1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later 2 /* Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method [RFC2631] 3 * 4 * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation 5 * Authors: Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com> 6 */ 7 8 #include <linux/fips.h> 9 #include <linux/module.h> 10 #include <crypto/internal/kpp.h> 11 #include <crypto/kpp.h> 12 #include <crypto/dh.h> 13 #include <crypto/rng.h> 14 #include <linux/mpi.h> 15 16 struct dh_ctx { 17 MPI p; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ 18 MPI g; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ 19 MPI xa; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ 20 }; 21 22 static void dh_clear_ctx(struct dh_ctx *ctx) 23 { 24 mpi_free(ctx->p); 25 mpi_free(ctx->g); 26 mpi_free(ctx->xa); 27 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); 28 } 29 30 /* 31 * If base is g we compute the public key 32 * ya = g^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1] 33 * else if base if the counterpart public key we compute the shared secret 34 * ZZ = yb^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1] 35 */ 36 static int _compute_val(const struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI base, MPI val) 37 { 38 /* val = base^xa mod p */ 39 return mpi_powm(val, base, ctx->xa, ctx->p); 40 } 41 42 static inline struct dh_ctx *dh_get_ctx(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) 43 { 44 return kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); 45 } 46 47 static int dh_check_params_length(unsigned int p_len) 48 { 49 if (fips_enabled) 50 return (p_len < 2048) ? -EINVAL : 0; 51 52 return (p_len < 1536) ? -EINVAL : 0; 53 } 54 55 static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params) 56 { 57 if (dh_check_params_length(params->p_size << 3)) 58 return -EINVAL; 59 60 ctx->p = mpi_read_raw_data(params->p, params->p_size); 61 if (!ctx->p) 62 return -EINVAL; 63 64 ctx->g = mpi_read_raw_data(params->g, params->g_size); 65 if (!ctx->g) 66 return -EINVAL; 67 68 return 0; 69 } 70 71 static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf, 72 unsigned int len) 73 { 74 struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); 75 struct dh params; 76 77 /* Free the old MPI key if any */ 78 dh_clear_ctx(ctx); 79 80 if (crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0) 81 goto err_clear_ctx; 82 83 if (dh_set_params(ctx, ¶ms) < 0) 84 goto err_clear_ctx; 85 86 ctx->xa = mpi_read_raw_data(params.key, params.key_size); 87 if (!ctx->xa) 88 goto err_clear_ctx; 89 90 return 0; 91 92 err_clear_ctx: 93 dh_clear_ctx(ctx); 94 return -EINVAL; 95 } 96 97 /* 98 * SP800-56A public key verification: 99 * 100 * * For the safe-prime groups in FIPS mode, Q can be computed 101 * trivially from P and a full validation according to SP800-56A 102 * section 5.6.2.3.1 is performed. 103 * 104 * * For all other sets of group parameters, only a partial validation 105 * according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is performed. 106 */ 107 static int dh_is_pubkey_valid(struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI y) 108 { 109 if (unlikely(!ctx->p)) 110 return -EINVAL; 111 112 /* 113 * Step 1: Verify that 2 <= y <= p - 2. 114 * 115 * The upper limit check is actually y < p instead of y < p - 1 116 * in order to save one mpi_sub_ui() invocation here. Note that 117 * p - 1 is the non-trivial element of the subgroup of order 2 and 118 * thus, the check on y^q below would fail if y == p - 1. 119 */ 120 if (mpi_cmp_ui(y, 1) < 1 || mpi_cmp(y, ctx->p) >= 0) 121 return -EINVAL; 122 123 /* 124 * Step 2: Verify that 1 = y^q mod p 125 * 126 * For the safe-prime groups q = (p - 1)/2. 127 */ 128 if (fips_enabled) { 129 MPI val, q; 130 int ret; 131 132 val = mpi_alloc(0); 133 if (!val) 134 return -ENOMEM; 135 136 q = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(ctx->p)); 137 if (!q) { 138 mpi_free(val); 139 return -ENOMEM; 140 } 141 142 /* 143 * ->p is odd, so no need to explicitly subtract one 144 * from it before shifting to the right. 145 */ 146 mpi_rshift(q, ctx->p, 1); 147 148 ret = mpi_powm(val, y, q, ctx->p); 149 mpi_free(q); 150 if (ret) { 151 mpi_free(val); 152 return ret; 153 } 154 155 ret = mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1); 156 157 mpi_free(val); 158 159 if (ret != 0) 160 return -EINVAL; 161 } 162 163 return 0; 164 } 165 166 static int dh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req) 167 { 168 struct crypto_kpp *tfm = crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req); 169 struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); 170 MPI base, val = mpi_alloc(0); 171 int ret = 0; 172 int sign; 173 174 if (!val) 175 return -ENOMEM; 176 177 if (unlikely(!ctx->xa)) { 178 ret = -EINVAL; 179 goto err_free_val; 180 } 181 182 if (req->src) { 183 base = mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(req->src, req->src_len); 184 if (!base) { 185 ret = -EINVAL; 186 goto err_free_val; 187 } 188 ret = dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, base); 189 if (ret) 190 goto err_free_base; 191 } else { 192 base = ctx->g; 193 } 194 195 ret = _compute_val(ctx, base, val); 196 if (ret) 197 goto err_free_base; 198 199 if (fips_enabled) { 200 /* SP800-56A rev3 5.7.1.1 check: Validation of shared secret */ 201 if (req->src) { 202 MPI pone; 203 204 /* z <= 1 */ 205 if (mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1) < 1) { 206 ret = -EBADMSG; 207 goto err_free_base; 208 } 209 210 /* z == p - 1 */ 211 pone = mpi_alloc(0); 212 213 if (!pone) { 214 ret = -ENOMEM; 215 goto err_free_base; 216 } 217 218 ret = mpi_sub_ui(pone, ctx->p, 1); 219 if (!ret && !mpi_cmp(pone, val)) 220 ret = -EBADMSG; 221 222 mpi_free(pone); 223 224 if (ret) 225 goto err_free_base; 226 227 /* SP800-56A rev 3 5.6.2.1.3 key check */ 228 } else { 229 if (dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, val)) { 230 ret = -EAGAIN; 231 goto err_free_val; 232 } 233 } 234 } 235 236 ret = mpi_write_to_sgl(val, req->dst, req->dst_len, &sign); 237 if (ret) 238 goto err_free_base; 239 240 if (sign < 0) 241 ret = -EBADMSG; 242 err_free_base: 243 if (req->src) 244 mpi_free(base); 245 err_free_val: 246 mpi_free(val); 247 return ret; 248 } 249 250 static unsigned int dh_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) 251 { 252 struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); 253 254 return mpi_get_size(ctx->p); 255 } 256 257 static void dh_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) 258 { 259 struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); 260 261 dh_clear_ctx(ctx); 262 } 263 264 static struct kpp_alg dh = { 265 .set_secret = dh_set_secret, 266 .generate_public_key = dh_compute_value, 267 .compute_shared_secret = dh_compute_value, 268 .max_size = dh_max_size, 269 .exit = dh_exit_tfm, 270 .base = { 271 .cra_name = "dh", 272 .cra_driver_name = "dh-generic", 273 .cra_priority = 100, 274 .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, 275 .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_ctx), 276 }, 277 }; 278 279 280 struct dh_safe_prime { 281 unsigned int max_strength; 282 unsigned int p_size; 283 const char *p; 284 }; 285 286 static const char safe_prime_g[] = { 2 }; 287 288 struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx { 289 struct crypto_kpp_spawn dh_spawn; 290 const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime; 291 }; 292 293 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx { 294 struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm; 295 }; 296 297 static void dh_safe_prime_free_instance(struct kpp_instance *inst) 298 { 299 struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst); 300 301 crypto_drop_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn); 302 kfree(inst); 303 } 304 305 static inline struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx( 306 struct crypto_kpp *tfm) 307 { 308 return kpp_instance_ctx(kpp_alg_instance(tfm)); 309 } 310 311 static int dh_safe_prime_init_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) 312 { 313 struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx = 314 dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm); 315 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); 316 317 tfm_ctx->dh_tfm = crypto_spawn_kpp(&inst_ctx->dh_spawn); 318 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm)) 319 return PTR_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); 320 321 return 0; 322 } 323 324 static void dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) 325 { 326 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); 327 328 crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); 329 } 330 331 static u64 __add_u64_to_be(__be64 *dst, unsigned int n, u64 val) 332 { 333 unsigned int i; 334 335 for (i = n; val && i > 0; --i) { 336 u64 tmp = be64_to_cpu(dst[i - 1]); 337 338 tmp += val; 339 val = tmp >= val ? 0 : 1; 340 dst[i - 1] = cpu_to_be64(tmp); 341 } 342 343 return val; 344 } 345 346 static void *dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime, 347 unsigned int *key_size) 348 { 349 unsigned int n, oversampling_size; 350 __be64 *key; 351 int err; 352 u64 h, o; 353 354 /* 355 * Generate a private key following NIST SP800-56Ar3, 356 * sec. 5.6.1.1.1 and 5.6.1.1.3 resp.. 357 * 358 * 5.6.1.1.1: choose key length N such that 359 * 2 * ->max_strength <= N <= log2(q) + 1 = ->p_size * 8 - 1 360 * with q = (p - 1) / 2 for the safe-prime groups. 361 * Choose the lower bound's next power of two for N in order to 362 * avoid excessively large private keys while still 363 * maintaining some extra reserve beyond the bare minimum in 364 * most cases. Note that for each entry in safe_prime_groups[], 365 * the following holds for such N: 366 * - N >= 256, in particular it is a multiple of 2^6 = 64 367 * bits and 368 * - N < log2(q) + 1, i.e. N respects the upper bound. 369 */ 370 n = roundup_pow_of_two(2 * safe_prime->max_strength); 371 WARN_ON_ONCE(n & ((1u << 6) - 1)); 372 n >>= 6; /* Convert N into units of u64. */ 373 374 /* 375 * Reserve one extra u64 to hold the extra random bits 376 * required as per 5.6.1.1.3. 377 */ 378 oversampling_size = (n + 1) * sizeof(__be64); 379 key = kmalloc(oversampling_size, GFP_KERNEL); 380 if (!key) 381 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 382 383 /* 384 * 5.6.1.1.3, step 3 (and implicitly step 4): obtain N + 64 385 * random bits and interpret them as a big endian integer. 386 */ 387 err = -EFAULT; 388 if (crypto_get_default_rng()) 389 goto out_err; 390 391 err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, (u8 *)key, 392 oversampling_size); 393 crypto_put_default_rng(); 394 if (err) 395 goto out_err; 396 397 /* 398 * 5.6.1.1.3, step 5 is implicit: 2^N < q and thus, 399 * M = min(2^N, q) = 2^N. 400 * 401 * For step 6, calculate 402 * key = (key[] mod (M - 1)) + 1 = (key[] mod (2^N - 1)) + 1. 403 * 404 * In order to avoid expensive divisions, note that 405 * 2^N mod (2^N - 1) = 1 and thus, for any integer h, 406 * 2^N * h mod (2^N - 1) = h mod (2^N - 1) always holds. 407 * The big endian integer key[] composed of n + 1 64bit words 408 * may be written as key[] = h * 2^N + l, with h = key[0] 409 * representing the 64 most significant bits and l 410 * corresponding to the remaining 2^N bits. With the remark 411 * from above, 412 * h * 2^N + l mod (2^N - 1) = l + h mod (2^N - 1). 413 * As both, l and h are less than 2^N, their sum after 414 * this first reduction is guaranteed to be <= 2^(N + 1) - 2. 415 * Or equivalently, that their sum can again be written as 416 * h' * 2^N + l' with h' now either zero or one and if one, 417 * then l' <= 2^N - 2. Thus, all bits at positions >= N will 418 * be zero after a second reduction: 419 * h' * 2^N + l' mod (2^N - 1) = l' + h' mod (2^N - 1). 420 * At this point, it is still possible that 421 * l' + h' = 2^N - 1, i.e. that l' + h' mod (2^N - 1) 422 * is zero. This condition will be detected below by means of 423 * the final increment overflowing in this case. 424 */ 425 h = be64_to_cpu(key[0]); 426 h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h); 427 h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h); 428 WARN_ON_ONCE(h); 429 430 /* Increment to obtain the final result. */ 431 o = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, 1); 432 /* 433 * The overflow bit o from the increment is either zero or 434 * one. If zero, key[1:n] holds the final result in big-endian 435 * order. If one, key[1:n] is zero now, but needs to be set to 436 * one, c.f. above. 437 */ 438 if (o) 439 key[n] = cpu_to_be64(1); 440 441 /* n is in units of u64, convert to bytes. */ 442 *key_size = n << 3; 443 /* Strip the leading extra __be64, which is (virtually) zero by now. */ 444 memmove(key, &key[1], *key_size); 445 446 return key; 447 448 out_err: 449 kfree_sensitive(key); 450 return ERR_PTR(err); 451 } 452 453 static int dh_safe_prime_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buffer, 454 unsigned int len) 455 { 456 struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx = 457 dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm); 458 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); 459 struct dh params = {}; 460 void *buf = NULL, *key = NULL; 461 unsigned int buf_size; 462 int err; 463 464 if (buffer) { 465 err = __crypto_dh_decode_key(buffer, len, ¶ms); 466 if (err) 467 return err; 468 if (params.p_size || params.g_size) 469 return -EINVAL; 470 } 471 472 params.p = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p; 473 params.p_size = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p_size; 474 params.g = safe_prime_g; 475 params.g_size = sizeof(safe_prime_g); 476 477 if (!params.key_size) { 478 key = dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(inst_ctx->safe_prime, 479 ¶ms.key_size); 480 if (IS_ERR(key)) 481 return PTR_ERR(key); 482 params.key = key; 483 } 484 485 buf_size = crypto_dh_key_len(¶ms); 486 buf = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); 487 if (!buf) { 488 err = -ENOMEM; 489 goto out; 490 } 491 492 err = crypto_dh_encode_key(buf, buf_size, ¶ms); 493 if (err) 494 goto out; 495 496 err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm, buf, buf_size); 497 out: 498 kfree_sensitive(buf); 499 kfree_sensitive(key); 500 return err; 501 } 502 503 static void dh_safe_prime_complete_req(struct crypto_async_request *dh_req, 504 int err) 505 { 506 struct kpp_request *req = dh_req->data; 507 508 kpp_request_complete(req, err); 509 } 510 511 static struct kpp_request *dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(struct kpp_request *req) 512 { 513 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = 514 kpp_tfm_ctx(crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req)); 515 struct kpp_request *dh_req = kpp_request_ctx(req); 516 517 kpp_request_set_tfm(dh_req, tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); 518 kpp_request_set_callback(dh_req, req->base.flags, 519 dh_safe_prime_complete_req, req); 520 521 kpp_request_set_input(dh_req, req->src, req->src_len); 522 kpp_request_set_output(dh_req, req->dst, req->dst_len); 523 524 return dh_req; 525 } 526 527 static int dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key(struct kpp_request *req) 528 { 529 struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req); 530 531 return crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(dh_req); 532 } 533 534 static int dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret(struct kpp_request *req) 535 { 536 struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req); 537 538 return crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(dh_req); 539 } 540 541 static unsigned int dh_safe_prime_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) 542 { 543 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); 544 545 return crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); 546 } 547 548 static int __maybe_unused __dh_safe_prime_create( 549 struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb, 550 const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime) 551 { 552 struct kpp_instance *inst; 553 struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx; 554 const char *dh_name; 555 struct kpp_alg *dh_alg; 556 u32 mask; 557 int err; 558 559 err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP, &mask); 560 if (err) 561 return err; 562 563 dh_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]); 564 if (IS_ERR(dh_name)) 565 return PTR_ERR(dh_name); 566 567 inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); 568 if (!inst) 569 return -ENOMEM; 570 571 ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst); 572 573 err = crypto_grab_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn, kpp_crypto_instance(inst), 574 dh_name, 0, mask); 575 if (err) 576 goto err_free_inst; 577 578 err = -EINVAL; 579 dh_alg = crypto_spawn_kpp_alg(&ctx->dh_spawn); 580 if (strcmp(dh_alg->base.cra_name, "dh")) 581 goto err_free_inst; 582 583 ctx->safe_prime = safe_prime; 584 585 err = crypto_inst_setname(kpp_crypto_instance(inst), 586 tmpl->name, &dh_alg->base); 587 if (err) 588 goto err_free_inst; 589 590 inst->alg.set_secret = dh_safe_prime_set_secret; 591 inst->alg.generate_public_key = dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key; 592 inst->alg.compute_shared_secret = dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret; 593 inst->alg.max_size = dh_safe_prime_max_size; 594 inst->alg.init = dh_safe_prime_init_tfm; 595 inst->alg.exit = dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm; 596 inst->alg.reqsize = sizeof(struct kpp_request) + dh_alg->reqsize; 597 inst->alg.base.cra_priority = dh_alg->base.cra_priority; 598 inst->alg.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE; 599 inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx); 600 601 inst->free = dh_safe_prime_free_instance; 602 603 err = kpp_register_instance(tmpl, inst); 604 if (err) 605 goto err_free_inst; 606 607 return 0; 608 609 err_free_inst: 610 dh_safe_prime_free_instance(inst); 611 612 return err; 613 } 614 615 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS 616 617 static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe2048_prime = { 618 .max_strength = 112, 619 .p_size = 256, 620 .p = 621 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" 622 "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" 623 "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" 624 "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" 625 "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" 626 "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" 627 "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" 628 "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" 629 "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" 630 "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" 631 "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" 632 "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" 633 "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" 634 "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" 635 "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" 636 "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x28\x5c\x97\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", 637 }; 638 639 static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe3072_prime = { 640 .max_strength = 128, 641 .p_size = 384, 642 .p = 643 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" 644 "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" 645 "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" 646 "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" 647 "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" 648 "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" 649 "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" 650 "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" 651 "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" 652 "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" 653 "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" 654 "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" 655 "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" 656 "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" 657 "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" 658 "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" 659 "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" 660 "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" 661 "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" 662 "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" 663 "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" 664 "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" 665 "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" 666 "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\xc6\x2e\x37\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", 667 }; 668 669 static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe4096_prime = { 670 .max_strength = 152, 671 .p_size = 512, 672 .p = 673 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" 674 "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" 675 "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" 676 "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" 677 "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" 678 "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" 679 "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" 680 "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" 681 "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" 682 "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" 683 "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" 684 "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" 685 "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" 686 "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" 687 "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" 688 "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" 689 "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" 690 "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" 691 "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" 692 "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" 693 "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" 694 "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" 695 "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" 696 "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb" 697 "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18" 698 "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a" 699 "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32" 700 "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38" 701 "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c" 702 "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf" 703 "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1" 704 "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x65\x5f\x6a\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", 705 }; 706 707 static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe6144_prime = { 708 .max_strength = 176, 709 .p_size = 768, 710 .p = 711 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" 712 "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" 713 "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" 714 "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" 715 "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" 716 "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" 717 "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" 718 "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" 719 "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" 720 "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" 721 "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" 722 "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" 723 "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" 724 "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" 725 "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" 726 "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" 727 "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" 728 "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" 729 "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" 730 "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" 731 "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" 732 "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" 733 "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" 734 "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb" 735 "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18" 736 "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a" 737 "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32" 738 "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38" 739 "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c" 740 "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf" 741 "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1" 742 "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a" 743 "\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6" 744 "\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c" 745 "\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71" 746 "\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77" 747 "\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8" 748 "\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e" 749 "\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4" 750 "\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92" 751 "\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82" 752 "\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c" 753 "\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46" 754 "\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17" 755 "\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04" 756 "\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69" 757 "\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4" 758 "\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xd0\xe4\x0e\x65\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", 759 }; 760 761 static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe8192_prime = { 762 .max_strength = 200, 763 .p_size = 1024, 764 .p = 765 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" 766 "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" 767 "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" 768 "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" 769 "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" 770 "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" 771 "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" 772 "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" 773 "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" 774 "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" 775 "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" 776 "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" 777 "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" 778 "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" 779 "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" 780 "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" 781 "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" 782 "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" 783 "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" 784 "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" 785 "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" 786 "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" 787 "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" 788 "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb" 789 "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18" 790 "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a" 791 "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32" 792 "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38" 793 "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c" 794 "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf" 795 "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1" 796 "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a" 797 "\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6" 798 "\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c" 799 "\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71" 800 "\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77" 801 "\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8" 802 "\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e" 803 "\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4" 804 "\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92" 805 "\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82" 806 "\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c" 807 "\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46" 808 "\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17" 809 "\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04" 810 "\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69" 811 "\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4" 812 "\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xcf\xf4\x6a\xaa\x36\xad\x00\x4c\xf6\x00\xc8\x38" 813 "\x1e\x42\x5a\x31\xd9\x51\xae\x64\xfd\xb2\x3f\xce\xc9\x50\x9d\x43" 814 "\x68\x7f\xeb\x69\xed\xd1\xcc\x5e\x0b\x8c\xc3\xbd\xf6\x4b\x10\xef" 815 "\x86\xb6\x31\x42\xa3\xab\x88\x29\x55\x5b\x2f\x74\x7c\x93\x26\x65" 816 "\xcb\x2c\x0f\x1c\xc0\x1b\xd7\x02\x29\x38\x88\x39\xd2\xaf\x05\xe4" 817 "\x54\x50\x4a\xc7\x8b\x75\x82\x82\x28\x46\xc0\xba\x35\xc3\x5f\x5c" 818 "\x59\x16\x0c\xc0\x46\xfd\x82\x51\x54\x1f\xc6\x8c\x9c\x86\xb0\x22" 819 "\xbb\x70\x99\x87\x6a\x46\x0e\x74\x51\xa8\xa9\x31\x09\x70\x3f\xee" 820 "\x1c\x21\x7e\x6c\x38\x26\xe5\x2c\x51\xaa\x69\x1e\x0e\x42\x3c\xfc" 821 "\x99\xe9\xe3\x16\x50\xc1\x21\x7b\x62\x48\x16\xcd\xad\x9a\x95\xf9" 822 "\xd5\xb8\x01\x94\x88\xd9\xc0\xa0\xa1\xfe\x30\x75\xa5\x77\xe2\x31" 823 "\x83\xf8\x1d\x4a\x3f\x2f\xa4\x57\x1e\xfc\x8c\xe0\xba\x8a\x4f\xe8" 824 "\xb6\x85\x5d\xfe\x72\xb0\xa6\x6e\xde\xd2\xfb\xab\xfb\xe5\x8a\x30" 825 "\xfa\xfa\xbe\x1c\x5d\x71\xa8\x7e\x2f\x74\x1e\xf8\xc1\xfe\x86\xfe" 826 "\xa6\xbb\xfd\xe5\x30\x67\x7f\x0d\x97\xd1\x1d\x49\xf7\xa8\x44\x3d" 827 "\x08\x22\xe5\x06\xa9\xf4\x61\x4e\x01\x1e\x2a\x94\x83\x8f\xf8\x8c" 828 "\xd6\x8c\x8b\xb7\xc5\xc6\x42\x4c\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", 829 }; 830 831 static int dh_ffdhe2048_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, 832 struct rtattr **tb) 833 { 834 return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe2048_prime); 835 } 836 837 static int dh_ffdhe3072_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, 838 struct rtattr **tb) 839 { 840 return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe3072_prime); 841 } 842 843 static int dh_ffdhe4096_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, 844 struct rtattr **tb) 845 { 846 return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe4096_prime); 847 } 848 849 static int dh_ffdhe6144_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, 850 struct rtattr **tb) 851 { 852 return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe6144_prime); 853 } 854 855 static int dh_ffdhe8192_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, 856 struct rtattr **tb) 857 { 858 return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe8192_prime); 859 } 860 861 static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = { 862 { 863 .name = "ffdhe2048", 864 .create = dh_ffdhe2048_create, 865 .module = THIS_MODULE, 866 }, 867 { 868 .name = "ffdhe3072", 869 .create = dh_ffdhe3072_create, 870 .module = THIS_MODULE, 871 }, 872 { 873 .name = "ffdhe4096", 874 .create = dh_ffdhe4096_create, 875 .module = THIS_MODULE, 876 }, 877 { 878 .name = "ffdhe6144", 879 .create = dh_ffdhe6144_create, 880 .module = THIS_MODULE, 881 }, 882 { 883 .name = "ffdhe8192", 884 .create = dh_ffdhe8192_create, 885 .module = THIS_MODULE, 886 }, 887 }; 888 889 #else /* ! CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */ 890 891 static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {}; 892 893 #endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */ 894 895 896 static int __init dh_init(void) 897 { 898 int err; 899 900 err = crypto_register_kpp(&dh); 901 if (err) 902 return err; 903 904 err = crypto_register_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates, 905 ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates)); 906 if (err) { 907 crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh); 908 return err; 909 } 910 911 return 0; 912 } 913 914 static void __exit dh_exit(void) 915 { 916 crypto_unregister_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates, 917 ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates)); 918 crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh); 919 } 920 921 subsys_initcall(dh_init); 922 module_exit(dh_exit); 923 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("dh"); 924 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); 925 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DH generic algorithm"); 926