xref: /openbmc/linux/kernel/auditfilter.c (revision 1c2dd16a)
1 /* auditfilter.c -- filtering of audit events
2  *
3  * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc.
4  * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
5  * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation
6  *
7  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9  * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
10  * (at your option) any later version.
11  *
12  * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13  * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14  * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
15  * GNU General Public License for more details.
16  *
17  * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18  * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
19  * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
20  */
21 
22 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
23 
24 #include <linux/kernel.h>
25 #include <linux/audit.h>
26 #include <linux/kthread.h>
27 #include <linux/mutex.h>
28 #include <linux/fs.h>
29 #include <linux/namei.h>
30 #include <linux/netlink.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/slab.h>
33 #include <linux/security.h>
34 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
35 #include <net/sock.h>
36 #include "audit.h"
37 
38 /*
39  * Locking model:
40  *
41  * audit_filter_mutex:
42  *		Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist
43  *		data.  Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access
44  *		contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque
45  *		LSM rules during filtering.  If modified, these structures
46  *		must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist.
47  *		An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may
48  *		be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held.
49  */
50 
51 /* Audit filter lists, defined in <linux/audit.h> */
52 struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
53 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
54 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
55 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
56 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
57 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
58 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]),
59 #if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 6
60 #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
61 #endif
62 };
63 static struct list_head audit_rules_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
64 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[0]),
65 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[1]),
66 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[2]),
67 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[3]),
68 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[4]),
69 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[5]),
70 };
71 
72 DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
73 
74 static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
75 {
76 	switch (f->type) {
77 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
78 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
79 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
80 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
81 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
82 	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
83 	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
84 	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
85 	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
86 	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
87 		kfree(f->lsm_str);
88 		security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
89 	}
90 }
91 
92 static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
93 {
94 	int i;
95 	struct audit_krule *erule = &e->rule;
96 
97 	/* some rules don't have associated watches */
98 	if (erule->watch)
99 		audit_put_watch(erule->watch);
100 	if (erule->fields)
101 		for (i = 0; i < erule->field_count; i++)
102 			audit_free_lsm_field(&erule->fields[i]);
103 	kfree(erule->fields);
104 	kfree(erule->filterkey);
105 	kfree(e);
106 }
107 
108 void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
109 {
110 	struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
111 	audit_free_rule(e);
112 }
113 
114 /* Initialize an audit filterlist entry. */
115 static inline struct audit_entry *audit_init_entry(u32 field_count)
116 {
117 	struct audit_entry *entry;
118 	struct audit_field *fields;
119 
120 	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
121 	if (unlikely(!entry))
122 		return NULL;
123 
124 	fields = kcalloc(field_count, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
125 	if (unlikely(!fields)) {
126 		kfree(entry);
127 		return NULL;
128 	}
129 	entry->rule.fields = fields;
130 
131 	return entry;
132 }
133 
134 /* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space
135  * buffer. */
136 char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
137 {
138 	char *str;
139 
140 	if (!*bufp || (len == 0) || (len > *remain))
141 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
142 
143 	/* Of the currently implemented string fields, PATH_MAX
144 	 * defines the longest valid length.
145 	 */
146 	if (len > PATH_MAX)
147 		return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
148 
149 	str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
150 	if (unlikely(!str))
151 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
152 
153 	memcpy(str, *bufp, len);
154 	str[len] = 0;
155 	*bufp += len;
156 	*remain -= len;
157 
158 	return str;
159 }
160 
161 /* Translate an inode field to kernel representation. */
162 static inline int audit_to_inode(struct audit_krule *krule,
163 				 struct audit_field *f)
164 {
165 	if (krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT ||
166 	    krule->inode_f || krule->watch || krule->tree ||
167 	    (f->op != Audit_equal && f->op != Audit_not_equal))
168 		return -EINVAL;
169 
170 	krule->inode_f = f;
171 	return 0;
172 }
173 
174 static __u32 *classes[AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES];
175 
176 int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list)
177 {
178 	__u32 *p = kcalloc(AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE, sizeof(__u32), GFP_KERNEL);
179 	if (!p)
180 		return -ENOMEM;
181 	while (*list != ~0U) {
182 		unsigned n = *list++;
183 		if (n >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES) {
184 			kfree(p);
185 			return -EINVAL;
186 		}
187 		p[AUDIT_WORD(n)] |= AUDIT_BIT(n);
188 	}
189 	if (class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || classes[class]) {
190 		kfree(p);
191 		return -EINVAL;
192 	}
193 	classes[class] = p;
194 	return 0;
195 }
196 
197 int audit_match_class(int class, unsigned syscall)
198 {
199 	if (unlikely(syscall >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32))
200 		return 0;
201 	if (unlikely(class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || !classes[class]))
202 		return 0;
203 	return classes[class][AUDIT_WORD(syscall)] & AUDIT_BIT(syscall);
204 }
205 
206 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
207 static inline int audit_match_class_bits(int class, u32 *mask)
208 {
209 	int i;
210 
211 	if (classes[class]) {
212 		for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
213 			if (mask[i] & classes[class][i])
214 				return 0;
215 	}
216 	return 1;
217 }
218 
219 static int audit_match_signal(struct audit_entry *entry)
220 {
221 	struct audit_field *arch = entry->rule.arch_f;
222 
223 	if (!arch) {
224 		/* When arch is unspecified, we must check both masks on biarch
225 		 * as syscall number alone is ambiguous. */
226 		return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL,
227 					       entry->rule.mask) &&
228 			audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32,
229 					       entry->rule.mask));
230 	}
231 
232 	switch(audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) {
233 	case 0: /* native */
234 		return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL,
235 					       entry->rule.mask));
236 	case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
237 		return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32,
238 					       entry->rule.mask));
239 	default:
240 		return 1;
241 	}
242 }
243 #endif
244 
245 /* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */
246 static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule_data *rule)
247 {
248 	unsigned listnr;
249 	struct audit_entry *entry;
250 	int i, err;
251 
252 	err = -EINVAL;
253 	listnr = rule->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
254 	switch(listnr) {
255 	default:
256 		goto exit_err;
257 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
258 	case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY:
259 		if (rule->action == AUDIT_ALWAYS)
260 			goto exit_err;
261 	case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT:
262 	case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK:
263 #endif
264 	case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
265 	case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE:
266 		;
267 	}
268 	if (unlikely(rule->action == AUDIT_POSSIBLE)) {
269 		pr_err("AUDIT_POSSIBLE is deprecated\n");
270 		goto exit_err;
271 	}
272 	if (rule->action != AUDIT_NEVER && rule->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
273 		goto exit_err;
274 	if (rule->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
275 		goto exit_err;
276 
277 	err = -ENOMEM;
278 	entry = audit_init_entry(rule->field_count);
279 	if (!entry)
280 		goto exit_err;
281 
282 	entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
283 	entry->rule.listnr = listnr;
284 	entry->rule.action = rule->action;
285 	entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count;
286 
287 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
288 		entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i];
289 
290 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES; i++) {
291 		int bit = AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - i - 1;
292 		__u32 *p = &entry->rule.mask[AUDIT_WORD(bit)];
293 		__u32 *class;
294 
295 		if (!(*p & AUDIT_BIT(bit)))
296 			continue;
297 		*p &= ~AUDIT_BIT(bit);
298 		class = classes[i];
299 		if (class) {
300 			int j;
301 			for (j = 0; j < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; j++)
302 				entry->rule.mask[j] |= class[j];
303 		}
304 	}
305 
306 	return entry;
307 
308 exit_err:
309 	return ERR_PTR(err);
310 }
311 
312 static u32 audit_ops[] =
313 {
314 	[Audit_equal] = AUDIT_EQUAL,
315 	[Audit_not_equal] = AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL,
316 	[Audit_bitmask] = AUDIT_BIT_MASK,
317 	[Audit_bittest] = AUDIT_BIT_TEST,
318 	[Audit_lt] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN,
319 	[Audit_gt] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN,
320 	[Audit_le] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
321 	[Audit_ge] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
322 };
323 
324 static u32 audit_to_op(u32 op)
325 {
326 	u32 n;
327 	for (n = Audit_equal; n < Audit_bad && audit_ops[n] != op; n++)
328 		;
329 	return n;
330 }
331 
332 /* check if an audit field is valid */
333 static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f)
334 {
335 	switch(f->type) {
336 	case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
337 		if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE &&
338 		    entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_USER)
339 			return -EINVAL;
340 		break;
341 	};
342 
343 	switch(f->type) {
344 	default:
345 		return -EINVAL;
346 	case AUDIT_UID:
347 	case AUDIT_EUID:
348 	case AUDIT_SUID:
349 	case AUDIT_FSUID:
350 	case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
351 	case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
352 	case AUDIT_GID:
353 	case AUDIT_EGID:
354 	case AUDIT_SGID:
355 	case AUDIT_FSGID:
356 	case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
357 	case AUDIT_PID:
358 	case AUDIT_PERS:
359 	case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
360 	case AUDIT_PPID:
361 	case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
362 	case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
363 	case AUDIT_EXIT:
364 	case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
365 	case AUDIT_INODE:
366 	case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
367 		/* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */
368 		if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
369 			return -EINVAL;
370 		break;
371 	case AUDIT_ARG0:
372 	case AUDIT_ARG1:
373 	case AUDIT_ARG2:
374 	case AUDIT_ARG3:
375 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
376 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
377 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
378 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
379 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
380 	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
381 	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
382 	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
383 	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
384 	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
385 	case AUDIT_WATCH:
386 	case AUDIT_DIR:
387 	case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
388 		break;
389 	case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
390 		if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1))
391 			return -EINVAL;
392 	/* FALL THROUGH */
393 	case AUDIT_ARCH:
394 		if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
395 			return -EINVAL;
396 		break;
397 	case AUDIT_PERM:
398 		if (f->val & ~15)
399 			return -EINVAL;
400 		break;
401 	case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
402 		if (f->val & ~S_IFMT)
403 			return -EINVAL;
404 		break;
405 	case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
406 		if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE)
407 			return -EINVAL;
408 		break;
409 	case AUDIT_EXE:
410 		if (f->op != Audit_equal)
411 			return -EINVAL;
412 		if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT)
413 			return -EINVAL;
414 		break;
415 	};
416 	return 0;
417 }
418 
419 /* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule representation. */
420 static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
421 					       size_t datasz)
422 {
423 	int err = 0;
424 	struct audit_entry *entry;
425 	void *bufp;
426 	size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data);
427 	int i;
428 	char *str;
429 	struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark;
430 
431 	entry = audit_to_entry_common(data);
432 	if (IS_ERR(entry))
433 		goto exit_nofree;
434 
435 	bufp = data->buf;
436 	for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
437 		struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
438 
439 		err = -EINVAL;
440 
441 		f->op = audit_to_op(data->fieldflags[i]);
442 		if (f->op == Audit_bad)
443 			goto exit_free;
444 
445 		f->type = data->fields[i];
446 		f->val = data->values[i];
447 
448 		/* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */
449 		if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) {
450 			f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
451 			f->val = 0;
452 			entry->rule.pflags |= AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY;
453 		}
454 
455 		err = audit_field_valid(entry, f);
456 		if (err)
457 			goto exit_free;
458 
459 		err = -EINVAL;
460 		switch (f->type) {
461 		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
462 		case AUDIT_UID:
463 		case AUDIT_EUID:
464 		case AUDIT_SUID:
465 		case AUDIT_FSUID:
466 		case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
467 			f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
468 			if (!uid_valid(f->uid))
469 				goto exit_free;
470 			break;
471 		case AUDIT_GID:
472 		case AUDIT_EGID:
473 		case AUDIT_SGID:
474 		case AUDIT_FSGID:
475 		case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
476 			f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
477 			if (!gid_valid(f->gid))
478 				goto exit_free;
479 			break;
480 		case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
481 		case AUDIT_ARCH:
482 			entry->rule.arch_f = f;
483 			break;
484 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
485 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
486 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
487 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
488 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
489 		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
490 		case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
491 		case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
492 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
493 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
494 			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
495 			if (IS_ERR(str))
496 				goto exit_free;
497 			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
498 
499 			err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
500 						       (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
501 			/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
502 			 * become valid after a policy reload. */
503 			if (err == -EINVAL) {
504 				pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n",
505 					str);
506 				err = 0;
507 			}
508 			if (err) {
509 				kfree(str);
510 				goto exit_free;
511 			} else
512 				f->lsm_str = str;
513 			break;
514 		case AUDIT_WATCH:
515 			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
516 			if (IS_ERR(str))
517 				goto exit_free;
518 			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
519 
520 			err = audit_to_watch(&entry->rule, str, f->val, f->op);
521 			if (err) {
522 				kfree(str);
523 				goto exit_free;
524 			}
525 			break;
526 		case AUDIT_DIR:
527 			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
528 			if (IS_ERR(str))
529 				goto exit_free;
530 			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
531 
532 			err = audit_make_tree(&entry->rule, str, f->op);
533 			kfree(str);
534 			if (err)
535 				goto exit_free;
536 			break;
537 		case AUDIT_INODE:
538 			err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
539 			if (err)
540 				goto exit_free;
541 			break;
542 		case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
543 			if (entry->rule.filterkey || f->val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN)
544 				goto exit_free;
545 			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
546 			if (IS_ERR(str))
547 				goto exit_free;
548 			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
549 			entry->rule.filterkey = str;
550 			break;
551 		case AUDIT_EXE:
552 			if (entry->rule.exe || f->val > PATH_MAX)
553 				goto exit_free;
554 			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
555 			if (IS_ERR(str)) {
556 				err = PTR_ERR(str);
557 				goto exit_free;
558 			}
559 			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
560 
561 			audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(&entry->rule, str, f->val);
562 			if (IS_ERR(audit_mark)) {
563 				kfree(str);
564 				err = PTR_ERR(audit_mark);
565 				goto exit_free;
566 			}
567 			entry->rule.exe = audit_mark;
568 			break;
569 		}
570 	}
571 
572 	if (entry->rule.inode_f && entry->rule.inode_f->op == Audit_not_equal)
573 		entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
574 
575 exit_nofree:
576 	return entry;
577 
578 exit_free:
579 	if (entry->rule.tree)
580 		audit_put_tree(entry->rule.tree); /* that's the temporary one */
581 	if (entry->rule.exe)
582 		audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe); /* that's the template one */
583 	audit_free_rule(entry);
584 	return ERR_PTR(err);
585 }
586 
587 /* Pack a filter field's string representation into data block. */
588 static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, const char *str)
589 {
590 	size_t len = strlen(str);
591 
592 	memcpy(*bufp, str, len);
593 	*bufp += len;
594 
595 	return len;
596 }
597 
598 /* Translate kernel rule representation to struct audit_rule_data. */
599 static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
600 {
601 	struct audit_rule_data *data;
602 	void *bufp;
603 	int i;
604 
605 	data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data) + krule->buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
606 	if (unlikely(!data))
607 		return NULL;
608 	memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
609 
610 	data->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
611 	data->action = krule->action;
612 	data->field_count = krule->field_count;
613 	bufp = data->buf;
614 	for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
615 		struct audit_field *f = &krule->fields[i];
616 
617 		data->fields[i] = f->type;
618 		data->fieldflags[i] = audit_ops[f->op];
619 		switch(f->type) {
620 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
621 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
622 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
623 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
624 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
625 		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
626 		case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
627 		case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
628 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
629 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
630 			data->buflen += data->values[i] =
631 				audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str);
632 			break;
633 		case AUDIT_WATCH:
634 			data->buflen += data->values[i] =
635 				audit_pack_string(&bufp,
636 						  audit_watch_path(krule->watch));
637 			break;
638 		case AUDIT_DIR:
639 			data->buflen += data->values[i] =
640 				audit_pack_string(&bufp,
641 						  audit_tree_path(krule->tree));
642 			break;
643 		case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
644 			data->buflen += data->values[i] =
645 				audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
646 			break;
647 		case AUDIT_EXE:
648 			data->buflen += data->values[i] =
649 				audit_pack_string(&bufp, audit_mark_path(krule->exe));
650 			break;
651 		case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
652 			if (krule->pflags & AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY && !f->val) {
653 				data->fields[i] = AUDIT_LOGINUID;
654 				data->values[i] = AUDIT_UID_UNSET;
655 				break;
656 			}
657 			/* fallthrough if set */
658 		default:
659 			data->values[i] = f->val;
660 		}
661 	}
662 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
663 
664 	return data;
665 }
666 
667 /* Compare two rules in kernel format.  Considered success if rules
668  * don't match. */
669 static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
670 {
671 	int i;
672 
673 	if (a->flags != b->flags ||
674 	    a->pflags != b->pflags ||
675 	    a->listnr != b->listnr ||
676 	    a->action != b->action ||
677 	    a->field_count != b->field_count)
678 		return 1;
679 
680 	for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
681 		if (a->fields[i].type != b->fields[i].type ||
682 		    a->fields[i].op != b->fields[i].op)
683 			return 1;
684 
685 		switch(a->fields[i].type) {
686 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
687 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
688 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
689 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
690 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
691 		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
692 		case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
693 		case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
694 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
695 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
696 			if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str))
697 				return 1;
698 			break;
699 		case AUDIT_WATCH:
700 			if (strcmp(audit_watch_path(a->watch),
701 				   audit_watch_path(b->watch)))
702 				return 1;
703 			break;
704 		case AUDIT_DIR:
705 			if (strcmp(audit_tree_path(a->tree),
706 				   audit_tree_path(b->tree)))
707 				return 1;
708 			break;
709 		case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
710 			/* both filterkeys exist based on above type compare */
711 			if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey))
712 				return 1;
713 			break;
714 		case AUDIT_EXE:
715 			/* both paths exist based on above type compare */
716 			if (strcmp(audit_mark_path(a->exe),
717 				   audit_mark_path(b->exe)))
718 				return 1;
719 			break;
720 		case AUDIT_UID:
721 		case AUDIT_EUID:
722 		case AUDIT_SUID:
723 		case AUDIT_FSUID:
724 		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
725 		case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
726 			if (!uid_eq(a->fields[i].uid, b->fields[i].uid))
727 				return 1;
728 			break;
729 		case AUDIT_GID:
730 		case AUDIT_EGID:
731 		case AUDIT_SGID:
732 		case AUDIT_FSGID:
733 		case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
734 			if (!gid_eq(a->fields[i].gid, b->fields[i].gid))
735 				return 1;
736 			break;
737 		default:
738 			if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val)
739 				return 1;
740 		}
741 	}
742 
743 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
744 		if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
745 			return 1;
746 
747 	return 0;
748 }
749 
750 /* Duplicate LSM field information.  The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
751  * re-initialized. */
752 static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
753 					   struct audit_field *sf)
754 {
755 	int ret = 0;
756 	char *lsm_str;
757 
758 	/* our own copy of lsm_str */
759 	lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL);
760 	if (unlikely(!lsm_str))
761 		return -ENOMEM;
762 	df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
763 
764 	/* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
765 	ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
766 				       (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
767 	/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
768 	 * become valid after a policy reload. */
769 	if (ret == -EINVAL) {
770 		pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n",
771 			df->lsm_str);
772 		ret = 0;
773 	}
774 
775 	return ret;
776 }
777 
778 /* Duplicate an audit rule.  This will be a deep copy with the exception
779  * of the watch - that pointer is carried over.  The LSM specific fields
780  * will be updated in the copy.  The point is to be able to replace the old
781  * rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule.
782  * The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from
783  * the initial copy. */
784 struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
785 {
786 	u32 fcount = old->field_count;
787 	struct audit_entry *entry;
788 	struct audit_krule *new;
789 	char *fk;
790 	int i, err = 0;
791 
792 	entry = audit_init_entry(fcount);
793 	if (unlikely(!entry))
794 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
795 
796 	new = &entry->rule;
797 	new->flags = old->flags;
798 	new->pflags = old->pflags;
799 	new->listnr = old->listnr;
800 	new->action = old->action;
801 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
802 		new->mask[i] = old->mask[i];
803 	new->prio = old->prio;
804 	new->buflen = old->buflen;
805 	new->inode_f = old->inode_f;
806 	new->field_count = old->field_count;
807 
808 	/*
809 	 * note that we are OK with not refcounting here; audit_match_tree()
810 	 * never dereferences tree and we can't get false positives there
811 	 * since we'd have to have rule gone from the list *and* removed
812 	 * before the chunks found by lookup had been allocated, i.e. before
813 	 * the beginning of list scan.
814 	 */
815 	new->tree = old->tree;
816 	memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
817 
818 	/* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
819 	 * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
820 	for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
821 		switch (new->fields[i].type) {
822 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
823 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
824 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
825 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
826 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
827 		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
828 		case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
829 		case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
830 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
831 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
832 			err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i],
833 						       &old->fields[i]);
834 			break;
835 		case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
836 			fk = kstrdup(old->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
837 			if (unlikely(!fk))
838 				err = -ENOMEM;
839 			else
840 				new->filterkey = fk;
841 			break;
842 		case AUDIT_EXE:
843 			err = audit_dupe_exe(new, old);
844 			break;
845 		}
846 		if (err) {
847 			if (new->exe)
848 				audit_remove_mark(new->exe);
849 			audit_free_rule(entry);
850 			return ERR_PTR(err);
851 		}
852 	}
853 
854 	if (old->watch) {
855 		audit_get_watch(old->watch);
856 		new->watch = old->watch;
857 	}
858 
859 	return entry;
860 }
861 
862 /* Find an existing audit rule.
863  * Caller must hold audit_filter_mutex to prevent stale rule data. */
864 static struct audit_entry *audit_find_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
865 					   struct list_head **p)
866 {
867 	struct audit_entry *e, *found = NULL;
868 	struct list_head *list;
869 	int h;
870 
871 	if (entry->rule.inode_f) {
872 		h = audit_hash_ino(entry->rule.inode_f->val);
873 		*p = list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
874 	} else if (entry->rule.watch) {
875 		/* we don't know the inode number, so must walk entire hash */
876 		for (h = 0; h < AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; h++) {
877 			list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
878 			list_for_each_entry(e, list, list)
879 				if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) {
880 					found = e;
881 					goto out;
882 				}
883 		}
884 		goto out;
885 	} else {
886 		*p = list = &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr];
887 	}
888 
889 	list_for_each_entry(e, list, list)
890 		if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) {
891 			found = e;
892 			goto out;
893 		}
894 
895 out:
896 	return found;
897 }
898 
899 static u64 prio_low = ~0ULL/2;
900 static u64 prio_high = ~0ULL/2 - 1;
901 
902 /* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate. */
903 static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
904 {
905 	struct audit_entry *e;
906 	struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch;
907 	struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
908 	struct list_head *list;
909 	int err = 0;
910 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
911 	int dont_count = 0;
912 
913 	/* If either of these, don't count towards total */
914 	if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_USER ||
915 		entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE)
916 		dont_count = 1;
917 #endif
918 
919 	mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
920 	e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list);
921 	if (e) {
922 		mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
923 		err = -EEXIST;
924 		/* normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it on failure */
925 		if (tree)
926 			audit_put_tree(tree);
927 		return err;
928 	}
929 
930 	if (watch) {
931 		/* audit_filter_mutex is dropped and re-taken during this call */
932 		err = audit_add_watch(&entry->rule, &list);
933 		if (err) {
934 			mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
935 			/*
936 			 * normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it
937 			 * on failure
938 			 */
939 			if (tree)
940 				audit_put_tree(tree);
941 			return err;
942 		}
943 	}
944 	if (tree) {
945 		err = audit_add_tree_rule(&entry->rule);
946 		if (err) {
947 			mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
948 			return err;
949 		}
950 	}
951 
952 	entry->rule.prio = ~0ULL;
953 	if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT) {
954 		if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND)
955 			entry->rule.prio = ++prio_high;
956 		else
957 			entry->rule.prio = --prio_low;
958 	}
959 
960 	if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
961 		list_add(&entry->rule.list,
962 			 &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
963 		list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
964 		entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
965 	} else {
966 		list_add_tail(&entry->rule.list,
967 			      &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
968 		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
969 	}
970 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
971 	if (!dont_count)
972 		audit_n_rules++;
973 
974 	if (!audit_match_signal(entry))
975 		audit_signals++;
976 #endif
977 	mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
978 
979 	return err;
980 }
981 
982 /* Remove an existing rule from filterlist. */
983 int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
984 {
985 	struct audit_entry  *e;
986 	struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
987 	struct list_head *list;
988 	int ret = 0;
989 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
990 	int dont_count = 0;
991 
992 	/* If either of these, don't count towards total */
993 	if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_USER ||
994 		entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE)
995 		dont_count = 1;
996 #endif
997 
998 	mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
999 	e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list);
1000 	if (!e) {
1001 		ret = -ENOENT;
1002 		goto out;
1003 	}
1004 
1005 	if (e->rule.watch)
1006 		audit_remove_watch_rule(&e->rule);
1007 
1008 	if (e->rule.tree)
1009 		audit_remove_tree_rule(&e->rule);
1010 
1011 	if (e->rule.exe)
1012 		audit_remove_mark_rule(&e->rule);
1013 
1014 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
1015 	if (!dont_count)
1016 		audit_n_rules--;
1017 
1018 	if (!audit_match_signal(entry))
1019 		audit_signals--;
1020 #endif
1021 
1022 	list_del_rcu(&e->list);
1023 	list_del(&e->rule.list);
1024 	call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
1025 
1026 out:
1027 	mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1028 
1029 	if (tree)
1030 		audit_put_tree(tree);	/* that's the temporary one */
1031 
1032 	return ret;
1033 }
1034 
1035 /* List rules using struct audit_rule_data. */
1036 static void audit_list_rules(__u32 portid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
1037 {
1038 	struct sk_buff *skb;
1039 	struct audit_krule *r;
1040 	int i;
1041 
1042 	/* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu
1043 	 * iterator to sync with list writers. */
1044 	for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
1045 		list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
1046 			struct audit_rule_data *data;
1047 
1048 			data = audit_krule_to_data(r);
1049 			if (unlikely(!data))
1050 				break;
1051 			skb = audit_make_reply(portid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES,
1052 					       0, 1, data,
1053 					       sizeof(*data) + data->buflen);
1054 			if (skb)
1055 				skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
1056 			kfree(data);
1057 		}
1058 	}
1059 	skb = audit_make_reply(portid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
1060 	if (skb)
1061 		skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
1062 }
1063 
1064 /* Log rule additions and removals */
1065 static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int res)
1066 {
1067 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
1068 	uid_t loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current));
1069 	unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
1070 
1071 	if (!audit_enabled)
1072 		return;
1073 
1074 	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
1075 	if (!ab)
1076 		return;
1077 	audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u" ,loginuid, sessionid);
1078 	audit_log_task_context(ab);
1079 	audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s", action);
1080 	audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
1081 	audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=%d", rule->listnr, res);
1082 	audit_log_end(ab);
1083 }
1084 
1085 /**
1086  * audit_rule_change - apply all rules to the specified message type
1087  * @type: audit message type
1088  * @portid: target port id for netlink audit messages
1089  * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number
1090  * @data: payload data
1091  * @datasz: size of payload data
1092  */
1093 int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int seq, void *data,
1094 			size_t datasz)
1095 {
1096 	int err = 0;
1097 	struct audit_entry *entry;
1098 
1099 	entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
1100 	if (IS_ERR(entry))
1101 		return PTR_ERR(entry);
1102 
1103 	switch (type) {
1104 	case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
1105 		err = audit_add_rule(entry);
1106 		audit_log_rule_change("add_rule", &entry->rule, !err);
1107 		break;
1108 	case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
1109 		err = audit_del_rule(entry);
1110 		audit_log_rule_change("remove_rule", &entry->rule, !err);
1111 		break;
1112 	default:
1113 		err = -EINVAL;
1114 		WARN_ON(1);
1115 	}
1116 
1117 	if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE) {
1118 		if (entry->rule.exe)
1119 			audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
1120 		audit_free_rule(entry);
1121 	}
1122 
1123 	return err;
1124 }
1125 
1126 /**
1127  * audit_list_rules_send - list the audit rules
1128  * @request_skb: skb of request we are replying to (used to target the reply)
1129  * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number
1130  */
1131 int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq)
1132 {
1133 	u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid;
1134 	struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk);
1135 	struct task_struct *tsk;
1136 	struct audit_netlink_list *dest;
1137 	int err = 0;
1138 
1139 	/* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
1140 	 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
1141 	 * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
1142 	 * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
1143 	 * trying to _send_ the stuff */
1144 
1145 	dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL);
1146 	if (!dest)
1147 		return -ENOMEM;
1148 	dest->net = get_net(net);
1149 	dest->portid = portid;
1150 	skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q);
1151 
1152 	mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1153 	audit_list_rules(portid, seq, &dest->q);
1154 	mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1155 
1156 	tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list, dest, "audit_send_list");
1157 	if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
1158 		skb_queue_purge(&dest->q);
1159 		kfree(dest);
1160 		err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
1161 	}
1162 
1163 	return err;
1164 }
1165 
1166 int audit_comparator(u32 left, u32 op, u32 right)
1167 {
1168 	switch (op) {
1169 	case Audit_equal:
1170 		return (left == right);
1171 	case Audit_not_equal:
1172 		return (left != right);
1173 	case Audit_lt:
1174 		return (left < right);
1175 	case Audit_le:
1176 		return (left <= right);
1177 	case Audit_gt:
1178 		return (left > right);
1179 	case Audit_ge:
1180 		return (left >= right);
1181 	case Audit_bitmask:
1182 		return (left & right);
1183 	case Audit_bittest:
1184 		return ((left & right) == right);
1185 	default:
1186 		BUG();
1187 		return 0;
1188 	}
1189 }
1190 
1191 int audit_uid_comparator(kuid_t left, u32 op, kuid_t right)
1192 {
1193 	switch (op) {
1194 	case Audit_equal:
1195 		return uid_eq(left, right);
1196 	case Audit_not_equal:
1197 		return !uid_eq(left, right);
1198 	case Audit_lt:
1199 		return uid_lt(left, right);
1200 	case Audit_le:
1201 		return uid_lte(left, right);
1202 	case Audit_gt:
1203 		return uid_gt(left, right);
1204 	case Audit_ge:
1205 		return uid_gte(left, right);
1206 	case Audit_bitmask:
1207 	case Audit_bittest:
1208 	default:
1209 		BUG();
1210 		return 0;
1211 	}
1212 }
1213 
1214 int audit_gid_comparator(kgid_t left, u32 op, kgid_t right)
1215 {
1216 	switch (op) {
1217 	case Audit_equal:
1218 		return gid_eq(left, right);
1219 	case Audit_not_equal:
1220 		return !gid_eq(left, right);
1221 	case Audit_lt:
1222 		return gid_lt(left, right);
1223 	case Audit_le:
1224 		return gid_lte(left, right);
1225 	case Audit_gt:
1226 		return gid_gt(left, right);
1227 	case Audit_ge:
1228 		return gid_gte(left, right);
1229 	case Audit_bitmask:
1230 	case Audit_bittest:
1231 	default:
1232 		BUG();
1233 		return 0;
1234 	}
1235 }
1236 
1237 /**
1238  * parent_len - find the length of the parent portion of a pathname
1239  * @path: pathname of which to determine length
1240  */
1241 int parent_len(const char *path)
1242 {
1243 	int plen;
1244 	const char *p;
1245 
1246 	plen = strlen(path);
1247 
1248 	if (plen == 0)
1249 		return plen;
1250 
1251 	/* disregard trailing slashes */
1252 	p = path + plen - 1;
1253 	while ((*p == '/') && (p > path))
1254 		p--;
1255 
1256 	/* walk backward until we find the next slash or hit beginning */
1257 	while ((*p != '/') && (p > path))
1258 		p--;
1259 
1260 	/* did we find a slash? Then increment to include it in path */
1261 	if (*p == '/')
1262 		p++;
1263 
1264 	return p - path;
1265 }
1266 
1267 /**
1268  * audit_compare_dname_path - compare given dentry name with last component in
1269  * 			      given path. Return of 0 indicates a match.
1270  * @dname:	dentry name that we're comparing
1271  * @path:	full pathname that we're comparing
1272  * @parentlen:	length of the parent if known. Passing in AUDIT_NAME_FULL
1273  * 		here indicates that we must compute this value.
1274  */
1275 int audit_compare_dname_path(const char *dname, const char *path, int parentlen)
1276 {
1277 	int dlen, pathlen;
1278 	const char *p;
1279 
1280 	dlen = strlen(dname);
1281 	pathlen = strlen(path);
1282 	if (pathlen < dlen)
1283 		return 1;
1284 
1285 	parentlen = parentlen == AUDIT_NAME_FULL ? parent_len(path) : parentlen;
1286 	if (pathlen - parentlen != dlen)
1287 		return 1;
1288 
1289 	p = path + parentlen;
1290 
1291 	return strncmp(p, dname, dlen);
1292 }
1293 
1294 int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
1295 {
1296 	struct audit_entry *e;
1297 	int ret = 1; /* Audit by default */
1298 
1299 	rcu_read_lock();
1300 	if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[listtype]))
1301 		goto unlock_and_return;
1302 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[listtype], list) {
1303 		int i, result = 0;
1304 
1305 		for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
1306 			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
1307 			pid_t pid;
1308 			u32 sid;
1309 
1310 			switch (f->type) {
1311 			case AUDIT_PID:
1312 				pid = task_pid_nr(current);
1313 				result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
1314 				break;
1315 			case AUDIT_UID:
1316 				result = audit_uid_comparator(current_uid(), f->op, f->uid);
1317 				break;
1318 			case AUDIT_GID:
1319 				result = audit_gid_comparator(current_gid(), f->op, f->gid);
1320 				break;
1321 			case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
1322 				result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(current),
1323 							      f->op, f->uid);
1324 				break;
1325 			case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
1326 				result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(current),
1327 							  f->op, f->val);
1328 				break;
1329 			case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
1330 				result = audit_comparator(msgtype, f->op, f->val);
1331 				break;
1332 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
1333 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
1334 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
1335 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
1336 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
1337 				if (f->lsm_rule) {
1338 					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
1339 					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
1340 							f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, NULL);
1341 				}
1342 				break;
1343 			default:
1344 				goto unlock_and_return;
1345 			}
1346 			if (result < 0) /* error */
1347 				goto unlock_and_return;
1348 			if (!result)
1349 				break;
1350 		}
1351 		if (result > 0) {
1352 			if (e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER || listtype == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE)
1353 				ret = 0;
1354 			break;
1355 		}
1356 	}
1357 unlock_and_return:
1358 	rcu_read_unlock();
1359 	return ret;
1360 }
1361 
1362 static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
1363 {
1364 	struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
1365 	struct audit_entry *nentry;
1366 	int err = 0;
1367 
1368 	if (!security_audit_rule_known(r))
1369 		return 0;
1370 
1371 	nentry = audit_dupe_rule(r);
1372 	if (entry->rule.exe)
1373 		audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
1374 	if (IS_ERR(nentry)) {
1375 		/* save the first error encountered for the
1376 		 * return value */
1377 		err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
1378 		audit_panic("error updating LSM filters");
1379 		if (r->watch)
1380 			list_del(&r->rlist);
1381 		list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
1382 		list_del(&r->list);
1383 	} else {
1384 		if (r->watch || r->tree)
1385 			list_replace_init(&r->rlist, &nentry->rule.rlist);
1386 		list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
1387 		list_replace(&r->list, &nentry->rule.list);
1388 	}
1389 	call_rcu(&entry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
1390 
1391 	return err;
1392 }
1393 
1394 /* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
1395  * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
1396  * specific filter fields.  When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
1397  * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
1398  * updated rule. */
1399 int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
1400 {
1401 	struct audit_krule *r, *n;
1402 	int i, err = 0;
1403 
1404 	/* audit_filter_mutex synchronizes the writers */
1405 	mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1406 
1407 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
1408 		list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
1409 			int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
1410 			if (!err)
1411 				err = res;
1412 		}
1413 	}
1414 	mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1415 
1416 	return err;
1417 }
1418