xref: /openbmc/linux/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c (revision 8b030a57)
1 /*
2  * Intel Memory Protection Keys management
3  * Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation.
4  *
5  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
6  * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
7  * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
8  *
9  * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
10  * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
11  * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License for
12  * more details.
13  */
14 #include <linux/debugfs.h>		/* debugfs_create_u32()		*/
15 #include <linux/mm_types.h>             /* mm_struct, vma, etc...       */
16 #include <linux/pkeys.h>                /* PKEY_*                       */
17 #include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h>
18 
19 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>             /* boot_cpu_has, ...            */
20 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>            /* vma_pkey()                   */
21 
22 int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
23 {
24 	bool need_to_set_mm_pkey = false;
25 	int execute_only_pkey = mm->context.execute_only_pkey;
26 	int ret;
27 
28 	/* Do we need to assign a pkey for mm's execute-only maps? */
29 	if (execute_only_pkey == -1) {
30 		/* Go allocate one to use, which might fail */
31 		execute_only_pkey = mm_pkey_alloc(mm);
32 		if (execute_only_pkey < 0)
33 			return -1;
34 		need_to_set_mm_pkey = true;
35 	}
36 
37 	/*
38 	 * We do not want to go through the relatively costly
39 	 * dance to set PKRU if we do not need to.  Check it
40 	 * first and assume that if the execute-only pkey is
41 	 * write-disabled that we do not have to set it
42 	 * ourselves.  We need preempt off so that nobody
43 	 * can make fpregs inactive.
44 	 */
45 	preempt_disable();
46 	if (!need_to_set_mm_pkey &&
47 	    current->thread.fpu.initialized &&
48 	    !__pkru_allows_read(read_pkru(), execute_only_pkey)) {
49 		preempt_enable();
50 		return execute_only_pkey;
51 	}
52 	preempt_enable();
53 
54 	/*
55 	 * Set up PKRU so that it denies access for everything
56 	 * other than execution.
57 	 */
58 	ret = arch_set_user_pkey_access(current, execute_only_pkey,
59 			PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
60 	/*
61 	 * If the PKRU-set operation failed somehow, just return
62 	 * 0 and effectively disable execute-only support.
63 	 */
64 	if (ret) {
65 		mm_set_pkey_free(mm, execute_only_pkey);
66 		return -1;
67 	}
68 
69 	/* We got one, store it and use it from here on out */
70 	if (need_to_set_mm_pkey)
71 		mm->context.execute_only_pkey = execute_only_pkey;
72 	return execute_only_pkey;
73 }
74 
75 static inline bool vma_is_pkey_exec_only(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
76 {
77 	/* Do this check first since the vm_flags should be hot */
78 	if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC)) != VM_EXEC)
79 		return false;
80 	if (vma_pkey(vma) != vma->vm_mm->context.execute_only_pkey)
81 		return false;
82 
83 	return true;
84 }
85 
86 /*
87  * This is only called for *plain* mprotect calls.
88  */
89 int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot, int pkey)
90 {
91 	/*
92 	 * Is this an mprotect_pkey() call?  If so, never
93 	 * override the value that came from the user.
94 	 */
95 	if (pkey != -1)
96 		return pkey;
97 
98 	/*
99 	 * The mapping is execute-only.  Go try to get the
100 	 * execute-only protection key.  If we fail to do that,
101 	 * fall through as if we do not have execute-only
102 	 * support in this mm.
103 	 */
104 	if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
105 		pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm);
106 		if (pkey > 0)
107 			return pkey;
108 	} else if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma)) {
109 		/*
110 		 * Protections are *not* PROT_EXEC, but the mapping
111 		 * is using the exec-only pkey.  This mapping was
112 		 * PROT_EXEC and will no longer be.  Move back to
113 		 * the default pkey.
114 		 */
115 		return ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY;
116 	}
117 
118 	/*
119 	 * This is a vanilla, non-pkey mprotect (or we failed to
120 	 * setup execute-only), inherit the pkey from the VMA we
121 	 * are working on.
122 	 */
123 	return vma_pkey(vma);
124 }
125 
126 #define PKRU_AD_KEY(pkey)	(PKRU_AD_BIT << ((pkey) * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY))
127 
128 /*
129  * Make the default PKRU value (at execve() time) as restrictive
130  * as possible.  This ensures that any threads clone()'d early
131  * in the process's lifetime will not accidentally get access
132  * to data which is pkey-protected later on.
133  */
134 static
135 u32 init_pkru_value = PKRU_AD_KEY( 1) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 2) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 3) |
136 		      PKRU_AD_KEY( 4) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 5) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 6) |
137 		      PKRU_AD_KEY( 7) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 8) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 9) |
138 		      PKRU_AD_KEY(10) | PKRU_AD_KEY(11) | PKRU_AD_KEY(12) |
139 		      PKRU_AD_KEY(13) | PKRU_AD_KEY(14) | PKRU_AD_KEY(15);
140 
141 /*
142  * Called from the FPU code when creating a fresh set of FPU
143  * registers.  This is called from a very specific context where
144  * we know the FPU regstiers are safe for use and we can use PKRU
145  * directly.
146  */
147 void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void)
148 {
149 	u32 init_pkru_value_snapshot = READ_ONCE(init_pkru_value);
150 	/*
151 	 * Any write to PKRU takes it out of the XSAVE 'init
152 	 * state' which increases context switch cost.  Avoid
153 	 * writing 0 when PKRU was already 0.
154 	 */
155 	if (!init_pkru_value_snapshot && !read_pkru())
156 		return;
157 	/*
158 	 * Override the PKRU state that came from 'init_fpstate'
159 	 * with the baseline from the process.
160 	 */
161 	write_pkru(init_pkru_value_snapshot);
162 }
163 
164 static ssize_t init_pkru_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
165 			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
166 {
167 	char buf[32];
168 	unsigned int len;
169 
170 	len = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", init_pkru_value);
171 	return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, len);
172 }
173 
174 static ssize_t init_pkru_write_file(struct file *file,
175 		 const char __user *user_buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
176 {
177 	char buf[32];
178 	ssize_t len;
179 	u32 new_init_pkru;
180 
181 	len = min(count, sizeof(buf) - 1);
182 	if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, len))
183 		return -EFAULT;
184 
185 	/* Make the buffer a valid string that we can not overrun */
186 	buf[len] = '\0';
187 	if (kstrtouint(buf, 0, &new_init_pkru))
188 		return -EINVAL;
189 
190 	/*
191 	 * Don't allow insane settings that will blow the system
192 	 * up immediately if someone attempts to disable access
193 	 * or writes to pkey 0.
194 	 */
195 	if (new_init_pkru & (PKRU_AD_BIT|PKRU_WD_BIT))
196 		return -EINVAL;
197 
198 	WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru);
199 	return count;
200 }
201 
202 static const struct file_operations fops_init_pkru = {
203 	.read = init_pkru_read_file,
204 	.write = init_pkru_write_file,
205 	.llseek = default_llseek,
206 };
207 
208 static int __init create_init_pkru_value(void)
209 {
210 	debugfs_create_file("init_pkru", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR,
211 			arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, &fops_init_pkru);
212 	return 0;
213 }
214 late_initcall(create_init_pkru_value);
215 
216 static __init int setup_init_pkru(char *opt)
217 {
218 	u32 new_init_pkru;
219 
220 	if (kstrtouint(opt, 0, &new_init_pkru))
221 		return 1;
222 
223 	WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru);
224 
225 	return 1;
226 }
227 __setup("init_pkru=", setup_init_pkru);
228