1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
2 
3 #ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
4 #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
5 
6 #include <linux/static_key.h>
7 #include <linux/objtool.h>
8 #include <linux/linkage.h>
9 
10 #include <asm/alternative.h>
11 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
12 #include <asm/msr-index.h>
13 #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
14 #include <asm/percpu.h>
15 #include <asm/current.h>
16 
17 /*
18  * Call depth tracking for Intel SKL CPUs to address the RSB underflow
19  * issue in software.
20  *
21  * The tracking does not use a counter. It uses uses arithmetic shift
22  * right on call entry and logical shift left on return.
23  *
24  * The depth tracking variable is initialized to 0x8000.... when the call
25  * depth is zero. The arithmetic shift right sign extends the MSB and
26  * saturates after the 12th call. The shift count is 5 for both directions
27  * so the tracking covers 12 nested calls.
28  *
29  *  Call
30  *  0: 0x8000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
31  *  1: 0xfc00000000000000	0xf000000000000000
32  * ...
33  * 11: 0xfffffffffffffff8	0xfffffffffffffc00
34  * 12: 0xffffffffffffffff	0xffffffffffffffe0
35  *
36  * After a return buffer fill the depth is credited 12 calls before the
37  * next stuffing has to take place.
38  *
39  * There is a inaccuracy for situations like this:
40  *
41  *  10 calls
42  *   5 returns
43  *   3 calls
44  *   4 returns
45  *   3 calls
46  *   ....
47  *
48  * The shift count might cause this to be off by one in either direction,
49  * but there is still a cushion vs. the RSB depth. The algorithm does not
50  * claim to be perfect and it can be speculated around by the CPU, but it
51  * is considered that it obfuscates the problem enough to make exploitation
52  * extremly difficult.
53  */
54 #define RET_DEPTH_SHIFT			5
55 #define RSB_RET_STUFF_LOOPS		16
56 #define RET_DEPTH_INIT			0x8000000000000000ULL
57 #define RET_DEPTH_INIT_FROM_CALL	0xfc00000000000000ULL
58 #define RET_DEPTH_CREDIT		0xffffffffffffffffULL
59 
60 #ifdef CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG
61 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS				\
62 	incq	%gs:__x86_call_count;
63 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_RETS				\
64 	incq	%gs:__x86_ret_count;
65 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_STUFFS				\
66 	incq	%gs:__x86_stuffs_count;
67 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CTXSW				\
68 	incq	%gs:__x86_ctxsw_count;
69 #else
70 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS
71 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_RETS
72 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_STUFFS
73 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CTXSW
74 #endif
75 
76 #if defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) && !defined(COMPILE_OFFSETS)
77 
78 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
79 
80 #define CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH					\
81 	movq	$-1, PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth);
82 
83 #define ASM_CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH					\
84 	movq	$-1, PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth);
85 
86 #define RESET_CALL_DEPTH					\
87 	mov	$0x80, %rax;					\
88 	shl	$56, %rax;					\
89 	movq	%rax, PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth);
90 
91 #define RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL				\
92 	mov	$0xfc, %rax;					\
93 	shl	$56, %rax;					\
94 	movq	%rax, PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth);	\
95 	CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS
96 
97 #define INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH					\
98 	sarq	$5, %gs:pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth;		\
99 	CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS
100 
101 #define ASM_INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH				\
102 	sarq	$5, PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth);	\
103 	CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS
104 
105 #else
106 #define CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH
107 #define ASM_CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH
108 #define RESET_CALL_DEPTH
109 #define INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH
110 #define ASM_INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH
111 #define RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL
112 #endif
113 
114 /*
115  * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
116  *
117  * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
118  * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
119  *
120  * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
121  * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
122  * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
123  * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
124  * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
125  *
126  * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
127  * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
128  * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
129  */
130 
131 #define RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE	32
132 #define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS		32	/* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
133 
134 /*
135  * Common helper for __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER and __FILL_ONE_RETURN.
136  */
137 #define __FILL_RETURN_SLOT			\
138 	ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL;		\
139 	call	772f;				\
140 	int3;					\
141 772:
142 
143 /*
144  * Stuff the entire RSB.
145  *
146  * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
147  * the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation
148  * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
149  */
150 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
151 #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr)			\
152 	mov	$(nr/2), reg;				\
153 771:							\
154 	__FILL_RETURN_SLOT				\
155 	__FILL_RETURN_SLOT				\
156 	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, %_ASM_SP;	\
157 	dec	reg;					\
158 	jnz	771b;					\
159 	/* barrier for jnz misprediction */		\
160 	lfence;						\
161 	ASM_CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH				\
162 	CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CTXSW
163 #else
164 /*
165  * i386 doesn't unconditionally have LFENCE, as such it can't
166  * do a loop.
167  */
168 #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr)			\
169 	.rept nr;					\
170 	__FILL_RETURN_SLOT;				\
171 	.endr;						\
172 	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, %_ASM_SP;
173 #endif
174 
175 /*
176  * Stuff a single RSB slot.
177  *
178  * To mitigate Post-Barrier RSB speculation, one CALL instruction must be
179  * forced to retire before letting a RET instruction execute.
180  *
181  * On PBRSB-vulnerable CPUs, it is not safe for a RET to be executed
182  * before this point.
183  */
184 #define __FILL_ONE_RETURN				\
185 	__FILL_RETURN_SLOT				\
186 	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP;		\
187 	lfence;
188 
189 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
190 
191 /*
192  * This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells
193  * objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline
194  * builds.
195  */
196 .macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
197 	.Lannotate_\@:
198 	.pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe
199 	_ASM_PTR .Lannotate_\@
200 	.popsection
201 .endm
202 
203 /*
204  * (ab)use RETPOLINE_SAFE on RET to annotate away 'bare' RET instructions
205  * vs RETBleed validation.
206  */
207 #define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
208 
209 /*
210  * Abuse ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE on a NOP to indicate UNRET_END, should
211  * eventually turn into it's own annotation.
212  */
213 .macro ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
214 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
215 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
216 	nop
217 #endif
218 .endm
219 
220 /*
221  * Equivalent to -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix; emit the 5 byte jmp/call
222  * to the retpoline thunk with a CS prefix when the register requires
223  * a RAX prefix byte to encode. Also see apply_retpolines().
224  */
225 .macro __CS_PREFIX reg:req
226 	.irp rs,r8,r9,r10,r11,r12,r13,r14,r15
227 	.ifc \reg,\rs
228 	.byte 0x2e
229 	.endif
230 	.endr
231 .endm
232 
233 /*
234  * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
235  * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
236  * attack.
237  */
238 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
239 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
240 	__CS_PREFIX \reg
241 	jmp	__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
242 #else
243 	jmp	*%\reg
244 	int3
245 #endif
246 .endm
247 
248 .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
249 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
250 	__CS_PREFIX \reg
251 	call	__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
252 #else
253 	call	*%\reg
254 #endif
255 .endm
256 
257  /*
258   * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
259   * monstrosity above, manually.
260   */
261 .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req ftr2=ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS)
262 	ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
263 		__stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr)), \ftr, \
264 		__stringify(__FILL_ONE_RETURN), \ftr2
265 
266 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
267 .endm
268 
269 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
270 #define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET	"call zen_untrain_ret"
271 #else
272 #define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET	""
273 #endif
274 
275 /*
276  * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the
277  * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD
278  * typically has NO_MELTDOWN).
279  *
280  * While zen_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack,
281  * entry_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX.
282  *
283  * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point
284  * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
285  */
286 .macro UNTRAIN_RET
287 #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \
288 	defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING)
289 	ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
290 	ALTERNATIVE_3 "",						\
291 		      CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET,		\
292 		      "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB,	\
293 		      __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
294 #endif
295 .endm
296 
297 .macro UNTRAIN_RET_FROM_CALL
298 #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \
299 	defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING)
300 	ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
301 	ALTERNATIVE_3 "",						\
302 		      CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET,		\
303 		      "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB,	\
304 		      __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
305 #endif
306 .endm
307 
308 
309 .macro CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT
310 #ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
311 	ALTERNATIVE "",							\
312 		    __stringify(ASM_INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
313 #endif
314 .endm
315 
316 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
317 
318 #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\
319 	"999:\n\t"						\
320 	".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t"		\
321 	_ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t"					\
322 	".popsection\n\t"
323 
324 typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE];
325 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[];
326 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_call_thunk_array[];
327 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array[];
328 
329 extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
330 extern void zen_untrain_ret(void);
331 extern void entry_ibpb(void);
332 
333 #ifdef CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS
334 extern void (*x86_return_thunk)(void);
335 #else
336 #define x86_return_thunk	(&__x86_return_thunk)
337 #endif
338 
339 #ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
340 extern void __x86_return_skl(void);
341 
342 static inline void x86_set_skl_return_thunk(void)
343 {
344 	x86_return_thunk = &__x86_return_skl;
345 }
346 
347 #define CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT					\
348 	ALTERNATIVE("",						\
349 		    __stringify(INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH),		\
350 		    X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH)
351 
352 #ifdef CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG
353 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_call_count);
354 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_ret_count);
355 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_stuffs_count);
356 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_ctxsw_count);
357 #endif
358 #else
359 static inline void x86_set_skl_return_thunk(void) {}
360 
361 #define CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT ""
362 
363 #endif
364 
365 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
366 
367 #define GEN(reg) \
368 	extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg;
369 #include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
370 #undef GEN
371 
372 #define GEN(reg)						\
373 	extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_call_thunk_ ## reg;
374 #include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
375 #undef GEN
376 
377 #define GEN(reg)						\
378 	extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_ ## reg;
379 #include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
380 #undef GEN
381 
382 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
383 
384 /*
385  * Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC
386  * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined.
387  */
388 # define CALL_NOSPEC						\
389 	ALTERNATIVE_2(						\
390 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\
391 	"call *%[thunk_target]\n",				\
392 	"call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n",		\
393 	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,					\
394 	"lfence;\n"						\
395 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\
396 	"call *%[thunk_target]\n",				\
397 	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)
398 
399 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
400 
401 #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
402 /*
403  * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
404  * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
405  * here, anyway.
406  */
407 # define CALL_NOSPEC						\
408 	ALTERNATIVE_2(						\
409 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\
410 	"call *%[thunk_target]\n",				\
411 	"       jmp    904f;\n"					\
412 	"       .align 16\n"					\
413 	"901:	call   903f;\n"					\
414 	"902:	pause;\n"					\
415 	"    	lfence;\n"					\
416 	"       jmp    902b;\n"					\
417 	"       .align 16\n"					\
418 	"903:	lea    4(%%esp), %%esp;\n"			\
419 	"       pushl  %[thunk_target];\n"			\
420 	"       ret;\n"						\
421 	"       .align 16\n"					\
422 	"904:	call   901b;\n",				\
423 	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,					\
424 	"lfence;\n"						\
425 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\
426 	"call *%[thunk_target]\n",				\
427 	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)
428 
429 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
430 #endif
431 #else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
432 # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
433 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
434 #endif
435 
436 /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
437 enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
438 	SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
439 	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE,
440 	SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE,
441 	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS,
442 	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
443 	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE,
444 	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
445 };
446 
447 /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
448 enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation {
449 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE,
450 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT,
451 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED,
452 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL,
453 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP,
454 };
455 
456 /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
457 enum ssb_mitigation {
458 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
459 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
460 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL,
461 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP,
462 };
463 
464 extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
465 extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
466 
467 static __always_inline
468 void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
469 {
470 	asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature])
471 		: : "c" (msr),
472 		    "a" ((u32)val),
473 		    "d" ((u32)(val >> 32)),
474 		    [feature] "i" (feature)
475 		: "memory");
476 }
477 
478 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
479 {
480 	u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
481 
482 	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
483 }
484 
485 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
486 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
487 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
488 extern void update_spec_ctrl_cond(u64 val);
489 extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void);
490 
491 /*
492  * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
493  * before calling into firmware.
494  *
495  * (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.)
496  */
497 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start()			\
498 do {									\
499 	preempt_disable();						\
500 	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,			\
501 			      spec_ctrl_current() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS,	\
502 			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);			\
503 	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB,		\
504 			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB_FW);			\
505 } while (0)
506 
507 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end()			\
508 do {									\
509 	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,			\
510 			      spec_ctrl_current(),			\
511 			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);			\
512 	preempt_enable();						\
513 } while (0)
514 
515 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
516 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
517 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
518 
519 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
520 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
521 
522 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
523 
524 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
525 
526 #include <asm/segment.h>
527 
528 /**
529  * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
530  *
531  * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
532  * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
533  * instruction is executed.
534  */
535 static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
536 {
537 	static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS;
538 
539 	/*
540 	 * Has to be the memory-operand variant because only that
541 	 * guarantees the CPU buffer flush functionality according to
542 	 * documentation. The register-operand variant does not.
543 	 * Works with any segment selector, but a valid writable
544 	 * data segment is the fastest variant.
545 	 *
546 	 * "cc" clobber is required because VERW modifies ZF.
547 	 */
548 	asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc");
549 }
550 
551 /**
552  * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
553  *
554  * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
555  */
556 static __always_inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
557 {
558 	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear))
559 		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
560 }
561 
562 /**
563  * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
564  *
565  * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
566  */
567 static inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
568 {
569 	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear))
570 		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
571 }
572 
573 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
574 
575 #endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */
576