1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ 2 3 #ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ 4 #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ 5 6 #include <linux/static_key.h> 7 #include <linux/objtool.h> 8 #include <linux/linkage.h> 9 10 #include <asm/alternative.h> 11 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h> 12 #include <asm/msr-index.h> 13 #include <asm/unwind_hints.h> 14 #include <asm/percpu.h> 15 #include <asm/current.h> 16 17 /* 18 * Call depth tracking for Intel SKL CPUs to address the RSB underflow 19 * issue in software. 20 * 21 * The tracking does not use a counter. It uses uses arithmetic shift 22 * right on call entry and logical shift left on return. 23 * 24 * The depth tracking variable is initialized to 0x8000.... when the call 25 * depth is zero. The arithmetic shift right sign extends the MSB and 26 * saturates after the 12th call. The shift count is 5 for both directions 27 * so the tracking covers 12 nested calls. 28 * 29 * Call 30 * 0: 0x8000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 31 * 1: 0xfc00000000000000 0xf000000000000000 32 * ... 33 * 11: 0xfffffffffffffff8 0xfffffffffffffc00 34 * 12: 0xffffffffffffffff 0xffffffffffffffe0 35 * 36 * After a return buffer fill the depth is credited 12 calls before the 37 * next stuffing has to take place. 38 * 39 * There is a inaccuracy for situations like this: 40 * 41 * 10 calls 42 * 5 returns 43 * 3 calls 44 * 4 returns 45 * 3 calls 46 * .... 47 * 48 * The shift count might cause this to be off by one in either direction, 49 * but there is still a cushion vs. the RSB depth. The algorithm does not 50 * claim to be perfect and it can be speculated around by the CPU, but it 51 * is considered that it obfuscates the problem enough to make exploitation 52 * extremly difficult. 53 */ 54 #define RET_DEPTH_SHIFT 5 55 #define RSB_RET_STUFF_LOOPS 16 56 #define RET_DEPTH_INIT 0x8000000000000000ULL 57 #define RET_DEPTH_INIT_FROM_CALL 0xfc00000000000000ULL 58 #define RET_DEPTH_CREDIT 0xffffffffffffffffULL 59 60 #ifdef CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG 61 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS \ 62 incq %gs:__x86_call_count; 63 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_RETS \ 64 incq %gs:__x86_ret_count; 65 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_STUFFS \ 66 incq %gs:__x86_stuffs_count; 67 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CTXSW \ 68 incq %gs:__x86_ctxsw_count; 69 #else 70 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS 71 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_RETS 72 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_STUFFS 73 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CTXSW 74 #endif 75 76 #if defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) && !defined(COMPILE_OFFSETS) 77 78 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> 79 80 #define CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH \ 81 movq $-1, PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth); 82 83 #define ASM_CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH \ 84 movq $-1, PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth); 85 86 #define RESET_CALL_DEPTH \ 87 mov $0x80, %rax; \ 88 shl $56, %rax; \ 89 movq %rax, PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth); 90 91 #define RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL \ 92 mov $0xfc, %rax; \ 93 shl $56, %rax; \ 94 movq %rax, PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth); \ 95 CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS 96 97 #define INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH \ 98 sarq $5, %gs:pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth; \ 99 CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS 100 101 #define ASM_INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH \ 102 sarq $5, PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth); \ 103 CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS 104 105 #else 106 #define CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH 107 #define ASM_CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH 108 #define RESET_CALL_DEPTH 109 #define INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH 110 #define ASM_INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH 111 #define RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL 112 #endif 113 114 /* 115 * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. 116 * 117 * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an 118 * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. 119 * 120 * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based 121 * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to 122 * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes 123 * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would 124 * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. 125 * 126 * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and 127 * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that 128 * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there. 129 */ 130 131 #define RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE 32 132 #define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ 133 134 /* 135 * Common helper for __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER and __FILL_ONE_RETURN. 136 */ 137 #define __FILL_RETURN_SLOT \ 138 ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \ 139 call 772f; \ 140 int3; \ 141 772: 142 143 /* 144 * Stuff the entire RSB. 145 * 146 * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be 147 * the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation 148 * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. 149 */ 150 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 151 #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr) \ 152 mov $(nr/2), reg; \ 153 771: \ 154 __FILL_RETURN_SLOT \ 155 __FILL_RETURN_SLOT \ 156 add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, %_ASM_SP; \ 157 dec reg; \ 158 jnz 771b; \ 159 /* barrier for jnz misprediction */ \ 160 lfence; \ 161 ASM_CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH \ 162 CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CTXSW 163 #else 164 /* 165 * i386 doesn't unconditionally have LFENCE, as such it can't 166 * do a loop. 167 */ 168 #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr) \ 169 .rept nr; \ 170 __FILL_RETURN_SLOT; \ 171 .endr; \ 172 add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, %_ASM_SP; 173 #endif 174 175 /* 176 * Stuff a single RSB slot. 177 * 178 * To mitigate Post-Barrier RSB speculation, one CALL instruction must be 179 * forced to retire before letting a RET instruction execute. 180 * 181 * On PBRSB-vulnerable CPUs, it is not safe for a RET to be executed 182 * before this point. 183 */ 184 #define __FILL_ONE_RETURN \ 185 __FILL_RETURN_SLOT \ 186 add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP; \ 187 lfence; 188 189 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ 190 191 /* 192 * This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells 193 * objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline 194 * builds. 195 */ 196 .macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE 197 .Lannotate_\@: 198 .pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe 199 _ASM_PTR .Lannotate_\@ 200 .popsection 201 .endm 202 203 /* 204 * (ab)use RETPOLINE_SAFE on RET to annotate away 'bare' RET instructions 205 * vs RETBleed validation. 206 */ 207 #define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE 208 209 /* 210 * Abuse ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE on a NOP to indicate UNRET_END, should 211 * eventually turn into it's own annotation. 212 */ 213 .macro ANNOTATE_UNRET_END 214 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY 215 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE 216 nop 217 #endif 218 .endm 219 220 /* 221 * Equivalent to -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix; emit the 5 byte jmp/call 222 * to the retpoline thunk with a CS prefix when the register requires 223 * a RAX prefix byte to encode. Also see apply_retpolines(). 224 */ 225 .macro __CS_PREFIX reg:req 226 .irp rs,r8,r9,r10,r11,r12,r13,r14,r15 227 .ifc \reg,\rs 228 .byte 0x2e 229 .endif 230 .endr 231 .endm 232 233 /* 234 * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple 235 * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2 236 * attack. 237 */ 238 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req 239 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE 240 __CS_PREFIX \reg 241 jmp __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg 242 #else 243 jmp *%\reg 244 int3 245 #endif 246 .endm 247 248 .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req 249 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE 250 __CS_PREFIX \reg 251 call __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg 252 #else 253 call *%\reg 254 #endif 255 .endm 256 257 /* 258 * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP 259 * monstrosity above, manually. 260 */ 261 .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req ftr2=ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS) 262 ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \ 263 __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr)), \ftr, \ 264 __stringify(nop;nop;__FILL_ONE_RETURN), \ftr2 265 266 .Lskip_rsb_\@: 267 .endm 268 269 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY 270 #define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET "call zen_untrain_ret" 271 #else 272 #define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET "" 273 #endif 274 275 /* 276 * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the 277 * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD 278 * typically has NO_MELTDOWN). 279 * 280 * While zen_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack, 281 * entry_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX. 282 * 283 * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point 284 * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction. 285 */ 286 .macro UNTRAIN_RET 287 #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \ 288 defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) 289 ANNOTATE_UNRET_END 290 ALTERNATIVE_3 "", \ 291 CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ 292 "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB, \ 293 __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH 294 #endif 295 .endm 296 297 .macro UNTRAIN_RET_FROM_CALL 298 #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \ 299 defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) 300 ANNOTATE_UNRET_END 301 ALTERNATIVE_3 "", \ 302 CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ 303 "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB, \ 304 __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH 305 #endif 306 .endm 307 308 309 .macro CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT 310 #ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING 311 ALTERNATIVE "", \ 312 __stringify(ASM_INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH 313 #endif 314 .endm 315 316 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ 317 318 #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ 319 "999:\n\t" \ 320 ".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t" \ 321 _ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t" \ 322 ".popsection\n\t" 323 324 typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE]; 325 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[]; 326 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_call_thunk_array[]; 327 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array[]; 328 329 extern void __x86_return_thunk(void); 330 extern void zen_untrain_ret(void); 331 extern void entry_ibpb(void); 332 333 #ifdef CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS 334 extern void (*x86_return_thunk)(void); 335 #else 336 #define x86_return_thunk (&__x86_return_thunk) 337 #endif 338 339 #ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING 340 extern void __x86_return_skl(void); 341 342 static inline void x86_set_skl_return_thunk(void) 343 { 344 x86_return_thunk = &__x86_return_skl; 345 } 346 347 #define CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT \ 348 ALTERNATIVE("", \ 349 __stringify(INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH), \ 350 X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH) 351 352 #ifdef CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG 353 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_call_count); 354 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_ret_count); 355 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_stuffs_count); 356 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_ctxsw_count); 357 #endif 358 #else 359 static inline void x86_set_skl_return_thunk(void) {} 360 361 #define CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT "" 362 363 #endif 364 365 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE 366 367 #define GEN(reg) \ 368 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg; 369 #include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h> 370 #undef GEN 371 372 #define GEN(reg) \ 373 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_call_thunk_ ## reg; 374 #include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h> 375 #undef GEN 376 377 #define GEN(reg) \ 378 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_ ## reg; 379 #include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h> 380 #undef GEN 381 382 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 383 384 /* 385 * Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC 386 * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined. 387 */ 388 # define CALL_NOSPEC \ 389 ALTERNATIVE_2( \ 390 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ 391 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ 392 "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n", \ 393 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ 394 "lfence;\n" \ 395 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ 396 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ 397 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) 398 399 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr) 400 401 #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ 402 /* 403 * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because 404 * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET 405 * here, anyway. 406 */ 407 # define CALL_NOSPEC \ 408 ALTERNATIVE_2( \ 409 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ 410 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ 411 " jmp 904f;\n" \ 412 " .align 16\n" \ 413 "901: call 903f;\n" \ 414 "902: pause;\n" \ 415 " lfence;\n" \ 416 " jmp 902b;\n" \ 417 " .align 16\n" \ 418 "903: lea 4(%%esp), %%esp;\n" \ 419 " pushl %[thunk_target];\n" \ 420 " ret;\n" \ 421 " .align 16\n" \ 422 "904: call 901b;\n", \ 423 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ 424 "lfence;\n" \ 425 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ 426 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ 427 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) 428 429 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr) 430 #endif 431 #else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */ 432 # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n" 433 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr) 434 #endif 435 436 /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */ 437 enum spectre_v2_mitigation { 438 SPECTRE_V2_NONE, 439 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE, 440 SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE, 441 SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS, 442 SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, 443 SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE, 444 SPECTRE_V2_IBRS, 445 }; 446 447 /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */ 448 enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation { 449 SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE, 450 SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT, 451 SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED, 452 SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL, 453 SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP, 454 }; 455 456 /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */ 457 enum ssb_mitigation { 458 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE, 459 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE, 460 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL, 461 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP, 462 }; 463 464 extern char __indirect_thunk_start[]; 465 extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; 466 467 static __always_inline 468 void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature) 469 { 470 asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature]) 471 : : "c" (msr), 472 "a" ((u32)val), 473 "d" ((u32)(val >> 32)), 474 [feature] "i" (feature) 475 : "memory"); 476 } 477 478 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) 479 { 480 u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB; 481 482 alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); 483 } 484 485 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ 486 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; 487 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current); 488 extern void update_spec_ctrl_cond(u64 val); 489 extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void); 490 491 /* 492 * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction 493 * before calling into firmware. 494 * 495 * (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.) 496 */ 497 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \ 498 do { \ 499 preempt_disable(); \ 500 alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, \ 501 spec_ctrl_current() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, \ 502 X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ 503 alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB, \ 504 X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB_FW); \ 505 } while (0) 506 507 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \ 508 do { \ 509 alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, \ 510 spec_ctrl_current(), \ 511 X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ 512 preempt_enable(); \ 513 } while (0) 514 515 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp); 516 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb); 517 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb); 518 519 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear); 520 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear); 521 522 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush); 523 524 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear); 525 526 #include <asm/segment.h> 527 528 /** 529 * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability 530 * 531 * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in 532 * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the 533 * instruction is executed. 534 */ 535 static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void) 536 { 537 static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS; 538 539 /* 540 * Has to be the memory-operand variant because only that 541 * guarantees the CPU buffer flush functionality according to 542 * documentation. The register-operand variant does not. 543 * Works with any segment selector, but a valid writable 544 * data segment is the fastest variant. 545 * 546 * "cc" clobber is required because VERW modifies ZF. 547 */ 548 asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc"); 549 } 550 551 /** 552 * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability 553 * 554 * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled 555 */ 556 static __always_inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void) 557 { 558 if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear)) 559 mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); 560 } 561 562 /** 563 * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability 564 * 565 * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled 566 */ 567 static __always_inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void) 568 { 569 if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear)) 570 mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); 571 } 572 573 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ 574 575 #endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */ 576