xref: /openbmc/linux/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c (revision a36954f5)
1 /*
2  * Intel Memory Protection Keys management
3  * Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation.
4  *
5  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
6  * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
7  * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
8  *
9  * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
10  * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
11  * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License for
12  * more details.
13  */
14 #include <linux/debugfs.h>		/* debugfs_create_u32()		*/
15 #include <linux/mm_types.h>             /* mm_struct, vma, etc...       */
16 #include <linux/pkeys.h>                /* PKEY_*                       */
17 #include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h>
18 
19 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>             /* boot_cpu_has, ...            */
20 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>            /* vma_pkey()                   */
21 #include <asm/fpu/internal.h>           /* fpregs_active()              */
22 
23 int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
24 {
25 	bool need_to_set_mm_pkey = false;
26 	int execute_only_pkey = mm->context.execute_only_pkey;
27 	int ret;
28 
29 	/* Do we need to assign a pkey for mm's execute-only maps? */
30 	if (execute_only_pkey == -1) {
31 		/* Go allocate one to use, which might fail */
32 		execute_only_pkey = mm_pkey_alloc(mm);
33 		if (execute_only_pkey < 0)
34 			return -1;
35 		need_to_set_mm_pkey = true;
36 	}
37 
38 	/*
39 	 * We do not want to go through the relatively costly
40 	 * dance to set PKRU if we do not need to.  Check it
41 	 * first and assume that if the execute-only pkey is
42 	 * write-disabled that we do not have to set it
43 	 * ourselves.  We need preempt off so that nobody
44 	 * can make fpregs inactive.
45 	 */
46 	preempt_disable();
47 	if (!need_to_set_mm_pkey &&
48 	    fpregs_active() &&
49 	    !__pkru_allows_read(read_pkru(), execute_only_pkey)) {
50 		preempt_enable();
51 		return execute_only_pkey;
52 	}
53 	preempt_enable();
54 
55 	/*
56 	 * Set up PKRU so that it denies access for everything
57 	 * other than execution.
58 	 */
59 	ret = arch_set_user_pkey_access(current, execute_only_pkey,
60 			PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
61 	/*
62 	 * If the PKRU-set operation failed somehow, just return
63 	 * 0 and effectively disable execute-only support.
64 	 */
65 	if (ret) {
66 		mm_set_pkey_free(mm, execute_only_pkey);
67 		return -1;
68 	}
69 
70 	/* We got one, store it and use it from here on out */
71 	if (need_to_set_mm_pkey)
72 		mm->context.execute_only_pkey = execute_only_pkey;
73 	return execute_only_pkey;
74 }
75 
76 static inline bool vma_is_pkey_exec_only(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
77 {
78 	/* Do this check first since the vm_flags should be hot */
79 	if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC)) != VM_EXEC)
80 		return false;
81 	if (vma_pkey(vma) != vma->vm_mm->context.execute_only_pkey)
82 		return false;
83 
84 	return true;
85 }
86 
87 /*
88  * This is only called for *plain* mprotect calls.
89  */
90 int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot, int pkey)
91 {
92 	/*
93 	 * Is this an mprotect_pkey() call?  If so, never
94 	 * override the value that came from the user.
95 	 */
96 	if (pkey != -1)
97 		return pkey;
98 	/*
99 	 * Look for a protection-key-drive execute-only mapping
100 	 * which is now being given permissions that are not
101 	 * execute-only.  Move it back to the default pkey.
102 	 */
103 	if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma) &&
104 	    (prot & (PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE))) {
105 		return 0;
106 	}
107 	/*
108 	 * The mapping is execute-only.  Go try to get the
109 	 * execute-only protection key.  If we fail to do that,
110 	 * fall through as if we do not have execute-only
111 	 * support.
112 	 */
113 	if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
114 		pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm);
115 		if (pkey > 0)
116 			return pkey;
117 	}
118 	/*
119 	 * This is a vanilla, non-pkey mprotect (or we failed to
120 	 * setup execute-only), inherit the pkey from the VMA we
121 	 * are working on.
122 	 */
123 	return vma_pkey(vma);
124 }
125 
126 #define PKRU_AD_KEY(pkey)	(PKRU_AD_BIT << ((pkey) * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY))
127 
128 /*
129  * Make the default PKRU value (at execve() time) as restrictive
130  * as possible.  This ensures that any threads clone()'d early
131  * in the process's lifetime will not accidentally get access
132  * to data which is pkey-protected later on.
133  */
134 u32 init_pkru_value = PKRU_AD_KEY( 1) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 2) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 3) |
135 		      PKRU_AD_KEY( 4) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 5) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 6) |
136 		      PKRU_AD_KEY( 7) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 8) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 9) |
137 		      PKRU_AD_KEY(10) | PKRU_AD_KEY(11) | PKRU_AD_KEY(12) |
138 		      PKRU_AD_KEY(13) | PKRU_AD_KEY(14) | PKRU_AD_KEY(15);
139 
140 /*
141  * Called from the FPU code when creating a fresh set of FPU
142  * registers.  This is called from a very specific context where
143  * we know the FPU regstiers are safe for use and we can use PKRU
144  * directly.
145  */
146 void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void)
147 {
148 	u32 init_pkru_value_snapshot = READ_ONCE(init_pkru_value);
149 	/*
150 	 * Any write to PKRU takes it out of the XSAVE 'init
151 	 * state' which increases context switch cost.  Avoid
152 	 * writing 0 when PKRU was already 0.
153 	 */
154 	if (!init_pkru_value_snapshot && !read_pkru())
155 		return;
156 	/*
157 	 * Override the PKRU state that came from 'init_fpstate'
158 	 * with the baseline from the process.
159 	 */
160 	write_pkru(init_pkru_value_snapshot);
161 }
162 
163 static ssize_t init_pkru_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
164 			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
165 {
166 	char buf[32];
167 	unsigned int len;
168 
169 	len = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", init_pkru_value);
170 	return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, len);
171 }
172 
173 static ssize_t init_pkru_write_file(struct file *file,
174 		 const char __user *user_buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
175 {
176 	char buf[32];
177 	ssize_t len;
178 	u32 new_init_pkru;
179 
180 	len = min(count, sizeof(buf) - 1);
181 	if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, len))
182 		return -EFAULT;
183 
184 	/* Make the buffer a valid string that we can not overrun */
185 	buf[len] = '\0';
186 	if (kstrtouint(buf, 0, &new_init_pkru))
187 		return -EINVAL;
188 
189 	/*
190 	 * Don't allow insane settings that will blow the system
191 	 * up immediately if someone attempts to disable access
192 	 * or writes to pkey 0.
193 	 */
194 	if (new_init_pkru & (PKRU_AD_BIT|PKRU_WD_BIT))
195 		return -EINVAL;
196 
197 	WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru);
198 	return count;
199 }
200 
201 static const struct file_operations fops_init_pkru = {
202 	.read = init_pkru_read_file,
203 	.write = init_pkru_write_file,
204 	.llseek = default_llseek,
205 };
206 
207 static int __init create_init_pkru_value(void)
208 {
209 	debugfs_create_file("init_pkru", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR,
210 			arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, &fops_init_pkru);
211 	return 0;
212 }
213 late_initcall(create_init_pkru_value);
214 
215 static __init int setup_init_pkru(char *opt)
216 {
217 	u32 new_init_pkru;
218 
219 	if (kstrtouint(opt, 0, &new_init_pkru))
220 		return 1;
221 
222 	WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru);
223 
224 	return 1;
225 }
226 __setup("init_pkru=", setup_init_pkru);
227