EINVAL;
13063 	}
13064 	if (tgt_prog) {
13065 		struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = tgt_prog->aux;
13066 
13067 		for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++)
13068 			if (aux->func_info[i].type_id == btf_id) {
13069 				subprog = i;
13070 				break;
13071 			}
13072 		if (subprog == -1) {
13073 			bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname);
13074 			return -EINVAL;
13075 		}
13076 		conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable;
13077 		if (prog_extension) {
13078 			if (conservative) {
13079 				bpf_log(log,
13080 					"Cannot replace static functions\n");
13081 				return -EINVAL;
13082 			}
13083 			if (!prog->jit_requested) {
13084 				bpf_log(log,
13085 					"Extension programs should be JITed\n");
13086 				return -EINVAL;
13087 			}
13088 		}
13089 		if (!tgt_prog->jited) {
13090 			bpf_log(log, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n");
13091 			return -EINVAL;
13092 		}
13093 		if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) {
13094 			/* Cannot fentry/fexit another fentry/fexit program.
13095 			 * Cannot attach program extension to another extension.
13096 			 * It's ok to attach fentry/fexit to extension program.
13097 			 */
13098 			bpf_log(log, "Cannot recursively attach\n");
13099 			return -EINVAL;
13100 		}
13101 		if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
13102 		    prog_extension &&
13103 		    (tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FENTRY ||
13104 		     tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT)) {
13105 			/* Program extensions can extend all program types
13106 			 * except fentry/fexit. The reason is the following.
13107 			 * The fentry/fexit programs are used for performance
13108 			 * analysis, stats and can be attached to any program
13109 			 * type except themselves. When extension program is
13110 			 * replacing XDP function it is necessary to allow
13111 			 * performance analysis of all functions. Both original
13112 			 * XDP program and its program extension. Hence
13113 			 * attaching fentry/fexit to BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is
13114 			 * allowed. If extending of fentry/fexit was allowed it
13115 			 * would be possible to create long call chain
13116 			 * fentry->extension->fentry->extension beyond
13117 			 * reasonable stack size. Hence extending fentry is not
13118 			 * allowed.
13119 			 */
13120 			bpf_log(log, "Cannot extend fentry/fexit\n");
13121 			return -EINVAL;
13122 		}
13123 	} else {
13124 		if (prog_extension) {
13125 			bpf_log(log, "Cannot replace kernel functions\n");
13126 			return -EINVAL;
13127 		}
13128 	}
13129 
13130 	switch (prog->expected_attach_type) {
13131 	case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP:
13132 		if (tgt_prog) {
13133 			bpf_log(log,
13134 				"Only FENTRY/FEXIT progs are attachable to another BPF prog\n");
13135 			return -EINVAL;
13136 		}
13137 		if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) {
13138 			bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n",
13139 				btf_id);
13140 			return -EINVAL;
13141 		}
13142 		if (strncmp(prefix, tname, sizeof(prefix) - 1)) {
13143 			bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n",
13144 				btf_id, tname);
13145 			return -EINVAL;
13146 		}
13147 		tname += sizeof(prefix) - 1;
13148 		t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
13149 		if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t))
13150 			/* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */
13151 			return -EINVAL;
13152 		t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
13153 		if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t))
13154 			/* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */
13155 			return -EINVAL;
13156 
13157 		break;
13158 	case BPF_TRACE_ITER:
13159 		if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) {
13160 			bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n",
13161 				btf_id);
13162 			return -EINVAL;
13163 		}
13164 		t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
13165 		if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t))
13166 			return -EINVAL;
13167 		ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel);
13168 		if (ret)
13169 			return ret;
13170 		break;
13171 	default:
13172 		if (!prog_extension)
13173 			return -EINVAL;
13174 		fallthrough;
13175 	case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
13176 	case BPF_LSM_MAC:
13177 	case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY:
13178 	case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT:
13179 		if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) {
13180 			bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n",
13181 				btf_id);
13182 			return -EINVAL;
13183 		}
13184 		if (prog_extension &&
13185 		    btf_check_type_match(log, prog, btf, t))
13186 			return -EINVAL;
13187 		t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
13188 		if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t))
13189 			return -EINVAL;
13190 
13191 		if ((prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type || prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type) &&
13192 		    (!tgt_prog || prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type != tgt_prog->type ||
13193 		     prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type != tgt_prog->expected_attach_type))
13194 			return -EINVAL;
13195 
13196 		if (tgt_prog && conservative)
13197 			t = NULL;
13198 
13199 		ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel);
13200 		if (ret < 0)
13201 			return ret;
13202 
13203 		if (tgt_prog) {
13204 			if (subprog == 0)
13205 				addr = (long) tgt_prog->bpf_func;
13206 			else
13207 				addr = (long) tgt_prog->aux->func[subprog]->bpf_func;
13208 		} else {
13209 			addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname);
13210 			if (!addr) {
13211 				bpf_log(log,
13212 					"The address of function %s cannot be found\n",
13213 					tname);
13214 				return -ENOENT;
13215 			}
13216 		}
13217 
13218 		if (prog->aux->sleepable) {
13219 			ret = -EINVAL;
13220 			switch (prog->type) {
13221 			case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
13222 				/* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable only if they are
13223 				 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist.
13224 				 */
13225 				if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) &&
13226 				    within_error_injection_list(addr))
13227 					ret = 0;
13228 				break;
13229 			case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
13230 				/* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs.
13231 				 * Only some of them are sleepable.
13232 				 */
13233 				if (bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(btf_id))
13234 					ret = 0;
13235 				break;
13236 			default:
13237 				break;
13238 			}
13239 			if (ret) {
13240 				bpf_log(log, "%s is not sleepable\n", tname);
13241 				return ret;
13242 			}
13243 		} else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) {
13244 			if (tgt_prog) {
13245 				bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n");
13246 				return -EINVAL;
13247 			}
13248 			ret = check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname);
13249 			if (ret) {
13250 				bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname);
13251 				return ret;
13252 			}
13253 		}
13254 
13255 		break;
13256 	}
13257 	tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr;
13258 	tgt_info->tgt_name = tname;
13259 	tgt_info->tgt_type = t;
13260 	return 0;
13261 }
13262 
13263 BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny)
13264 BTF_ID_UNUSED
13265 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
13266 BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable)
13267 BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable)
13268 #endif
13269 #if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU
13270 BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict)
13271 #endif
13272 BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny)
13273 
13274 static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
13275 {
13276 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
13277 	struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->dst_prog;
13278 	struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {};
13279 	u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id;
13280 	struct bpf_trampoline *tr;
13281 	int ret;
13282 	u64 key;
13283 
13284 	if (prog->aux->sleepable && prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
13285 	    prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) {
13286 		verbose(env, "Only fentry/fexit/fmod_ret and lsm programs can be sleepable\n");
13287 		return -EINVAL;
13288 	}
13289 
13290 	if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS)
13291 		return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env);
13292 
13293 	if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
13294 	    prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM &&
13295 	    prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT)
13296 		return 0;
13297 
13298 	ret = bpf_check_attach_target(&env->log, prog, tgt_prog, btf_id, &tgt_info);
13299 	if (ret)
13300 		return ret;
13301 
13302 	if (tgt_prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) {
13303 		/* to make freplace equivalent to their targets, they need to
13304 		 * inherit env->ops and expected_attach_type for the rest of the
13305 		 * verification
13306 		 */
13307 		env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type];
13308 		prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type;
13309 	}
13310 
13311 	/* store info about the attachment target that will be used later */
13312 	prog->aux->attach_func_proto = tgt_info.tgt_type;
13313 	prog->aux->attach_func_name = tgt_info.tgt_name;
13314 
13315 	if (tgt_prog) {
13316 		prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type = tgt_prog->type;
13317 		prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type;
13318 	}
13319 
13320 	if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) {
13321 		prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true;
13322 		return 0;
13323 	} else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) {
13324 		if (!bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog))
13325 			return -EINVAL;
13326 		return 0;
13327 	}
13328 
13329 	if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) {
13330 		ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog);
13331 		if (ret < 0)
13332 			return ret;
13333 	} else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
13334 		   btf_id_set_contains(&btf_id_deny, btf_id)) {
13335 		return -EINVAL;
13336 	}
13337 
13338 	key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, prog->aux->attach_btf, btf_id);
13339 	tr = bpf_trampoline_get(key, &tgt_info);
13340 	if (!tr)
13341 		return -ENOMEM;
13342 
13343 	prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr;
13344 	return 0;
13345 }
13346 
13347 struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void)
13348 {
13349 	if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) {
13350 		mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
13351 		if (!btf_vmlinux)
13352 			btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux();
13353 		mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
13354 	}
13355 	return btf_vmlinux;
13356 }
13357 
13358 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
13359 	      union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
13360 {
13361 	u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns();
13362 	struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
13363 	struct bpf_verifier_log *log;
13364 	int i, len, ret = -EINVAL;
13365 	bool is_priv;
13366 
13367 	/* no program is valid */
13368 	if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0)
13369 		return -EINVAL;
13370 
13371 	/* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small,
13372 	 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called
13373 	 */
13374 	env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
13375 	if (!env)
13376 		return -ENOMEM;
13377 	log = &env->log;
13378 
13379 	len = (*prog)->len;
13380 	env->insn_aux_data =
13381 		vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data), len));
13382 	ret = -ENOMEM;
13383 	if (!env->insn_aux_data)
13384 		goto err_free_env;
13385 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
13386 		env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i;
13387 	env->prog = *prog;
13388 	env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type];
13389 	is_priv = bpf_capable();
13390 
13391 	bpf_get_btf_vmlinux();
13392 
13393 	/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
13394 	if (!is_priv)
13395 		mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
13396 
13397 	if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) {
13398 		/* user requested verbose verifier output
13399 		 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace
13400 		 */
13401 		log->level = attr->log_level;
13402 		log->ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf;
13403 		log->len_total = attr->log_size;
13404 
13405 		ret = -EINVAL;
13406 		/* log attributes have to be sane */
13407 		if (log->len_total < 128 || log->len_total > UINT_MAX >> 2 ||
13408 		    !log->level || !log->ubuf || log->level & ~BPF_LOG_MASK)
13409 			goto err_unlock;
13410 	}
13411 
13412 	if (IS_ERR(btf_vmlinux)) {
13413 		/* Either gcc or pahole or kernel are broken. */
13414 		verbose(env, "in-kernel BTF is malformed\n");
13415 		ret = PTR_ERR(btf_vmlinux);
13416 		goto skip_full_check;
13417 	}
13418 
13419 	env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT);
13420 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
13421 		env->strict_alignment = true;
13422 	if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT)
13423 		env->strict_alignment = false;
13424 
13425 	env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks();
13426 	env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack();
13427 	env->allow_ptr_to_map_access = bpf_allow_ptr_to_map_access();
13428 	env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1();
13429 	env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4();
13430 	env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable();
13431 
13432 	if (is_priv)
13433 		env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ;
13434 
13435 	env->explored_states = kvcalloc(state_htab_size(env),
13436 				       sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
13437 				       GFP_USER);
13438 	ret = -ENOMEM;
13439 	if (!env->explored_states)
13440 		goto skip_full_check;
13441 
13442 	ret = add_subprog_and_kfunc(env);
13443 	if (ret < 0)
13444 		goto skip_full_check;
13445 
13446 	ret = check_subprogs(env);
13447 	if (ret < 0)
13448 		goto skip_full_check;
13449 
13450 	ret = check_btf_info(env, attr, uattr);
13451 	if (ret < 0)
13452 		goto skip_full_check;
13453 
13454 	ret = check_attach_btf_id(env);
13455 	if (ret)
13456 		goto skip_full_check;
13457 
13458 	ret = resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(env);
13459 	if (ret < 0)
13460 		goto skip_full_check;
13461 
13462 	if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) {
13463 		ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog);
13464 		if (ret)
13465 			goto skip_full_check;
13466 	}
13467 
13468 	ret = check_cfg(env);
13469 	if (ret < 0)
13470 		goto skip_full_check;
13471 
13472 	ret = do_check_subprogs(env);
13473 	ret = ret ?: do_check_main(env);
13474 
13475 	if (ret == 0 && bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux))
13476 		ret = bpf_prog_offload_finalize(env);
13477 
13478 skip_full_check:
13479 	kvfree(env->explored_states);
13480 
13481 	if (ret == 0)
13482 		ret = check_max_stack_depth(env);
13483 
13484 	/* instruction rewrites happen after this point */
13485 	if (is_priv) {
13486 		if (ret == 0)
13487 			opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(env);
13488 		if (ret == 0)
13489 			ret = opt_remove_dead_code(env);
13490 		if (ret == 0)
13491 			ret = opt_remove_nops(env);
13492 	} else {
13493 		if (ret == 0)
13494 			sanitize_dead_code(env);
13495 	}
13496 
13497 	if (ret == 0)
13498 		/* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
13499 		ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
13500 
13501 	if (ret == 0)
13502 		ret = do_misc_fixups(env);
13503 
13504 	/* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched
13505 	 * insns could be handled correctly.
13506 	 */
13507 	if (ret == 0 && !bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) {
13508 		ret = opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(env, attr);
13509 		env->prog->aux->verifier_zext = bpf_jit_needs_zext() ? !ret
13510 								     : false;
13511 	}
13512 
13513 	if (ret == 0)
13514 		ret = fixup_call_args(env);
13515 
13516 	env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time;
13517 	print_verification_stats(env);
13518 
13519 	if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log))
13520 		ret = -ENOSPC;
13521 	if (log->level && !log->ubuf) {
13522 		ret = -EFAULT;
13523 		goto err_release_maps;
13524 	}
13525 
13526 	if (ret)
13527 		goto err_release_maps;
13528 
13529 	if (env->used_map_cnt) {
13530 		/* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */
13531 		env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt,
13532 							  sizeof(env->used_maps[0]),
13533 							  GFP_KERNEL);
13534 
13535 		if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) {
13536 			ret = -ENOMEM;
13537 			goto err_release_maps;
13538 		}
13539 
13540 		memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps,
13541 		       sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt);
13542 		env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt;
13543 	}
13544 	if (env->used_btf_cnt) {
13545 		/* if program passed verifier, update used_btfs in bpf_prog_aux */
13546 		env->prog->aux->used_btfs = kmalloc_array(env->used_btf_cnt,
13547 							  sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]),
13548 							  GFP_KERNEL);
13549 		if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) {
13550 			ret = -ENOMEM;
13551 			goto err_release_maps;
13552 		}
13553 
13554 		memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_btfs, env->used_btfs,
13555 		       sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]) * env->used_btf_cnt);
13556 		env->prog->aux->used_btf_cnt = env->used_btf_cnt;
13557 	}
13558 	if (env->used_map_cnt || env->used_btf_cnt) {
13559 		/* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic
13560 		 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions
13561 		 */
13562 		convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env);
13563 	}
13564 
13565 	adjust_btf_func(env);
13566 
13567 err_release_maps:
13568 	if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps)
13569 		/* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release
13570 		 * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them.
13571 		 */
13572 		release_maps(env);
13573 	if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs)
13574 		release_btfs(env);
13575 
13576 	/* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets
13577 	   for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning
13578 	 */
13579 	if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT)
13580 		env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0;
13581 
13582 	*prog = env->prog;
13583 err_unlock:
13584 	if (!is_priv)
13585 		mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
13586 	vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
13587 err_free_env:
13588 	kfree(env);
13589 	return ret;
13590 }
13591