1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only 2 /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com 3 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook 4 * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io 5 */ 6 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h> 7 #include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h> 8 #include <linux/kernel.h> 9 #include <linux/types.h> 10 #include <linux/slab.h> 11 #include <linux/bpf.h> 12 #include <linux/btf.h> 13 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> 14 #include <linux/filter.h> 15 #include <net/netlink.h> 16 #include <linux/file.h> 17 #include <linux/vmalloc.h> 18 #include <linux/stringify.h> 19 #include <linux/bsearch.h> 20 #include <linux/sort.h> 21 #include <linux/perf_event.h> 22 #include <linux/ctype.h> 23 #include <linux/error-injection.h> 24 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> 25 #include <linux/btf_ids.h> 26 #include <linux/poison.h> 27 #include <linux/module.h> 28 #include <linux/cpumask.h> 29 #include <net/xdp.h> 30 31 #include "disasm.h" 32 33 static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = { 34 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \ 35 [_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops, 36 #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) 37 #define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name) 38 #include <linux/bpf_types.h> 39 #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE 40 #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE 41 #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE 42 }; 43 44 /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program 45 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state. 46 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn. 47 * 48 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG. 49 * It rejects the following programs: 50 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns 51 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge) 52 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function) 53 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps 54 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn. 55 * Since it's analyzing all paths through the program, the length of the 56 * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of 57 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs. 58 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k 59 * 60 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction 61 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics. 62 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is 63 * copied to R1. 64 * 65 * All registers are 64-bit. 66 * R0 - return register 67 * R1-R5 argument passing registers 68 * R6-R9 callee saved registers 69 * R10 - frame pointer read-only 70 * 71 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context 72 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX. 73 * 74 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case: 75 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), 76 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20), 77 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1 78 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize 79 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack. 80 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK 81 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking). 82 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant. 83 * 84 * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which 85 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer. 86 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type) 87 * 88 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register 89 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are 90 * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function. 91 * 92 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value' 93 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible. 94 * 95 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against 96 * function argument constraints. 97 * 98 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints. 99 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be 100 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as 101 * 'pointer to map element key' 102 * 103 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem(): 104 * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, 105 * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, 106 * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 107 * 108 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null' 109 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and 110 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside 111 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key. 112 * 113 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like: 114 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) 115 * { 116 * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; 117 * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; 118 * void *value; 119 * 120 * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that 121 * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on 122 * the stack of eBPF program. 123 * } 124 * 125 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like: 126 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR 127 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK 128 * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP 129 * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), 130 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees: 131 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok, 132 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes 133 * 134 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far, 135 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits 136 * and were initialized prior to this call. 137 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at 138 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets 139 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function 140 * returns either pointer to map value or NULL. 141 * 142 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off' 143 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to 144 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false 145 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op(). 146 * 147 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5 148 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable. 149 * 150 * The following reference types represent a potential reference to a kernel 151 * resource which, after first being allocated, must be checked and freed by 152 * the BPF program: 153 * - PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, PTR_TO_SOCKET 154 * 155 * When the verifier sees a helper call return a reference type, it allocates a 156 * pointer id for the reference and stores it in the current function state. 157 * Similar to the way that PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL is converted into 158 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL becomes PTR_TO_SOCKET when the type 159 * passes through a NULL-check conditional. For the branch wherein the state is 160 * changed to CONST_IMM, the verifier releases the reference. 161 * 162 * For each helper function that allocates a reference, such as 163 * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), there is a corresponding release function, such as 164 * bpf_sk_release(). When a reference type passes into the release function, 165 * the verifier also releases the reference. If any unchecked or unreleased 166 * reference remains at the end of the program, the verifier rejects it. 167 */ 168 169 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */ 170 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem { 171 /* verifer state is 'st' 172 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx' 173 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx' 174 */ 175 struct bpf_verifier_state st; 176 int insn_idx; 177 int prev_insn_idx; 178 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next; 179 /* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */ 180 u32 log_pos; 181 }; 182 183 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ 8192 184 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64 185 186 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON (1ULL << 63) 187 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN (1ULL << 62) 188 189 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV 1UL 190 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) + \ 191 POISON_POINTER_DELTA)) 192 #define BPF_MAP_PTR(X) ((struct bpf_map *)((X) & ~BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV)) 193 194 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx); 195 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ref_obj_id); 196 static void invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 197 static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 198 static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 199 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 200 static void specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 201 u32 func_id, u16 offset, unsigned long *addr); 202 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 203 204 static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 205 { 206 return BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON; 207 } 208 209 static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 210 { 211 return aux->map_ptr_state & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV; 212 } 213 214 static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 215 const struct bpf_map *map, bool unpriv) 216 { 217 BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV); 218 unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux); 219 aux->map_ptr_state = (unsigned long)map | 220 (unpriv ? BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV : 0UL); 221 } 222 223 static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 224 { 225 return aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON; 226 } 227 228 static bool bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 229 { 230 return !(aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN); 231 } 232 233 static u64 bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 234 { 235 return aux->map_key_state & ~(BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 236 } 237 238 static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state) 239 { 240 bool poisoned = bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux); 241 242 aux->map_key_state = state | BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | 243 (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL); 244 } 245 246 static bool bpf_helper_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 247 { 248 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 249 insn->src_reg == 0; 250 } 251 252 static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 253 { 254 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 255 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL; 256 } 257 258 static bool bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 259 { 260 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 261 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL; 262 } 263 264 struct bpf_call_arg_meta { 265 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 266 bool raw_mode; 267 bool pkt_access; 268 u8 release_regno; 269 int regno; 270 int access_size; 271 int mem_size; 272 u64 msize_max_value; 273 int ref_obj_id; 274 int dynptr_id; 275 int map_uid; 276 int func_id; 277 struct btf *btf; 278 u32 btf_id; 279 struct btf *ret_btf; 280 u32 ret_btf_id; 281 u32 subprogno; 282 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 283 }; 284 285 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta { 286 /* In parameters */ 287 struct btf *btf; 288 u32 func_id; 289 u32 kfunc_flags; 290 const struct btf_type *func_proto; 291 const char *func_name; 292 /* Out parameters */ 293 u32 ref_obj_id; 294 u8 release_regno; 295 bool r0_rdonly; 296 u32 ret_btf_id; 297 u64 r0_size; 298 u32 subprogno; 299 struct { 300 u64 value; 301 bool found; 302 } arg_constant; 303 304 /* arg_{btf,btf_id,owning_ref} are used by kfunc-specific handling, 305 * generally to pass info about user-defined local kptr types to later 306 * verification logic 307 * bpf_obj_drop 308 * Record the local kptr type to be drop'd 309 * bpf_refcount_acquire (via KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR arg type) 310 * Record the local kptr type to be refcount_incr'd and use 311 * arg_owning_ref to determine whether refcount_acquire should be 312 * fallible 313 */ 314 struct btf *arg_btf; 315 u32 arg_btf_id; 316 bool arg_owning_ref; 317 318 struct { 319 struct btf_field *field; 320 } arg_list_head; 321 struct { 322 struct btf_field *field; 323 } arg_rbtree_root; 324 struct { 325 enum bpf_dynptr_type type; 326 u32 id; 327 u32 ref_obj_id; 328 } initialized_dynptr; 329 struct { 330 u8 spi; 331 u8 frameno; 332 } iter; 333 u64 mem_size; 334 }; 335 336 struct btf *btf_vmlinux; 337 338 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); 339 340 static const struct bpf_line_info * 341 find_linfo(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_off) 342 { 343 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 344 const struct bpf_prog *prog; 345 u32 i, nr_linfo; 346 347 prog = env->prog; 348 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 349 350 if (!nr_linfo || insn_off >= prog->len) 351 return NULL; 352 353 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 354 for (i = 1; i < nr_linfo; i++) 355 if (insn_off < linfo[i].insn_off) 356 break; 357 358 return &linfo[i - 1]; 359 } 360 361 __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...) 362 { 363 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data; 364 va_list args; 365 366 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 367 return; 368 369 va_start(args, fmt); 370 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); 371 va_end(args); 372 } 373 374 static const char *ltrim(const char *s) 375 { 376 while (isspace(*s)) 377 s++; 378 379 return s; 380 } 381 382 __printf(3, 4) static void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 383 u32 insn_off, 384 const char *prefix_fmt, ...) 385 { 386 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 387 388 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 389 return; 390 391 linfo = find_linfo(env, insn_off); 392 if (!linfo || linfo == env->prev_linfo) 393 return; 394 395 if (prefix_fmt) { 396 va_list args; 397 398 va_start(args, prefix_fmt); 399 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, prefix_fmt, args); 400 va_end(args); 401 } 402 403 verbose(env, "%s\n", 404 ltrim(btf_name_by_offset(env->prog->aux->btf, 405 linfo->line_off))); 406 407 env->prev_linfo = linfo; 408 } 409 410 static void verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 411 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 412 struct tnum *range, const char *ctx, 413 const char *reg_name) 414 { 415 char tn_buf[48]; 416 417 verbose(env, "At %s the register %s ", ctx, reg_name); 418 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 419 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 420 verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf); 421 } else { 422 verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value"); 423 } 424 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), *range); 425 verbose(env, " should have been in %s\n", tn_buf); 426 } 427 428 static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 429 { 430 type = base_type(type); 431 return type == PTR_TO_PACKET || 432 type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META; 433 } 434 435 static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 436 { 437 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 438 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || 439 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 440 type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 441 } 442 443 static bool type_may_be_null(u32 type) 444 { 445 return type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 446 } 447 448 static bool reg_not_null(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 449 { 450 enum bpf_reg_type type; 451 452 type = reg->type; 453 if (type_may_be_null(type)) 454 return false; 455 456 type = base_type(type); 457 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 458 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 459 type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 460 type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 461 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || 462 (type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && is_trusted_reg(reg)) || 463 type == PTR_TO_MEM; 464 } 465 466 static bool type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(u32 type) 467 { 468 return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && type_flag(type) & MEM_ALLOC; 469 } 470 471 static bool type_is_non_owning_ref(u32 type) 472 { 473 return type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(type) && type_flag(type) & NON_OWN_REF; 474 } 475 476 static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 477 { 478 struct btf_record *rec = NULL; 479 struct btf_struct_meta *meta; 480 481 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 482 rec = reg->map_ptr->record; 483 } else if (type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 484 meta = btf_find_struct_meta(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 485 if (meta) 486 rec = meta->record; 487 } 488 return rec; 489 } 490 491 static bool subprog_is_global(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 492 { 493 struct bpf_func_info_aux *aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux; 494 495 return aux && aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL; 496 } 497 498 static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 499 { 500 return btf_record_has_field(reg_btf_record(reg), BPF_SPIN_LOCK); 501 } 502 503 static bool type_is_rdonly_mem(u32 type) 504 { 505 return type & MEM_RDONLY; 506 } 507 508 static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 509 const struct bpf_map *map) 510 { 511 enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC; 512 513 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || 514 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || 515 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp || 516 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve || 517 func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 518 return true; 519 520 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 521 (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 522 map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)) 523 return true; 524 525 return false; 526 } 527 528 static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 529 { 530 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock || 531 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock || 532 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_sock || 533 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp6_sock || 534 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_udp6_sock || 535 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_mptcp_sock || 536 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock || 537 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_request_sock; 538 } 539 540 static bool is_dynptr_ref_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 541 { 542 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data; 543 } 544 545 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 546 547 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 548 { 549 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 550 func_id == BPF_FUNC_find_vma || 551 func_id == BPF_FUNC_loop || 552 func_id == BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain; 553 } 554 555 static bool is_async_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 556 { 557 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback; 558 } 559 560 static bool is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 561 { 562 return is_sync_callback_calling_function(func_id) || 563 is_async_callback_calling_function(func_id); 564 } 565 566 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn) 567 { 568 return (bpf_helper_call(insn) && is_sync_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) || 569 (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)); 570 } 571 572 static bool is_storage_get_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 573 { 574 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get || 575 func_id == BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get || 576 func_id == BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get || 577 func_id == BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get; 578 } 579 580 static bool helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 581 const struct bpf_map *map) 582 { 583 int ref_obj_uses = 0; 584 585 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) 586 ref_obj_uses++; 587 if (is_acquire_function(func_id, map)) 588 ref_obj_uses++; 589 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) 590 ref_obj_uses++; 591 592 return ref_obj_uses > 1; 593 } 594 595 static bool is_cmpxchg_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 596 { 597 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && 598 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 599 insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG; 600 } 601 602 /* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' 603 * 604 * Note that reg_type_str() can not appear more than once in a single verbose() 605 * statement. 606 */ 607 static const char *reg_type_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 608 enum bpf_reg_type type) 609 { 610 char postfix[16] = {0}, prefix[64] = {0}; 611 static const char * const str[] = { 612 [NOT_INIT] = "?", 613 [SCALAR_VALUE] = "scalar", 614 [PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx", 615 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr", 616 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value", 617 [PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp", 618 [PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt", 619 [PTR_TO_PACKET_META] = "pkt_meta", 620 [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end", 621 [PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS] = "flow_keys", 622 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = "sock", 623 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = "sock_common", 624 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = "tcp_sock", 625 [PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER] = "tp_buffer", 626 [PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK] = "xdp_sock", 627 [PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = "ptr_", 628 [PTR_TO_MEM] = "mem", 629 [PTR_TO_BUF] = "buf", 630 [PTR_TO_FUNC] = "func", 631 [PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = "map_key", 632 [CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = "dynptr_ptr", 633 }; 634 635 if (type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { 636 if (base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 637 strncpy(postfix, "or_null_", 16); 638 else 639 strncpy(postfix, "_or_null", 16); 640 } 641 642 snprintf(prefix, sizeof(prefix), "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s", 643 type & MEM_RDONLY ? "rdonly_" : "", 644 type & MEM_RINGBUF ? "ringbuf_" : "", 645 type & MEM_USER ? "user_" : "", 646 type & MEM_PERCPU ? "percpu_" : "", 647 type & MEM_RCU ? "rcu_" : "", 648 type & PTR_UNTRUSTED ? "untrusted_" : "", 649 type & PTR_TRUSTED ? "trusted_" : "" 650 ); 651 652 snprintf(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, "%s%s%s", 653 prefix, str[base_type(type)], postfix); 654 return env->tmp_str_buf; 655 } 656 657 static char slot_type_char[] = { 658 [STACK_INVALID] = '?', 659 [STACK_SPILL] = 'r', 660 [STACK_MISC] = 'm', 661 [STACK_ZERO] = '0', 662 [STACK_DYNPTR] = 'd', 663 [STACK_ITER] = 'i', 664 }; 665 666 static void print_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 667 enum bpf_reg_liveness live) 668 { 669 if (live & (REG_LIVE_READ | REG_LIVE_WRITTEN | REG_LIVE_DONE)) 670 verbose(env, "_"); 671 if (live & REG_LIVE_READ) 672 verbose(env, "r"); 673 if (live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 674 verbose(env, "w"); 675 if (live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 676 verbose(env, "D"); 677 } 678 679 static int __get_spi(s32 off) 680 { 681 return (-off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 682 } 683 684 static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 685 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 686 { 687 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 688 689 return cur->frame[reg->frameno]; 690 } 691 692 static bool is_spi_bounds_valid(struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi, int nr_slots) 693 { 694 int allocated_slots = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 695 696 /* We need to check that slots between [spi - nr_slots + 1, spi] are 697 * within [0, allocated_stack). 698 * 699 * Please note that the spi grows downwards. For example, a dynptr 700 * takes the size of two stack slots; the first slot will be at 701 * spi and the second slot will be at spi - 1. 702 */ 703 return spi - nr_slots + 1 >= 0 && spi < allocated_slots; 704 } 705 706 static int stack_slot_obj_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 707 const char *obj_kind, int nr_slots) 708 { 709 int off, spi; 710 711 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 712 verbose(env, "%s has to be at a constant offset\n", obj_kind); 713 return -EINVAL; 714 } 715 716 off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 717 if (off % BPF_REG_SIZE) { 718 verbose(env, "cannot pass in %s at an offset=%d\n", obj_kind, off); 719 return -EINVAL; 720 } 721 722 spi = __get_spi(off); 723 if (spi + 1 < nr_slots) { 724 verbose(env, "cannot pass in %s at an offset=%d\n", obj_kind, off); 725 return -EINVAL; 726 } 727 728 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(func(env, reg), spi, nr_slots)) 729 return -ERANGE; 730 return spi; 731 } 732 733 static int dynptr_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 734 { 735 return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "dynptr", BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS); 736 } 737 738 static int iter_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) 739 { 740 return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "iter", nr_slots); 741 } 742 743 static const char *btf_type_name(const struct btf *btf, u32 id) 744 { 745 return btf_name_by_offset(btf, btf_type_by_id(btf, id)->name_off); 746 } 747 748 static const char *dynptr_type_str(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 749 { 750 switch (type) { 751 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 752 return "local"; 753 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 754 return "ringbuf"; 755 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB: 756 return "skb"; 757 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP: 758 return "xdp"; 759 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID: 760 return "<invalid>"; 761 default: 762 WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown dynptr type %d\n", type); 763 return "<unknown>"; 764 } 765 } 766 767 static const char *iter_type_str(const struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id) 768 { 769 if (!btf || btf_id == 0) 770 return "<invalid>"; 771 772 /* we already validated that type is valid and has conforming name */ 773 return btf_type_name(btf, btf_id) + sizeof(ITER_PREFIX) - 1; 774 } 775 776 static const char *iter_state_str(enum bpf_iter_state state) 777 { 778 switch (state) { 779 case BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE: 780 return "active"; 781 case BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED: 782 return "drained"; 783 case BPF_ITER_STATE_INVALID: 784 return "<invalid>"; 785 default: 786 WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown iter state %d\n", state); 787 return "<unknown>"; 788 } 789 } 790 791 static void mark_reg_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno) 792 { 793 env->scratched_regs |= 1U << regno; 794 } 795 796 static void mark_stack_slot_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 spi) 797 { 798 env->scratched_stack_slots |= 1ULL << spi; 799 } 800 801 static bool reg_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno) 802 { 803 return (env->scratched_regs >> regno) & 1; 804 } 805 806 static bool stack_slot_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u64 regno) 807 { 808 return (env->scratched_stack_slots >> regno) & 1; 809 } 810 811 static bool verifier_state_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 812 { 813 return env->scratched_regs || env->scratched_stack_slots; 814 } 815 816 static void mark_verifier_state_clean(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 817 { 818 env->scratched_regs = 0U; 819 env->scratched_stack_slots = 0ULL; 820 } 821 822 /* Used for printing the entire verifier state. */ 823 static void mark_verifier_state_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 824 { 825 env->scratched_regs = ~0U; 826 env->scratched_stack_slots = ~0ULL; 827 } 828 829 static enum bpf_dynptr_type arg_to_dynptr_type(enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 830 { 831 switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) { 832 case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 833 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL; 834 case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 835 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 836 case DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB: 837 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB; 838 case DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP: 839 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP; 840 default: 841 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID; 842 } 843 } 844 845 static enum bpf_type_flag get_dynptr_type_flag(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 846 { 847 switch (type) { 848 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 849 return DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL; 850 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 851 return DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 852 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB: 853 return DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB; 854 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP: 855 return DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP; 856 default: 857 return 0; 858 } 859 } 860 861 static bool dynptr_type_refcounted(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 862 { 863 return type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 864 } 865 866 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 867 enum bpf_dynptr_type type, 868 bool first_slot, int dynptr_id); 869 870 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 871 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 872 873 static void mark_dynptr_stack_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 874 struct bpf_reg_state *sreg1, 875 struct bpf_reg_state *sreg2, 876 enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 877 { 878 int id = ++env->id_gen; 879 880 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg1, type, true, id); 881 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg2, type, false, id); 882 } 883 884 static void mark_dynptr_cb_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 885 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 886 enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 887 { 888 __mark_dynptr_reg(reg, type, true, ++env->id_gen); 889 } 890 891 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 892 struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi); 893 894 static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 895 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int insn_idx, int clone_ref_obj_id) 896 { 897 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 898 enum bpf_dynptr_type type; 899 int spi, i, err; 900 901 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 902 if (spi < 0) 903 return spi; 904 905 /* We cannot assume both spi and spi - 1 belong to the same dynptr, 906 * hence we need to call destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot twice for both, 907 * to ensure that for the following example: 908 * [d1][d1][d2][d2] 909 * spi 3 2 1 0 910 * So marking spi = 2 should lead to destruction of both d1 and d2. In 911 * case they do belong to same dynptr, second call won't see slot_type 912 * as STACK_DYNPTR and will simply skip destruction. 913 */ 914 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 915 if (err) 916 return err; 917 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi - 1); 918 if (err) 919 return err; 920 921 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 922 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 923 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 924 } 925 926 type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 927 if (type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) 928 return -EINVAL; 929 930 mark_dynptr_stack_regs(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 931 &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr, type); 932 933 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(type)) { 934 /* The id is used to track proper releasing */ 935 int id; 936 937 if (clone_ref_obj_id) 938 id = clone_ref_obj_id; 939 else 940 id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 941 942 if (id < 0) 943 return id; 944 945 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id; 946 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id; 947 } 948 949 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 950 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 951 952 return 0; 953 } 954 955 static void invalidate_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi) 956 { 957 int i; 958 959 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 960 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 961 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 962 } 963 964 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 965 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr); 966 967 /* Why do we need to set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN for STACK_INVALID slot? 968 * 969 * While we don't allow reading STACK_INVALID, it is still possible to 970 * do <8 byte writes marking some but not all slots as STACK_MISC. Then, 971 * helpers or insns can do partial read of that part without failing, 972 * but check_stack_range_initialized, check_stack_read_var_off, and 973 * check_stack_read_fixed_off will do mark_reg_read for all 8-bytes of 974 * the slot conservatively. Hence we need to prevent those liveness 975 * marking walks. 976 * 977 * This was not a problem before because STACK_INVALID is only set by 978 * default (where the default reg state has its reg->parent as NULL), or 979 * in clean_live_states after REG_LIVE_DONE (at which point 980 * mark_reg_read won't walk reg->parent chain), but not randomly during 981 * verifier state exploration (like we did above). Hence, for our case 982 * parentage chain will still be live (i.e. reg->parent may be 983 * non-NULL), while earlier reg->parent was NULL, so we need 984 * REG_LIVE_WRITTEN to screen off read marker propagation when it is 985 * done later on reads or by mark_dynptr_read as well to unnecessary 986 * mark registers in verifier state. 987 */ 988 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 989 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 990 } 991 992 static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 993 { 994 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 995 int spi, ref_obj_id, i; 996 997 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 998 if (spi < 0) 999 return spi; 1000 1001 if (!dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) { 1002 invalidate_dynptr(env, state, spi); 1003 return 0; 1004 } 1005 1006 ref_obj_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 1007 1008 /* If the dynptr has a ref_obj_id, then we need to invalidate 1009 * two things: 1010 * 1011 * 1) Any dynptrs with a matching ref_obj_id (clones) 1012 * 2) Any slices derived from this dynptr. 1013 */ 1014 1015 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */ 1016 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, ref_obj_id)); 1017 1018 /* Invalidate any dynptr clones */ 1019 for (i = 1; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 1020 if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id != ref_obj_id) 1021 continue; 1022 1023 /* it should always be the case that if the ref obj id 1024 * matches then the stack slot also belongs to a 1025 * dynptr 1026 */ 1027 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR) { 1028 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: misconfigured ref_obj_id\n"); 1029 return -EFAULT; 1030 } 1031 if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 1032 invalidate_dynptr(env, state, i); 1033 } 1034 1035 return 0; 1036 } 1037 1038 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1039 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 1040 1041 static void mark_reg_invalid(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1042 { 1043 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 1044 __mark_reg_not_init(env, reg); 1045 else 1046 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 1047 } 1048 1049 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1050 struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi) 1051 { 1052 struct bpf_func_state *fstate; 1053 struct bpf_reg_state *dreg; 1054 int i, dynptr_id; 1055 1056 /* We always ensure that STACK_DYNPTR is never set partially, 1057 * hence just checking for slot_type[0] is enough. This is 1058 * different for STACK_SPILL, where it may be only set for 1059 * 1 byte, so code has to use is_spilled_reg. 1060 */ 1061 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR) 1062 return 0; 1063 1064 /* Reposition spi to first slot */ 1065 if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 1066 spi = spi + 1; 1067 1068 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) { 1069 verbose(env, "cannot overwrite referenced dynptr\n"); 1070 return -EINVAL; 1071 } 1072 1073 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 1074 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - 1); 1075 1076 /* Writing partially to one dynptr stack slot destroys both. */ 1077 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 1078 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 1079 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 1080 } 1081 1082 dynptr_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id; 1083 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */ 1084 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, fstate, dreg, ({ 1085 /* Dynptr slices are only PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL and PTR_TO_MEM */ 1086 if (dreg->type != (PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_MAYBE_NULL) && dreg->type != PTR_TO_MEM) 1087 continue; 1088 if (dreg->dynptr_id == dynptr_id) 1089 mark_reg_invalid(env, dreg); 1090 })); 1091 1092 /* Do not release reference state, we are destroying dynptr on stack, 1093 * not using some helper to release it. Just reset register. 1094 */ 1095 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 1096 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr); 1097 1098 /* Same reason as unmark_stack_slots_dynptr above */ 1099 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 1100 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 1101 1102 return 0; 1103 } 1104 1105 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1106 { 1107 int spi; 1108 1109 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 1110 return false; 1111 1112 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 1113 1114 /* -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots) isn't an 1115 * error because this just means the stack state hasn't been updated yet. 1116 * We will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later. 1117 */ 1118 if (spi < 0 && spi != -ERANGE) 1119 return false; 1120 1121 /* We don't need to check if the stack slots are marked by previous 1122 * dynptr initializations because we allow overwriting existing unreferenced 1123 * STACK_DYNPTR slots, see mark_stack_slots_dynptr which calls 1124 * destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot to ensure dynptr objects at the slots we are 1125 * touching are completely destructed before we reinitialize them for a new 1126 * one. For referenced ones, destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot returns an error early 1127 * instead of delaying it until the end where the user will get "Unreleased 1128 * reference" error. 1129 */ 1130 return true; 1131 } 1132 1133 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1134 { 1135 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1136 int i, spi; 1137 1138 /* This already represents first slot of initialized bpf_dynptr. 1139 * 1140 * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR already has fixed and var_off as 0 due to 1141 * check_func_arg_reg_off's logic, so we don't need to check its 1142 * offset and alignment. 1143 */ 1144 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 1145 return true; 1146 1147 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 1148 if (spi < 0) 1149 return false; 1150 if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 1151 return false; 1152 1153 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 1154 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR || 1155 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR) 1156 return false; 1157 } 1158 1159 return true; 1160 } 1161 1162 static bool is_dynptr_type_expected(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1163 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 1164 { 1165 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1166 enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type; 1167 int spi; 1168 1169 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR takes any type of dynptr */ 1170 if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 1171 return true; 1172 1173 dynptr_type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 1174 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 1175 return reg->dynptr.type == dynptr_type; 1176 } else { 1177 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 1178 if (spi < 0) 1179 return false; 1180 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type == dynptr_type; 1181 } 1182 } 1183 1184 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 1185 1186 static int mark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1187 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int insn_idx, 1188 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots) 1189 { 1190 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1191 int spi, i, j, id; 1192 1193 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1194 if (spi < 0) 1195 return spi; 1196 1197 id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 1198 if (id < 0) 1199 return id; 1200 1201 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1202 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1203 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1204 1205 __mark_reg_known_zero(st); 1206 st->type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* we don't have dedicated reg type */ 1207 st->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 1208 st->ref_obj_id = i == 0 ? id : 0; 1209 st->iter.btf = btf; 1210 st->iter.btf_id = btf_id; 1211 st->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE; 1212 st->iter.depth = 0; 1213 1214 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1215 slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_ITER; 1216 1217 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i); 1218 } 1219 1220 return 0; 1221 } 1222 1223 static int unmark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1224 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) 1225 { 1226 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1227 int spi, i, j; 1228 1229 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1230 if (spi < 0) 1231 return spi; 1232 1233 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1234 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1235 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1236 1237 if (i == 0) 1238 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, st->ref_obj_id)); 1239 1240 __mark_reg_not_init(env, st); 1241 1242 /* see unmark_stack_slots_dynptr() for why we need to set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN */ 1243 st->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 1244 1245 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1246 slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; 1247 1248 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i); 1249 } 1250 1251 return 0; 1252 } 1253 1254 static bool is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1255 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) 1256 { 1257 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1258 int spi, i, j; 1259 1260 /* For -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots), we 1261 * will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later, so 1262 * return true for that case. 1263 */ 1264 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1265 if (spi == -ERANGE) 1266 return true; 1267 if (spi < 0) 1268 return false; 1269 1270 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1271 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1272 1273 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1274 if (slot->slot_type[j] == STACK_ITER) 1275 return false; 1276 } 1277 1278 return true; 1279 } 1280 1281 static bool is_iter_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1282 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots) 1283 { 1284 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1285 int spi, i, j; 1286 1287 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1288 if (spi < 0) 1289 return false; 1290 1291 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1292 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1293 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1294 1295 /* only main (first) slot has ref_obj_id set */ 1296 if (i == 0 && !st->ref_obj_id) 1297 return false; 1298 if (i != 0 && st->ref_obj_id) 1299 return false; 1300 if (st->iter.btf != btf || st->iter.btf_id != btf_id) 1301 return false; 1302 1303 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1304 if (slot->slot_type[j] != STACK_ITER) 1305 return false; 1306 } 1307 1308 return true; 1309 } 1310 1311 /* Check if given stack slot is "special": 1312 * - spilled register state (STACK_SPILL); 1313 * - dynptr state (STACK_DYNPTR); 1314 * - iter state (STACK_ITER). 1315 */ 1316 static bool is_stack_slot_special(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1317 { 1318 enum bpf_stack_slot_type type = stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]; 1319 1320 switch (type) { 1321 case STACK_SPILL: 1322 case STACK_DYNPTR: 1323 case STACK_ITER: 1324 return true; 1325 case STACK_INVALID: 1326 case STACK_MISC: 1327 case STACK_ZERO: 1328 return false; 1329 default: 1330 WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown stack slot type %d\n", type); 1331 return true; 1332 } 1333 } 1334 1335 /* The reg state of a pointer or a bounded scalar was saved when 1336 * it was spilled to the stack. 1337 */ 1338 static bool is_spilled_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1339 { 1340 return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL; 1341 } 1342 1343 static bool is_spilled_scalar_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1344 { 1345 return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL && 1346 stack->spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE; 1347 } 1348 1349 static void scrub_spilled_slot(u8 *stype) 1350 { 1351 if (*stype != STACK_INVALID) 1352 *stype = STACK_MISC; 1353 } 1354 1355 static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1356 const struct bpf_func_state *state, 1357 bool print_all) 1358 { 1359 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 1360 enum bpf_reg_type t; 1361 int i; 1362 1363 if (state->frameno) 1364 verbose(env, " frame%d:", state->frameno); 1365 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 1366 reg = &state->regs[i]; 1367 t = reg->type; 1368 if (t == NOT_INIT) 1369 continue; 1370 if (!print_all && !reg_scratched(env, i)) 1371 continue; 1372 verbose(env, " R%d", i); 1373 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1374 verbose(env, "="); 1375 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 1376 verbose(env, "P"); 1377 if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) && 1378 tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 1379 /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */ 1380 verbose(env, "%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t)); 1381 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 1382 } else { 1383 const char *sep = ""; 1384 1385 verbose(env, "%s", reg_type_str(env, t)); 1386 if (base_type(t) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 1387 verbose(env, "%s", btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id)); 1388 verbose(env, "("); 1389 /* 1390 * _a stands for append, was shortened to avoid multiline statements below. 1391 * This macro is used to output a comma separated list of attributes. 1392 */ 1393 #define verbose_a(fmt, ...) ({ verbose(env, "%s" fmt, sep, __VA_ARGS__); sep = ","; }) 1394 1395 if (reg->id) 1396 verbose_a("id=%d", reg->id); 1397 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 1398 verbose_a("ref_obj_id=%d", reg->ref_obj_id); 1399 if (type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) 1400 verbose_a("%s", "non_own_ref"); 1401 if (t != SCALAR_VALUE) 1402 verbose_a("off=%d", reg->off); 1403 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t)) 1404 verbose_a("r=%d", reg->range); 1405 else if (base_type(t) == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || 1406 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 1407 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) 1408 verbose_a("ks=%d,vs=%d", 1409 reg->map_ptr->key_size, 1410 reg->map_ptr->value_size); 1411 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 1412 /* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but 1413 * could be a pointer whose offset is too big 1414 * for reg->off 1415 */ 1416 verbose_a("imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value); 1417 } else { 1418 if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value && 1419 reg->smin_value != S64_MIN) 1420 verbose_a("smin=%lld", (long long)reg->smin_value); 1421 if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value && 1422 reg->smax_value != S64_MAX) 1423 verbose_a("smax=%lld", (long long)reg->smax_value); 1424 if (reg->umin_value != 0) 1425 verbose_a("umin=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value); 1426 if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX) 1427 verbose_a("umax=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value); 1428 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 1429 char tn_buf[48]; 1430 1431 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 1432 verbose_a("var_off=%s", tn_buf); 1433 } 1434 if (reg->s32_min_value != reg->smin_value && 1435 reg->s32_min_value != S32_MIN) 1436 verbose_a("s32_min=%d", (int)(reg->s32_min_value)); 1437 if (reg->s32_max_value != reg->smax_value && 1438 reg->s32_max_value != S32_MAX) 1439 verbose_a("s32_max=%d", (int)(reg->s32_max_value)); 1440 if (reg->u32_min_value != reg->umin_value && 1441 reg->u32_min_value != U32_MIN) 1442 verbose_a("u32_min=%d", (int)(reg->u32_min_value)); 1443 if (reg->u32_max_value != reg->umax_value && 1444 reg->u32_max_value != U32_MAX) 1445 verbose_a("u32_max=%d", (int)(reg->u32_max_value)); 1446 } 1447 #undef verbose_a 1448 1449 verbose(env, ")"); 1450 } 1451 } 1452 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 1453 char types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE + 1]; 1454 bool valid = false; 1455 int j; 1456 1457 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 1458 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[j] != STACK_INVALID) 1459 valid = true; 1460 types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[state->stack[i].slot_type[j]]; 1461 } 1462 types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0; 1463 if (!valid) 1464 continue; 1465 if (!print_all && !stack_slot_scratched(env, i)) 1466 continue; 1467 switch (state->stack[i].slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]) { 1468 case STACK_SPILL: 1469 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 1470 t = reg->type; 1471 1472 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 1473 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1474 verbose(env, "=%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t)); 1475 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 1476 verbose(env, "P"); 1477 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 1478 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 1479 break; 1480 case STACK_DYNPTR: 1481 i += BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS - 1; 1482 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 1483 1484 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 1485 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1486 verbose(env, "=dynptr_%s", dynptr_type_str(reg->dynptr.type)); 1487 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 1488 verbose(env, "(ref_id=%d)", reg->ref_obj_id); 1489 break; 1490 case STACK_ITER: 1491 /* only main slot has ref_obj_id set; skip others */ 1492 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 1493 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) 1494 continue; 1495 1496 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 1497 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1498 verbose(env, "=iter_%s(ref_id=%d,state=%s,depth=%u)", 1499 iter_type_str(reg->iter.btf, reg->iter.btf_id), 1500 reg->ref_obj_id, iter_state_str(reg->iter.state), 1501 reg->iter.depth); 1502 break; 1503 case STACK_MISC: 1504 case STACK_ZERO: 1505 default: 1506 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 1507 1508 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1509 types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[state->stack[i].slot_type[j]]; 1510 types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0; 1511 1512 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 1513 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1514 verbose(env, "=%s", types_buf); 1515 break; 1516 } 1517 } 1518 if (state->acquired_refs && state->refs[0].id) { 1519 verbose(env, " refs=%d", state->refs[0].id); 1520 for (i = 1; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) 1521 if (state->refs[i].id) 1522 verbose(env, ",%d", state->refs[i].id); 1523 } 1524 if (state->in_callback_fn) 1525 verbose(env, " cb"); 1526 if (state->in_async_callback_fn) 1527 verbose(env, " async_cb"); 1528 verbose(env, "\n"); 1529 if (!print_all) 1530 mark_verifier_state_clean(env); 1531 } 1532 1533 static inline u32 vlog_alignment(u32 pos) 1534 { 1535 return round_up(max(pos + BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT / 2, BPF_LOG_ALIGNMENT), 1536 BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT) - pos - 1; 1537 } 1538 1539 static void print_insn_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1540 const struct bpf_func_state *state) 1541 { 1542 if (env->prev_log_pos && env->prev_log_pos == env->log.end_pos) { 1543 /* remove new line character */ 1544 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, env->prev_log_pos - 1); 1545 verbose(env, "%*c;", vlog_alignment(env->prev_insn_print_pos), ' '); 1546 } else { 1547 verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx); 1548 } 1549 print_verifier_state(env, state, false); 1550 } 1551 1552 /* copy array src of length n * size bytes to dst. dst is reallocated if it's too 1553 * small to hold src. This is different from krealloc since we don't want to preserve 1554 * the contents of dst. 1555 * 1556 * Leaves dst untouched if src is NULL or length is zero. Returns NULL if memory could 1557 * not be allocated. 1558 */ 1559 static void *copy_array(void *dst, const void *src, size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags) 1560 { 1561 size_t alloc_bytes; 1562 void *orig = dst; 1563 size_t bytes; 1564 1565 if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(src)) 1566 goto out; 1567 1568 if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(n, size, &bytes))) 1569 return NULL; 1570 1571 alloc_bytes = max(ksize(orig), kmalloc_size_roundup(bytes)); 1572 dst = krealloc(orig, alloc_bytes, flags); 1573 if (!dst) { 1574 kfree(orig); 1575 return NULL; 1576 } 1577 1578 memcpy(dst, src, bytes); 1579 out: 1580 return dst ? dst : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1581 } 1582 1583 /* resize an array from old_n items to new_n items. the array is reallocated if it's too 1584 * small to hold new_n items. new items are zeroed out if the array grows. 1585 * 1586 * Contrary to krealloc_array, does not free arr if new_n is zero. 1587 */ 1588 static void *realloc_array(void *arr, size_t old_n, size_t new_n, size_t size) 1589 { 1590 size_t alloc_size; 1591 void *new_arr; 1592 1593 if (!new_n || old_n == new_n) 1594 goto out; 1595 1596 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(new_n, size)); 1597 new_arr = krealloc(arr, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL); 1598 if (!new_arr) { 1599 kfree(arr); 1600 return NULL; 1601 } 1602 arr = new_arr; 1603 1604 if (new_n > old_n) 1605 memset(arr + old_n * size, 0, (new_n - old_n) * size); 1606 1607 out: 1608 return arr ? arr : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1609 } 1610 1611 static int copy_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1612 { 1613 dst->refs = copy_array(dst->refs, src->refs, src->acquired_refs, 1614 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state), GFP_KERNEL); 1615 if (!dst->refs) 1616 return -ENOMEM; 1617 1618 dst->acquired_refs = src->acquired_refs; 1619 return 0; 1620 } 1621 1622 static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1623 { 1624 size_t n = src->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1625 1626 dst->stack = copy_array(dst->stack, src->stack, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state), 1627 GFP_KERNEL); 1628 if (!dst->stack) 1629 return -ENOMEM; 1630 1631 dst->allocated_stack = src->allocated_stack; 1632 return 0; 1633 } 1634 1635 static int resize_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, size_t n) 1636 { 1637 state->refs = realloc_array(state->refs, state->acquired_refs, n, 1638 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state)); 1639 if (!state->refs) 1640 return -ENOMEM; 1641 1642 state->acquired_refs = n; 1643 return 0; 1644 } 1645 1646 /* Possibly update state->allocated_stack to be at least size bytes. Also 1647 * possibly update the function's high-water mark in its bpf_subprog_info. 1648 */ 1649 static int grow_stack_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *state, int size) 1650 { 1651 size_t old_n = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, n = size / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1652 1653 if (old_n >= n) 1654 return 0; 1655 1656 state->stack = realloc_array(state->stack, old_n, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state)); 1657 if (!state->stack) 1658 return -ENOMEM; 1659 1660 state->allocated_stack = size; 1661 1662 /* update known max for given subprogram */ 1663 if (env->subprog_info[state->subprogno].stack_depth < size) 1664 env->subprog_info[state->subprogno].stack_depth = size; 1665 1666 return 0; 1667 } 1668 1669 /* Acquire a pointer id from the env and update the state->refs to include 1670 * this new pointer reference. 1671 * On success, returns a valid pointer id to associate with the register 1672 * On failure, returns a negative errno. 1673 */ 1674 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 1675 { 1676 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 1677 int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs; 1678 int id, err; 1679 1680 err = resize_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1); 1681 if (err) 1682 return err; 1683 id = ++env->id_gen; 1684 state->refs[new_ofs].id = id; 1685 state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx; 1686 state->refs[new_ofs].callback_ref = state->in_callback_fn ? state->frameno : 0; 1687 1688 return id; 1689 } 1690 1691 /* release function corresponding to acquire_reference_state(). Idempotent. */ 1692 static int release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id) 1693 { 1694 int i, last_idx; 1695 1696 last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1; 1697 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 1698 if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) { 1699 /* Cannot release caller references in callbacks */ 1700 if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno) 1701 return -EINVAL; 1702 if (last_idx && i != last_idx) 1703 memcpy(&state->refs[i], &state->refs[last_idx], 1704 sizeof(*state->refs)); 1705 memset(&state->refs[last_idx], 0, sizeof(*state->refs)); 1706 state->acquired_refs--; 1707 return 0; 1708 } 1709 } 1710 return -EINVAL; 1711 } 1712 1713 static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state) 1714 { 1715 if (!state) 1716 return; 1717 kfree(state->refs); 1718 kfree(state->stack); 1719 kfree(state); 1720 } 1721 1722 static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) 1723 { 1724 kfree(state->jmp_history); 1725 state->jmp_history = NULL; 1726 state->jmp_history_cnt = 0; 1727 } 1728 1729 static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, 1730 bool free_self) 1731 { 1732 int i; 1733 1734 for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) { 1735 free_func_state(state->frame[i]); 1736 state->frame[i] = NULL; 1737 } 1738 clear_jmp_history(state); 1739 if (free_self) 1740 kfree(state); 1741 } 1742 1743 /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space 1744 * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack 1745 */ 1746 static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, 1747 const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1748 { 1749 int err; 1750 1751 memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, acquired_refs)); 1752 err = copy_reference_state(dst, src); 1753 if (err) 1754 return err; 1755 return copy_stack_state(dst, src); 1756 } 1757 1758 static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, 1759 const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) 1760 { 1761 struct bpf_func_state *dst; 1762 int i, err; 1763 1764 dst_state->jmp_history = copy_array(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history, 1765 src->jmp_history_cnt, sizeof(struct bpf_idx_pair), 1766 GFP_USER); 1767 if (!dst_state->jmp_history) 1768 return -ENOMEM; 1769 dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt; 1770 1771 /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */ 1772 for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) { 1773 free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]); 1774 dst_state->frame[i] = NULL; 1775 } 1776 dst_state->speculative = src->speculative; 1777 dst_state->active_rcu_lock = src->active_rcu_lock; 1778 dst_state->curframe = src->curframe; 1779 dst_state->active_lock.ptr = src->active_lock.ptr; 1780 dst_state->active_lock.id = src->active_lock.id; 1781 dst_state->branches = src->branches; 1782 dst_state->parent = src->parent; 1783 dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx; 1784 dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx; 1785 dst_state->dfs_depth = src->dfs_depth; 1786 dst_state->callback_unroll_depth = src->callback_unroll_depth; 1787 dst_state->used_as_loop_entry = src->used_as_loop_entry; 1788 for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { 1789 dst = dst_state->frame[i]; 1790 if (!dst) { 1791 dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL); 1792 if (!dst) 1793 return -ENOMEM; 1794 dst_state->frame[i] = dst; 1795 } 1796 err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]); 1797 if (err) 1798 return err; 1799 } 1800 return 0; 1801 } 1802 1803 static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 1804 { 1805 return env->prog->len; 1806 } 1807 1808 static struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 1809 { 1810 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 1811 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; 1812 1813 return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)]; 1814 } 1815 1816 static bool same_callsites(struct bpf_verifier_state *a, struct bpf_verifier_state *b) 1817 { 1818 int fr; 1819 1820 if (a->curframe != b->curframe) 1821 return false; 1822 1823 for (fr = a->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) 1824 if (a->frame[fr]->callsite != b->frame[fr]->callsite) 1825 return false; 1826 1827 return true; 1828 } 1829 1830 /* Open coded iterators allow back-edges in the state graph in order to 1831 * check unbounded loops that iterators. 1832 * 1833 * In is_state_visited() it is necessary to know if explored states are 1834 * part of some loops in order to decide whether non-exact states 1835 * comparison could be used: 1836 * - non-exact states comparison establishes sub-state relation and uses 1837 * read and precision marks to do so, these marks are propagated from 1838 * children states and thus are not guaranteed to be final in a loop; 1839 * - exact states comparison just checks if current and explored states 1840 * are identical (and thus form a back-edge). 1841 * 1842 * Paper "A New Algorithm for Identifying Loops in Decompilation" 1843 * by Tao Wei, Jian Mao, Wei Zou and Yu Chen [1] presents a convenient 1844 * algorithm for loop structure detection and gives an overview of 1845 * relevant terminology. It also has helpful illustrations. 1846 * 1847 * [1] https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:15784067 1848 * 1849 * We use a similar algorithm but because loop nested structure is 1850 * irrelevant for verifier ours is significantly simpler and resembles 1851 * strongly connected components algorithm from Sedgewick's textbook. 1852 * 1853 * Define topmost loop entry as a first node of the loop traversed in a 1854 * depth first search starting from initial state. The goal of the loop 1855 * tracking algorithm is to associate topmost loop entries with states 1856 * derived from these entries. 1857 * 1858 * For each step in the DFS states traversal algorithm needs to identify 1859 * the following situations: 1860 * 1861 * initial initial initial 1862 * | | | 1863 * V V V 1864 * ... ... .---------> hdr 1865 * | | | | 1866 * V V | V 1867 * cur .-> succ | .------... 1868 * | | | | | | 1869 * V | V | V V 1870 * succ '-- cur | ... ... 1871 * | | | 1872 * | V V 1873 * | succ <- cur 1874 * | | 1875 * | V 1876 * | ... 1877 * | | 1878 * '----' 1879 * 1880 * (A) successor state of cur (B) successor state of cur or it's entry 1881 * not yet traversed are in current DFS path, thus cur and succ 1882 * are members of the same outermost loop 1883 * 1884 * initial initial 1885 * | | 1886 * V V 1887 * ... ... 1888 * | | 1889 * V V 1890 * .------... .------... 1891 * | | | | 1892 * V V V V 1893 * .-> hdr ... ... ... 1894 * | | | | | 1895 * | V V V V 1896 * | succ <- cur succ <- cur 1897 * | | | 1898 * | V V 1899 * | ... ... 1900 * | | | 1901 * '----' exit 1902 * 1903 * (C) successor state of cur is a part of some loop but this loop 1904 * does not include cur or successor state is not in a loop at all. 1905 * 1906 * Algorithm could be described as the following python code: 1907 * 1908 * traversed = set() # Set of traversed nodes 1909 * entries = {} # Mapping from node to loop entry 1910 * depths = {} # Depth level assigned to graph node 1911 * path = set() # Current DFS path 1912 * 1913 * # Find outermost loop entry known for n 1914 * def get_loop_entry(n): 1915 * h = entries.get(n, None) 1916 * while h in entries and entries[h] != h: 1917 * h = entries[h] 1918 * return h 1919 * 1920 * # Update n's loop entry if h's outermost entry comes 1921 * # before n's outermost entry in current DFS path. 1922 * def update_loop_entry(n, h): 1923 * n1 = get_loop_entry(n) or n 1924 * h1 = get_loop_entry(h) or h 1925 * if h1 in path and depths[h1] <= depths[n1]: 1926 * entries[n] = h1 1927 * 1928 * def dfs(n, depth): 1929 * traversed.add(n) 1930 * path.add(n) 1931 * depths[n] = depth 1932 * for succ in G.successors(n): 1933 * if succ not in traversed: 1934 * # Case A: explore succ and update cur's loop entry 1935 * # only if succ's entry is in current DFS path. 1936 * dfs(succ, depth + 1) 1937 * h = get_loop_entry(succ) 1938 * update_loop_entry(n, h) 1939 * else: 1940 * # Case B or C depending on `h1 in path` check in update_loop_entry(). 1941 * update_loop_entry(n, succ) 1942 * path.remove(n) 1943 * 1944 * To adapt this algorithm for use with verifier: 1945 * - use st->branch == 0 as a signal that DFS of succ had been finished 1946 * and cur's loop entry has to be updated (case A), handle this in 1947 * update_branch_counts(); 1948 * - use st->branch > 0 as a signal that st is in the current DFS path; 1949 * - handle cases B and C in is_state_visited(); 1950 * - update topmost loop entry for intermediate states in get_loop_entry(). 1951 */ 1952 static struct bpf_verifier_state *get_loop_entry(struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 1953 { 1954 struct bpf_verifier_state *topmost = st->loop_entry, *old; 1955 1956 while (topmost && topmost->loop_entry && topmost != topmost->loop_entry) 1957 topmost = topmost->loop_entry; 1958 /* Update loop entries for intermediate states to avoid this 1959 * traversal in future get_loop_entry() calls. 1960 */ 1961 while (st && st->loop_entry != topmost) { 1962 old = st->loop_entry; 1963 st->loop_entry = topmost; 1964 st = old; 1965 } 1966 return topmost; 1967 } 1968 1969 static void update_loop_entry(struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, struct bpf_verifier_state *hdr) 1970 { 1971 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur1, *hdr1; 1972 1973 cur1 = get_loop_entry(cur) ?: cur; 1974 hdr1 = get_loop_entry(hdr) ?: hdr; 1975 /* The head1->branches check decides between cases B and C in 1976 * comment for get_loop_entry(). If hdr1->branches == 0 then 1977 * head's topmost loop entry is not in current DFS path, 1978 * hence 'cur' and 'hdr' are not in the same loop and there is 1979 * no need to update cur->loop_entry. 1980 */ 1981 if (hdr1->branches && hdr1->dfs_depth <= cur1->dfs_depth) { 1982 cur->loop_entry = hdr; 1983 hdr->used_as_loop_entry = true; 1984 } 1985 } 1986 1987 static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 1988 { 1989 while (st) { 1990 u32 br = --st->branches; 1991 1992 /* br == 0 signals that DFS exploration for 'st' is finished, 1993 * thus it is necessary to update parent's loop entry if it 1994 * turned out that st is a part of some loop. 1995 * This is a part of 'case A' in get_loop_entry() comment. 1996 */ 1997 if (br == 0 && st->parent && st->loop_entry) 1998 update_loop_entry(st->parent, st->loop_entry); 1999 2000 /* WARN_ON(br > 1) technically makes sense here, 2001 * but see comment in push_stack(), hence: 2002 */ 2003 WARN_ONCE((int)br < 0, 2004 "BUG update_branch_counts:branches_to_explore=%d\n", 2005 br); 2006 if (br) 2007 break; 2008 st = st->parent; 2009 } 2010 } 2011 2012 static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, 2013 int *insn_idx, bool pop_log) 2014 { 2015 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 2016 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head; 2017 int err; 2018 2019 if (env->head == NULL) 2020 return -ENOENT; 2021 2022 if (cur) { 2023 err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st); 2024 if (err) 2025 return err; 2026 } 2027 if (pop_log) 2028 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos); 2029 if (insn_idx) 2030 *insn_idx = head->insn_idx; 2031 if (prev_insn_idx) 2032 *prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx; 2033 elem = head->next; 2034 free_verifier_state(&head->st, false); 2035 kfree(head); 2036 env->head = elem; 2037 env->stack_size--; 2038 return 0; 2039 } 2040 2041 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2042 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 2043 bool speculative) 2044 { 2045 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 2046 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 2047 int err; 2048 2049 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); 2050 if (!elem) 2051 goto err; 2052 2053 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 2054 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 2055 elem->next = env->head; 2056 elem->log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 2057 env->head = elem; 2058 env->stack_size++; 2059 err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur); 2060 if (err) 2061 goto err; 2062 elem->st.speculative |= speculative; 2063 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 2064 verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n", 2065 env->stack_size); 2066 goto err; 2067 } 2068 if (elem->st.parent) { 2069 ++elem->st.parent->branches; 2070 /* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here, 2071 * but 2072 * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch 2073 * instructions 2074 * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create 2075 * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current 2076 * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state 2077 * which might have large 'branches' count. 2078 */ 2079 } 2080 return &elem->st; 2081 err: 2082 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 2083 env->cur_state = NULL; 2084 /* pop all elements and return */ 2085 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 2086 return NULL; 2087 } 2088 2089 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6 2090 static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = { 2091 BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5 2092 }; 2093 2094 /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */ 2095 static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 2096 { 2097 reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm); 2098 reg->smin_value = (s64)imm; 2099 reg->smax_value = (s64)imm; 2100 reg->umin_value = imm; 2101 reg->umax_value = imm; 2102 2103 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 2104 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 2105 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 2106 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 2107 } 2108 2109 /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as 2110 * known to have the value @imm. 2111 */ 2112 static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 2113 { 2114 /* Clear off and union(map_ptr, range) */ 2115 memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0, 2116 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type)); 2117 reg->id = 0; 2118 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 2119 ___mark_reg_known(reg, imm); 2120 } 2121 2122 static void __mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 2123 { 2124 reg->var_off = tnum_const_subreg(reg->var_off, imm); 2125 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 2126 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 2127 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 2128 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 2129 } 2130 2131 /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be 2132 * used only on registers holding a pointer type. 2133 */ 2134 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2135 { 2136 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 2137 } 2138 2139 static void __mark_reg_const_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2140 { 2141 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 2142 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 2143 } 2144 2145 static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2146 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 2147 { 2148 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 2149 verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno); 2150 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ 2151 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) 2152 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2153 return; 2154 } 2155 __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno); 2156 } 2157 2158 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum bpf_dynptr_type type, 2159 bool first_slot, int dynptr_id) 2160 { 2161 /* reg->type has no meaning for STACK_DYNPTR, but when we set reg for 2162 * callback arguments, it does need to be CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, so simply 2163 * set it unconditionally as it is ignored for STACK_DYNPTR anyway. 2164 */ 2165 __mark_reg_known_zero(reg); 2166 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 2167 /* Give each dynptr a unique id to uniquely associate slices to it. */ 2168 reg->id = dynptr_id; 2169 reg->dynptr.type = type; 2170 reg->dynptr.first_slot = first_slot; 2171 } 2172 2173 static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2174 { 2175 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 2176 const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 2177 2178 if (map->inner_map_meta) { 2179 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 2180 reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta; 2181 /* transfer reg's id which is unique for every map_lookup_elem 2182 * as UID of the inner map. 2183 */ 2184 if (btf_record_has_field(map->inner_map_meta->record, BPF_TIMER)) 2185 reg->map_uid = reg->id; 2186 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) { 2187 reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 2188 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 2189 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) { 2190 reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; 2191 } else { 2192 reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 2193 } 2194 return; 2195 } 2196 2197 reg->type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 2198 } 2199 2200 static void mark_reg_graph_node(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 2201 struct btf_field_graph_root *ds_head) 2202 { 2203 __mark_reg_known_zero(®s[regno]); 2204 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 2205 regs[regno].btf = ds_head->btf; 2206 regs[regno].btf_id = ds_head->value_btf_id; 2207 regs[regno].off = ds_head->node_offset; 2208 } 2209 2210 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2211 { 2212 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 2213 } 2214 2215 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2216 { 2217 return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) || 2218 reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END; 2219 } 2220 2221 static bool reg_is_dynptr_slice_pkt(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2222 { 2223 return base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM && 2224 (reg->type & DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB || reg->type & DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP); 2225 } 2226 2227 /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */ 2228 static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 2229 enum bpf_reg_type which) 2230 { 2231 /* The register can already have a range from prior markings. 2232 * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its 2233 * origin. 2234 */ 2235 return reg->type == which && 2236 reg->id == 0 && 2237 reg->off == 0 && 2238 tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 2239 } 2240 2241 /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */ 2242 static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2243 { 2244 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2245 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2246 reg->umin_value = 0; 2247 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 2248 2249 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 2250 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 2251 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 2252 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 2253 } 2254 2255 static void __mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2256 { 2257 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2258 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2259 reg->umin_value = 0; 2260 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 2261 } 2262 2263 static void __mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2264 { 2265 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 2266 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 2267 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 2268 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 2269 } 2270 2271 static void __update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2272 { 2273 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 2274 2275 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 2276 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, 2277 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MIN)); 2278 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 2279 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, 2280 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MAX)); 2281 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)var32_off.value); 2282 reg->u32_max_value = min(reg->u32_max_value, 2283 (u32)(var32_off.value | var32_off.mask)); 2284 } 2285 2286 static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2287 { 2288 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 2289 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, 2290 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN)); 2291 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 2292 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, 2293 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX)); 2294 reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value); 2295 reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value, 2296 reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask); 2297 } 2298 2299 static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2300 { 2301 __update_reg32_bounds(reg); 2302 __update_reg64_bounds(reg); 2303 } 2304 2305 /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */ 2306 static void __reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2307 { 2308 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 2309 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 2310 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 2311 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 2312 */ 2313 if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 || reg->s32_max_value < 0) { 2314 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 2315 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 2316 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 2317 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 2318 return; 2319 } 2320 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 2321 * boundary, so we must be careful. 2322 */ 2323 if ((s32)reg->u32_max_value >= 0) { 2324 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 2325 * is positive, hence safe. 2326 */ 2327 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value; 2328 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 2329 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 2330 } else if ((s32)reg->u32_min_value < 0) { 2331 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 2332 * is negative, hence safe. 2333 */ 2334 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 2335 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 2336 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value; 2337 } 2338 } 2339 2340 static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2341 { 2342 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 2343 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 2344 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 2345 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 2346 */ 2347 if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) { 2348 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 2349 reg->umin_value); 2350 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 2351 reg->umax_value); 2352 return; 2353 } 2354 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 2355 * boundary, so we must be careful. 2356 */ 2357 if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) { 2358 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 2359 * is positive, hence safe. 2360 */ 2361 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 2362 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 2363 reg->umax_value); 2364 } else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) { 2365 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 2366 * is negative, hence safe. 2367 */ 2368 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 2369 reg->umin_value); 2370 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 2371 } 2372 } 2373 2374 static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2375 { 2376 __reg32_deduce_bounds(reg); 2377 __reg64_deduce_bounds(reg); 2378 } 2379 2380 /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */ 2381 static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2382 { 2383 struct tnum var64_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off, 2384 tnum_range(reg->umin_value, 2385 reg->umax_value)); 2386 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(var64_off), 2387 tnum_range(reg->u32_min_value, 2388 reg->u32_max_value)); 2389 2390 reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off); 2391 } 2392 2393 static void reg_bounds_sync(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2394 { 2395 /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */ 2396 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 2397 /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */ 2398 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 2399 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ 2400 __reg_bound_offset(reg); 2401 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 2402 * slightly, e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 2403 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 2404 */ 2405 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 2406 } 2407 2408 static bool __reg32_bound_s64(s32 a) 2409 { 2410 return a >= 0 && a <= S32_MAX; 2411 } 2412 2413 static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2414 { 2415 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value; 2416 reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value; 2417 2418 /* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds but must 2419 * be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds and refine later 2420 * from tnum. 2421 */ 2422 if (__reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_min_value) && 2423 __reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_max_value)) { 2424 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value; 2425 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value; 2426 } else { 2427 reg->smin_value = 0; 2428 reg->smax_value = U32_MAX; 2429 } 2430 } 2431 2432 static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2433 { 2434 /* special case when 64-bit register has upper 32-bit register 2435 * zeroed. Typically happens after zext or <<32, >>32 sequence 2436 * allowing us to use 32-bit bounds directly, 2437 */ 2438 if (tnum_equals_const(tnum_clear_subreg(reg->var_off), 0)) { 2439 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 2440 } else { 2441 /* Otherwise the best we can do is push lower 32bit known and 2442 * unknown bits into register (var_off set from jmp logic) 2443 * then learn as much as possible from the 64-bit tnum 2444 * known and unknown bits. The previous smin/smax bounds are 2445 * invalid here because of jmp32 compare so mark them unknown 2446 * so they do not impact tnum bounds calculation. 2447 */ 2448 __mark_reg64_unbounded(reg); 2449 } 2450 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 2451 } 2452 2453 static bool __reg64_bound_s32(s64 a) 2454 { 2455 return a >= S32_MIN && a <= S32_MAX; 2456 } 2457 2458 static bool __reg64_bound_u32(u64 a) 2459 { 2460 return a >= U32_MIN && a <= U32_MAX; 2461 } 2462 2463 static void __reg_combine_64_into_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2464 { 2465 __mark_reg32_unbounded(reg); 2466 if (__reg64_bound_s32(reg->smin_value) && __reg64_bound_s32(reg->smax_value)) { 2467 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)reg->smin_value; 2468 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)reg->smax_value; 2469 } 2470 if (__reg64_bound_u32(reg->umin_value) && __reg64_bound_u32(reg->umax_value)) { 2471 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)reg->umin_value; 2472 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)reg->umax_value; 2473 } 2474 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 2475 } 2476 2477 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */ 2478 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2479 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2480 { 2481 /* 2482 * Clear type, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and 2483 * padding between 'type' and union 2484 */ 2485 memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)); 2486 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 2487 reg->id = 0; 2488 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 2489 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; 2490 reg->frameno = 0; 2491 reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable; 2492 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); 2493 } 2494 2495 static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2496 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 2497 { 2498 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 2499 verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno); 2500 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 2501 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 2502 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2503 return; 2504 } 2505 __mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno); 2506 } 2507 2508 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2509 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2510 { 2511 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 2512 reg->type = NOT_INIT; 2513 } 2514 2515 static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2516 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 2517 { 2518 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 2519 verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno); 2520 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 2521 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 2522 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2523 return; 2524 } 2525 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2526 } 2527 2528 static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2529 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 2530 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type, 2531 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, 2532 enum bpf_type_flag flag) 2533 { 2534 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 2535 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 2536 return; 2537 } 2538 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); 2539 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag; 2540 regs[regno].btf = btf; 2541 regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id; 2542 if (type_may_be_null(flag)) 2543 regs[regno].id = ++env->id_gen; 2544 } 2545 2546 #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0) 2547 static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2548 struct bpf_func_state *state) 2549 { 2550 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 2551 int i; 2552 2553 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 2554 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i); 2555 regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 2556 regs[i].parent = NULL; 2557 regs[i].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 2558 } 2559 2560 /* frame pointer */ 2561 regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK; 2562 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP); 2563 regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno; 2564 } 2565 2566 #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1) 2567 static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2568 struct bpf_func_state *state, 2569 int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno) 2570 { 2571 state->callsite = callsite; 2572 state->frameno = frameno; 2573 state->subprogno = subprogno; 2574 state->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 0); 2575 init_reg_state(env, state); 2576 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 2577 } 2578 2579 /* Similar to push_stack(), but for async callbacks */ 2580 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_async_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2581 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 2582 int subprog) 2583 { 2584 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 2585 struct bpf_func_state *frame; 2586 2587 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); 2588 if (!elem) 2589 goto err; 2590 2591 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 2592 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 2593 elem->next = env->head; 2594 elem->log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 2595 env->head = elem; 2596 env->stack_size++; 2597 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 2598 verbose(env, 2599 "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex for async cb.\n", 2600 env->stack_size); 2601 goto err; 2602 } 2603 /* Unlike push_stack() do not copy_verifier_state(). 2604 * The caller state doesn't matter. 2605 * This is async callback. It starts in a fresh stack. 2606 * Initialize it similar to do_check_common(). 2607 */ 2608 elem->st.branches = 1; 2609 frame = kzalloc(sizeof(*frame), GFP_KERNEL); 2610 if (!frame) 2611 goto err; 2612 init_func_state(env, frame, 2613 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 2614 0 /* frameno within this callchain */, 2615 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 2616 elem->st.frame[0] = frame; 2617 return &elem->st; 2618 err: 2619 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 2620 env->cur_state = NULL; 2621 /* pop all elements and return */ 2622 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 2623 return NULL; 2624 } 2625 2626 2627 enum reg_arg_type { 2628 SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */ 2629 DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */ 2630 DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */ 2631 }; 2632 2633 static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b) 2634 { 2635 return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start - 2636 ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start; 2637 } 2638 2639 static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 2640 { 2641 struct bpf_subprog_info *p; 2642 2643 p = bsearch(&off, env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 2644 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs); 2645 if (!p) 2646 return -ENOENT; 2647 return p - env->subprog_info; 2648 2649 } 2650 2651 static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 2652 { 2653 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 2654 int ret; 2655 2656 if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) { 2657 verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n"); 2658 return -EINVAL; 2659 } 2660 ret = find_subprog(env, off); 2661 if (ret >= 0) 2662 return ret; 2663 if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) { 2664 verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n"); 2665 return -E2BIG; 2666 } 2667 /* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */ 2668 env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off; 2669 sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 2670 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL); 2671 return env->subprog_cnt - 1; 2672 } 2673 2674 #define MAX_KFUNC_DESCS 256 2675 #define MAX_KFUNC_BTFS 256 2676 2677 struct bpf_kfunc_desc { 2678 struct btf_func_model func_model; 2679 u32 func_id; 2680 s32 imm; 2681 u16 offset; 2682 unsigned long addr; 2683 }; 2684 2685 struct bpf_kfunc_btf { 2686 struct btf *btf; 2687 struct module *module; 2688 u16 offset; 2689 }; 2690 2691 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab { 2692 /* Sorted by func_id (BTF ID) and offset (fd_array offset) during 2693 * verification. JITs do lookups by bpf_insn, where func_id may not be 2694 * available, therefore at the end of verification do_misc_fixups() 2695 * sorts this by imm and offset. 2696 */ 2697 struct bpf_kfunc_desc descs[MAX_KFUNC_DESCS]; 2698 u32 nr_descs; 2699 }; 2700 2701 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab { 2702 struct bpf_kfunc_btf descs[MAX_KFUNC_BTFS]; 2703 u32 nr_descs; 2704 }; 2705 2706 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off(const void *a, const void *b) 2707 { 2708 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 2709 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 2710 2711 /* func_id is not greater than BTF_MAX_TYPE */ 2712 return d0->func_id - d1->func_id ?: d0->offset - d1->offset; 2713 } 2714 2715 static int kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off(const void *a, const void *b) 2716 { 2717 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d0 = a; 2718 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d1 = b; 2719 2720 return d0->offset - d1->offset; 2721 } 2722 2723 static const struct bpf_kfunc_desc * 2724 find_kfunc_desc(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, u16 offset) 2725 { 2726 struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 2727 .func_id = func_id, 2728 .offset = offset, 2729 }; 2730 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2731 2732 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2733 return bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 2734 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off); 2735 } 2736 2737 int bpf_get_kfunc_addr(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, 2738 u16 btf_fd_idx, u8 **func_addr) 2739 { 2740 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 2741 2742 desc = find_kfunc_desc(prog, func_id, btf_fd_idx); 2743 if (!desc) 2744 return -EFAULT; 2745 2746 *func_addr = (u8 *)desc->addr; 2747 return 0; 2748 } 2749 2750 static struct btf *__find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2751 s16 offset) 2752 { 2753 struct bpf_kfunc_btf kf_btf = { .offset = offset }; 2754 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab; 2755 struct bpf_kfunc_btf *b; 2756 struct module *mod; 2757 struct btf *btf; 2758 int btf_fd; 2759 2760 tab = env->prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 2761 b = bsearch(&kf_btf, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 2762 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off); 2763 if (!b) { 2764 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_BTFS) { 2765 verbose(env, "too many different module BTFs\n"); 2766 return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); 2767 } 2768 2769 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 2770 verbose(env, "kfunc offset > 0 without fd_array is invalid\n"); 2771 return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO); 2772 } 2773 2774 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&btf_fd, env->fd_array, 2775 offset * sizeof(btf_fd), 2776 sizeof(btf_fd))) 2777 return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); 2778 2779 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); 2780 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 2781 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF fd specified\n"); 2782 return btf; 2783 } 2784 2785 if (!btf_is_module(btf)) { 2786 verbose(env, "BTF fd for kfunc is not a module BTF\n"); 2787 btf_put(btf); 2788 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 2789 } 2790 2791 mod = btf_try_get_module(btf); 2792 if (!mod) { 2793 btf_put(btf); 2794 return ERR_PTR(-ENXIO); 2795 } 2796 2797 b = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 2798 b->btf = btf; 2799 b->module = mod; 2800 b->offset = offset; 2801 2802 /* sort() reorders entries by value, so b may no longer point 2803 * to the right entry after this 2804 */ 2805 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2806 kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off, NULL); 2807 } else { 2808 btf = b->btf; 2809 } 2810 2811 return btf; 2812 } 2813 2814 void bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab) 2815 { 2816 if (!tab) 2817 return; 2818 2819 while (tab->nr_descs--) { 2820 module_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].module); 2821 btf_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].btf); 2822 } 2823 kfree(tab); 2824 } 2825 2826 static struct btf *find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, s16 offset) 2827 { 2828 if (offset) { 2829 if (offset < 0) { 2830 /* In the future, this can be allowed to increase limit 2831 * of fd index into fd_array, interpreted as u16. 2832 */ 2833 verbose(env, "negative offset disallowed for kernel module function call\n"); 2834 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 2835 } 2836 2837 return __find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 2838 } 2839 return btf_vmlinux ?: ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); 2840 } 2841 2842 static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id, s16 offset) 2843 { 2844 const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto; 2845 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *btf_tab; 2846 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2847 struct bpf_prog_aux *prog_aux; 2848 struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 2849 const char *func_name; 2850 struct btf *desc_btf; 2851 unsigned long call_imm; 2852 unsigned long addr; 2853 int err; 2854 2855 prog_aux = env->prog->aux; 2856 tab = prog_aux->kfunc_tab; 2857 btf_tab = prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 2858 if (!tab) { 2859 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 2860 verbose(env, "calling kernel function is not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 2861 return -ENOTSUPP; 2862 } 2863 2864 if (!env->prog->jit_requested) { 2865 verbose(env, "JIT is required for calling kernel function\n"); 2866 return -ENOTSUPP; 2867 } 2868 2869 if (!bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call()) { 2870 verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kernel function\n"); 2871 return -ENOTSUPP; 2872 } 2873 2874 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible) { 2875 verbose(env, "cannot call kernel function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 2876 return -EINVAL; 2877 } 2878 2879 tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*tab), GFP_KERNEL); 2880 if (!tab) 2881 return -ENOMEM; 2882 prog_aux->kfunc_tab = tab; 2883 } 2884 2885 /* func_id == 0 is always invalid, but instead of returning an error, be 2886 * conservative and wait until the code elimination pass before returning 2887 * error, so that invalid calls that get pruned out can be in BPF programs 2888 * loaded from userspace. It is also required that offset be untouched 2889 * for such calls. 2890 */ 2891 if (!func_id && !offset) 2892 return 0; 2893 2894 if (!btf_tab && offset) { 2895 btf_tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*btf_tab), GFP_KERNEL); 2896 if (!btf_tab) 2897 return -ENOMEM; 2898 prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab = btf_tab; 2899 } 2900 2901 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 2902 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) { 2903 verbose(env, "failed to find BTF for kernel function\n"); 2904 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 2905 } 2906 2907 if (find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, func_id, offset)) 2908 return 0; 2909 2910 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_DESCS) { 2911 verbose(env, "too many different kernel function calls\n"); 2912 return -E2BIG; 2913 } 2914 2915 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 2916 if (!func || !btf_type_is_func(func)) { 2917 verbose(env, "kernel btf_id %u is not a function\n", 2918 func_id); 2919 return -EINVAL; 2920 } 2921 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 2922 if (!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)) { 2923 verbose(env, "kernel function btf_id %u does not have a valid func_proto\n", 2924 func_id); 2925 return -EINVAL; 2926 } 2927 2928 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 2929 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(func_name); 2930 if (!addr) { 2931 verbose(env, "cannot find address for kernel function %s\n", 2932 func_name); 2933 return -EINVAL; 2934 } 2935 specialize_kfunc(env, func_id, offset, &addr); 2936 2937 if (bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()) { 2938 call_imm = func_id; 2939 } else { 2940 call_imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(addr); 2941 /* Check whether the relative offset overflows desc->imm */ 2942 if ((unsigned long)(s32)call_imm != call_imm) { 2943 verbose(env, "address of kernel function %s is out of range\n", 2944 func_name); 2945 return -EINVAL; 2946 } 2947 } 2948 2949 if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(func_id)) { 2950 err = bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_check(&env->log, prog_aux); 2951 if (err) 2952 return err; 2953 } 2954 2955 desc = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 2956 desc->func_id = func_id; 2957 desc->imm = call_imm; 2958 desc->offset = offset; 2959 desc->addr = addr; 2960 err = btf_distill_func_proto(&env->log, desc_btf, 2961 func_proto, func_name, 2962 &desc->func_model); 2963 if (!err) 2964 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2965 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off, NULL); 2966 return err; 2967 } 2968 2969 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off(const void *a, const void *b) 2970 { 2971 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 2972 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 2973 2974 if (d0->imm != d1->imm) 2975 return d0->imm < d1->imm ? -1 : 1; 2976 if (d0->offset != d1->offset) 2977 return d0->offset < d1->offset ? -1 : 1; 2978 return 0; 2979 } 2980 2981 static void sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm_off(struct bpf_prog *prog) 2982 { 2983 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2984 2985 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2986 if (!tab) 2987 return; 2988 2989 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2990 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off, NULL); 2991 } 2992 2993 bool bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_prog *prog) 2994 { 2995 return !!prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2996 } 2997 2998 const struct btf_func_model * 2999 bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog *prog, 3000 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 3001 { 3002 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 3003 .imm = insn->imm, 3004 .offset = insn->off, 3005 }; 3006 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *res; 3007 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 3008 3009 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 3010 res = bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 3011 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off); 3012 3013 return res ? &res->func_model : NULL; 3014 } 3015 3016 static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3017 { 3018 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 3019 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 3020 int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 3021 3022 /* Add entry function. */ 3023 ret = add_subprog(env, 0); 3024 if (ret) 3025 return ret; 3026 3027 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 3028 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn) && 3029 !bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) 3030 continue; 3031 3032 if (!env->bpf_capable) { 3033 verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"); 3034 return -EPERM; 3035 } 3036 3037 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn) || bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 3038 ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 3039 else 3040 ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm, insn->off); 3041 3042 if (ret < 0) 3043 return ret; 3044 } 3045 3046 /* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration 3047 * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased. 3048 */ 3049 subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt; 3050 3051 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 3052 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 3053 verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start); 3054 3055 return 0; 3056 } 3057 3058 static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3059 { 3060 int i, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0; 3061 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 3062 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 3063 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 3064 3065 /* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */ 3066 subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start; 3067 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 3068 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 3069 u8 code = insn[i].code; 3070 3071 if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 3072 insn[i].src_reg == 0 && 3073 insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 3074 subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true; 3075 subprog[cur_subprog].tail_call_reachable = true; 3076 } 3077 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_LD && 3078 (BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IND)) 3079 subprog[cur_subprog].has_ld_abs = true; 3080 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) 3081 goto next; 3082 if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL) 3083 goto next; 3084 if (code == (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA)) 3085 off = i + insn[i].imm + 1; 3086 else 3087 off = i + insn[i].off + 1; 3088 if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) { 3089 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off); 3090 return -EINVAL; 3091 } 3092 next: 3093 if (i == subprog_end - 1) { 3094 /* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another 3095 * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit 3096 * or unconditional jump back 3097 */ 3098 if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) && 3099 code != (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA) && 3100 code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { 3101 verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n"); 3102 return -EINVAL; 3103 } 3104 subprog_start = subprog_end; 3105 cur_subprog++; 3106 if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt) 3107 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 3108 } 3109 } 3110 return 0; 3111 } 3112 3113 /* Parentage chain of this register (or stack slot) should take care of all 3114 * issues like callee-saved registers, stack slot allocation time, etc. 3115 */ 3116 static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3117 const struct bpf_reg_state *state, 3118 struct bpf_reg_state *parent, u8 flag) 3119 { 3120 bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */ 3121 int cnt = 0; 3122 3123 while (parent) { 3124 /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ 3125 if (writes && state->live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 3126 break; 3127 if (parent->live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { 3128 verbose(env, "verifier BUG type %s var_off %lld off %d\n", 3129 reg_type_str(env, parent->type), 3130 parent->var_off.value, parent->off); 3131 return -EFAULT; 3132 } 3133 /* The first condition is more likely to be true than the 3134 * second, checked it first. 3135 */ 3136 if ((parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ) == flag || 3137 parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ64) 3138 /* The parentage chain never changes and 3139 * this parent was already marked as LIVE_READ. 3140 * There is no need to keep walking the chain again and 3141 * keep re-marking all parents as LIVE_READ. 3142 * This case happens when the same register is read 3143 * multiple times without writes into it in-between. 3144 * Also, if parent has the stronger REG_LIVE_READ64 set, 3145 * then no need to set the weak REG_LIVE_READ32. 3146 */ 3147 break; 3148 /* ... then we depend on parent's value */ 3149 parent->live |= flag; 3150 /* REG_LIVE_READ64 overrides REG_LIVE_READ32. */ 3151 if (flag == REG_LIVE_READ64) 3152 parent->live &= ~REG_LIVE_READ32; 3153 state = parent; 3154 parent = state->parent; 3155 writes = true; 3156 cnt++; 3157 } 3158 3159 if (env->longest_mark_read_walk < cnt) 3160 env->longest_mark_read_walk = cnt; 3161 return 0; 3162 } 3163 3164 static int mark_dynptr_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3165 { 3166 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 3167 int spi, ret; 3168 3169 /* For CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, it must have already been done by 3170 * check_reg_arg in check_helper_call and mark_btf_func_reg_size in 3171 * check_kfunc_call. 3172 */ 3173 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 3174 return 0; 3175 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 3176 if (spi < 0) 3177 return spi; 3178 /* Caller ensures dynptr is valid and initialized, which means spi is in 3179 * bounds and spi is the first dynptr slot. Simply mark stack slot as 3180 * read. 3181 */ 3182 ret = mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 3183 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 3184 if (ret) 3185 return ret; 3186 return mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr, 3187 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 3188 } 3189 3190 static int mark_iter_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3191 int spi, int nr_slots) 3192 { 3193 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 3194 int err, i; 3195 3196 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 3197 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &state->stack[spi - i].spilled_ptr; 3198 3199 err = mark_reg_read(env, st, st->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 3200 if (err) 3201 return err; 3202 3203 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i); 3204 } 3205 3206 return 0; 3207 } 3208 3209 /* This function is supposed to be used by the following 32-bit optimization 3210 * code only. It returns TRUE if the source or destination register operates 3211 * on 64-bit, otherwise return FALSE. 3212 */ 3213 static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 3214 u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum reg_arg_type t) 3215 { 3216 u8 code, class, op; 3217 3218 code = insn->code; 3219 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 3220 op = BPF_OP(code); 3221 if (class == BPF_JMP) { 3222 /* BPF_EXIT for "main" will reach here. Return TRUE 3223 * conservatively. 3224 */ 3225 if (op == BPF_EXIT) 3226 return true; 3227 if (op == BPF_CALL) { 3228 /* BPF to BPF call will reach here because of marking 3229 * caller saved clobber with DST_OP_NO_MARK for which we 3230 * don't care the register def because they are anyway 3231 * marked as NOT_INIT already. 3232 */ 3233 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 3234 return false; 3235 /* Helper call will reach here because of arg type 3236 * check, conservatively return TRUE. 3237 */ 3238 if (t == SRC_OP) 3239 return true; 3240 3241 return false; 3242 } 3243 } 3244 3245 if (class == BPF_ALU64 && op == BPF_END && (insn->imm == 16 || insn->imm == 32)) 3246 return false; 3247 3248 if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP || 3249 (class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64)) 3250 return true; 3251 3252 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_JMP32) 3253 return false; 3254 3255 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 3256 if (t != SRC_OP) 3257 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 3258 /* LDX source must be ptr. */ 3259 return true; 3260 } 3261 3262 if (class == BPF_STX) { 3263 /* BPF_STX (including atomic variants) has multiple source 3264 * operands, one of which is a ptr. Check whether the caller is 3265 * asking about it. 3266 */ 3267 if (t == SRC_OP && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 3268 return true; 3269 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 3270 } 3271 3272 if (class == BPF_LD) { 3273 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(code); 3274 3275 /* LD_IMM64 */ 3276 if (mode == BPF_IMM) 3277 return true; 3278 3279 /* Both LD_IND and LD_ABS return 32-bit data. */ 3280 if (t != SRC_OP) 3281 return false; 3282 3283 /* Implicit ctx ptr. */ 3284 if (regno == BPF_REG_6) 3285 return true; 3286 3287 /* Explicit source could be any width. */ 3288 return true; 3289 } 3290 3291 if (class == BPF_ST) 3292 /* The only source register for BPF_ST is a ptr. */ 3293 return true; 3294 3295 /* Conservatively return true at default. */ 3296 return true; 3297 } 3298 3299 /* Return the regno defined by the insn, or -1. */ 3300 static int insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 3301 { 3302 switch (BPF_CLASS(insn->code)) { 3303 case BPF_JMP: 3304 case BPF_JMP32: 3305 case BPF_ST: 3306 return -1; 3307 case BPF_STX: 3308 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 3309 (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH)) { 3310 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 3311 return BPF_REG_0; 3312 else 3313 return insn->src_reg; 3314 } else { 3315 return -1; 3316 } 3317 default: 3318 return insn->dst_reg; 3319 } 3320 } 3321 3322 /* Return TRUE if INSN has defined any 32-bit value explicitly. */ 3323 static bool insn_has_def32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 3324 { 3325 int dst_reg = insn_def_regno(insn); 3326 3327 if (dst_reg == -1) 3328 return false; 3329 3330 return !is_reg64(env, insn, dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP); 3331 } 3332 3333 static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3334 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3335 { 3336 s32 def_idx = reg->subreg_def; 3337 3338 if (def_idx == DEF_NOT_SUBREG) 3339 return; 3340 3341 env->insn_aux_data[def_idx - 1].zext_dst = true; 3342 /* The dst will be zero extended, so won't be sub-register anymore. */ 3343 reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 3344 } 3345 3346 static int __check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 3347 enum reg_arg_type t) 3348 { 3349 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx; 3350 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3351 bool rw64; 3352 3353 if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) { 3354 verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno); 3355 return -EINVAL; 3356 } 3357 3358 mark_reg_scratched(env, regno); 3359 3360 reg = ®s[regno]; 3361 rw64 = is_reg64(env, insn, regno, reg, t); 3362 if (t == SRC_OP) { 3363 /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */ 3364 if (reg->type == NOT_INIT) { 3365 verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno); 3366 return -EACCES; 3367 } 3368 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ 3369 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) 3370 return 0; 3371 3372 if (rw64) 3373 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 3374 3375 return mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, 3376 rw64 ? REG_LIVE_READ64 : REG_LIVE_READ32); 3377 } else { 3378 /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */ 3379 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) { 3380 verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n"); 3381 return -EACCES; 3382 } 3383 reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3384 reg->subreg_def = rw64 ? DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 3385 if (t == DST_OP) 3386 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 3387 } 3388 return 0; 3389 } 3390 3391 static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3392 enum reg_arg_type t) 3393 { 3394 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3395 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3396 3397 return __check_reg_arg(env, state->regs, regno, t); 3398 } 3399 3400 static void mark_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 3401 { 3402 env->insn_aux_data[idx].jmp_point = true; 3403 } 3404 3405 static bool is_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 3406 { 3407 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].jmp_point; 3408 } 3409 3410 /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */ 3411 static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3412 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 3413 { 3414 u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt; 3415 struct bpf_idx_pair *p; 3416 size_t alloc_size; 3417 3418 if (!is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) 3419 return 0; 3420 3421 cnt++; 3422 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(cnt, sizeof(*p))); 3423 p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, alloc_size, GFP_USER); 3424 if (!p) 3425 return -ENOMEM; 3426 p[cnt - 1].idx = env->insn_idx; 3427 p[cnt - 1].prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 3428 cur->jmp_history = p; 3429 cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt; 3430 return 0; 3431 } 3432 3433 /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded 3434 * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution. 3435 * Return -ENOENT if we exhausted all instructions within given state. 3436 * 3437 * It's legal to have a bit of a looping with the same starting and ending 3438 * insn index within the same state, e.g.: 3->4->5->3, so just because current 3439 * instruction index is the same as state's first_idx doesn't mean we are 3440 * done. If there is still some jump history left, we should keep going. We 3441 * need to take into account that we might have a jump history between given 3442 * state's parent and itself, due to checkpointing. In this case, we'll have 3443 * history entry recording a jump from last instruction of parent state and 3444 * first instruction of given state. 3445 */ 3446 static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i, 3447 u32 *history) 3448 { 3449 u32 cnt = *history; 3450 3451 if (i == st->first_insn_idx) { 3452 if (cnt == 0) 3453 return -ENOENT; 3454 if (cnt == 1 && st->jmp_history[0].idx == i) 3455 return -ENOENT; 3456 } 3457 3458 if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) { 3459 i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx; 3460 (*history)--; 3461 } else { 3462 i--; 3463 } 3464 return i; 3465 } 3466 3467 static const char *disasm_kfunc_name(void *data, const struct bpf_insn *insn) 3468 { 3469 const struct btf_type *func; 3470 struct btf *desc_btf; 3471 3472 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 3473 return NULL; 3474 3475 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(data, insn->off); 3476 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 3477 return "<error>"; 3478 3479 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, insn->imm); 3480 return btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 3481 } 3482 3483 static inline void bt_init(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame) 3484 { 3485 bt->frame = frame; 3486 } 3487 3488 static inline void bt_reset(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3489 { 3490 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = bt->env; 3491 3492 memset(bt, 0, sizeof(*bt)); 3493 bt->env = env; 3494 } 3495 3496 static inline u32 bt_empty(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3497 { 3498 u64 mask = 0; 3499 int i; 3500 3501 for (i = 0; i <= bt->frame; i++) 3502 mask |= bt->reg_masks[i] | bt->stack_masks[i]; 3503 3504 return mask == 0; 3505 } 3506 3507 static inline int bt_subprog_enter(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3508 { 3509 if (bt->frame == MAX_CALL_FRAMES - 1) { 3510 verbose(bt->env, "BUG subprog enter from frame %d\n", bt->frame); 3511 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3512 return -EFAULT; 3513 } 3514 bt->frame++; 3515 return 0; 3516 } 3517 3518 static inline int bt_subprog_exit(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3519 { 3520 if (bt->frame == 0) { 3521 verbose(bt->env, "BUG subprog exit from frame 0\n"); 3522 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3523 return -EFAULT; 3524 } 3525 bt->frame--; 3526 return 0; 3527 } 3528 3529 static inline void bt_set_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg) 3530 { 3531 bt->reg_masks[frame] |= 1 << reg; 3532 } 3533 3534 static inline void bt_clear_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg) 3535 { 3536 bt->reg_masks[frame] &= ~(1 << reg); 3537 } 3538 3539 static inline void bt_set_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) 3540 { 3541 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame, reg); 3542 } 3543 3544 static inline void bt_clear_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) 3545 { 3546 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame, reg); 3547 } 3548 3549 static inline void bt_set_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot) 3550 { 3551 bt->stack_masks[frame] |= 1ull << slot; 3552 } 3553 3554 static inline void bt_clear_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot) 3555 { 3556 bt->stack_masks[frame] &= ~(1ull << slot); 3557 } 3558 3559 static inline void bt_set_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 slot) 3560 { 3561 bt_set_frame_slot(bt, bt->frame, slot); 3562 } 3563 3564 static inline void bt_clear_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 slot) 3565 { 3566 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, bt->frame, slot); 3567 } 3568 3569 static inline u32 bt_frame_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame) 3570 { 3571 return bt->reg_masks[frame]; 3572 } 3573 3574 static inline u32 bt_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3575 { 3576 return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame]; 3577 } 3578 3579 static inline u64 bt_frame_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame) 3580 { 3581 return bt->stack_masks[frame]; 3582 } 3583 3584 static inline u64 bt_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3585 { 3586 return bt->stack_masks[bt->frame]; 3587 } 3588 3589 static inline bool bt_is_reg_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) 3590 { 3591 return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame] & (1 << reg); 3592 } 3593 3594 static inline bool bt_is_slot_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 slot) 3595 { 3596 return bt->stack_masks[bt->frame] & (1ull << slot); 3597 } 3598 3599 /* format registers bitmask, e.g., "r0,r2,r4" for 0x15 mask */ 3600 static void fmt_reg_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u32 reg_mask) 3601 { 3602 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 3603 bool first = true; 3604 int i, n; 3605 3606 buf[0] = '\0'; 3607 3608 bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); 3609 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 3610 n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%sr%d", first ? "" : ",", i); 3611 first = false; 3612 buf += n; 3613 buf_sz -= n; 3614 if (buf_sz < 0) 3615 break; 3616 } 3617 } 3618 /* format stack slots bitmask, e.g., "-8,-24,-40" for 0x15 mask */ 3619 static void fmt_stack_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u64 stack_mask) 3620 { 3621 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 3622 bool first = true; 3623 int i, n; 3624 3625 buf[0] = '\0'; 3626 3627 bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask); 3628 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 3629 n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%s%d", first ? "" : ",", -(i + 1) * 8); 3630 first = false; 3631 buf += n; 3632 buf_sz -= n; 3633 if (buf_sz < 0) 3634 break; 3635 } 3636 } 3637 3638 static bool calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx); 3639 3640 /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to 3641 * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and 3642 * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state. 3643 * 3644 * @idx is an index of the instruction we are currently processing; 3645 * @subseq_idx is an index of the subsequent instruction that: 3646 * - *would be* executed next, if jump history is viewed in forward order; 3647 * - *was* processed previously during backtracking. 3648 */ 3649 static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, 3650 struct backtrack_state *bt) 3651 { 3652 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 3653 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 3654 .cb_print = verbose, 3655 .private_data = env, 3656 }; 3657 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx; 3658 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 3659 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 3660 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 3661 u32 dreg = insn->dst_reg; 3662 u32 sreg = insn->src_reg; 3663 u32 spi, i; 3664 3665 if (insn->code == 0) 3666 return 0; 3667 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 3668 fmt_reg_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3669 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: regs=%s ", 3670 bt->frame, env->tmp_str_buf); 3671 fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, bt_stack_mask(bt)); 3672 verbose(env, "stack=%s before ", env->tmp_str_buf); 3673 verbose(env, "%d: ", idx); 3674 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 3675 } 3676 3677 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 3678 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 3679 return 0; 3680 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { 3681 /* sreg is reserved and unused 3682 * dreg still need precision before this insn 3683 */ 3684 return 0; 3685 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 3686 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 3687 /* dreg = sreg or dreg = (s8, s16, s32)sreg 3688 * dreg needs precision after this insn 3689 * sreg needs precision before this insn 3690 */ 3691 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 3692 if (sreg != BPF_REG_FP) 3693 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 3694 } else { 3695 /* dreg = K 3696 * dreg needs precision after this insn. 3697 * Corresponding register is already marked 3698 * as precise=true in this verifier state. 3699 * No further markings in parent are necessary 3700 */ 3701 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 3702 } 3703 } else { 3704 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 3705 /* dreg += sreg 3706 * both dreg and sreg need precision 3707 * before this insn 3708 */ 3709 if (sreg != BPF_REG_FP) 3710 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 3711 } /* else dreg += K 3712 * dreg still needs precision before this insn 3713 */ 3714 } 3715 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 3716 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 3717 return 0; 3718 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 3719 3720 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision. 3721 * Load from any other memory can be zero extended. 3722 * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated 3723 * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state. 3724 * No further tracking necessary. 3725 */ 3726 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 3727 return 0; 3728 3729 /* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack. 3730 * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be 3731 * tracked with precision 3732 */ 3733 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3734 if (spi >= 64) { 3735 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 3736 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3737 return -EFAULT; 3738 } 3739 bt_set_slot(bt, spi); 3740 } else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) { 3741 if (bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 3742 /* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg 3743 * to access memory. It means backtracking 3744 * encountered a case of pointer subtraction. 3745 */ 3746 return -ENOTSUPP; 3747 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack */ 3748 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 3749 return 0; 3750 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3751 if (spi >= 64) { 3752 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 3753 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3754 return -EFAULT; 3755 } 3756 if (!bt_is_slot_set(bt, spi)) 3757 return 0; 3758 bt_clear_slot(bt, spi); 3759 if (class == BPF_STX) 3760 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 3761 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 3762 if (bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) { 3763 int subprog_insn_idx, subprog; 3764 3765 subprog_insn_idx = idx + insn->imm + 1; 3766 subprog = find_subprog(env, subprog_insn_idx); 3767 if (subprog < 0) 3768 return -EFAULT; 3769 3770 if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) { 3771 /* check that jump history doesn't have any 3772 * extra instructions from subprog; the next 3773 * instruction after call to global subprog 3774 * should be literally next instruction in 3775 * caller program 3776 */ 3777 WARN_ONCE(idx + 1 != subseq_idx, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3778 /* r1-r5 are invalidated after subprog call, 3779 * so for global func call it shouldn't be set 3780 * anymore 3781 */ 3782 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 3783 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3784 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3785 return -EFAULT; 3786 } 3787 /* global subprog always sets R0 */ 3788 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 3789 return 0; 3790 } else { 3791 /* static subprog call instruction, which 3792 * means that we are exiting current subprog, 3793 * so only r1-r5 could be still requested as 3794 * precise, r0 and r6-r10 or any stack slot in 3795 * the current frame should be zero by now 3796 */ 3797 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 3798 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3799 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3800 return -EFAULT; 3801 } 3802 /* we don't track register spills perfectly, 3803 * so fallback to force-precise instead of failing */ 3804 if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) 3805 return -ENOTSUPP; 3806 /* propagate r1-r5 to the caller */ 3807 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) { 3808 if (bt_is_reg_set(bt, i)) { 3809 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 3810 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame - 1, i); 3811 } 3812 } 3813 if (bt_subprog_exit(bt)) 3814 return -EFAULT; 3815 return 0; 3816 } 3817 } else if (is_sync_callback_calling_insn(insn) && idx != subseq_idx - 1) { 3818 /* exit from callback subprog to callback-calling helper or 3819 * kfunc call. Use idx/subseq_idx check to discern it from 3820 * straight line code backtracking. 3821 * Unlike the subprog call handling above, we shouldn't 3822 * propagate precision of r1-r5 (if any requested), as they are 3823 * not actually arguments passed directly to callback subprogs 3824 */ 3825 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 3826 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3827 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3828 return -EFAULT; 3829 } 3830 if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) 3831 return -ENOTSUPP; 3832 /* clear r1-r5 in callback subprog's mask */ 3833 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 3834 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 3835 if (bt_subprog_exit(bt)) 3836 return -EFAULT; 3837 return 0; 3838 } else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 3839 /* kfunc with imm==0 is invalid and fixup_kfunc_call will 3840 * catch this error later. Make backtracking conservative 3841 * with ENOTSUPP. 3842 */ 3843 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && insn->imm == 0) 3844 return -ENOTSUPP; 3845 /* regular helper call sets R0 */ 3846 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 3847 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 3848 /* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5 3849 * they should have been found already. 3850 */ 3851 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3852 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3853 return -EFAULT; 3854 } 3855 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 3856 bool r0_precise; 3857 3858 /* Backtracking to a nested function call, 'idx' is a part of 3859 * the inner frame 'subseq_idx' is a part of the outer frame. 3860 * In case of a regular function call, instructions giving 3861 * precision to registers R1-R5 should have been found already. 3862 * In case of a callback, it is ok to have R1-R5 marked for 3863 * backtracking, as these registers are set by the function 3864 * invoking callback. 3865 */ 3866 if (subseq_idx >= 0 && calls_callback(env, subseq_idx)) 3867 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 3868 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 3869 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 3870 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3871 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3872 return -EFAULT; 3873 } 3874 3875 /* BPF_EXIT in subprog or callback always returns 3876 * right after the call instruction, so by checking 3877 * whether the instruction at subseq_idx-1 is subprog 3878 * call or not we can distinguish actual exit from 3879 * *subprog* from exit from *callback*. In the former 3880 * case, we need to propagate r0 precision, if 3881 * necessary. In the former we never do that. 3882 */ 3883 r0_precise = subseq_idx - 1 >= 0 && 3884 bpf_pseudo_call(&env->prog->insnsi[subseq_idx - 1]) && 3885 bt_is_reg_set(bt, BPF_REG_0); 3886 3887 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 3888 if (bt_subprog_enter(bt)) 3889 return -EFAULT; 3890 3891 if (r0_precise) 3892 bt_set_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 3893 /* r6-r9 and stack slots will stay set in caller frame 3894 * bitmasks until we return back from callee(s) 3895 */ 3896 return 0; 3897 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 3898 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg) && !bt_is_reg_set(bt, sreg)) 3899 return 0; 3900 /* dreg <cond> sreg 3901 * Both dreg and sreg need precision before 3902 * this insn. If only sreg was marked precise 3903 * before it would be equally necessary to 3904 * propagate it to dreg. 3905 */ 3906 bt_set_reg(bt, dreg); 3907 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 3908 /* else dreg <cond> K 3909 * Only dreg still needs precision before 3910 * this insn, so for the K-based conditional 3911 * there is nothing new to be marked. 3912 */ 3913 } 3914 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 3915 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 3916 return 0; 3917 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 3918 /* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind. 3919 * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision 3920 * into parent is necessary 3921 */ 3922 if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS) 3923 /* to be analyzed */ 3924 return -ENOTSUPP; 3925 } 3926 return 0; 3927 } 3928 3929 /* the scalar precision tracking algorithm: 3930 * . at the start all registers have precise=false. 3931 * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns. 3932 * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in: 3933 * . ptr + scalar alu 3934 * . if (scalar cond K|scalar) 3935 * . helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected 3936 * backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and 3937 * stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar regisers 3938 * should be precise. 3939 * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots) 3940 * are equivalent if both are not precise. 3941 * 3942 * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain, 3943 * since many different registers and stack slots could have been 3944 * used to compute single precise scalar. 3945 * 3946 * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then 3947 * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects 3948 * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper 3949 * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe. 3950 * 3951 * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states. 3952 * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn. 3953 * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later. 3954 * 3955 * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like: 3956 * R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) 3957 * r9 -= r8 3958 * r5 = r9 3959 * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7 3960 * R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff)) 3961 * r5 += 1 3962 * ... 3963 * call bpf_perf_event_output#25 3964 * where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO 3965 * 3966 * and this case: 3967 * r6 = 1 3968 * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0 3969 * r0 += r6 3970 * if r0 == 0 goto 3971 * 3972 * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame. 3973 * 3974 * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started, 3975 * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees 3976 * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to 3977 * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences") 3978 * 3979 * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking. 3980 */ 3981 static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3982 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 3983 { 3984 struct bpf_func_state *func; 3985 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3986 int i, j; 3987 3988 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 3989 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: falling back to forcing all scalars precise\n", 3990 st->curframe); 3991 } 3992 3993 /* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path. 3994 * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars. 3995 * We also skip current state and go straight to first parent state, 3996 * because precision markings in current non-checkpointed state are 3997 * not needed. See why in the comment in __mark_chain_precision below. 3998 */ 3999 for (st = st->parent; st; st = st->parent) { 4000 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 4001 func = st->frame[i]; 4002 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 4003 reg = &func->regs[j]; 4004 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg->precise) 4005 continue; 4006 reg->precise = true; 4007 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4008 verbose(env, "force_precise: frame%d: forcing r%d to be precise\n", 4009 i, j); 4010 } 4011 } 4012 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 4013 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 4014 continue; 4015 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 4016 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg->precise) 4017 continue; 4018 reg->precise = true; 4019 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4020 verbose(env, "force_precise: frame%d: forcing fp%d to be precise\n", 4021 i, -(j + 1) * 8); 4022 } 4023 } 4024 } 4025 } 4026 } 4027 4028 static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 4029 { 4030 struct bpf_func_state *func; 4031 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4032 int i, j; 4033 4034 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 4035 func = st->frame[i]; 4036 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 4037 reg = &func->regs[j]; 4038 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 4039 continue; 4040 reg->precise = false; 4041 } 4042 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 4043 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 4044 continue; 4045 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 4046 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 4047 continue; 4048 reg->precise = false; 4049 } 4050 } 4051 } 4052 4053 static bool idset_contains(struct bpf_idset *s, u32 id) 4054 { 4055 u32 i; 4056 4057 for (i = 0; i < s->count; ++i) 4058 if (s->ids[i] == id) 4059 return true; 4060 4061 return false; 4062 } 4063 4064 static int idset_push(struct bpf_idset *s, u32 id) 4065 { 4066 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(s->count >= ARRAY_SIZE(s->ids))) 4067 return -EFAULT; 4068 s->ids[s->count++] = id; 4069 return 0; 4070 } 4071 4072 static void idset_reset(struct bpf_idset *s) 4073 { 4074 s->count = 0; 4075 } 4076 4077 /* Collect a set of IDs for all registers currently marked as precise in env->bt. 4078 * Mark all registers with these IDs as precise. 4079 */ 4080 static int mark_precise_scalar_ids(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 4081 { 4082 struct bpf_idset *precise_ids = &env->idset_scratch; 4083 struct backtrack_state *bt = &env->bt; 4084 struct bpf_func_state *func; 4085 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4086 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 4087 int i, fr; 4088 4089 idset_reset(precise_ids); 4090 4091 for (fr = bt->frame; fr >= 0; fr--) { 4092 func = st->frame[fr]; 4093 4094 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr)); 4095 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 4096 reg = &func->regs[i]; 4097 if (!reg->id || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 4098 continue; 4099 if (idset_push(precise_ids, reg->id)) 4100 return -EFAULT; 4101 } 4102 4103 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); 4104 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 4105 if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) 4106 break; 4107 if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) 4108 continue; 4109 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 4110 if (!reg->id) 4111 continue; 4112 if (idset_push(precise_ids, reg->id)) 4113 return -EFAULT; 4114 } 4115 } 4116 4117 for (fr = 0; fr <= st->curframe; ++fr) { 4118 func = st->frame[fr]; 4119 4120 for (i = BPF_REG_0; i < BPF_REG_10; ++i) { 4121 reg = &func->regs[i]; 4122 if (!reg->id) 4123 continue; 4124 if (!idset_contains(precise_ids, reg->id)) 4125 continue; 4126 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); 4127 } 4128 for (i = 0; i < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; ++i) { 4129 if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) 4130 continue; 4131 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 4132 if (!reg->id) 4133 continue; 4134 if (!idset_contains(precise_ids, reg->id)) 4135 continue; 4136 bt_set_frame_slot(bt, fr, i); 4137 } 4138 } 4139 4140 return 0; 4141 } 4142 4143 /* 4144 * __mark_chain_precision() backtracks BPF program instruction sequence and 4145 * chain of verifier states making sure that register *regno* (if regno >= 0) 4146 * and/or stack slot *spi* (if spi >= 0) are marked as precisely tracked 4147 * SCALARS, as well as any other registers and slots that contribute to 4148 * a tracked state of given registers/stack slots, depending on specific BPF 4149 * assembly instructions (see backtrack_insns() for exact instruction handling 4150 * logic). This backtracking relies on recorded jmp_history and is able to 4151 * traverse entire chain of parent states. This process ends only when all the 4152 * necessary registers/slots and their transitive dependencies are marked as 4153 * precise. 4154 * 4155 * One important and subtle aspect is that precise marks *do not matter* in 4156 * the currently verified state (current state). It is important to understand 4157 * why this is the case. 4158 * 4159 * First, note that current state is the state that is not yet "checkpointed", 4160 * i.e., it is not yet put into env->explored_states, and it has no children 4161 * states as well. It's ephemeral, and can end up either a) being discarded if 4162 * compatible explored state is found at some point or BPF_EXIT instruction is 4163 * reached or b) checkpointed and put into env->explored_states, branching out 4164 * into one or more children states. 4165 * 4166 * In the former case, precise markings in current state are completely 4167 * ignored by state comparison code (see regsafe() for details). Only 4168 * checkpointed ("old") state precise markings are important, and if old 4169 * state's register/slot is precise, regsafe() assumes current state's 4170 * register/slot as precise and checks value ranges exactly and precisely. If 4171 * states turn out to be compatible, current state's necessary precise 4172 * markings and any required parent states' precise markings are enforced 4173 * after the fact with propagate_precision() logic, after the fact. But it's 4174 * important to realize that in this case, even after marking current state 4175 * registers/slots as precise, we immediately discard current state. So what 4176 * actually matters is any of the precise markings propagated into current 4177 * state's parent states, which are always checkpointed (due to b) case above). 4178 * As such, for scenario a) it doesn't matter if current state has precise 4179 * markings set or not. 4180 * 4181 * Now, for the scenario b), checkpointing and forking into child(ren) 4182 * state(s). Note that before current state gets to checkpointing step, any 4183 * processed instruction always assumes precise SCALAR register/slot 4184 * knowledge: if precise value or range is useful to prune jump branch, BPF 4185 * verifier takes this opportunity enthusiastically. Similarly, when 4186 * register's value is used to calculate offset or memory address, exact 4187 * knowledge of SCALAR range is assumed, checked, and enforced. So, similar to 4188 * what we mentioned above about state comparison ignoring precise markings 4189 * during state comparison, BPF verifier ignores and also assumes precise 4190 * markings *at will* during instruction verification process. But as verifier 4191 * assumes precision, it also propagates any precision dependencies across 4192 * parent states, which are not yet finalized, so can be further restricted 4193 * based on new knowledge gained from restrictions enforced by their children 4194 * states. This is so that once those parent states are finalized, i.e., when 4195 * they have no more active children state, state comparison logic in 4196 * is_state_visited() would enforce strict and precise SCALAR ranges, if 4197 * required for correctness. 4198 * 4199 * To build a bit more intuition, note also that once a state is checkpointed, 4200 * the path we took to get to that state is not important. This is crucial 4201 * property for state pruning. When state is checkpointed and finalized at 4202 * some instruction index, it can be correctly and safely used to "short 4203 * circuit" any *compatible* state that reaches exactly the same instruction 4204 * index. I.e., if we jumped to that instruction from a completely different 4205 * code path than original finalized state was derived from, it doesn't 4206 * matter, current state can be discarded because from that instruction 4207 * forward having a compatible state will ensure we will safely reach the 4208 * exit. States describe preconditions for further exploration, but completely 4209 * forget the history of how we got here. 4210 * 4211 * This also means that even if we needed precise SCALAR range to get to 4212 * finalized state, but from that point forward *that same* SCALAR register is 4213 * never used in a precise context (i.e., it's precise value is not needed for 4214 * correctness), it's correct and safe to mark such register as "imprecise" 4215 * (i.e., precise marking set to false). This is what we rely on when we do 4216 * not set precise marking in current state. If no child state requires 4217 * precision for any given SCALAR register, it's safe to dictate that it can 4218 * be imprecise. If any child state does require this register to be precise, 4219 * we'll mark it precise later retroactively during precise markings 4220 * propagation from child state to parent states. 4221 * 4222 * Skipping precise marking setting in current state is a mild version of 4223 * relying on the above observation. But we can utilize this property even 4224 * more aggressively by proactively forgetting any precise marking in the 4225 * current state (which we inherited from the parent state), right before we 4226 * checkpoint it and branch off into new child state. This is done by 4227 * mark_all_scalars_imprecise() to hopefully get more permissive and generic 4228 * finalized states which help in short circuiting more future states. 4229 */ 4230 static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4231 { 4232 struct backtrack_state *bt = &env->bt; 4233 struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state; 4234 int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 4235 int last_idx = env->insn_idx; 4236 int subseq_idx = -1; 4237 struct bpf_func_state *func; 4238 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4239 bool skip_first = true; 4240 int i, fr, err; 4241 4242 if (!env->bpf_capable) 4243 return 0; 4244 4245 /* set frame number from which we are starting to backtrack */ 4246 bt_init(bt, env->cur_state->curframe); 4247 4248 /* Do sanity checks against current state of register and/or stack 4249 * slot, but don't set precise flag in current state, as precision 4250 * tracking in the current state is unnecessary. 4251 */ 4252 func = st->frame[bt->frame]; 4253 if (regno >= 0) { 4254 reg = &func->regs[regno]; 4255 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 4256 WARN_ONCE(1, "backtracing misuse"); 4257 return -EFAULT; 4258 } 4259 bt_set_reg(bt, regno); 4260 } 4261 4262 if (bt_empty(bt)) 4263 return 0; 4264 4265 for (;;) { 4266 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 4267 u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt; 4268 4269 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4270 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: last_idx %d first_idx %d subseq_idx %d \n", 4271 bt->frame, last_idx, first_idx, subseq_idx); 4272 } 4273 4274 /* If some register with scalar ID is marked as precise, 4275 * make sure that all registers sharing this ID are also precise. 4276 * This is needed to estimate effect of find_equal_scalars(). 4277 * Do this at the last instruction of each state, 4278 * bpf_reg_state::id fields are valid for these instructions. 4279 * 4280 * Allows to track precision in situation like below: 4281 * 4282 * r2 = unknown value 4283 * ... 4284 * --- state #0 --- 4285 * ... 4286 * r1 = r2 // r1 and r2 now share the same ID 4287 * ... 4288 * --- state #1 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} --- 4289 * ... 4290 * if (r2 > 10) goto exit; // find_equal_scalars() assigns range to r1 4291 * ... 4292 * --- state #2 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} --- 4293 * r3 = r10 4294 * r3 += r1 // need to mark both r1 and r2 4295 */ 4296 if (mark_precise_scalar_ids(env, st)) 4297 return -EFAULT; 4298 4299 if (last_idx < 0) { 4300 /* we are at the entry into subprog, which 4301 * is expected for global funcs, but only if 4302 * requested precise registers are R1-R5 4303 * (which are global func's input arguments) 4304 */ 4305 if (st->curframe == 0 && 4306 st->frame[0]->subprogno > 0 && 4307 st->frame[0]->callsite == BPF_MAIN_FUNC && 4308 bt_stack_mask(bt) == 0 && 4309 (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) == 0) { 4310 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4311 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 4312 reg = &st->frame[0]->regs[i]; 4313 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 4314 if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) 4315 reg->precise = true; 4316 } 4317 return 0; 4318 } 4319 4320 verbose(env, "BUG backtracking func entry subprog %d reg_mask %x stack_mask %llx\n", 4321 st->frame[0]->subprogno, bt_reg_mask(bt), bt_stack_mask(bt)); 4322 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 4323 return -EFAULT; 4324 } 4325 4326 for (i = last_idx;;) { 4327 if (skip_first) { 4328 err = 0; 4329 skip_first = false; 4330 } else { 4331 err = backtrack_insn(env, i, subseq_idx, bt); 4332 } 4333 if (err == -ENOTSUPP) { 4334 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, env->cur_state); 4335 bt_reset(bt); 4336 return 0; 4337 } else if (err) { 4338 return err; 4339 } 4340 if (bt_empty(bt)) 4341 /* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state. 4342 * Since this state is already marked, just return. 4343 * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state. 4344 */ 4345 return 0; 4346 subseq_idx = i; 4347 i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history); 4348 if (i == -ENOENT) 4349 break; 4350 if (i >= env->prog->len) { 4351 /* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0 4352 * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask 4353 * to backtrack. 4354 * It means the backtracking missed the spot where 4355 * particular register was initialized with a constant. 4356 */ 4357 verbose(env, "BUG backtracking idx %d\n", i); 4358 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 4359 return -EFAULT; 4360 } 4361 } 4362 st = st->parent; 4363 if (!st) 4364 break; 4365 4366 for (fr = bt->frame; fr >= 0; fr--) { 4367 func = st->frame[fr]; 4368 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr)); 4369 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 4370 reg = &func->regs[i]; 4371 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 4372 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); 4373 continue; 4374 } 4375 if (reg->precise) 4376 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); 4377 else 4378 reg->precise = true; 4379 } 4380 4381 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); 4382 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 4383 if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) { 4384 /* the sequence of instructions: 4385 * 2: (bf) r3 = r10 4386 * 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0 4387 * 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) 4388 * doesn't contain jmps. It's backtracked 4389 * as a single block. 4390 * During backtracking insn 3 is not recognized as 4391 * stack access, so at the end of backtracking 4392 * stack slot fp-8 is still marked in stack_mask. 4393 * However the parent state may not have accessed 4394 * fp-8 and it's "unallocated" stack space. 4395 * In such case fallback to conservative. 4396 */ 4397 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, env->cur_state); 4398 bt_reset(bt); 4399 return 0; 4400 } 4401 4402 if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) { 4403 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, i); 4404 continue; 4405 } 4406 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 4407 if (reg->precise) 4408 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, i); 4409 else 4410 reg->precise = true; 4411 } 4412 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4413 fmt_reg_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, 4414 bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr)); 4415 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: parent state regs=%s ", 4416 fr, env->tmp_str_buf); 4417 fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, 4418 bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); 4419 verbose(env, "stack=%s: ", env->tmp_str_buf); 4420 print_verifier_state(env, func, true); 4421 } 4422 } 4423 4424 if (bt_empty(bt)) 4425 return 0; 4426 4427 subseq_idx = first_idx; 4428 last_idx = st->last_insn_idx; 4429 first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 4430 } 4431 4432 /* if we still have requested precise regs or slots, we missed 4433 * something (e.g., stack access through non-r10 register), so 4434 * fallback to marking all precise 4435 */ 4436 if (!bt_empty(bt)) { 4437 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, env->cur_state); 4438 bt_reset(bt); 4439 } 4440 4441 return 0; 4442 } 4443 4444 int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4445 { 4446 return __mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 4447 } 4448 4449 /* mark_chain_precision_batch() assumes that env->bt is set in the caller to 4450 * desired reg and stack masks across all relevant frames 4451 */ 4452 static int mark_chain_precision_batch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 4453 { 4454 return __mark_chain_precision(env, -1); 4455 } 4456 4457 static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) 4458 { 4459 switch (base_type(type)) { 4460 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 4461 case PTR_TO_STACK: 4462 case PTR_TO_CTX: 4463 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 4464 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 4465 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 4466 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 4467 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 4468 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 4469 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 4470 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 4471 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 4472 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 4473 case PTR_TO_BUF: 4474 case PTR_TO_MEM: 4475 case PTR_TO_FUNC: 4476 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 4477 return true; 4478 default: 4479 return false; 4480 } 4481 } 4482 4483 /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */ 4484 static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4485 { 4486 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 4487 } 4488 4489 static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4490 { 4491 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 4492 } 4493 4494 static bool __is_scalar_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4495 { 4496 return tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off) && 4497 reg->smin_value == S64_MIN && reg->smax_value == S64_MAX && 4498 reg->umin_value == 0 && reg->umax_value == U64_MAX && 4499 reg->s32_min_value == S32_MIN && reg->s32_max_value == S32_MAX && 4500 reg->u32_min_value == 0 && reg->u32_max_value == U32_MAX; 4501 } 4502 4503 static bool register_is_bounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4504 { 4505 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !__is_scalar_unbounded(reg); 4506 } 4507 4508 static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks, 4509 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4510 { 4511 if (allow_ptr_leaks) 4512 return false; 4513 4514 return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE; 4515 } 4516 4517 /* Copy src state preserving dst->parent and dst->live fields */ 4518 static void copy_register_state(struct bpf_reg_state *dst, const struct bpf_reg_state *src) 4519 { 4520 struct bpf_reg_state *parent = dst->parent; 4521 enum bpf_reg_liveness live = dst->live; 4522 4523 *dst = *src; 4524 dst->parent = parent; 4525 dst->live = live; 4526 } 4527 4528 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, 4529 int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4530 int size) 4531 { 4532 int i; 4533 4534 copy_register_state(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, reg); 4535 if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) 4536 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 4537 4538 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE; i > BPF_REG_SIZE - size; i--) 4539 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1] = STACK_SPILL; 4540 4541 /* size < 8 bytes spill */ 4542 for (; i; i--) 4543 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1]); 4544 } 4545 4546 static bool is_bpf_st_mem(struct bpf_insn *insn) 4547 { 4548 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ST && BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM; 4549 } 4550 4551 /* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers, 4552 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() 4553 */ 4554 static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4555 /* stack frame we're writing to */ 4556 struct bpf_func_state *state, 4557 int off, int size, int value_regno, 4558 int insn_idx) 4559 { 4560 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 4561 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err; 4562 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 4563 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL; 4564 u32 dst_reg = insn->dst_reg; 4565 4566 /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0, 4567 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits 4568 */ 4569 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && 4570 is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && 4571 size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 4572 verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); 4573 return -EACCES; 4574 } 4575 4576 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 4577 if (value_regno >= 0) 4578 reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 4579 if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) { 4580 bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type); 4581 4582 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 4583 u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]; 4584 4585 if (type != STACK_MISC && type != STACK_ZERO) { 4586 sanitize = true; 4587 break; 4588 } 4589 } 4590 4591 if (sanitize) 4592 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_spill = true; 4593 } 4594 4595 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 4596 if (err) 4597 return err; 4598 4599 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 4600 if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && register_is_bounded(reg) && 4601 !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) { 4602 if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) { 4603 /* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit 4604 * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of 4605 * scalar via different register has to be conservative. 4606 * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise 4607 * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant. 4608 */ 4609 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 4610 if (err) 4611 return err; 4612 } 4613 save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size); 4614 /* Break the relation on a narrowing spill. */ 4615 if (fls64(reg->umax_value) > BITS_PER_BYTE * size) 4616 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id = 0; 4617 } else if (!reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && 4618 insn->imm != 0 && env->bpf_capable) { 4619 struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg = {}; 4620 4621 __mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, insn->imm); 4622 fake_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 4623 save_register_state(state, spi, &fake_reg, size); 4624 } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) { 4625 /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ 4626 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 4627 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 4628 verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); 4629 return -EACCES; 4630 } 4631 if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 4632 verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n"); 4633 return -EINVAL; 4634 } 4635 save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size); 4636 } else { 4637 u8 type = STACK_MISC; 4638 4639 /* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */ 4640 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 4641 /* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr/dynptr/iter. */ 4642 if (is_stack_slot_special(&state->stack[spi])) 4643 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 4644 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]); 4645 4646 /* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written 4647 * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon 4648 * when stack slots are partially written. 4649 * This heuristic means that read propagation will be 4650 * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks 4651 * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs 4652 * writes+reads less than 8 bytes 4653 */ 4654 if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) 4655 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 4656 4657 /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ 4658 if ((reg && register_is_null(reg)) || 4659 (!reg && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm == 0)) { 4660 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 4661 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 4662 if (err) 4663 return err; 4664 type = STACK_ZERO; 4665 } 4666 4667 /* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */ 4668 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) 4669 state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] = 4670 type; 4671 } 4672 return 0; 4673 } 4674 4675 /* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is 4676 * known to contain a variable offset. 4677 * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively 4678 * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the 4679 * dynamic range is potentially written to. 4680 * 4681 * 'off' includes 'regno->off'. 4682 * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to 4683 * the stack. 4684 * 4685 * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know 4686 * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for 4687 * future reads cannot be terminated by this write. 4688 * 4689 * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered 4690 * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets 4691 * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to 4692 * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets. 4693 */ 4694 static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4695 /* func where register points to */ 4696 struct bpf_func_state *state, 4697 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 4698 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 4699 { 4700 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 4701 int min_off, max_off; 4702 int i, err; 4703 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL; 4704 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 4705 bool writing_zero = false; 4706 /* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any 4707 * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO 4708 */ 4709 bool zero_used = false; 4710 4711 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 4712 ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno]; 4713 min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off; 4714 max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size; 4715 if (value_regno >= 0) 4716 value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 4717 if ((value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg)) || 4718 (!value_reg && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm == 0)) 4719 writing_zero = true; 4720 4721 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 4722 int spi; 4723 4724 spi = __get_spi(i); 4725 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 4726 if (err) 4727 return err; 4728 } 4729 4730 /* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */ 4731 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 4732 u8 new_type, *stype; 4733 int slot, spi; 4734 4735 slot = -i - 1; 4736 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 4737 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 4738 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 4739 4740 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && *stype != STACK_MISC && *stype != STACK_ZERO) { 4741 /* Reject the write if range we may write to has not 4742 * been initialized beforehand. If we didn't reject 4743 * here, the ptr status would be erased below (even 4744 * though not all slots are actually overwritten), 4745 * possibly opening the door to leaks. 4746 * 4747 * We do however catch STACK_INVALID case below, and 4748 * only allow reading possibly uninitialized memory 4749 * later for CAP_PERFMON, as the write may not happen to 4750 * that slot. 4751 */ 4752 verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d", 4753 insn_idx, i); 4754 return -EINVAL; 4755 } 4756 4757 /* Erase all spilled pointers. */ 4758 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 4759 4760 /* Update the slot type. */ 4761 new_type = STACK_MISC; 4762 if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) { 4763 new_type = STACK_ZERO; 4764 zero_used = true; 4765 } 4766 /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to 4767 * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot 4768 * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as 4769 * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory. 4770 * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots 4771 * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject 4772 * them, the error would be too confusing. 4773 */ 4774 if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) { 4775 verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d", 4776 insn_idx, i); 4777 return -EINVAL; 4778 } 4779 *stype = new_type; 4780 } 4781 if (zero_used) { 4782 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 4783 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 4784 if (err) 4785 return err; 4786 } 4787 return 0; 4788 } 4789 4790 /* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off, 4791 * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the 4792 * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then 4793 * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be 4794 * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must 4795 * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as 4796 * read. 4797 */ 4798 static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4799 /* func where src register points to */ 4800 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state, 4801 int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno) 4802 { 4803 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 4804 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 4805 int i, slot, spi; 4806 u8 *stype; 4807 int zeros = 0; 4808 4809 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 4810 slot = -i - 1; 4811 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 4812 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 4813 stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 4814 if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO) 4815 break; 4816 zeros++; 4817 } 4818 if (zeros == max_off - min_off) { 4819 /* any access_size read into register is zero extended, 4820 * so the whole register == const_zero 4821 */ 4822 __mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[dst_regno]); 4823 /* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet, 4824 * so mark it precise here, so that later 4825 * backtracking can stop here. 4826 * Backtracking may not need this if this register 4827 * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment. 4828 * Forward propagation of precise flag is not 4829 * necessary either. This mark is only to stop 4830 * backtracking. Any register that contributed 4831 * to const 0 was marked precise before spill. 4832 */ 4833 state->regs[dst_regno].precise = true; 4834 } else { 4835 /* have read misc data from the stack */ 4836 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 4837 } 4838 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 4839 } 4840 4841 /* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by 4842 * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a 4843 * spilled reg. 4844 * 4845 * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a 4846 * register. 4847 * 4848 * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds. 4849 */ 4850 static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4851 /* func where src register points to */ 4852 struct bpf_func_state *reg_state, 4853 int off, int size, int dst_regno) 4854 { 4855 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 4856 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 4857 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 4858 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4859 u8 *stype, type; 4860 4861 stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 4862 reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 4863 4864 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 4865 4866 if (is_spilled_reg(®_state->stack[spi])) { 4867 u8 spill_size = 1; 4868 4869 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; i > 0 && stype[i - 1] == STACK_SPILL; i--) 4870 spill_size++; 4871 4872 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE || spill_size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 4873 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 4874 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 4875 verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n"); 4876 return -EACCES; 4877 } 4878 4879 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 4880 if (dst_regno < 0) 4881 return 0; 4882 4883 if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == spill_size) { 4884 /* The earlier check_reg_arg() has decided the 4885 * subreg_def for this insn. Save it first. 4886 */ 4887 s32 subreg_def = state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def; 4888 4889 copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg); 4890 state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def = subreg_def; 4891 } else { 4892 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 4893 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 4894 if (type == STACK_SPILL) 4895 continue; 4896 if (type == STACK_MISC) 4897 continue; 4898 if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack) 4899 continue; 4900 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 4901 off, i, size); 4902 return -EACCES; 4903 } 4904 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 4905 } 4906 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 4907 return 0; 4908 } 4909 4910 if (dst_regno >= 0) { 4911 /* restore register state from stack */ 4912 copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg); 4913 /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely 4914 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited() 4915 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions 4916 */ 4917 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 4918 } else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) { 4919 /* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether 4920 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE 4921 * (e.g. for XADD). 4922 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that 4923 * with spilled pointers. 4924 */ 4925 verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n", 4926 off); 4927 return -EACCES; 4928 } 4929 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 4930 } else { 4931 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 4932 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 4933 if (type == STACK_MISC) 4934 continue; 4935 if (type == STACK_ZERO) 4936 continue; 4937 if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack) 4938 continue; 4939 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 4940 off, i, size); 4941 return -EACCES; 4942 } 4943 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 4944 if (dst_regno >= 0) 4945 mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno); 4946 } 4947 return 0; 4948 } 4949 4950 enum bpf_access_src { 4951 ACCESS_DIRECT = 1, /* the access is performed by an instruction */ 4952 ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */ 4953 }; 4954 4955 static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4956 int regno, int off, int access_size, 4957 bool zero_size_allowed, 4958 enum bpf_access_src type, 4959 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta); 4960 4961 static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4962 { 4963 return cur_regs(env) + regno; 4964 } 4965 4966 /* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register 4967 * 'dst_regno'. 4968 * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'), 4969 * but not its variable offset. 4970 * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned. 4971 * 4972 * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with 4973 * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when 4974 * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing 4975 * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable 4976 * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used 4977 * instead. 4978 */ 4979 static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4980 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno) 4981 { 4982 /* The state of the source register. */ 4983 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 4984 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg); 4985 int err; 4986 int min_off, max_off; 4987 4988 /* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted. 4989 */ 4990 err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 4991 false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL); 4992 if (err) 4993 return err; 4994 4995 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 4996 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 4997 mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno); 4998 return 0; 4999 } 5000 5001 /* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or 5002 * check_stack_read_var_off. 5003 * 5004 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack 5005 * bounds. 5006 * 5007 * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It 5008 * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register. 5009 */ 5010 static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5011 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 5012 int dst_regno) 5013 { 5014 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 5015 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 5016 int err; 5017 /* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */ 5018 bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 5019 5020 /* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a 5021 * register, in order to not leak pointers (see 5022 * check_stack_read_fixed_off). 5023 */ 5024 if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) { 5025 char tn_buf[48]; 5026 5027 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5028 verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n", 5029 tn_buf, off, size); 5030 return -EACCES; 5031 } 5032 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity 5033 * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack 5034 * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). The check in 5035 * check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic() called by 5036 * adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() prevents users from creating stack pointers 5037 * with variable offsets, therefore no check is required here. Further, 5038 * just checking it here would be insufficient as speculative stack 5039 * writes could still lead to unsafe speculative behaviour. 5040 */ 5041 if (!var_off) { 5042 off += reg->var_off.value; 5043 err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 5044 dst_regno); 5045 } else { 5046 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 5047 * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this 5048 * branch. 5049 */ 5050 err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 5051 dst_regno); 5052 } 5053 return err; 5054 } 5055 5056 5057 /* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or 5058 * check_stack_write_var_off. 5059 * 5060 * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack. 5061 * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any). 5062 * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can 5063 * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register. 5064 * 5065 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size. 5066 */ 5067 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5068 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 5069 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 5070 { 5071 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 5072 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 5073 int err; 5074 5075 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5076 off += reg->var_off.value; 5077 err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 5078 value_regno, insn_idx); 5079 } else { 5080 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 5081 * than fixed offset ones. 5082 */ 5083 err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state, 5084 ptr_regno, off, size, 5085 value_regno, insn_idx); 5086 } 5087 return err; 5088 } 5089 5090 static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5091 int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type) 5092 { 5093 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 5094 struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr; 5095 u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map); 5096 5097 if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) { 5098 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5099 map->value_size, off, size); 5100 return -EACCES; 5101 } 5102 5103 if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) { 5104 verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5105 map->value_size, off, size); 5106 return -EACCES; 5107 } 5108 5109 return 0; 5110 } 5111 5112 /* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */ 5113 static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 5114 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 5115 bool zero_size_allowed) 5116 { 5117 bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed); 5118 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 5119 5120 if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size) 5121 return 0; 5122 5123 reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 5124 switch (reg->type) { 5125 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 5126 verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5127 mem_size, off, size); 5128 break; 5129 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 5130 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5131 mem_size, off, size); 5132 break; 5133 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 5134 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 5135 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 5136 verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", 5137 off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size); 5138 break; 5139 case PTR_TO_MEM: 5140 default: 5141 verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n", 5142 mem_size, off, size); 5143 } 5144 5145 return -EACCES; 5146 } 5147 5148 /* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */ 5149 static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5150 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 5151 bool zero_size_allowed) 5152 { 5153 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 5154 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 5155 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 5156 int err; 5157 5158 /* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we 5159 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off 5160 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. 5161 * 5162 * The minimum value is only important with signed 5163 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a 5164 * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our 5165 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use 5166 * will have a set floor within our range. 5167 */ 5168 if (reg->smin_value < 0 && 5169 (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN || 5170 (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) || 5171 reg->smin_value + off < 0)) { 5172 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 5173 regno); 5174 return -EACCES; 5175 } 5176 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size, 5177 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 5178 if (err) { 5179 verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 5180 regno); 5181 return err; 5182 } 5183 5184 /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be 5185 * sure we won't do bad things. 5186 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too. 5187 */ 5188 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 5189 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access\n", 5190 regno); 5191 return -EACCES; 5192 } 5193 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size, 5194 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 5195 if (err) { 5196 verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 5197 regno); 5198 return err; 5199 } 5200 5201 return 0; 5202 } 5203 5204 static int __check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5205 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 5206 bool fixed_off_ok) 5207 { 5208 /* Access to this pointer-typed register or passing it to a helper 5209 * is only allowed in its original, unmodified form. 5210 */ 5211 5212 if (reg->off < 0) { 5213 verbose(env, "negative offset %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 5214 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 5215 return -EACCES; 5216 } 5217 5218 if (!fixed_off_ok && reg->off) { 5219 verbose(env, "dereference of modified %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 5220 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 5221 return -EACCES; 5222 } 5223 5224 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 5225 char tn_buf[48]; 5226 5227 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5228 verbose(env, "variable %s access var_off=%s disallowed\n", 5229 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), tn_buf); 5230 return -EACCES; 5231 } 5232 5233 return 0; 5234 } 5235 5236 int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5237 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno) 5238 { 5239 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 5240 } 5241 5242 static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5243 struct btf_field *kptr_field, 5244 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno) 5245 { 5246 const char *targ_name = btf_type_name(kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id); 5247 int perm_flags; 5248 const char *reg_name = ""; 5249 5250 if (btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 5251 perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_TRUSTED | MEM_RCU; 5252 5253 /* Only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */ 5254 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 5255 perm_flags |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 5256 } else { 5257 perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_ALLOC; 5258 } 5259 5260 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags)) 5261 goto bad_type; 5262 5263 /* We need to verify reg->type and reg->btf, before accessing reg->btf */ 5264 reg_name = btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 5265 5266 /* For ref_ptr case, release function check should ensure we get one 5267 * referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and that its fixed offset is 0. For the 5268 * normal store of unreferenced kptr, we must ensure var_off is zero. 5269 * Since ref_ptr cannot be accessed directly by BPF insns, checks for 5270 * reg->off and reg->ref_obj_id are not needed here. 5271 */ 5272 if (__check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true)) 5273 return -EACCES; 5274 5275 /* A full type match is needed, as BTF can be vmlinux, module or prog BTF, and 5276 * we also need to take into account the reg->off. 5277 * 5278 * We want to support cases like: 5279 * 5280 * struct foo { 5281 * struct bar br; 5282 * struct baz bz; 5283 * }; 5284 * 5285 * struct foo *v; 5286 * v = func(); // PTR_TO_BTF_ID 5287 * val->foo = v; // reg->off is zero, btf and btf_id match type 5288 * val->bar = &v->br; // reg->off is still zero, but we need to retry with 5289 * // first member type of struct after comparison fails 5290 * val->baz = &v->bz; // reg->off is non-zero, so struct needs to be walked 5291 * // to match type 5292 * 5293 * In the kptr_ref case, check_func_arg_reg_off already ensures reg->off 5294 * is zero. We must also ensure that btf_struct_ids_match does not walk 5295 * the struct to match type against first member of struct, i.e. reject 5296 * second case from above. Hence, when type is BPF_KPTR_REF, we set 5297 * strict mode to true for type match. 5298 */ 5299 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 5300 kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, 5301 kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF)) 5302 goto bad_type; 5303 return 0; 5304 bad_type: 5305 verbose(env, "invalid kptr access, R%d type=%s%s ", regno, 5306 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), reg_name); 5307 verbose(env, "expected=%s%s", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID), targ_name); 5308 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 5309 verbose(env, " or %s%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED), 5310 targ_name); 5311 else 5312 verbose(env, "\n"); 5313 return -EINVAL; 5314 } 5315 5316 /* The non-sleepable programs and sleepable programs with explicit bpf_rcu_read_lock() 5317 * can dereference RCU protected pointers and result is PTR_TRUSTED. 5318 */ 5319 static bool in_rcu_cs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 5320 { 5321 return env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock || 5322 env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr || 5323 !env->prog->aux->sleepable; 5324 } 5325 5326 /* Once GCC supports btf_type_tag the following mechanism will be replaced with tag check */ 5327 BTF_SET_START(rcu_protected_types) 5328 BTF_ID(struct, prog_test_ref_kfunc) 5329 BTF_ID(struct, cgroup) 5330 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_cpumask) 5331 BTF_ID(struct, task_struct) 5332 BTF_SET_END(rcu_protected_types) 5333 5334 static bool rcu_protected_object(const struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id) 5335 { 5336 if (!btf_is_kernel(btf)) 5337 return false; 5338 return btf_id_set_contains(&rcu_protected_types, btf_id); 5339 } 5340 5341 static bool rcu_safe_kptr(const struct btf_field *field) 5342 { 5343 const struct btf_field_kptr *kptr = &field->kptr; 5344 5345 return field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF && rcu_protected_object(kptr->btf, kptr->btf_id); 5346 } 5347 5348 static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5349 int value_regno, int insn_idx, 5350 struct btf_field *kptr_field) 5351 { 5352 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 5353 int class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 5354 struct bpf_reg_state *val_reg; 5355 5356 /* Things we already checked for in check_map_access and caller: 5357 * - Reject cases where variable offset may touch kptr 5358 * - size of access (must be BPF_DW) 5359 * - tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) 5360 * - kptr_field->offset == off + reg->var_off.value 5361 */ 5362 /* Only BPF_[LDX,STX,ST] | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW is supported */ 5363 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { 5364 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_MEM instruction mode\n"); 5365 return -EACCES; 5366 } 5367 5368 /* We only allow loading referenced kptr, since it will be marked as 5369 * untrusted, similar to unreferenced kptr. 5370 */ 5371 if (class != BPF_LDX && kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF) { 5372 verbose(env, "store to referenced kptr disallowed\n"); 5373 return -EACCES; 5374 } 5375 5376 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 5377 val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); 5378 /* We can simply mark the value_regno receiving the pointer 5379 * value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type. 5380 */ 5381 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, kptr_field->kptr.btf, 5382 kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, 5383 rcu_safe_kptr(kptr_field) && in_rcu_cs(env) ? 5384 PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU : 5385 PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED); 5386 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 5387 val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); 5388 if (!register_is_null(val_reg) && 5389 map_kptr_match_type(env, kptr_field, val_reg, value_regno)) 5390 return -EACCES; 5391 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 5392 if (insn->imm) { 5393 verbose(env, "BPF_ST imm must be 0 when storing to kptr at off=%u\n", 5394 kptr_field->offset); 5395 return -EACCES; 5396 } 5397 } else { 5398 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_LDX/BPF_STX/BPF_ST\n"); 5399 return -EACCES; 5400 } 5401 return 0; 5402 } 5403 5404 /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */ 5405 static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5406 int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed, 5407 enum bpf_access_src src) 5408 { 5409 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 5410 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 5411 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 5412 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 5413 struct btf_record *rec; 5414 int err, i; 5415 5416 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, map->value_size, 5417 zero_size_allowed); 5418 if (err) 5419 return err; 5420 5421 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(map->record)) 5422 return 0; 5423 rec = map->record; 5424 for (i = 0; i < rec->cnt; i++) { 5425 struct btf_field *field = &rec->fields[i]; 5426 u32 p = field->offset; 5427 5428 /* If any part of a field can be touched by load/store, reject 5429 * this program. To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2), 5430 * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2. 5431 */ 5432 if (reg->smin_value + off < p + btf_field_type_size(field->type) && 5433 p < reg->umax_value + off + size) { 5434 switch (field->type) { 5435 case BPF_KPTR_UNREF: 5436 case BPF_KPTR_REF: 5437 if (src != ACCESS_DIRECT) { 5438 verbose(env, "kptr cannot be accessed indirectly by helper\n"); 5439 return -EACCES; 5440 } 5441 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5442 verbose(env, "kptr access cannot have variable offset\n"); 5443 return -EACCES; 5444 } 5445 if (p != off + reg->var_off.value) { 5446 verbose(env, "kptr access misaligned expected=%u off=%llu\n", 5447 p, off + reg->var_off.value); 5448 return -EACCES; 5449 } 5450 if (size != bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_DW)) { 5451 verbose(env, "kptr access size must be BPF_DW\n"); 5452 return -EACCES; 5453 } 5454 break; 5455 default: 5456 verbose(env, "%s cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n", 5457 btf_field_type_name(field->type)); 5458 return -EACCES; 5459 } 5460 } 5461 } 5462 return 0; 5463 } 5464 5465 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff 5466 5467 static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5468 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 5469 enum bpf_access_type t) 5470 { 5471 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 5472 5473 switch (prog_type) { 5474 /* Program types only with direct read access go here! */ 5475 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN: 5476 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT: 5477 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL: 5478 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 5479 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 5480 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 5481 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 5482 return false; 5483 fallthrough; 5484 5485 /* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */ 5486 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 5487 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 5488 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 5489 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT: 5490 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB: 5491 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG: 5492 if (meta) 5493 return meta->pkt_access; 5494 5495 env->seen_direct_write = true; 5496 return true; 5497 5498 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 5499 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 5500 env->seen_direct_write = true; 5501 5502 return true; 5503 5504 default: 5505 return false; 5506 } 5507 } 5508 5509 static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, 5510 int size, bool zero_size_allowed) 5511 { 5512 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 5513 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 5514 int err; 5515 5516 /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any 5517 * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed 5518 * offset. 5519 */ 5520 5521 /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough 5522 * detail to prove they're safe. 5523 */ 5524 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 5525 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 5526 regno); 5527 return -EACCES; 5528 } 5529 5530 err = reg->range < 0 ? -EINVAL : 5531 __check_mem_access(env, regno, off, size, reg->range, 5532 zero_size_allowed); 5533 if (err) { 5534 verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno); 5535 return err; 5536 } 5537 5538 /* __check_mem_access has made sure "off + size - 1" is within u16. 5539 * reg->umax_value can't be bigger than MAX_PACKET_OFF which is 0xffff, 5540 * otherwise find_good_pkt_pointers would have refused to set range info 5541 * that __check_mem_access would have rejected this pkt access. 5542 * Therefore, "off + reg->umax_value + size - 1" won't overflow u32. 5543 */ 5544 env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = 5545 max_t(u32, env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset, 5546 off + reg->umax_value + size - 1); 5547 5548 return err; 5549 } 5550 5551 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */ 5552 static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size, 5553 enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, 5554 struct btf **btf, u32 *btf_id) 5555 { 5556 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = { 5557 .reg_type = *reg_type, 5558 .log = &env->log, 5559 }; 5560 5561 if (env->ops->is_valid_access && 5562 env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, &info)) { 5563 /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a 5564 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole 5565 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower 5566 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size 5567 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other 5568 * type of narrower access. 5569 */ 5570 *reg_type = info.reg_type; 5571 5572 if (base_type(*reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 5573 *btf = info.btf; 5574 *btf_id = info.btf_id; 5575 } else { 5576 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size; 5577 } 5578 /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ 5579 if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) 5580 env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size; 5581 return 0; 5582 } 5583 5584 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); 5585 return -EACCES; 5586 } 5587 5588 static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, 5589 int size) 5590 { 5591 if (size < 0 || off < 0 || 5592 (u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) { 5593 verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n", 5594 off, size); 5595 return -EACCES; 5596 } 5597 return 0; 5598 } 5599 5600 static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, 5601 u32 regno, int off, int size, 5602 enum bpf_access_type t) 5603 { 5604 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 5605 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 5606 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {}; 5607 bool valid; 5608 5609 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 5610 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 5611 regno); 5612 return -EACCES; 5613 } 5614 5615 switch (reg->type) { 5616 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 5617 valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 5618 break; 5619 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 5620 valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 5621 break; 5622 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 5623 valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 5624 break; 5625 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 5626 valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 5627 break; 5628 default: 5629 valid = false; 5630 } 5631 5632 5633 if (valid) { 5634 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = 5635 info.ctx_field_size; 5636 return 0; 5637 } 5638 5639 verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n", 5640 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type), off, size); 5641 5642 return -EACCES; 5643 } 5644 5645 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5646 { 5647 return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno)); 5648 } 5649 5650 static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5651 { 5652 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5653 5654 return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX; 5655 } 5656 5657 static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5658 { 5659 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5660 5661 return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type); 5662 } 5663 5664 static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5665 { 5666 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5667 5668 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 5669 } 5670 5671 static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5672 { 5673 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5674 5675 /* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */ 5676 return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS; 5677 } 5678 5679 static u32 *reg2btf_ids[__BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX] = { 5680 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 5681 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK], 5682 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 5683 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_TCP], 5684 #endif 5685 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = btf_bpf_map_id, 5686 }; 5687 5688 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 5689 { 5690 /* A referenced register is always trusted. */ 5691 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 5692 return true; 5693 5694 /* Types listed in the reg2btf_ids are always trusted */ 5695 if (reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)] && 5696 !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type)) 5697 return true; 5698 5699 /* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the 5700 * MEM_ALLOC or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the 5701 * other type modifiers may be safe, but we elect to take an opt-in 5702 * approach here as some (e.g. PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_MAYBE_NULL) are 5703 * not. 5704 * 5705 * Eventually, we should make PTR_TRUSTED the single source of truth 5706 * for whether a register is trusted. 5707 */ 5708 return type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS && 5709 !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type); 5710 } 5711 5712 static bool is_rcu_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 5713 { 5714 return reg->type & MEM_RCU; 5715 } 5716 5717 static void clear_trusted_flags(enum bpf_type_flag *flag) 5718 { 5719 *flag &= ~(BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS | MEM_RCU); 5720 } 5721 5722 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5723 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5724 int off, int size, bool strict) 5725 { 5726 struct tnum reg_off; 5727 int ip_align; 5728 5729 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 5730 if (!strict || size == 1) 5731 return 0; 5732 5733 /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling 5734 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of 5735 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms 5736 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get 5737 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate 5738 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an 5739 * unconditional IP align value of '2'. 5740 */ 5741 ip_align = 2; 5742 5743 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off)); 5744 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 5745 char tn_buf[48]; 5746 5747 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5748 verbose(env, 5749 "misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n", 5750 ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 5751 return -EACCES; 5752 } 5753 5754 return 0; 5755 } 5756 5757 static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5758 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5759 const char *pointer_desc, 5760 int off, int size, bool strict) 5761 { 5762 struct tnum reg_off; 5763 5764 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 5765 if (!strict || size == 1) 5766 return 0; 5767 5768 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off)); 5769 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 5770 char tn_buf[48]; 5771 5772 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5773 verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n", 5774 pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 5775 return -EACCES; 5776 } 5777 5778 return 0; 5779 } 5780 5781 static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5782 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, 5783 int size, bool strict_alignment_once) 5784 { 5785 bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once; 5786 const char *pointer_desc = ""; 5787 5788 switch (reg->type) { 5789 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 5790 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 5791 /* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits 5792 * right in front, treat it the very same way. 5793 */ 5794 return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict); 5795 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 5796 pointer_desc = "flow keys "; 5797 break; 5798 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 5799 pointer_desc = "key "; 5800 break; 5801 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 5802 pointer_desc = "value "; 5803 break; 5804 case PTR_TO_CTX: 5805 pointer_desc = "context "; 5806 break; 5807 case PTR_TO_STACK: 5808 pointer_desc = "stack "; 5809 /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off() 5810 * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being 5811 * aligned. 5812 */ 5813 strict = true; 5814 break; 5815 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 5816 pointer_desc = "sock "; 5817 break; 5818 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 5819 pointer_desc = "sock_common "; 5820 break; 5821 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 5822 pointer_desc = "tcp_sock "; 5823 break; 5824 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 5825 pointer_desc = "xdp_sock "; 5826 break; 5827 default: 5828 break; 5829 } 5830 return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size, 5831 strict); 5832 } 5833 5834 /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function 5835 * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call. 5836 * Ignore jump and exit insns. 5837 * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm 5838 * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites 5839 */ 5840 static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 5841 { 5842 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 5843 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 5844 int depth = 0, frame = 0, i, subprog_end; 5845 bool tail_call_reachable = false; 5846 int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 5847 int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 5848 int j; 5849 5850 i = subprog[idx].start; 5851 process_func: 5852 /* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when 5853 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack 5854 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario 5855 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = 5856 * 8k). 5857 * 5858 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example: 5859 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128 5860 * subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256 5861 * tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256 5862 * func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320) 5863 * subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64 5864 * subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128 5865 * tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128 5866 * func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416) 5867 * 5868 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid 5869 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above. 5870 */ 5871 if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) { 5872 verbose(env, 5873 "tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n", 5874 depth); 5875 return -EACCES; 5876 } 5877 /* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity 5878 * of interpreter stack size 5879 */ 5880 depth += round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 5881 if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) { 5882 verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n", 5883 frame + 1, depth); 5884 return -EACCES; 5885 } 5886 continue_func: 5887 subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start; 5888 for (; i < subprog_end; i++) { 5889 int next_insn, sidx; 5890 5891 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i)) 5892 continue; 5893 /* remember insn and function to return to */ 5894 ret_insn[frame] = i + 1; 5895 ret_prog[frame] = idx; 5896 5897 /* find the callee */ 5898 next_insn = i + insn[i].imm + 1; 5899 sidx = find_subprog(env, next_insn); 5900 if (sidx < 0) { 5901 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 5902 next_insn); 5903 return -EFAULT; 5904 } 5905 if (subprog[sidx].is_async_cb) { 5906 if (subprog[sidx].has_tail_call) { 5907 verbose(env, "verifier bug. subprog has tail_call and async cb\n"); 5908 return -EFAULT; 5909 } 5910 /* async callbacks don't increase bpf prog stack size unless called directly */ 5911 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i)) 5912 continue; 5913 } 5914 i = next_insn; 5915 idx = sidx; 5916 5917 if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) 5918 tail_call_reachable = true; 5919 5920 frame++; 5921 if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 5922 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n", 5923 frame); 5924 return -E2BIG; 5925 } 5926 goto process_func; 5927 } 5928 /* if tail call got detected across bpf2bpf calls then mark each of the 5929 * currently present subprog frames as tail call reachable subprogs; 5930 * this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the 5931 * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls 5932 */ 5933 if (tail_call_reachable) 5934 for (j = 0; j < frame; j++) 5935 subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true; 5936 if (subprog[0].tail_call_reachable) 5937 env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true; 5938 5939 /* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog' 5940 * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT 5941 */ 5942 if (frame == 0) 5943 return 0; 5944 depth -= round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 5945 frame--; 5946 i = ret_insn[frame]; 5947 idx = ret_prog[frame]; 5948 goto continue_func; 5949 } 5950 5951 static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 5952 { 5953 struct bpf_subprog_info *si = env->subprog_info; 5954 int ret; 5955 5956 for (int i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 5957 if (!i || si[i].is_async_cb) { 5958 ret = check_max_stack_depth_subprog(env, i); 5959 if (ret < 0) 5960 return ret; 5961 } 5962 continue; 5963 } 5964 return 0; 5965 } 5966 5967 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 5968 static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5969 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx) 5970 { 5971 int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog; 5972 5973 subprog = find_subprog(env, start); 5974 if (subprog < 0) { 5975 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 5976 start); 5977 return -EFAULT; 5978 } 5979 return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth; 5980 } 5981 #endif 5982 5983 static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5984 const char *buf_info, 5985 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5986 int regno, int off, int size) 5987 { 5988 if (off < 0) { 5989 verbose(env, 5990 "R%d invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n", 5991 regno, buf_info, off, size); 5992 return -EACCES; 5993 } 5994 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 5995 char tn_buf[48]; 5996 5997 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5998 verbose(env, 5999 "R%d invalid variable buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 6000 regno, off, tn_buf); 6001 return -EACCES; 6002 } 6003 6004 return 0; 6005 } 6006 6007 static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6008 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6009 int regno, int off, int size) 6010 { 6011 int err; 6012 6013 err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, regno, off, size); 6014 if (err) 6015 return err; 6016 6017 if (off + size > env->prog->aux->max_tp_access) 6018 env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = off + size; 6019 6020 return 0; 6021 } 6022 6023 static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6024 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6025 int regno, int off, int size, 6026 bool zero_size_allowed, 6027 u32 *max_access) 6028 { 6029 const char *buf_info = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type) ? "rdonly" : "rdwr"; 6030 int err; 6031 6032 err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, regno, off, size); 6033 if (err) 6034 return err; 6035 6036 if (off + size > *max_access) 6037 *max_access = off + size; 6038 6039 return 0; 6040 } 6041 6042 /* BPF architecture zero extends alu32 ops into 64-bit registesr */ 6043 static void zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 6044 { 6045 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 6046 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 6047 } 6048 6049 /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes) 6050 * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE 6051 */ 6052 static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6053 { 6054 u64 mask; 6055 6056 /* clear high bits in bit representation */ 6057 reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size); 6058 6059 /* fix arithmetic bounds */ 6060 mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1; 6061 if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) { 6062 reg->umin_value &= mask; 6063 reg->umax_value &= mask; 6064 } else { 6065 reg->umin_value = 0; 6066 reg->umax_value = mask; 6067 } 6068 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 6069 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 6070 6071 /* If size is smaller than 32bit register the 32bit register 6072 * values are also truncated so we push 64-bit bounds into 6073 * 32-bit bounds. Above were truncated < 32-bits already. 6074 */ 6075 if (size >= 4) 6076 return; 6077 __reg_combine_64_into_32(reg); 6078 } 6079 6080 static void set_sext64_default_val(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6081 { 6082 if (size == 1) { 6083 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S8_MIN; 6084 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S8_MAX; 6085 } else if (size == 2) { 6086 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S16_MIN; 6087 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S16_MAX; 6088 } else { 6089 /* size == 4 */ 6090 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 6091 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 6092 } 6093 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value = 0; 6094 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 6095 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 6096 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; 6097 } 6098 6099 static void coerce_reg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6100 { 6101 s64 init_s64_max, init_s64_min, s64_max, s64_min, u64_cval; 6102 u64 top_smax_value, top_smin_value; 6103 u64 num_bits = size * 8; 6104 6105 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6106 u64_cval = reg->var_off.value; 6107 if (size == 1) 6108 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s8)u64_cval); 6109 else if (size == 2) 6110 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s16)u64_cval); 6111 else 6112 /* size == 4 */ 6113 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s32)u64_cval); 6114 6115 u64_cval = reg->var_off.value; 6116 reg->smax_value = reg->smin_value = u64_cval; 6117 reg->umax_value = reg->umin_value = u64_cval; 6118 reg->s32_max_value = reg->s32_min_value = u64_cval; 6119 reg->u32_max_value = reg->u32_min_value = u64_cval; 6120 return; 6121 } 6122 6123 top_smax_value = ((u64)reg->smax_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6124 top_smin_value = ((u64)reg->smin_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6125 6126 if (top_smax_value != top_smin_value) 6127 goto out; 6128 6129 /* find the s64_min and s64_min after sign extension */ 6130 if (size == 1) { 6131 init_s64_max = (s8)reg->smax_value; 6132 init_s64_min = (s8)reg->smin_value; 6133 } else if (size == 2) { 6134 init_s64_max = (s16)reg->smax_value; 6135 init_s64_min = (s16)reg->smin_value; 6136 } else { 6137 init_s64_max = (s32)reg->smax_value; 6138 init_s64_min = (s32)reg->smin_value; 6139 } 6140 6141 s64_max = max(init_s64_max, init_s64_min); 6142 s64_min = min(init_s64_max, init_s64_min); 6143 6144 /* both of s64_max/s64_min positive or negative */ 6145 if ((s64_max >= 0) == (s64_min >= 0)) { 6146 reg->s32_min_value = reg->smin_value = s64_min; 6147 reg->s32_max_value = reg->smax_value = s64_max; 6148 reg->u32_min_value = reg->umin_value = s64_min; 6149 reg->u32_max_value = reg->umax_value = s64_max; 6150 reg->var_off = tnum_range(s64_min, s64_max); 6151 return; 6152 } 6153 6154 out: 6155 set_sext64_default_val(reg, size); 6156 } 6157 6158 static void set_sext32_default_val(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6159 { 6160 if (size == 1) { 6161 reg->s32_min_value = S8_MIN; 6162 reg->s32_max_value = S8_MAX; 6163 } else { 6164 /* size == 2 */ 6165 reg->s32_min_value = S16_MIN; 6166 reg->s32_max_value = S16_MAX; 6167 } 6168 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 6169 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 6170 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_unknown); 6171 } 6172 6173 static void coerce_subreg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6174 { 6175 s32 init_s32_max, init_s32_min, s32_max, s32_min, u32_val; 6176 u32 top_smax_value, top_smin_value; 6177 u32 num_bits = size * 8; 6178 6179 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6180 u32_val = reg->var_off.value; 6181 if (size == 1) 6182 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s8)u32_val); 6183 else 6184 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s16)u32_val); 6185 6186 u32_val = reg->var_off.value; 6187 reg->s32_min_value = reg->s32_max_value = u32_val; 6188 reg->u32_min_value = reg->u32_max_value = u32_val; 6189 return; 6190 } 6191 6192 top_smax_value = ((u32)reg->s32_max_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6193 top_smin_value = ((u32)reg->s32_min_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6194 6195 if (top_smax_value != top_smin_value) 6196 goto out; 6197 6198 /* find the s32_min and s32_min after sign extension */ 6199 if (size == 1) { 6200 init_s32_max = (s8)reg->s32_max_value; 6201 init_s32_min = (s8)reg->s32_min_value; 6202 } else { 6203 /* size == 2 */ 6204 init_s32_max = (s16)reg->s32_max_value; 6205 init_s32_min = (s16)reg->s32_min_value; 6206 } 6207 s32_max = max(init_s32_max, init_s32_min); 6208 s32_min = min(init_s32_max, init_s32_min); 6209 6210 if ((s32_min >= 0) == (s32_max >= 0)) { 6211 reg->s32_min_value = s32_min; 6212 reg->s32_max_value = s32_max; 6213 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)s32_min; 6214 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)s32_max; 6215 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_range(s32_min, s32_max)); 6216 return; 6217 } 6218 6219 out: 6220 set_sext32_default_val(reg, size); 6221 } 6222 6223 static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map) 6224 { 6225 /* A map is considered read-only if the following condition are true: 6226 * 6227 * 1) BPF program side cannot change any of the map content. The 6228 * BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG flag is throughout the lifetime of a map 6229 * and was set at map creation time. 6230 * 2) The map value(s) have been initialized from user space by a 6231 * loader and then "frozen", such that no new map update/delete 6232 * operations from syscall side are possible for the rest of 6233 * the map's lifetime from that point onwards. 6234 * 3) Any parallel/pending map update/delete operations from syscall 6235 * side have been completed. Only after that point, it's safe to 6236 * assume that map value(s) are immutable. 6237 */ 6238 return (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 6239 READ_ONCE(map->frozen) && 6240 !bpf_map_write_active(map); 6241 } 6242 6243 static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val, 6244 bool is_ldsx) 6245 { 6246 void *ptr; 6247 u64 addr; 6248 int err; 6249 6250 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 6251 if (err) 6252 return err; 6253 ptr = (void *)(long)addr + off; 6254 6255 switch (size) { 6256 case sizeof(u8): 6257 *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s8 *)ptr : (u64)*(u8 *)ptr; 6258 break; 6259 case sizeof(u16): 6260 *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s16 *)ptr : (u64)*(u16 *)ptr; 6261 break; 6262 case sizeof(u32): 6263 *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s32 *)ptr : (u64)*(u32 *)ptr; 6264 break; 6265 case sizeof(u64): 6266 *val = *(u64 *)ptr; 6267 break; 6268 default: 6269 return -EINVAL; 6270 } 6271 return 0; 6272 } 6273 6274 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu) 6275 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu_or_null) 6276 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted) 6277 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted_or_null) 6278 6279 /* 6280 * Allow list few fields as RCU trusted or full trusted. 6281 * This logic doesn't allow mix tagging and will be removed once GCC supports 6282 * btf_type_tag. 6283 */ 6284 6285 /* RCU trusted: these fields are trusted in RCU CS and never NULL */ 6286 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct) { 6287 const cpumask_t *cpus_ptr; 6288 struct css_set __rcu *cgroups; 6289 struct task_struct __rcu *real_parent; 6290 struct task_struct *group_leader; 6291 }; 6292 6293 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup) { 6294 /* cgrp->kn is always accessible as documented in kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c */ 6295 struct kernfs_node *kn; 6296 }; 6297 6298 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set) { 6299 struct cgroup *dfl_cgrp; 6300 }; 6301 6302 /* RCU trusted: these fields are trusted in RCU CS and can be NULL */ 6303 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct mm_struct) { 6304 struct file __rcu *exe_file; 6305 }; 6306 6307 /* skb->sk, req->sk are not RCU protected, but we mark them as such 6308 * because bpf prog accessible sockets are SOCK_RCU_FREE. 6309 */ 6310 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct sk_buff) { 6311 struct sock *sk; 6312 }; 6313 6314 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct request_sock) { 6315 struct sock *sk; 6316 }; 6317 6318 /* full trusted: these fields are trusted even outside of RCU CS and never NULL */ 6319 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta) { 6320 struct seq_file *seq; 6321 }; 6322 6323 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task) { 6324 struct bpf_iter_meta *meta; 6325 struct task_struct *task; 6326 }; 6327 6328 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm) { 6329 struct file *file; 6330 }; 6331 6332 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file) { 6333 struct inode *f_inode; 6334 }; 6335 6336 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry) { 6337 /* no negative dentry-s in places where bpf can see it */ 6338 struct inode *d_inode; 6339 }; 6340 6341 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket) { 6342 struct sock *sk; 6343 }; 6344 6345 static bool type_is_rcu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6346 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6347 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 6348 { 6349 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct)); 6350 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup)); 6351 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set)); 6352 6353 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_rcu"); 6354 } 6355 6356 static bool type_is_rcu_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6357 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6358 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 6359 { 6360 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct mm_struct)); 6361 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct sk_buff)); 6362 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct request_sock)); 6363 6364 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_rcu_or_null"); 6365 } 6366 6367 static bool type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6368 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6369 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 6370 { 6371 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta)); 6372 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task)); 6373 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm)); 6374 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file)); 6375 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry)); 6376 6377 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_trusted"); 6378 } 6379 6380 static bool type_is_trusted_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6381 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6382 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 6383 { 6384 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket)); 6385 6386 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, 6387 "__safe_trusted_or_null"); 6388 } 6389 6390 static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6391 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 6392 int regno, int off, int size, 6393 enum bpf_access_type atype, 6394 int value_regno) 6395 { 6396 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 6397 const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 6398 const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off); 6399 const char *field_name = NULL; 6400 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 6401 u32 btf_id = 0; 6402 int ret; 6403 6404 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 6405 verbose(env, 6406 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 6407 tname); 6408 return -EPERM; 6409 } 6410 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 6411 verbose(env, 6412 "Cannot access kernel 'struct %s' from non-GPL compatible program\n", 6413 tname); 6414 return -EINVAL; 6415 } 6416 if (off < 0) { 6417 verbose(env, 6418 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 6419 regno, tname, off); 6420 return -EACCES; 6421 } 6422 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 6423 char tn_buf[48]; 6424 6425 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 6426 verbose(env, 6427 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 6428 regno, tname, off, tn_buf); 6429 return -EACCES; 6430 } 6431 6432 if (reg->type & MEM_USER) { 6433 verbose(env, 6434 "R%d is ptr_%s access user memory: off=%d\n", 6435 regno, tname, off); 6436 return -EACCES; 6437 } 6438 6439 if (reg->type & MEM_PERCPU) { 6440 verbose(env, 6441 "R%d is ptr_%s access percpu memory: off=%d\n", 6442 regno, tname, off); 6443 return -EACCES; 6444 } 6445 6446 if (env->ops->btf_struct_access && !type_is_alloc(reg->type) && atype == BPF_WRITE) { 6447 if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 6448 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: reg->btf must be kernel btf\n"); 6449 return -EFAULT; 6450 } 6451 ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size); 6452 } else { 6453 /* Writes are permitted with default btf_struct_access for 6454 * program allocated objects (which always have ref_obj_id > 0), 6455 * but not for untrusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC. 6456 */ 6457 if (atype != BPF_READ && !type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 6458 verbose(env, "only read is supported\n"); 6459 return -EACCES; 6460 } 6461 6462 if (type_is_alloc(reg->type) && !type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) && 6463 !reg->ref_obj_id) { 6464 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id for allocated object must be non-zero\n"); 6465 return -EFAULT; 6466 } 6467 6468 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, &field_name); 6469 } 6470 6471 if (ret < 0) 6472 return ret; 6473 6474 if (ret != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 6475 /* just mark; */ 6476 6477 } else if (type_flag(reg->type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED) { 6478 /* If this is an untrusted pointer, all pointers formed by walking it 6479 * also inherit the untrusted flag. 6480 */ 6481 flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED; 6482 6483 } else if (is_trusted_reg(reg) || is_rcu_reg(reg)) { 6484 /* By default any pointer obtained from walking a trusted pointer is no 6485 * longer trusted, unless the field being accessed has explicitly been 6486 * marked as inheriting its parent's state of trust (either full or RCU). 6487 * For example: 6488 * 'cgroups' pointer is untrusted if task->cgroups dereference 6489 * happened in a sleepable program outside of bpf_rcu_read_lock() 6490 * section. In a non-sleepable program it's trusted while in RCU CS (aka MEM_RCU). 6491 * Note bpf_rcu_read_unlock() converts MEM_RCU pointers to PTR_UNTRUSTED. 6492 * 6493 * A regular RCU-protected pointer with __rcu tag can also be deemed 6494 * trusted if we are in an RCU CS. Such pointer can be NULL. 6495 */ 6496 if (type_is_trusted(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 6497 flag |= PTR_TRUSTED; 6498 } else if (type_is_trusted_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 6499 flag |= PTR_TRUSTED | PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 6500 } else if (in_rcu_cs(env) && !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 6501 if (type_is_rcu(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 6502 /* ignore __rcu tag and mark it MEM_RCU */ 6503 flag |= MEM_RCU; 6504 } else if (flag & MEM_RCU || 6505 type_is_rcu_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 6506 /* __rcu tagged pointers can be NULL */ 6507 flag |= MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 6508 6509 /* We always trust them */ 6510 if (type_is_rcu_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id) && 6511 flag & PTR_UNTRUSTED) 6512 flag &= ~PTR_UNTRUSTED; 6513 } else if (flag & (MEM_PERCPU | MEM_USER)) { 6514 /* keep as-is */ 6515 } else { 6516 /* walking unknown pointers yields old deprecated PTR_TO_BTF_ID */ 6517 clear_trusted_flags(&flag); 6518 } 6519 } else { 6520 /* 6521 * If not in RCU CS or MEM_RCU pointer can be NULL then 6522 * aggressively mark as untrusted otherwise such 6523 * pointers will be plain PTR_TO_BTF_ID without flags 6524 * and will be allowed to be passed into helpers for 6525 * compat reasons. 6526 */ 6527 flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED; 6528 } 6529 } else { 6530 /* Old compat. Deprecated */ 6531 clear_trusted_flags(&flag); 6532 } 6533 6534 if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 6535 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag); 6536 6537 return 0; 6538 } 6539 6540 static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6541 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 6542 int regno, int off, int size, 6543 enum bpf_access_type atype, 6544 int value_regno) 6545 { 6546 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 6547 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 6548 struct bpf_reg_state map_reg; 6549 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 6550 const struct btf_type *t; 6551 const char *tname; 6552 u32 btf_id; 6553 int ret; 6554 6555 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 6556 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 6557 return -ENOTSUPP; 6558 } 6559 6560 if (!map->ops->map_btf_id || !*map->ops->map_btf_id) { 6561 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported for map type %d\n", 6562 map->map_type); 6563 return -ENOTSUPP; 6564 } 6565 6566 t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id); 6567 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); 6568 6569 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 6570 verbose(env, 6571 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 6572 tname); 6573 return -EPERM; 6574 } 6575 6576 if (off < 0) { 6577 verbose(env, "R%d is %s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 6578 regno, tname, off); 6579 return -EACCES; 6580 } 6581 6582 if (atype != BPF_READ) { 6583 verbose(env, "only read from %s is supported\n", tname); 6584 return -EACCES; 6585 } 6586 6587 /* Simulate access to a PTR_TO_BTF_ID */ 6588 memset(&map_reg, 0, sizeof(map_reg)); 6589 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, &map_reg, 0, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id, 0); 6590 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, &map_reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, NULL); 6591 if (ret < 0) 6592 return ret; 6593 6594 if (value_regno >= 0) 6595 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id, flag); 6596 6597 return 0; 6598 } 6599 6600 /* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The 6601 * maximum valid offset is -1. 6602 * 6603 * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and 6604 * -state->allocated_stack for reads. 6605 */ 6606 static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6607 s64 off, 6608 struct bpf_func_state *state, 6609 enum bpf_access_type t) 6610 { 6611 int min_valid_off; 6612 6613 if (t == BPF_WRITE || env->allow_uninit_stack) 6614 min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK; 6615 else 6616 min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack; 6617 6618 if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1) 6619 return -EACCES; 6620 return 0; 6621 } 6622 6623 /* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack 6624 * bounds. 6625 * 6626 * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any). 6627 */ 6628 static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( 6629 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6630 int regno, int off, int access_size, 6631 enum bpf_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type) 6632 { 6633 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 6634 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 6635 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 6636 s64 min_off, max_off; 6637 int err; 6638 char *err_extra; 6639 6640 if (src == ACCESS_HELPER) 6641 /* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */ 6642 err_extra = " indirect access to"; 6643 else if (type == BPF_READ) 6644 err_extra = " read from"; 6645 else 6646 err_extra = " write to"; 6647 6648 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6649 min_off = (s64)reg->var_off.value + off; 6650 max_off = min_off + access_size; 6651 } else { 6652 if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || 6653 reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 6654 verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n", 6655 err_extra, regno); 6656 return -EACCES; 6657 } 6658 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 6659 max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size; 6660 } 6661 6662 err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(env, min_off, state, type); 6663 if (!err && max_off > 0) 6664 err = -EINVAL; /* out of stack access into non-negative offsets */ 6665 if (!err && access_size < 0) 6666 /* access_size should not be negative (or overflow an int); others checks 6667 * along the way should have prevented such an access. 6668 */ 6669 err = -EFAULT; /* invalid negative access size; integer overflow? */ 6670 6671 if (err) { 6672 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6673 verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n", 6674 err_extra, regno, off, access_size); 6675 } else { 6676 char tn_buf[48]; 6677 6678 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 6679 verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s size=%d\n", 6680 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, access_size); 6681 } 6682 return err; 6683 } 6684 6685 return grow_stack_state(env, state, round_up(-min_off, BPF_REG_SIZE)); 6686 } 6687 6688 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) 6689 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory 6690 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory 6691 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory 6692 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory 6693 */ 6694 static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, 6695 int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t, 6696 int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once, bool is_ldsx) 6697 { 6698 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 6699 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 6700 int size, err = 0; 6701 6702 size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size); 6703 if (size < 0) 6704 return size; 6705 6706 /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */ 6707 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once); 6708 if (err) 6709 return err; 6710 6711 /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */ 6712 off += reg->off; 6713 6714 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { 6715 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 6716 verbose(env, "write to change key R%d not allowed\n", regno); 6717 return -EACCES; 6718 } 6719 6720 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 6721 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 6722 if (err) 6723 return err; 6724 if (value_regno >= 0) 6725 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6726 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 6727 struct btf_field *kptr_field = NULL; 6728 6729 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 6730 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 6731 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); 6732 return -EACCES; 6733 } 6734 err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t); 6735 if (err) 6736 return err; 6737 err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false, ACCESS_DIRECT); 6738 if (err) 6739 return err; 6740 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 6741 kptr_field = btf_record_find(reg->map_ptr->record, 6742 off + reg->var_off.value, BPF_KPTR); 6743 if (kptr_field) { 6744 err = check_map_kptr_access(env, regno, value_regno, insn_idx, kptr_field); 6745 } else if (t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 6746 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 6747 6748 /* if map is read-only, track its contents as scalars */ 6749 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) && 6750 bpf_map_is_rdonly(map) && 6751 map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 6752 int map_off = off + reg->var_off.value; 6753 u64 val = 0; 6754 6755 err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size, 6756 &val, is_ldsx); 6757 if (err) 6758 return err; 6759 6760 regs[value_regno].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 6761 __mark_reg_known(®s[value_regno], val); 6762 } else { 6763 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6764 } 6765 } 6766 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM) { 6767 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 6768 6769 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 6770 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 6771 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6772 return -EACCES; 6773 } 6774 6775 if (t == BPF_WRITE && rdonly_mem) { 6776 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 6777 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6778 return -EACCES; 6779 } 6780 6781 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 6782 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 6783 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno); 6784 return -EACCES; 6785 } 6786 6787 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 6788 reg->mem_size, false); 6789 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (t == BPF_READ || rdonly_mem)) 6790 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6791 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { 6792 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE; 6793 struct btf *btf = NULL; 6794 u32 btf_id = 0; 6795 6796 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 6797 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 6798 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); 6799 return -EACCES; 6800 } 6801 6802 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno); 6803 if (err < 0) 6804 return err; 6805 6806 err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type, &btf, 6807 &btf_id); 6808 if (err) 6809 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 6810 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 6811 /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a 6812 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter 6813 * case, we know the offset is zero. 6814 */ 6815 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 6816 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6817 } else { 6818 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, 6819 value_regno); 6820 if (type_may_be_null(reg_type)) 6821 regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen; 6822 /* A load of ctx field could have different 6823 * actual load size with the one encoded in the 6824 * insn. When the dst is PTR, it is for sure not 6825 * a sub-register. 6826 */ 6827 regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 6828 if (base_type(reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 6829 regs[value_regno].btf = btf; 6830 regs[value_regno].btf_id = btf_id; 6831 } 6832 } 6833 regs[value_regno].type = reg_type; 6834 } 6835 6836 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 6837 /* Basic bounds checks. */ 6838 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, ACCESS_DIRECT, t); 6839 if (err) 6840 return err; 6841 6842 if (t == BPF_READ) 6843 err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size, 6844 value_regno); 6845 else 6846 err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size, 6847 value_regno, insn_idx); 6848 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) { 6849 if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) { 6850 verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n"); 6851 return -EACCES; 6852 } 6853 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 6854 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 6855 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n", 6856 value_regno); 6857 return -EACCES; 6858 } 6859 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false); 6860 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 6861 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6862 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS) { 6863 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 6864 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 6865 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into flow keys\n", 6866 value_regno); 6867 return -EACCES; 6868 } 6869 6870 err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size); 6871 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 6872 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6873 } else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) { 6874 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 6875 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 6876 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6877 return -EACCES; 6878 } 6879 err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t); 6880 if (!err && value_regno >= 0) 6881 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6882 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER) { 6883 err = check_tp_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size); 6884 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 6885 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6886 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 6887 !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 6888 err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 6889 value_regno); 6890 } else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) { 6891 err = check_ptr_to_map_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 6892 value_regno); 6893 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BUF) { 6894 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 6895 u32 *max_access; 6896 6897 if (rdonly_mem) { 6898 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 6899 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 6900 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6901 return -EACCES; 6902 } 6903 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 6904 } else { 6905 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 6906 } 6907 6908 err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false, 6909 max_access); 6910 6911 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (rdonly_mem || t == BPF_READ)) 6912 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6913 } else { 6914 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 6915 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6916 return -EACCES; 6917 } 6918 6919 if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ && 6920 regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 6921 if (!is_ldsx) 6922 /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */ 6923 coerce_reg_to_size(®s[value_regno], size); 6924 else 6925 coerce_reg_to_size_sx(®s[value_regno], size); 6926 } 6927 return err; 6928 } 6929 6930 static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn) 6931 { 6932 int load_reg; 6933 int err; 6934 6935 switch (insn->imm) { 6936 case BPF_ADD: 6937 case BPF_ADD | BPF_FETCH: 6938 case BPF_AND: 6939 case BPF_AND | BPF_FETCH: 6940 case BPF_OR: 6941 case BPF_OR | BPF_FETCH: 6942 case BPF_XOR: 6943 case BPF_XOR | BPF_FETCH: 6944 case BPF_XCHG: 6945 case BPF_CMPXCHG: 6946 break; 6947 default: 6948 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC uses invalid atomic opcode %02x\n", insn->imm); 6949 return -EINVAL; 6950 } 6951 6952 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 6953 verbose(env, "invalid atomic operand size\n"); 6954 return -EINVAL; 6955 } 6956 6957 /* check src1 operand */ 6958 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 6959 if (err) 6960 return err; 6961 6962 /* check src2 operand */ 6963 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 6964 if (err) 6965 return err; 6966 6967 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) { 6968 /* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */ 6969 const u32 aux_reg = BPF_REG_0; 6970 6971 err = check_reg_arg(env, aux_reg, SRC_OP); 6972 if (err) 6973 return err; 6974 6975 if (is_pointer_value(env, aux_reg)) { 6976 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", aux_reg); 6977 return -EACCES; 6978 } 6979 } 6980 6981 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 6982 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg); 6983 return -EACCES; 6984 } 6985 6986 if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 6987 is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 6988 is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 6989 is_sk_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 6990 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 6991 insn->dst_reg, 6992 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type)); 6993 return -EACCES; 6994 } 6995 6996 if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) { 6997 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 6998 load_reg = BPF_REG_0; 6999 else 7000 load_reg = insn->src_reg; 7001 7002 /* check and record load of old value */ 7003 err = check_reg_arg(env, load_reg, DST_OP); 7004 if (err) 7005 return err; 7006 } else { 7007 /* This instruction accesses a memory location but doesn't 7008 * actually load it into a register. 7009 */ 7010 load_reg = -1; 7011 } 7012 7013 /* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch 7014 * case to simulate the register fill. 7015 */ 7016 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 7017 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true, false); 7018 if (!err && load_reg >= 0) 7019 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 7020 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg, 7021 true, false); 7022 if (err) 7023 return err; 7024 7025 /* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */ 7026 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 7027 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true, false); 7028 if (err) 7029 return err; 7030 7031 return 0; 7032 } 7033 7034 /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through 7035 * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending 7036 * on the access type and privileges, that all elements of the stack are 7037 * initialized. 7038 * 7039 * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any). 7040 * 7041 * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the 7042 * read offsets are marked as read. 7043 */ 7044 static int check_stack_range_initialized( 7045 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off, 7046 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 7047 enum bpf_access_src type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7048 { 7049 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 7050 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 7051 int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi; 7052 char *err_extra = type == ACCESS_HELPER ? " indirect" : ""; 7053 enum bpf_access_type bounds_check_type; 7054 /* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are 7055 * read-only. 7056 */ 7057 bool clobber = false; 7058 7059 if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) { 7060 verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n"); 7061 return -EACCES; 7062 } 7063 7064 if (type == ACCESS_HELPER) { 7065 /* The bounds checks for writes are more permissive than for 7066 * reads. However, if raw_mode is not set, we'll do extra 7067 * checks below. 7068 */ 7069 bounds_check_type = BPF_WRITE; 7070 clobber = true; 7071 } else { 7072 bounds_check_type = BPF_READ; 7073 } 7074 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size, 7075 type, bounds_check_type); 7076 if (err) 7077 return err; 7078 7079 7080 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 7081 min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off; 7082 } else { 7083 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for 7084 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in 7085 * Spectre masking for stack ALU. 7086 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). 7087 */ 7088 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 7089 char tn_buf[48]; 7090 7091 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 7092 verbose(env, "R%d%s variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", 7093 regno, err_extra, tn_buf); 7094 return -EACCES; 7095 } 7096 /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed 7097 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to 7098 * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on 7099 * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may 7100 * cause uninitialized stack leaking. 7101 */ 7102 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) 7103 meta = NULL; 7104 7105 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 7106 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 7107 } 7108 7109 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 7110 /* Ensure we won't be overwriting dynptrs when simulating byte 7111 * by byte access in check_helper_call using meta.access_size. 7112 * This would be a problem if we have a helper in the future 7113 * which takes: 7114 * 7115 * helper(uninit_mem, len, dynptr) 7116 * 7117 * Now, uninint_mem may overlap with dynptr pointer. Hence, it 7118 * may end up writing to dynptr itself when touching memory from 7119 * arg 1. This can be relaxed on a case by case basis for known 7120 * safe cases, but reject due to the possibilitiy of aliasing by 7121 * default. 7122 */ 7123 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 7124 int stack_off = -i - 1; 7125 7126 spi = __get_spi(i); 7127 /* raw_mode may write past allocated_stack */ 7128 if (state->allocated_stack <= stack_off) 7129 continue; 7130 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[stack_off % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_DYNPTR) { 7131 verbose(env, "potential write to dynptr at off=%d disallowed\n", i); 7132 return -EACCES; 7133 } 7134 } 7135 meta->access_size = access_size; 7136 meta->regno = regno; 7137 return 0; 7138 } 7139 7140 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 7141 u8 *stype; 7142 7143 slot = -i - 1; 7144 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 7145 if (state->allocated_stack <= slot) { 7146 verbose(env, "verifier bug: allocated_stack too small"); 7147 return -EFAULT; 7148 } 7149 7150 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 7151 if (*stype == STACK_MISC) 7152 goto mark; 7153 if ((*stype == STACK_ZERO) || 7154 (*stype == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)) { 7155 if (clobber) { 7156 /* helper can write anything into the stack */ 7157 *stype = STACK_MISC; 7158 } 7159 goto mark; 7160 } 7161 7162 if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && 7163 (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE || 7164 env->allow_ptr_leaks)) { 7165 if (clobber) { 7166 __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 7167 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 7168 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[j]); 7169 } 7170 goto mark; 7171 } 7172 7173 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 7174 verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n", 7175 err_extra, regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size); 7176 } else { 7177 char tn_buf[48]; 7178 7179 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 7180 verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n", 7181 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size); 7182 } 7183 return -EACCES; 7184 mark: 7185 /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause 7186 * the whole slot to be marked as 'read' 7187 */ 7188 mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 7189 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, 7190 REG_LIVE_READ64); 7191 /* We do not set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN for stack slot, as we can not 7192 * be sure that whether stack slot is written to or not. Hence, 7193 * we must still conservatively propagate reads upwards even if 7194 * helper may write to the entire memory range. 7195 */ 7196 } 7197 return 0; 7198 } 7199 7200 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 7201 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 7202 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7203 { 7204 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7205 u32 *max_access; 7206 7207 switch (base_type(reg->type)) { 7208 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 7209 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 7210 return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 7211 zero_size_allowed); 7212 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 7213 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 7214 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 7215 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7216 return -EACCES; 7217 } 7218 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 7219 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 7220 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 7221 if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 7222 meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : 7223 BPF_READ)) 7224 return -EACCES; 7225 return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 7226 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER); 7227 case PTR_TO_MEM: 7228 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 7229 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 7230 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 7231 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7232 return -EACCES; 7233 } 7234 } 7235 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, 7236 access_size, reg->mem_size, 7237 zero_size_allowed); 7238 case PTR_TO_BUF: 7239 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 7240 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 7241 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 7242 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7243 return -EACCES; 7244 } 7245 7246 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 7247 } else { 7248 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 7249 } 7250 return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off, 7251 access_size, zero_size_allowed, 7252 max_access); 7253 case PTR_TO_STACK: 7254 return check_stack_range_initialized( 7255 env, 7256 regno, reg->off, access_size, 7257 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta); 7258 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 7259 return check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, reg->off, 7260 access_size, BPF_READ, -1); 7261 case PTR_TO_CTX: 7262 /* in case the function doesn't know how to access the context, 7263 * (because we are in a program of type SYSCALL for example), we 7264 * can not statically check its size. 7265 * Dynamically check it now. 7266 */ 7267 if (!env->ops->convert_ctx_access) { 7268 enum bpf_access_type atype = meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ; 7269 int offset = access_size - 1; 7270 7271 /* Allow zero-byte read from PTR_TO_CTX */ 7272 if (access_size == 0) 7273 return zero_size_allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; 7274 7275 return check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, regno, offset, BPF_B, 7276 atype, -1, false, false); 7277 } 7278 7279 fallthrough; 7280 default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */ 7281 /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ 7282 if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 && 7283 register_is_null(reg)) 7284 return 0; 7285 7286 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s ", regno, 7287 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7288 verbose(env, "expected=%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_STACK)); 7289 return -EACCES; 7290 } 7291 } 7292 7293 static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7294 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 7295 bool zero_size_allowed, 7296 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7297 { 7298 int err; 7299 7300 /* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers 7301 * that enforce this value as an upper bound on return values. 7302 * See do_refine_retval_range() for helpers that can refine 7303 * the return value. C type of helper is u32 so we pull register 7304 * bound from umax_value however, if negative verifier errors 7305 * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an 7306 * int type and negative retvals are allowed. 7307 */ 7308 meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value; 7309 7310 /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check 7311 * happens using its boundaries. 7312 */ 7313 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 7314 /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw 7315 * mode so that the program is required to 7316 * initialize all the memory that the helper could 7317 * just partially fill up. 7318 */ 7319 meta = NULL; 7320 7321 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 7322 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n", 7323 regno); 7324 return -EACCES; 7325 } 7326 7327 if (reg->umin_value == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) { 7328 verbose(env, "R%d invalid zero-sized read: u64=[%lld,%lld]\n", 7329 regno, reg->umin_value, reg->umax_value); 7330 return -EACCES; 7331 } 7332 7333 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) { 7334 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", 7335 regno); 7336 return -EACCES; 7337 } 7338 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 7339 reg->umax_value, 7340 zero_size_allowed, meta); 7341 if (!err) 7342 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 7343 return err; 7344 } 7345 7346 int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 7347 u32 regno, u32 mem_size) 7348 { 7349 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(reg->type); 7350 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 7351 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 7352 int err; 7353 7354 if (register_is_null(reg)) 7355 return 0; 7356 7357 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 7358 /* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory 7359 * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as 7360 * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller. 7361 */ 7362 if (may_be_null) { 7363 saved_reg = *reg; 7364 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 7365 } 7366 7367 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta); 7368 /* Check access for BPF_WRITE */ 7369 meta.raw_mode = true; 7370 err = err ?: check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta); 7371 7372 if (may_be_null) 7373 *reg = saved_reg; 7374 7375 return err; 7376 } 7377 7378 static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 7379 u32 regno) 7380 { 7381 struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno - 1]; 7382 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(mem_reg->type); 7383 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 7384 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 7385 int err; 7386 7387 WARN_ON_ONCE(regno < BPF_REG_2 || regno > BPF_REG_5); 7388 7389 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 7390 7391 if (may_be_null) { 7392 saved_reg = *mem_reg; 7393 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(mem_reg); 7394 } 7395 7396 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta); 7397 /* Check access for BPF_WRITE */ 7398 meta.raw_mode = true; 7399 err = err ?: check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta); 7400 7401 if (may_be_null) 7402 *mem_reg = saved_reg; 7403 return err; 7404 } 7405 7406 /* Implementation details: 7407 * bpf_map_lookup returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL. 7408 * bpf_obj_new returns PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_MAYBE_NULL. 7409 * Two bpf_map_lookups (even with the same key) will have different reg->id. 7410 * Two separate bpf_obj_new will also have different reg->id. 7411 * For traditional PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, the verifier 7412 * clears reg->id after value_or_null->value transition, since the verifier only 7413 * cares about the range of access to valid map value pointer and doesn't care 7414 * about actual address of the map element. 7415 * For maps with 'struct bpf_spin_lock' inside map value the verifier keeps 7416 * reg->id > 0 after value_or_null->value transition. By doing so 7417 * two bpf_map_lookups will be considered two different pointers that 7418 * point to different bpf_spin_locks. Likewise for pointers to allocated objects 7419 * returned from bpf_obj_new. 7420 * The verifier allows taking only one bpf_spin_lock at a time to avoid 7421 * dead-locks. 7422 * Since only one bpf_spin_lock is allowed the checks are simpler than 7423 * reg_is_refcounted() logic. The verifier needs to remember only 7424 * one spin_lock instead of array of acquired_refs. 7425 * cur_state->active_lock remembers which map value element or allocated 7426 * object got locked and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock. 7427 */ 7428 static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 7429 bool is_lock) 7430 { 7431 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7432 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 7433 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 7434 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 7435 struct bpf_map *map = NULL; 7436 struct btf *btf = NULL; 7437 struct btf_record *rec; 7438 7439 if (!is_const) { 7440 verbose(env, 7441 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_spin_lock has to be at the constant offset\n", 7442 regno); 7443 return -EINVAL; 7444 } 7445 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 7446 map = reg->map_ptr; 7447 if (!map->btf) { 7448 verbose(env, 7449 "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_spin_lock\n", 7450 map->name); 7451 return -EINVAL; 7452 } 7453 } else { 7454 btf = reg->btf; 7455 } 7456 7457 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 7458 if (!btf_record_has_field(rec, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 7459 verbose(env, "%s '%s' has no valid bpf_spin_lock\n", map ? "map" : "local", 7460 map ? map->name : "kptr"); 7461 return -EINVAL; 7462 } 7463 if (rec->spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) { 7464 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_spin_lock' that is at %d\n", 7465 val + reg->off, rec->spin_lock_off); 7466 return -EINVAL; 7467 } 7468 if (is_lock) { 7469 if (cur->active_lock.ptr) { 7470 verbose(env, 7471 "Locking two bpf_spin_locks are not allowed\n"); 7472 return -EINVAL; 7473 } 7474 if (map) 7475 cur->active_lock.ptr = map; 7476 else 7477 cur->active_lock.ptr = btf; 7478 cur->active_lock.id = reg->id; 7479 } else { 7480 void *ptr; 7481 7482 if (map) 7483 ptr = map; 7484 else 7485 ptr = btf; 7486 7487 if (!cur->active_lock.ptr) { 7488 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock without taking a lock\n"); 7489 return -EINVAL; 7490 } 7491 if (cur->active_lock.ptr != ptr || 7492 cur->active_lock.id != reg->id) { 7493 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock of different lock\n"); 7494 return -EINVAL; 7495 } 7496 7497 invalidate_non_owning_refs(env); 7498 7499 cur->active_lock.ptr = NULL; 7500 cur->active_lock.id = 0; 7501 } 7502 return 0; 7503 } 7504 7505 static int process_timer_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 7506 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7507 { 7508 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7509 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 7510 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 7511 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 7512 7513 if (!is_const) { 7514 verbose(env, 7515 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_timer has to be at the constant offset\n", 7516 regno); 7517 return -EINVAL; 7518 } 7519 if (!map->btf) { 7520 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_timer\n", 7521 map->name); 7522 return -EINVAL; 7523 } 7524 if (!btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { 7525 verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid bpf_timer\n", map->name); 7526 return -EINVAL; 7527 } 7528 if (map->record->timer_off != val + reg->off) { 7529 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_timer' that is at %d\n", 7530 val + reg->off, map->record->timer_off); 7531 return -EINVAL; 7532 } 7533 if (meta->map_ptr) { 7534 verbose(env, "verifier bug. Two map pointers in a timer helper\n"); 7535 return -EFAULT; 7536 } 7537 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 7538 meta->map_ptr = map; 7539 return 0; 7540 } 7541 7542 static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 7543 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7544 { 7545 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7546 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 7547 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 7548 u32 kptr_off; 7549 7550 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 7551 verbose(env, 7552 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. kptr has to be at the constant offset\n", 7553 regno); 7554 return -EINVAL; 7555 } 7556 if (!map_ptr->btf) { 7557 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_kptr_xchg\n", 7558 map_ptr->name); 7559 return -EINVAL; 7560 } 7561 if (!btf_record_has_field(map_ptr->record, BPF_KPTR)) { 7562 verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid kptr\n", map_ptr->name); 7563 return -EINVAL; 7564 } 7565 7566 meta->map_ptr = map_ptr; 7567 kptr_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 7568 kptr_field = btf_record_find(map_ptr->record, kptr_off, BPF_KPTR); 7569 if (!kptr_field) { 7570 verbose(env, "off=%d doesn't point to kptr\n", kptr_off); 7571 return -EACCES; 7572 } 7573 if (kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF) { 7574 verbose(env, "off=%d kptr isn't referenced kptr\n", kptr_off); 7575 return -EACCES; 7576 } 7577 meta->kptr_field = kptr_field; 7578 return 0; 7579 } 7580 7581 /* There are two register types representing a bpf_dynptr, one is PTR_TO_STACK 7582 * which points to a stack slot, and the other is CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR. 7583 * 7584 * In both cases we deal with the first 8 bytes, but need to mark the next 8 7585 * bytes as STACK_DYNPTR in case of PTR_TO_STACK. In case of 7586 * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, we are guaranteed to get the beginning of the object. 7587 * 7588 * Mutability of bpf_dynptr is at two levels, one is at the level of struct 7589 * bpf_dynptr itself, i.e. whether the helper is receiving a pointer to struct 7590 * bpf_dynptr or pointer to const struct bpf_dynptr. In the former case, it can 7591 * mutate the view of the dynptr and also possibly destroy it. In the latter 7592 * case, it cannot mutate the bpf_dynptr itself but it can still mutate the 7593 * memory that dynptr points to. 7594 * 7595 * The verifier will keep track both levels of mutation (bpf_dynptr's in 7596 * reg->type and the memory's in reg->dynptr.type), but there is no support for 7597 * readonly dynptr view yet, hence only the first case is tracked and checked. 7598 * 7599 * This is consistent with how C applies the const modifier to a struct object, 7600 * where the pointer itself inside bpf_dynptr becomes const but not what it 7601 * points to. 7602 * 7603 * Helpers which do not mutate the bpf_dynptr set MEM_RDONLY in their argument 7604 * type, and declare it as 'const struct bpf_dynptr *' in their prototype. 7605 */ 7606 static int process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_idx, 7607 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int clone_ref_obj_id) 7608 { 7609 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7610 int err; 7611 7612 /* MEM_UNINIT and MEM_RDONLY are exclusive, when applied to an 7613 * ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR (or ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_*): 7614 */ 7615 if ((arg_type & (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) == (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) { 7616 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: misconfigured dynptr helper type flags\n"); 7617 return -EFAULT; 7618 } 7619 7620 /* MEM_UNINIT - Points to memory that is an appropriate candidate for 7621 * constructing a mutable bpf_dynptr object. 7622 * 7623 * Currently, this is only possible with PTR_TO_STACK 7624 * pointing to a region of at least 16 bytes which doesn't 7625 * contain an existing bpf_dynptr. 7626 * 7627 * MEM_RDONLY - Points to a initialized bpf_dynptr that will not be 7628 * mutated or destroyed. However, the memory it points to 7629 * may be mutated. 7630 * 7631 * None - Points to a initialized dynptr that can be mutated and 7632 * destroyed, including mutation of the memory it points 7633 * to. 7634 */ 7635 if (arg_type & MEM_UNINIT) { 7636 int i; 7637 7638 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg)) { 7639 verbose(env, "Dynptr has to be an uninitialized dynptr\n"); 7640 return -EINVAL; 7641 } 7642 7643 /* we write BPF_DW bits (8 bytes) at a time */ 7644 for (i = 0; i < BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE; i += 8) { 7645 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno, 7646 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 7647 if (err) 7648 return err; 7649 } 7650 7651 err = mark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, reg, arg_type, insn_idx, clone_ref_obj_id); 7652 } else /* MEM_RDONLY and None case from above */ { 7653 /* For the reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK case, bpf_dynptr is never const */ 7654 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR && !(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) { 7655 verbose(env, "cannot pass pointer to const bpf_dynptr, the helper mutates it\n"); 7656 return -EINVAL; 7657 } 7658 7659 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(env, reg)) { 7660 verbose(env, 7661 "Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #%d\n", 7662 regno); 7663 return -EINVAL; 7664 } 7665 7666 /* Fold modifiers (in this case, MEM_RDONLY) when checking expected type */ 7667 if (!is_dynptr_type_expected(env, reg, arg_type & ~MEM_RDONLY)) { 7668 verbose(env, 7669 "Expected a dynptr of type %s as arg #%d\n", 7670 dynptr_type_str(arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type)), regno); 7671 return -EINVAL; 7672 } 7673 7674 err = mark_dynptr_read(env, reg); 7675 } 7676 return err; 7677 } 7678 7679 static u32 iter_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int spi) 7680 { 7681 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 7682 7683 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 7684 } 7685 7686 static bool is_iter_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7687 { 7688 return meta->kfunc_flags & (KF_ITER_NEW | KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_ITER_DESTROY); 7689 } 7690 7691 static bool is_iter_new_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7692 { 7693 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_NEW; 7694 } 7695 7696 static bool is_iter_next_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7697 { 7698 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_NEXT; 7699 } 7700 7701 static bool is_iter_destroy_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7702 { 7703 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_DESTROY; 7704 } 7705 7706 static bool is_kfunc_arg_iter(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, int arg) 7707 { 7708 /* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() guarantees that first argument of any iter 7709 * kfunc is iter state pointer 7710 */ 7711 return arg == 0 && is_iter_kfunc(meta); 7712 } 7713 7714 static int process_iter_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_idx, 7715 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7716 { 7717 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7718 const struct btf_type *t; 7719 const struct btf_param *arg; 7720 int spi, err, i, nr_slots; 7721 u32 btf_id; 7722 7723 /* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() ensures we don't need to validate anything here */ 7724 arg = &btf_params(meta->func_proto)[0]; 7725 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta->btf, arg->type, NULL); /* PTR */ 7726 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta->btf, t->type, &btf_id); /* STRUCT */ 7727 nr_slots = t->size / BPF_REG_SIZE; 7728 7729 if (is_iter_new_kfunc(meta)) { 7730 /* bpf_iter_<type>_new() expects pointer to uninit iter state */ 7731 if (!is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg, nr_slots)) { 7732 verbose(env, "expected uninitialized iter_%s as arg #%d\n", 7733 iter_type_str(meta->btf, btf_id), regno); 7734 return -EINVAL; 7735 } 7736 7737 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots * 8; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) { 7738 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno, 7739 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 7740 if (err) 7741 return err; 7742 } 7743 7744 err = mark_stack_slots_iter(env, reg, insn_idx, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots); 7745 if (err) 7746 return err; 7747 } else { 7748 /* iter_next() or iter_destroy() expect initialized iter state*/ 7749 if (!is_iter_reg_valid_init(env, reg, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots)) { 7750 verbose(env, "expected an initialized iter_%s as arg #%d\n", 7751 iter_type_str(meta->btf, btf_id), regno); 7752 return -EINVAL; 7753 } 7754 7755 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 7756 if (spi < 0) 7757 return spi; 7758 7759 err = mark_iter_read(env, reg, spi, nr_slots); 7760 if (err) 7761 return err; 7762 7763 /* remember meta->iter info for process_iter_next_call() */ 7764 meta->iter.spi = spi; 7765 meta->iter.frameno = reg->frameno; 7766 meta->ref_obj_id = iter_ref_obj_id(env, reg, spi); 7767 7768 if (is_iter_destroy_kfunc(meta)) { 7769 err = unmark_stack_slots_iter(env, reg, nr_slots); 7770 if (err) 7771 return err; 7772 } 7773 } 7774 7775 return 0; 7776 } 7777 7778 /* Look for a previous loop entry at insn_idx: nearest parent state 7779 * stopped at insn_idx with callsites matching those in cur->frame. 7780 */ 7781 static struct bpf_verifier_state *find_prev_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7782 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, 7783 int insn_idx) 7784 { 7785 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 7786 struct bpf_verifier_state *st; 7787 7788 /* Explored states are pushed in stack order, most recent states come first */ 7789 sl = *explored_state(env, insn_idx); 7790 for (; sl; sl = sl->next) { 7791 /* If st->branches != 0 state is a part of current DFS verification path, 7792 * hence cur & st for a loop. 7793 */ 7794 st = &sl->state; 7795 if (st->insn_idx == insn_idx && st->branches && same_callsites(st, cur) && 7796 st->dfs_depth < cur->dfs_depth) 7797 return st; 7798 } 7799 7800 return NULL; 7801 } 7802 7803 static void reset_idmap_scratch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 7804 static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 7805 const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 7806 struct bpf_idmap *idmap); 7807 7808 static void maybe_widen_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7809 struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 7810 struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 7811 { 7812 if (rold->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 7813 return; 7814 if (rold->type != rcur->type) 7815 return; 7816 if (rold->precise || rcur->precise || regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap)) 7817 return; 7818 __mark_reg_unknown(env, rcur); 7819 } 7820 7821 static int widen_imprecise_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7822 struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 7823 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 7824 { 7825 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; 7826 int i, fr; 7827 7828 reset_idmap_scratch(env); 7829 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 7830 fold = old->frame[fr]; 7831 fcur = cur->frame[fr]; 7832 7833 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 7834 maybe_widen_reg(env, 7835 &fold->regs[i], 7836 &fcur->regs[i], 7837 &env->idmap_scratch); 7838 7839 for (i = 0; i < fold->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 7840 if (!is_spilled_reg(&fold->stack[i]) || 7841 !is_spilled_reg(&fcur->stack[i])) 7842 continue; 7843 7844 maybe_widen_reg(env, 7845 &fold->stack[i].spilled_ptr, 7846 &fcur->stack[i].spilled_ptr, 7847 &env->idmap_scratch); 7848 } 7849 } 7850 return 0; 7851 } 7852 7853 static struct bpf_reg_state *get_iter_from_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st, 7854 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7855 { 7856 int iter_frameno = meta->iter.frameno; 7857 int iter_spi = meta->iter.spi; 7858 7859 return &cur_st->frame[iter_frameno]->stack[iter_spi].spilled_ptr; 7860 } 7861 7862 /* process_iter_next_call() is called when verifier gets to iterator's next 7863 * "method" (e.g., bpf_iter_num_next() for numbers iterator) call. We'll refer 7864 * to it as just "iter_next()" in comments below. 7865 * 7866 * BPF verifier relies on a crucial contract for any iter_next() 7867 * implementation: it should *eventually* return NULL, and once that happens 7868 * it should keep returning NULL. That is, once iterator exhausts elements to 7869 * iterate, it should never reset or spuriously return new elements. 7870 * 7871 * With the assumption of such contract, process_iter_next_call() simulates 7872 * a fork in the verifier state to validate loop logic correctness and safety 7873 * without having to simulate infinite amount of iterations. 7874 * 7875 * In current state, we first assume that iter_next() returned NULL and 7876 * iterator state is set to DRAINED (BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED). In such 7877 * conditions we should not form an infinite loop and should eventually reach 7878 * exit. 7879 * 7880 * Besides that, we also fork current state and enqueue it for later 7881 * verification. In a forked state we keep iterator state as ACTIVE 7882 * (BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) and assume non-NULL return from iter_next(). We 7883 * also bump iteration depth to prevent erroneous infinite loop detection 7884 * later on (see iter_active_depths_differ() comment for details). In this 7885 * state we assume that we'll eventually loop back to another iter_next() 7886 * calls (it could be in exactly same location or in some other instruction, 7887 * it doesn't matter, we don't make any unnecessary assumptions about this, 7888 * everything revolves around iterator state in a stack slot, not which 7889 * instruction is calling iter_next()). When that happens, we either will come 7890 * to iter_next() with equivalent state and can conclude that next iteration 7891 * will proceed in exactly the same way as we just verified, so it's safe to 7892 * assume that loop converges. If not, we'll go on another iteration 7893 * simulation with a different input state, until all possible starting states 7894 * are validated or we reach maximum number of instructions limit. 7895 * 7896 * This way, we will either exhaustively discover all possible input states 7897 * that iterator loop can start with and eventually will converge, or we'll 7898 * effectively regress into bounded loop simulation logic and either reach 7899 * maximum number of instructions if loop is not provably convergent, or there 7900 * is some statically known limit on number of iterations (e.g., if there is 7901 * an explicit `if n > 100 then break;` statement somewhere in the loop). 7902 * 7903 * Iteration convergence logic in is_state_visited() relies on exact 7904 * states comparison, which ignores read and precision marks. 7905 * This is necessary because read and precision marks are not finalized 7906 * while in the loop. Exact comparison might preclude convergence for 7907 * simple programs like below: 7908 * 7909 * i = 0; 7910 * while(iter_next(&it)) 7911 * i++; 7912 * 7913 * At each iteration step i++ would produce a new distinct state and 7914 * eventually instruction processing limit would be reached. 7915 * 7916 * To avoid such behavior speculatively forget (widen) range for 7917 * imprecise scalar registers, if those registers were not precise at the 7918 * end of the previous iteration and do not match exactly. 7919 * 7920 * This is a conservative heuristic that allows to verify wide range of programs, 7921 * however it precludes verification of programs that conjure an 7922 * imprecise value on the first loop iteration and use it as precise on a second. 7923 * For example, the following safe program would fail to verify: 7924 * 7925 * struct bpf_num_iter it; 7926 * int arr[10]; 7927 * int i = 0, a = 0; 7928 * bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, 10); 7929 * while (bpf_iter_num_next(&it)) { 7930 * if (a == 0) { 7931 * a = 1; 7932 * i = 7; // Because i changed verifier would forget 7933 * // it's range on second loop entry. 7934 * } else { 7935 * arr[i] = 42; // This would fail to verify. 7936 * } 7937 * } 7938 * bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it); 7939 */ 7940 static int process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, 7941 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7942 { 7943 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st = env->cur_state, *queued_st, *prev_st; 7944 struct bpf_func_state *cur_fr = cur_st->frame[cur_st->curframe], *queued_fr; 7945 struct bpf_reg_state *cur_iter, *queued_iter; 7946 7947 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(struct bpf_iter); 7948 7949 cur_iter = get_iter_from_state(cur_st, meta); 7950 7951 if (cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE && 7952 cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED) { 7953 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected iterator state %d (%s)\n", 7954 cur_iter->iter.state, iter_state_str(cur_iter->iter.state)); 7955 return -EFAULT; 7956 } 7957 7958 if (cur_iter->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) { 7959 /* Because iter_next() call is a checkpoint is_state_visitied() 7960 * should guarantee parent state with same call sites and insn_idx. 7961 */ 7962 if (!cur_st->parent || cur_st->parent->insn_idx != insn_idx || 7963 !same_callsites(cur_st->parent, cur_st)) { 7964 verbose(env, "bug: bad parent state for iter next call"); 7965 return -EFAULT; 7966 } 7967 /* Note cur_st->parent in the call below, it is necessary to skip 7968 * checkpoint created for cur_st by is_state_visited() 7969 * right at this instruction. 7970 */ 7971 prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, cur_st->parent, insn_idx); 7972 /* branch out active iter state */ 7973 queued_st = push_stack(env, insn_idx + 1, insn_idx, false); 7974 if (!queued_st) 7975 return -ENOMEM; 7976 7977 queued_iter = get_iter_from_state(queued_st, meta); 7978 queued_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE; 7979 queued_iter->iter.depth++; 7980 if (prev_st) 7981 widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, queued_st); 7982 7983 queued_fr = queued_st->frame[queued_st->curframe]; 7984 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&queued_fr->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 7985 } 7986 7987 /* switch to DRAINED state, but keep the depth unchanged */ 7988 /* mark current iter state as drained and assume returned NULL */ 7989 cur_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED; 7990 __mark_reg_const_zero(&cur_fr->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 7991 7992 return 0; 7993 } 7994 7995 static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 7996 { 7997 return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE || 7998 type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO; 7999 } 8000 8001 static bool arg_type_is_raw_mem(enum bpf_arg_type type) 8002 { 8003 return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM && 8004 type & MEM_UNINIT; 8005 } 8006 8007 static bool arg_type_is_release(enum bpf_arg_type type) 8008 { 8009 return type & OBJ_RELEASE; 8010 } 8011 8012 static bool arg_type_is_dynptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) 8013 { 8014 return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 8015 } 8016 8017 static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8018 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 8019 enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type) 8020 { 8021 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 8022 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 8023 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type\n"); 8024 return -EACCES; 8025 } 8026 8027 switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) { 8028 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 8029 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 8030 if (*arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 8031 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON; 8032 } else { 8033 verbose(env, "invalid arg_type for sockmap/sockhash\n"); 8034 return -EINVAL; 8035 } 8036 break; 8037 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 8038 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem) 8039 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 8040 break; 8041 default: 8042 break; 8043 } 8044 return 0; 8045 } 8046 8047 struct bpf_reg_types { 8048 const enum bpf_reg_type types[10]; 8049 u32 *btf_id; 8050 }; 8051 8052 static const struct bpf_reg_types sock_types = { 8053 .types = { 8054 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 8055 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 8056 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 8057 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 8058 }, 8059 }; 8060 8061 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 8062 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_id_sock_common_types = { 8063 .types = { 8064 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 8065 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 8066 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 8067 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 8068 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 8069 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 8070 }, 8071 .btf_id = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 8072 }; 8073 #endif 8074 8075 static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = { 8076 .types = { 8077 PTR_TO_STACK, 8078 PTR_TO_PACKET, 8079 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 8080 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 8081 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 8082 PTR_TO_MEM, 8083 PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF, 8084 PTR_TO_BUF, 8085 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 8086 }, 8087 }; 8088 8089 static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = { 8090 .types = { 8091 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 8092 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, 8093 } 8094 }; 8095 8096 static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } }; 8097 static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } }; 8098 static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } }; 8099 static const struct bpf_reg_types ringbuf_mem_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF } }; 8100 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_TO_MAP } }; 8101 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = { 8102 .types = { 8103 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 8104 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 8105 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU, 8106 }, 8107 }; 8108 static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { 8109 .types = { 8110 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU, 8111 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED, 8112 } 8113 }; 8114 static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } }; 8115 static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } }; 8116 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_str_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 8117 static const struct bpf_reg_types timer_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 8118 static const struct bpf_reg_types kptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 8119 static const struct bpf_reg_types dynptr_types = { 8120 .types = { 8121 PTR_TO_STACK, 8122 CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, 8123 } 8124 }; 8125 8126 static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = { 8127 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = &mem_types, 8128 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = &mem_types, 8129 [ARG_CONST_SIZE] = &scalar_types, 8130 [ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 8131 [ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 8132 [ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR] = &const_map_ptr_types, 8133 [ARG_PTR_TO_CTX] = &context_types, 8134 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &sock_types, 8135 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 8136 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_id_sock_common_types, 8137 #endif 8138 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &fullsock_types, 8139 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = &btf_ptr_types, 8140 [ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK] = &spin_lock_types, 8141 [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM] = &mem_types, 8142 [ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM] = &ringbuf_mem_types, 8143 [ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = &percpu_btf_ptr_types, 8144 [ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC] = &func_ptr_types, 8145 [ARG_PTR_TO_STACK] = &stack_ptr_types, 8146 [ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR] = &const_str_ptr_types, 8147 [ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER] = &timer_types, 8148 [ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR] = &kptr_types, 8149 [ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = &dynptr_types, 8150 }; 8151 8152 static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 8153 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, 8154 const u32 *arg_btf_id, 8155 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 8156 { 8157 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 8158 enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type; 8159 const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible; 8160 int i, j; 8161 8162 compatible = compatible_reg_types[base_type(arg_type)]; 8163 if (!compatible) { 8164 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unsupported arg type %d\n", arg_type); 8165 return -EFAULT; 8166 } 8167 8168 /* ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY, 8169 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM and NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY 8170 * 8171 * Same for MAYBE_NULL: 8172 * 8173 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL, 8174 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM but NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL 8175 * 8176 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM that is tagged with a dynptr type. 8177 * 8178 * Therefore we fold these flags depending on the arg_type before comparison. 8179 */ 8180 if (arg_type & MEM_RDONLY) 8181 type &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 8182 if (arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) 8183 type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 8184 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) 8185 type &= ~DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK; 8186 8187 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && type_is_alloc(type)) 8188 type &= ~MEM_ALLOC; 8189 8190 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) { 8191 expected = compatible->types[i]; 8192 if (expected == NOT_INIT) 8193 break; 8194 8195 if (type == expected) 8196 goto found; 8197 } 8198 8199 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=", regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 8200 for (j = 0; j + 1 < i; j++) 8201 verbose(env, "%s, ", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 8202 verbose(env, "%s\n", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 8203 return -EACCES; 8204 8205 found: 8206 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 8207 return 0; 8208 8209 if (compatible == &mem_types) { 8210 if (!(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) { 8211 verbose(env, 8212 "%s() may write into memory pointed by R%d type=%s\n", 8213 func_id_name(meta->func_id), 8214 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 8215 return -EACCES; 8216 } 8217 return 0; 8218 } 8219 8220 switch ((int)reg->type) { 8221 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 8222 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: 8223 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU: 8224 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL: 8225 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU: 8226 { 8227 /* For bpf_sk_release, it needs to match against first member 8228 * 'struct sock_common', hence make an exception for it. This 8229 * allows bpf_sk_release to work for multiple socket types. 8230 */ 8231 bool strict_type_match = arg_type_is_release(arg_type) && 8232 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_release; 8233 8234 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && 8235 (!type_may_be_null(arg_type) || arg_type_is_release(arg_type))) { 8236 verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to helper arg%d\n", regno); 8237 return -EACCES; 8238 } 8239 8240 if (!arg_btf_id) { 8241 if (!compatible->btf_id) { 8242 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing arg compatible BTF ID\n"); 8243 return -EFAULT; 8244 } 8245 arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id; 8246 } 8247 8248 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 8249 if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) 8250 return -EACCES; 8251 } else { 8252 if (arg_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 8253 verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); 8254 verbose(env, "R%d has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON type\n", 8255 regno); 8256 return -EACCES; 8257 } 8258 8259 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 8260 btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id, 8261 strict_type_match)) { 8262 verbose(env, "R%d is of type %s but %s is expected\n", 8263 regno, btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id), 8264 btf_type_name(btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id)); 8265 return -EACCES; 8266 } 8267 } 8268 break; 8269 } 8270 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 8271 if (meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_lock && meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock && 8272 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 8273 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unimplemented handling of MEM_ALLOC\n"); 8274 return -EFAULT; 8275 } 8276 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 8277 if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) 8278 return -EACCES; 8279 } 8280 break; 8281 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU: 8282 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED: 8283 /* Handled by helper specific checks */ 8284 break; 8285 default: 8286 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: invalid PTR_TO_BTF_ID register for type match\n"); 8287 return -EFAULT; 8288 } 8289 return 0; 8290 } 8291 8292 static struct btf_field * 8293 reg_find_field_offset(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, s32 off, u32 fields) 8294 { 8295 struct btf_field *field; 8296 struct btf_record *rec; 8297 8298 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 8299 if (!rec) 8300 return NULL; 8301 8302 field = btf_record_find(rec, off, fields); 8303 if (!field) 8304 return NULL; 8305 8306 return field; 8307 } 8308 8309 int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8310 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 8311 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 8312 { 8313 u32 type = reg->type; 8314 8315 /* When referenced register is passed to release function, its fixed 8316 * offset must be 0. 8317 * 8318 * We will check arg_type_is_release reg has ref_obj_id when storing 8319 * meta->release_regno. 8320 */ 8321 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) { 8322 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR with OBJ_RELEASE is a bit special, as it 8323 * may not directly point to the object being released, but to 8324 * dynptr pointing to such object, which might be at some offset 8325 * on the stack. In that case, we simply to fallback to the 8326 * default handling. 8327 */ 8328 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type) && type == PTR_TO_STACK) 8329 return 0; 8330 8331 /* Doing check_ptr_off_reg check for the offset will catch this 8332 * because fixed_off_ok is false, but checking here allows us 8333 * to give the user a better error message. 8334 */ 8335 if (reg->off) { 8336 verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func or trusted arg to kfunc\n", 8337 regno); 8338 return -EINVAL; 8339 } 8340 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 8341 } 8342 8343 switch (type) { 8344 /* Pointer types where both fixed and variable offset is explicitly allowed: */ 8345 case PTR_TO_STACK: 8346 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 8347 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 8348 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 8349 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 8350 case PTR_TO_MEM: 8351 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY: 8352 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF: 8353 case PTR_TO_BUF: 8354 case PTR_TO_BUF | MEM_RDONLY: 8355 case SCALAR_VALUE: 8356 return 0; 8357 /* All the rest must be rejected, except PTR_TO_BTF_ID which allows 8358 * fixed offset. 8359 */ 8360 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 8361 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 8362 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: 8363 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU: 8364 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF: 8365 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF | MEM_RCU: 8366 /* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function, 8367 * its fixed offset must be 0. In the other cases, fixed offset 8368 * can be non-zero. This was already checked above. So pass 8369 * fixed_off_ok as true to allow fixed offset for all other 8370 * cases. var_off always must be 0 for PTR_TO_BTF_ID, hence we 8371 * still need to do checks instead of returning. 8372 */ 8373 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true); 8374 default: 8375 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 8376 } 8377 } 8378 8379 static struct bpf_reg_state *get_dynptr_arg_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8380 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, 8381 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 8382 { 8383 struct bpf_reg_state *state = NULL; 8384 int i; 8385 8386 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) 8387 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[i])) { 8388 if (state) { 8389 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: multiple dynptr args\n"); 8390 return NULL; 8391 } 8392 state = ®s[BPF_REG_1 + i]; 8393 } 8394 8395 if (!state) 8396 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr arg found\n"); 8397 8398 return state; 8399 } 8400 8401 static int dynptr_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 8402 { 8403 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 8404 int spi; 8405 8406 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 8407 return reg->id; 8408 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 8409 if (spi < 0) 8410 return spi; 8411 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id; 8412 } 8413 8414 static int dynptr_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 8415 { 8416 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 8417 int spi; 8418 8419 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 8420 return reg->ref_obj_id; 8421 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 8422 if (spi < 0) 8423 return spi; 8424 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 8425 } 8426 8427 static enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_get_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8428 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 8429 { 8430 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 8431 int spi; 8432 8433 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 8434 return reg->dynptr.type; 8435 8436 spi = __get_spi(reg->off); 8437 if (spi < 0) { 8438 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: invalid spi when querying dynptr type\n"); 8439 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID; 8440 } 8441 8442 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type; 8443 } 8444 8445 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, 8446 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 8447 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, 8448 int insn_idx) 8449 { 8450 u32 regno = BPF_REG_1 + arg; 8451 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 8452 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[arg]; 8453 enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type; 8454 u32 *arg_btf_id = NULL; 8455 int err = 0; 8456 8457 if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE) 8458 return 0; 8459 8460 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP); 8461 if (err) 8462 return err; 8463 8464 if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { 8465 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { 8466 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", 8467 regno); 8468 return -EACCES; 8469 } 8470 return 0; 8471 } 8472 8473 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && 8474 !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) { 8475 verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n"); 8476 return -EACCES; 8477 } 8478 8479 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 8480 err = resolve_map_arg_type(env, meta, &arg_type); 8481 if (err) 8482 return err; 8483 } 8484 8485 if (register_is_null(reg) && type_may_be_null(arg_type)) 8486 /* A NULL register has a SCALAR_VALUE type, so skip 8487 * type checking. 8488 */ 8489 goto skip_type_check; 8490 8491 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 8492 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 8493 base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 8494 arg_btf_id = fn->arg_btf_id[arg]; 8495 8496 err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, arg_btf_id, meta); 8497 if (err) 8498 return err; 8499 8500 err = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 8501 if (err) 8502 return err; 8503 8504 skip_type_check: 8505 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) { 8506 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type)) { 8507 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 8508 int spi; 8509 8510 /* Only dynptr created on stack can be released, thus 8511 * the get_spi and stack state checks for spilled_ptr 8512 * should only be done before process_dynptr_func for 8513 * PTR_TO_STACK. 8514 */ 8515 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 8516 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 8517 if (spi < 0 || !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id) { 8518 verbose(env, "arg %d is an unacquired reference\n", regno); 8519 return -EINVAL; 8520 } 8521 } else { 8522 verbose(env, "cannot release unowned const bpf_dynptr\n"); 8523 return -EINVAL; 8524 } 8525 } else if (!reg->ref_obj_id && !register_is_null(reg)) { 8526 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced when passed to release function\n", 8527 regno); 8528 return -EINVAL; 8529 } 8530 if (meta->release_regno) { 8531 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one release argument\n"); 8532 return -EFAULT; 8533 } 8534 meta->release_regno = regno; 8535 } 8536 8537 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 8538 if (meta->ref_obj_id) { 8539 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", 8540 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 8541 meta->ref_obj_id); 8542 return -EFAULT; 8543 } 8544 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 8545 } 8546 8547 switch (base_type(arg_type)) { 8548 case ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR: 8549 /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */ 8550 if (meta->map_ptr) { 8551 /* Use map_uid (which is unique id of inner map) to reject: 8552 * inner_map1 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key1) 8553 * inner_map2 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key2) 8554 * if (inner_map1 && inner_map2) { 8555 * timer = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner_map1); 8556 * if (timer) 8557 * // mismatch would have been allowed 8558 * bpf_timer_init(timer, inner_map2); 8559 * } 8560 * 8561 * Comparing map_ptr is enough to distinguish normal and outer maps. 8562 */ 8563 if (meta->map_ptr != reg->map_ptr || 8564 meta->map_uid != reg->map_uid) { 8565 verbose(env, 8566 "timer pointer in R1 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R2 map_uid=%d\n", 8567 meta->map_uid, reg->map_uid); 8568 return -EINVAL; 8569 } 8570 } 8571 meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 8572 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 8573 break; 8574 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 8575 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call: 8576 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within 8577 * stack limits and initialized 8578 */ 8579 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 8580 /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before 8581 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before 8582 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means 8583 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier 8584 */ 8585 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); 8586 return -EACCES; 8587 } 8588 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 8589 meta->map_ptr->key_size, false, 8590 NULL); 8591 break; 8592 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 8593 if (type_may_be_null(arg_type) && register_is_null(reg)) 8594 return 0; 8595 8596 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call: 8597 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity 8598 */ 8599 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 8600 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 8601 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); 8602 return -EACCES; 8603 } 8604 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 8605 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 8606 meta->map_ptr->value_size, false, 8607 meta); 8608 break; 8609 case ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID: 8610 if (!reg->btf_id) { 8611 verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno); 8612 return -EACCES; 8613 } 8614 meta->ret_btf = reg->btf; 8615 meta->ret_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 8616 break; 8617 case ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK: 8618 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) { 8619 verbose(env, "can't spin_{lock,unlock} in rbtree cb\n"); 8620 return -EACCES; 8621 } 8622 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) { 8623 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, true); 8624 if (err) 8625 return err; 8626 } else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) { 8627 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, false); 8628 if (err) 8629 return err; 8630 } else { 8631 verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n"); 8632 return -EFAULT; 8633 } 8634 break; 8635 case ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER: 8636 err = process_timer_func(env, regno, meta); 8637 if (err) 8638 return err; 8639 break; 8640 case ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC: 8641 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; 8642 break; 8643 case ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 8644 /* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the 8645 * next is_mem_size argument below. 8646 */ 8647 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 8648 if (arg_type & MEM_FIXED_SIZE) { 8649 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, fn->arg_size[arg], false, meta); 8650 if (err) 8651 return err; 8652 if (arg_type & MEM_ALIGNED) 8653 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, fn->arg_size[arg], true); 8654 } 8655 break; 8656 case ARG_CONST_SIZE: 8657 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, false, meta); 8658 break; 8659 case ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 8660 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, meta); 8661 break; 8662 case ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 8663 err = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx, arg_type, 0); 8664 if (err) 8665 return err; 8666 break; 8667 case ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 8668 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8669 verbose(env, "R%d is not a known constant'\n", 8670 regno); 8671 return -EACCES; 8672 } 8673 meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value; 8674 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 8675 if (err) 8676 return err; 8677 break; 8678 case ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR: 8679 { 8680 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 8681 int map_off; 8682 u64 map_addr; 8683 char *str_ptr; 8684 8685 if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) { 8686 verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno); 8687 return -EACCES; 8688 } 8689 8690 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8691 verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno); 8692 return -EACCES; 8693 } 8694 8695 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 8696 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 8697 return -EACCES; 8698 } 8699 8700 err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, 8701 map->value_size - reg->off, false, 8702 ACCESS_HELPER); 8703 if (err) 8704 return err; 8705 8706 map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 8707 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off); 8708 if (err) { 8709 verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n"); 8710 return err; 8711 } 8712 8713 str_ptr = (char *)(long)(map_addr); 8714 if (!strnchr(str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off, 0)) { 8715 verbose(env, "string is not zero-terminated\n"); 8716 return -EINVAL; 8717 } 8718 break; 8719 } 8720 case ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR: 8721 err = process_kptr_func(env, regno, meta); 8722 if (err) 8723 return err; 8724 break; 8725 } 8726 8727 return err; 8728 } 8729 8730 static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id) 8731 { 8732 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type; 8733 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 8734 8735 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && 8736 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem) 8737 return false; 8738 8739 /* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these 8740 * contexts, so updating is safe. 8741 */ 8742 switch (type) { 8743 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 8744 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER) 8745 return true; 8746 break; 8747 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: 8748 /* map_update allowed only via dedicated helpers with event type checks */ 8749 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem) 8750 return true; 8751 break; 8752 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 8753 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 8754 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 8755 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 8756 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 8757 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 8758 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 8759 return true; 8760 default: 8761 break; 8762 } 8763 8764 verbose(env, "cannot update sockmap in this context\n"); 8765 return false; 8766 } 8767 8768 static bool allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 8769 { 8770 return env->prog->jit_requested && 8771 bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(); 8772 } 8773 8774 static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8775 struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) 8776 { 8777 if (!map) 8778 return 0; 8779 8780 /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */ 8781 switch (map->map_type) { 8782 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY: 8783 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 8784 goto error; 8785 break; 8786 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY: 8787 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read && 8788 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output && 8789 func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_output && 8790 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value && 8791 func_id != BPF_FUNC_xdp_output) 8792 goto error; 8793 break; 8794 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 8795 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output && 8796 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve && 8797 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query && 8798 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr && 8799 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr && 8800 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr) 8801 goto error; 8802 break; 8803 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 8804 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain) 8805 goto error; 8806 break; 8807 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE: 8808 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid) 8809 goto error; 8810 break; 8811 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: 8812 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup && 8813 func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup) 8814 goto error; 8815 break; 8816 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE: 8817 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE: 8818 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage) 8819 goto error; 8820 break; 8821 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP: 8822 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH: 8823 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 8824 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 8825 goto error; 8826 break; 8827 /* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases 8828 * appear. 8829 */ 8830 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP: 8831 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) 8832 goto error; 8833 break; 8834 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP: 8835 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 8836 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 8837 goto error; 8838 break; 8839 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 8840 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 8841 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 8842 goto error; 8843 break; 8844 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 8845 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map && 8846 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update && 8847 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map && 8848 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 8849 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 8850 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 8851 goto error; 8852 break; 8853 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 8854 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash && 8855 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update && 8856 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash && 8857 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 8858 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 8859 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 8860 goto error; 8861 break; 8862 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY: 8863 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport) 8864 goto error; 8865 break; 8866 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE: 8867 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK: 8868 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 8869 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 8870 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 8871 goto error; 8872 break; 8873 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 8874 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get && 8875 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete && 8876 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 8877 goto error; 8878 break; 8879 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 8880 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get && 8881 func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete && 8882 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 8883 goto error; 8884 break; 8885 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 8886 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get && 8887 func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete && 8888 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 8889 goto error; 8890 break; 8891 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE: 8892 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get && 8893 func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete && 8894 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 8895 goto error; 8896 break; 8897 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 8898 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 8899 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 8900 goto error; 8901 break; 8902 default: 8903 break; 8904 } 8905 8906 /* ... and second from the function itself. */ 8907 switch (func_id) { 8908 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 8909 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) 8910 goto error; 8911 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && !allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) { 8912 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 8913 return -EINVAL; 8914 } 8915 break; 8916 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read: 8917 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: 8918 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value: 8919 case BPF_FUNC_skb_output: 8920 case BPF_FUNC_xdp_output: 8921 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY) 8922 goto error; 8923 break; 8924 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output: 8925 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve: 8926 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query: 8927 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr: 8928 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr: 8929 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr: 8930 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF) 8931 goto error; 8932 break; 8933 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 8934 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF) 8935 goto error; 8936 break; 8937 case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid: 8938 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE) 8939 goto error; 8940 break; 8941 case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup: 8942 case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: 8943 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY) 8944 goto error; 8945 break; 8946 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 8947 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP && 8948 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH && 8949 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP && 8950 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) 8951 goto error; 8952 break; 8953 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map: 8954 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map: 8955 case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update: 8956 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP) 8957 goto error; 8958 break; 8959 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash: 8960 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash: 8961 case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update: 8962 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 8963 goto error; 8964 break; 8965 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 8966 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE && 8967 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE) 8968 goto error; 8969 break; 8970 case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport: 8971 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY && 8972 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP && 8973 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 8974 goto error; 8975 break; 8976 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 8977 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 8978 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK) 8979 goto error; 8980 break; 8981 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 8982 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 8983 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 8984 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK && 8985 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER) 8986 goto error; 8987 break; 8988 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 8989 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY && 8990 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH && 8991 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH) 8992 goto error; 8993 break; 8994 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get: 8995 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete: 8996 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE) 8997 goto error; 8998 break; 8999 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get: 9000 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete: 9001 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) 9002 goto error; 9003 break; 9004 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get: 9005 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete: 9006 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE) 9007 goto error; 9008 break; 9009 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get: 9010 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete: 9011 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE) 9012 goto error; 9013 break; 9014 default: 9015 break; 9016 } 9017 9018 return 0; 9019 error: 9020 verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n", 9021 map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 9022 return -EINVAL; 9023 } 9024 9025 static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 9026 { 9027 int count = 0; 9028 9029 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg1_type)) 9030 count++; 9031 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg2_type)) 9032 count++; 9033 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg3_type)) 9034 count++; 9035 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg4_type)) 9036 count++; 9037 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg5_type)) 9038 count++; 9039 9040 /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, 9041 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have 9042 * right now. 9043 */ 9044 return count <= 1; 9045 } 9046 9047 static bool check_args_pair_invalid(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int arg) 9048 { 9049 bool is_fixed = fn->arg_type[arg] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE; 9050 bool has_size = fn->arg_size[arg] != 0; 9051 bool is_next_size = false; 9052 9053 if (arg + 1 < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type)) 9054 is_next_size = arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg_type[arg + 1]); 9055 9056 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[arg]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) 9057 return is_next_size; 9058 9059 return has_size == is_next_size || is_next_size == is_fixed; 9060 } 9061 9062 static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 9063 { 9064 /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' 9065 * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need 9066 * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy 9067 * helper function specification. 9068 */ 9069 if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) || 9070 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 0) || 9071 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 1) || 9072 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 2) || 9073 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 3) || 9074 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 4)) 9075 return false; 9076 9077 return true; 9078 } 9079 9080 static bool check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 9081 { 9082 int i; 9083 9084 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) { 9085 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 9086 return !!fn->arg_btf_id[i]; 9087 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 9088 return fn->arg_btf_id[i] == BPF_PTR_POISON; 9089 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && fn->arg_btf_id[i] && 9090 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 9091 (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM || 9092 !(fn->arg_type[i] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE))) 9093 return false; 9094 } 9095 9096 return true; 9097 } 9098 9099 static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id) 9100 { 9101 return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) && 9102 check_arg_pair_ok(fn) && 9103 check_btf_id_ok(fn) ? 0 : -EINVAL; 9104 } 9105 9106 /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] 9107 * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE. 9108 * 9109 * This also applies to dynptr slices belonging to skb and xdp dynptrs, 9110 * since these slices point to packet data. 9111 */ 9112 static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9113 { 9114 struct bpf_func_state *state; 9115 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 9116 9117 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 9118 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg) || reg_is_dynptr_slice_pkt(reg)) 9119 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 9120 })); 9121 } 9122 9123 enum { 9124 AT_PKT_END = -1, 9125 BEYOND_PKT_END = -2, 9126 }; 9127 9128 static void mark_pkt_end(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, int regn, bool range_open) 9129 { 9130 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 9131 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regn]; 9132 9133 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET) 9134 /* PTR_TO_PACKET_META is not supported yet */ 9135 return; 9136 9137 /* The 'reg' is pkt > pkt_end or pkt >= pkt_end. 9138 * How far beyond pkt_end it goes is unknown. 9139 * if (!range_open) it's the case of pkt >= pkt_end 9140 * if (range_open) it's the case of pkt > pkt_end 9141 * hence this pointer is at least 1 byte bigger than pkt_end 9142 */ 9143 if (range_open) 9144 reg->range = BEYOND_PKT_END; 9145 else 9146 reg->range = AT_PKT_END; 9147 } 9148 9149 /* The pointer with the specified id has released its reference to kernel 9150 * resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference. 9151 */ 9152 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9153 int ref_obj_id) 9154 { 9155 struct bpf_func_state *state; 9156 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 9157 int err; 9158 9159 err = release_reference_state(cur_func(env), ref_obj_id); 9160 if (err) 9161 return err; 9162 9163 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 9164 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) 9165 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 9166 })); 9167 9168 return 0; 9169 } 9170 9171 static void invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9172 { 9173 struct bpf_func_state *unused; 9174 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 9175 9176 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, unused, reg, ({ 9177 if (type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) 9178 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 9179 })); 9180 } 9181 9182 static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9183 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 9184 { 9185 int i; 9186 9187 /* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */ 9188 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 9189 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 9190 __check_reg_arg(env, regs, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 9191 } 9192 } 9193 9194 typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9195 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9196 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 9197 int insn_idx); 9198 9199 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9200 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9201 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx); 9202 9203 static int setup_func_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog, int callsite, 9204 set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb, 9205 struct bpf_verifier_state *state) 9206 { 9207 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 9208 int err; 9209 9210 if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 9211 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n", 9212 state->curframe + 2); 9213 return -E2BIG; 9214 } 9215 9216 if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) { 9217 verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n", 9218 state->curframe + 1); 9219 return -EFAULT; 9220 } 9221 9222 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 9223 callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL); 9224 if (!callee) 9225 return -ENOMEM; 9226 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee; 9227 9228 /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write 9229 * into its own stack before reading from it. 9230 * callee can read/write into caller's stack 9231 */ 9232 init_func_state(env, callee, 9233 /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */ 9234 callsite, 9235 state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */, 9236 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 9237 /* Transfer references to the callee */ 9238 err = copy_reference_state(callee, caller); 9239 err = err ?: set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, callsite); 9240 if (err) 9241 goto err_out; 9242 9243 /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */ 9244 state->curframe++; 9245 9246 return 0; 9247 9248 err_out: 9249 free_func_state(callee); 9250 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; 9251 return err; 9252 } 9253 9254 static int push_callback_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 9255 int insn_idx, int subprog, 9256 set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb) 9257 { 9258 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state, *callback_state; 9259 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 9260 int err; 9261 9262 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 9263 err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs); 9264 if (err == -EFAULT) 9265 return err; 9266 9267 /* set_callee_state is used for direct subprog calls, but we are 9268 * interested in validating only BPF helpers that can call subprogs as 9269 * callbacks 9270 */ 9271 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && 9272 !is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)) { 9273 verbose(env, "verifier bug: kfunc %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n", 9274 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 9275 return -EFAULT; 9276 } else if (!bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && 9277 !is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) { /* helper */ 9278 verbose(env, "verifier bug: helper %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n", 9279 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 9280 return -EFAULT; 9281 } 9282 9283 if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 9284 insn->src_reg == 0 && 9285 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { 9286 struct bpf_verifier_state *async_cb; 9287 9288 /* there is no real recursion here. timer callbacks are async */ 9289 env->subprog_info[subprog].is_async_cb = true; 9290 async_cb = push_async_cb(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, 9291 insn_idx, subprog); 9292 if (!async_cb) 9293 return -EFAULT; 9294 callee = async_cb->frame[0]; 9295 callee->async_entry_cnt = caller->async_entry_cnt + 1; 9296 9297 /* Convert bpf_timer_set_callback() args into timer callback args */ 9298 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, insn_idx); 9299 if (err) 9300 return err; 9301 9302 return 0; 9303 } 9304 9305 /* for callback functions enqueue entry to callback and 9306 * proceed with next instruction within current frame. 9307 */ 9308 callback_state = push_stack(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, insn_idx, false); 9309 if (!callback_state) 9310 return -ENOMEM; 9311 9312 err = setup_func_entry(env, subprog, insn_idx, set_callee_state_cb, 9313 callback_state); 9314 if (err) 9315 return err; 9316 9317 callback_state->callback_unroll_depth++; 9318 callback_state->frame[callback_state->curframe - 1]->callback_depth++; 9319 caller->callback_depth = 0; 9320 return 0; 9321 } 9322 9323 static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 9324 int *insn_idx) 9325 { 9326 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 9327 struct bpf_func_state *caller; 9328 int err, subprog, target_insn; 9329 9330 target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1; 9331 subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn); 9332 if (subprog < 0) { 9333 verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", target_insn); 9334 return -EFAULT; 9335 } 9336 9337 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 9338 err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs); 9339 if (err == -EFAULT) 9340 return err; 9341 if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) { 9342 if (err) { 9343 verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n", subprog); 9344 return err; 9345 } 9346 9347 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 9348 verbose(env, "Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n", subprog); 9349 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 9350 9351 /* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */ 9352 mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); 9353 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 9354 9355 /* continue with next insn after call */ 9356 return 0; 9357 } 9358 9359 /* for regular function entry setup new frame and continue 9360 * from that frame. 9361 */ 9362 err = setup_func_entry(env, subprog, *insn_idx, set_callee_state, state); 9363 if (err) 9364 return err; 9365 9366 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 9367 9368 /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */ 9369 *insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1; 9370 9371 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 9372 verbose(env, "caller:\n"); 9373 print_verifier_state(env, caller, true); 9374 verbose(env, "callee:\n"); 9375 print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe], true); 9376 } 9377 9378 return 0; 9379 } 9380 9381 int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9382 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9383 struct bpf_func_state *callee) 9384 { 9385 /* bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, 9386 * void *callback_ctx, u64 flags); 9387 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 9388 * void *callback_ctx); 9389 */ 9390 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 9391 9392 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 9393 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 9394 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 9395 9396 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 9397 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 9398 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 9399 9400 /* pointer to stack or null */ 9401 callee->regs[BPF_REG_4] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 9402 9403 /* unused */ 9404 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 9405 return 0; 9406 } 9407 9408 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9409 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9410 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx) 9411 { 9412 int i; 9413 9414 /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access. The copy includes parent 9415 * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain 9416 */ 9417 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 9418 callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i]; 9419 return 0; 9420 } 9421 9422 static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9423 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9424 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 9425 int insn_idx) 9426 { 9427 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 9428 struct bpf_map *map; 9429 int err; 9430 9431 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(insn_aux)) { 9432 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 9433 return -EINVAL; 9434 } 9435 9436 map = BPF_MAP_PTR(insn_aux->map_ptr_state); 9437 if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args || 9438 !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) { 9439 verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n"); 9440 return -ENOTSUPP; 9441 } 9442 9443 err = map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args(env, caller, callee); 9444 if (err) 9445 return err; 9446 9447 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 9448 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 9449 return 0; 9450 } 9451 9452 static int set_loop_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9453 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9454 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 9455 int insn_idx) 9456 { 9457 /* bpf_loop(u32 nr_loops, void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, 9458 * u64 flags); 9459 * callback_fn(u32 index, void *callback_ctx); 9460 */ 9461 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 9462 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 9463 9464 /* unused */ 9465 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 9466 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 9467 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 9468 9469 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 9470 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 9471 return 0; 9472 } 9473 9474 static int set_timer_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9475 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9476 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 9477 int insn_idx) 9478 { 9479 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 9480 9481 /* bpf_timer_set_callback(struct bpf_timer *timer, void *callback_fn); 9482 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value); 9483 */ 9484 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 9485 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 9486 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr = map_ptr; 9487 9488 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 9489 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 9490 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = map_ptr; 9491 9492 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 9493 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 9494 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = map_ptr; 9495 9496 /* unused */ 9497 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 9498 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 9499 callee->in_async_callback_fn = true; 9500 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 9501 return 0; 9502 } 9503 9504 static int set_find_vma_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9505 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9506 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 9507 int insn_idx) 9508 { 9509 /* bpf_find_vma(struct task_struct *task, u64 addr, 9510 * void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, u64 flags) 9511 * (callback_fn)(struct task_struct *task, 9512 * struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *callback_ctx); 9513 */ 9514 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 9515 9516 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 9517 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 9518 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf = btf_vmlinux; 9519 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf_id = btf_tracing_ids[BTF_TRACING_TYPE_VMA], 9520 9521 /* pointer to stack or null */ 9522 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_4]; 9523 9524 /* unused */ 9525 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 9526 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 9527 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 9528 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 9529 return 0; 9530 } 9531 9532 static int set_user_ringbuf_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9533 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9534 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 9535 int insn_idx) 9536 { 9537 /* bpf_user_ringbuf_drain(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, void 9538 * callback_ctx, u64 flags); 9539 * callback_fn(const struct bpf_dynptr_t* dynptr, void *callback_ctx); 9540 */ 9541 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 9542 mark_dynptr_cb_reg(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_1], BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL); 9543 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 9544 9545 /* unused */ 9546 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 9547 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 9548 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 9549 9550 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 9551 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 9552 return 0; 9553 } 9554 9555 static int set_rbtree_add_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9556 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 9557 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 9558 int insn_idx) 9559 { 9560 /* void bpf_rbtree_add_impl(struct bpf_rb_root *root, struct bpf_rb_node *node, 9561 * bool (less)(struct bpf_rb_node *a, const struct bpf_rb_node *b)); 9562 * 9563 * 'struct bpf_rb_node *node' arg to bpf_rbtree_add_impl is the same PTR_TO_BTF_ID w/ offset 9564 * that 'less' callback args will be receiving. However, 'node' arg was release_reference'd 9565 * by this point, so look at 'root' 9566 */ 9567 struct btf_field *field; 9568 9569 field = reg_find_field_offset(&caller->regs[BPF_REG_1], caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].off, 9570 BPF_RB_ROOT); 9571 if (!field || !field->graph_root.value_btf_id) 9572 return -EFAULT; 9573 9574 mark_reg_graph_node(callee->regs, BPF_REG_1, &field->graph_root); 9575 ref_set_non_owning(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 9576 mark_reg_graph_node(callee->regs, BPF_REG_2, &field->graph_root); 9577 ref_set_non_owning(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 9578 9579 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 9580 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 9581 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 9582 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 9583 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 9584 return 0; 9585 } 9586 9587 static bool is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 9588 9589 /* Are we currently verifying the callback for a rbtree helper that must 9590 * be called with lock held? If so, no need to complain about unreleased 9591 * lock 9592 */ 9593 static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9594 { 9595 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 9596 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 9597 struct bpf_func_state *callee; 9598 int kfunc_btf_id; 9599 9600 if (!state->curframe) 9601 return false; 9602 9603 callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; 9604 9605 if (!callee->in_callback_fn) 9606 return false; 9607 9608 kfunc_btf_id = insn[callee->callsite].imm; 9609 return is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id); 9610 } 9611 9612 static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) 9613 { 9614 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state, *prev_st; 9615 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 9616 struct bpf_reg_state *r0; 9617 bool in_callback_fn; 9618 int err; 9619 9620 callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; 9621 r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]; 9622 if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 9623 /* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer 9624 * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller, 9625 * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack 9626 * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits, 9627 * but let's be conservative 9628 */ 9629 verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n"); 9630 return -EINVAL; 9631 } 9632 9633 caller = state->frame[state->curframe - 1]; 9634 if (callee->in_callback_fn) { 9635 /* enforce R0 return value range [0, 1]. */ 9636 struct tnum range = callee->callback_ret_range; 9637 9638 if (r0->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 9639 verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n"); 9640 return -EACCES; 9641 } 9642 9643 /* we are going to rely on register's precise value */ 9644 err = mark_reg_read(env, r0, r0->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 9645 err = err ?: mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_0); 9646 if (err) 9647 return err; 9648 9649 if (!tnum_in(range, r0->var_off)) { 9650 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, &range, "callback return", "R0"); 9651 return -EINVAL; 9652 } 9653 if (!calls_callback(env, callee->callsite)) { 9654 verbose(env, "BUG: in callback at %d, callsite %d !calls_callback\n", 9655 *insn_idx, callee->callsite); 9656 return -EFAULT; 9657 } 9658 } else { 9659 /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */ 9660 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; 9661 } 9662 9663 /* callback_fn frame should have released its own additions to parent's 9664 * reference state at this point, or check_reference_leak would 9665 * complain, hence it must be the same as the caller. There is no need 9666 * to copy it back. 9667 */ 9668 if (!callee->in_callback_fn) { 9669 /* Transfer references to the caller */ 9670 err = copy_reference_state(caller, callee); 9671 if (err) 9672 return err; 9673 } 9674 9675 /* for callbacks like bpf_loop or bpf_for_each_map_elem go back to callsite, 9676 * there function call logic would reschedule callback visit. If iteration 9677 * converges is_state_visited() would prune that visit eventually. 9678 */ 9679 in_callback_fn = callee->in_callback_fn; 9680 if (in_callback_fn) 9681 *insn_idx = callee->callsite; 9682 else 9683 *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; 9684 9685 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 9686 verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n"); 9687 print_verifier_state(env, callee, true); 9688 verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx); 9689 print_verifier_state(env, caller, true); 9690 } 9691 /* clear everything in the callee */ 9692 free_func_state(callee); 9693 state->frame[state->curframe--] = NULL; 9694 9695 /* for callbacks widen imprecise scalars to make programs like below verify: 9696 * 9697 * struct ctx { int i; } 9698 * void cb(int idx, struct ctx *ctx) { ctx->i++; ... } 9699 * ... 9700 * struct ctx = { .i = 0; } 9701 * bpf_loop(100, cb, &ctx, 0); 9702 * 9703 * This is similar to what is done in process_iter_next_call() for open 9704 * coded iterators. 9705 */ 9706 prev_st = in_callback_fn ? find_prev_entry(env, state, *insn_idx) : NULL; 9707 if (prev_st) { 9708 err = widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, state); 9709 if (err) 9710 return err; 9711 } 9712 return 0; 9713 } 9714 9715 static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, 9716 int func_id, 9717 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 9718 { 9719 struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0]; 9720 9721 if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER) 9722 return; 9723 9724 switch (func_id) { 9725 case BPF_FUNC_get_stack: 9726 case BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack: 9727 case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str: 9728 case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str: 9729 case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str: 9730 ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value; 9731 ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value; 9732 ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 9733 ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 9734 reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg); 9735 break; 9736 case BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id: 9737 ret_reg->umax_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 9738 ret_reg->u32_max_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 9739 ret_reg->smax_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 9740 ret_reg->s32_max_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 9741 ret_reg->umin_value = 0; 9742 ret_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 9743 ret_reg->smin_value = 0; 9744 ret_reg->s32_min_value = 0; 9745 reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg); 9746 break; 9747 } 9748 } 9749 9750 static int 9751 record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 9752 int func_id, int insn_idx) 9753 { 9754 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 9755 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 9756 9757 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call && 9758 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 9759 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && 9760 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 9761 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem && 9762 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 9763 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 9764 func_id != BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem && 9765 func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 9766 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem) 9767 return 0; 9768 9769 if (map == NULL) { 9770 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 9771 return -EINVAL; 9772 } 9773 9774 /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions 9775 * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the 9776 * state of the map from program side. 9777 */ 9778 if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 9779 (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 9780 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 9781 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 9782 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) { 9783 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n"); 9784 return -EACCES; 9785 } 9786 9787 if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state)) 9788 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, 9789 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 9790 else if (BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) != meta->map_ptr) 9791 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON, 9792 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 9793 return 0; 9794 } 9795 9796 static int 9797 record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 9798 int func_id, int insn_idx) 9799 { 9800 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 9801 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg; 9802 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 9803 u64 val, max; 9804 int err; 9805 9806 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 9807 return 0; 9808 if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) { 9809 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 9810 return -EINVAL; 9811 } 9812 9813 reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 9814 val = reg->var_off.value; 9815 max = map->max_entries; 9816 9817 if (!(register_is_const(reg) && val < max)) { 9818 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 9819 return 0; 9820 } 9821 9822 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3); 9823 if (err) 9824 return err; 9825 if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux)) 9826 bpf_map_key_store(aux, val); 9827 else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 9828 bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val) 9829 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 9830 return 0; 9831 } 9832 9833 static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9834 { 9835 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 9836 bool refs_lingering = false; 9837 int i; 9838 9839 if (state->frameno && !state->in_callback_fn) 9840 return 0; 9841 9842 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 9843 if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno) 9844 continue; 9845 verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n", 9846 state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx); 9847 refs_lingering = true; 9848 } 9849 return refs_lingering ? -EINVAL : 0; 9850 } 9851 9852 static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9853 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 9854 { 9855 struct bpf_reg_state *fmt_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 9856 struct bpf_reg_state *data_len_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_5]; 9857 struct bpf_map *fmt_map = fmt_reg->map_ptr; 9858 struct bpf_bprintf_data data = {}; 9859 int err, fmt_map_off, num_args; 9860 u64 fmt_addr; 9861 char *fmt; 9862 9863 /* data must be an array of u64 */ 9864 if (data_len_reg->var_off.value % 8) 9865 return -EINVAL; 9866 num_args = data_len_reg->var_off.value / 8; 9867 9868 /* fmt being ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR guarantees that var_off is const 9869 * and map_direct_value_addr is set. 9870 */ 9871 fmt_map_off = fmt_reg->off + fmt_reg->var_off.value; 9872 err = fmt_map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(fmt_map, &fmt_addr, 9873 fmt_map_off); 9874 if (err) { 9875 verbose(env, "verifier bug\n"); 9876 return -EFAULT; 9877 } 9878 fmt = (char *)(long)fmt_addr + fmt_map_off; 9879 9880 /* We are also guaranteed that fmt+fmt_map_off is NULL terminated, we 9881 * can focus on validating the format specifiers. 9882 */ 9883 err = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, num_args, &data); 9884 if (err < 0) 9885 verbose(env, "Invalid format string\n"); 9886 9887 return err; 9888 } 9889 9890 static int check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9891 { 9892 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 9893 int func_id = BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip; 9894 9895 if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) { 9896 if (!bpf_prog_has_trampoline(env->prog)) { 9897 verbose(env, "func %s#%d supported only for fentry/fexit/fmod_ret programs\n", 9898 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 9899 return -ENOTSUPP; 9900 } 9901 return 0; 9902 } else if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) { 9903 return 0; 9904 } 9905 9906 verbose(env, "func %s#%d not supported for program type %d\n", 9907 func_id_name(func_id), func_id, type); 9908 return -ENOTSUPP; 9909 } 9910 9911 static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9912 { 9913 return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]; 9914 } 9915 9916 static bool loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9917 { 9918 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 9919 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[BPF_REG_4]; 9920 bool reg_is_null = register_is_null(reg); 9921 9922 if (reg_is_null) 9923 mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_4); 9924 9925 return reg_is_null; 9926 } 9927 9928 static void update_loop_inline_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 subprogno) 9929 { 9930 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *state = &cur_aux(env)->loop_inline_state; 9931 9932 if (!state->initialized) { 9933 state->initialized = 1; 9934 state->fit_for_inline = loop_flag_is_zero(env); 9935 state->callback_subprogno = subprogno; 9936 return; 9937 } 9938 9939 if (!state->fit_for_inline) 9940 return; 9941 9942 state->fit_for_inline = (loop_flag_is_zero(env) && 9943 state->callback_subprogno == subprogno); 9944 } 9945 9946 static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 9947 int *insn_idx_p) 9948 { 9949 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 9950 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL; 9951 enum bpf_return_type ret_type; 9952 enum bpf_type_flag ret_flag; 9953 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 9954 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 9955 int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 9956 bool changes_data; 9957 int i, err, func_id; 9958 9959 /* find function prototype */ 9960 func_id = insn->imm; 9961 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) { 9962 verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 9963 func_id); 9964 return -EINVAL; 9965 } 9966 9967 if (env->ops->get_func_proto) 9968 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog); 9969 if (!fn) { 9970 verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 9971 func_id); 9972 return -EINVAL; 9973 } 9974 9975 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */ 9976 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) { 9977 verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 9978 return -EINVAL; 9979 } 9980 9981 if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) { 9982 verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n"); 9983 return -EINVAL; 9984 } 9985 9986 if (!env->prog->aux->sleepable && fn->might_sleep) { 9987 verbose(env, "helper call might sleep in a non-sleepable prog\n"); 9988 return -EINVAL; 9989 } 9990 9991 /* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */ 9992 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func); 9993 if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { 9994 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n", 9995 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 9996 return -EINVAL; 9997 } 9998 9999 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 10000 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access; 10001 10002 err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id); 10003 if (err) { 10004 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 10005 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 10006 return err; 10007 } 10008 10009 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 10010 if (fn->might_sleep) { 10011 verbose(env, "sleepable helper %s#%d in rcu_read_lock region\n", 10012 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 10013 return -EINVAL; 10014 } 10015 10016 if (env->prog->aux->sleepable && is_storage_get_function(func_id)) 10017 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].storage_get_func_atomic = true; 10018 } 10019 10020 meta.func_id = func_id; 10021 /* check args */ 10022 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) { 10023 err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn, insn_idx); 10024 if (err) 10025 return err; 10026 } 10027 10028 err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 10029 if (err) 10030 return err; 10031 10032 err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 10033 if (err) 10034 return err; 10035 10036 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset 10037 * is inferred from register state. 10038 */ 10039 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) { 10040 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, 10041 BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 10042 if (err) 10043 return err; 10044 } 10045 10046 regs = cur_regs(env); 10047 10048 if (meta.release_regno) { 10049 err = -EINVAL; 10050 /* This can only be set for PTR_TO_STACK, as CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot 10051 * be released by any dynptr helper. Hence, unmark_stack_slots_dynptr 10052 * is safe to do directly. 10053 */ 10054 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno - BPF_REG_1])) { 10055 if (regs[meta.release_regno].type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 10056 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot be released\n"); 10057 return -EFAULT; 10058 } 10059 err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, ®s[meta.release_regno]); 10060 } else if (meta.ref_obj_id) { 10061 err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id); 10062 } else if (register_is_null(®s[meta.release_regno])) { 10063 /* meta.ref_obj_id can only be 0 if register that is meant to be 10064 * released is NULL, which must be > R0. 10065 */ 10066 err = 0; 10067 } 10068 if (err) { 10069 verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 10070 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 10071 return err; 10072 } 10073 } 10074 10075 switch (func_id) { 10076 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 10077 err = check_reference_leak(env); 10078 if (err) { 10079 verbose(env, "tail_call would lead to reference leak\n"); 10080 return err; 10081 } 10082 break; 10083 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 10084 /* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0, 10085 * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error. 10086 */ 10087 if (!register_is_null(®s[BPF_REG_2])) { 10088 verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n"); 10089 return -EINVAL; 10090 } 10091 break; 10092 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 10093 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 10094 set_map_elem_callback_state); 10095 break; 10096 case BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback: 10097 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 10098 set_timer_callback_state); 10099 break; 10100 case BPF_FUNC_find_vma: 10101 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 10102 set_find_vma_callback_state); 10103 break; 10104 case BPF_FUNC_snprintf: 10105 err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs); 10106 break; 10107 case BPF_FUNC_loop: 10108 update_loop_inline_state(env, meta.subprogno); 10109 /* Verifier relies on R1 value to determine if bpf_loop() iteration 10110 * is finished, thus mark it precise. 10111 */ 10112 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_1); 10113 if (err) 10114 return err; 10115 if (cur_func(env)->callback_depth < regs[BPF_REG_1].umax_value) { 10116 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 10117 set_loop_callback_state); 10118 } else { 10119 cur_func(env)->callback_depth = 0; 10120 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 10121 verbose(env, "frame%d bpf_loop iteration limit reached\n", 10122 env->cur_state->curframe); 10123 } 10124 break; 10125 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_from_mem: 10126 if (regs[BPF_REG_1].type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 10127 verbose(env, "Unsupported reg type %s for bpf_dynptr_from_mem data\n", 10128 reg_type_str(env, regs[BPF_REG_1].type)); 10129 return -EACCES; 10130 } 10131 break; 10132 case BPF_FUNC_set_retval: 10133 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 10134 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 10135 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 10136 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 10137 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 10138 */ 10139 verbose(env, "BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 10140 return -EINVAL; 10141 } 10142 } 10143 break; 10144 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data: 10145 { 10146 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 10147 int id, ref_obj_id; 10148 10149 reg = get_dynptr_arg_reg(env, fn, regs); 10150 if (!reg) 10151 return -EFAULT; 10152 10153 10154 if (meta.dynptr_id) { 10155 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: meta.dynptr_id already set\n"); 10156 return -EFAULT; 10157 } 10158 if (meta.ref_obj_id) { 10159 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: meta.ref_obj_id already set\n"); 10160 return -EFAULT; 10161 } 10162 10163 id = dynptr_id(env, reg); 10164 if (id < 0) { 10165 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr id\n"); 10166 return id; 10167 } 10168 10169 ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg); 10170 if (ref_obj_id < 0) { 10171 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr ref_obj_id\n"); 10172 return ref_obj_id; 10173 } 10174 10175 meta.dynptr_id = id; 10176 meta.ref_obj_id = ref_obj_id; 10177 10178 break; 10179 } 10180 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_write: 10181 { 10182 enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type; 10183 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 10184 10185 reg = get_dynptr_arg_reg(env, fn, regs); 10186 if (!reg) 10187 return -EFAULT; 10188 10189 dynptr_type = dynptr_get_type(env, reg); 10190 if (dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) 10191 return -EFAULT; 10192 10193 if (dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB) 10194 /* this will trigger clear_all_pkt_pointers(), which will 10195 * invalidate all dynptr slices associated with the skb 10196 */ 10197 changes_data = true; 10198 10199 break; 10200 } 10201 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 10202 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 10203 set_user_ringbuf_callback_state); 10204 break; 10205 } 10206 10207 if (err) 10208 return err; 10209 10210 /* reset caller saved regs */ 10211 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 10212 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 10213 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 10214 } 10215 10216 /* helper call returns 64-bit value. */ 10217 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 10218 10219 /* update return register (already marked as written above) */ 10220 ret_type = fn->ret_type; 10221 ret_flag = type_flag(ret_type); 10222 10223 switch (base_type(ret_type)) { 10224 case RET_INTEGER: 10225 /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */ 10226 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10227 break; 10228 case RET_VOID: 10229 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT; 10230 break; 10231 case RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 10232 /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */ 10233 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10234 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access() 10235 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access 10236 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() 10237 */ 10238 if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { 10239 verbose(env, 10240 "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 10241 return -EINVAL; 10242 } 10243 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; 10244 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_uid = meta.map_uid; 10245 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | ret_flag; 10246 if (!type_may_be_null(ret_type) && 10247 btf_record_has_field(meta.map_ptr->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 10248 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 10249 } 10250 break; 10251 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET: 10252 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10253 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET | ret_flag; 10254 break; 10255 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 10256 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10257 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON | ret_flag; 10258 break; 10259 case RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 10260 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10261 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK | ret_flag; 10262 break; 10263 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM: 10264 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10265 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 10266 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size; 10267 break; 10268 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID: 10269 { 10270 const struct btf_type *t; 10271 10272 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10273 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta.ret_btf, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL); 10274 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 10275 u32 tsize; 10276 const struct btf_type *ret; 10277 const char *tname; 10278 10279 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 10280 ret = btf_resolve_size(meta.ret_btf, t, &tsize); 10281 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 10282 tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta.ret_btf, t->name_off); 10283 verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 10284 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 10285 return -EINVAL; 10286 } 10287 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 10288 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize; 10289 } else { 10290 /* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it 10291 * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise 10292 * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in 10293 * check_mem_access(). 10294 */ 10295 ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 10296 10297 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 10298 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf; 10299 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 10300 } 10301 break; 10302 } 10303 case RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 10304 { 10305 struct btf *ret_btf; 10306 int ret_btf_id; 10307 10308 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 10309 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 10310 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 10311 ret_btf = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf; 10312 ret_btf_id = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf_id; 10313 if (!btf_is_kernel(ret_btf)) 10314 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_ALLOC; 10315 } else { 10316 if (fn->ret_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 10317 verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); 10318 verbose(env, "func %s has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON return type\n", 10319 func_id_name(func_id)); 10320 return -EINVAL; 10321 } 10322 ret_btf = btf_vmlinux; 10323 ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id; 10324 } 10325 if (ret_btf_id == 0) { 10326 verbose(env, "invalid return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 10327 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), 10328 func_id); 10329 return -EINVAL; 10330 } 10331 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 10332 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 10333 break; 10334 } 10335 default: 10336 verbose(env, "unknown return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 10337 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 10338 return -EINVAL; 10339 } 10340 10341 if (type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type)) 10342 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 10343 10344 if (helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 10345 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: func %s#%d sets ref_obj_id more than once\n", 10346 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 10347 return -EFAULT; 10348 } 10349 10350 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) 10351 regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta.dynptr_id; 10352 10353 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id) || is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) { 10354 /* For release_reference() */ 10355 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 10356 } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 10357 int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 10358 10359 if (id < 0) 10360 return id; 10361 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */ 10362 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 10363 /* For release_reference() */ 10364 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 10365 } 10366 10367 do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); 10368 10369 err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id); 10370 if (err) 10371 return err; 10372 10373 if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack || 10374 func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) && 10375 !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) { 10376 const char *err_str; 10377 10378 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 10379 err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack); 10380 err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n"; 10381 #else 10382 err = -ENOTSUPP; 10383 err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n"; 10384 #endif 10385 if (err) { 10386 verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 10387 return err; 10388 } 10389 10390 env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true; 10391 } 10392 10393 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stackid || func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack) 10394 env->prog->call_get_stack = true; 10395 10396 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 10397 if (check_get_func_ip(env)) 10398 return -ENOTSUPP; 10399 env->prog->call_get_func_ip = true; 10400 } 10401 10402 if (changes_data) 10403 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 10404 return 0; 10405 } 10406 10407 /* mark_btf_func_reg_size() is used when the reg size is determined by 10408 * the BTF func_proto's return value size and argument. 10409 */ 10410 static void mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 10411 size_t reg_size) 10412 { 10413 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 10414 10415 if (regno == BPF_REG_0) { 10416 /* Function return value */ 10417 reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 10418 reg->subreg_def = reg_size == sizeof(u64) ? 10419 DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 10420 } else { 10421 /* Function argument */ 10422 if (reg_size == sizeof(u64)) { 10423 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 10424 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 10425 } else { 10426 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ32); 10427 } 10428 } 10429 } 10430 10431 static bool is_kfunc_acquire(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10432 { 10433 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ACQUIRE; 10434 } 10435 10436 static bool is_kfunc_release(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10437 { 10438 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RELEASE; 10439 } 10440 10441 static bool is_kfunc_trusted_args(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10442 { 10443 return (meta->kfunc_flags & KF_TRUSTED_ARGS) || is_kfunc_release(meta); 10444 } 10445 10446 static bool is_kfunc_sleepable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10447 { 10448 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_SLEEPABLE; 10449 } 10450 10451 static bool is_kfunc_destructive(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10452 { 10453 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_DESTRUCTIVE; 10454 } 10455 10456 static bool is_kfunc_rcu(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10457 { 10458 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU; 10459 } 10460 10461 static bool __kfunc_param_match_suffix(const struct btf *btf, 10462 const struct btf_param *arg, 10463 const char *suffix) 10464 { 10465 int suffix_len = strlen(suffix), len; 10466 const char *param_name; 10467 10468 /* In the future, this can be ported to use BTF tagging */ 10469 param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off); 10470 if (str_is_empty(param_name)) 10471 return false; 10472 len = strlen(param_name); 10473 if (len < suffix_len) 10474 return false; 10475 param_name += len - suffix_len; 10476 return !strncmp(param_name, suffix, suffix_len); 10477 } 10478 10479 static bool is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(const struct btf *btf, 10480 const struct btf_param *arg, 10481 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 10482 { 10483 const struct btf_type *t; 10484 10485 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 10486 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 10487 return false; 10488 10489 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__sz"); 10490 } 10491 10492 static bool is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(const struct btf *btf, 10493 const struct btf_param *arg, 10494 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 10495 { 10496 const struct btf_type *t; 10497 10498 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 10499 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 10500 return false; 10501 10502 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__szk"); 10503 } 10504 10505 static bool is_kfunc_arg_optional(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10506 { 10507 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__opt"); 10508 } 10509 10510 static bool is_kfunc_arg_constant(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10511 { 10512 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__k"); 10513 } 10514 10515 static bool is_kfunc_arg_ignore(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10516 { 10517 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__ign"); 10518 } 10519 10520 static bool is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10521 { 10522 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__alloc"); 10523 } 10524 10525 static bool is_kfunc_arg_uninit(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10526 { 10527 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__uninit"); 10528 } 10529 10530 static bool is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10531 { 10532 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__refcounted_kptr"); 10533 } 10534 10535 static bool is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(const struct btf *btf, 10536 const struct btf_param *arg, 10537 const char *name) 10538 { 10539 int len, target_len = strlen(name); 10540 const char *param_name; 10541 10542 param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off); 10543 if (str_is_empty(param_name)) 10544 return false; 10545 len = strlen(param_name); 10546 if (len != target_len) 10547 return false; 10548 if (strcmp(param_name, name)) 10549 return false; 10550 10551 return true; 10552 } 10553 10554 enum { 10555 KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID, 10556 KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID, 10557 KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID, 10558 KF_ARG_RB_ROOT_ID, 10559 KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID, 10560 }; 10561 10562 BTF_ID_LIST(kf_arg_btf_ids) 10563 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_dynptr_kern) 10564 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_head) 10565 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_node) 10566 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_rb_root) 10567 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_rb_node) 10568 10569 static bool __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(const struct btf *btf, 10570 const struct btf_param *arg, int type) 10571 { 10572 const struct btf_type *t; 10573 u32 res_id; 10574 10575 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 10576 if (!t) 10577 return false; 10578 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 10579 return false; 10580 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &res_id); 10581 if (!t) 10582 return false; 10583 return btf_types_are_same(btf, res_id, btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[type]); 10584 } 10585 10586 static bool is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10587 { 10588 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID); 10589 } 10590 10591 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_head(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10592 { 10593 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID); 10594 } 10595 10596 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10597 { 10598 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID); 10599 } 10600 10601 static bool is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_root(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10602 { 10603 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RB_ROOT_ID); 10604 } 10605 10606 static bool is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 10607 { 10608 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID); 10609 } 10610 10611 static bool is_kfunc_arg_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct btf *btf, 10612 const struct btf_param *arg) 10613 { 10614 const struct btf_type *t; 10615 10616 t = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf, arg->type, NULL); 10617 if (!t) 10618 return false; 10619 10620 return true; 10621 } 10622 10623 /* Returns true if struct is composed of scalars, 4 levels of nesting allowed */ 10624 static bool __btf_type_is_scalar_struct(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10625 const struct btf *btf, 10626 const struct btf_type *t, int rec) 10627 { 10628 const struct btf_type *member_type; 10629 const struct btf_member *member; 10630 u32 i; 10631 10632 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) 10633 return false; 10634 10635 for_each_member(i, t, member) { 10636 const struct btf_array *array; 10637 10638 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, member->type, NULL); 10639 if (btf_type_is_struct(member_type)) { 10640 if (rec >= 3) { 10641 verbose(env, "max struct nesting depth exceeded\n"); 10642 return false; 10643 } 10644 if (!__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, btf, member_type, rec + 1)) 10645 return false; 10646 continue; 10647 } 10648 if (btf_type_is_array(member_type)) { 10649 array = btf_array(member_type); 10650 if (!array->nelems) 10651 return false; 10652 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, array->type, NULL); 10653 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 10654 return false; 10655 continue; 10656 } 10657 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 10658 return false; 10659 } 10660 return true; 10661 } 10662 10663 enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type { 10664 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, 10665 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID, /* Allocated object */ 10666 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR, /* Refcounted local kptr */ 10667 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, 10668 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER, 10669 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD, 10670 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE, 10671 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID, /* Also covers reg2btf_ids conversions */ 10672 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, 10673 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE, /* Size derived from next argument, skip it */ 10674 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK, 10675 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT, 10676 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE, 10677 }; 10678 10679 enum special_kfunc_type { 10680 KF_bpf_obj_new_impl, 10681 KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl, 10682 KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl, 10683 KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl, 10684 KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl, 10685 KF_bpf_list_pop_front, 10686 KF_bpf_list_pop_back, 10687 KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx, 10688 KF_bpf_rdonly_cast, 10689 KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock, 10690 KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock, 10691 KF_bpf_rbtree_remove, 10692 KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl, 10693 KF_bpf_rbtree_first, 10694 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb, 10695 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_xdp, 10696 KF_bpf_dynptr_slice, 10697 KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr, 10698 KF_bpf_dynptr_clone, 10699 }; 10700 10701 BTF_SET_START(special_kfunc_set) 10702 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl) 10703 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl) 10704 BTF_ID(func, bpf_refcount_acquire_impl) 10705 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front_impl) 10706 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back_impl) 10707 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front) 10708 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back) 10709 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx) 10710 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast) 10711 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_remove) 10712 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_add_impl) 10713 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_first) 10714 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_skb) 10715 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_xdp) 10716 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice) 10717 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr) 10718 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_clone) 10719 BTF_SET_END(special_kfunc_set) 10720 10721 BTF_ID_LIST(special_kfunc_list) 10722 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl) 10723 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl) 10724 BTF_ID(func, bpf_refcount_acquire_impl) 10725 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front_impl) 10726 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back_impl) 10727 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front) 10728 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back) 10729 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx) 10730 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast) 10731 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_lock) 10732 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_unlock) 10733 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_remove) 10734 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_add_impl) 10735 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_first) 10736 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_skb) 10737 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_xdp) 10738 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice) 10739 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr) 10740 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_clone) 10741 10742 static bool is_kfunc_ret_null(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10743 { 10744 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl] && 10745 meta->arg_owning_ref) { 10746 return false; 10747 } 10748 10749 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RET_NULL; 10750 } 10751 10752 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10753 { 10754 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock]; 10755 } 10756 10757 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10758 { 10759 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock]; 10760 } 10761 10762 static enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type 10763 get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10764 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 10765 const struct btf_type *t, const struct btf_type *ref_t, 10766 const char *ref_tname, const struct btf_param *args, 10767 int argno, int nargs) 10768 { 10769 u32 regno = argno + 1; 10770 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 10771 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 10772 bool arg_mem_size = false; 10773 10774 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) 10775 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 10776 10777 /* In this function, we verify the kfunc's BTF as per the argument type, 10778 * leaving the rest of the verification with respect to the register 10779 * type to our caller. When a set of conditions hold in the BTF type of 10780 * arguments, we resolve it to a known kfunc_ptr_arg_type. 10781 */ 10782 if (btf_get_prog_ctx_type(&env->log, meta->btf, t, resolve_prog_type(env->prog), argno)) 10783 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 10784 10785 if (is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10786 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID; 10787 10788 if (is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10789 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR; 10790 10791 if (is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10792 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 10793 10794 if (is_kfunc_arg_iter(meta, argno)) 10795 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER; 10796 10797 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_head(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10798 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD; 10799 10800 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_node(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10801 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE; 10802 10803 if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_root(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10804 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT; 10805 10806 if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10807 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE; 10808 10809 if ((base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)])) { 10810 if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) { 10811 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 10812 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 10813 return -EINVAL; 10814 } 10815 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 10816 } 10817 10818 if (is_kfunc_arg_callback(env, meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10819 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK; 10820 10821 10822 if (argno + 1 < nargs && 10823 (is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], ®s[regno + 1]) || 10824 is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], ®s[regno + 1]))) 10825 arg_mem_size = true; 10826 10827 /* This is the catch all argument type of register types supported by 10828 * check_helper_mem_access. However, we only allow when argument type is 10829 * pointer to scalar, or struct composed (recursively) of scalars. When 10830 * arg_mem_size is true, the pointer can be void *. 10831 */ 10832 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(ref_t) && !__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, meta->btf, ref_t, 0) && 10833 (arg_mem_size ? !btf_type_is_void(ref_t) : 1)) { 10834 verbose(env, "arg#%d pointer type %s %s must point to %sscalar, or struct with scalar\n", 10835 argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, arg_mem_size ? "void, " : ""); 10836 return -EINVAL; 10837 } 10838 return arg_mem_size ? KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE : KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM; 10839 } 10840 10841 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10842 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 10843 const struct btf_type *ref_t, 10844 const char *ref_tname, u32 ref_id, 10845 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 10846 int argno) 10847 { 10848 const struct btf_type *reg_ref_t; 10849 bool strict_type_match = false; 10850 const struct btf *reg_btf; 10851 const char *reg_ref_tname; 10852 u32 reg_ref_id; 10853 10854 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 10855 reg_btf = reg->btf; 10856 reg_ref_id = reg->btf_id; 10857 } else { 10858 reg_btf = btf_vmlinux; 10859 reg_ref_id = *reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]; 10860 } 10861 10862 /* Enforce strict type matching for calls to kfuncs that are acquiring 10863 * or releasing a reference, or are no-cast aliases. We do _not_ 10864 * enforce strict matching for plain KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs by default, 10865 * as we want to enable BPF programs to pass types that are bitwise 10866 * equivalent without forcing them to explicitly cast with something 10867 * like bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx(). 10868 * 10869 * For example, say we had a type like the following: 10870 * 10871 * struct bpf_cpumask { 10872 * cpumask_t cpumask; 10873 * refcount_t usage; 10874 * }; 10875 * 10876 * Note that as specified in <linux/cpumask.h>, cpumask_t is typedef'ed 10877 * to a struct cpumask, so it would be safe to pass a struct 10878 * bpf_cpumask * to a kfunc expecting a struct cpumask *. 10879 * 10880 * The philosophy here is similar to how we allow scalars of different 10881 * types to be passed to kfuncs as long as the size is the same. The 10882 * only difference here is that we're simply allowing 10883 * btf_struct_ids_match() to walk the struct at the 0th offset, and 10884 * resolve types. 10885 */ 10886 if (is_kfunc_acquire(meta) || 10887 (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) || 10888 btf_type_ids_nocast_alias(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, meta->btf, ref_id)) 10889 strict_type_match = true; 10890 10891 WARN_ON_ONCE(is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && reg->off); 10892 10893 reg_ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(reg_btf, reg_ref_id, ®_ref_id); 10894 reg_ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg_btf, reg_ref_t->name_off); 10895 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, reg->off, meta->btf, ref_id, strict_type_match)) { 10896 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d expected pointer to %s %s but R%d has a pointer to %s %s\n", 10897 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, argno + 1, 10898 btf_type_str(reg_ref_t), reg_ref_tname); 10899 return -EINVAL; 10900 } 10901 return 0; 10902 } 10903 10904 static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 10905 { 10906 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 10907 struct btf_record *rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 10908 10909 if (!state->active_lock.ptr) { 10910 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_set_non_owning w/o active lock\n"); 10911 return -EFAULT; 10912 } 10913 10914 if (type_flag(reg->type) & NON_OWN_REF) { 10915 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: NON_OWN_REF already set\n"); 10916 return -EFAULT; 10917 } 10918 10919 reg->type |= NON_OWN_REF; 10920 if (rec->refcount_off >= 0) 10921 reg->type |= MEM_RCU; 10922 10923 return 0; 10924 } 10925 10926 static int ref_convert_owning_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 ref_obj_id) 10927 { 10928 struct bpf_func_state *state, *unused; 10929 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 10930 int i; 10931 10932 state = cur_func(env); 10933 10934 if (!ref_obj_id) { 10935 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id is zero for " 10936 "owning -> non-owning conversion\n"); 10937 return -EFAULT; 10938 } 10939 10940 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 10941 if (state->refs[i].id != ref_obj_id) 10942 continue; 10943 10944 /* Clear ref_obj_id here so release_reference doesn't clobber 10945 * the whole reg 10946 */ 10947 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, unused, reg, ({ 10948 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) { 10949 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 10950 ref_set_non_owning(env, reg); 10951 } 10952 })); 10953 return 0; 10954 } 10955 10956 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref state missing for ref_obj_id\n"); 10957 return -EFAULT; 10958 } 10959 10960 /* Implementation details: 10961 * 10962 * Each register points to some region of memory, which we define as an 10963 * allocation. Each allocation may embed a bpf_spin_lock which protects any 10964 * special BPF objects (bpf_list_head, bpf_rb_root, etc.) part of the same 10965 * allocation. The lock and the data it protects are colocated in the same 10966 * memory region. 10967 * 10968 * Hence, everytime a register holds a pointer value pointing to such 10969 * allocation, the verifier preserves a unique reg->id for it. 10970 * 10971 * The verifier remembers the lock 'ptr' and the lock 'id' whenever 10972 * bpf_spin_lock is called. 10973 * 10974 * To enable this, lock state in the verifier captures two values: 10975 * active_lock.ptr = Register's type specific pointer 10976 * active_lock.id = A unique ID for each register pointer value 10977 * 10978 * Currently, PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC are the two 10979 * supported register types. 10980 * 10981 * The active_lock.ptr in case of map values is the reg->map_ptr, and in case of 10982 * allocated objects is the reg->btf pointer. 10983 * 10984 * The active_lock.id is non-unique for maps supporting direct_value_addr, as we 10985 * can establish the provenance of the map value statically for each distinct 10986 * lookup into such maps. They always contain a single map value hence unique 10987 * IDs for each pseudo load pessimizes the algorithm and rejects valid programs. 10988 * 10989 * So, in case of global variables, they use array maps with max_entries = 1, 10990 * hence their active_lock.ptr becomes map_ptr and id = 0 (since they all point 10991 * into the same map value as max_entries is 1, as described above). 10992 * 10993 * In case of inner map lookups, the inner map pointer has same map_ptr as the 10994 * outer map pointer (in verifier context), but each lookup into an inner map 10995 * assigns a fresh reg->id to the lookup, so while lookups into distinct inner 10996 * maps from the same outer map share the same map_ptr as active_lock.ptr, they 10997 * will get different reg->id assigned to each lookup, hence different 10998 * active_lock.id. 10999 * 11000 * In case of allocated objects, active_lock.ptr is the reg->btf, and the 11001 * reg->id is a unique ID preserved after the NULL pointer check on the pointer 11002 * returned from bpf_obj_new. Each allocation receives a new reg->id. 11003 */ 11004 static int check_reg_allocation_locked(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 11005 { 11006 void *ptr; 11007 u32 id; 11008 11009 switch ((int)reg->type) { 11010 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 11011 ptr = reg->map_ptr; 11012 break; 11013 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 11014 ptr = reg->btf; 11015 break; 11016 default: 11017 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reg type for lock check\n"); 11018 return -EFAULT; 11019 } 11020 id = reg->id; 11021 11022 if (!env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) 11023 return -EINVAL; 11024 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr != ptr || 11025 env->cur_state->active_lock.id != id) { 11026 verbose(env, "held lock and object are not in the same allocation\n"); 11027 return -EINVAL; 11028 } 11029 return 0; 11030 } 11031 11032 static bool is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 11033 { 11034 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 11035 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] || 11036 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] || 11037 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back]; 11038 } 11039 11040 static bool is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 11041 { 11042 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl] || 11043 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] || 11044 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_first]; 11045 } 11046 11047 static bool is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 11048 { 11049 return is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(btf_id) || is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(btf_id) || 11050 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]; 11051 } 11052 11053 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 11054 { 11055 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]; 11056 } 11057 11058 static bool is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 11059 { 11060 return is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(btf_id); 11061 } 11062 11063 static bool check_kfunc_is_graph_root_api(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11064 enum btf_field_type head_field_type, 11065 u32 kfunc_btf_id) 11066 { 11067 bool ret; 11068 11069 switch (head_field_type) { 11070 case BPF_LIST_HEAD: 11071 ret = is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id); 11072 break; 11073 case BPF_RB_ROOT: 11074 ret = is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id); 11075 break; 11076 default: 11077 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected graph root argument type %s\n", 11078 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type)); 11079 return false; 11080 } 11081 11082 if (!ret) 11083 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: %s head arg for unknown kfunc\n", 11084 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type)); 11085 return ret; 11086 } 11087 11088 static bool check_kfunc_is_graph_node_api(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11089 enum btf_field_type node_field_type, 11090 u32 kfunc_btf_id) 11091 { 11092 bool ret; 11093 11094 switch (node_field_type) { 11095 case BPF_LIST_NODE: 11096 ret = (kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 11097 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl]); 11098 break; 11099 case BPF_RB_NODE: 11100 ret = (kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] || 11101 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]); 11102 break; 11103 default: 11104 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected graph node argument type %s\n", 11105 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type)); 11106 return false; 11107 } 11108 11109 if (!ret) 11110 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: %s node arg for unknown kfunc\n", 11111 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type)); 11112 return ret; 11113 } 11114 11115 static int 11116 __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11117 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 11118 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 11119 enum btf_field_type head_field_type, 11120 struct btf_field **head_field) 11121 { 11122 const char *head_type_name; 11123 struct btf_field *field; 11124 struct btf_record *rec; 11125 u32 head_off; 11126 11127 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) { 11128 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call\n"); 11129 return -EFAULT; 11130 } 11131 11132 if (!check_kfunc_is_graph_root_api(env, head_field_type, meta->func_id)) 11133 return -EFAULT; 11134 11135 head_type_name = btf_field_type_name(head_field_type); 11136 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 11137 verbose(env, 11138 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n", 11139 regno, head_type_name); 11140 return -EINVAL; 11141 } 11142 11143 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 11144 head_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 11145 field = btf_record_find(rec, head_off, head_field_type); 11146 if (!field) { 11147 verbose(env, "%s not found at offset=%u\n", head_type_name, head_off); 11148 return -EINVAL; 11149 } 11150 11151 /* All functions require bpf_list_head to be protected using a bpf_spin_lock */ 11152 if (check_reg_allocation_locked(env, reg)) { 11153 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock at off=%d must be held for %s\n", 11154 rec->spin_lock_off, head_type_name); 11155 return -EINVAL; 11156 } 11157 11158 if (*head_field) { 11159 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: repeating %s arg\n", head_type_name); 11160 return -EFAULT; 11161 } 11162 *head_field = field; 11163 return 0; 11164 } 11165 11166 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11167 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 11168 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 11169 { 11170 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(env, reg, regno, meta, BPF_LIST_HEAD, 11171 &meta->arg_list_head.field); 11172 } 11173 11174 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11175 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 11176 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 11177 { 11178 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(env, reg, regno, meta, BPF_RB_ROOT, 11179 &meta->arg_rbtree_root.field); 11180 } 11181 11182 static int 11183 __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11184 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 11185 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 11186 enum btf_field_type head_field_type, 11187 enum btf_field_type node_field_type, 11188 struct btf_field **node_field) 11189 { 11190 const char *node_type_name; 11191 const struct btf_type *et, *t; 11192 struct btf_field *field; 11193 u32 node_off; 11194 11195 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) { 11196 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call\n"); 11197 return -EFAULT; 11198 } 11199 11200 if (!check_kfunc_is_graph_node_api(env, node_field_type, meta->func_id)) 11201 return -EFAULT; 11202 11203 node_type_name = btf_field_type_name(node_field_type); 11204 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 11205 verbose(env, 11206 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n", 11207 regno, node_type_name); 11208 return -EINVAL; 11209 } 11210 11211 node_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 11212 field = reg_find_field_offset(reg, node_off, node_field_type); 11213 if (!field || field->offset != node_off) { 11214 verbose(env, "%s not found at offset=%u\n", node_type_name, node_off); 11215 return -EINVAL; 11216 } 11217 11218 field = *node_field; 11219 11220 et = btf_type_by_id(field->graph_root.btf, field->graph_root.value_btf_id); 11221 t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 11222 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, 0, field->graph_root.btf, 11223 field->graph_root.value_btf_id, true)) { 11224 verbose(env, "operation on %s expects arg#1 %s at offset=%d " 11225 "in struct %s, but arg is at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 11226 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type), 11227 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type), 11228 field->graph_root.node_offset, 11229 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off), 11230 node_off, btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off)); 11231 return -EINVAL; 11232 } 11233 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; 11234 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 11235 11236 if (node_off != field->graph_root.node_offset) { 11237 verbose(env, "arg#1 offset=%d, but expected %s at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 11238 node_off, btf_field_type_name(node_field_type), 11239 field->graph_root.node_offset, 11240 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off)); 11241 return -EINVAL; 11242 } 11243 11244 return 0; 11245 } 11246 11247 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11248 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 11249 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 11250 { 11251 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(env, reg, regno, meta, 11252 BPF_LIST_HEAD, BPF_LIST_NODE, 11253 &meta->arg_list_head.field); 11254 } 11255 11256 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11257 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 11258 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 11259 { 11260 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(env, reg, regno, meta, 11261 BPF_RB_ROOT, BPF_RB_NODE, 11262 &meta->arg_rbtree_root.field); 11263 } 11264 11265 static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 11266 int insn_idx) 11267 { 11268 const char *func_name = meta->func_name, *ref_tname; 11269 const struct btf *btf = meta->btf; 11270 const struct btf_param *args; 11271 struct btf_record *rec; 11272 u32 i, nargs; 11273 int ret; 11274 11275 args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta->func_proto + 1); 11276 nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta->func_proto); 11277 if (nargs > MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) { 11278 verbose(env, "Function %s has %d > %d args\n", func_name, nargs, 11279 MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS); 11280 return -EINVAL; 11281 } 11282 11283 /* Check that BTF function arguments match actual types that the 11284 * verifier sees. 11285 */ 11286 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 11287 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[i + 1]; 11288 const struct btf_type *t, *ref_t, *resolve_ret; 11289 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = ARG_DONTCARE; 11290 u32 regno = i + 1, ref_id, type_size; 11291 bool is_ret_buf_sz = false; 11292 int kf_arg_type; 11293 11294 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, args[i].type, NULL); 11295 11296 if (is_kfunc_arg_ignore(btf, &args[i])) 11297 continue; 11298 11299 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 11300 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 11301 verbose(env, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno); 11302 return -EINVAL; 11303 } 11304 11305 if (is_kfunc_arg_constant(meta->btf, &args[i])) { 11306 if (meta->arg_constant.found) { 11307 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: only one constant argument permitted\n"); 11308 return -EFAULT; 11309 } 11310 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 11311 verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno); 11312 return -EINVAL; 11313 } 11314 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 11315 if (ret < 0) 11316 return ret; 11317 meta->arg_constant.found = true; 11318 meta->arg_constant.value = reg->var_off.value; 11319 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdonly_buf_size")) { 11320 meta->r0_rdonly = true; 11321 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 11322 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdwr_buf_size")) { 11323 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 11324 } 11325 11326 if (is_ret_buf_sz) { 11327 if (meta->r0_size) { 11328 verbose(env, "2 or more rdonly/rdwr_buf_size parameters for kfunc"); 11329 return -EINVAL; 11330 } 11331 11332 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 11333 verbose(env, "R%d is not a const\n", regno); 11334 return -EINVAL; 11335 } 11336 11337 meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value; 11338 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 11339 if (ret) 11340 return ret; 11341 } 11342 continue; 11343 } 11344 11345 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 11346 verbose(env, "Unrecognized arg#%d type %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t)); 11347 return -EINVAL; 11348 } 11349 11350 if ((is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) || is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) && 11351 (register_is_null(reg) || type_may_be_null(reg->type))) { 11352 verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg%d\n", i); 11353 return -EACCES; 11354 } 11355 11356 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 11357 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && meta->ref_obj_id) { 11358 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", 11359 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 11360 meta->ref_obj_id); 11361 return -EFAULT; 11362 } 11363 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 11364 if (is_kfunc_release(meta)) 11365 meta->release_regno = regno; 11366 } 11367 11368 ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &ref_id); 11369 ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, ref_t->name_off); 11370 11371 kf_arg_type = get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(env, meta, t, ref_t, ref_tname, args, i, nargs); 11372 if (kf_arg_type < 0) 11373 return kf_arg_type; 11374 11375 switch (kf_arg_type) { 11376 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 11377 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 11378 if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && !is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) 11379 break; 11380 11381 if (!is_trusted_reg(reg)) { 11382 if (!is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) { 11383 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno); 11384 return -EINVAL; 11385 } 11386 if (!is_rcu_reg(reg)) { 11387 verbose(env, "R%d must be a rcu pointer\n", regno); 11388 return -EINVAL; 11389 } 11390 } 11391 11392 fallthrough; 11393 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 11394 /* Trusted arguments have the same offset checks as release arguments */ 11395 arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE; 11396 break; 11397 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 11398 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER: 11399 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 11400 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 11401 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT: 11402 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE: 11403 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 11404 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 11405 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK: 11406 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR: 11407 /* Trusted by default */ 11408 break; 11409 default: 11410 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 11411 return -EFAULT; 11412 } 11413 11414 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) 11415 arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE; 11416 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 11417 if (ret < 0) 11418 return ret; 11419 11420 switch (kf_arg_type) { 11421 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 11422 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 11423 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to ctx, but got %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t)); 11424 return -EINVAL; 11425 } 11426 11427 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 11428 ret = get_kern_ctx_btf_id(&env->log, resolve_prog_type(env->prog)); 11429 if (ret < 0) 11430 return -EINVAL; 11431 meta->ret_btf_id = ret; 11432 } 11433 break; 11434 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 11435 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 11436 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 11437 return -EINVAL; 11438 } 11439 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 11440 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 11441 return -EINVAL; 11442 } 11443 if (meta->btf == btf_vmlinux && 11444 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 11445 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; 11446 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 11447 } 11448 break; 11449 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 11450 { 11451 enum bpf_arg_type dynptr_arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 11452 int clone_ref_obj_id = 0; 11453 11454 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK && 11455 reg->type != CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 11456 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to stack or dynptr_ptr\n", i); 11457 return -EINVAL; 11458 } 11459 11460 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 11461 dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_RDONLY; 11462 11463 if (is_kfunc_arg_uninit(btf, &args[i])) 11464 dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_UNINIT; 11465 11466 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) { 11467 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB; 11468 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_xdp]) { 11469 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP; 11470 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_clone] && 11471 (dynptr_arg_type & MEM_UNINIT)) { 11472 enum bpf_dynptr_type parent_type = meta->initialized_dynptr.type; 11473 11474 if (parent_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) { 11475 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr type for parent of clone\n"); 11476 return -EFAULT; 11477 } 11478 11479 dynptr_arg_type |= (unsigned int)get_dynptr_type_flag(parent_type); 11480 clone_ref_obj_id = meta->initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id; 11481 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(parent_type) && !clone_ref_obj_id) { 11482 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing ref obj id for parent of clone\n"); 11483 return -EFAULT; 11484 } 11485 } 11486 11487 ret = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx, dynptr_arg_type, clone_ref_obj_id); 11488 if (ret < 0) 11489 return ret; 11490 11491 if (!(dynptr_arg_type & MEM_UNINIT)) { 11492 int id = dynptr_id(env, reg); 11493 11494 if (id < 0) { 11495 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr id\n"); 11496 return id; 11497 } 11498 meta->initialized_dynptr.id = id; 11499 meta->initialized_dynptr.type = dynptr_get_type(env, reg); 11500 meta->initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg); 11501 } 11502 11503 break; 11504 } 11505 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER: 11506 ret = process_iter_arg(env, regno, insn_idx, meta); 11507 if (ret < 0) 11508 return ret; 11509 break; 11510 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 11511 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 11512 reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 11513 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i); 11514 return -EINVAL; 11515 } 11516 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 11517 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 11518 return -EINVAL; 11519 } 11520 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(env, reg, regno, meta); 11521 if (ret < 0) 11522 return ret; 11523 break; 11524 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT: 11525 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 11526 reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 11527 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i); 11528 return -EINVAL; 11529 } 11530 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 11531 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 11532 return -EINVAL; 11533 } 11534 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_root(env, reg, regno, meta); 11535 if (ret < 0) 11536 return ret; 11537 break; 11538 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 11539 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 11540 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 11541 return -EINVAL; 11542 } 11543 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 11544 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 11545 return -EINVAL; 11546 } 11547 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(env, reg, regno, meta); 11548 if (ret < 0) 11549 return ret; 11550 break; 11551 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE: 11552 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove]) { 11553 if (!type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) || reg->ref_obj_id) { 11554 verbose(env, "rbtree_remove node input must be non-owning ref\n"); 11555 return -EINVAL; 11556 } 11557 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) { 11558 verbose(env, "rbtree_remove not allowed in rbtree cb\n"); 11559 return -EINVAL; 11560 } 11561 } else { 11562 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 11563 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 11564 return -EINVAL; 11565 } 11566 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 11567 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 11568 return -EINVAL; 11569 } 11570 } 11571 11572 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(env, reg, regno, meta); 11573 if (ret < 0) 11574 return ret; 11575 break; 11576 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 11577 /* Only base_type is checked, further checks are done here */ 11578 if ((base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 11579 (bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type) && !is_rcu_reg(reg))) && 11580 !reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]) { 11581 verbose(env, "arg#%d is %s ", i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 11582 verbose(env, "expected %s or socket\n", 11583 reg_type_str(env, base_type(reg->type) | 11584 (type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS))); 11585 return -EINVAL; 11586 } 11587 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(env, reg, ref_t, ref_tname, ref_id, meta, i); 11588 if (ret < 0) 11589 return ret; 11590 break; 11591 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 11592 resolve_ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, ref_t, &type_size); 11593 if (IS_ERR(resolve_ret)) { 11594 verbose(env, "arg#%d reference type('%s %s') size cannot be determined: %ld\n", 11595 i, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, PTR_ERR(resolve_ret)); 11596 return -EINVAL; 11597 } 11598 ret = check_mem_reg(env, reg, regno, type_size); 11599 if (ret < 0) 11600 return ret; 11601 break; 11602 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 11603 { 11604 struct bpf_reg_state *buff_reg = ®s[regno]; 11605 const struct btf_param *buff_arg = &args[i]; 11606 struct bpf_reg_state *size_reg = ®s[regno + 1]; 11607 const struct btf_param *size_arg = &args[i + 1]; 11608 11609 if (!register_is_null(buff_reg) || !is_kfunc_arg_optional(meta->btf, buff_arg)) { 11610 ret = check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(env, size_reg, regno + 1); 11611 if (ret < 0) { 11612 verbose(env, "arg#%d arg#%d memory, len pair leads to invalid memory access\n", i, i + 1); 11613 return ret; 11614 } 11615 } 11616 11617 if (is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, size_arg, size_reg)) { 11618 if (meta->arg_constant.found) { 11619 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: only one constant argument permitted\n"); 11620 return -EFAULT; 11621 } 11622 if (!tnum_is_const(size_reg->var_off)) { 11623 verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno + 1); 11624 return -EINVAL; 11625 } 11626 meta->arg_constant.found = true; 11627 meta->arg_constant.value = size_reg->var_off.value; 11628 } 11629 11630 /* Skip next '__sz' or '__szk' argument */ 11631 i++; 11632 break; 11633 } 11634 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK: 11635 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_FUNC) { 11636 verbose(env, "arg%d expected pointer to func\n", i); 11637 return -EINVAL; 11638 } 11639 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; 11640 break; 11641 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR: 11642 if (!type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 11643 verbose(env, "arg#%d is neither owning or non-owning ref\n", i); 11644 return -EINVAL; 11645 } 11646 if (!type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) 11647 meta->arg_owning_ref = true; 11648 11649 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 11650 if (!rec) { 11651 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: Couldn't find btf_record\n"); 11652 return -EFAULT; 11653 } 11654 11655 if (rec->refcount_off < 0) { 11656 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a type with bpf_refcount field\n", i); 11657 return -EINVAL; 11658 } 11659 11660 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; 11661 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 11662 break; 11663 } 11664 } 11665 11666 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && !meta->release_regno) { 11667 verbose(env, "release kernel function %s expects refcounted PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n", 11668 func_name); 11669 return -EINVAL; 11670 } 11671 11672 return 0; 11673 } 11674 11675 static int fetch_kfunc_meta(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11676 struct bpf_insn *insn, 11677 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 11678 const char **kfunc_name) 11679 { 11680 const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto; 11681 u32 func_id, *kfunc_flags; 11682 const char *func_name; 11683 struct btf *desc_btf; 11684 11685 if (kfunc_name) 11686 *kfunc_name = NULL; 11687 11688 if (!insn->imm) 11689 return -EINVAL; 11690 11691 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, insn->off); 11692 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 11693 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 11694 11695 func_id = insn->imm; 11696 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 11697 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 11698 if (kfunc_name) 11699 *kfunc_name = func_name; 11700 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 11701 11702 kfunc_flags = btf_kfunc_id_set_contains(desc_btf, func_id, env->prog); 11703 if (!kfunc_flags) { 11704 return -EACCES; 11705 } 11706 11707 memset(meta, 0, sizeof(*meta)); 11708 meta->btf = desc_btf; 11709 meta->func_id = func_id; 11710 meta->kfunc_flags = *kfunc_flags; 11711 meta->func_proto = func_proto; 11712 meta->func_name = func_name; 11713 11714 return 0; 11715 } 11716 11717 static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 11718 int *insn_idx_p) 11719 { 11720 const struct btf_type *t, *ptr_type; 11721 u32 i, nargs, ptr_type_id, release_ref_obj_id; 11722 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 11723 const char *func_name, *ptr_type_name; 11724 bool sleepable, rcu_lock, rcu_unlock; 11725 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; 11726 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux; 11727 int err, insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 11728 const struct btf_param *args; 11729 const struct btf_type *ret_t; 11730 struct btf *desc_btf; 11731 11732 /* skip for now, but return error when we find this in fixup_kfunc_call */ 11733 if (!insn->imm) 11734 return 0; 11735 11736 err = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, insn, &meta, &func_name); 11737 if (err == -EACCES && func_name) 11738 verbose(env, "calling kernel function %s is not allowed\n", func_name); 11739 if (err) 11740 return err; 11741 desc_btf = meta.btf; 11742 insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 11743 11744 insn_aux->is_iter_next = is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta); 11745 11746 if (is_kfunc_destructive(&meta) && !capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) { 11747 verbose(env, "destructive kfunc calls require CAP_SYS_BOOT capability\n"); 11748 return -EACCES; 11749 } 11750 11751 sleepable = is_kfunc_sleepable(&meta); 11752 if (sleepable && !env->prog->aux->sleepable) { 11753 verbose(env, "program must be sleepable to call sleepable kfunc %s\n", func_name); 11754 return -EACCES; 11755 } 11756 11757 /* Check the arguments */ 11758 err = check_kfunc_args(env, &meta, insn_idx); 11759 if (err < 0) 11760 return err; 11761 11762 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 11763 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 11764 set_rbtree_add_callback_state); 11765 if (err) { 11766 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n", 11767 func_name, meta.func_id); 11768 return err; 11769 } 11770 } 11771 11772 rcu_lock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(&meta); 11773 rcu_unlock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(&meta); 11774 11775 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 11776 struct bpf_func_state *state; 11777 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 11778 11779 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env) && (rcu_lock || rcu_unlock)) { 11780 verbose(env, "Calling bpf_rcu_read_{lock,unlock} in unnecessary rbtree callback\n"); 11781 return -EACCES; 11782 } 11783 11784 if (rcu_lock) { 11785 verbose(env, "nested rcu read lock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name); 11786 return -EINVAL; 11787 } else if (rcu_unlock) { 11788 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 11789 if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) { 11790 reg->type &= ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL); 11791 reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 11792 } 11793 })); 11794 env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock = false; 11795 } else if (sleepable) { 11796 verbose(env, "kernel func %s is sleepable within rcu_read_lock region\n", func_name); 11797 return -EACCES; 11798 } 11799 } else if (rcu_lock) { 11800 env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock = true; 11801 } else if (rcu_unlock) { 11802 verbose(env, "unmatched rcu read unlock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name); 11803 return -EINVAL; 11804 } 11805 11806 /* In case of release function, we get register number of refcounted 11807 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID in bpf_kfunc_arg_meta, do the release now. 11808 */ 11809 if (meta.release_regno) { 11810 err = release_reference(env, regs[meta.release_regno].ref_obj_id); 11811 if (err) { 11812 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 11813 func_name, meta.func_id); 11814 return err; 11815 } 11816 } 11817 11818 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 11819 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] || 11820 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 11821 release_ref_obj_id = regs[BPF_REG_2].ref_obj_id; 11822 insn_aux->insert_off = regs[BPF_REG_2].off; 11823 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf, meta.arg_btf_id); 11824 err = ref_convert_owning_non_owning(env, release_ref_obj_id); 11825 if (err) { 11826 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d conversion of owning ref to non-owning failed\n", 11827 func_name, meta.func_id); 11828 return err; 11829 } 11830 11831 err = release_reference(env, release_ref_obj_id); 11832 if (err) { 11833 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 11834 func_name, meta.func_id); 11835 return err; 11836 } 11837 } 11838 11839 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) 11840 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 11841 11842 /* Check return type */ 11843 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, meta.func_proto->type, NULL); 11844 11845 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta) && !btf_type_is_struct_ptr(meta.btf, t)) { 11846 /* Only exception is bpf_obj_new_impl */ 11847 if (meta.btf != btf_vmlinux || 11848 (meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] && 11849 meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl])) { 11850 verbose(env, "acquire kernel function does not return PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n"); 11851 return -EINVAL; 11852 } 11853 } 11854 11855 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 11856 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11857 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, t->size); 11858 } else if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 11859 ptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, t->type, &ptr_type_id); 11860 11861 if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && btf_id_set_contains(&special_kfunc_set, meta.func_id)) { 11862 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) { 11863 struct btf *ret_btf; 11864 u32 ret_btf_id; 11865 11866 if (unlikely(!bpf_global_ma_set)) 11867 return -ENOMEM; 11868 11869 if (((u64)(u32)meta.arg_constant.value) != meta.arg_constant.value) { 11870 verbose(env, "local type ID argument must be in range [0, U32_MAX]\n"); 11871 return -EINVAL; 11872 } 11873 11874 ret_btf = env->prog->aux->btf; 11875 ret_btf_id = meta.arg_constant.value; 11876 11877 /* This may be NULL due to user not supplying a BTF */ 11878 if (!ret_btf) { 11879 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new requires prog BTF\n"); 11880 return -EINVAL; 11881 } 11882 11883 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 11884 if (!ret_t || !__btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 11885 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct\n"); 11886 return -EINVAL; 11887 } 11888 11889 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11890 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 11891 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 11892 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 11893 11894 insn_aux->obj_new_size = ret_t->size; 11895 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = 11896 btf_find_struct_meta(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 11897 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) { 11898 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11899 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 11900 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.arg_btf; 11901 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.arg_btf_id; 11902 11903 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = 11904 btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf, 11905 meta.arg_btf_id); 11906 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] || 11907 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back]) { 11908 struct btf_field *field = meta.arg_list_head.field; 11909 11910 mark_reg_graph_node(regs, BPF_REG_0, &field->graph_root); 11911 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] || 11912 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_first]) { 11913 struct btf_field *field = meta.arg_rbtree_root.field; 11914 11915 mark_reg_graph_node(regs, BPF_REG_0, &field->graph_root); 11916 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 11917 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11918 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED; 11919 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 11920 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 11921 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 11922 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, meta.arg_constant.value); 11923 if (!ret_t || !btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 11924 verbose(env, 11925 "kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast type ID argument must be of a struct\n"); 11926 return -EINVAL; 11927 } 11928 11929 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11930 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; 11931 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 11932 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.arg_constant.value; 11933 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice] || 11934 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr]) { 11935 enum bpf_type_flag type_flag = get_dynptr_type_flag(meta.initialized_dynptr.type); 11936 11937 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11938 11939 if (!meta.arg_constant.found) { 11940 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: bpf_dynptr_slice(_rdwr) no constant size\n"); 11941 return -EFAULT; 11942 } 11943 11944 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.arg_constant.value; 11945 11946 /* PTR_MAYBE_NULL will be added when is_kfunc_ret_null is checked */ 11947 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | type_flag; 11948 11949 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice]) { 11950 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY; 11951 } else { 11952 /* this will set env->seen_direct_write to true */ 11953 if (!may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE)) { 11954 verbose(env, "the prog does not allow writes to packet data\n"); 11955 return -EINVAL; 11956 } 11957 } 11958 11959 if (!meta.initialized_dynptr.id) { 11960 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr id\n"); 11961 return -EFAULT; 11962 } 11963 regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta.initialized_dynptr.id; 11964 11965 /* we don't need to set BPF_REG_0's ref obj id 11966 * because packet slices are not refcounted (see 11967 * dynptr_type_refcounted) 11968 */ 11969 } else { 11970 verbose(env, "kernel function %s unhandled dynamic return type\n", 11971 meta.func_name); 11972 return -EFAULT; 11973 } 11974 } else if (!__btf_type_is_struct(ptr_type)) { 11975 if (!meta.r0_size) { 11976 __u32 sz; 11977 11978 if (!IS_ERR(btf_resolve_size(desc_btf, ptr_type, &sz))) { 11979 meta.r0_size = sz; 11980 meta.r0_rdonly = true; 11981 } 11982 } 11983 if (!meta.r0_size) { 11984 ptr_type_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, 11985 ptr_type->name_off); 11986 verbose(env, 11987 "kernel function %s returns pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 11988 func_name, 11989 btf_type_str(ptr_type), 11990 ptr_type_name); 11991 return -EINVAL; 11992 } 11993 11994 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11995 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM; 11996 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.r0_size; 11997 11998 if (meta.r0_rdonly) 11999 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY; 12000 12001 /* Ensures we don't access the memory after a release_reference() */ 12002 if (meta.ref_obj_id) 12003 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 12004 } else { 12005 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 12006 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 12007 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 12008 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ptr_type_id; 12009 12010 if (is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) { 12011 struct bpf_reg_state *cur_iter; 12012 12013 cur_iter = get_iter_from_state(env->cur_state, &meta); 12014 12015 if (cur_iter->type & MEM_RCU) /* KF_RCU_PROTECTED */ 12016 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RCU; 12017 else 12018 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_TRUSTED; 12019 } 12020 } 12021 12022 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) { 12023 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 12024 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg, see 93c230e3f5bd6 */ 12025 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 12026 } 12027 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(void *)); 12028 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta)) { 12029 int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 12030 12031 if (id < 0) 12032 return id; 12033 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) 12034 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 12035 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 12036 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_first]) { 12037 ref_set_non_owning(env, ®s[BPF_REG_0]); 12038 } 12039 12040 if (reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(®s[BPF_REG_0]) && !regs[BPF_REG_0].id) 12041 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 12042 } else if (btf_type_is_void(t)) { 12043 if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && btf_id_set_contains(&special_kfunc_set, meta.func_id)) { 12044 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 12045 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = 12046 btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf, 12047 meta.arg_btf_id); 12048 } 12049 } 12050 } 12051 12052 nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta.func_proto); 12053 args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta.func_proto + 1); 12054 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 12055 u32 regno = i + 1; 12056 12057 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, args[i].type, NULL); 12058 if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 12059 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, sizeof(void *)); 12060 else 12061 /* scalar. ensured by btf_check_kfunc_arg_match() */ 12062 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, t->size); 12063 } 12064 12065 if (is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) { 12066 err = process_iter_next_call(env, insn_idx, &meta); 12067 if (err) 12068 return err; 12069 } 12070 12071 return 0; 12072 } 12073 12074 static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 12075 { 12076 /* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 12077 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b); 12078 12079 if (b < 0) 12080 return res > a; 12081 return res < a; 12082 } 12083 12084 static bool signed_add32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 12085 { 12086 /* Do the add in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ 12087 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a + (u32)b); 12088 12089 if (b < 0) 12090 return res > a; 12091 return res < a; 12092 } 12093 12094 static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 12095 { 12096 /* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 12097 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b); 12098 12099 if (b < 0) 12100 return res < a; 12101 return res > a; 12102 } 12103 12104 static bool signed_sub32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 12105 { 12106 /* Do the sub in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ 12107 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a - (u32)b); 12108 12109 if (b < 0) 12110 return res < a; 12111 return res > a; 12112 } 12113 12114 static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12115 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 12116 enum bpf_reg_type type) 12117 { 12118 bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 12119 s64 val = reg->var_off.value; 12120 s64 smin = reg->smin_value; 12121 12122 if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) { 12123 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n", 12124 reg_type_str(env, type), val); 12125 return false; 12126 } 12127 12128 if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 12129 verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n", 12130 reg_type_str(env, type), reg->off); 12131 return false; 12132 } 12133 12134 if (smin == S64_MIN) { 12135 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n", 12136 reg_type_str(env, type)); 12137 return false; 12138 } 12139 12140 if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 12141 verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n", 12142 smin, reg_type_str(env, type)); 12143 return false; 12144 } 12145 12146 return true; 12147 } 12148 12149 enum { 12150 REASON_BOUNDS = -1, 12151 REASON_TYPE = -2, 12152 REASON_PATHS = -3, 12153 REASON_LIMIT = -4, 12154 REASON_STACK = -5, 12155 }; 12156 12157 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 12158 u32 *alu_limit, bool mask_to_left) 12159 { 12160 u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0; 12161 12162 switch (ptr_reg->type) { 12163 case PTR_TO_STACK: 12164 /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the 12165 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar 12166 * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is 12167 * currently prohibited for unprivileged. 12168 */ 12169 max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left; 12170 ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off); 12171 break; 12172 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 12173 max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size; 12174 ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ? 12175 ptr_reg->smin_value : 12176 ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off; 12177 break; 12178 default: 12179 return REASON_TYPE; 12180 } 12181 12182 if (ptr_limit >= max) 12183 return REASON_LIMIT; 12184 *alu_limit = ptr_limit; 12185 return 0; 12186 } 12187 12188 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12189 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 12190 { 12191 return env->bypass_spec_v1 || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K; 12192 } 12193 12194 static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 12195 u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit) 12196 { 12197 /* If we arrived here from different branches with different 12198 * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work. 12199 */ 12200 if (aux->alu_state && 12201 (aux->alu_state != alu_state || 12202 aux->alu_limit != alu_limit)) 12203 return REASON_PATHS; 12204 12205 /* Corresponding fixup done in do_misc_fixups(). */ 12206 aux->alu_state = alu_state; 12207 aux->alu_limit = alu_limit; 12208 return 0; 12209 } 12210 12211 static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12212 struct bpf_insn *insn) 12213 { 12214 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 12215 12216 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 12217 return 0; 12218 12219 return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0); 12220 } 12221 12222 static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode) 12223 { 12224 return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB; 12225 } 12226 12227 struct bpf_sanitize_info { 12228 struct bpf_insn_aux_data aux; 12229 bool mask_to_left; 12230 }; 12231 12232 static struct bpf_verifier_state * 12233 sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12234 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 12235 u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx) 12236 { 12237 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; 12238 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 12239 12240 branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true); 12241 if (branch && insn) { 12242 regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs; 12243 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 12244 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 12245 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 12246 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 12247 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg); 12248 } 12249 } 12250 return branch; 12251 } 12252 12253 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12254 struct bpf_insn *insn, 12255 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 12256 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 12257 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12258 struct bpf_sanitize_info *info, 12259 const bool commit_window) 12260 { 12261 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : &info->aux; 12262 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 12263 bool off_is_imm = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 12264 bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0; 12265 bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg; 12266 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 12267 u32 alu_state, alu_limit; 12268 struct bpf_reg_state tmp; 12269 bool ret; 12270 int err; 12271 12272 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 12273 return 0; 12274 12275 /* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative 12276 * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care 12277 * to explore bad access from here. 12278 */ 12279 if (vstate->speculative) 12280 goto do_sim; 12281 12282 if (!commit_window) { 12283 if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) && 12284 (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0)) 12285 return REASON_BOUNDS; 12286 12287 info->mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) || 12288 (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg); 12289 } 12290 12291 err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left); 12292 if (err < 0) 12293 return err; 12294 12295 if (commit_window) { 12296 /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on 12297 * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation. 12298 */ 12299 alu_state = info->aux.alu_state; 12300 alu_limit = abs(info->aux.alu_limit - alu_limit); 12301 } else { 12302 alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0; 12303 alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0; 12304 alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? 12305 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; 12306 12307 /* Limit pruning on unknown scalars to enable deep search for 12308 * potential masking differences from other program paths. 12309 */ 12310 if (!off_is_imm) 12311 env->explore_alu_limits = true; 12312 } 12313 12314 err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit); 12315 if (err < 0) 12316 return err; 12317 do_sim: 12318 /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already 12319 * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification 12320 * stack. 12321 * 12322 * Also, when register is a known constant, we rewrite register-based 12323 * operation to immediate-based, and thus do not need masking (and as 12324 * a consequence, do not need to simulate the zero-truncation either). 12325 */ 12326 if (commit_window || off_is_imm) 12327 return 0; 12328 12329 /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under 12330 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of 12331 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off 12332 * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there 12333 * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example, 12334 * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction 12335 * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore 12336 * bad access. 12337 */ 12338 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) { 12339 tmp = *dst_reg; 12340 copy_register_state(dst_reg, ptr_reg); 12341 } 12342 ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1, 12343 env->insn_idx); 12344 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret) 12345 *dst_reg = tmp; 12346 return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0; 12347 } 12348 12349 static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12350 { 12351 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 12352 12353 /* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the 12354 * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in 12355 * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still 12356 * rewrite/sanitize them. 12357 */ 12358 if (!vstate->speculative) 12359 env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt; 12360 } 12361 12362 static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12363 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason, 12364 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 12365 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 12366 { 12367 static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root"; 12368 const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub"; 12369 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg; 12370 12371 switch (reason) { 12372 case REASON_BOUNDS: 12373 verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n", 12374 off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err); 12375 break; 12376 case REASON_TYPE: 12377 verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n", 12378 off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err); 12379 break; 12380 case REASON_PATHS: 12381 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n", 12382 dst, op, err); 12383 break; 12384 case REASON_LIMIT: 12385 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n", 12386 dst, op, err); 12387 break; 12388 case REASON_STACK: 12389 verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n", 12390 dst, err); 12391 break; 12392 default: 12393 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reason (%d)\n", 12394 reason); 12395 break; 12396 } 12397 12398 return -EACCES; 12399 } 12400 12401 /* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't 12402 * have a variable offset. 12403 * 12404 * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it 12405 * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU. See also 12406 * retrieve_ptr_limit(). 12407 * 12408 * 12409 * 'off' includes 'reg->off'. 12410 */ 12411 static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( 12412 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12413 int regno, 12414 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 12415 int off) 12416 { 12417 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 12418 char tn_buf[48]; 12419 12420 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 12421 verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n", 12422 regno, tn_buf, off); 12423 return -EACCES; 12424 } 12425 12426 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) { 12427 verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, " 12428 "prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off); 12429 return -EACCES; 12430 } 12431 12432 return 0; 12433 } 12434 12435 static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12436 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 12437 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 12438 { 12439 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 12440 12441 /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds 12442 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. 12443 */ 12444 if (env->bypass_spec_v1) 12445 return 0; 12446 12447 switch (dst_reg->type) { 12448 case PTR_TO_STACK: 12449 if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg, 12450 dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value)) 12451 return -EACCES; 12452 break; 12453 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 12454 if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false, ACCESS_HELPER)) { 12455 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " 12456 "prohibited for !root\n", dst); 12457 return -EACCES; 12458 } 12459 break; 12460 default: 12461 break; 12462 } 12463 12464 return 0; 12465 } 12466 12467 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. 12468 * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. 12469 * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a 12470 * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks. 12471 */ 12472 static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12473 struct bpf_insn *insn, 12474 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 12475 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg) 12476 { 12477 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 12478 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 12479 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg; 12480 bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 12481 s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value, 12482 smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; 12483 u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, 12484 umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; 12485 struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {}; 12486 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 12487 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 12488 int ret; 12489 12490 dst_reg = ®s[dst]; 12491 12492 if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 12493 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 12494 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from 12495 * e.g. dead branches. 12496 */ 12497 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 12498 return 0; 12499 } 12500 12501 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { 12502 /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */ 12503 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 12504 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 12505 return 0; 12506 } 12507 12508 verbose(env, 12509 "R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 12510 dst); 12511 return -EACCES; 12512 } 12513 12514 if (ptr_reg->type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { 12515 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n", 12516 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 12517 return -EACCES; 12518 } 12519 12520 switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) { 12521 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 12522 if (known) 12523 break; 12524 fallthrough; 12525 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 12526 /* smin_val represents the known value */ 12527 if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD) 12528 break; 12529 fallthrough; 12530 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 12531 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 12532 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 12533 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 12534 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 12535 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", 12536 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 12537 return -EACCES; 12538 default: 12539 break; 12540 } 12541 12542 /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id. 12543 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset. 12544 */ 12545 dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type; 12546 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 12547 12548 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) || 12549 !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 12550 return -EINVAL; 12551 12552 /* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */ 12553 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 12554 12555 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 12556 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 12557 &info, false); 12558 if (ret < 0) 12559 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 12560 } 12561 12562 switch (opcode) { 12563 case BPF_ADD: 12564 /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow 12565 * the s32 'off' field 12566 */ 12567 if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val == 12568 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) { 12569 /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */ 12570 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 12571 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 12572 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 12573 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 12574 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 12575 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val; 12576 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 12577 break; 12578 } 12579 /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off 12580 * == 0, since it's a scalar. 12581 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive 12582 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id' 12583 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET. 12584 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets 12585 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset 12586 * from ptr_reg. 12587 */ 12588 if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) || 12589 signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) { 12590 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12591 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12592 } else { 12593 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val; 12594 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val; 12595 } 12596 if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr || 12597 umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) { 12598 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 12599 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 12600 } else { 12601 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val; 12602 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val; 12603 } 12604 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 12605 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 12606 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 12607 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 12608 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 12609 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 12610 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 12611 } 12612 break; 12613 case BPF_SUB: 12614 if (dst_reg == off_reg) { 12615 /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ 12616 verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", 12617 dst); 12618 return -EACCES; 12619 } 12620 /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to 12621 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not 12622 * be able to deal with it. 12623 */ 12624 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 12625 verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n", 12626 dst); 12627 return -EACCES; 12628 } 12629 if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val == 12630 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) { 12631 /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */ 12632 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 12633 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 12634 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 12635 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 12636 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 12637 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 12638 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val; 12639 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 12640 break; 12641 } 12642 /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known 12643 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good. 12644 */ 12645 if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) || 12646 signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) { 12647 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12648 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12649 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12650 } else { 12651 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val; 12652 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val; 12653 } 12654 if (umin_ptr < umax_val) { 12655 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12656 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 12657 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 12658 } else { 12659 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 12660 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val; 12661 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val; 12662 } 12663 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 12664 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 12665 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 12666 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 12667 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 12668 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 12669 if (smin_val < 0) 12670 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 12671 } 12672 break; 12673 case BPF_AND: 12674 case BPF_OR: 12675 case BPF_XOR: 12676 /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */ 12677 verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n", 12678 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 12679 return -EACCES; 12680 default: 12681 /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */ 12682 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n", 12683 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 12684 return -EACCES; 12685 } 12686 12687 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 12688 return -EINVAL; 12689 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 12690 if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0) 12691 return -EACCES; 12692 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 12693 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 12694 &info, true); 12695 if (ret < 0) 12696 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 12697 } 12698 12699 return 0; 12700 } 12701 12702 static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12703 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12704 { 12705 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12706 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 12707 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 12708 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 12709 12710 if (signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smin_val) || 12711 signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smax_val)) { 12712 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12713 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12714 } else { 12715 dst_reg->s32_min_value += smin_val; 12716 dst_reg->s32_max_value += smax_val; 12717 } 12718 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value + umin_val < umin_val || 12719 dst_reg->u32_max_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 12720 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 12721 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 12722 } else { 12723 dst_reg->u32_min_value += umin_val; 12724 dst_reg->u32_max_value += umax_val; 12725 } 12726 } 12727 12728 static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12729 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12730 { 12731 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12732 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 12733 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 12734 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 12735 12736 if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) || 12737 signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) { 12738 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12739 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12740 } else { 12741 dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val; 12742 dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val; 12743 } 12744 if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val || 12745 dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 12746 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 12747 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 12748 } else { 12749 dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val; 12750 dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val; 12751 } 12752 } 12753 12754 static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12755 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12756 { 12757 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12758 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 12759 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 12760 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 12761 12762 if (signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smax_val) || 12763 signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smin_val)) { 12764 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12765 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12766 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12767 } else { 12768 dst_reg->s32_min_value -= smax_val; 12769 dst_reg->s32_max_value -= smin_val; 12770 } 12771 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value < umax_val) { 12772 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12773 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 12774 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 12775 } else { 12776 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 12777 dst_reg->u32_min_value -= umax_val; 12778 dst_reg->u32_max_value -= umin_val; 12779 } 12780 } 12781 12782 static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12783 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12784 { 12785 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12786 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 12787 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 12788 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 12789 12790 if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) || 12791 signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) { 12792 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12793 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12794 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12795 } else { 12796 dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val; 12797 dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val; 12798 } 12799 if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) { 12800 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12801 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 12802 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 12803 } else { 12804 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 12805 dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val; 12806 dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val; 12807 } 12808 } 12809 12810 static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12811 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12812 { 12813 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12814 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 12815 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 12816 12817 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0) { 12818 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 12819 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 12820 return; 12821 } 12822 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 12823 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S32_MAX). 12824 */ 12825 if (umax_val > U16_MAX || dst_reg->u32_max_value > U16_MAX) { 12826 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 12827 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 12828 return; 12829 } 12830 dst_reg->u32_min_value *= umin_val; 12831 dst_reg->u32_max_value *= umax_val; 12832 if (dst_reg->u32_max_value > S32_MAX) { 12833 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12834 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12835 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12836 } else { 12837 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 12838 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 12839 } 12840 } 12841 12842 static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12843 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12844 { 12845 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12846 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 12847 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 12848 12849 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) { 12850 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 12851 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 12852 return; 12853 } 12854 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 12855 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX). 12856 */ 12857 if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) { 12858 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 12859 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 12860 return; 12861 } 12862 dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val; 12863 dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val; 12864 if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) { 12865 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12866 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12867 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12868 } else { 12869 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 12870 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 12871 } 12872 } 12873 12874 static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12875 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12876 { 12877 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 12878 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 12879 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 12880 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12881 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 12882 12883 if (src_known && dst_known) { 12884 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 12885 return; 12886 } 12887 12888 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 12889 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 12890 */ 12891 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 12892 dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val); 12893 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 12894 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 12895 * ain't nobody got time for that. 12896 */ 12897 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12898 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12899 } else { 12900 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 12901 * cast result into s64. 12902 */ 12903 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 12904 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 12905 } 12906 } 12907 12908 static void scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12909 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12910 { 12911 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 12912 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 12913 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12914 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 12915 12916 if (src_known && dst_known) { 12917 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 12918 return; 12919 } 12920 12921 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 12922 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 12923 */ 12924 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 12925 dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val); 12926 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 12927 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 12928 * ain't nobody got time for that. 12929 */ 12930 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12931 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12932 } else { 12933 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 12934 * cast result into s64. 12935 */ 12936 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 12937 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 12938 } 12939 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 12940 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 12941 } 12942 12943 static void scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12944 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12945 { 12946 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 12947 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 12948 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 12949 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12950 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 12951 12952 if (src_known && dst_known) { 12953 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 12954 return; 12955 } 12956 12957 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 12958 * maximum of the operands' minima 12959 */ 12960 dst_reg->u32_min_value = max(dst_reg->u32_min_value, umin_val); 12961 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 12962 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 12963 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 12964 * ain't nobody got time for that. 12965 */ 12966 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12967 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12968 } else { 12969 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 12970 * cast result into s64. 12971 */ 12972 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 12973 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 12974 } 12975 } 12976 12977 static void scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12978 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12979 { 12980 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 12981 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 12982 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12983 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 12984 12985 if (src_known && dst_known) { 12986 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 12987 return; 12988 } 12989 12990 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 12991 * maximum of the operands' minima 12992 */ 12993 dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val); 12994 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 12995 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 12996 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 12997 * ain't nobody got time for that. 12998 */ 12999 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 13000 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 13001 } else { 13002 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 13003 * cast result into s64. 13004 */ 13005 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 13006 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 13007 } 13008 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 13009 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 13010 } 13011 13012 static void scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13013 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13014 { 13015 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 13016 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 13017 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 13018 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 13019 13020 if (src_known && dst_known) { 13021 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 13022 return; 13023 } 13024 13025 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var32_off. */ 13026 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 13027 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 13028 13029 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 13030 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 13031 * so safe to cast u32 result into s32. 13032 */ 13033 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 13034 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 13035 } else { 13036 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 13037 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 13038 } 13039 } 13040 13041 static void scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13042 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13043 { 13044 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 13045 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 13046 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 13047 13048 if (src_known && dst_known) { 13049 /* dst_reg->var_off.value has been updated earlier */ 13050 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 13051 return; 13052 } 13053 13054 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var_off. */ 13055 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 13056 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 13057 13058 if (dst_reg->smin_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 13059 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 13060 * so safe to cast u64 result into s64. 13061 */ 13062 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 13063 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 13064 } else { 13065 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 13066 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 13067 } 13068 13069 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 13070 } 13071 13072 static void __scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13073 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 13074 { 13075 /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick 13076 * up from var_off) 13077 */ 13078 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 13079 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 13080 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 13081 if (umax_val > 31 || dst_reg->u32_max_value > 1ULL << (31 - umax_val)) { 13082 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 13083 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 13084 } else { 13085 dst_reg->u32_min_value <<= umin_val; 13086 dst_reg->u32_max_value <<= umax_val; 13087 } 13088 } 13089 13090 static void scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13091 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13092 { 13093 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 13094 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 13095 /* u32 alu operation will zext upper bits */ 13096 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 13097 13098 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 13099 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_lshift(subreg, umin_val)); 13100 /* Not required but being careful mark reg64 bounds as unknown so 13101 * that we are forced to pick them up from tnum and zext later and 13102 * if some path skips this step we are still safe. 13103 */ 13104 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 13105 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 13106 } 13107 13108 static void __scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13109 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 13110 { 13111 /* Special case <<32 because it is a common compiler pattern to sign 13112 * extend subreg by doing <<32 s>>32. In this case if 32bit bounds are 13113 * positive we know this shift will also be positive so we can track 13114 * bounds correctly. Otherwise we lose all sign bit information except 13115 * what we can pick up from var_off. Perhaps we can generalize this 13116 * later to shifts of any length. 13117 */ 13118 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_max_value >= 0) 13119 dst_reg->smax_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_max_value << 32; 13120 else 13121 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 13122 13123 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0) 13124 dst_reg->smin_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_min_value << 32; 13125 else 13126 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 13127 13128 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 13129 if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) { 13130 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 13131 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 13132 } else { 13133 dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val; 13134 dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val; 13135 } 13136 } 13137 13138 static void scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13139 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13140 { 13141 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 13142 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 13143 13144 /* scalar64 calc uses 32bit unshifted bounds so must be called first */ 13145 __scalar64_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 13146 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 13147 13148 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 13149 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 13150 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 13151 } 13152 13153 static void scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13154 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13155 { 13156 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 13157 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 13158 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 13159 13160 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 13161 * be negative, then either: 13162 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 13163 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 13164 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 13165 * signed bounds 13166 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 13167 * about the result 13168 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 13169 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 13170 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 13171 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 13172 * var_off of the result. 13173 */ 13174 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 13175 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 13176 13177 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(subreg, umin_val); 13178 dst_reg->u32_min_value >>= umax_val; 13179 dst_reg->u32_max_value >>= umin_val; 13180 13181 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 13182 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 13183 } 13184 13185 static void scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13186 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13187 { 13188 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 13189 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 13190 13191 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 13192 * be negative, then either: 13193 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 13194 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 13195 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 13196 * signed bounds 13197 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 13198 * about the result 13199 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 13200 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 13201 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 13202 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 13203 * var_off of the result. 13204 */ 13205 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 13206 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 13207 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 13208 dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val; 13209 dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val; 13210 13211 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 13212 * on bits being shifted in. Take easy way out and mark unbounded 13213 * so we can recalculate later from tnum. 13214 */ 13215 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 13216 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 13217 } 13218 13219 static void scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13220 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13221 { 13222 u64 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 13223 13224 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and 13225 * umax_val is equal to umin_val. 13226 */ 13227 dst_reg->s32_min_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_min_value) >> umin_val); 13228 dst_reg->s32_max_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_max_value) >> umin_val); 13229 13230 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off), umin_val, 32); 13231 13232 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 13233 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 13234 */ 13235 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 13236 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 13237 13238 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 13239 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 13240 } 13241 13242 static void scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13243 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 13244 { 13245 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 13246 13247 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and umax_val is equal 13248 * to umin_val. 13249 */ 13250 dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val; 13251 dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val; 13252 13253 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val, 64); 13254 13255 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 13256 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 13257 */ 13258 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 13259 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 13260 13261 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 13262 * on bits being shifted in from upper 32-bits. Take easy way out 13263 * and mark unbounded so we can recalculate later from tnum. 13264 */ 13265 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 13266 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 13267 } 13268 13269 /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual 13270 * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts 13271 * need extra checks in the 32-bit case. 13272 */ 13273 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13274 struct bpf_insn *insn, 13275 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13276 struct bpf_reg_state src_reg) 13277 { 13278 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 13279 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 13280 bool src_known; 13281 s64 smin_val, smax_val; 13282 u64 umin_val, umax_val; 13283 s32 s32_min_val, s32_max_val; 13284 u32 u32_min_val, u32_max_val; 13285 u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32; 13286 bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64); 13287 int ret; 13288 13289 smin_val = src_reg.smin_value; 13290 smax_val = src_reg.smax_value; 13291 umin_val = src_reg.umin_value; 13292 umax_val = src_reg.umax_value; 13293 13294 s32_min_val = src_reg.s32_min_value; 13295 s32_max_val = src_reg.s32_max_value; 13296 u32_min_val = src_reg.u32_min_value; 13297 u32_max_val = src_reg.u32_max_value; 13298 13299 if (alu32) { 13300 src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 13301 if ((src_known && 13302 (s32_min_val != s32_max_val || u32_min_val != u32_max_val)) || 13303 s32_min_val > s32_max_val || u32_min_val > u32_max_val) { 13304 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 13305 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 13306 */ 13307 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 13308 return 0; 13309 } 13310 } else { 13311 src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 13312 if ((src_known && 13313 (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 13314 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 13315 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 13316 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 13317 */ 13318 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 13319 return 0; 13320 } 13321 } 13322 13323 if (!src_known && 13324 opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) { 13325 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 13326 return 0; 13327 } 13328 13329 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 13330 ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn); 13331 if (ret < 0) 13332 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL); 13333 } 13334 13335 /* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops. 13336 * There are two classes of instructions: The first class we track both 13337 * alu32 and alu64 sign/unsigned bounds independently this provides the 13338 * greatest amount of precision when alu operations are mixed with jmp32 13339 * operations. These operations are BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, BPF_MUL, BPF_ADD, 13340 * and BPF_OR. This is possible because these ops have fairly easy to 13341 * understand and calculate behavior in both 32-bit and 64-bit alu ops. 13342 * See alu32 verifier tests for examples. The second class of 13343 * operations, BPF_LSH, BPF_RSH, and BPF_ARSH, however are not so easy 13344 * with regards to tracking sign/unsigned bounds because the bits may 13345 * cross subreg boundaries in the alu64 case. When this happens we mark 13346 * the reg unbounded in the subreg bound space and use the resulting 13347 * tnum to calculate an approximation of the sign/unsigned bounds. 13348 */ 13349 switch (opcode) { 13350 case BPF_ADD: 13351 scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13352 scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13353 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 13354 break; 13355 case BPF_SUB: 13356 scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13357 scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13358 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 13359 break; 13360 case BPF_MUL: 13361 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 13362 scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13363 scalar_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13364 break; 13365 case BPF_AND: 13366 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 13367 scalar32_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13368 scalar_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13369 break; 13370 case BPF_OR: 13371 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 13372 scalar32_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13373 scalar_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13374 break; 13375 case BPF_XOR: 13376 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_xor(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 13377 scalar32_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13378 scalar_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13379 break; 13380 case BPF_LSH: 13381 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 13382 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 13383 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 13384 */ 13385 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 13386 break; 13387 } 13388 if (alu32) 13389 scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13390 else 13391 scalar_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13392 break; 13393 case BPF_RSH: 13394 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 13395 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 13396 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 13397 */ 13398 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 13399 break; 13400 } 13401 if (alu32) 13402 scalar32_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13403 else 13404 scalar_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13405 break; 13406 case BPF_ARSH: 13407 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 13408 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 13409 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 13410 */ 13411 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 13412 break; 13413 } 13414 if (alu32) 13415 scalar32_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13416 else 13417 scalar_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 13418 break; 13419 default: 13420 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 13421 break; 13422 } 13423 13424 /* ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register */ 13425 if (alu32) 13426 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 13427 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 13428 return 0; 13429 } 13430 13431 /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max 13432 * and var_off. 13433 */ 13434 static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13435 struct bpf_insn *insn) 13436 { 13437 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 13438 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 13439 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg; 13440 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0}; 13441 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 13442 int err; 13443 13444 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 13445 src_reg = NULL; 13446 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 13447 ptr_reg = dst_reg; 13448 else 13449 /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be 13450 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by find_equal_scalars() 13451 */ 13452 dst_reg->id = 0; 13453 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 13454 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 13455 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 13456 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 13457 /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields 13458 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except 13459 * pointer subtraction 13460 */ 13461 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 13462 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 13463 return 0; 13464 } 13465 verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n", 13466 insn->dst_reg, 13467 bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 13468 return -EACCES; 13469 } else { 13470 /* scalar += pointer 13471 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our 13472 * src/dest handling in computing the range 13473 */ 13474 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 13475 if (err) 13476 return err; 13477 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 13478 src_reg, dst_reg); 13479 } 13480 } else if (ptr_reg) { 13481 /* pointer += scalar */ 13482 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 13483 if (err) 13484 return err; 13485 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 13486 dst_reg, src_reg); 13487 } else if (dst_reg->precise) { 13488 /* if dst_reg is precise, src_reg should be precise as well */ 13489 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 13490 if (err) 13491 return err; 13492 } 13493 } else { 13494 /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only 13495 * need to be able to read from this state. 13496 */ 13497 off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 13498 __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm); 13499 src_reg = &off_reg; 13500 if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */ 13501 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 13502 ptr_reg, src_reg); 13503 } 13504 13505 /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */ 13506 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) { 13507 print_verifier_state(env, state, true); 13508 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); 13509 return -EINVAL; 13510 } 13511 if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) { 13512 print_verifier_state(env, state, true); 13513 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); 13514 return -EINVAL; 13515 } 13516 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); 13517 } 13518 13519 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */ 13520 static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 13521 { 13522 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 13523 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 13524 int err; 13525 13526 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { 13527 if (opcode == BPF_NEG) { 13528 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 13529 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 13530 insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) { 13531 verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n"); 13532 return -EINVAL; 13533 } 13534 } else { 13535 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 13536 (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) || 13537 (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 && 13538 BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_TO_LE)) { 13539 verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n"); 13540 return -EINVAL; 13541 } 13542 } 13543 13544 /* check src operand */ 13545 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 13546 if (err) 13547 return err; 13548 13549 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 13550 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 13551 insn->dst_reg); 13552 return -EACCES; 13553 } 13554 13555 /* check dest operand */ 13556 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 13557 if (err) 13558 return err; 13559 13560 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 13561 13562 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 13563 if (insn->imm != 0) { 13564 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 13565 return -EINVAL; 13566 } 13567 13568 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU) { 13569 if (insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 8 && insn->off != 16) { 13570 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 13571 return -EINVAL; 13572 } 13573 } else { 13574 if (insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 8 && insn->off != 16 && 13575 insn->off != 32) { 13576 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 13577 return -EINVAL; 13578 } 13579 } 13580 13581 /* check src operand */ 13582 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 13583 if (err) 13584 return err; 13585 } else { 13586 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 13587 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 13588 return -EINVAL; 13589 } 13590 } 13591 13592 /* check dest operand, mark as required later */ 13593 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 13594 if (err) 13595 return err; 13596 13597 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 13598 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg; 13599 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg; 13600 bool need_id = src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id && 13601 !tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 13602 13603 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 13604 if (insn->off == 0) { 13605 /* case: R1 = R2 13606 * copy register state to dest reg 13607 */ 13608 if (need_id) 13609 /* Assign src and dst registers the same ID 13610 * that will be used by find_equal_scalars() 13611 * to propagate min/max range. 13612 */ 13613 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 13614 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 13615 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 13616 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 13617 } else { 13618 /* case: R1 = (s8, s16 s32)R2 */ 13619 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 13620 verbose(env, 13621 "R%d sign-extension part of pointer\n", 13622 insn->src_reg); 13623 return -EACCES; 13624 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 13625 bool no_sext; 13626 13627 no_sext = src_reg->umax_value < (1ULL << (insn->off - 1)); 13628 if (no_sext && need_id) 13629 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 13630 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 13631 if (!no_sext) 13632 dst_reg->id = 0; 13633 coerce_reg_to_size_sx(dst_reg, insn->off >> 3); 13634 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 13635 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 13636 } else { 13637 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 13638 } 13639 } 13640 } else { 13641 /* R1 = (u32) R2 */ 13642 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 13643 verbose(env, 13644 "R%d partial copy of pointer\n", 13645 insn->src_reg); 13646 return -EACCES; 13647 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 13648 if (insn->off == 0) { 13649 bool is_src_reg_u32 = src_reg->umax_value <= U32_MAX; 13650 13651 if (is_src_reg_u32 && need_id) 13652 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 13653 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 13654 /* Make sure ID is cleared if src_reg is not in u32 13655 * range otherwise dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly 13656 * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars() 13657 */ 13658 if (!is_src_reg_u32) 13659 dst_reg->id = 0; 13660 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 13661 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 13662 } else { 13663 /* case: W1 = (s8, s16)W2 */ 13664 bool no_sext = src_reg->umax_value < (1ULL << (insn->off - 1)); 13665 13666 if (no_sext && need_id) 13667 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 13668 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 13669 if (!no_sext) 13670 dst_reg->id = 0; 13671 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 13672 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 13673 coerce_subreg_to_size_sx(dst_reg, insn->off >> 3); 13674 } 13675 } else { 13676 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, 13677 insn->dst_reg); 13678 } 13679 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 13680 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 13681 } 13682 } else { 13683 /* case: R = imm 13684 * remember the value we stored into this reg 13685 */ 13686 /* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */ 13687 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 13688 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 13689 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 13690 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 13691 insn->imm); 13692 } else { 13693 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 13694 (u32)insn->imm); 13695 } 13696 } 13697 13698 } else if (opcode > BPF_END) { 13699 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode); 13700 return -EINVAL; 13701 13702 } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */ 13703 13704 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 13705 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off > 1 || 13706 (insn->off == 1 && opcode != BPF_MOD && opcode != BPF_DIV)) { 13707 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 13708 return -EINVAL; 13709 } 13710 /* check src1 operand */ 13711 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 13712 if (err) 13713 return err; 13714 } else { 13715 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off > 1 || 13716 (insn->off == 1 && opcode != BPF_MOD && opcode != BPF_DIV)) { 13717 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 13718 return -EINVAL; 13719 } 13720 } 13721 13722 /* check src2 operand */ 13723 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 13724 if (err) 13725 return err; 13726 13727 if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) && 13728 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) { 13729 verbose(env, "div by zero\n"); 13730 return -EINVAL; 13731 } 13732 13733 if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH || 13734 opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 13735 int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32; 13736 13737 if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) { 13738 verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm); 13739 return -EINVAL; 13740 } 13741 } 13742 13743 /* check dest operand */ 13744 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 13745 if (err) 13746 return err; 13747 13748 return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn); 13749 } 13750 13751 return 0; 13752 } 13753 13754 static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 13755 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13756 enum bpf_reg_type type, 13757 bool range_right_open) 13758 { 13759 struct bpf_func_state *state; 13760 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 13761 int new_range; 13762 13763 if (dst_reg->off < 0 || 13764 (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open)) 13765 /* This doesn't give us any range */ 13766 return; 13767 13768 if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF || 13769 dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF) 13770 /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less 13771 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt. 13772 */ 13773 return; 13774 13775 new_range = dst_reg->off; 13776 if (range_right_open) 13777 new_range++; 13778 13779 /* Examples for register markings: 13780 * 13781 * pkt_data in dst register: 13782 * 13783 * r2 = r3; 13784 * r2 += 8; 13785 * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception> 13786 * <access okay> 13787 * 13788 * r2 = r3; 13789 * r2 += 8; 13790 * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay> 13791 * <handle exception> 13792 * 13793 * Where: 13794 * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg 13795 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 13796 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 13797 * 13798 * pkt_data in src register: 13799 * 13800 * r2 = r3; 13801 * r2 += 8; 13802 * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay> 13803 * <handle exception> 13804 * 13805 * r2 = r3; 13806 * r2 += 8; 13807 * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception> 13808 * <access okay> 13809 * 13810 * Where: 13811 * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg 13812 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 13813 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 13814 * 13815 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) 13816 * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) 13817 * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on 13818 * the check. 13819 */ 13820 13821 /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we 13822 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big 13823 * the range won't allow anything. 13824 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16. 13825 */ 13826 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 13827 if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) 13828 /* keep the maximum range already checked */ 13829 reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range); 13830 })); 13831 } 13832 13833 static int is_branch32_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 val, u8 opcode) 13834 { 13835 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 13836 s32 sval = (s32)val; 13837 13838 switch (opcode) { 13839 case BPF_JEQ: 13840 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 13841 return !!tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 13842 else if (val < reg->u32_min_value || val > reg->u32_max_value) 13843 return 0; 13844 break; 13845 case BPF_JNE: 13846 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 13847 return !tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 13848 else if (val < reg->u32_min_value || val > reg->u32_max_value) 13849 return 1; 13850 break; 13851 case BPF_JSET: 13852 if ((~subreg.mask & subreg.value) & val) 13853 return 1; 13854 if (!((subreg.mask | subreg.value) & val)) 13855 return 0; 13856 break; 13857 case BPF_JGT: 13858 if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 13859 return 1; 13860 else if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 13861 return 0; 13862 break; 13863 case BPF_JSGT: 13864 if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 13865 return 1; 13866 else if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) 13867 return 0; 13868 break; 13869 case BPF_JLT: 13870 if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 13871 return 1; 13872 else if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 13873 return 0; 13874 break; 13875 case BPF_JSLT: 13876 if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 13877 return 1; 13878 else if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 13879 return 0; 13880 break; 13881 case BPF_JGE: 13882 if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 13883 return 1; 13884 else if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 13885 return 0; 13886 break; 13887 case BPF_JSGE: 13888 if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 13889 return 1; 13890 else if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 13891 return 0; 13892 break; 13893 case BPF_JLE: 13894 if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 13895 return 1; 13896 else if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 13897 return 0; 13898 break; 13899 case BPF_JSLE: 13900 if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) 13901 return 1; 13902 else if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 13903 return 0; 13904 break; 13905 } 13906 13907 return -1; 13908 } 13909 13910 13911 static int is_branch64_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode) 13912 { 13913 s64 sval = (s64)val; 13914 13915 switch (opcode) { 13916 case BPF_JEQ: 13917 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 13918 return !!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 13919 else if (val < reg->umin_value || val > reg->umax_value) 13920 return 0; 13921 break; 13922 case BPF_JNE: 13923 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 13924 return !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 13925 else if (val < reg->umin_value || val > reg->umax_value) 13926 return 1; 13927 break; 13928 case BPF_JSET: 13929 if ((~reg->var_off.mask & reg->var_off.value) & val) 13930 return 1; 13931 if (!((reg->var_off.mask | reg->var_off.value) & val)) 13932 return 0; 13933 break; 13934 case BPF_JGT: 13935 if (reg->umin_value > val) 13936 return 1; 13937 else if (reg->umax_value <= val) 13938 return 0; 13939 break; 13940 case BPF_JSGT: 13941 if (reg->smin_value > sval) 13942 return 1; 13943 else if (reg->smax_value <= sval) 13944 return 0; 13945 break; 13946 case BPF_JLT: 13947 if (reg->umax_value < val) 13948 return 1; 13949 else if (reg->umin_value >= val) 13950 return 0; 13951 break; 13952 case BPF_JSLT: 13953 if (reg->smax_value < sval) 13954 return 1; 13955 else if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 13956 return 0; 13957 break; 13958 case BPF_JGE: 13959 if (reg->umin_value >= val) 13960 return 1; 13961 else if (reg->umax_value < val) 13962 return 0; 13963 break; 13964 case BPF_JSGE: 13965 if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 13966 return 1; 13967 else if (reg->smax_value < sval) 13968 return 0; 13969 break; 13970 case BPF_JLE: 13971 if (reg->umax_value <= val) 13972 return 1; 13973 else if (reg->umin_value > val) 13974 return 0; 13975 break; 13976 case BPF_JSLE: 13977 if (reg->smax_value <= sval) 13978 return 1; 13979 else if (reg->smin_value > sval) 13980 return 0; 13981 break; 13982 } 13983 13984 return -1; 13985 } 13986 13987 /* compute branch direction of the expression "if (reg opcode val) goto target;" 13988 * and return: 13989 * 1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed 13990 * 0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn 13991 * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg < 5)" is unknown when register value 13992 * range [0,10] 13993 */ 13994 static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode, 13995 bool is_jmp32) 13996 { 13997 if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg)) { 13998 if (!reg_not_null(reg)) 13999 return -1; 14000 14001 /* If pointer is valid tests against zero will fail so we can 14002 * use this to direct branch taken. 14003 */ 14004 if (val != 0) 14005 return -1; 14006 14007 switch (opcode) { 14008 case BPF_JEQ: 14009 return 0; 14010 case BPF_JNE: 14011 return 1; 14012 default: 14013 return -1; 14014 } 14015 } 14016 14017 if (is_jmp32) 14018 return is_branch32_taken(reg, val, opcode); 14019 return is_branch64_taken(reg, val, opcode); 14020 } 14021 14022 static int flip_opcode(u32 opcode) 14023 { 14024 /* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */ 14025 static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = { 14026 /* these stay the same */ 14027 [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = BPF_JEQ, 14028 [BPF_JNE >> 4] = BPF_JNE, 14029 [BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET, 14030 /* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */ 14031 [BPF_JGE >> 4] = BPF_JLE, 14032 [BPF_JGT >> 4] = BPF_JLT, 14033 [BPF_JLE >> 4] = BPF_JGE, 14034 [BPF_JLT >> 4] = BPF_JGT, 14035 [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = BPF_JSLE, 14036 [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = BPF_JSLT, 14037 [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = BPF_JSGE, 14038 [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = BPF_JSGT 14039 }; 14040 return opcode_flip[opcode >> 4]; 14041 } 14042 14043 static int is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 14044 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 14045 u8 opcode) 14046 { 14047 struct bpf_reg_state *pkt; 14048 14049 if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 14050 pkt = dst_reg; 14051 } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 14052 pkt = src_reg; 14053 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 14054 } else { 14055 return -1; 14056 } 14057 14058 if (pkt->range >= 0) 14059 return -1; 14060 14061 switch (opcode) { 14062 case BPF_JLE: 14063 /* pkt <= pkt_end */ 14064 fallthrough; 14065 case BPF_JGT: 14066 /* pkt > pkt_end */ 14067 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END) 14068 /* pkt has at last one extra byte beyond pkt_end */ 14069 return opcode == BPF_JGT; 14070 break; 14071 case BPF_JLT: 14072 /* pkt < pkt_end */ 14073 fallthrough; 14074 case BPF_JGE: 14075 /* pkt >= pkt_end */ 14076 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END || pkt->range == AT_PKT_END) 14077 return opcode == BPF_JGE; 14078 break; 14079 } 14080 return -1; 14081 } 14082 14083 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the 14084 * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're 14085 * simply doing a BPF_K check. 14086 * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values. 14087 */ 14088 static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 14089 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 14090 u64 val, u32 val32, 14091 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 14092 { 14093 struct tnum false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off); 14094 struct tnum false_64off = false_reg->var_off; 14095 struct tnum true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off); 14096 struct tnum true_64off = true_reg->var_off; 14097 s64 sval = (s64)val; 14098 s32 sval32 = (s32)val32; 14099 14100 /* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its 14101 * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into 14102 * the same object, but we don't bother with that. 14103 * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we 14104 * only need to check one of them for pointerness. 14105 */ 14106 if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg)) 14107 return; 14108 14109 switch (opcode) { 14110 /* JEQ/JNE comparison doesn't change the register equivalence. 14111 * 14112 * r1 = r2; 14113 * if (r1 == 42) goto label; 14114 * ... 14115 * label: // here both r1 and r2 are known to be 42. 14116 * 14117 * Hence when marking register as known preserve it's ID. 14118 */ 14119 case BPF_JEQ: 14120 if (is_jmp32) { 14121 __mark_reg32_known(true_reg, val32); 14122 true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off); 14123 } else { 14124 ___mark_reg_known(true_reg, val); 14125 true_64off = true_reg->var_off; 14126 } 14127 break; 14128 case BPF_JNE: 14129 if (is_jmp32) { 14130 __mark_reg32_known(false_reg, val32); 14131 false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off); 14132 } else { 14133 ___mark_reg_known(false_reg, val); 14134 false_64off = false_reg->var_off; 14135 } 14136 break; 14137 case BPF_JSET: 14138 if (is_jmp32) { 14139 false_32off = tnum_and(false_32off, tnum_const(~val32)); 14140 if (is_power_of_2(val32)) 14141 true_32off = tnum_or(true_32off, 14142 tnum_const(val32)); 14143 } else { 14144 false_64off = tnum_and(false_64off, tnum_const(~val)); 14145 if (is_power_of_2(val)) 14146 true_64off = tnum_or(true_64off, 14147 tnum_const(val)); 14148 } 14149 break; 14150 case BPF_JGE: 14151 case BPF_JGT: 14152 { 14153 if (is_jmp32) { 14154 u32 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 : val32 - 1; 14155 u32 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 + 1 : val32; 14156 14157 false_reg->u32_max_value = min(false_reg->u32_max_value, 14158 false_umax); 14159 true_reg->u32_min_value = max(true_reg->u32_min_value, 14160 true_umin); 14161 } else { 14162 u64 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val : val - 1; 14163 u64 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val + 1 : val; 14164 14165 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, false_umax); 14166 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, true_umin); 14167 } 14168 break; 14169 } 14170 case BPF_JSGE: 14171 case BPF_JSGT: 14172 { 14173 if (is_jmp32) { 14174 s32 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 : sval32 - 1; 14175 s32 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 + 1 : sval32; 14176 14177 false_reg->s32_max_value = min(false_reg->s32_max_value, false_smax); 14178 true_reg->s32_min_value = max(true_reg->s32_min_value, true_smin); 14179 } else { 14180 s64 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval : sval - 1; 14181 s64 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval + 1 : sval; 14182 14183 false_reg->smax_value = min(false_reg->smax_value, false_smax); 14184 true_reg->smin_value = max(true_reg->smin_value, true_smin); 14185 } 14186 break; 14187 } 14188 case BPF_JLE: 14189 case BPF_JLT: 14190 { 14191 if (is_jmp32) { 14192 u32 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 : val32 + 1; 14193 u32 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 - 1 : val32; 14194 14195 false_reg->u32_min_value = max(false_reg->u32_min_value, 14196 false_umin); 14197 true_reg->u32_max_value = min(true_reg->u32_max_value, 14198 true_umax); 14199 } else { 14200 u64 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val : val + 1; 14201 u64 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val - 1 : val; 14202 14203 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, false_umin); 14204 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, true_umax); 14205 } 14206 break; 14207 } 14208 case BPF_JSLE: 14209 case BPF_JSLT: 14210 { 14211 if (is_jmp32) { 14212 s32 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 : sval32 + 1; 14213 s32 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 - 1 : sval32; 14214 14215 false_reg->s32_min_value = max(false_reg->s32_min_value, false_smin); 14216 true_reg->s32_max_value = min(true_reg->s32_max_value, true_smax); 14217 } else { 14218 s64 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval : sval + 1; 14219 s64 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval - 1 : sval; 14220 14221 false_reg->smin_value = max(false_reg->smin_value, false_smin); 14222 true_reg->smax_value = min(true_reg->smax_value, true_smax); 14223 } 14224 break; 14225 } 14226 default: 14227 return; 14228 } 14229 14230 if (is_jmp32) { 14231 false_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(false_64off), 14232 tnum_subreg(false_32off)); 14233 true_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(true_64off), 14234 tnum_subreg(true_32off)); 14235 __reg_combine_32_into_64(false_reg); 14236 __reg_combine_32_into_64(true_reg); 14237 } else { 14238 false_reg->var_off = false_64off; 14239 true_reg->var_off = true_64off; 14240 __reg_combine_64_into_32(false_reg); 14241 __reg_combine_64_into_32(true_reg); 14242 } 14243 } 14244 14245 /* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is 14246 * the variable reg. 14247 */ 14248 static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 14249 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 14250 u64 val, u32 val32, 14251 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 14252 { 14253 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 14254 /* This uses zero as "not present in table"; luckily the zero opcode, 14255 * BPF_JA, can't get here. 14256 */ 14257 if (opcode) 14258 reg_set_min_max(true_reg, false_reg, val, val32, opcode, is_jmp32); 14259 } 14260 14261 /* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */ 14262 static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 14263 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 14264 { 14265 src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value, 14266 dst_reg->umin_value); 14267 src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value, 14268 dst_reg->umax_value); 14269 src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value, 14270 dst_reg->smin_value); 14271 src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value, 14272 dst_reg->smax_value); 14273 src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off, 14274 dst_reg->var_off); 14275 reg_bounds_sync(src_reg); 14276 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 14277 } 14278 14279 static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src, 14280 struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst, 14281 struct bpf_reg_state *false_src, 14282 struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst, 14283 u8 opcode) 14284 { 14285 switch (opcode) { 14286 case BPF_JEQ: 14287 __reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst); 14288 break; 14289 case BPF_JNE: 14290 __reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst); 14291 break; 14292 } 14293 } 14294 14295 static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, 14296 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id, 14297 bool is_null) 14298 { 14299 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id && 14300 (is_rcu_reg(reg) || !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id))) { 14301 /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should have been 14302 * known-zero, because we don't allow pointer arithmetic on 14303 * pointers that might be NULL. If we see this happening, don't 14304 * convert the register. 14305 * 14306 * But in some cases, some helpers that return local kptrs 14307 * advance offset for the returned pointer. In those cases, it 14308 * is fine to expect to see reg->off. 14309 */ 14310 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value || !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0))) 14311 return; 14312 if (!(type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type) || type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) && 14313 WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->off)) 14314 return; 14315 14316 if (is_null) { 14317 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 14318 /* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point 14319 * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it, 14320 * so that state pruning has chances to take effect. 14321 */ 14322 reg->id = 0; 14323 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 14324 14325 return; 14326 } 14327 14328 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 14329 14330 if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) { 14331 /* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset 14332 * in release_reference(). 14333 * 14334 * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other 14335 * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset. 14336 */ 14337 reg->id = 0; 14338 } 14339 } 14340 } 14341 14342 /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually 14343 * be folded together at some point. 14344 */ 14345 static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno, 14346 bool is_null) 14347 { 14348 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 14349 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; 14350 u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id; 14351 u32 id = regs[regno].id; 14352 14353 if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null) 14354 /* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch. 14355 * No one could have freed the reference state before 14356 * doing the NULL check. 14357 */ 14358 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_state(state, id)); 14359 14360 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 14361 mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, reg, id, is_null); 14362 })); 14363 } 14364 14365 static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn, 14366 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 14367 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 14368 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch, 14369 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch) 14370 { 14371 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X) 14372 return false; 14373 14374 /* Pointers are always 64-bit. */ 14375 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32) 14376 return false; 14377 14378 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 14379 case BPF_JGT: 14380 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 14381 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 14382 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 14383 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 14384 /* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */ 14385 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 14386 dst_reg->type, false); 14387 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 14388 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 14389 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 14390 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 14391 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 14392 /* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 14393 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 14394 src_reg->type, true); 14395 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 14396 } else { 14397 return false; 14398 } 14399 break; 14400 case BPF_JLT: 14401 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 14402 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 14403 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 14404 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 14405 /* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */ 14406 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 14407 dst_reg->type, true); 14408 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 14409 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 14410 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 14411 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 14412 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 14413 /* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 14414 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 14415 src_reg->type, false); 14416 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 14417 } else { 14418 return false; 14419 } 14420 break; 14421 case BPF_JGE: 14422 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 14423 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 14424 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 14425 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 14426 /* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */ 14427 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 14428 dst_reg->type, true); 14429 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 14430 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 14431 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 14432 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 14433 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 14434 /* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */ 14435 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 14436 src_reg->type, false); 14437 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 14438 } else { 14439 return false; 14440 } 14441 break; 14442 case BPF_JLE: 14443 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 14444 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 14445 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 14446 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 14447 /* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */ 14448 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 14449 dst_reg->type, false); 14450 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 14451 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 14452 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 14453 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 14454 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 14455 /* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */ 14456 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 14457 src_reg->type, true); 14458 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 14459 } else { 14460 return false; 14461 } 14462 break; 14463 default: 14464 return false; 14465 } 14466 14467 return true; 14468 } 14469 14470 static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 14471 struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg) 14472 { 14473 struct bpf_func_state *state; 14474 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 14475 14476 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 14477 if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id) 14478 copy_register_state(reg, known_reg); 14479 })); 14480 } 14481 14482 static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14483 struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx) 14484 { 14485 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state; 14486 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch; 14487 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs; 14488 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL; 14489 struct bpf_reg_state *eq_branch_regs; 14490 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 14491 bool is_jmp32; 14492 int pred = -1; 14493 int err; 14494 14495 /* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */ 14496 if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JSLE) { 14497 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode); 14498 return -EINVAL; 14499 } 14500 14501 /* check src2 operand */ 14502 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 14503 if (err) 14504 return err; 14505 14506 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 14507 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 14508 if (insn->imm != 0) { 14509 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 14510 return -EINVAL; 14511 } 14512 14513 /* check src1 operand */ 14514 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 14515 if (err) 14516 return err; 14517 14518 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 14519 if (!(reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg)) && 14520 is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 14521 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 14522 insn->src_reg); 14523 return -EACCES; 14524 } 14525 } else { 14526 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 14527 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 14528 return -EINVAL; 14529 } 14530 } 14531 14532 is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32; 14533 14534 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 14535 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode, is_jmp32); 14536 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 14537 is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off))) { 14538 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 14539 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 14540 opcode, 14541 is_jmp32); 14542 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 14543 !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)) { 14544 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 14545 src_reg->var_off.value, 14546 opcode, 14547 is_jmp32); 14548 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 14549 is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off))) { 14550 pred = is_branch_taken(src_reg, 14551 tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value, 14552 flip_opcode(opcode), 14553 is_jmp32); 14554 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 14555 !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off)) { 14556 pred = is_branch_taken(src_reg, 14557 dst_reg->var_off.value, 14558 flip_opcode(opcode), 14559 is_jmp32); 14560 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && 14561 reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg) && 14562 !is_jmp32) { 14563 pred = is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg, opcode); 14564 } 14565 14566 if (pred >= 0) { 14567 /* If we get here with a dst_reg pointer type it is because 14568 * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison. 14569 */ 14570 if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg)) 14571 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 14572 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err && 14573 !__is_pointer_value(false, src_reg)) 14574 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 14575 if (err) 14576 return err; 14577 } 14578 14579 if (pred == 1) { 14580 /* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push 14581 * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative 14582 * execution. 14583 */ 14584 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && 14585 !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1, 14586 *insn_idx)) 14587 return -EFAULT; 14588 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 14589 print_insn_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]); 14590 *insn_idx += insn->off; 14591 return 0; 14592 } else if (pred == 0) { 14593 /* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the 14594 * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for 14595 * simulation under speculative execution. 14596 */ 14597 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && 14598 !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, 14599 *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, 14600 *insn_idx)) 14601 return -EFAULT; 14602 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 14603 print_insn_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]); 14604 return 0; 14605 } 14606 14607 other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx, 14608 false); 14609 if (!other_branch) 14610 return -EFAULT; 14611 other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs; 14612 14613 /* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust 14614 * our min/max values for our dst register. 14615 * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same 14616 * object, I suppose, see the PTR_MAYBE_NULL related if block below), 14617 * because otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't 14618 * comparable. 14619 */ 14620 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 14621 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 14622 14623 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 14624 src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 14625 if (tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off) || 14626 (is_jmp32 && 14627 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off)))) 14628 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 14629 dst_reg, 14630 src_reg->var_off.value, 14631 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 14632 opcode, is_jmp32); 14633 else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off) || 14634 (is_jmp32 && 14635 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off)))) 14636 reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 14637 src_reg, 14638 dst_reg->var_off.value, 14639 tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value, 14640 opcode, is_jmp32); 14641 else if (!is_jmp32 && 14642 (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE)) 14643 /* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */ 14644 reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 14645 &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 14646 src_reg, dst_reg, opcode); 14647 if (src_reg->id && 14648 !WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) { 14649 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, src_reg); 14650 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 14651 } 14652 14653 } 14654 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 14655 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 14656 dst_reg, insn->imm, (u32)insn->imm, 14657 opcode, is_jmp32); 14658 } 14659 14660 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id && 14661 !WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) { 14662 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, dst_reg); 14663 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 14664 } 14665 14666 /* if one pointer register is compared to another pointer 14667 * register check if PTR_MAYBE_NULL could be lifted. 14668 * E.g. register A - maybe null 14669 * register B - not null 14670 * for JNE A, B, ... - A is not null in the false branch; 14671 * for JEQ A, B, ... - A is not null in the true branch. 14672 * 14673 * Since PTR_TO_BTF_ID points to a kernel struct that does 14674 * not need to be null checked by the BPF program, i.e., 14675 * could be null even without PTR_MAYBE_NULL marking, so 14676 * only propagate nullness when neither reg is that type. 14677 */ 14678 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && 14679 __is_pointer_value(false, src_reg) && __is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg) && 14680 type_may_be_null(src_reg->type) != type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type) && 14681 base_type(src_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 14682 base_type(dst_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 14683 eq_branch_regs = NULL; 14684 switch (opcode) { 14685 case BPF_JEQ: 14686 eq_branch_regs = other_branch_regs; 14687 break; 14688 case BPF_JNE: 14689 eq_branch_regs = regs; 14690 break; 14691 default: 14692 /* do nothing */ 14693 break; 14694 } 14695 if (eq_branch_regs) { 14696 if (type_may_be_null(src_reg->type)) 14697 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 14698 else 14699 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 14700 } 14701 } 14702 14703 /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem(). 14704 * NOTE: these optimizations below are related with pointer comparison 14705 * which will never be JMP32. 14706 */ 14707 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && 14708 insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && 14709 type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) { 14710 /* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either 14711 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional. 14712 */ 14713 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, 14714 opcode == BPF_JNE); 14715 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, 14716 opcode == BPF_JEQ); 14717 } else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg], 14718 this_branch, other_branch) && 14719 is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 14720 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 14721 insn->dst_reg); 14722 return -EACCES; 14723 } 14724 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 14725 print_insn_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]); 14726 return 0; 14727 } 14728 14729 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ 14730 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 14731 { 14732 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 14733 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 14734 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg; 14735 struct bpf_map *map; 14736 int err; 14737 14738 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 14739 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n"); 14740 return -EINVAL; 14741 } 14742 if (insn->off != 0) { 14743 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n"); 14744 return -EINVAL; 14745 } 14746 14747 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 14748 if (err) 14749 return err; 14750 14751 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 14752 if (insn->src_reg == 0) { 14753 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; 14754 14755 dst_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 14756 __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], imm); 14757 return 0; 14758 } 14759 14760 /* All special src_reg cases are listed below. From this point onwards 14761 * we either succeed and assign a corresponding dst_reg->type after 14762 * zeroing the offset, or fail and reject the program. 14763 */ 14764 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 14765 14766 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 14767 dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type; 14768 switch (base_type(dst_reg->type)) { 14769 case PTR_TO_MEM: 14770 dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size; 14771 break; 14772 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 14773 dst_reg->btf = aux->btf_var.btf; 14774 dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id; 14775 break; 14776 default: 14777 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 14778 return -EFAULT; 14779 } 14780 return 0; 14781 } 14782 14783 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 14784 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 14785 u32 subprogno = find_subprog(env, 14786 env->insn_idx + insn->imm + 1); 14787 14788 if (!aux->func_info) { 14789 verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n"); 14790 return -EINVAL; 14791 } 14792 if (aux->func_info_aux[subprogno].linkage != BTF_FUNC_STATIC) { 14793 verbose(env, "callback function not static\n"); 14794 return -EINVAL; 14795 } 14796 14797 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 14798 dst_reg->subprogno = subprogno; 14799 return 0; 14800 } 14801 14802 map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index]; 14803 dst_reg->map_ptr = map; 14804 14805 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE || 14806 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE) { 14807 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 14808 dst_reg->off = aux->map_off; 14809 WARN_ON_ONCE(map->max_entries != 1); 14810 /* We want reg->id to be same (0) as map_value is not distinct */ 14811 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 14812 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 14813 dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 14814 } else { 14815 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 14816 return -EINVAL; 14817 } 14818 14819 return 0; 14820 } 14821 14822 static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type) 14823 { 14824 switch (type) { 14825 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 14826 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 14827 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 14828 return true; 14829 default: 14830 return false; 14831 } 14832 } 14833 14834 /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions: 14835 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb 14836 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers, 14837 * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0 14838 * 14839 * Implicit input: 14840 * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX 14841 * 14842 * Explicit input: 14843 * SRC == any register 14844 * IMM == 32-bit immediate 14845 * 14846 * Output: 14847 * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness 14848 */ 14849 static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 14850 { 14851 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 14852 static const int ctx_reg = BPF_REG_6; 14853 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 14854 int i, err; 14855 14856 if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) { 14857 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); 14858 return -EINVAL; 14859 } 14860 14861 if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) { 14862 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 14863 return -EINVAL; 14864 } 14865 14866 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 14867 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW || 14868 (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) { 14869 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n"); 14870 return -EINVAL; 14871 } 14872 14873 /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */ 14874 err = check_reg_arg(env, ctx_reg, SRC_OP); 14875 if (err) 14876 return err; 14877 14878 /* Disallow usage of BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] with reference tracking, as 14879 * gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to 14880 * reference leak. 14881 */ 14882 err = check_reference_leak(env); 14883 if (err) { 14884 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be mixed with socket references\n"); 14885 return err; 14886 } 14887 14888 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) { 14889 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_spin_lock-ed region\n"); 14890 return -EINVAL; 14891 } 14892 14893 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 14894 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_rcu_read_lock-ed region\n"); 14895 return -EINVAL; 14896 } 14897 14898 if (regs[ctx_reg].type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 14899 verbose(env, 14900 "at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n"); 14901 return -EINVAL; 14902 } 14903 14904 if (mode == BPF_IND) { 14905 /* check explicit source operand */ 14906 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 14907 if (err) 14908 return err; 14909 } 14910 14911 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, ®s[ctx_reg], ctx_reg); 14912 if (err < 0) 14913 return err; 14914 14915 /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */ 14916 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 14917 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 14918 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 14919 } 14920 14921 /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains 14922 * the value fetched from the packet. 14923 * Already marked as written above. 14924 */ 14925 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 14926 /* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */ 14927 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 14928 return 0; 14929 } 14930 14931 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14932 { 14933 struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown; 14934 const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 14935 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 14936 struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1), const_0 = tnum_const(0); 14937 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 14938 int err; 14939 struct bpf_func_state *frame = env->cur_state->frame[0]; 14940 const bool is_subprog = frame->subprogno; 14941 14942 /* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */ 14943 if (!is_subprog) { 14944 switch (prog_type) { 14945 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 14946 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) 14947 /* See below, can be 0 or 0-1 depending on hook. */ 14948 break; 14949 fallthrough; 14950 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: 14951 if (!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 14952 return 0; 14953 break; 14954 default: 14955 break; 14956 } 14957 } 14958 14959 /* eBPF calling convention is such that R0 is used 14960 * to return the value from eBPF program. 14961 * Make sure that it's readable at this time 14962 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote 14963 * something into it earlier 14964 */ 14965 err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP); 14966 if (err) 14967 return err; 14968 14969 if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) { 14970 verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n"); 14971 return -EACCES; 14972 } 14973 14974 reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0; 14975 14976 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn) { 14977 /* enforce return zero from async callbacks like timer */ 14978 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 14979 verbose(env, "In async callback the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", 14980 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 14981 return -EINVAL; 14982 } 14983 14984 if (!tnum_in(const_0, reg->var_off)) { 14985 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &const_0, "async callback", "R0"); 14986 return -EINVAL; 14987 } 14988 return 0; 14989 } 14990 14991 if (is_subprog) { 14992 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 14993 verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R0 is not a scalar value (%s)\n", 14994 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 14995 return -EINVAL; 14996 } 14997 return 0; 14998 } 14999 15000 switch (prog_type) { 15001 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: 15002 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG || 15003 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG || 15004 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME || 15005 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME || 15006 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME || 15007 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME) 15008 range = tnum_range(1, 1); 15009 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND || 15010 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND) 15011 range = tnum_range(0, 3); 15012 break; 15013 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 15014 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) { 15015 range = tnum_range(0, 3); 15016 enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3); 15017 } 15018 break; 15019 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: 15020 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: 15021 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE: 15022 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: 15023 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 15024 break; 15025 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 15026 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_btf_id) 15027 return 0; 15028 range = tnum_const(0); 15029 break; 15030 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 15031 switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) { 15032 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 15033 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 15034 range = tnum_const(0); 15035 break; 15036 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 15037 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 15038 return 0; 15039 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 15040 break; 15041 default: 15042 return -ENOTSUPP; 15043 } 15044 break; 15045 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 15046 range = tnum_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS); 15047 break; 15048 15049 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 15050 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 15051 /* Regular BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM programs can return 15052 * any value. 15053 */ 15054 return 0; 15055 } 15056 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 15057 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 15058 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 15059 */ 15060 range = tnum_range(1, 1); 15061 } 15062 break; 15063 15064 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_NETFILTER: 15065 range = tnum_range(NF_DROP, NF_ACCEPT); 15066 break; 15067 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: 15068 /* freplace program can return anything as its return value 15069 * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program. 15070 */ 15071 default: 15072 return 0; 15073 } 15074 15075 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 15076 verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", 15077 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 15078 return -EINVAL; 15079 } 15080 15081 if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { 15082 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "program exit", "R0"); 15083 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP && 15084 prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 15085 !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 15086 verbose(env, "Note, BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 15087 return -EINVAL; 15088 } 15089 15090 if (!tnum_is_unknown(enforce_attach_type_range) && 15091 tnum_in(enforce_attach_type_range, reg->var_off)) 15092 env->prog->enforce_expected_attach_type = 1; 15093 return 0; 15094 } 15095 15096 /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code 15097 * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v): 15098 * 2 label v as discovered 15099 * 3 let S be a stack 15100 * 4 S.push(v) 15101 * 5 while S is not empty 15102 * 6 t <- S.peek() 15103 * 7 if t is what we're looking for: 15104 * 8 return t 15105 * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do 15106 * 10 if edge e is already labelled 15107 * 11 continue with the next edge 15108 * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e) 15109 * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored 15110 * 14 label e as tree-edge 15111 * 15 label w as discovered 15112 * 16 S.push(w) 15113 * 17 continue at 5 15114 * 18 else if vertex w is discovered 15115 * 19 label e as back-edge 15116 * 20 else 15117 * 21 // vertex w is explored 15118 * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge 15119 * 23 label t as explored 15120 * 24 S.pop() 15121 * 15122 * convention: 15123 * 0x10 - discovered 15124 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled 15125 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled 15126 * 0x20 - explored 15127 */ 15128 15129 enum { 15130 DISCOVERED = 0x10, 15131 EXPLORED = 0x20, 15132 FALLTHROUGH = 1, 15133 BRANCH = 2, 15134 }; 15135 15136 static void mark_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 15137 { 15138 env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true; 15139 } 15140 15141 static bool is_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 15142 { 15143 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point; 15144 } 15145 15146 static void mark_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 15147 { 15148 env->insn_aux_data[idx].force_checkpoint = true; 15149 } 15150 15151 static bool is_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 15152 { 15153 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].force_checkpoint; 15154 } 15155 15156 static void mark_calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 15157 { 15158 env->insn_aux_data[idx].calls_callback = true; 15159 } 15160 15161 static bool calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 15162 { 15163 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].calls_callback; 15164 } 15165 15166 enum { 15167 DONE_EXPLORING = 0, 15168 KEEP_EXPLORING = 1, 15169 }; 15170 15171 /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above: 15172 * t - index of current instruction 15173 * w - next instruction 15174 * e - edge 15175 */ 15176 static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15177 { 15178 int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack; 15179 int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state; 15180 15181 if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH)) 15182 return DONE_EXPLORING; 15183 15184 if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH)) 15185 return DONE_EXPLORING; 15186 15187 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { 15188 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 15189 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 15190 return -EINVAL; 15191 } 15192 15193 if (e == BRANCH) { 15194 /* mark branch target for state pruning */ 15195 mark_prune_point(env, w); 15196 mark_jmp_point(env, w); 15197 } 15198 15199 if (insn_state[w] == 0) { 15200 /* tree-edge */ 15201 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 15202 insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED; 15203 if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len) 15204 return -E2BIG; 15205 insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; 15206 return KEEP_EXPLORING; 15207 } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { 15208 if (env->bpf_capable) 15209 return DONE_EXPLORING; 15210 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 15211 verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w); 15212 verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 15213 return -EINVAL; 15214 } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) { 15215 /* forward- or cross-edge */ 15216 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 15217 } else { 15218 verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n"); 15219 return -EFAULT; 15220 } 15221 return DONE_EXPLORING; 15222 } 15223 15224 static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, struct bpf_insn *insns, 15225 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15226 bool visit_callee) 15227 { 15228 int ret, insn_sz; 15229 15230 insn_sz = bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[t]) ? 2 : 1; 15231 ret = push_insn(t, t + insn_sz, FALLTHROUGH, env); 15232 if (ret) 15233 return ret; 15234 15235 mark_prune_point(env, t + insn_sz); 15236 /* when we exit from subprog, we need to record non-linear history */ 15237 mark_jmp_point(env, t + insn_sz); 15238 15239 if (visit_callee) { 15240 mark_prune_point(env, t); 15241 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env); 15242 } 15243 return ret; 15244 } 15245 15246 /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following: 15247 * < 0 - an error occurred 15248 * DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored 15249 * KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored 15250 */ 15251 static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15252 { 15253 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi, *insn = &insns[t]; 15254 int ret, off, insn_sz; 15255 15256 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) 15257 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, true); 15258 15259 /* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */ 15260 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP && 15261 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP32) { 15262 insn_sz = bpf_is_ldimm64(insn) ? 2 : 1; 15263 return push_insn(t, t + insn_sz, FALLTHROUGH, env); 15264 } 15265 15266 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 15267 case BPF_EXIT: 15268 return DONE_EXPLORING; 15269 15270 case BPF_CALL: 15271 if (insn->src_reg == 0 && insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) 15272 /* Mark this call insn as a prune point to trigger 15273 * is_state_visited() check before call itself is 15274 * processed by __check_func_call(). Otherwise new 15275 * async state will be pushed for further exploration. 15276 */ 15277 mark_prune_point(env, t); 15278 /* For functions that invoke callbacks it is not known how many times 15279 * callback would be called. Verifier models callback calling functions 15280 * by repeatedly visiting callback bodies and returning to origin call 15281 * instruction. 15282 * In order to stop such iteration verifier needs to identify when a 15283 * state identical some state from a previous iteration is reached. 15284 * Check below forces creation of checkpoint before callback calling 15285 * instruction to allow search for such identical states. 15286 */ 15287 if (is_sync_callback_calling_insn(insn)) { 15288 mark_calls_callback(env, t); 15289 mark_force_checkpoint(env, t); 15290 mark_prune_point(env, t); 15291 mark_jmp_point(env, t); 15292 } 15293 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 15294 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; 15295 15296 ret = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, insn, &meta, NULL); 15297 if (ret == 0 && is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) { 15298 mark_prune_point(env, t); 15299 /* Checking and saving state checkpoints at iter_next() call 15300 * is crucial for fast convergence of open-coded iterator loop 15301 * logic, so we need to force it. If we don't do that, 15302 * is_state_visited() might skip saving a checkpoint, causing 15303 * unnecessarily long sequence of not checkpointed 15304 * instructions and jumps, leading to exhaustion of jump 15305 * history buffer, and potentially other undesired outcomes. 15306 * It is expected that with correct open-coded iterators 15307 * convergence will happen quickly, so we don't run a risk of 15308 * exhausting memory. 15309 */ 15310 mark_force_checkpoint(env, t); 15311 } 15312 } 15313 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL); 15314 15315 case BPF_JA: 15316 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K) 15317 return -EINVAL; 15318 15319 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP) 15320 off = insn->off; 15321 else 15322 off = insn->imm; 15323 15324 /* unconditional jump with single edge */ 15325 ret = push_insn(t, t + off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); 15326 if (ret) 15327 return ret; 15328 15329 mark_prune_point(env, t + off + 1); 15330 mark_jmp_point(env, t + off + 1); 15331 15332 return ret; 15333 15334 default: 15335 /* conditional jump with two edges */ 15336 mark_prune_point(env, t); 15337 15338 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); 15339 if (ret) 15340 return ret; 15341 15342 return push_insn(t, t + insn->off + 1, BRANCH, env); 15343 } 15344 } 15345 15346 /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program 15347 * loop == back-edge in directed graph 15348 */ 15349 static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15350 { 15351 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 15352 int *insn_stack, *insn_state; 15353 int ret = 0; 15354 int i; 15355 15356 insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 15357 if (!insn_state) 15358 return -ENOMEM; 15359 15360 insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 15361 if (!insn_stack) { 15362 kvfree(insn_state); 15363 return -ENOMEM; 15364 } 15365 15366 insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */ 15367 insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */ 15368 env->cfg.cur_stack = 1; 15369 15370 while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) { 15371 int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1]; 15372 15373 ret = visit_insn(t, env); 15374 switch (ret) { 15375 case DONE_EXPLORING: 15376 insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; 15377 env->cfg.cur_stack--; 15378 break; 15379 case KEEP_EXPLORING: 15380 break; 15381 default: 15382 if (ret > 0) { 15383 verbose(env, "visit_insn internal bug\n"); 15384 ret = -EFAULT; 15385 } 15386 goto err_free; 15387 } 15388 } 15389 15390 if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) { 15391 verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n"); 15392 ret = -EFAULT; 15393 goto err_free; 15394 } 15395 15396 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 15397 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[i]; 15398 15399 if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) { 15400 verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i); 15401 ret = -EINVAL; 15402 goto err_free; 15403 } 15404 if (bpf_is_ldimm64(insn)) { 15405 if (insn_state[i + 1] != 0) { 15406 verbose(env, "jump into the middle of ldimm64 insn %d\n", i); 15407 ret = -EINVAL; 15408 goto err_free; 15409 } 15410 i++; /* skip second half of ldimm64 */ 15411 } 15412 } 15413 ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */ 15414 15415 err_free: 15416 kvfree(insn_state); 15417 kvfree(insn_stack); 15418 env->cfg.insn_state = env->cfg.insn_stack = NULL; 15419 return ret; 15420 } 15421 15422 static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15423 { 15424 int i; 15425 15426 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15427 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 15428 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 15429 return -EINVAL; 15430 } 15431 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 15432 verbose(env, "tail_call is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 15433 return -EINVAL; 15434 } 15435 } 15436 return 0; 15437 } 15438 15439 /* The minimum supported BTF func info size */ 15440 #define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE 8 15441 #define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 252 15442 15443 static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15444 const union bpf_attr *attr, 15445 bpfptr_t uattr) 15446 { 15447 const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type; 15448 u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size; 15449 u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info); 15450 struct bpf_func_info *krecord; 15451 struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL; 15452 struct bpf_prog *prog; 15453 const struct btf *btf; 15454 bpfptr_t urecord; 15455 u32 prev_offset = 0; 15456 bool scalar_return; 15457 int ret = -ENOMEM; 15458 15459 nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt; 15460 if (!nfuncs) { 15461 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 15462 return -EINVAL; 15463 return 0; 15464 } 15465 15466 if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) { 15467 verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n"); 15468 return -EINVAL; 15469 } 15470 15471 urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size; 15472 if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE || 15473 urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE || 15474 urec_size % sizeof(u32)) { 15475 verbose(env, "invalid func info rec size %u\n", urec_size); 15476 return -EINVAL; 15477 } 15478 15479 prog = env->prog; 15480 btf = prog->aux->btf; 15481 15482 urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel); 15483 min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size); 15484 15485 krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 15486 if (!krecord) 15487 return -ENOMEM; 15488 info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 15489 if (!info_aux) 15490 goto err_free; 15491 15492 for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) { 15493 ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size); 15494 if (ret) { 15495 if (ret == -E2BIG) { 15496 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in func info"); 15497 /* set the size kernel expects so loader can zero 15498 * out the rest of the record. 15499 */ 15500 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 15501 offsetof(union bpf_attr, func_info_rec_size), 15502 &min_size, sizeof(min_size))) 15503 ret = -EFAULT; 15504 } 15505 goto err_free; 15506 } 15507 15508 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&krecord[i], urecord, min_size)) { 15509 ret = -EFAULT; 15510 goto err_free; 15511 } 15512 15513 /* check insn_off */ 15514 ret = -EINVAL; 15515 if (i == 0) { 15516 if (krecord[i].insn_off) { 15517 verbose(env, 15518 "nonzero insn_off %u for the first func info record", 15519 krecord[i].insn_off); 15520 goto err_free; 15521 } 15522 } else if (krecord[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) { 15523 verbose(env, 15524 "same or smaller insn offset (%u) than previous func info record (%u)", 15525 krecord[i].insn_off, prev_offset); 15526 goto err_free; 15527 } 15528 15529 if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) { 15530 verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n"); 15531 goto err_free; 15532 } 15533 15534 /* check type_id */ 15535 type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id); 15536 if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) { 15537 verbose(env, "invalid type id %d in func info", 15538 krecord[i].type_id); 15539 goto err_free; 15540 } 15541 info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info); 15542 15543 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type); 15544 if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto))) 15545 /* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */ 15546 goto err_free; 15547 ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL); 15548 scalar_return = 15549 btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_is_any_enum(ret_type); 15550 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 15551 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 15552 goto err_free; 15553 } 15554 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 15555 verbose(env, "tail_call is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 15556 goto err_free; 15557 } 15558 15559 prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off; 15560 bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size); 15561 } 15562 15563 prog->aux->func_info = krecord; 15564 prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs; 15565 prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux; 15566 return 0; 15567 15568 err_free: 15569 kvfree(krecord); 15570 kfree(info_aux); 15571 return ret; 15572 } 15573 15574 static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15575 { 15576 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 15577 int i; 15578 15579 if (!aux->func_info) 15580 return; 15581 15582 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 15583 aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start; 15584 } 15585 15586 #define MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE offsetofend(struct bpf_line_info, line_col) 15587 #define MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 15588 15589 static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15590 const union bpf_attr *attr, 15591 bpfptr_t uattr) 15592 { 15593 u32 i, s, nr_linfo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size, prev_offset = 0; 15594 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub; 15595 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 15596 struct bpf_prog *prog; 15597 const struct btf *btf; 15598 bpfptr_t ulinfo; 15599 int err; 15600 15601 nr_linfo = attr->line_info_cnt; 15602 if (!nr_linfo) 15603 return 0; 15604 if (nr_linfo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_line_info)) 15605 return -EINVAL; 15606 15607 rec_size = attr->line_info_rec_size; 15608 if (rec_size < MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE || 15609 rec_size > MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE || 15610 rec_size & (sizeof(u32) - 1)) 15611 return -EINVAL; 15612 15613 /* Need to zero it in case the userspace may 15614 * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object. 15615 */ 15616 linfo = kvcalloc(nr_linfo, sizeof(struct bpf_line_info), 15617 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 15618 if (!linfo) 15619 return -ENOMEM; 15620 15621 prog = env->prog; 15622 btf = prog->aux->btf; 15623 15624 s = 0; 15625 sub = env->subprog_info; 15626 ulinfo = make_bpfptr(attr->line_info, uattr.is_kernel); 15627 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_line_info); 15628 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 15629 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) { 15630 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, expected_size, rec_size); 15631 if (err) { 15632 if (err == -E2BIG) { 15633 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in line_info"); 15634 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 15635 offsetof(union bpf_attr, line_info_rec_size), 15636 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 15637 err = -EFAULT; 15638 } 15639 goto err_free; 15640 } 15641 15642 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&linfo[i], ulinfo, ncopy)) { 15643 err = -EFAULT; 15644 goto err_free; 15645 } 15646 15647 /* 15648 * Check insn_off to ensure 15649 * 1) strictly increasing AND 15650 * 2) bounded by prog->len 15651 * 15652 * The linfo[0].insn_off == 0 check logically falls into 15653 * the later "missing bpf_line_info for func..." case 15654 * because the first linfo[0].insn_off must be the 15655 * first sub also and the first sub must have 15656 * subprog_info[0].start == 0. 15657 */ 15658 if ((i && linfo[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) || 15659 linfo[i].insn_off >= prog->len) { 15660 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].insn_off:%u (prev_offset:%u prog->len:%u)\n", 15661 i, linfo[i].insn_off, prev_offset, 15662 prog->len); 15663 err = -EINVAL; 15664 goto err_free; 15665 } 15666 15667 if (!prog->insnsi[linfo[i].insn_off].code) { 15668 verbose(env, 15669 "Invalid insn code at line_info[%u].insn_off\n", 15670 i); 15671 err = -EINVAL; 15672 goto err_free; 15673 } 15674 15675 if (!btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].line_off) || 15676 !btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].file_name_off)) { 15677 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].line_off or .file_name_off\n", i); 15678 err = -EINVAL; 15679 goto err_free; 15680 } 15681 15682 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 15683 if (linfo[i].insn_off == sub[s].start) { 15684 sub[s].linfo_idx = i; 15685 s++; 15686 } else if (sub[s].start < linfo[i].insn_off) { 15687 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for func#%u\n", s); 15688 err = -EINVAL; 15689 goto err_free; 15690 } 15691 } 15692 15693 prev_offset = linfo[i].insn_off; 15694 bpfptr_add(&ulinfo, rec_size); 15695 } 15696 15697 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 15698 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for %u funcs starting from func#%u\n", 15699 env->subprog_cnt - s, s); 15700 err = -EINVAL; 15701 goto err_free; 15702 } 15703 15704 prog->aux->linfo = linfo; 15705 prog->aux->nr_linfo = nr_linfo; 15706 15707 return 0; 15708 15709 err_free: 15710 kvfree(linfo); 15711 return err; 15712 } 15713 15714 #define MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo) 15715 #define MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 15716 15717 static int check_core_relo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15718 const union bpf_attr *attr, 15719 bpfptr_t uattr) 15720 { 15721 u32 i, nr_core_relo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size; 15722 struct bpf_core_relo core_relo = {}; 15723 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 15724 const struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf; 15725 struct bpf_core_ctx ctx = { 15726 .log = &env->log, 15727 .btf = btf, 15728 }; 15729 bpfptr_t u_core_relo; 15730 int err; 15731 15732 nr_core_relo = attr->core_relo_cnt; 15733 if (!nr_core_relo) 15734 return 0; 15735 if (nr_core_relo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo)) 15736 return -EINVAL; 15737 15738 rec_size = attr->core_relo_rec_size; 15739 if (rec_size < MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 15740 rec_size > MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 15741 rec_size % sizeof(u32)) 15742 return -EINVAL; 15743 15744 u_core_relo = make_bpfptr(attr->core_relos, uattr.is_kernel); 15745 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo); 15746 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 15747 15748 /* Unlike func_info and line_info, copy and apply each CO-RE 15749 * relocation record one at a time. 15750 */ 15751 for (i = 0; i < nr_core_relo; i++) { 15752 /* future proofing when sizeof(bpf_core_relo) changes */ 15753 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(u_core_relo, expected_size, rec_size); 15754 if (err) { 15755 if (err == -E2BIG) { 15756 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in core_relo"); 15757 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 15758 offsetof(union bpf_attr, core_relo_rec_size), 15759 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 15760 err = -EFAULT; 15761 } 15762 break; 15763 } 15764 15765 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&core_relo, u_core_relo, ncopy)) { 15766 err = -EFAULT; 15767 break; 15768 } 15769 15770 if (core_relo.insn_off % 8 || core_relo.insn_off / 8 >= prog->len) { 15771 verbose(env, "Invalid core_relo[%u].insn_off:%u prog->len:%u\n", 15772 i, core_relo.insn_off, prog->len); 15773 err = -EINVAL; 15774 break; 15775 } 15776 15777 err = bpf_core_apply(&ctx, &core_relo, i, 15778 &prog->insnsi[core_relo.insn_off / 8]); 15779 if (err) 15780 break; 15781 bpfptr_add(&u_core_relo, rec_size); 15782 } 15783 return err; 15784 } 15785 15786 static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15787 const union bpf_attr *attr, 15788 bpfptr_t uattr) 15789 { 15790 struct btf *btf; 15791 int err; 15792 15793 if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) { 15794 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 15795 return -EINVAL; 15796 return 0; 15797 } 15798 15799 btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd); 15800 if (IS_ERR(btf)) 15801 return PTR_ERR(btf); 15802 if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) { 15803 btf_put(btf); 15804 return -EACCES; 15805 } 15806 env->prog->aux->btf = btf; 15807 15808 err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr); 15809 if (err) 15810 return err; 15811 15812 err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr); 15813 if (err) 15814 return err; 15815 15816 err = check_core_relo(env, attr, uattr); 15817 if (err) 15818 return err; 15819 15820 return 0; 15821 } 15822 15823 /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */ 15824 static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old, 15825 struct bpf_reg_state *cur) 15826 { 15827 return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value && 15828 old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value && 15829 old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value && 15830 old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value && 15831 old->u32_min_value <= cur->u32_min_value && 15832 old->u32_max_value >= cur->u32_max_value && 15833 old->s32_min_value <= cur->s32_min_value && 15834 old->s32_max_value >= cur->s32_max_value; 15835 } 15836 15837 /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have 15838 * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from 15839 * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids. 15840 * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent 15841 * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But 15842 * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about 15843 * that. 15844 * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If 15845 * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map. 15846 */ 15847 static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 15848 { 15849 struct bpf_id_pair *map = idmap->map; 15850 unsigned int i; 15851 15852 /* either both IDs should be set or both should be zero */ 15853 if (!!old_id != !!cur_id) 15854 return false; 15855 15856 if (old_id == 0) /* cur_id == 0 as well */ 15857 return true; 15858 15859 for (i = 0; i < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) { 15860 if (!map[i].old) { 15861 /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */ 15862 map[i].old = old_id; 15863 map[i].cur = cur_id; 15864 return true; 15865 } 15866 if (map[i].old == old_id) 15867 return map[i].cur == cur_id; 15868 if (map[i].cur == cur_id) 15869 return false; 15870 } 15871 /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */ 15872 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 15873 return false; 15874 } 15875 15876 /* Similar to check_ids(), but allocate a unique temporary ID 15877 * for 'old_id' or 'cur_id' of zero. 15878 * This makes pairs like '0 vs unique ID', 'unique ID vs 0' valid. 15879 */ 15880 static bool check_scalar_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 15881 { 15882 old_id = old_id ? old_id : ++idmap->tmp_id_gen; 15883 cur_id = cur_id ? cur_id : ++idmap->tmp_id_gen; 15884 15885 return check_ids(old_id, cur_id, idmap); 15886 } 15887 15888 static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15889 struct bpf_func_state *st) 15890 { 15891 enum bpf_reg_liveness live; 15892 int i, j; 15893 15894 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 15895 live = st->regs[i].live; 15896 /* liveness must not touch this register anymore */ 15897 st->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 15898 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 15899 /* since the register is unused, clear its state 15900 * to make further comparison simpler 15901 */ 15902 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]); 15903 } 15904 15905 for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 15906 live = st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live; 15907 /* liveness must not touch this stack slot anymore */ 15908 st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 15909 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { 15910 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr); 15911 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 15912 st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; 15913 } 15914 } 15915 } 15916 15917 static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15918 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 15919 { 15920 int i; 15921 15922 if (st->frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 15923 /* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */ 15924 return; 15925 15926 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) 15927 clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i]); 15928 } 15929 15930 /* the parentage chains form a tree. 15931 * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and 15932 * pushed into state stack for future exploration. 15933 * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifer states 15934 * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already, 15935 * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when 15936 * the verifier explores other branches. 15937 * Example: 15938 * 1: r0 = 1 15939 * 2: if r1 == 100 goto pc+1 15940 * 3: r0 = 2 15941 * 4: exit 15942 * when the verifier reaches exit insn the register r0 in the state list of 15943 * insn 2 will be seen as !REG_LIVE_READ. Then the verifier pops the other_branch 15944 * of insn 2 and goes exploring further. At the insn 4 it will walk the 15945 * parentage chain from insn 4 into insn 2 and will mark r0 as REG_LIVE_READ. 15946 * 15947 * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring 15948 * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second 15949 * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and 15950 * their final liveness marks are already propagated. 15951 * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited() 15952 * we can call this clean_live_states() function to mark all liveness states 15953 * as REG_LIVE_DONE to indicate that 'parent' pointers of 'struct bpf_reg_state' 15954 * will not be used. 15955 * This function also clears the registers and stack for states that !READ 15956 * to simplify state merging. 15957 * 15958 * Important note here that walking the same branch instruction in the callee 15959 * doesn't meant that the states are DONE. The verifier has to compare 15960 * the callsites 15961 */ 15962 static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn, 15963 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 15964 { 15965 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 15966 15967 sl = *explored_state(env, insn); 15968 while (sl) { 15969 if (sl->state.branches) 15970 goto next; 15971 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn || 15972 !same_callsites(&sl->state, cur)) 15973 goto next; 15974 clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state); 15975 next: 15976 sl = sl->next; 15977 } 15978 } 15979 15980 static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 15981 const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 15982 struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 15983 { 15984 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && 15985 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) && 15986 check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap); 15987 } 15988 15989 /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ 15990 static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 15991 struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap, bool exact) 15992 { 15993 if (exact) 15994 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap); 15995 15996 if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 15997 /* explored state didn't use this */ 15998 return true; 15999 if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) 16000 /* explored state can't have used this */ 16001 return true; 16002 if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT) 16003 return false; 16004 16005 /* Enforce that register types have to match exactly, including their 16006 * modifiers (like PTR_MAYBE_NULL, MEM_RDONLY, etc), as a general 16007 * rule. 16008 * 16009 * One can make a point that using a pointer register as unbounded 16010 * SCALAR would be technically acceptable, but this could lead to 16011 * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak while pointers 16012 * are not. We could make this safe in special cases if root is 16013 * calling us, but it's probably not worth the hassle. 16014 * 16015 * Also, register types that are *not* MAYBE_NULL could technically be 16016 * safe to use as their MAYBE_NULL variants (e.g., PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE 16017 * is safe to be used as PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, provided both point 16018 * to the same map). 16019 * However, if the old MAYBE_NULL register then got NULL checked, 16020 * doing so could have affected others with the same id, and we can't 16021 * check for that because we lost the id when we converted to 16022 * a non-MAYBE_NULL variant. 16023 * So, as a general rule we don't allow mixing MAYBE_NULL and 16024 * non-MAYBE_NULL registers as well. 16025 */ 16026 if (rold->type != rcur->type) 16027 return false; 16028 16029 switch (base_type(rold->type)) { 16030 case SCALAR_VALUE: 16031 if (env->explore_alu_limits) { 16032 /* explore_alu_limits disables tnum_in() and range_within() 16033 * logic and requires everything to be strict 16034 */ 16035 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && 16036 check_scalar_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); 16037 } 16038 if (!rold->precise) 16039 return true; 16040 /* Why check_ids() for scalar registers? 16041 * 16042 * Consider the following BPF code: 16043 * 1: r6 = ... unbound scalar, ID=a ... 16044 * 2: r7 = ... unbound scalar, ID=b ... 16045 * 3: if (r6 > r7) goto +1 16046 * 4: r6 = r7 16047 * 5: if (r6 > X) goto ... 16048 * 6: ... memory operation using r7 ... 16049 * 16050 * First verification path is [1-6]: 16051 * - at (4) same bpf_reg_state::id (b) would be assigned to r6 and r7; 16052 * - at (5) r6 would be marked <= X, find_equal_scalars() would also mark 16053 * r7 <= X, because r6 and r7 share same id. 16054 * Next verification path is [1-4, 6]. 16055 * 16056 * Instruction (6) would be reached in two states: 16057 * I. r6{.id=b}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-6; 16058 * II. r6{.id=a}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-4, 6. 16059 * 16060 * Use check_ids() to distinguish these states. 16061 * --- 16062 * Also verify that new value satisfies old value range knowledge. 16063 */ 16064 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 16065 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) && 16066 check_scalar_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); 16067 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 16068 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 16069 case PTR_TO_MEM: 16070 case PTR_TO_BUF: 16071 case PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER: 16072 /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and 16073 * everything else matches, we are OK. 16074 */ 16075 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)) == 0 && 16076 range_within(rold, rcur) && 16077 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) && 16078 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) && 16079 check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap); 16080 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 16081 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 16082 /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr 16083 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are 16084 * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off, 16085 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or 16086 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access. 16087 */ 16088 if (rold->range > rcur->range) 16089 return false; 16090 /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment; 16091 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range. 16092 */ 16093 if (rold->off != rcur->off) 16094 return false; 16095 /* id relations must be preserved */ 16096 if (!check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap)) 16097 return false; 16098 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 16099 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 16100 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 16101 case PTR_TO_STACK: 16102 /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to 16103 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar 16104 */ 16105 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap) && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; 16106 default: 16107 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap); 16108 } 16109 } 16110 16111 static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 16112 struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap, bool exact) 16113 { 16114 int i, spi; 16115 16116 /* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional 16117 * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state 16118 * didn't use them 16119 */ 16120 for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) { 16121 struct bpf_reg_state *old_reg, *cur_reg; 16122 16123 spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE; 16124 16125 if (exact && 16126 (i >= cur->allocated_stack || 16127 old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != 16128 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE])) 16129 return false; 16130 16131 if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ) && !exact) { 16132 i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; 16133 /* explored state didn't use this */ 16134 continue; 16135 } 16136 16137 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID) 16138 continue; 16139 16140 if (env->allow_uninit_stack && 16141 old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC) 16142 continue; 16143 16144 /* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack 16145 * and these slots were used 16146 */ 16147 if (i >= cur->allocated_stack) 16148 return false; 16149 16150 /* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack 16151 * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack. 16152 * The opposite is not true 16153 */ 16154 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC && 16155 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) 16156 continue; 16157 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != 16158 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]) 16159 /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in 16160 * this stack slot, but current has STACK_MISC -> 16161 * this verifier states are not equivalent, 16162 * return false to continue verification of this path 16163 */ 16164 return false; 16165 if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE != BPF_REG_SIZE - 1) 16166 continue; 16167 /* Both old and cur are having same slot_type */ 16168 switch (old->stack[spi].slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]) { 16169 case STACK_SPILL: 16170 /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing 16171 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types 16172 * are the same as well. 16173 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored 16174 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8} 16175 * but current path has stored: 16176 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16} 16177 * such verifier states are not equivalent. 16178 * return false to continue verification of this path 16179 */ 16180 if (!regsafe(env, &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 16181 &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, idmap, exact)) 16182 return false; 16183 break; 16184 case STACK_DYNPTR: 16185 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 16186 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 16187 if (old_reg->dynptr.type != cur_reg->dynptr.type || 16188 old_reg->dynptr.first_slot != cur_reg->dynptr.first_slot || 16189 !check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap)) 16190 return false; 16191 break; 16192 case STACK_ITER: 16193 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 16194 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 16195 /* iter.depth is not compared between states as it 16196 * doesn't matter for correctness and would otherwise 16197 * prevent convergence; we maintain it only to prevent 16198 * infinite loop check triggering, see 16199 * iter_active_depths_differ() 16200 */ 16201 if (old_reg->iter.btf != cur_reg->iter.btf || 16202 old_reg->iter.btf_id != cur_reg->iter.btf_id || 16203 old_reg->iter.state != cur_reg->iter.state || 16204 /* ignore {old_reg,cur_reg}->iter.depth, see above */ 16205 !check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap)) 16206 return false; 16207 break; 16208 case STACK_MISC: 16209 case STACK_ZERO: 16210 case STACK_INVALID: 16211 continue; 16212 /* Ensure that new unhandled slot types return false by default */ 16213 default: 16214 return false; 16215 } 16216 } 16217 return true; 16218 } 16219 16220 static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur, 16221 struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 16222 { 16223 int i; 16224 16225 if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs) 16226 return false; 16227 16228 for (i = 0; i < old->acquired_refs; i++) { 16229 if (!check_ids(old->refs[i].id, cur->refs[i].id, idmap)) 16230 return false; 16231 } 16232 16233 return true; 16234 } 16235 16236 /* compare two verifier states 16237 * 16238 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since 16239 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them 16240 * 16241 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of 16242 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has 16243 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution 16244 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already 16245 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish. 16246 * 16247 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative 16248 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one. 16249 * Example: 16250 * explored current 16251 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) 16252 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) 16253 * 16254 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more 16255 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means 16256 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too 16257 * 16258 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid 16259 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that 16260 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely 16261 */ 16262 static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 16263 struct bpf_func_state *cur, bool exact) 16264 { 16265 int i; 16266 16267 if (old->callback_depth > cur->callback_depth) 16268 return false; 16269 16270 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 16271 if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], 16272 &env->idmap_scratch, exact)) 16273 return false; 16274 16275 if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch, exact)) 16276 return false; 16277 16278 if (!refsafe(old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch)) 16279 return false; 16280 16281 return true; 16282 } 16283 16284 static void reset_idmap_scratch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16285 { 16286 env->idmap_scratch.tmp_id_gen = env->id_gen; 16287 memset(&env->idmap_scratch.map, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch.map)); 16288 } 16289 16290 static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16291 struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 16292 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, 16293 bool exact) 16294 { 16295 int i; 16296 16297 if (old->curframe != cur->curframe) 16298 return false; 16299 16300 reset_idmap_scratch(env); 16301 16302 /* Verification state from speculative execution simulation 16303 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one. 16304 */ 16305 if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative) 16306 return false; 16307 16308 if (old->active_lock.ptr != cur->active_lock.ptr) 16309 return false; 16310 16311 /* Old and cur active_lock's have to be either both present 16312 * or both absent. 16313 */ 16314 if (!!old->active_lock.id != !!cur->active_lock.id) 16315 return false; 16316 16317 if (old->active_lock.id && 16318 !check_ids(old->active_lock.id, cur->active_lock.id, &env->idmap_scratch)) 16319 return false; 16320 16321 if (old->active_rcu_lock != cur->active_rcu_lock) 16322 return false; 16323 16324 /* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same 16325 * and all frame states need to be equivalent 16326 */ 16327 for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) { 16328 if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 16329 return false; 16330 if (!func_states_equal(env, old->frame[i], cur->frame[i], exact)) 16331 return false; 16332 } 16333 return true; 16334 } 16335 16336 /* Return 0 if no propagation happened. Return negative error code if error 16337 * happened. Otherwise, return the propagated bit. 16338 */ 16339 static int propagate_liveness_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16340 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 16341 struct bpf_reg_state *parent_reg) 16342 { 16343 u8 parent_flag = parent_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 16344 u8 flag = reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 16345 int err; 16346 16347 /* When comes here, read flags of PARENT_REG or REG could be any of 16348 * REG_LIVE_READ64, REG_LIVE_READ32, REG_LIVE_NONE. There is no need 16349 * of propagation if PARENT_REG has strongest REG_LIVE_READ64. 16350 */ 16351 if (parent_flag == REG_LIVE_READ64 || 16352 /* Or if there is no read flag from REG. */ 16353 !flag || 16354 /* Or if the read flag from REG is the same as PARENT_REG. */ 16355 parent_flag == flag) 16356 return 0; 16357 16358 err = mark_reg_read(env, reg, parent_reg, flag); 16359 if (err) 16360 return err; 16361 16362 return flag; 16363 } 16364 16365 /* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the 16366 * straight-line code between a state and its parent. When we arrive at an 16367 * equivalent state (jump target or such) we didn't arrive by the straight-line 16368 * code, so read marks in the state must propagate to the parent regardless 16369 * of the state's write marks. That's what 'parent == state->parent' comparison 16370 * in mark_reg_read() is for. 16371 */ 16372 static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16373 const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 16374 struct bpf_verifier_state *vparent) 16375 { 16376 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg, *parent_reg; 16377 struct bpf_func_state *state, *parent; 16378 int i, frame, err = 0; 16379 16380 if (vparent->curframe != vstate->curframe) { 16381 WARN(1, "propagate_live: parent frame %d current frame %d\n", 16382 vparent->curframe, vstate->curframe); 16383 return -EFAULT; 16384 } 16385 /* Propagate read liveness of registers... */ 16386 BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG); 16387 for (frame = 0; frame <= vstate->curframe; frame++) { 16388 parent = vparent->frame[frame]; 16389 state = vstate->frame[frame]; 16390 parent_reg = parent->regs; 16391 state_reg = state->regs; 16392 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness, it's read-only */ 16393 for (i = frame < vstate->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 16394 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, &state_reg[i], 16395 &parent_reg[i]); 16396 if (err < 0) 16397 return err; 16398 if (err == REG_LIVE_READ64) 16399 mark_insn_zext(env, &parent_reg[i]); 16400 } 16401 16402 /* Propagate stack slots. */ 16403 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE && 16404 i < parent->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 16405 parent_reg = &parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 16406 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 16407 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, state_reg, 16408 parent_reg); 16409 if (err < 0) 16410 return err; 16411 } 16412 } 16413 return 0; 16414 } 16415 16416 /* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and 16417 * propagate them into the current state 16418 */ 16419 static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16420 const struct bpf_verifier_state *old) 16421 { 16422 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg; 16423 struct bpf_func_state *state; 16424 int i, err = 0, fr; 16425 bool first; 16426 16427 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 16428 state = old->frame[fr]; 16429 state_reg = state->regs; 16430 first = true; 16431 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) { 16432 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 16433 !state_reg->precise || 16434 !(state_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 16435 continue; 16436 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 16437 if (first) 16438 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating r%d", fr, i); 16439 else 16440 verbose(env, ",r%d", i); 16441 } 16442 bt_set_frame_reg(&env->bt, fr, i); 16443 first = false; 16444 } 16445 16446 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 16447 if (!is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i])) 16448 continue; 16449 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 16450 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 16451 !state_reg->precise || 16452 !(state_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 16453 continue; 16454 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 16455 if (first) 16456 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating fp%d", 16457 fr, (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 16458 else 16459 verbose(env, ",fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 16460 } 16461 bt_set_frame_slot(&env->bt, fr, i); 16462 first = false; 16463 } 16464 if (!first) 16465 verbose(env, "\n"); 16466 } 16467 16468 err = mark_chain_precision_batch(env); 16469 if (err < 0) 16470 return err; 16471 16472 return 0; 16473 } 16474 16475 static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 16476 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 16477 { 16478 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; 16479 int i, fr = cur->curframe; 16480 16481 if (old->curframe != fr) 16482 return false; 16483 16484 fold = old->frame[fr]; 16485 fcur = cur->frame[fr]; 16486 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 16487 if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i], 16488 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent))) 16489 return false; 16490 return true; 16491 } 16492 16493 static bool is_iter_next_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 16494 { 16495 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].is_iter_next; 16496 } 16497 16498 /* is_state_visited() handles iter_next() (see process_iter_next_call() for 16499 * terminology) calls specially: as opposed to bounded BPF loops, it *expects* 16500 * states to match, which otherwise would look like an infinite loop. So while 16501 * iter_next() calls are taken care of, we still need to be careful and 16502 * prevent erroneous and too eager declaration of "ininite loop", when 16503 * iterators are involved. 16504 * 16505 * Here's a situation in pseudo-BPF assembly form: 16506 * 16507 * 0: again: ; set up iter_next() call args 16508 * 1: r1 = &it ; <CHECKPOINT HERE> 16509 * 2: call bpf_iter_num_next ; this is iter_next() call 16510 * 3: if r0 == 0 goto done 16511 * 4: ... something useful here ... 16512 * 5: goto again ; another iteration 16513 * 6: done: 16514 * 7: r1 = &it 16515 * 8: call bpf_iter_num_destroy ; clean up iter state 16516 * 9: exit 16517 * 16518 * This is a typical loop. Let's assume that we have a prune point at 1:, 16519 * before we get to `call bpf_iter_num_next` (e.g., because of that `goto 16520 * again`, assuming other heuristics don't get in a way). 16521 * 16522 * When we first time come to 1:, let's say we have some state X. We proceed 16523 * to 2:, fork states, enqueue ACTIVE, validate NULL case successfully, exit. 16524 * Now we come back to validate that forked ACTIVE state. We proceed through 16525 * 3-5, come to goto, jump to 1:. Let's assume our state didn't change, so we 16526 * are converging. But the problem is that we don't know that yet, as this 16527 * convergence has to happen at iter_next() call site only. So if nothing is 16528 * done, at 1: verifier will use bounded loop logic and declare infinite 16529 * looping (and would be *technically* correct, if not for iterator's 16530 * "eventual sticky NULL" contract, see process_iter_next_call()). But we 16531 * don't want that. So what we do in process_iter_next_call() when we go on 16532 * another ACTIVE iteration, we bump slot->iter.depth, to mark that it's 16533 * a different iteration. So when we suspect an infinite loop, we additionally 16534 * check if any of the *ACTIVE* iterator states depths differ. If yes, we 16535 * pretend we are not looping and wait for next iter_next() call. 16536 * 16537 * This only applies to ACTIVE state. In DRAINED state we don't expect to 16538 * loop, because that would actually mean infinite loop, as DRAINED state is 16539 * "sticky", and so we'll keep returning into the same instruction with the 16540 * same state (at least in one of possible code paths). 16541 * 16542 * This approach allows to keep infinite loop heuristic even in the face of 16543 * active iterator. E.g., C snippet below is and will be detected as 16544 * inifintely looping: 16545 * 16546 * struct bpf_iter_num it; 16547 * int *p, x; 16548 * 16549 * bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, 10); 16550 * while ((p = bpf_iter_num_next(&t))) { 16551 * x = p; 16552 * while (x--) {} // <<-- infinite loop here 16553 * } 16554 * 16555 */ 16556 static bool iter_active_depths_differ(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 16557 { 16558 struct bpf_reg_state *slot, *cur_slot; 16559 struct bpf_func_state *state; 16560 int i, fr; 16561 16562 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 16563 state = old->frame[fr]; 16564 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 16565 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_ITER) 16566 continue; 16567 16568 slot = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 16569 if (slot->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) 16570 continue; 16571 16572 cur_slot = &cur->frame[fr]->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 16573 if (cur_slot->iter.depth != slot->iter.depth) 16574 return true; 16575 } 16576 } 16577 return false; 16578 } 16579 16580 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 16581 { 16582 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; 16583 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev; 16584 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new, *loop_entry; 16585 int i, j, n, err, states_cnt = 0; 16586 bool force_new_state = env->test_state_freq || is_force_checkpoint(env, insn_idx); 16587 bool add_new_state = force_new_state; 16588 bool force_exact; 16589 16590 /* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions 16591 * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1 16592 * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen 16593 * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions. 16594 * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric. 16595 * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier 16596 * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup. 16597 */ 16598 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 && 16599 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8) 16600 add_new_state = true; 16601 16602 pprev = explored_state(env, insn_idx); 16603 sl = *pprev; 16604 16605 clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur); 16606 16607 while (sl) { 16608 states_cnt++; 16609 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx) 16610 goto next; 16611 16612 if (sl->state.branches) { 16613 struct bpf_func_state *frame = sl->state.frame[sl->state.curframe]; 16614 16615 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn && 16616 frame->async_entry_cnt != cur->frame[cur->curframe]->async_entry_cnt) { 16617 /* Different async_entry_cnt means that the verifier is 16618 * processing another entry into async callback. 16619 * Seeing the same state is not an indication of infinite 16620 * loop or infinite recursion. 16621 * But finding the same state doesn't mean that it's safe 16622 * to stop processing the current state. The previous state 16623 * hasn't yet reached bpf_exit, since state.branches > 0. 16624 * Checking in_async_callback_fn alone is not enough either. 16625 * Since the verifier still needs to catch infinite loops 16626 * inside async callbacks. 16627 */ 16628 goto skip_inf_loop_check; 16629 } 16630 /* BPF open-coded iterators loop detection is special. 16631 * states_maybe_looping() logic is too simplistic in detecting 16632 * states that *might* be equivalent, because it doesn't know 16633 * about ID remapping, so don't even perform it. 16634 * See process_iter_next_call() and iter_active_depths_differ() 16635 * for overview of the logic. When current and one of parent 16636 * states are detected as equivalent, it's a good thing: we prove 16637 * convergence and can stop simulating further iterations. 16638 * It's safe to assume that iterator loop will finish, taking into 16639 * account iter_next() contract of eventually returning 16640 * sticky NULL result. 16641 * 16642 * Note, that states have to be compared exactly in this case because 16643 * read and precision marks might not be finalized inside the loop. 16644 * E.g. as in the program below: 16645 * 16646 * 1. r7 = -16 16647 * 2. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 16648 * 3. while (bpf_iter_num_next(&fp[-8])) { 16649 * 4. if (r6 != 42) { 16650 * 5. r7 = -32 16651 * 6. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 16652 * 7. continue 16653 * 8. } 16654 * 9. r0 = r10 16655 * 10. r0 += r7 16656 * 11. r8 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0) 16657 * 12. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 16658 * 13. } 16659 * 16660 * Here verifier would first visit path 1-3, create a checkpoint at 3 16661 * with r7=-16, continue to 4-7,3. Existing checkpoint at 3 does 16662 * not have read or precision mark for r7 yet, thus inexact states 16663 * comparison would discard current state with r7=-32 16664 * => unsafe memory access at 11 would not be caught. 16665 */ 16666 if (is_iter_next_insn(env, insn_idx)) { 16667 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, true)) { 16668 struct bpf_func_state *cur_frame; 16669 struct bpf_reg_state *iter_state, *iter_reg; 16670 int spi; 16671 16672 cur_frame = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; 16673 /* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() enforces that 16674 * iter state pointer is always the first arg 16675 */ 16676 iter_reg = &cur_frame->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 16677 /* current state is valid due to states_equal(), 16678 * so we can assume valid iter and reg state, 16679 * no need for extra (re-)validations 16680 */ 16681 spi = __get_spi(iter_reg->off + iter_reg->var_off.value); 16682 iter_state = &func(env, iter_reg)->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 16683 if (iter_state->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) { 16684 update_loop_entry(cur, &sl->state); 16685 goto hit; 16686 } 16687 } 16688 goto skip_inf_loop_check; 16689 } 16690 if (calls_callback(env, insn_idx)) { 16691 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, true)) 16692 goto hit; 16693 goto skip_inf_loop_check; 16694 } 16695 /* attempt to detect infinite loop to avoid unnecessary doomed work */ 16696 if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) && 16697 states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, false) && 16698 !iter_active_depths_differ(&sl->state, cur) && 16699 sl->state.callback_unroll_depth == cur->callback_unroll_depth) { 16700 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 16701 verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx); 16702 verbose(env, "cur state:"); 16703 print_verifier_state(env, cur->frame[cur->curframe], true); 16704 verbose(env, "old state:"); 16705 print_verifier_state(env, sl->state.frame[cur->curframe], true); 16706 return -EINVAL; 16707 } 16708 /* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state 16709 * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct 16710 * states and may not help future pruning. 16711 * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that 16712 * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly. 16713 * The most abusive loop will be: 16714 * r1 += 1 16715 * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2 16716 * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states. 16717 * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states 16718 * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning. 16719 */ 16720 skip_inf_loop_check: 16721 if (!force_new_state && 16722 env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 && 16723 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100) 16724 add_new_state = false; 16725 goto miss; 16726 } 16727 /* If sl->state is a part of a loop and this loop's entry is a part of 16728 * current verification path then states have to be compared exactly. 16729 * 'force_exact' is needed to catch the following case: 16730 * 16731 * initial Here state 'succ' was processed first, 16732 * | it was eventually tracked to produce a 16733 * V state identical to 'hdr'. 16734 * .---------> hdr All branches from 'succ' had been explored 16735 * | | and thus 'succ' has its .branches == 0. 16736 * | V 16737 * | .------... Suppose states 'cur' and 'succ' correspond 16738 * | | | to the same instruction + callsites. 16739 * | V V In such case it is necessary to check 16740 * | ... ... if 'succ' and 'cur' are states_equal(). 16741 * | | | If 'succ' and 'cur' are a part of the 16742 * | V V same loop exact flag has to be set. 16743 * | succ <- cur To check if that is the case, verify 16744 * | | if loop entry of 'succ' is in current 16745 * | V DFS path. 16746 * | ... 16747 * | | 16748 * '----' 16749 * 16750 * Additional details are in the comment before get_loop_entry(). 16751 */ 16752 loop_entry = get_loop_entry(&sl->state); 16753 force_exact = loop_entry && loop_entry->branches > 0; 16754 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, force_exact)) { 16755 if (force_exact) 16756 update_loop_entry(cur, loop_entry); 16757 hit: 16758 sl->hit_cnt++; 16759 /* reached equivalent register/stack state, 16760 * prune the search. 16761 * Registers read by the continuation are read by us. 16762 * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they 16763 * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation 16764 * from reaching our parent (an explored_state). Our 16765 * own state will get the read marks recorded, but 16766 * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning 16767 * this state and will pop a new one. 16768 */ 16769 err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur); 16770 16771 /* if previous state reached the exit with precision and 16772 * current state is equivalent to it (except precsion marks) 16773 * the precision needs to be propagated back in 16774 * the current state. 16775 */ 16776 err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur); 16777 err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state); 16778 if (err) 16779 return err; 16780 return 1; 16781 } 16782 miss: 16783 /* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count. 16784 * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state 16785 * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have 16786 * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning 16787 * and some at the end) to help pruning. 16788 */ 16789 if (add_new_state) 16790 sl->miss_cnt++; 16791 /* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial 16792 * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view. 16793 * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time, 16794 * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed. 16795 * 'n' controls how many times state could miss before eviction. 16796 * Use bigger 'n' for checkpoints because evicting checkpoint states 16797 * too early would hinder iterator convergence. 16798 */ 16799 n = is_force_checkpoint(env, insn_idx) && sl->state.branches > 0 ? 64 : 3; 16800 if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * n + n) { 16801 /* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to 16802 * speed up verification 16803 */ 16804 *pprev = sl->next; 16805 if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE && 16806 !sl->state.used_as_loop_entry) { 16807 u32 br = sl->state.branches; 16808 16809 WARN_ONCE(br, 16810 "BUG live_done but branches_to_explore %d\n", 16811 br); 16812 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 16813 kfree(sl); 16814 env->peak_states--; 16815 } else { 16816 /* cannot free this state, since parentage chain may 16817 * walk it later. Add it for free_list instead to 16818 * be freed at the end of verification 16819 */ 16820 sl->next = env->free_list; 16821 env->free_list = sl; 16822 } 16823 sl = *pprev; 16824 continue; 16825 } 16826 next: 16827 pprev = &sl->next; 16828 sl = *pprev; 16829 } 16830 16831 if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt) 16832 env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt; 16833 16834 if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) 16835 return 0; 16836 16837 if (!add_new_state) 16838 return 0; 16839 16840 /* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one. 16841 * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, 16842 * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe) 16843 * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be 16844 * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx) 16845 * again on the way to bpf_exit. 16846 * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state 16847 * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0. 16848 */ 16849 new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL); 16850 if (!new_sl) 16851 return -ENOMEM; 16852 env->total_states++; 16853 env->peak_states++; 16854 env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed; 16855 env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed; 16856 16857 /* forget precise markings we inherited, see __mark_chain_precision */ 16858 if (env->bpf_capable) 16859 mark_all_scalars_imprecise(env, cur); 16860 16861 /* add new state to the head of linked list */ 16862 new = &new_sl->state; 16863 err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur); 16864 if (err) { 16865 free_verifier_state(new, false); 16866 kfree(new_sl); 16867 return err; 16868 } 16869 new->insn_idx = insn_idx; 16870 WARN_ONCE(new->branches != 1, 16871 "BUG is_state_visited:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d\n", new->branches, insn_idx); 16872 16873 cur->parent = new; 16874 cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx; 16875 cur->dfs_depth = new->dfs_depth + 1; 16876 clear_jmp_history(cur); 16877 new_sl->next = *explored_state(env, insn_idx); 16878 *explored_state(env, insn_idx) = new_sl; 16879 /* connect new state to parentage chain. Current frame needs all 16880 * registers connected. Only r6 - r9 of the callers are alive (pushed 16881 * to the stack implicitly by JITs) so in callers' frames connect just 16882 * r6 - r9 as an optimization. Callers will have r1 - r5 connected to 16883 * the state of the call instruction (with WRITTEN set), and r0 comes 16884 * from callee with its full parentage chain, anyway. 16885 */ 16886 /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes 16887 * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us. 16888 * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark 16889 * their parent and current state never has children yet. Only 16890 * explored_states can get read marks.) 16891 */ 16892 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 16893 for (i = j < cur->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 16894 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].parent = &new->frame[j]->regs[i]; 16895 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 16896 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 16897 } 16898 16899 /* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */ 16900 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 16901 struct bpf_func_state *frame = cur->frame[j]; 16902 struct bpf_func_state *newframe = new->frame[j]; 16903 16904 for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 16905 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 16906 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.parent = 16907 &newframe->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 16908 } 16909 } 16910 return 0; 16911 } 16912 16913 /* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */ 16914 static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type) 16915 { 16916 switch (base_type(type)) { 16917 case PTR_TO_CTX: 16918 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 16919 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 16920 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 16921 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 16922 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 16923 return false; 16924 default: 16925 return true; 16926 } 16927 } 16928 16929 /* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we 16930 * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok 16931 * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch: 16932 * 16933 * R1 = sock_ptr 16934 * goto X; 16935 * ... 16936 * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr; 16937 * goto X; 16938 * ... 16939 * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0); 16940 */ 16941 static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev) 16942 { 16943 return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) || 16944 !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev)); 16945 } 16946 16947 static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type type, 16948 bool allow_trust_missmatch) 16949 { 16950 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; 16951 16952 if (*prev_type == NOT_INIT) { 16953 /* Saw a valid insn 16954 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off) 16955 * save type to validate intersecting paths 16956 */ 16957 *prev_type = type; 16958 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(type, *prev_type)) { 16959 /* Abuser program is trying to use the same insn 16960 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) 16961 * with different pointer types: 16962 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and 16963 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. 16964 * Reject it. 16965 */ 16966 if (allow_trust_missmatch && 16967 base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 16968 base_type(*prev_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 16969 /* 16970 * Have to support a use case when one path through 16971 * the program yields TRUSTED pointer while another 16972 * is UNTRUSTED. Fallback to UNTRUSTED to generate 16973 * BPF_PROBE_MEM/BPF_PROBE_MEMSX. 16974 */ 16975 *prev_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; 16976 } else { 16977 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 16978 return -EINVAL; 16979 } 16980 } 16981 16982 return 0; 16983 } 16984 16985 static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16986 { 16987 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 16988 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 16989 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 16990 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 16991 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 16992 bool do_print_state = false; 16993 int prev_insn_idx = -1; 16994 16995 for (;;) { 16996 struct bpf_insn *insn; 16997 u8 class; 16998 int err; 16999 17000 env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 17001 if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { 17002 verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", 17003 env->insn_idx, insn_cnt); 17004 return -EFAULT; 17005 } 17006 17007 insn = &insns[env->insn_idx]; 17008 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 17009 17010 if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { 17011 verbose(env, 17012 "BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", 17013 env->insn_processed); 17014 return -E2BIG; 17015 } 17016 17017 state->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 17018 17019 if (is_prune_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { 17020 err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx); 17021 if (err < 0) 17022 return err; 17023 if (err == 1) { 17024 /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ 17025 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 17026 if (do_print_state) 17027 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n", 17028 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 17029 env->cur_state->speculative ? 17030 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 17031 else 17032 verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx); 17033 } 17034 goto process_bpf_exit; 17035 } 17036 } 17037 17038 if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { 17039 err = push_jmp_history(env, state); 17040 if (err) 17041 return err; 17042 } 17043 17044 if (signal_pending(current)) 17045 return -EAGAIN; 17046 17047 if (need_resched()) 17048 cond_resched(); 17049 17050 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 && do_print_state) { 17051 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:", 17052 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 17053 env->cur_state->speculative ? 17054 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 17055 print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe], true); 17056 do_print_state = false; 17057 } 17058 17059 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 17060 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 17061 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 17062 .cb_print = verbose, 17063 .private_data = env, 17064 }; 17065 17066 if (verifier_state_scratched(env)) 17067 print_insn_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]); 17068 17069 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 17070 env->prev_log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 17071 verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx); 17072 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 17073 env->prev_insn_print_pos = env->log.end_pos - env->prev_log_pos; 17074 env->prev_log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 17075 } 17076 17077 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 17078 err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx, 17079 env->prev_insn_idx); 17080 if (err) 17081 return err; 17082 } 17083 17084 regs = cur_regs(env); 17085 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 17086 prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx; 17087 17088 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 17089 err = check_alu_op(env, insn); 17090 if (err) 17091 return err; 17092 17093 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 17094 enum bpf_reg_type src_reg_type; 17095 17096 /* check for reserved fields is already done */ 17097 17098 /* check src operand */ 17099 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 17100 if (err) 17101 return err; 17102 17103 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 17104 if (err) 17105 return err; 17106 17107 src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type; 17108 17109 /* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable, 17110 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func 17111 */ 17112 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg, 17113 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 17114 BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false, 17115 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEMSX); 17116 if (err) 17117 return err; 17118 17119 err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, src_reg_type, true); 17120 if (err) 17121 return err; 17122 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 17123 enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type; 17124 17125 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) { 17126 err = check_atomic(env, env->insn_idx, insn); 17127 if (err) 17128 return err; 17129 env->insn_idx++; 17130 continue; 17131 } 17132 17133 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) { 17134 verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); 17135 return -EINVAL; 17136 } 17137 17138 /* check src1 operand */ 17139 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 17140 if (err) 17141 return err; 17142 /* check src2 operand */ 17143 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 17144 if (err) 17145 return err; 17146 17147 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; 17148 17149 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 17150 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 17151 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 17152 BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false, false); 17153 if (err) 17154 return err; 17155 17156 err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false); 17157 if (err) 17158 return err; 17159 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 17160 enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type; 17161 17162 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || 17163 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 17164 verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); 17165 return -EINVAL; 17166 } 17167 /* check src operand */ 17168 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 17169 if (err) 17170 return err; 17171 17172 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; 17173 17174 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 17175 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 17176 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 17177 BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 17178 if (err) 17179 return err; 17180 17181 err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false); 17182 if (err) 17183 return err; 17184 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 17185 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 17186 17187 env->jmps_processed++; 17188 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 17189 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 17190 (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL 17191 && insn->off != 0) || 17192 (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 && 17193 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL && 17194 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) || 17195 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 17196 class == BPF_JMP32) { 17197 verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); 17198 return -EINVAL; 17199 } 17200 17201 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) { 17202 if ((insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_0 && insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) || 17203 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) || 17204 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && 17205 (insn->off != 0 || !is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(insn->imm)))) { 17206 verbose(env, "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n"); 17207 return -EINVAL; 17208 } 17209 } 17210 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 17211 err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 17212 else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 17213 err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 17214 else 17215 err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 17216 if (err) 17217 return err; 17218 17219 mark_reg_scratched(env, BPF_REG_0); 17220 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { 17221 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 17222 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 17223 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 17224 (class == BPF_JMP && insn->imm != 0) || 17225 (class == BPF_JMP32 && insn->off != 0)) { 17226 verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); 17227 return -EINVAL; 17228 } 17229 17230 if (class == BPF_JMP) 17231 env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1; 17232 else 17233 env->insn_idx += insn->imm + 1; 17234 continue; 17235 17236 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 17237 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 17238 insn->imm != 0 || 17239 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 17240 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 17241 class == BPF_JMP32) { 17242 verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); 17243 return -EINVAL; 17244 } 17245 17246 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr && 17247 !in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) { 17248 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock is missing\n"); 17249 return -EINVAL; 17250 } 17251 17252 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock && 17253 !in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) { 17254 verbose(env, "bpf_rcu_read_unlock is missing\n"); 17255 return -EINVAL; 17256 } 17257 17258 /* We must do check_reference_leak here before 17259 * prepare_func_exit to handle the case when 17260 * state->curframe > 0, it may be a callback 17261 * function, for which reference_state must 17262 * match caller reference state when it exits. 17263 */ 17264 err = check_reference_leak(env); 17265 if (err) 17266 return err; 17267 17268 if (state->curframe) { 17269 /* exit from nested function */ 17270 err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); 17271 if (err) 17272 return err; 17273 do_print_state = true; 17274 continue; 17275 } 17276 17277 err = check_return_code(env); 17278 if (err) 17279 return err; 17280 process_bpf_exit: 17281 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 17282 update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state); 17283 err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, 17284 &env->insn_idx, pop_log); 17285 if (err < 0) { 17286 if (err != -ENOENT) 17287 return err; 17288 break; 17289 } else { 17290 do_print_state = true; 17291 continue; 17292 } 17293 } else { 17294 err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 17295 if (err) 17296 return err; 17297 } 17298 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 17299 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 17300 17301 if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) { 17302 err = check_ld_abs(env, insn); 17303 if (err) 17304 return err; 17305 17306 } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) { 17307 err = check_ld_imm(env, insn); 17308 if (err) 17309 return err; 17310 17311 env->insn_idx++; 17312 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 17313 } else { 17314 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); 17315 return -EINVAL; 17316 } 17317 } else { 17318 verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class); 17319 return -EINVAL; 17320 } 17321 17322 env->insn_idx++; 17323 } 17324 17325 return 0; 17326 } 17327 17328 static int find_btf_percpu_datasec(struct btf *btf) 17329 { 17330 const struct btf_type *t; 17331 const char *tname; 17332 int i, n; 17333 17334 /* 17335 * Both vmlinux and module each have their own ".data..percpu" 17336 * DATASECs in BTF. So for module's case, we need to skip vmlinux BTF 17337 * types to look at only module's own BTF types. 17338 */ 17339 n = btf_nr_types(btf); 17340 if (btf_is_module(btf)) 17341 i = btf_nr_types(btf_vmlinux); 17342 else 17343 i = 1; 17344 17345 for(; i < n; i++) { 17346 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, i); 17347 if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) != BTF_KIND_DATASEC) 17348 continue; 17349 17350 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 17351 if (!strcmp(tname, ".data..percpu")) 17352 return i; 17353 } 17354 17355 return -ENOENT; 17356 } 17357 17358 /* replace pseudo btf_id with kernel symbol address */ 17359 static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 17360 struct bpf_insn *insn, 17361 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 17362 { 17363 const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi; 17364 const struct btf_type *datasec; 17365 struct btf_mod_pair *btf_mod; 17366 const struct btf_type *t; 17367 const char *sym_name; 17368 bool percpu = false; 17369 u32 type, id = insn->imm; 17370 struct btf *btf; 17371 s32 datasec_id; 17372 u64 addr; 17373 int i, btf_fd, err; 17374 17375 btf_fd = insn[1].imm; 17376 if (btf_fd) { 17377 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); 17378 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 17379 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF object FD specified.\n"); 17380 return -EINVAL; 17381 } 17382 } else { 17383 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 17384 verbose(env, "kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\n"); 17385 return -EINVAL; 17386 } 17387 btf = btf_vmlinux; 17388 btf_get(btf); 17389 } 17390 17391 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id); 17392 if (!t) { 17393 verbose(env, "ldimm64 insn specifies invalid btf_id %d.\n", id); 17394 err = -ENOENT; 17395 goto err_put; 17396 } 17397 17398 if (!btf_type_is_var(t) && !btf_type_is_func(t)) { 17399 verbose(env, "pseudo btf_id %d in ldimm64 isn't KIND_VAR or KIND_FUNC\n", id); 17400 err = -EINVAL; 17401 goto err_put; 17402 } 17403 17404 sym_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 17405 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(sym_name); 17406 if (!addr) { 17407 verbose(env, "ldimm64 failed to find the address for kernel symbol '%s'.\n", 17408 sym_name); 17409 err = -ENOENT; 17410 goto err_put; 17411 } 17412 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 17413 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 17414 17415 if (btf_type_is_func(t)) { 17416 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY; 17417 aux->btf_var.mem_size = 0; 17418 goto check_btf; 17419 } 17420 17421 datasec_id = find_btf_percpu_datasec(btf); 17422 if (datasec_id > 0) { 17423 datasec = btf_type_by_id(btf, datasec_id); 17424 for_each_vsi(i, datasec, vsi) { 17425 if (vsi->type == id) { 17426 percpu = true; 17427 break; 17428 } 17429 } 17430 } 17431 17432 type = t->type; 17433 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, type, NULL); 17434 if (percpu) { 17435 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU; 17436 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 17437 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 17438 } else if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 17439 const struct btf_type *ret; 17440 const char *tname; 17441 u32 tsize; 17442 17443 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 17444 ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, t, &tsize); 17445 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 17446 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 17447 verbose(env, "ldimm64 unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 17448 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 17449 err = -EINVAL; 17450 goto err_put; 17451 } 17452 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY; 17453 aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize; 17454 } else { 17455 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 17456 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 17457 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 17458 } 17459 check_btf: 17460 /* check whether we recorded this BTF (and maybe module) already */ 17461 for (i = 0; i < env->used_btf_cnt; i++) { 17462 if (env->used_btfs[i].btf == btf) { 17463 btf_put(btf); 17464 return 0; 17465 } 17466 } 17467 17468 if (env->used_btf_cnt >= MAX_USED_BTFS) { 17469 err = -E2BIG; 17470 goto err_put; 17471 } 17472 17473 btf_mod = &env->used_btfs[env->used_btf_cnt]; 17474 btf_mod->btf = btf; 17475 btf_mod->module = NULL; 17476 17477 /* if we reference variables from kernel module, bump its refcount */ 17478 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 17479 btf_mod->module = btf_try_get_module(btf); 17480 if (!btf_mod->module) { 17481 err = -ENXIO; 17482 goto err_put; 17483 } 17484 } 17485 17486 env->used_btf_cnt++; 17487 17488 return 0; 17489 err_put: 17490 btf_put(btf); 17491 return err; 17492 } 17493 17494 static bool is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type) 17495 { 17496 switch (type) { 17497 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: 17498 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT: 17499 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT: 17500 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 17501 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE: 17502 return true; 17503 default: 17504 return false; 17505 } 17506 } 17507 17508 static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 17509 struct bpf_map *map, 17510 struct bpf_prog *prog) 17511 17512 { 17513 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 17514 17515 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_LIST_HEAD) || 17516 btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_RB_ROOT)) { 17517 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 17518 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_{list_head,rb_root} yet\n"); 17519 return -EINVAL; 17520 } 17521 } 17522 17523 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 17524 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) { 17525 verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 17526 return -EINVAL; 17527 } 17528 17529 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 17530 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 17531 return -EINVAL; 17532 } 17533 } 17534 17535 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { 17536 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 17537 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_timer yet\n"); 17538 return -EINVAL; 17539 } 17540 } 17541 17542 if ((bpf_prog_is_offloaded(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_offloaded(map)) && 17543 !bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) { 17544 verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n"); 17545 return -EINVAL; 17546 } 17547 17548 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { 17549 verbose(env, "bpf_struct_ops map cannot be used in prog\n"); 17550 return -EINVAL; 17551 } 17552 17553 if (prog->aux->sleepable) 17554 switch (map->map_type) { 17555 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH: 17556 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH: 17557 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY: 17558 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH: 17559 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY: 17560 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH: 17561 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 17562 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 17563 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 17564 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 17565 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 17566 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 17567 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 17568 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE: 17569 break; 17570 default: 17571 verbose(env, 17572 "Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, ringbuf and local storage maps\n"); 17573 return -EINVAL; 17574 } 17575 17576 return 0; 17577 } 17578 17579 static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map) 17580 { 17581 return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE || 17582 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE); 17583 } 17584 17585 /* find and rewrite pseudo imm in ld_imm64 instructions: 17586 * 17587 * 1. if it accesses map FD, replace it with actual map pointer. 17588 * 2. if it accesses btf_id of a VAR, replace it with pointer to the var. 17589 * 17590 * NOTE: btf_vmlinux is required for converting pseudo btf_id. 17591 */ 17592 static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17593 { 17594 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 17595 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 17596 int i, j, err; 17597 17598 err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog); 17599 if (err) 17600 return err; 17601 17602 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 17603 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 17604 ((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM && BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEMSX) || 17605 insn->imm != 0)) { 17606 verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n"); 17607 return -EINVAL; 17608 } 17609 17610 if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) { 17611 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 17612 struct bpf_map *map; 17613 struct fd f; 17614 u64 addr; 17615 u32 fd; 17616 17617 if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 || 17618 insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 || 17619 insn[1].off != 0) { 17620 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 17621 return -EINVAL; 17622 } 17623 17624 if (insn[0].src_reg == 0) 17625 /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */ 17626 goto next_insn; 17627 17628 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 17629 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 17630 err = check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux); 17631 if (err) 17632 return err; 17633 goto next_insn; 17634 } 17635 17636 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 17637 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 17638 aux->ptr_type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 17639 goto next_insn; 17640 } 17641 17642 /* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is 17643 * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn. 17644 */ 17645 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 17646 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE: 17647 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 17648 break; 17649 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD: 17650 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 17651 if (insn[1].imm == 0) 17652 break; 17653 fallthrough; 17654 default: 17655 verbose(env, "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 17656 return -EINVAL; 17657 } 17658 17659 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 17660 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 17661 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 17662 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 17663 verbose(env, "fd_idx without fd_array is invalid\n"); 17664 return -EPROTO; 17665 } 17666 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&fd, env->fd_array, 17667 insn[0].imm * sizeof(fd), 17668 sizeof(fd))) 17669 return -EFAULT; 17670 break; 17671 default: 17672 fd = insn[0].imm; 17673 break; 17674 } 17675 17676 f = fdget(fd); 17677 map = __bpf_map_get(f); 17678 if (IS_ERR(map)) { 17679 verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", fd); 17680 return PTR_ERR(map); 17681 } 17682 17683 err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog); 17684 if (err) { 17685 fdput(f); 17686 return err; 17687 } 17688 17689 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 17690 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 17691 insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 17692 addr = (unsigned long)map; 17693 } else { 17694 u32 off = insn[1].imm; 17695 17696 if (off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 17697 verbose(env, "direct value offset of %u is not allowed\n", off); 17698 fdput(f); 17699 return -EINVAL; 17700 } 17701 17702 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 17703 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 17704 fdput(f); 17705 return -EINVAL; 17706 } 17707 17708 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 17709 if (err) { 17710 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n", 17711 map->value_size, off); 17712 fdput(f); 17713 return err; 17714 } 17715 17716 aux->map_off = off; 17717 addr += off; 17718 } 17719 17720 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 17721 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 17722 17723 /* check whether we recorded this map already */ 17724 for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++) { 17725 if (env->used_maps[j] == map) { 17726 aux->map_index = j; 17727 fdput(f); 17728 goto next_insn; 17729 } 17730 } 17731 17732 if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) { 17733 fdput(f); 17734 return -E2BIG; 17735 } 17736 17737 if (env->prog->aux->sleepable) 17738 atomic64_inc(&map->sleepable_refcnt); 17739 /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier, 17740 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it 17741 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded 17742 * and all maps are released in bpf_free_used_maps() 17743 */ 17744 bpf_map_inc(map); 17745 17746 aux->map_index = env->used_map_cnt; 17747 env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map; 17748 17749 if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) && 17750 bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog->aux, map)) { 17751 verbose(env, "only one cgroup storage of each type is allowed\n"); 17752 fdput(f); 17753 return -EBUSY; 17754 } 17755 17756 fdput(f); 17757 next_insn: 17758 insn++; 17759 i++; 17760 continue; 17761 } 17762 17763 /* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */ 17764 if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) { 17765 verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code); 17766 return -EINVAL; 17767 } 17768 } 17769 17770 /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid 17771 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd. 17772 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access. 17773 */ 17774 return 0; 17775 } 17776 17777 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 17778 static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17779 { 17780 __bpf_free_used_maps(env->prog->aux, env->used_maps, 17781 env->used_map_cnt); 17782 } 17783 17784 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 17785 static void release_btfs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17786 { 17787 __bpf_free_used_btfs(env->prog->aux, env->used_btfs, 17788 env->used_btf_cnt); 17789 } 17790 17791 /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */ 17792 static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17793 { 17794 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 17795 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 17796 int i; 17797 17798 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 17799 if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) 17800 continue; 17801 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) 17802 continue; 17803 insn->src_reg = 0; 17804 } 17805 } 17806 17807 /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range 17808 * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying 17809 * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero 17810 */ 17811 static void adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 17812 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, 17813 struct bpf_prog *new_prog, u32 off, u32 cnt) 17814 { 17815 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *old_data = env->insn_aux_data; 17816 struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi; 17817 u32 old_seen = old_data[off].seen; 17818 u32 prog_len; 17819 int i; 17820 17821 /* aux info at OFF always needs adjustment, no matter fast path 17822 * (cnt == 1) is taken or not. There is no guarantee INSN at OFF is the 17823 * original insn at old prog. 17824 */ 17825 old_data[off].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + off + cnt - 1); 17826 17827 if (cnt == 1) 17828 return; 17829 prog_len = new_prog->len; 17830 17831 memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off); 17832 memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off, 17833 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1)); 17834 for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) { 17835 /* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */ 17836 new_data[i].seen = old_seen; 17837 new_data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + i); 17838 } 17839 env->insn_aux_data = new_data; 17840 vfree(old_data); 17841 } 17842 17843 static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) 17844 { 17845 int i; 17846 17847 if (len == 1) 17848 return; 17849 /* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */ 17850 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 17851 if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off) 17852 continue; 17853 env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1; 17854 } 17855 } 17856 17857 static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 len) 17858 { 17859 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 17860 int i, sz = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 17861 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *desc; 17862 17863 for (i = 0; i < sz; i++) { 17864 desc = &tab[i]; 17865 if (desc->insn_idx <= off) 17866 continue; 17867 desc->insn_idx += len - 1; 17868 } 17869 } 17870 17871 static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 17872 const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len) 17873 { 17874 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 17875 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data = NULL; 17876 17877 if (len > 1) { 17878 new_data = vzalloc(array_size(env->prog->len + len - 1, 17879 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data))); 17880 if (!new_data) 17881 return NULL; 17882 } 17883 17884 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len); 17885 if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) { 17886 if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE) 17887 verbose(env, 17888 "insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n", 17889 env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx); 17890 vfree(new_data); 17891 return NULL; 17892 } 17893 adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_data, new_prog, off, len); 17894 adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len); 17895 adjust_poke_descs(new_prog, off, len); 17896 return new_prog; 17897 } 17898 17899 static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 17900 u32 off, u32 cnt) 17901 { 17902 int i, j; 17903 17904 /* find first prog starting at or after off (first to remove) */ 17905 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 17906 if (env->subprog_info[i].start >= off) 17907 break; 17908 /* find first prog starting at or after off + cnt (first to stay) */ 17909 for (j = i; j < env->subprog_cnt; j++) 17910 if (env->subprog_info[j].start >= off + cnt) 17911 break; 17912 /* if j doesn't start exactly at off + cnt, we are just removing 17913 * the front of previous prog 17914 */ 17915 if (env->subprog_info[j].start != off + cnt) 17916 j--; 17917 17918 if (j > i) { 17919 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 17920 int move; 17921 17922 /* move fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 17923 move = env->subprog_cnt + 1 - j; 17924 17925 memmove(env->subprog_info + i, 17926 env->subprog_info + j, 17927 sizeof(*env->subprog_info) * move); 17928 env->subprog_cnt -= j - i; 17929 17930 /* remove func_info */ 17931 if (aux->func_info) { 17932 move = aux->func_info_cnt - j; 17933 17934 memmove(aux->func_info + i, 17935 aux->func_info + j, 17936 sizeof(*aux->func_info) * move); 17937 aux->func_info_cnt -= j - i; 17938 /* func_info->insn_off is set after all code rewrites, 17939 * in adjust_btf_func() - no need to adjust 17940 */ 17941 } 17942 } else { 17943 /* convert i from "first prog to remove" to "first to adjust" */ 17944 if (env->subprog_info[i].start == off) 17945 i++; 17946 } 17947 17948 /* update fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 17949 for (; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 17950 env->subprog_info[i].start -= cnt; 17951 17952 return 0; 17953 } 17954 17955 static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 17956 u32 cnt) 17957 { 17958 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 17959 u32 i, l_off, l_cnt, nr_linfo; 17960 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 17961 17962 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 17963 if (!nr_linfo) 17964 return 0; 17965 17966 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 17967 17968 /* find first line info to remove, count lines to be removed */ 17969 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) 17970 if (linfo[i].insn_off >= off) 17971 break; 17972 17973 l_off = i; 17974 l_cnt = 0; 17975 for (; i < nr_linfo; i++) 17976 if (linfo[i].insn_off < off + cnt) 17977 l_cnt++; 17978 else 17979 break; 17980 17981 /* First live insn doesn't match first live linfo, it needs to "inherit" 17982 * last removed linfo. prog is already modified, so prog->len == off 17983 * means no live instructions after (tail of the program was removed). 17984 */ 17985 if (prog->len != off && l_cnt && 17986 (i == nr_linfo || linfo[i].insn_off != off + cnt)) { 17987 l_cnt--; 17988 linfo[--i].insn_off = off + cnt; 17989 } 17990 17991 /* remove the line info which refer to the removed instructions */ 17992 if (l_cnt) { 17993 memmove(linfo + l_off, linfo + i, 17994 sizeof(*linfo) * (nr_linfo - i)); 17995 17996 prog->aux->nr_linfo -= l_cnt; 17997 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 17998 } 17999 18000 /* pull all linfo[i].insn_off >= off + cnt in by cnt */ 18001 for (i = l_off; i < nr_linfo; i++) 18002 linfo[i].insn_off -= cnt; 18003 18004 /* fix up all subprogs (incl. 'exit') which start >= off */ 18005 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 18006 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx > l_off) { 18007 /* program may have started in the removed region but 18008 * may not be fully removed 18009 */ 18010 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx >= l_off + l_cnt) 18011 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx -= l_cnt; 18012 else 18013 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx = l_off; 18014 } 18015 18016 return 0; 18017 } 18018 18019 static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt) 18020 { 18021 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 18022 unsigned int orig_prog_len = env->prog->len; 18023 int err; 18024 18025 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 18026 bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(env, off, cnt); 18027 18028 err = bpf_remove_insns(env->prog, off, cnt); 18029 if (err) 18030 return err; 18031 18032 err = adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 18033 if (err) 18034 return err; 18035 18036 err = bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 18037 if (err) 18038 return err; 18039 18040 memmove(aux_data + off, aux_data + off + cnt, 18041 sizeof(*aux_data) * (orig_prog_len - off - cnt)); 18042 18043 return 0; 18044 } 18045 18046 /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not 18047 * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can 18048 * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code 18049 * with 'ja -1'. 18050 * 18051 * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the 18052 * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then 18053 * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception 18054 * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead 18055 * code could be located. 18056 */ 18057 static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18058 { 18059 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 18060 struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1); 18061 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 18062 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 18063 int i; 18064 18065 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 18066 if (aux_data[i].seen) 18067 continue; 18068 memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap)); 18069 aux_data[i].zext_dst = false; 18070 } 18071 } 18072 18073 static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code) 18074 { 18075 u8 op; 18076 18077 op = BPF_OP(code); 18078 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32) 18079 return op != BPF_JA; 18080 18081 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP) 18082 return false; 18083 18084 return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL; 18085 } 18086 18087 static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18088 { 18089 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 18090 struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 18091 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 18092 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 18093 int i; 18094 18095 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 18096 if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code)) 18097 continue; 18098 18099 if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen) 18100 ja.off = insn->off; 18101 else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen) 18102 ja.off = 0; 18103 else 18104 continue; 18105 18106 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 18107 bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(env, i, &ja); 18108 18109 memcpy(insn, &ja, sizeof(ja)); 18110 } 18111 } 18112 18113 static int opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18114 { 18115 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 18116 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 18117 int i, err; 18118 18119 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 18120 int j; 18121 18122 j = 0; 18123 while (i + j < insn_cnt && !aux_data[i + j].seen) 18124 j++; 18125 if (!j) 18126 continue; 18127 18128 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, j); 18129 if (err) 18130 return err; 18131 insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 18132 } 18133 18134 return 0; 18135 } 18136 18137 static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18138 { 18139 const struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 18140 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 18141 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 18142 int i, err; 18143 18144 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 18145 if (memcmp(&insn[i], &ja, sizeof(ja))) 18146 continue; 18147 18148 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, 1); 18149 if (err) 18150 return err; 18151 insn_cnt--; 18152 i--; 18153 } 18154 18155 return 0; 18156 } 18157 18158 static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18159 const union bpf_attr *attr) 18160 { 18161 struct bpf_insn *patch, zext_patch[2], rnd_hi32_patch[4]; 18162 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 18163 int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len; 18164 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 18165 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 18166 bool rnd_hi32; 18167 18168 rnd_hi32 = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32; 18169 zext_patch[1] = BPF_ZEXT_REG(0); 18170 rnd_hi32_patch[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 18171 rnd_hi32_patch[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); 18172 rnd_hi32_patch[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, 0, BPF_REG_AX); 18173 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { 18174 int adj_idx = i + delta; 18175 struct bpf_insn insn; 18176 int load_reg; 18177 18178 insn = insns[adj_idx]; 18179 load_reg = insn_def_regno(&insn); 18180 if (!aux[adj_idx].zext_dst) { 18181 u8 code, class; 18182 u32 imm_rnd; 18183 18184 if (!rnd_hi32) 18185 continue; 18186 18187 code = insn.code; 18188 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 18189 if (load_reg == -1) 18190 continue; 18191 18192 /* NOTE: arg "reg" (the fourth one) is only used for 18193 * BPF_STX + SRC_OP, so it is safe to pass NULL 18194 * here. 18195 */ 18196 if (is_reg64(env, &insn, load_reg, NULL, DST_OP)) { 18197 if (class == BPF_LD && 18198 BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IMM) 18199 i++; 18200 continue; 18201 } 18202 18203 /* ctx load could be transformed into wider load. */ 18204 if (class == BPF_LDX && 18205 aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX) 18206 continue; 18207 18208 imm_rnd = get_random_u32(); 18209 rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn; 18210 rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd; 18211 rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = load_reg; 18212 patch = rnd_hi32_patch; 18213 patch_len = 4; 18214 goto apply_patch_buffer; 18215 } 18216 18217 /* Add in an zero-extend instruction if a) the JIT has requested 18218 * it or b) it's a CMPXCHG. 18219 * 18220 * The latter is because: BPF_CMPXCHG always loads a value into 18221 * R0, therefore always zero-extends. However some archs' 18222 * equivalent instruction only does this load when the 18223 * comparison is successful. This detail of CMPXCHG is 18224 * orthogonal to the general zero-extension behaviour of the 18225 * CPU, so it's treated independently of bpf_jit_needs_zext. 18226 */ 18227 if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext() && !is_cmpxchg_insn(&insn)) 18228 continue; 18229 18230 /* Zero-extension is done by the caller. */ 18231 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(&insn)) 18232 continue; 18233 18234 if (WARN_ON(load_reg == -1)) { 18235 verbose(env, "verifier bug. zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined\n"); 18236 return -EFAULT; 18237 } 18238 18239 zext_patch[0] = insn; 18240 zext_patch[1].dst_reg = load_reg; 18241 zext_patch[1].src_reg = load_reg; 18242 patch = zext_patch; 18243 patch_len = 2; 18244 apply_patch_buffer: 18245 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, adj_idx, patch, patch_len); 18246 if (!new_prog) 18247 return -ENOMEM; 18248 env->prog = new_prog; 18249 insns = new_prog->insnsi; 18250 aux = env->insn_aux_data; 18251 delta += patch_len - 1; 18252 } 18253 18254 return 0; 18255 } 18256 18257 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a 18258 * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure: 18259 * struct __sk_buff -> struct sk_buff 18260 * struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock 18261 */ 18262 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18263 { 18264 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops; 18265 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0; 18266 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 18267 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn; 18268 u32 target_size, size_default, off; 18269 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 18270 enum bpf_access_type type; 18271 bool is_narrower_load; 18272 18273 if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) { 18274 if (!ops->gen_prologue) { 18275 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 18276 return -EINVAL; 18277 } 18278 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, 18279 env->prog); 18280 if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 18281 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 18282 return -EINVAL; 18283 } else if (cnt) { 18284 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); 18285 if (!new_prog) 18286 return -ENOMEM; 18287 18288 env->prog = new_prog; 18289 delta += cnt - 1; 18290 } 18291 } 18292 18293 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 18294 return 0; 18295 18296 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta; 18297 18298 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 18299 bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access; 18300 u8 mode; 18301 18302 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 18303 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 18304 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 18305 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 18306 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_B) || 18307 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_H) || 18308 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_W)) { 18309 type = BPF_READ; 18310 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 18311 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 18312 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 18313 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 18314 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 18315 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 18316 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 18317 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { 18318 type = BPF_WRITE; 18319 } else { 18320 continue; 18321 } 18322 18323 if (type == BPF_WRITE && 18324 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_spill) { 18325 struct bpf_insn patch[] = { 18326 *insn, 18327 BPF_ST_NOSPEC(), 18328 }; 18329 18330 cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch); 18331 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt); 18332 if (!new_prog) 18333 return -ENOMEM; 18334 18335 delta += cnt - 1; 18336 env->prog = new_prog; 18337 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18338 continue; 18339 } 18340 18341 switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) { 18342 case PTR_TO_CTX: 18343 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access) 18344 continue; 18345 convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access; 18346 break; 18347 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 18348 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 18349 convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access; 18350 break; 18351 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 18352 convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 18353 break; 18354 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 18355 convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 18356 break; 18357 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 18358 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 18359 /* PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC always has a valid lifetime, unlike 18360 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and an active ref_obj_id, but the same cannot 18361 * be said once it is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, hence we must handle 18362 * any faults for loads into such types. BPF_WRITE is disallowed 18363 * for this case. 18364 */ 18365 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 18366 if (type == BPF_READ) { 18367 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM) 18368 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | 18369 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); 18370 else 18371 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEMSX | 18372 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); 18373 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; 18374 } 18375 continue; 18376 default: 18377 continue; 18378 } 18379 18380 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size; 18381 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn); 18382 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 18383 18384 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field, 18385 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific 18386 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful, 18387 * we will apply proper mask to the result. 18388 */ 18389 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size; 18390 size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size); 18391 off = insn->off; 18392 if (is_narrower_load) { 18393 u8 size_code; 18394 18395 if (type == BPF_WRITE) { 18396 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n"); 18397 return -EINVAL; 18398 } 18399 18400 size_code = BPF_H; 18401 if (ctx_field_size == 4) 18402 size_code = BPF_W; 18403 else if (ctx_field_size == 8) 18404 size_code = BPF_DW; 18405 18406 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1); 18407 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code; 18408 } 18409 18410 target_size = 0; 18411 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, 18412 &target_size); 18413 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) || 18414 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { 18415 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 18416 return -EINVAL; 18417 } 18418 18419 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { 18420 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset( 18421 off, size, size_default) * 8; 18422 if (shift && cnt + 1 >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 18423 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx load misconfigured\n"); 18424 return -EINVAL; 18425 } 18426 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) { 18427 if (shift) 18428 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH, 18429 insn->dst_reg, 18430 shift); 18431 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 18432 (1 << size * 8) - 1); 18433 } else { 18434 if (shift) 18435 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, 18436 insn->dst_reg, 18437 shift); 18438 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 18439 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1); 18440 } 18441 } 18442 if (mode == BPF_MEMSX) 18443 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X, 18444 insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg, 18445 size * 8, 0); 18446 18447 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 18448 if (!new_prog) 18449 return -ENOMEM; 18450 18451 delta += cnt - 1; 18452 18453 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */ 18454 env->prog = new_prog; 18455 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18456 } 18457 18458 return 0; 18459 } 18460 18461 static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18462 { 18463 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp; 18464 int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog; 18465 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 18466 struct bpf_insn *insn; 18467 void *old_bpf_func; 18468 int err, num_exentries; 18469 18470 if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1) 18471 return 0; 18472 18473 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 18474 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 18475 continue; 18476 18477 /* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but 18478 * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is 18479 * propagated in any case. 18480 */ 18481 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 18482 if (subprog < 0) { 18483 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 18484 i + insn->imm + 1); 18485 return -EFAULT; 18486 } 18487 /* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of 18488 * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs 18489 */ 18490 insn->off = subprog; 18491 /* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback 18492 * to interpreter will be needed 18493 */ 18494 env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; 18495 /* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */ 18496 insn->imm = 1; 18497 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) 18498 /* jit (e.g. x86_64) may emit fewer instructions 18499 * if it learns a u32 imm is the same as a u64 imm. 18500 * Force a non zero here. 18501 */ 18502 insn[1].imm = 1; 18503 } 18504 18505 err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog); 18506 if (err) 18507 goto out_undo_insn; 18508 18509 err = -ENOMEM; 18510 func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL); 18511 if (!func) 18512 goto out_undo_insn; 18513 18514 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18515 subprog_start = subprog_end; 18516 subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start; 18517 18518 len = subprog_end - subprog_start; 18519 /* bpf_prog_run() doesn't call subprogs directly, 18520 * hence main prog stats include the runtime of subprogs. 18521 * subprogs don't have IDs and not reachable via prog_get_next_id 18522 * func[i]->stats will never be accessed and stays NULL 18523 */ 18524 func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER); 18525 if (!func[i]) 18526 goto out_free; 18527 memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start], 18528 len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn)); 18529 func[i]->type = prog->type; 18530 func[i]->len = len; 18531 if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i])) 18532 goto out_free; 18533 func[i]->is_func = 1; 18534 func[i]->aux->func_idx = i; 18535 /* Below members will be freed only at prog->aux */ 18536 func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf; 18537 func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info; 18538 func[i]->aux->func_info_cnt = prog->aux->func_info_cnt; 18539 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 18540 func[i]->aux->size_poke_tab = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 18541 18542 for (j = 0; j < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) { 18543 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke; 18544 18545 poke = &prog->aux->poke_tab[j]; 18546 if (poke->insn_idx < subprog_end && 18547 poke->insn_idx >= subprog_start) 18548 poke->aux = func[i]->aux; 18549 } 18550 18551 func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F'; 18552 func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 18553 func[i]->jit_requested = 1; 18554 func[i]->blinding_requested = prog->blinding_requested; 18555 func[i]->aux->kfunc_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 18556 func[i]->aux->kfunc_btf_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 18557 func[i]->aux->linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 18558 func[i]->aux->nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 18559 func[i]->aux->jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo; 18560 func[i]->aux->linfo_idx = env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx; 18561 num_exentries = 0; 18562 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 18563 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 18564 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 18565 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM || 18566 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX)) 18567 num_exentries++; 18568 } 18569 func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries; 18570 func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable; 18571 func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 18572 if (!func[i]->jited) { 18573 err = -ENOTSUPP; 18574 goto out_free; 18575 } 18576 cond_resched(); 18577 } 18578 18579 /* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed 18580 * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and 18581 * run last pass of JIT 18582 */ 18583 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18584 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 18585 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 18586 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 18587 subprog = insn->off; 18588 insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func; 18589 insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32; 18590 continue; 18591 } 18592 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 18593 continue; 18594 subprog = insn->off; 18595 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(func[subprog]->bpf_func); 18596 } 18597 18598 /* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses 18599 * of the JITed images for each function in the program 18600 * 18601 * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field 18602 * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start 18603 * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base 18604 * 18605 * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee 18606 * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of 18607 * the call instruction, as an index for this list 18608 */ 18609 func[i]->aux->func = func; 18610 func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 18611 } 18612 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18613 old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func; 18614 tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 18615 if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) { 18616 verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 18617 err = -ENOTSUPP; 18618 goto out_free; 18619 } 18620 cond_resched(); 18621 } 18622 18623 /* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and 18624 * populate kallsysm. Begin at the first subprogram, since 18625 * bpf_prog_load will add the kallsyms for the main program. 18626 */ 18627 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18628 bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]); 18629 bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]); 18630 } 18631 18632 /* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main 18633 * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can 18634 * later look the same as if they were interpreted only. 18635 */ 18636 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 18637 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 18638 insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 18639 insn[1].imm = insn->off; 18640 insn->off = 0; 18641 continue; 18642 } 18643 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 18644 continue; 18645 insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 18646 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1); 18647 insn->imm = subprog; 18648 } 18649 18650 prog->jited = 1; 18651 prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func; 18652 prog->jited_len = func[0]->jited_len; 18653 prog->aux->extable = func[0]->aux->extable; 18654 prog->aux->num_exentries = func[0]->aux->num_exentries; 18655 prog->aux->func = func; 18656 prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 18657 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 18658 return 0; 18659 out_free: 18660 /* We failed JIT'ing, so at this point we need to unregister poke 18661 * descriptors from subprogs, so that kernel is not attempting to 18662 * patch it anymore as we're freeing the subprog JIT memory. 18663 */ 18664 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 18665 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 18666 map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, prog->aux); 18667 } 18668 /* At this point we're guaranteed that poke descriptors are not 18669 * live anymore. We can just unlink its descriptor table as it's 18670 * released with the main prog. 18671 */ 18672 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18673 if (!func[i]) 18674 continue; 18675 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = NULL; 18676 bpf_jit_free(func[i]); 18677 } 18678 kfree(func); 18679 out_undo_insn: 18680 /* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */ 18681 prog->jit_requested = 0; 18682 prog->blinding_requested = 0; 18683 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 18684 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 18685 continue; 18686 insn->off = 0; 18687 insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 18688 } 18689 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 18690 return err; 18691 } 18692 18693 static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18694 { 18695 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 18696 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 18697 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 18698 bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog); 18699 int i, depth; 18700 #endif 18701 int err = 0; 18702 18703 if (env->prog->jit_requested && 18704 !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 18705 err = jit_subprogs(env); 18706 if (err == 0) 18707 return 0; 18708 if (err == -EFAULT) 18709 return err; 18710 } 18711 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 18712 if (has_kfunc_call) { 18713 verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 18714 return -EINVAL; 18715 } 18716 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) { 18717 /* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls 18718 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 18719 */ 18720 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 18721 return -EINVAL; 18722 } 18723 for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 18724 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 18725 /* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls 18726 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 18727 */ 18728 verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 18729 return -EINVAL; 18730 } 18731 18732 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 18733 continue; 18734 depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i); 18735 if (depth < 0) 18736 return depth; 18737 bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth); 18738 } 18739 err = 0; 18740 #endif 18741 return err; 18742 } 18743 18744 /* replace a generic kfunc with a specialized version if necessary */ 18745 static void specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18746 u32 func_id, u16 offset, unsigned long *addr) 18747 { 18748 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 18749 bool seen_direct_write; 18750 void *xdp_kfunc; 18751 bool is_rdonly; 18752 18753 if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(func_id)) { 18754 xdp_kfunc = bpf_dev_bound_resolve_kfunc(prog, func_id); 18755 if (xdp_kfunc) { 18756 *addr = (unsigned long)xdp_kfunc; 18757 return; 18758 } 18759 /* fallback to default kfunc when not supported by netdev */ 18760 } 18761 18762 if (offset) 18763 return; 18764 18765 if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) { 18766 seen_direct_write = env->seen_direct_write; 18767 is_rdonly = !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE); 18768 18769 if (is_rdonly) 18770 *addr = (unsigned long)bpf_dynptr_from_skb_rdonly; 18771 18772 /* restore env->seen_direct_write to its original value, since 18773 * may_access_direct_pkt_data mutates it 18774 */ 18775 env->seen_direct_write = seen_direct_write; 18776 } 18777 } 18778 18779 static void __fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux, 18780 u16 struct_meta_reg, 18781 u16 node_offset_reg, 18782 struct bpf_insn *insn, 18783 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, 18784 int *cnt) 18785 { 18786 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta; 18787 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(struct_meta_reg, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 18788 18789 insn_buf[0] = addr[0]; 18790 insn_buf[1] = addr[1]; 18791 insn_buf[2] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(node_offset_reg, insn_aux->insert_off); 18792 insn_buf[3] = *insn; 18793 *cnt = 4; 18794 } 18795 18796 static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 18797 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, int insn_idx, int *cnt) 18798 { 18799 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 18800 18801 if (!insn->imm) { 18802 verbose(env, "invalid kernel function call not eliminated in verifier pass\n"); 18803 return -EINVAL; 18804 } 18805 18806 *cnt = 0; 18807 18808 /* insn->imm has the btf func_id. Replace it with an offset relative to 18809 * __bpf_call_base, unless the JIT needs to call functions that are 18810 * further than 32 bits away (bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()). 18811 */ 18812 desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm, insn->off); 18813 if (!desc) { 18814 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u\n", 18815 insn->imm); 18816 return -EFAULT; 18817 } 18818 18819 if (!bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()) 18820 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(desc->addr); 18821 if (insn->off) 18822 return 0; 18823 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) { 18824 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 18825 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 18826 u64 obj_new_size = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].obj_new_size; 18827 18828 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, obj_new_size); 18829 insn_buf[1] = addr[0]; 18830 insn_buf[2] = addr[1]; 18831 insn_buf[3] = *insn; 18832 *cnt = 4; 18833 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl] || 18834 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) { 18835 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 18836 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 18837 18838 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl] && 18839 !kptr_struct_meta) { 18840 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d\n", 18841 insn_idx); 18842 return -EFAULT; 18843 } 18844 18845 insn_buf[0] = addr[0]; 18846 insn_buf[1] = addr[1]; 18847 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 18848 *cnt = 3; 18849 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] || 18850 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 18851 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 18852 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 18853 int struct_meta_reg = BPF_REG_3; 18854 int node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_4; 18855 18856 /* rbtree_add has extra 'less' arg, so args-to-fixup are in diff regs */ 18857 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 18858 struct_meta_reg = BPF_REG_4; 18859 node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_5; 18860 } 18861 18862 if (!kptr_struct_meta) { 18863 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d\n", 18864 insn_idx); 18865 return -EFAULT; 18866 } 18867 18868 __fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(&env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx], struct_meta_reg, 18869 node_offset_reg, insn, insn_buf, cnt); 18870 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx] || 18871 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 18872 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 18873 *cnt = 1; 18874 } 18875 return 0; 18876 } 18877 18878 /* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass. 18879 * These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations. 18880 */ 18881 static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18882 { 18883 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 18884 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = prog->expected_attach_type; 18885 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 18886 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 18887 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn; 18888 const int insn_cnt = prog->len; 18889 const struct bpf_map_ops *ops; 18890 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 18891 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16]; 18892 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 18893 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 18894 int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0; 18895 18896 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 18897 /* Make divide-by-zero exceptions impossible. */ 18898 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 18899 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || 18900 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 18901 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { 18902 bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64; 18903 bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV; 18904 struct bpf_insn *patchlet; 18905 struct bpf_insn chk_and_div[] = { 18906 /* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */ 18907 BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 18908 BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 18909 0, 2, 0), 18910 BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), 18911 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), 18912 *insn, 18913 }; 18914 struct bpf_insn chk_and_mod[] = { 18915 /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */ 18916 BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 18917 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 18918 0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0), 18919 *insn, 18920 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), 18921 BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), 18922 }; 18923 18924 patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_div : chk_and_mod; 18925 cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_div) : 18926 ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_mod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0); 18927 18928 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt); 18929 if (!new_prog) 18930 return -ENOMEM; 18931 18932 delta += cnt - 1; 18933 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18934 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18935 continue; 18936 } 18937 18938 /* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */ 18939 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD && 18940 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS || 18941 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { 18942 cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf); 18943 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 18944 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 18945 return -EINVAL; 18946 } 18947 18948 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 18949 if (!new_prog) 18950 return -ENOMEM; 18951 18952 delta += cnt - 1; 18953 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18954 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18955 continue; 18956 } 18957 18958 /* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */ 18959 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) || 18960 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) { 18961 const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X; 18962 const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X; 18963 struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0]; 18964 bool issrc, isneg, isimm; 18965 u32 off_reg; 18966 18967 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 18968 if (!aux->alu_state || 18969 aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER) 18970 continue; 18971 18972 isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE; 18973 issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) == 18974 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC; 18975 isimm = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE; 18976 18977 off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg; 18978 if (isimm) { 18979 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 18980 } else { 18981 if (isneg) 18982 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 18983 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 18984 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 18985 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 18986 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 18987 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63); 18988 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 18989 } 18990 if (!issrc) 18991 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg); 18992 insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX; 18993 if (isneg) 18994 insn->code = insn->code == code_add ? 18995 code_sub : code_add; 18996 *patch++ = *insn; 18997 if (issrc && isneg && !isimm) 18998 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 18999 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 19000 19001 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 19002 if (!new_prog) 19003 return -ENOMEM; 19004 19005 delta += cnt - 1; 19006 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19007 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19008 continue; 19009 } 19010 19011 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) 19012 continue; 19013 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 19014 continue; 19015 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 19016 ret = fixup_kfunc_call(env, insn, insn_buf, i + delta, &cnt); 19017 if (ret) 19018 return ret; 19019 if (cnt == 0) 19020 continue; 19021 19022 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 19023 if (!new_prog) 19024 return -ENOMEM; 19025 19026 delta += cnt - 1; 19027 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19028 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19029 continue; 19030 } 19031 19032 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm) 19033 prog->dst_needed = 1; 19034 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32) 19035 bpf_user_rnd_init_once(); 19036 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return) 19037 prog->kprobe_override = 1; 19038 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 19039 /* If we tail call into other programs, we 19040 * cannot make any assumptions since they can 19041 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in 19042 * the program array. 19043 */ 19044 prog->cb_access = 1; 19045 if (!allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) 19046 prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK; 19047 prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF; 19048 19049 /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid 19050 * conditional branch in the interpreter for every normal 19051 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler 19052 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet 19053 */ 19054 insn->imm = 0; 19055 insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL; 19056 19057 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 19058 if (env->bpf_capable && !prog->blinding_requested && 19059 prog->jit_requested && 19060 !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 19061 !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) && 19062 !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) { 19063 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = { 19064 .reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL, 19065 .tail_call.map = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state), 19066 .tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux), 19067 .insn_idx = i + delta, 19068 }; 19069 19070 ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(prog, &desc); 19071 if (ret < 0) { 19072 verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n"); 19073 return ret; 19074 } 19075 19076 insn->imm = ret + 1; 19077 continue; 19078 } 19079 19080 if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) 19081 continue; 19082 19083 /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call 19084 * emit two extra insns: 19085 * if (index >= max_entries) goto out; 19086 * index &= array->index_mask; 19087 * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation 19088 */ 19089 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) { 19090 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 19091 return -EINVAL; 19092 } 19093 19094 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 19095 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, 19096 map_ptr->max_entries, 2); 19097 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, 19098 container_of(map_ptr, 19099 struct bpf_array, 19100 map)->index_mask); 19101 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 19102 cnt = 3; 19103 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 19104 if (!new_prog) 19105 return -ENOMEM; 19106 19107 delta += cnt - 1; 19108 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19109 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19110 continue; 19111 } 19112 19113 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { 19114 /* The verifier will process callback_fn as many times as necessary 19115 * with different maps and the register states prepared by 19116 * set_timer_callback_state will be accurate. 19117 * 19118 * The following use case is valid: 19119 * map1 is shared by prog1, prog2, prog3. 19120 * prog1 calls bpf_timer_init for some map1 elements 19121 * prog2 calls bpf_timer_set_callback for some map1 elements. 19122 * Those that were not bpf_timer_init-ed will return -EINVAL. 19123 * prog3 calls bpf_timer_start for some map1 elements. 19124 * Those that were not both bpf_timer_init-ed and 19125 * bpf_timer_set_callback-ed will return -EINVAL. 19126 */ 19127 struct bpf_insn ld_addrs[2] = { 19128 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_3, (long)prog->aux), 19129 }; 19130 19131 insn_buf[0] = ld_addrs[0]; 19132 insn_buf[1] = ld_addrs[1]; 19133 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 19134 cnt = 3; 19135 19136 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 19137 if (!new_prog) 19138 return -ENOMEM; 19139 19140 delta += cnt - 1; 19141 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19142 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19143 goto patch_call_imm; 19144 } 19145 19146 if (is_storage_get_function(insn->imm)) { 19147 if (!env->prog->aux->sleepable || 19148 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].storage_get_func_atomic) 19149 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_ATOMIC); 19150 else 19151 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_KERNEL); 19152 insn_buf[1] = *insn; 19153 cnt = 2; 19154 19155 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 19156 if (!new_prog) 19157 return -ENOMEM; 19158 19159 delta += cnt - 1; 19160 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19161 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19162 goto patch_call_imm; 19163 } 19164 19165 /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup 19166 * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit 19167 * only. 19168 */ 19169 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 19170 (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem || 19171 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 19172 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 19173 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 19174 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem || 19175 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem || 19176 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map || 19177 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 19178 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem)) { 19179 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 19180 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) 19181 goto patch_call_imm; 19182 19183 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 19184 ops = map_ptr->ops; 19185 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 19186 ops->map_gen_lookup) { 19187 cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf); 19188 if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP) 19189 goto patch_map_ops_generic; 19190 if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 19191 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 19192 return -EINVAL; 19193 } 19194 19195 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, 19196 insn_buf, cnt); 19197 if (!new_prog) 19198 return -ENOMEM; 19199 19200 delta += cnt - 1; 19201 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19202 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19203 continue; 19204 } 19205 19206 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem, 19207 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 19208 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem, 19209 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 19210 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem, 19211 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 19212 u64 flags))NULL)); 19213 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_push_elem, 19214 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value, 19215 u64 flags))NULL)); 19216 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_pop_elem, 19217 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 19218 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_peek_elem, 19219 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 19220 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_redirect, 19221 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, u64 index, u64 flags))NULL)); 19222 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_for_each_callback, 19223 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, 19224 bpf_callback_t callback_fn, 19225 void *callback_ctx, 19226 u64 flags))NULL)); 19227 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem, 19228 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u32 cpu))NULL)); 19229 19230 patch_map_ops_generic: 19231 switch (insn->imm) { 19232 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: 19233 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_elem); 19234 continue; 19235 case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem: 19236 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_update_elem); 19237 continue; 19238 case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem: 19239 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_delete_elem); 19240 continue; 19241 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 19242 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_push_elem); 19243 continue; 19244 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 19245 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_pop_elem); 19246 continue; 19247 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 19248 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_peek_elem); 19249 continue; 19250 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 19251 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_redirect); 19252 continue; 19253 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 19254 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_for_each_callback); 19255 continue; 19256 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 19257 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem); 19258 continue; 19259 } 19260 19261 goto patch_call_imm; 19262 } 19263 19264 /* Implement bpf_jiffies64 inline. */ 19265 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 19266 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) { 19267 struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = { 19268 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 19269 (unsigned long)&jiffies), 19270 }; 19271 19272 insn_buf[0] = ld_jiffies_addr[0]; 19273 insn_buf[1] = ld_jiffies_addr[1]; 19274 insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 19275 BPF_REG_0, 0); 19276 cnt = 3; 19277 19278 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 19279 cnt); 19280 if (!new_prog) 19281 return -ENOMEM; 19282 19283 delta += cnt - 1; 19284 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19285 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19286 continue; 19287 } 19288 19289 /* Implement bpf_get_func_arg inline. */ 19290 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 19291 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg) { 19292 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 19293 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 19294 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, 6); 19295 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_2, 3); 19296 insn_buf[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1); 19297 insn_buf[4] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0); 19298 insn_buf[5] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 19299 insn_buf[6] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 19300 insn_buf[7] = BPF_JMP_A(1); 19301 insn_buf[8] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EINVAL); 19302 cnt = 9; 19303 19304 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 19305 if (!new_prog) 19306 return -ENOMEM; 19307 19308 delta += cnt - 1; 19309 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19310 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19311 continue; 19312 } 19313 19314 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ret inline. */ 19315 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 19316 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ret) { 19317 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT || 19318 eatype == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 19319 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 19320 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 19321 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_0, 3); 19322 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 19323 insn_buf[3] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 19324 insn_buf[4] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, 0); 19325 insn_buf[5] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 19326 cnt = 6; 19327 } else { 19328 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EOPNOTSUPP); 19329 cnt = 1; 19330 } 19331 19332 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 19333 if (!new_prog) 19334 return -ENOMEM; 19335 19336 delta += cnt - 1; 19337 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19338 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19339 continue; 19340 } 19341 19342 /* Implement get_func_arg_cnt inline. */ 19343 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 19344 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg_cnt) { 19345 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 19346 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 19347 19348 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 19349 if (!new_prog) 19350 return -ENOMEM; 19351 19352 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19353 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19354 continue; 19355 } 19356 19357 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ip inline. */ 19358 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 19359 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 19360 /* Load IP address from ctx - 16 */ 19361 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -16); 19362 19363 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 19364 if (!new_prog) 19365 return -ENOMEM; 19366 19367 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 19368 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19369 continue; 19370 } 19371 19372 patch_call_imm: 19373 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog); 19374 /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed 19375 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions 19376 */ 19377 if (!fn->func) { 19378 verbose(env, 19379 "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 19380 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 19381 return -EFAULT; 19382 } 19383 insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base; 19384 } 19385 19386 /* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */ 19387 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 19388 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 19389 if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track || 19390 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack || 19391 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) { 19392 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 19393 return -EINVAL; 19394 } 19395 19396 ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux); 19397 if (ret < 0) { 19398 verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n"); 19399 return ret; 19400 } 19401 } 19402 19403 sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm_off(env->prog); 19404 19405 return 0; 19406 } 19407 19408 static struct bpf_prog *inline_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 19409 int position, 19410 s32 stack_base, 19411 u32 callback_subprogno, 19412 u32 *cnt) 19413 { 19414 s32 r6_offset = stack_base + 0 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 19415 s32 r7_offset = stack_base + 1 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 19416 s32 r8_offset = stack_base + 2 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 19417 int reg_loop_max = BPF_REG_6; 19418 int reg_loop_cnt = BPF_REG_7; 19419 int reg_loop_ctx = BPF_REG_8; 19420 19421 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 19422 u32 callback_start; 19423 u32 call_insn_offset; 19424 s32 callback_offset; 19425 19426 /* This represents an inlined version of bpf_iter.c:bpf_loop, 19427 * be careful to modify this code in sync. 19428 */ 19429 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[] = { 19430 /* Return error and jump to the end of the patch if 19431 * expected number of iterations is too big. 19432 */ 19433 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_1, BPF_MAX_LOOPS, 2), 19434 BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -E2BIG), 19435 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 16), 19436 /* spill R6, R7, R8 to use these as loop vars */ 19437 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, r6_offset), 19438 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, r7_offset), 19439 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_8, r8_offset), 19440 /* initialize loop vars */ 19441 BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_max, BPF_REG_1), 19442 BPF_MOV32_IMM(reg_loop_cnt, 0), 19443 BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_ctx, BPF_REG_3), 19444 /* loop header, 19445 * if reg_loop_cnt >= reg_loop_max skip the loop body 19446 */ 19447 BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, reg_loop_cnt, reg_loop_max, 5), 19448 /* callback call, 19449 * correct callback offset would be set after patching 19450 */ 19451 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, reg_loop_cnt), 19452 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, reg_loop_ctx), 19453 BPF_CALL_REL(0), 19454 /* increment loop counter */ 19455 BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, reg_loop_cnt, 1), 19456 /* jump to loop header if callback returned 0 */ 19457 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, -6), 19458 /* return value of bpf_loop, 19459 * set R0 to the number of iterations 19460 */ 19461 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, reg_loop_cnt), 19462 /* restore original values of R6, R7, R8 */ 19463 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10, r6_offset), 19464 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_10, r7_offset), 19465 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_10, r8_offset), 19466 }; 19467 19468 *cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf); 19469 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, position, insn_buf, *cnt); 19470 if (!new_prog) 19471 return new_prog; 19472 19473 /* callback start is known only after patching */ 19474 callback_start = env->subprog_info[callback_subprogno].start; 19475 /* Note: insn_buf[12] is an offset of BPF_CALL_REL instruction */ 19476 call_insn_offset = position + 12; 19477 callback_offset = callback_start - call_insn_offset - 1; 19478 new_prog->insnsi[call_insn_offset].imm = callback_offset; 19479 19480 return new_prog; 19481 } 19482 19483 static bool is_bpf_loop_call(struct bpf_insn *insn) 19484 { 19485 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 19486 insn->src_reg == 0 && 19487 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_loop; 19488 } 19489 19490 /* For all sub-programs in the program (including main) check 19491 * insn_aux_data to see if there are bpf_loop calls that require 19492 * inlining. If such calls are found the calls are replaced with a 19493 * sequence of instructions produced by `inline_bpf_loop` function and 19494 * subprog stack_depth is increased by the size of 3 registers. 19495 * This stack space is used to spill values of the R6, R7, R8. These 19496 * registers are used to store the loop bound, counter and context 19497 * variables. 19498 */ 19499 static int optimize_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 19500 { 19501 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info; 19502 int i, cur_subprog = 0, cnt, delta = 0; 19503 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 19504 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 19505 u16 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 19506 u16 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 19507 u16 stack_depth_extra = 0; 19508 19509 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 19510 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *inline_state = 19511 &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].loop_inline_state; 19512 19513 if (is_bpf_loop_call(insn) && inline_state->fit_for_inline) { 19514 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 19515 19516 stack_depth_extra = BPF_REG_SIZE * 3 + stack_depth_roundup; 19517 new_prog = inline_bpf_loop(env, 19518 i + delta, 19519 -(stack_depth + stack_depth_extra), 19520 inline_state->callback_subprogno, 19521 &cnt); 19522 if (!new_prog) 19523 return -ENOMEM; 19524 19525 delta += cnt - 1; 19526 env->prog = new_prog; 19527 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 19528 } 19529 19530 if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) { 19531 subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra; 19532 cur_subprog++; 19533 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 19534 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 19535 stack_depth_extra = 0; 19536 } 19537 } 19538 19539 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 19540 19541 return 0; 19542 } 19543 19544 static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 19545 { 19546 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln; 19547 int i; 19548 19549 sl = env->free_list; 19550 while (sl) { 19551 sln = sl->next; 19552 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 19553 kfree(sl); 19554 sl = sln; 19555 } 19556 env->free_list = NULL; 19557 19558 if (!env->explored_states) 19559 return; 19560 19561 for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) { 19562 sl = env->explored_states[i]; 19563 19564 while (sl) { 19565 sln = sl->next; 19566 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 19567 kfree(sl); 19568 sl = sln; 19569 } 19570 env->explored_states[i] = NULL; 19571 } 19572 } 19573 19574 static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 19575 { 19576 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 19577 struct bpf_verifier_state *state; 19578 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 19579 int ret, i; 19580 19581 env->prev_linfo = NULL; 19582 env->pass_cnt++; 19583 19584 state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL); 19585 if (!state) 19586 return -ENOMEM; 19587 state->curframe = 0; 19588 state->speculative = false; 19589 state->branches = 1; 19590 state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL); 19591 if (!state->frame[0]) { 19592 kfree(state); 19593 return -ENOMEM; 19594 } 19595 env->cur_state = state; 19596 init_func_state(env, state->frame[0], 19597 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 19598 0 /* frameno */, 19599 subprog); 19600 state->first_insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start; 19601 state->last_insn_idx = -1; 19602 19603 regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs; 19604 if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 19605 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog, regs); 19606 if (ret) 19607 goto out; 19608 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) { 19609 if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_CTX) 19610 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 19611 else if (regs[i].type == SCALAR_VALUE) 19612 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 19613 else if (base_type(regs[i].type) == PTR_TO_MEM) { 19614 const u32 mem_size = regs[i].mem_size; 19615 19616 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 19617 regs[i].mem_size = mem_size; 19618 regs[i].id = ++env->id_gen; 19619 } 19620 } 19621 } else { 19622 /* 1st arg to a function */ 19623 regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX; 19624 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1); 19625 ret = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, regs); 19626 if (ret == -EFAULT) 19627 /* unlikely verifier bug. abort. 19628 * ret == 0 and ret < 0 are sadly acceptable for 19629 * main() function due to backward compatibility. 19630 * Like socket filter program may be written as: 19631 * int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) 19632 * and never dereference that ctx in the program. 19633 * 'struct pt_regs' is a type mismatch for socket 19634 * filter that should be using 'struct __sk_buff'. 19635 */ 19636 goto out; 19637 } 19638 19639 ret = do_check(env); 19640 out: 19641 /* check for NULL is necessary, since cur_state can be freed inside 19642 * do_check() under memory pressure. 19643 */ 19644 if (env->cur_state) { 19645 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 19646 env->cur_state = NULL; 19647 } 19648 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 19649 if (!ret && pop_log) 19650 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0); 19651 free_states(env); 19652 return ret; 19653 } 19654 19655 /* Verify all global functions in a BPF program one by one based on their BTF. 19656 * All global functions must pass verification. Otherwise the whole program is rejected. 19657 * Consider: 19658 * int bar(int); 19659 * int foo(int f) 19660 * { 19661 * return bar(f); 19662 * } 19663 * int bar(int b) 19664 * { 19665 * ... 19666 * } 19667 * foo() will be verified first for R1=any_scalar_value. During verification it 19668 * will be assumed that bar() already verified successfully and call to bar() 19669 * from foo() will be checked for type match only. Later bar() will be verified 19670 * independently to check that it's safe for R1=any_scalar_value. 19671 */ 19672 static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 19673 { 19674 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 19675 int i, ret; 19676 19677 if (!aux->func_info) 19678 return 0; 19679 19680 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 19681 if (aux->func_info_aux[i].linkage != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL) 19682 continue; 19683 env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start; 19684 WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0); 19685 ret = do_check_common(env, i); 19686 if (ret) { 19687 return ret; 19688 } else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 19689 verbose(env, 19690 "Func#%d is safe for any args that match its prototype\n", 19691 i); 19692 } 19693 } 19694 return 0; 19695 } 19696 19697 static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 19698 { 19699 int ret; 19700 19701 env->insn_idx = 0; 19702 ret = do_check_common(env, 0); 19703 if (!ret) 19704 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 19705 return ret; 19706 } 19707 19708 19709 static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 19710 { 19711 int i; 19712 19713 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) { 19714 verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n", 19715 div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000)); 19716 verbose(env, "stack depth "); 19717 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 19718 u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 19719 19720 verbose(env, "%d", depth); 19721 if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt) 19722 verbose(env, "+"); 19723 } 19724 verbose(env, "\n"); 19725 } 19726 verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d " 19727 "total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n", 19728 env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS, 19729 env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states, 19730 env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk); 19731 } 19732 19733 static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 19734 { 19735 const struct btf_type *t, *func_proto; 19736 const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops; 19737 const struct btf_member *member; 19738 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 19739 u32 btf_id, member_idx; 19740 const char *mname; 19741 19742 if (!prog->gpl_compatible) { 19743 verbose(env, "struct ops programs must have a GPL compatible license\n"); 19744 return -EINVAL; 19745 } 19746 19747 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 19748 st_ops = bpf_struct_ops_find(btf_id); 19749 if (!st_ops) { 19750 verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a supported struct\n", 19751 btf_id); 19752 return -ENOTSUPP; 19753 } 19754 19755 t = st_ops->type; 19756 member_idx = prog->expected_attach_type; 19757 if (member_idx >= btf_type_vlen(t)) { 19758 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member idx %u of struct %s\n", 19759 member_idx, st_ops->name); 19760 return -EINVAL; 19761 } 19762 19763 member = &btf_type_member(t)[member_idx]; 19764 mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, member->name_off); 19765 func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf_vmlinux, member->type, 19766 NULL); 19767 if (!func_proto) { 19768 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member %s(@idx %u) of struct %s\n", 19769 mname, member_idx, st_ops->name); 19770 return -EINVAL; 19771 } 19772 19773 if (st_ops->check_member) { 19774 int err = st_ops->check_member(t, member, prog); 19775 19776 if (err) { 19777 verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n", 19778 mname, st_ops->name); 19779 return err; 19780 } 19781 } 19782 19783 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = func_proto; 19784 prog->aux->attach_func_name = mname; 19785 env->ops = st_ops->verifier_ops; 19786 19787 return 0; 19788 } 19789 #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" 19790 19791 static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name) 19792 { 19793 if (within_error_injection_list(addr) || 19794 !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) 19795 return 0; 19796 19797 return -EINVAL; 19798 } 19799 19800 /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on 19801 * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list 19802 */ 19803 BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 19804 /* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context. 19805 * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view. 19806 */ 19807 BTF_ID(func, __filemap_add_folio) 19808 BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page) 19809 BTF_ID(func, should_failslab) 19810 BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 19811 19812 static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id) 19813 { 19814 return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id); 19815 } 19816 19817 int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, 19818 const struct bpf_prog *prog, 19819 const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog, 19820 u32 btf_id, 19821 struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info) 19822 { 19823 bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT; 19824 const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_"; 19825 int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i; 19826 const struct btf_type *t; 19827 bool conservative = true; 19828 const char *tname; 19829 struct btf *btf; 19830 long addr = 0; 19831 struct module *mod = NULL; 19832 19833 if (!btf_id) { 19834 bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n"); 19835 return -EINVAL; 19836 } 19837 btf = tgt_prog ? tgt_prog->aux->btf : prog->aux->attach_btf; 19838 if (!btf) { 19839 bpf_log(log, 19840 "FENTRY/FEXIT program can only be attached to another program annotated with BTF\n"); 19841 return -EINVAL; 19842 } 19843 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id); 19844 if (!t) { 19845 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id); 19846 return -EINVAL; 19847 } 19848 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 19849 if (!tname) { 19850 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id); 19851 return -EINVAL; 19852 } 19853 if (tgt_prog) { 19854 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = tgt_prog->aux; 19855 19856 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) && 19857 !bpf_prog_dev_bound_match(prog, tgt_prog)) { 19858 bpf_log(log, "Target program bound device mismatch"); 19859 return -EINVAL; 19860 } 19861 19862 for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++) 19863 if (aux->func_info[i].type_id == btf_id) { 19864 subprog = i; 19865 break; 19866 } 19867 if (subprog == -1) { 19868 bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname); 19869 return -EINVAL; 19870 } 19871 conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable; 19872 if (prog_extension) { 19873 if (conservative) { 19874 bpf_log(log, 19875 "Cannot replace static functions\n"); 19876 return -EINVAL; 19877 } 19878 if (!prog->jit_requested) { 19879 bpf_log(log, 19880 "Extension programs should be JITed\n"); 19881 return -EINVAL; 19882 } 19883 } 19884 if (!tgt_prog->jited) { 19885 bpf_log(log, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n"); 19886 return -EINVAL; 19887 } 19888 if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) { 19889 /* Cannot fentry/fexit another fentry/fexit program. 19890 * Cannot attach program extension to another extension. 19891 * It's ok to attach fentry/fexit to extension program. 19892 */ 19893 bpf_log(log, "Cannot recursively attach\n"); 19894 return -EINVAL; 19895 } 19896 if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 19897 prog_extension && 19898 (tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FENTRY || 19899 tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT)) { 19900 /* Program extensions can extend all program types 19901 * except fentry/fexit. The reason is the following. 19902 * The fentry/fexit programs are used for performance 19903 * analysis, stats and can be attached to any program 19904 * type except themselves. When extension program is 19905 * replacing XDP function it is necessary to allow 19906 * performance analysis of all functions. Both original 19907 * XDP program and its program extension. Hence 19908 * attaching fentry/fexit to BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is 19909 * allowed. If extending of fentry/fexit was allowed it 19910 * would be possible to create long call chain 19911 * fentry->extension->fentry->extension beyond 19912 * reasonable stack size. Hence extending fentry is not 19913 * allowed. 19914 */ 19915 bpf_log(log, "Cannot extend fentry/fexit\n"); 19916 return -EINVAL; 19917 } 19918 } else { 19919 if (prog_extension) { 19920 bpf_log(log, "Cannot replace kernel functions\n"); 19921 return -EINVAL; 19922 } 19923 } 19924 19925 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 19926 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 19927 if (tgt_prog) { 19928 bpf_log(log, 19929 "Only FENTRY/FEXIT progs are attachable to another BPF prog\n"); 19930 return -EINVAL; 19931 } 19932 if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) { 19933 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n", 19934 btf_id); 19935 return -EINVAL; 19936 } 19937 if (strncmp(prefix, tname, sizeof(prefix) - 1)) { 19938 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n", 19939 btf_id, tname); 19940 return -EINVAL; 19941 } 19942 tname += sizeof(prefix) - 1; 19943 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 19944 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 19945 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 19946 return -EINVAL; 19947 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 19948 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 19949 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 19950 return -EINVAL; 19951 19952 break; 19953 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 19954 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 19955 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 19956 btf_id); 19957 return -EINVAL; 19958 } 19959 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 19960 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 19961 return -EINVAL; 19962 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 19963 if (ret) 19964 return ret; 19965 break; 19966 default: 19967 if (!prog_extension) 19968 return -EINVAL; 19969 fallthrough; 19970 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 19971 case BPF_LSM_MAC: 19972 case BPF_LSM_CGROUP: 19973 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 19974 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 19975 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 19976 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 19977 btf_id); 19978 return -EINVAL; 19979 } 19980 if (prog_extension && 19981 btf_check_type_match(log, prog, btf, t)) 19982 return -EINVAL; 19983 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 19984 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 19985 return -EINVAL; 19986 19987 if ((prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type || prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type) && 19988 (!tgt_prog || prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type != tgt_prog->type || 19989 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type != tgt_prog->expected_attach_type)) 19990 return -EINVAL; 19991 19992 if (tgt_prog && conservative) 19993 t = NULL; 19994 19995 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 19996 if (ret < 0) 19997 return ret; 19998 19999 if (tgt_prog) { 20000 if (subprog == 0) 20001 addr = (long) tgt_prog->bpf_func; 20002 else 20003 addr = (long) tgt_prog->aux->func[subprog]->bpf_func; 20004 } else { 20005 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 20006 mod = btf_try_get_module(btf); 20007 if (mod) 20008 addr = find_kallsyms_symbol_value(mod, tname); 20009 else 20010 addr = 0; 20011 } else { 20012 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname); 20013 } 20014 if (!addr) { 20015 module_put(mod); 20016 bpf_log(log, 20017 "The address of function %s cannot be found\n", 20018 tname); 20019 return -ENOENT; 20020 } 20021 } 20022 20023 if (prog->aux->sleepable) { 20024 ret = -EINVAL; 20025 switch (prog->type) { 20026 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 20027 20028 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are 20029 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist. 20030 */ 20031 if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) && 20032 within_error_injection_list(addr)) 20033 ret = 0; 20034 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can also be sleepable if they are 20035 * in the fmodret id set with the KF_SLEEPABLE flag. 20036 */ 20037 else { 20038 u32 *flags = btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id, 20039 prog); 20040 20041 if (flags && (*flags & KF_SLEEPABLE)) 20042 ret = 0; 20043 } 20044 break; 20045 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 20046 /* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs. 20047 * Only some of them are sleepable. 20048 */ 20049 if (bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(btf_id)) 20050 ret = 0; 20051 break; 20052 default: 20053 break; 20054 } 20055 if (ret) { 20056 module_put(mod); 20057 bpf_log(log, "%s is not sleepable\n", tname); 20058 return ret; 20059 } 20060 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 20061 if (tgt_prog) { 20062 module_put(mod); 20063 bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n"); 20064 return -EINVAL; 20065 } 20066 ret = -EINVAL; 20067 if (btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id, prog) || 20068 !check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname)) 20069 ret = 0; 20070 if (ret) { 20071 module_put(mod); 20072 bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname); 20073 return ret; 20074 } 20075 } 20076 20077 break; 20078 } 20079 tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr; 20080 tgt_info->tgt_name = tname; 20081 tgt_info->tgt_type = t; 20082 tgt_info->tgt_mod = mod; 20083 return 0; 20084 } 20085 20086 BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny) 20087 BTF_ID_UNUSED 20088 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP 20089 BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable) 20090 BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable) 20091 #endif 20092 #if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU 20093 BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict) 20094 #endif 20095 #if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) || defined(CONFIG_TRACE_PREEMPT_TOGGLE) 20096 BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_add) 20097 BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_sub) 20098 #endif 20099 #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU 20100 BTF_ID(func, __rcu_read_lock) 20101 BTF_ID(func, __rcu_read_unlock) 20102 #endif 20103 BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny) 20104 20105 static bool can_be_sleepable(struct bpf_prog *prog) 20106 { 20107 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) { 20108 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 20109 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 20110 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 20111 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 20112 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 20113 return true; 20114 default: 20115 return false; 20116 } 20117 } 20118 return prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM || 20119 prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE /* only for uprobes */ || 20120 prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS; 20121 } 20122 20123 static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 20124 { 20125 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 20126 struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->dst_prog; 20127 struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {}; 20128 u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 20129 struct bpf_trampoline *tr; 20130 int ret; 20131 u64 key; 20132 20133 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL) { 20134 if (prog->aux->sleepable) 20135 /* attach_btf_id checked to be zero already */ 20136 return 0; 20137 verbose(env, "Syscall programs can only be sleepable\n"); 20138 return -EINVAL; 20139 } 20140 20141 if (prog->aux->sleepable && !can_be_sleepable(prog)) { 20142 verbose(env, "Only fentry/fexit/fmod_ret, lsm, iter, uprobe, and struct_ops programs can be sleepable\n"); 20143 return -EINVAL; 20144 } 20145 20146 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) 20147 return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env); 20148 20149 if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 20150 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 20151 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 20152 return 0; 20153 20154 ret = bpf_check_attach_target(&env->log, prog, tgt_prog, btf_id, &tgt_info); 20155 if (ret) 20156 return ret; 20157 20158 if (tgt_prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 20159 /* to make freplace equivalent to their targets, they need to 20160 * inherit env->ops and expected_attach_type for the rest of the 20161 * verification 20162 */ 20163 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type]; 20164 prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 20165 } 20166 20167 /* store info about the attachment target that will be used later */ 20168 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = tgt_info.tgt_type; 20169 prog->aux->attach_func_name = tgt_info.tgt_name; 20170 prog->aux->mod = tgt_info.tgt_mod; 20171 20172 if (tgt_prog) { 20173 prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type = tgt_prog->type; 20174 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 20175 } 20176 20177 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) { 20178 prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true; 20179 return 0; 20180 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) { 20181 if (!bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog)) 20182 return -EINVAL; 20183 return 0; 20184 } 20185 20186 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { 20187 ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog); 20188 if (ret < 0) 20189 return ret; 20190 } else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 20191 btf_id_set_contains(&btf_id_deny, btf_id)) { 20192 return -EINVAL; 20193 } 20194 20195 key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, prog->aux->attach_btf, btf_id); 20196 tr = bpf_trampoline_get(key, &tgt_info); 20197 if (!tr) 20198 return -ENOMEM; 20199 20200 if (tgt_prog && tgt_prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) 20201 tr->flags = BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX; 20202 20203 prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr; 20204 return 0; 20205 } 20206 20207 struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void) 20208 { 20209 if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { 20210 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 20211 if (!btf_vmlinux) 20212 btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux(); 20213 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 20214 } 20215 return btf_vmlinux; 20216 } 20217 20218 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u32 uattr_size) 20219 { 20220 u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns(); 20221 struct bpf_verifier_env *env; 20222 int i, len, ret = -EINVAL, err; 20223 u32 log_true_size; 20224 bool is_priv; 20225 20226 /* no program is valid */ 20227 if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0) 20228 return -EINVAL; 20229 20230 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, 20231 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called 20232 */ 20233 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); 20234 if (!env) 20235 return -ENOMEM; 20236 20237 env->bt.env = env; 20238 20239 len = (*prog)->len; 20240 env->insn_aux_data = 20241 vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data), len)); 20242 ret = -ENOMEM; 20243 if (!env->insn_aux_data) 20244 goto err_free_env; 20245 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 20246 env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i; 20247 env->prog = *prog; 20248 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type]; 20249 env->fd_array = make_bpfptr(attr->fd_array, uattr.is_kernel); 20250 is_priv = bpf_capable(); 20251 20252 bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(); 20253 20254 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ 20255 if (!is_priv) 20256 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 20257 20258 /* user could have requested verbose verifier output 20259 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace 20260 */ 20261 ret = bpf_vlog_init(&env->log, attr->log_level, 20262 (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf, 20263 attr->log_size); 20264 if (ret) 20265 goto err_unlock; 20266 20267 mark_verifier_state_clean(env); 20268 20269 if (IS_ERR(btf_vmlinux)) { 20270 /* Either gcc or pahole or kernel are broken. */ 20271 verbose(env, "in-kernel BTF is malformed\n"); 20272 ret = PTR_ERR(btf_vmlinux); 20273 goto skip_full_check; 20274 } 20275 20276 env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); 20277 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) 20278 env->strict_alignment = true; 20279 if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT) 20280 env->strict_alignment = false; 20281 20282 env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(); 20283 env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack(); 20284 env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(); 20285 env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(); 20286 env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable(); 20287 20288 if (is_priv) 20289 env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ; 20290 20291 env->explored_states = kvcalloc(state_htab_size(env), 20292 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *), 20293 GFP_USER); 20294 ret = -ENOMEM; 20295 if (!env->explored_states) 20296 goto skip_full_check; 20297 20298 ret = add_subprog_and_kfunc(env); 20299 if (ret < 0) 20300 goto skip_full_check; 20301 20302 ret = check_subprogs(env); 20303 if (ret < 0) 20304 goto skip_full_check; 20305 20306 ret = check_btf_info(env, attr, uattr); 20307 if (ret < 0) 20308 goto skip_full_check; 20309 20310 ret = check_attach_btf_id(env); 20311 if (ret) 20312 goto skip_full_check; 20313 20314 ret = resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(env); 20315 if (ret < 0) 20316 goto skip_full_check; 20317 20318 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 20319 ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog); 20320 if (ret) 20321 goto skip_full_check; 20322 } 20323 20324 ret = check_cfg(env); 20325 if (ret < 0) 20326 goto skip_full_check; 20327 20328 ret = do_check_subprogs(env); 20329 ret = ret ?: do_check_main(env); 20330 20331 if (ret == 0 && bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 20332 ret = bpf_prog_offload_finalize(env); 20333 20334 skip_full_check: 20335 kvfree(env->explored_states); 20336 20337 if (ret == 0) 20338 ret = check_max_stack_depth(env); 20339 20340 /* instruction rewrites happen after this point */ 20341 if (ret == 0) 20342 ret = optimize_bpf_loop(env); 20343 20344 if (is_priv) { 20345 if (ret == 0) 20346 opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(env); 20347 if (ret == 0) 20348 ret = opt_remove_dead_code(env); 20349 if (ret == 0) 20350 ret = opt_remove_nops(env); 20351 } else { 20352 if (ret == 0) 20353 sanitize_dead_code(env); 20354 } 20355 20356 if (ret == 0) 20357 /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */ 20358 ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env); 20359 20360 if (ret == 0) 20361 ret = do_misc_fixups(env); 20362 20363 /* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched 20364 * insns could be handled correctly. 20365 */ 20366 if (ret == 0 && !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 20367 ret = opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(env, attr); 20368 env->prog->aux->verifier_zext = bpf_jit_needs_zext() ? !ret 20369 : false; 20370 } 20371 20372 if (ret == 0) 20373 ret = fixup_call_args(env); 20374 20375 env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time; 20376 print_verification_stats(env); 20377 env->prog->aux->verified_insns = env->insn_processed; 20378 20379 /* preserve original error even if log finalization is successful */ 20380 err = bpf_vlog_finalize(&env->log, &log_true_size); 20381 if (err) 20382 ret = err; 20383 20384 if (uattr_size >= offsetofend(union bpf_attr, log_true_size) && 20385 copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, offsetof(union bpf_attr, log_true_size), 20386 &log_true_size, sizeof(log_true_size))) { 20387 ret = -EFAULT; 20388 goto err_release_maps; 20389 } 20390 20391 if (ret) 20392 goto err_release_maps; 20393 20394 if (env->used_map_cnt) { 20395 /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */ 20396 env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt, 20397 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]), 20398 GFP_KERNEL); 20399 20400 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) { 20401 ret = -ENOMEM; 20402 goto err_release_maps; 20403 } 20404 20405 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps, 20406 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt); 20407 env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt; 20408 } 20409 if (env->used_btf_cnt) { 20410 /* if program passed verifier, update used_btfs in bpf_prog_aux */ 20411 env->prog->aux->used_btfs = kmalloc_array(env->used_btf_cnt, 20412 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]), 20413 GFP_KERNEL); 20414 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) { 20415 ret = -ENOMEM; 20416 goto err_release_maps; 20417 } 20418 20419 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_btfs, env->used_btfs, 20420 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]) * env->used_btf_cnt); 20421 env->prog->aux->used_btf_cnt = env->used_btf_cnt; 20422 } 20423 if (env->used_map_cnt || env->used_btf_cnt) { 20424 /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic 20425 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions 20426 */ 20427 convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env); 20428 } 20429 20430 adjust_btf_func(env); 20431 20432 err_release_maps: 20433 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) 20434 /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release 20435 * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them. 20436 */ 20437 release_maps(env); 20438 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) 20439 release_btfs(env); 20440 20441 /* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets 20442 for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning 20443 */ 20444 if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 20445 env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0; 20446 20447 *prog = env->prog; 20448 err_unlock: 20449 if (!is_priv) 20450 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 20451 vfree(env->insn_aux_data); 20452 err_free_env: 20453 kfree(env); 20454 return ret; 20455 } 20456