1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only 2 /* 3 * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux 4 * 5 * Macros and functions to access KVM PTEs (also known as SPTEs) 6 * 7 * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc. 8 * Copyright 2020 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates. 9 */ 10 11 12 #include <linux/kvm_host.h> 13 #include "mmu.h" 14 #include "mmu_internal.h" 15 #include "x86.h" 16 #include "spte.h" 17 18 #include <asm/e820/api.h> 19 #include <asm/vmx.h> 20 21 static bool __read_mostly enable_mmio_caching = true; 22 module_param_named(mmio_caching, enable_mmio_caching, bool, 0444); 23 24 u64 __read_mostly shadow_host_writable_mask; 25 u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmu_writable_mask; 26 u64 __read_mostly shadow_nx_mask; 27 u64 __read_mostly shadow_x_mask; /* mutual exclusive with nx_mask */ 28 u64 __read_mostly shadow_user_mask; 29 u64 __read_mostly shadow_accessed_mask; 30 u64 __read_mostly shadow_dirty_mask; 31 u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_value; 32 u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mask; 33 u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_access_mask; 34 u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask; 35 u64 __read_mostly shadow_me_mask; 36 u64 __read_mostly shadow_acc_track_mask; 37 38 u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask; 39 u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask; 40 41 u8 __read_mostly shadow_phys_bits; 42 43 static u64 generation_mmio_spte_mask(u64 gen) 44 { 45 u64 mask; 46 47 WARN_ON(gen & ~MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK); 48 49 mask = (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK; 50 mask |= (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK; 51 return mask; 52 } 53 54 u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access) 55 { 56 u64 gen = kvm_vcpu_memslots(vcpu)->generation & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK; 57 u64 spte = generation_mmio_spte_mask(gen); 58 u64 gpa = gfn << PAGE_SHIFT; 59 60 WARN_ON_ONCE(!shadow_mmio_value); 61 62 access &= shadow_mmio_access_mask; 63 spte |= shadow_mmio_value | access; 64 spte |= gpa | shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask; 65 spte |= (gpa & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask) 66 << SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN; 67 68 return spte; 69 } 70 71 static bool kvm_is_mmio_pfn(kvm_pfn_t pfn) 72 { 73 if (pfn_valid(pfn)) 74 return !is_zero_pfn(pfn) && PageReserved(pfn_to_page(pfn)) && 75 /* 76 * Some reserved pages, such as those from NVDIMM 77 * DAX devices, are not for MMIO, and can be mapped 78 * with cached memory type for better performance. 79 * However, the above check misconceives those pages 80 * as MMIO, and results in KVM mapping them with UC 81 * memory type, which would hurt the performance. 82 * Therefore, we check the host memory type in addition 83 * and only treat UC/UC-/WC pages as MMIO. 84 */ 85 (!pat_enabled() || pat_pfn_immune_to_uc_mtrr(pfn)); 86 87 return !e820__mapped_raw_any(pfn_to_hpa(pfn), 88 pfn_to_hpa(pfn + 1) - 1, 89 E820_TYPE_RAM); 90 } 91 92 int make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int pte_access, int level, 93 gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, u64 old_spte, bool speculative, 94 bool can_unsync, bool host_writable, bool ad_disabled, 95 u64 *new_spte) 96 { 97 u64 spte = SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK; 98 int ret = 0; 99 100 if (ad_disabled) 101 spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED_MASK; 102 else if (kvm_vcpu_ad_need_write_protect(vcpu)) 103 spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_WRPROT_ONLY_MASK; 104 105 /* 106 * For the EPT case, shadow_present_mask is 0 if hardware 107 * supports exec-only page table entries. In that case, 108 * ACC_USER_MASK and shadow_user_mask are used to represent 109 * read access. See FNAME(gpte_access) in paging_tmpl.h. 110 */ 111 spte |= shadow_present_mask; 112 if (!speculative) 113 spte |= spte_shadow_accessed_mask(spte); 114 115 if (level > PG_LEVEL_4K && (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK) && 116 is_nx_huge_page_enabled()) { 117 pte_access &= ~ACC_EXEC_MASK; 118 } 119 120 if (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK) 121 spte |= shadow_x_mask; 122 else 123 spte |= shadow_nx_mask; 124 125 if (pte_access & ACC_USER_MASK) 126 spte |= shadow_user_mask; 127 128 if (level > PG_LEVEL_4K) 129 spte |= PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK; 130 if (tdp_enabled) 131 spte |= static_call(kvm_x86_get_mt_mask)(vcpu, gfn, 132 kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn)); 133 134 if (host_writable) 135 spte |= shadow_host_writable_mask; 136 else 137 pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK; 138 139 if (!kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn)) 140 spte |= shadow_me_mask; 141 142 spte |= (u64)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT; 143 144 if (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK) { 145 spte |= PT_WRITABLE_MASK | shadow_mmu_writable_mask; 146 147 /* 148 * Optimization: for pte sync, if spte was writable the hash 149 * lookup is unnecessary (and expensive). Write protection 150 * is responsibility of kvm_mmu_get_page / kvm_mmu_sync_roots. 151 * Same reasoning can be applied to dirty page accounting. 152 */ 153 if (!can_unsync && is_writable_pte(old_spte)) 154 goto out; 155 156 /* 157 * Unsync shadow pages that are reachable by the new, writable 158 * SPTE. Write-protect the SPTE if the page can't be unsync'd, 159 * e.g. it's write-tracked (upper-level SPs) or has one or more 160 * shadow pages and unsync'ing pages is not allowed. 161 */ 162 if (mmu_try_to_unsync_pages(vcpu, gfn, can_unsync)) { 163 pgprintk("%s: found shadow page for %llx, marking ro\n", 164 __func__, gfn); 165 ret |= SET_SPTE_WRITE_PROTECTED_PT; 166 pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK; 167 spte &= ~(PT_WRITABLE_MASK | shadow_mmu_writable_mask); 168 } 169 } 170 171 if (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK) 172 spte |= spte_shadow_dirty_mask(spte); 173 174 if (speculative) 175 spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(spte); 176 177 out: 178 WARN_ON(is_mmio_spte(spte)); 179 *new_spte = spte; 180 return ret; 181 } 182 183 u64 make_nonleaf_spte(u64 *child_pt, bool ad_disabled) 184 { 185 u64 spte = SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK; 186 187 spte |= __pa(child_pt) | shadow_present_mask | PT_WRITABLE_MASK | 188 shadow_user_mask | shadow_x_mask | shadow_me_mask; 189 190 if (ad_disabled) 191 spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED_MASK; 192 else 193 spte |= shadow_accessed_mask; 194 195 return spte; 196 } 197 198 u64 kvm_mmu_changed_pte_notifier_make_spte(u64 old_spte, kvm_pfn_t new_pfn) 199 { 200 u64 new_spte; 201 202 new_spte = old_spte & ~PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK; 203 new_spte |= (u64)new_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT; 204 205 new_spte &= ~PT_WRITABLE_MASK; 206 new_spte &= ~shadow_host_writable_mask; 207 208 new_spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(new_spte); 209 210 return new_spte; 211 } 212 213 static u8 kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits(void) 214 { 215 /* 216 * boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits is reduced when MKTME or SME are detected 217 * in CPU detection code, but the processor treats those reduced bits as 218 * 'keyID' thus they are not reserved bits. Therefore KVM needs to look at 219 * the physical address bits reported by CPUID. 220 */ 221 if (likely(boot_cpu_data.extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008)) 222 return cpuid_eax(0x80000008) & 0xff; 223 224 /* 225 * Quite weird to have VMX or SVM but not MAXPHYADDR; probably a VM with 226 * custom CPUID. Proceed with whatever the kernel found since these features 227 * aren't virtualizable (SME/SEV also require CPUIDs higher than 0x80000008). 228 */ 229 return boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits; 230 } 231 232 u64 mark_spte_for_access_track(u64 spte) 233 { 234 if (spte_ad_enabled(spte)) 235 return spte & ~shadow_accessed_mask; 236 237 if (is_access_track_spte(spte)) 238 return spte; 239 240 /* 241 * Making an Access Tracking PTE will result in removal of write access 242 * from the PTE. So, verify that we will be able to restore the write 243 * access in the fast page fault path later on. 244 */ 245 WARN_ONCE((spte & PT_WRITABLE_MASK) && 246 !spte_can_locklessly_be_made_writable(spte), 247 "kvm: Writable SPTE is not locklessly dirty-trackable\n"); 248 249 WARN_ONCE(spte & (SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK << 250 SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT), 251 "kvm: Access Tracking saved bit locations are not zero\n"); 252 253 spte |= (spte & SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK) << 254 SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT; 255 spte &= ~shadow_acc_track_mask; 256 257 return spte; 258 } 259 260 void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask) 261 { 262 BUG_ON((u64)(unsigned)access_mask != access_mask); 263 WARN_ON(mmio_value & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask); 264 265 if (!enable_mmio_caching) 266 mmio_value = 0; 267 268 /* 269 * Disable MMIO caching if the MMIO value collides with the bits that 270 * are used to hold the relocated GFN when the L1TF mitigation is 271 * enabled. This should never fire as there is no known hardware that 272 * can trigger this condition, e.g. SME/SEV CPUs that require a custom 273 * MMIO value are not susceptible to L1TF. 274 */ 275 if (WARN_ON(mmio_value & (shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask << 276 SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN))) 277 mmio_value = 0; 278 279 /* 280 * The masked MMIO value must obviously match itself and a removed SPTE 281 * must not get a false positive. Removed SPTEs and MMIO SPTEs should 282 * never collide as MMIO must set some RWX bits, and removed SPTEs must 283 * not set any RWX bits. 284 */ 285 if (WARN_ON((mmio_value & mmio_mask) != mmio_value) || 286 WARN_ON(mmio_value && (REMOVED_SPTE & mmio_mask) == mmio_value)) 287 mmio_value = 0; 288 289 shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value; 290 shadow_mmio_mask = mmio_mask; 291 shadow_mmio_access_mask = access_mask; 292 } 293 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask); 294 295 void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only) 296 { 297 shadow_user_mask = VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK; 298 shadow_accessed_mask = has_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT : 0ull; 299 shadow_dirty_mask = has_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull; 300 shadow_nx_mask = 0ull; 301 shadow_x_mask = VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK; 302 shadow_present_mask = has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK; 303 shadow_acc_track_mask = VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK; 304 shadow_me_mask = 0ull; 305 306 shadow_host_writable_mask = EPT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE; 307 shadow_mmu_writable_mask = EPT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE; 308 309 /* 310 * EPT Misconfigurations are generated if the value of bits 2:0 311 * of an EPT paging-structure entry is 110b (write/execute). 312 */ 313 kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE, 314 VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK, 0); 315 } 316 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks); 317 318 void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks(void) 319 { 320 u8 low_phys_bits; 321 u64 mask; 322 323 shadow_phys_bits = kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits(); 324 325 /* 326 * If the CPU has 46 or less physical address bits, then set an 327 * appropriate mask to guard against L1TF attacks. Otherwise, it is 328 * assumed that the CPU is not vulnerable to L1TF. 329 * 330 * Some Intel CPUs address the L1 cache using more PA bits than are 331 * reported by CPUID. Use the PA width of the L1 cache when possible 332 * to achieve more effective mitigation, e.g. if system RAM overlaps 333 * the most significant bits of legal physical address space. 334 */ 335 shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask = 0; 336 low_phys_bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits; 337 if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) && 338 !WARN_ON_ONCE(boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits >= 339 52 - SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN)) { 340 low_phys_bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits 341 - SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN; 342 shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask = 343 rsvd_bits(low_phys_bits, boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits - 1); 344 } 345 346 shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask = 347 GENMASK_ULL(low_phys_bits - 1, PAGE_SHIFT); 348 349 shadow_user_mask = PT_USER_MASK; 350 shadow_accessed_mask = PT_ACCESSED_MASK; 351 shadow_dirty_mask = PT_DIRTY_MASK; 352 shadow_nx_mask = PT64_NX_MASK; 353 shadow_x_mask = 0; 354 shadow_present_mask = PT_PRESENT_MASK; 355 shadow_acc_track_mask = 0; 356 shadow_me_mask = sme_me_mask; 357 358 shadow_host_writable_mask = DEFAULT_SPTE_HOST_WRITEABLE; 359 shadow_mmu_writable_mask = DEFAULT_SPTE_MMU_WRITEABLE; 360 361 /* 362 * Set a reserved PA bit in MMIO SPTEs to generate page faults with 363 * PFEC.RSVD=1 on MMIO accesses. 64-bit PTEs (PAE, x86-64, and EPT 364 * paging) support a maximum of 52 bits of PA, i.e. if the CPU supports 365 * 52-bit physical addresses then there are no reserved PA bits in the 366 * PTEs and so the reserved PA approach must be disabled. 367 */ 368 if (shadow_phys_bits < 52) 369 mask = BIT_ULL(51) | PT_PRESENT_MASK; 370 else 371 mask = 0; 372 373 kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(mask, mask, ACC_WRITE_MASK | ACC_USER_MASK); 374 } 375