1.. _perf_security: 2 3Perf Events and tool security 4============================= 5 6Overview 7-------- 8 9Usage of Performance Counters for Linux (perf_events) [1]_ , [2]_ , [3]_ can 10impose a considerable risk of leaking sensitive data accessed by monitored 11processes. The data leakage is possible both in scenarios of direct usage of 12perf_events system call API [2]_ and over data files generated by Perf tool user 13mode utility (Perf) [3]_ , [4]_ . The risk depends on the nature of data that 14perf_events performance monitoring units (PMU) [2]_ collect and expose for 15performance analysis. Having that said perf_events/Perf performance monitoring 16is the subject for security access control management [5]_ . 17 18perf_events/Perf access control 19------------------------------- 20 21To perform security checks, the Linux implementation splits processes into two 22categories [6]_ : a) privileged processes (whose effective user ID is 0, referred 23to as superuser or root), and b) unprivileged processes (whose effective UID is 24nonzero). Privileged processes bypass all kernel security permission checks so 25perf_events performance monitoring is fully available to privileged processes 26without access, scope and resource restrictions. 27 28Unprivileged processes are subject to a full security permission check based on 29the process's credentials [5]_ (usually: effective UID, effective GID, and 30supplementary group list). 31 32Linux divides the privileges traditionally associated with superuser into 33distinct units, known as capabilities [6]_ , which can be independently enabled 34and disabled on per-thread basis for processes and files of unprivileged users. 35 36Unprivileged processes with enabled CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability are treated as 37privileged processes with respect to perf_events performance monitoring and 38bypass *scope* permissions checks in the kernel. 39 40Unprivileged processes using perf_events system call API is also subject for 41PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS ptrace access mode check [7]_ , whose outcome 42determines whether monitoring is permitted. So unprivileged processes provided 43with CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability are effectively permitted to pass the check. 44 45Other capabilities being granted to unprivileged processes can effectively 46enable capturing of additional data required for later performance analysis of 47monitored processes or a system. For example, CAP_SYSLOG capability permits 48reading kernel space memory addresses from /proc/kallsyms file. 49 50perf_events/Perf unprivileged users 51----------------------------------- 52 53perf_events/Perf *scope* and *access* control for unprivileged processes is 54governed by perf_event_paranoid [2]_ setting: 55 56-1: 57 Impose no *scope* and *access* restrictions on using perf_events performance 58 monitoring. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb [2]_ locking limit is 59 ignored when allocating memory buffers for storing performance data. 60 This is the least secure mode since allowed monitored *scope* is 61 maximized and no perf_events specific limits are imposed on *resources* 62 allocated for performance monitoring. 63 64>=0: 65 *scope* includes per-process and system wide performance monitoring 66 but excludes raw tracepoints and ftrace function tracepoints monitoring. 67 CPU and system events happened when executing either in user or 68 in kernel space can be monitored and captured for later analysis. 69 Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb locking limit is imposed but 70 ignored for unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK [6]_ capability. 71 72>=1: 73 *scope* includes per-process performance monitoring only and excludes 74 system wide performance monitoring. CPU and system events happened when 75 executing either in user or in kernel space can be monitored and 76 captured for later analysis. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb 77 locking limit is imposed but ignored for unprivileged processes with 78 CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. 79 80>=2: 81 *scope* includes per-process performance monitoring only. CPU and system 82 events happened when executing in user space only can be monitored and 83 captured for later analysis. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb 84 locking limit is imposed but ignored for unprivileged processes with 85 CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. 86 87Bibliography 88------------ 89 90.. [1] `<https://lwn.net/Articles/337493/>`_ 91.. [2] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html>`_ 92.. [3] `<http://web.eece.maine.edu/~vweaver/projects/perf_events/>`_ 93.. [4] `<https://perf.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/Main_Page>`_ 94.. [5] `<https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html>`_ 95.. [6] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html>`_ 96.. [7] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html>`_ 97 98