Searched hist:"97228 ca375c78bfd960767dcd4919c981add306f" (Results 1 – 4 of 4) sorted by relevance
| /openbmc/linux/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ |
| H A D | ptrace-decl.h | diff 97228ca375c78bfd960767dcd4919c981add306f Mon Jun 19 02:36:26 CDT 2023 Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com> powerpc/ptrace: Expose HASHKEYR register to ptrace
The HASHKEYR register contains a secret per-process key to enable unique
hashes per process. In general it should not be exposed to userspace
at all and a regular process has no need to know its key.
However, checkpoint restore in userspace (CRIU) functionality requires
that a process be able to set the HASHKEYR of another process, otherwise
existing hashes on the stack would be invalidated by a new random key.
Exposing HASHKEYR in this way also makes it appear in core dumps, which
is a security concern. Multiple threads may share a key, for example
just after a fork() call, where the kernel cannot know if the child is
going to return back along the parent's stack. If such a thread is
coerced into making a core dump, then the HASHKEYR value will be
readable and able to be used against all other threads sharing that key,
effectively undoing any protection offered by hashst/hashchk.
Therefore we expose HASHKEYR to ptrace when CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is
enabled, providing a choice of increased security or migratable ROP
protected processes. This is similar to how ARM exposes its PAC keys.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230616034846.311705-8-bgray@linux.ibm.com
|
| H A D | ptrace-view.c | diff 97228ca375c78bfd960767dcd4919c981add306f Mon Jun 19 02:36:26 CDT 2023 Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com> powerpc/ptrace: Expose HASHKEYR register to ptrace
The HASHKEYR register contains a secret per-process key to enable unique
hashes per process. In general it should not be exposed to userspace
at all and a regular process has no need to know its key.
However, checkpoint restore in userspace (CRIU) functionality requires
that a process be able to set the HASHKEYR of another process, otherwise
existing hashes on the stack would be invalidated by a new random key.
Exposing HASHKEYR in this way also makes it appear in core dumps, which
is a security concern. Multiple threads may share a key, for example
just after a fork() call, where the kernel cannot know if the child is
going to return back along the parent's stack. If such a thread is
coerced into making a core dump, then the HASHKEYR value will be
readable and able to be used against all other threads sharing that key,
effectively undoing any protection offered by hashst/hashchk.
Therefore we expose HASHKEYR to ptrace when CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is
enabled, providing a choice of increased security or migratable ROP
protected processes. This is similar to how ARM exposes its PAC keys.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230616034846.311705-8-bgray@linux.ibm.com
|
| /openbmc/linux/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/ |
| H A D | elf.h | diff 97228ca375c78bfd960767dcd4919c981add306f Mon Jun 19 02:36:26 CDT 2023 Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com> powerpc/ptrace: Expose HASHKEYR register to ptrace
The HASHKEYR register contains a secret per-process key to enable unique
hashes per process. In general it should not be exposed to userspace
at all and a regular process has no need to know its key.
However, checkpoint restore in userspace (CRIU) functionality requires
that a process be able to set the HASHKEYR of another process, otherwise
existing hashes on the stack would be invalidated by a new random key.
Exposing HASHKEYR in this way also makes it appear in core dumps, which
is a security concern. Multiple threads may share a key, for example
just after a fork() call, where the kernel cannot know if the child is
going to return back along the parent's stack. If such a thread is
coerced into making a core dump, then the HASHKEYR value will be
readable and able to be used against all other threads sharing that key,
effectively undoing any protection offered by hashst/hashchk.
Therefore we expose HASHKEYR to ptrace when CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is
enabled, providing a choice of increased security or migratable ROP
protected processes. This is similar to how ARM exposes its PAC keys.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230616034846.311705-8-bgray@linux.ibm.com
|
| /openbmc/linux/include/uapi/linux/ |
| H A D | elf.h | diff 97228ca375c78bfd960767dcd4919c981add306f Mon Jun 19 02:36:26 CDT 2023 Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com> powerpc/ptrace: Expose HASHKEYR register to ptrace
The HASHKEYR register contains a secret per-process key to enable unique
hashes per process. In general it should not be exposed to userspace
at all and a regular process has no need to know its key.
However, checkpoint restore in userspace (CRIU) functionality requires
that a process be able to set the HASHKEYR of another process, otherwise
existing hashes on the stack would be invalidated by a new random key.
Exposing HASHKEYR in this way also makes it appear in core dumps, which
is a security concern. Multiple threads may share a key, for example
just after a fork() call, where the kernel cannot know if the child is
going to return back along the parent's stack. If such a thread is
coerced into making a core dump, then the HASHKEYR value will be
readable and able to be used against all other threads sharing that key,
effectively undoing any protection offered by hashst/hashchk.
Therefore we expose HASHKEYR to ptrace when CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is
enabled, providing a choice of increased security or migratable ROP
protected processes. This is similar to how ARM exposes its PAC keys.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230616034846.311705-8-bgray@linux.ibm.com
|