xref: /openbmc/linux/kernel/kcsan/permissive.h (revision 762f99f4f3cb41a775b5157dd761217beba65873)
149f72d53SMarco Elver /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
249f72d53SMarco Elver /*
349f72d53SMarco Elver  * Special rules for ignoring entire classes of data-racy memory accesses. None
449f72d53SMarco Elver  * of the rules here imply that such data races are generally safe!
549f72d53SMarco Elver  *
649f72d53SMarco Elver  * All rules in this file can be configured via CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE. Keep
749f72d53SMarco Elver  * them separate from core code to make it easier to audit.
849f72d53SMarco Elver  *
949f72d53SMarco Elver  * Copyright (C) 2019, Google LLC.
1049f72d53SMarco Elver  */
1149f72d53SMarco Elver 
1249f72d53SMarco Elver #ifndef _KERNEL_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE_H
1349f72d53SMarco Elver #define _KERNEL_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE_H
1449f72d53SMarco Elver 
15*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver #include <linux/bitops.h>
16*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver #include <linux/sched.h>
1749f72d53SMarco Elver #include <linux/types.h>
1849f72d53SMarco Elver 
1949f72d53SMarco Elver /*
2049f72d53SMarco Elver  * Access ignore rules based on address.
2149f72d53SMarco Elver  */
kcsan_ignore_address(const volatile void * ptr)2249f72d53SMarco Elver static __always_inline bool kcsan_ignore_address(const volatile void *ptr)
2349f72d53SMarco Elver {
2449f72d53SMarco Elver 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE))
2549f72d53SMarco Elver 		return false;
2649f72d53SMarco Elver 
27*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	/*
28*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * Data-racy bitops on current->flags are too common, ignore completely
29*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * for now.
30*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 */
31*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	return ptr == &current->flags;
3249f72d53SMarco Elver }
3349f72d53SMarco Elver 
3449f72d53SMarco Elver /*
3549f72d53SMarco Elver  * Data race ignore rules based on access type and value change patterns.
3649f72d53SMarco Elver  */
3749f72d53SMarco Elver static bool
kcsan_ignore_data_race(size_t size,int type,u64 old,u64 new,u64 diff)3849f72d53SMarco Elver kcsan_ignore_data_race(size_t size, int type, u64 old, u64 new, u64 diff)
3949f72d53SMarco Elver {
4049f72d53SMarco Elver 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE))
4149f72d53SMarco Elver 		return false;
4249f72d53SMarco Elver 
4349f72d53SMarco Elver 	/*
4449f72d53SMarco Elver 	 * Rules here are only for plain read accesses, so that we still report
4549f72d53SMarco Elver 	 * data races between plain read-write accesses.
4649f72d53SMarco Elver 	 */
4749f72d53SMarco Elver 	if (type || size > sizeof(long))
4849f72d53SMarco Elver 		return false;
4949f72d53SMarco Elver 
50*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	/*
51*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * A common pattern is checking/setting just 1 bit in a variable; for
52*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * example:
53*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 *
54*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 *	if (flags & SOME_FLAG) { ... }
55*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 *
56*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * and elsewhere flags is updated concurrently:
57*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 *
58*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 *	flags |= SOME_OTHER_FLAG; // just 1 bit
59*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 *
60*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * While it is still recommended that such accesses be marked
61*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * appropriately, in many cases these types of data races are so common
62*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * that marking them all is often unrealistic and left to maintainer
63*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * preference.
64*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 *
65*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * The assumption in all cases is that with all known compiler
66*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * optimizations (including those that tear accesses), because no more
67*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * than 1 bit changed, the plain accesses are safe despite the presence
68*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * of data races.
69*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 *
70*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * The rules here will ignore the data races if we observe no more than
71*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * 1 bit changed.
72*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 *
73*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * Of course many operations can effecively change just 1 bit, but the
74*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * general assuption that data races involving 1-bit changes can be
75*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * tolerated still applies.
76*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 *
77*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * And in case a true bug is missed, the bug likely manifests as a
78*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 * reportable data race elsewhere.
79*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	 */
80*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	if (hweight64(diff) == 1) {
81*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 		/*
82*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 		 * Exception: Report data races where the values look like
83*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 		 * ordinary booleans (one of them was 0 and the 0th bit was
84*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 		 * changed) More often than not, they come with interesting
85*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 		 * memory ordering requirements, so let's report them.
86*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 		 */
87*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 		if (!((!old || !new) && diff == 1))
88*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 			return true;
89*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 	}
90*d8fd74d3SMarco Elver 
9149f72d53SMarco Elver 	return false;
9249f72d53SMarco Elver }
9349f72d53SMarco Elver 
9449f72d53SMarco Elver #endif /* _KERNEL_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE_H */
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