1=============== 2NVDIMM Security 3=============== 4 51. Introduction 6--------------- 7 8With the introduction of Intel Device Specific Methods (DSM) v1.8 9specification [1], security DSMs are introduced. The spec added the following 10security DSMs: "get security state", "set passphrase", "disable passphrase", 11"unlock unit", "freeze lock", "secure erase", and "overwrite". A security_ops 12data structure has been added to struct dimm in order to support the security 13operations and generic APIs are exposed to allow vendor neutral operations. 14 152. Sysfs Interface 16------------------ 17The "security" sysfs attribute is provided in the nvdimm sysfs directory. For 18example: 19/sys/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/ACPI0012:00/ndbus0/nmem0/security 20 21The "show" attribute of that attribute will display the security state for 22that DIMM. The following states are available: disabled, unlocked, locked, 23frozen, and overwrite. If security is not supported, the sysfs attribute 24will not be visible. 25 26The "store" attribute takes several commands when it is being written to 27in order to support some of the security functionalities: 28update <old_keyid> <new_keyid> - enable or update passphrase. 29disable <keyid> - disable enabled security and remove key. 30freeze - freeze changing of security states. 31erase <keyid> - delete existing user encryption key. 32overwrite <keyid> - wipe the entire nvdimm. 33master_update <keyid> <new_keyid> - enable or update master passphrase. 34master_erase <keyid> - delete existing user encryption key. 35 363. Key Management 37----------------- 38 39The key is associated to the payload by the DIMM id. For example: 40# cat /sys/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/ACPI0012:00/ndbus0/nmem0/nfit/id 418089-a2-1740-00000133 42The DIMM id would be provided along with the key payload (passphrase) to 43the kernel. 44 45The security keys are managed on the basis of a single key per DIMM. The 46key "passphrase" is expected to be 32bytes long. This is similar to the ATA 47security specification [2]. A key is initially acquired via the request_key() 48kernel API call during nvdimm unlock. It is up to the user to make sure that 49all the keys are in the kernel user keyring for unlock. 50 51A nvdimm encrypted-key of format enc32 has the description format of: 52nvdimm:<bus-provider-specific-unique-id> 53 54See file ``Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst`` for creating 55encrypted-keys of enc32 format. TPM usage with a master trusted key is 56preferred for sealing the encrypted-keys. 57 584. Unlocking 59------------ 60When the DIMMs are being enumerated by the kernel, the kernel will attempt to 61retrieve the key from the kernel user keyring. This is the only time 62a locked DIMM can be unlocked. Once unlocked, the DIMM will remain unlocked 63until reboot. Typically an entity (i.e. shell script) will inject all the 64relevant encrypted-keys into the kernel user keyring during the initramfs phase. 65This provides the unlock function access to all the related keys that contain 66the passphrase for the respective nvdimms. It is also recommended that the 67keys are injected before libnvdimm is loaded by modprobe. 68 695. Update 70--------- 71When doing an update, it is expected that the existing key is removed from 72the kernel user keyring and reinjected as different (old) key. It's irrelevant 73what the key description is for the old key since we are only interested in the 74keyid when doing the update operation. It is also expected that the new key 75is injected with the description format described from earlier in this 76document. The update command written to the sysfs attribute will be with 77the format: 78update <old keyid> <new keyid> 79 80If there is no old keyid due to a security enabling, then a 0 should be 81passed in. 82 836. Freeze 84--------- 85The freeze operation does not require any keys. The security config can be 86frozen by a user with root privelege. 87 887. Disable 89---------- 90The security disable command format is: 91disable <keyid> 92 93An key with the current passphrase payload that is tied to the nvdimm should be 94in the kernel user keyring. 95 968. Secure Erase 97--------------- 98The command format for doing a secure erase is: 99erase <keyid> 100 101An key with the current passphrase payload that is tied to the nvdimm should be 102in the kernel user keyring. 103 1049. Overwrite 105------------ 106The command format for doing an overwrite is: 107overwrite <keyid> 108 109Overwrite can be done without a key if security is not enabled. A key serial 110of 0 can be passed in to indicate no key. 111 112The sysfs attribute "security" can be polled to wait on overwrite completion. 113Overwrite can last tens of minutes or more depending on nvdimm size. 114 115An encrypted-key with the current user passphrase that is tied to the nvdimm 116should be injected and its keyid should be passed in via sysfs. 117 11810. Master Update 119----------------- 120The command format for doing a master update is: 121update <old keyid> <new keyid> 122 123The operating mechanism for master update is identical to update except the 124master passphrase key is passed to the kernel. The master passphrase key 125is just another encrypted-key. 126 127This command is only available when security is disabled. 128 12911. Master Erase 130---------------- 131The command format for doing a master erase is: 132master_erase <current keyid> 133 134This command has the same operating mechanism as erase except the master 135passphrase key is passed to the kernel. The master passphrase key is just 136another encrypted-key. 137 138This command is only available when the master security is enabled, indicated 139by the extended security status. 140 141[1]: http://pmem.io/documents/NVDIMM_DSM_Interface-V1.8.pdf 142 143[2]: http://www.t13.org/documents/UploadedDocuments/docs2006/e05179r4-ACS-SecurityClarifications.pdf 144