xref: /openbmc/linux/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm (revision 68198dca)
1What:		security/evm
2Date:		March 2011
3Contact:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
4Description:
5		EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs)
6		against integrity attacks. The initial method maintains an
7		HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the
8		value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
9
10		EVM supports two classes of security.evm. The first is
11		an HMAC-sha1 generated locally with a
12		trusted/encrypted key stored in the Kernel Key
13		Retention System. The second is a digital signature
14		generated either locally or remotely using an
15		asymmetric key. These keys are loaded onto root's
16		keyring using keyctl, and EVM is then enabled by
17		echoing a value to <securityfs>/evm:
18
19		1: enable HMAC validation and creation
20		2: enable digital signature validation
21		3: enable HMAC and digital signature validation and HMAC
22		   creation
23
24		Further writes will be blocked if HMAC support is enabled or
25		if bit 32 is set:
26
27		echo 0x80000002 ><securityfs>/evm
28
29		will enable digital signature validation and block
30		further writes to <securityfs>/evm.
31
32		Until this is done, EVM can not create or validate the
33		'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.
34		Loading keys and signaling EVM should be done as early
35		as possible.  Normally this is done in the initramfs,
36		which has already been measured as part of the trusted
37		boot.  For more information on creating and loading
38		existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to:
39
40		Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst. Both dracut
41		(via 97masterkey and 98integrity) and systemd (via
42		core/ima-setup) have support for loading keys at boot
43		time.
44